CONTENTS OF THIS ISSUE

Early Warning Issues for June 1 Post-Election Analysis: 2010 Pending PSC Issues 1 Sudan Polls 12 Country Analysis: Madagascar 2 PSC Retrospective – Women and Armed Conflict 17 PSC Retrospective – AU PCRD Policy Framework 6 Spotlight on the PSC: Chairperson AU Commission 18 Country Analysis: Guinea-Bissau 7 Important Forthcoming Dates 19 PSC Retrospective – Security Sector Reform 11 No. 11, June 2010

This report is available on the ISS website and can be viewed together with Thematic Reports on the work of the PSC at www.issafrica.org. All documents referred to in this Report can also be found on the ISS website. Peace and Security Council Protocol ‘The PSC shall encourage non-governmental organizations to participate actively in the efforts aimed at pro- moting peace, security and stability in Africa. When required such organizations may be invited to address the Peace and Security Council’ – Article 20 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the PSC of the .

Early Warning Issues country. On 19 April 2010, it was security in Guinea-Bissau. The brief reported that a coup attempt was detention of the Prime Minister, fol- for June foiled. A month later on 20 May lowing an apparent coup attempt 2010, two government soldiers were on 1 April 2010, illustrated the The scheduled Rotating Chair of killed and three civilians wounded fragile state of affairs in the country. the African Union (AU) Peace and as Madagascan security forces sup- Tensions continue to escalate among pressed an attempted mutiny by the key political actors. The potential Security Council (PSC) for the month for crisis escalation in the country of June is Chad. In the absence of a some troops from the National Gendarmes Intervention Force is relatively high and it continues country’s representation at ambassa- to pose a significant challenge, not dorial level, an alternate member will (FIGN). The key parties are still involved in a zero-sum quest for only to Guinea-Bissau, but also to chair the Council for the month. the security and stability of the West power. The crisis escalation potential African region. therefore remains significantly high. Madagascar Guinea-Bissau In March 2009, following the un- Pending PSC Issues constitutional change of government in the country the PSC issued a com- On 29 March 2010, the PSC issued a communiqué, PSC/PR/COMM. Issues pending for the Council muniqué, PSC/PR/Comm.(CLXXXI), include: suspending Madagascar from ‘partici- (CCXXII), in which it cited ‘encour- aging developments in and the pating in the activities of the AU progress made since the holding until the restoration of constitutional of early presidential elections’ in On 16 December 2008, the PSC order.’ On 19 February 2010, the Guinea-Bissau in July 2009. The was briefed by the International PSC considered the Report of the Council acknowledged the efforts of Committee of the Red Cross Chairperson of the Commission, the Guinean authorities in organising (ICRC) on its activities and how PSC/PR/2(CCXVI), and briefings the National Reconciliation Confe- it contributes towards enhancing from key stakeholders engaged in rence as a prelude towards estab- humanitarian assistance to victims the ongoing political crisis in lishing peace in the country. It also of armed conflicts in Africa. With Madagascar. After more than a year acknowledged the Guinean Govern- ment’s efforts to address drug traf- reference to the provisions of of crisis the continuing impasse in im- international humanitarian law plementing the power-sharing deals ficking and confront the specter of enshrined in Article 4 (o and m) concluded under the Maputo Agree- impunity in the country. The spate of political assassinations in 2009 of the AU Constitutive Act and ment and the Act has gravely undermined peace and Article 4 (c) of the PSC Protocol, precipitated a political crisis in the Livingstone Formula ‘Civil Society Organizations may provide technical support to the African Union by undertaking early warning reporting, and situation analysis which feeds information into the decision-making process of the PSC’ – PSC/ PR/(CLX), 5 December 2008, Conclusions of a Retreat of the PSC on a mechanism of interaction between the Council and CSOs.

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1 the Council appealed to coun- com-muniqué, PSC/PR/Comm dismissal by the Prime Minister of tries affected by conflict to facili- (CLXXXI), suspending Madagascar the Minister of Armed Forces, Noel tate access by ICRC to civilians in from ‘participating in the activities Rakotonandrasana, who played key need of humanitarian assistance. of the AU until the restoration role in the March 2009 power grab. The Council issued a com- of constitutional order.’ On 19 April 2010, it was reported muniqué, PSC/PR/Comm.(CLXI), that a coup attempt was foiled. A requesting the Commission, in month later on 20 May 2010, two line with the relevant provisions Crisis Escalation Potential: government soldiers were killed of the Constitutive Act of the and three civilians wounded as AU and the Protocol of the PSC, After more than a year of crisis the Madagascan security forces sup- to take all necessary measures continuing impasse in implementing pressed an attempted mutiny by to enhance the relationship with the power-sharing deals concluded some troops from the National the ICRC. The PSC is yet to issue under the Maputo Agreement and Gendarmes Intervention Force a communiqué recognising these the Addis Ababa Act has precipi- (FIGN). measures. tated a political crisis in the country. The key parties are still involved The effects of the crisis are con- in a zero-sum quest for power. tinuing to be felt at the economic Rajoelina the head of the so-called and social levels as it has led to job COUNTRY ANALYSIS High Authority of the Transition, losses and undermined the tourism has blocked the implementation industry and brought about substan- of the accords and undertaken tial reductions in donor support. unilateral initiatives such as abrogat- In addition, the global economic Madagascar ing the Charter of the Transition crisis has led to the decline in the and rejecting the implementation Previous AU and PSC demand for Madagascar’s export of the Maputo and Addis Ababa products and decreased foreign Communiques and Reports: Agreements. In December 2010, investment. The public has called he cancelled the appointment of for an end to the crisis and on 10 On 19 February 2010, the PSC a consensus prime minister and May 2010, Madagascan religious considered the Report of the Chair- replaced him with a senior military leaders called for the resignation of person of the Commission, PSC/ officer Colonel Camille Vital. He Rajoelina’s unconstitutional govern- PR/2(CCXVI), and briefings from also unilaterally announced the plan ment. The crisis escalation potential key stakeholders engaged in the on- to convene elections. therefore remains significantly high. going political crisis in Madagascar. The Council subsequently issued The latest attempt to resolve the a communiqué, PSC/PR/Comm.1 remaining differences between the Key Issues and Internal (CCXVI), that called on the current four leaders, who include Andry Dynamics: regime, led by Andry Rajoelina, to Rajoelina, Marc Ravalomanana, accept the Maputo Agreement of Didier Ratsiraka and Albert Zafy, Madagascar plunged into the August 2009 and the Addis Ababa was undertaken between 29 and ongoing political crisis following Additional Act of 6 November 30 April 2010, in the Pretoria talks the ousting of the former President 2009. The PSC also decided facilitated by President Jacob Zuma. Marc Ravalomanana through street that should the authorities fail to However, the parties failed to find a demonstrations and the support accept this request by 16 March compromise solution and Rajoelina of the military in March 2009. 2010, targeted sanctions would be once again declared his unilateral Rajoelina’s High Transitional Autho- imposed on the regime including plan to form a transitional govern- rity government initiated various a travel ban, the freezing of funds ment with or without the other measures including criminal charges and diplomatic isolation. When this political movements. against the ousted President leading deadline lapsed the PSC imposed to the latter’s conviction in absentia a series of sanctions through its in July 2009. communiqué, PSC/PR/BR.(CCXX), Frustrated by the continuing crisis, of 17 March 2010, against Rajoelina in early April 2010, the army impa- and 108 of his associates. tiently gave Rajoelina until the end To resolve the crisis, the AU in Simultaneously, the Council en- of the month to produce an accept- collaboration with SADC initiated couraged the AU Commission in able road map to end the crisis. In political dialogue under the tutelage collaboration with SADC to strive a reverse of this initial threat, the of former Mozambican President to promote constitutional order military subsequently withdrew Joaquim Chissano serving as in Madagascar. Earlier in March its involvement in the crisis after Mediator. These efforts led to the 2009, following the unconstitu- meeting Rajoelina upon his return signing of the Maputo Agreements tional change of government in the from the failed Pretoria talks. On 7 in August 2009. When an impasse country the PSC issued a April 2010, the divisions within the emerged due to the disagreements military became public with the

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2 over the establishment of the exe- with or without the other political Pan-African and RECs Dynamics: cutive council and distribution of movements. It is reported that this ministerial posts, the AU facilitated ‘neutral’ government would involve The AU Commission has been further dialogue which led to the representatives of technocrats, actively engaged in a robust signing of the Addis Ababa Act in civil society as well as the armed mediation/peacemaking effort in November 2009. forces. Additionally, the President Madagascar. In addition to tabling of the current National Independent compromise solutions, the AU Electoral Commission announced Tensions persist over the formation Commission also undertook three that the poll for the constitutional of an inclusive transitional govern- mediation visits to Madagascar referendum would be organised on ment, the executive council, the in November 2009 (jointly with 12 August 2010. allocation of senior government UN, SADC and International positions, amnesty for alleged Organization of the Francophone); crimes, as well as the proposed Civil society groups have criticised in January 2010 ( with the Chairman constitutional referendum and elec- this move and the other three of the Commission leading a del- tions. As far as elections are con- political movements involved in the egation); and in February 2010. cerned there are differences over Maputo and Addis Ababa agree- During the last mission from 10 the sequence between presidential ments have threatened to boycott to 14 February 2010 led by the and legislative elections. Under the the plan. The situation remains AU Commissioner for Peace and current Constitution, Rajoelina is in unresolved and the forthcoming Security, Ramtane Lamamra, con- fact under the designated age for weeks may further determine the sultations were held with members the head of state. In accordance, Madagascar’s political trajectory, its of the delegation from Rajoelina’s with AU regulations on the uncon- continuing diplomatic isolation. The faction, but they did not yield any stitutional change of government tensions within the country do not significant progress. he is barred from competing in augur well for its continued stability. the forthcoming elections, if they are held as part of the process for On 12 May 2010, Rajoelina un- restoring constitutional order. veiled a calendar for the political On 14 January 2010, SADC con- transition and summarily declared vened a Special Summit on The recent Pretoria initiative con- that he would not participate in the Regional Security in Maputo and vened between 29 and 30 April elections. The calendar for sequen- issued a communiqué rejecting 2010 was partly only possible tial legislative and presidential Rajoelina’s refusal to continue with following ’s intervention elections set for 30 September and the power-sharing negotiations which prompted Rajoelina to par- 26 November 2010 respectively, for implementing the Maputo and ticipate in the meeting convened contravenes the AU’s proposal for Addis agreements. Leaders from the by South Africa, France, SADC holding the two elections concur- SADC Organ of Politics, Defence and AU. According to the SADC rently. Moreover, as part of the and Security urged Rajoelina to Mediator Joaquim Chissano, the calendar a ‘national dialogue’ is due return to the mediation process and meeting was unable to resolve the to take place between 27 and 29 denounced his unilateral plan for timing of the elections and the May 2010. a transitional government and for granting of amnesty for alleged holding legislative elections. crimes committed in the lead up to Expectedly, other political forma- Ravalomanana’s removal. tions have rejected Rajoelina’s plan UN Dynamics: citing his lack of consultation, and According to the Pretoria Com- the Chief Mediator, Chissano, called munique issued by SADC, at the for return to negotiation stating Although the AU and SADC are end of the conclusion of the meet- that ‘unilateralism is unacceptable’. playing the lead role in the media- ing, the leaders of the four political The attempted mutiny of 20 May tion effort to end the year-long movements agreed to meet again in 2010 also demonstrated the failure crisis in Madagascar, the UN is South Africa after 15 days to resolve of Rajoelina’s plan to mend the also playing a supportive role, outstanding issues. divisions within the military whose represented by Tiebile Drame, leadership seems to include people Mali’s former Foreign Minister, and with allegiance to the other political the Envoy of the UN Secretary- Rajoelina has however continued movements. In addition to the dete- General to Madagascar. In this with his unilateral approach declar- riorating situation, the accusations regard, the UN has participated in ing that the Pretoria talks were the by Rajoelina against Chissano of the joint mission facilitated by the last chance to resolve his differ- bias, is set to increase the pressure AU in November 2009 and it was ences with the other three parties. on the mediation process. also part of ’s delegation He then proceeded to announce that visited Madagascar in January a plan for establishing what he 2010. Drame is a member of the called a ‘neutral’ government Geo-Political Dynamics: Joint Mediation Team involved in

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3 the mediation efforts together with President Sarkozy after the proposal Reports of human rights abuses by Joaquim Chissano and Ablasse of the new roadmap by the French the government of HAT are also Ouedraogo, the AU Special Envoy, Secretary of State in Charge of emerging. It is reported that the and the Prime Minister of Togo, Cooperation, Alain Joyandet, was government is still holding under its , who is representing presented jointly with South Africa custody without trial several indi- and SADC. the Organisation internationale de viduals including 13 women who la Francophonie (OIF). were arrested during the September When Rajoelina announced that 2009 street demonstrations. Human he would not participate in the rights organizations are reportedly The UN is also a member of the elections and that parliamentary mobilizing support to coordinate International Contact Group on and presidential elections would be the release of these ‘political de- Madagascar (ICG-M), and plays an organized sequentially, as opposed tainees’. important role of coordinating and to AU’s proposal for a concurrent mobilizing international support for election, France was the first to regional mediation efforts. UN’s welcome the announcement as So far civil society have effectively support for the efforts by the AU an important step towards solving been excluded from participat- and SADC resulted in the exclusion the crisis. This is in contrast to the ing in the mediation processes. of the delegation of Madagascar position of the lead actors, AU and Furthermore, they do not have any SADC, as expressed by the Chief from addressing the UN General representation on the ICG-M and Mediator who rejected Rajoelina’s Assembly following a motion which plan stating that ‘unilateralism is the other regional mediation efforts. was proposed by the Africa group unacceptable’. This illustrates that This in effect means that the voice and endorsed by a vote of the there is a need for the AU and of the citizens will not necessarily Assembly. SADC to coordinate communica- be represented in the discussions. tion and consultations among all the intervening actors to ensure Wider International consistent engagement in crisis Scenario Planning: Community Dynamics: situations. Given the above analysis, the fol- The international community is As for the US, it has already lowing scenarios may take place: actively engaged in the Madagascar suspended Madagascar from crisis under the auspices of the exporting goods under the US pref- Scenario 1: ICG-M, which includes the AU erential system, Africa Growth and and a range of organisations and Opportunity Act. Unfortunately, this countries, namely: the Common is affecting the economic situation The continuing impasse for imple- Market for Eastern and Southern of local citizens because textile menting the Maputo and Addis Africa (COMESA); Indian Ocean factories are closing down and Ababa accords as well as the pro- Commission (IOC); ; laying-off their workers. The World posed compromise solutions could OIF; SADC and the Bank estimates that there have persist. This is likely to heighten (EU). ICG-M has so far held five been job losses at 228,000, mainly meetings at the initiative of the AU in urban areas largely as a result of internal tensions within the HAT Chairperson Jean Ping. The last a sharp decline in tourism and the and the military leading to a mili- meeting was held on 18 February suspension of a preferential trade tary take-over, which may involve 2010 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The agreement with the US, on which confrontation between different communiqué issued by the ICG-M Madagascar’s textile industry had factions of the military and provoke reaffirmed its support for the relied heavily. violent protest by supporters of the Maputo and Addis Ababa accords other political movements as well and indicated that it would encour- as members of civil society. age its members to institute sanc- Civil Society Dynamics: tions against parties who impede the initiatives to constitutional Scenario 2: The Alliance of Civil Society Organi- order. zations and the group of religious leaders have been vocal in their Rajoelina may co-opt leading Individual countries with significant call for ending the crisis. Although figures of the military as well as influence include France and the some members of the civil society technocrats and others to form US. France has not only historical backed Rajoelina in his unconstitu- unilaterally a transitional govern- ties with the fourth largest Island tional grab for power, this support is ment during the May ‘national dia- state but substantial economic logue’. He could also proceed with interest in exploiting its natural gradually fading. In early May 2010, convening elections, including the resources. France’s influence was members of the group of religious evident in the role it played in leaders called for Rajoelina resigna- constitutional referendum, which is compelling Rajoelina to attend the tion and called on the public not to likely to exclude the other political Pretoria talks. Rajoelina expressed cooperate with HAT. movements. his acceptance to participate in the Pretoria talks in a letter to French

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4 Scenario 3: Option 3: participating in the ICG-M, to take further individual action against the regime in the face of its continuing The HAT may revise the calendar The PSC could consider increas- intransigence. for transition in accordance with ing the pressure on the de facto AU’s proposed compromise pro- government of Rajoelina. To this posals and agree to participate in end the Council can work with the further discussions to facilitate the Commission to mobilise members immediate implementation of the of the international community, par- Maputo and Addis accords includ- ticularly organisations and countries ing the establishment of the power- sharing transitional government in Documentation the Situation in Madagascar which all four political movements are included. Relevant AU Documents: PSC/PR/Comm.(CLXXX) (17 March 2009) Communique on Report of the Chair Person of the the Situation in Madagascar Early Response Options: Commission on the Situation in Madagascar, PSC/PR/2 (CCXVI) PSC/PR/BR(CLXXIX) (16 March Given the above scenarios the 19 February 2010 2009) Communique on the following options could be Situation in Madagascar considered: Communique of the 6th Meeting of the International Contact PSC/PR/Comm.(CLXXX) (5 March Group on Madagascar, 18 Option 1: 2009) Statement on the Situation February 2010 in Madagascar

In order to achieve a more inclusive AU Communiqué (23 January PSC/PR/BR/2(CLXIX) (10 and comprehensive transitional 2010) issued following the AU February 2009) Statement on the arrangement conducive for bring- Commission Chairperson’s visit to Situation in Madagascar ing a lasting end to the cycle of the Madagascar as part of the effort crisis of constitutional governance to end the crisis RECs Documents: in Madagascar, the PSC could con- sider initiating a wider national rec- AU Communiqué (6 January onciliation conference involving not 2010) issued following the SADC Pretoria Communique only the four political movements International Contact Group on the Madagascar Mediation on Madagascar (ICG-M) Fourth but also other members of the Initiative, (30 April 2010) Pretoria, Consultative Meeting in Addis South Africa. Madagascar public including civil Ababa society organizations, the group of religious leaders and the Diaspora. Southern Africa Development This could address all aspects of the PSC Communique PSC/PR/ Community (SADC) (14 January Comm. (CCXXI) (17 March 2010) 2010) Summit Communiqué, political crisis and lead to the estab- Communique on the Situation in Maputo, Mozambique lishment of a new constitutional Madagascar order in the country. Southern Africa Development PSC/PR/Comm. 1 (CCXVI) (19 Community (SADC) (20 June Option 2: February 2010) Communique on 2009) Communiqué of an the Situation in Madagascar Extraordinary Summit of Heads of State and Government, Sandton, The PSC could together with SADC South Africa consider deploying an AU peace PSC/PR/BR(CCXI) (7 December mission to Madagascar having the 2009) Press Statement on the Situation in Madagascar Southern Africa Development mandate of overseeing and sup- Community (SADC) (30 March porting the establishment of an all 2009) Communiqué of an inclusive government, facilitating a PSC/PR/Comm. (CCVII) (9 Extraordinary Summit of Heads of national reconciliation and consti- November 2009) Communique State and Government, Ezulwini, on the Situation in Madagascar tutional dialogue and supervising Swaziland the constitutional referendum and subsequent elections. PSC/PR/BR (CCII) (10 September Southern Africa Development 2009) Press Statement on the Community (SADC) (19 March Situation in Madagascar 2009) Communiqué of an Extraordinary SADC Summit of PSC/PR/COMM.(CLXXXI) (20 the Organ on Politics, Defence March 2009) Communique on and Security Cooperation on Madagascar, Ezulwini, Swaziland

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5 PSC RETROSPECTIVE: The AU PCRD Policy Framework

In the past decade, efforts to disarmament, demobilisation and strategy on PCRD. Subsequently, promote peace in Africa have reintegration programmes; resettle- from 7 to 8 February 2006 waxed and waned. The AU and ment and reintegration of refugees a Technical Experts meeting the PSC have sought to decrease and internally displaced persons; on PCRD was held in Addis the number of active conflicts and assistance to vulnerable Ababa, Ethiopia, and between on the continent. However, in persons. 5 and 7 April 2006, an AU-Civil most countries that have attained Society Organisations (CSOs) peace, there is a high risk of the meeting, was held in Abuja, In 2006, the AU has adopted re-escalation of violent conflict Nigeria. Ultimately, on 31 May a Post-Conflict Reconstruction due to the persistence of poverty, 2006 a Validation meeting was and Development (PCRD) Policy lack of access to basic services, a convened by the Commission in Framework. On 17 April 2007, weakened or non-existent institu- Addis Ababa. The PCRD Policy the PSC assessed the efforts to tional capacity to deliver on these Framework was finally adopted implement this Policy Framework. services as well as an absence of in June 2006 by the 9th Ordinary Between 1 and 3 July 2009, during a culture of democratic govern- Session of the Executive Council the Thirteenth Ordinary Session of ance, the rule of law and respect of the AU held in Banjul, Gambia. the AU Assembly of Heads of State for human rights. The transitional and Government in Sirte, Libya, the process in these countries is often Chairperson of the AU Commission, The PCRD Policy Framework was fragile and consequently there is Jean Ping tabled his Report, SP/ conceived as a flexible set of an urgent demand for an effec- ASSEMBLY/PS/RPT(I), which among guidelines that can be adapted tive strategy to provide guidance other issues assessed the progress to assist affected regions and with regards to the consolidation made towards the implementa- countries in their efforts to pro- of peace, reconstruction and tion of the AU PCRD Policy. Initial mote reconstruction, security development. assessments indicate that as far as and growth. The AU PCRD Policy the activities of the AU and the PSC Framework seeks to provide The PSC has the main responsibil- are concerned, the PCRD agenda broad guidelines and strategies to: ity of promoting peacebuilding has not received the same degree of focus as other components of and post-conflict reconstruction 1. Consolidate peace and the African Peace and Security in Africa. According to Article prevent relapse to violence; 3, paragraph (c) of the PSC Architecture (APSA). Protocol, one of the key objec- tives of the Council is to promote In terms of the trajectory and 2. Help address the root and implement peace-building evolution of the AU PCRD Policy causes of conflict; and post-conflict reconstruction Framework, Article 5, paragraph 2, activities to consolidate peace of the AU Constitutive Act outlines 3. Encourage the fast track and prevent the resurgence of the Union’s mandate with respect planning and implementation violence. Article 14, paragraph 3 to post-conflict reconstruction and of reconstruction of the Protocol further mandates development. From 28 June to 2 activities; and the Council with a number of July 2005, the AU Executive Council post-conflict reconstruction activi- of Ministers held its 7th Ordinary ties including the: restoration of Session, in Sirte, Libya, and adopted 4. Enhance complementarities and coordination between the rule of law; establishment a Decision, Ex.CL/Dec.228 (VII), and development of democratic requesting the Commission to and among diverse actors institutions; and the preparation, develop an AU Policy on Post- engaged in PCRD processes. organisation and supervision of Conflict Reconstruction based on elections in the concerned mem- the relevant provisions of the PSC Since the adoption of the Policy ber states. For countries affected protocol and the African experi- the AU Commission has also by violent conflict, the mandate ence. Between 4 and 5 September developed operational guidelines also includes the: consolidation 2005, the AU Commission con- for the: adoption of the Policy of the peace agreements that vened a brainstorming retreat of at regional and national levels; have been negotiated; establish- the members of the PSC and other establishment and creation of a ing conditions of political, social Permanent Representatives of mem- database of African experts on and economic reconstruction ber states in Durban, South Africa. PCRD; and development of an of the society and government This meeting launched the process AU Standing Multi-dimensional institutions; implementation of of discussing an overarching AU Committee on PCRD. The AU >>page 7

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6 condemning the assassination, on 5 PSC RETROSPECTIVE: The AU PCRD Policy Framework June 2009, of Baciro Dabó, a candi- date for the presidential elections, Commission has launched specific war-affected countries. In the as well as Hélder Proença, the in-country peacebuilding initia- decision adopting the AU Policy former Minister of Defense. Prior to tives to support countries like the on PCRD, the Executive Council that on 3 March 2009, the Council Central African Republic (CAR), also recommended that the AU, had also condemned the assassina- Comoros, Liberia and Sierra Leone RECs and national government’s tion of the President of the Republic within the context of the PCRD actively engage the civil society of Guinea Bissau, João Bernardo Policy Framework. By the end of in implementing the PCRD Policy Nino Vieira, and the Army Chief of 2009, and in keeping with the Framework. It is widely acknowl- Staff, General Batista Tagme Na Wai operationalisation of the PCRD edged that CSOs are often closely PSC/PR/Comm(CLXXIV). Policy Framework, and as a follow situated to local communities and up to a decision adopted by the have a better awareness of the Crisis Escalation Potential: AU Assembly in January 2008, the context. CSOs that have the nec- Commission has also finalized a essary expertise can also provide draft of a proposed comprehensive operational and technical exper- The spate of political assassinations AU Framework on Security Sector tise in the implementation of the in 2009 gravely undermined peace Reform (SSR). AU PCRD Policy Framework. and security in Guinea-Bissau. The brief detention of the Prime Minister, following an apparent Article 16, paragraph 3 of the PSC The AU Standing Multi- coup attempt on 1 April 2010, illus- Protocol stipulates the param- dimensional Committee estab- trated the fragile state of affairs in eters for cooperation between lished by the Commission to the country. In an effort to deflect the AU Commission and Regional provide political support and criticism for this incident, President Economic Communities (RECs) for mobilise all the necessary and Malam Bacai Sanha, characterised the effective implementation of available resources for the imple- it as a case of ‘confusion between peacebuilding initiatives. RECs can mentation of the PCRD Policy soldiers’. In spite of this tensions therefore play an important role Framework should establish an continue to escalate among the key in the harmonization and coor- institutional partnership with the political actors. Although Sanha has dination of the implementation United Nations Peace Building the support of some foreign govern- of the PCRD Policy Framework Commission (PBC). Ultimately, the ments, the country also has to deal with regional initiatives. The PSC needs to establish a sub-com- with the scourge of well-armed and AU Commission and the PSC mittee to ensure the appropriate well-connected drug cartels. The need to undertake a series of oversight and monitoring of imple- army is also beset by ethnic and capacity building activities at mentation of the PCRD Policy political factionalism and has been the national and regional level Framework as well as ensuring implicated in almost all of the politi- in order to ensure the effective effective collaboration with other cal assassinations. The politicisation planning, implementation and components of the AU’s peace of the military and the reciprocal monitoring of PCRD activities in and security architecture. militarisation of the political sphere have severely undermined the rule of law and the prospects for demo- Conference as a prelude towards cratic governance. The Deputy COUNTRY ANALYSIS establishing peace in the country. Chief of Staff of the Army, General It also acknowledged the Guinean Antonio Indjai, was appointed by governments efforts to address drug Guinea-Bissau the military to ‘manage the situa- trafficking and confront the specter tion’ but he has not succeeded in of impunity in the country. The Previous PSC Communiqués consolidating control of the army. PSC requested the AU Commission and Recommendations: Therefore, the potential for crisis to accelerate the process of escalation in the country is rela- establishing an AU Liaison Office tively high and it continues to pose On 29 March 2010, the PSC issued in Guinea Bissau, in anticipation a significant challenge, not only to a communiqué, PSC/PR/COMM. of the subsequent deployment of Guinea-Bissau, but also to the secu- (CCXXII), in which it cited ‘encour- the AU/ECOWAS Joint Civilian rity and stability of the West African aging developments in Guinea- Mission to support for post-conflict region. Bissau and the progress made since reconstruction. the holding of early presidential elections in July 2009’. The Council acknowledged the efforts of the Earlier on 10 June 2009, the PSC >>page 8 Guinean authorities in organis- had issued a communiqué, PSC/ ing the National Reconciliation PR/COMM.5(CXCII), vehemently

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7 Key Issues and Internal a bloodless coup, and President Following a run-off Sanha was Dynamics: Henrique Rosa was sworn in as declared winner of the second interim president. In 2005, former round by the Comite Nacional da President Vieira was re-elected in Eleicoes (CNE) and was duly sworn On 1 April 2010, a group of army another set of elections pledging to in as president on 8 September officers detained Guinea-Bissau’s pursue economic development and 2009. elected Prime Minister, Carlos national reconciliation. Gomes Junior, and the Chief of Staff, General Jose Zamora Induta, Guinea-Bissau remains a key transit together with 40 other military Despite the appearance of a rela- point for illicit drugs originating officers. Prime Minister Gomes was tively stable government, in March from Latin America, notably freed after several hours following 2009, President Vieira was mur- cocaine, which is shipped through the gathering of hundreds of people dered by disgruntled troops. This West Africa en route to Europe. in front of his office petitioning was apparently in revenge for the The erosion of state institutions for his release. The broadcast on assassination of head of the armed necessary for the maintenance of the national radio was interrupted forces, General Tagme Na Waie. In law and order has made the country for a period of time suggesting July 2009, elections were convened a vulnerable target for organized that a coup was in progress. This in which President Sanha the cur- crime syndicates. Corruption facili- was subsequently followed by the rent incumbent was elected. The tates the tacit acquiescence of key announcement that the Deputy elections were marred by the assas- government officials with this illicit Chief of Staff of the Army, General sination of the opposition candi- trade. In 2007, the UN drug agency Indjai, had been named as key date, Dabo, and the former Minister issued a special report on Guinea- person behind the apparent coup. of Defence, Proença. This prompted Bissau in which it noted ‘repeated There were mixed signals emanat- the AU PSC to requisition an inde- allegations that high ranking offi- ing from the capital when Prime pendent and credible investigation cials in government and the military Minister Gomes, reiterated that to uncover the origins of the recent were complicit in drug trafficking.’ his government had not been dis- spate of political assassinations; According to the agency’s Executive solved and the institutions of the however, this is yet to be achieved. Director, Antonio Maria Costa, in state would continue to function. Guinea-Bissau, ‘the value of cocaine Subsequently, President Sanha also Guinea-Bissau’s governance struc- trafficked through the country may confirmed that there had been ture has evolved from a highly be greater than the entire national no regime change. The military centralized bureaucracy towards a income.’ This further compounds continues to declare its loyalty to more devolved system. Currently, the instability in the country and Guinea-Bissau’s political leaders, the President is the head of also exacerbates human insecurity and the authority that it wields on state and the Prime Minister is in the West African region. the ground means that there is no the head of government. At the certainty about the agenda of the legislative level, there is a unicam- Geo-Political Dynamics: military leadership. eral “Assembleia Nacional Popular” (National People’s Assembly) made Pan-African and RECs Dynamics: The current political and security up of 100 members. They are popu- larly elected from multi-member dynamics in Guinea-Bissau are remi- On 1 April 2010 ECOWAS recog- niscent of the country’s troubled constituencies to serve a four-year term. At the judicial level, there is nised that instability in Guinea- past. Since independence from Bissau was a threat to stability in Portugal in 1974, politico-military a “Tribunal Supremo da Justiça” (Supreme Court) which consists the region and issued a statement upheaval became the order of condemning ‘indiscipline by the the day. In 1980, a military coup of nine justices appointed by the President, ostensibly to keep in military’ (No.048/2010). ECOWAS established President Joao Bernardo established a delegation to initiate ‘Nino’ Vieira as President. In 1994, check the power of the executive branch. dialogue with the authorities in President Vieira re-modelled himself the country led by the Chairman as an elected president in the coun- of the body’s Commission, James try’s first elections since independ- President Sanhá’s Partido da Africa Victor Gbeho. This mission also ence. The military mutiny and ensu- Independencia da Guine-Bissau e included the Chairperson of the ing civil war in 1998 set the scene Cape Verde (PAIGC) and Partido AU Commission, Jean Ping; the for Vieira’s ousting in May 1999. Renovacao Social (PRS) are two UN Special Envoy for West Africa, In February 2000, a transitional major political parties in Guinea- Said Djinnit and the Executive government relinquished power Bissau. In the 2009 election that Secretary of the Community of to opposition leader, Kumba Yala, replaced the assassinated Vieira, Portuguese-speaking Countries, after he won the presidential poll. Sanhá was the PAIGC presidential Domingos Simoes Pereira. On 4 After three years in office President candidate while Yala, was the Yala was ousted by the military in presidential candidate of the PRS. >>page 9

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8 April 2010, the delegation con- former colonial power Portugal has Scenario 3: demned the events of 1 April 2010, called for the immediate restoration after having met with civilian and of constitutional order. EU High Both political and military elites military leadership of the country. Representative for Foreign Affairs, could resist external involvement in AU Commissioner for Peace and Catherine Ashton, condemned the undertaking proper investigations Security, Ramtane Lamamra, has incident as ‘an unacceptable breach into the spate of assassinations indicated that the AU will convene of the constitutional order.’ Since that took place in the country over another high-level meeting to 2008, the European Union has last year. This would encourage a discuss the issue before the end of maintained a security support mis- culture of impunity to prevail in the this year and also operationalise its sion in Guinea-Bissau. This mission country, thus maintain the status Liaison Office in Guinea-Bissau. is mandated to advise and assist quo of instability in the country. local authorities with security sec- tor reform programmes including In 2009, ECOWAS convened a the consolidation and restructuring Scenario 4: meeting in Praia, the capital of of the army. Similarly, the US State Cape-Verde, in which the organisa- Department spokesperson, Philip tion’s member states made signifi- The success of careful interven- Crowley, has called for a swift cant pledges for the restructuring tions by ECOWAS, AU and UN return to constitutional rule follow- and modernisation of the country’s supported by the wider interna- ing the events in 1 April 2010. security sector. Specifically, the tional community could revitalize ECOWAS Commission pledged 13.5 the commitment of the Guinean million US dollars for economic sta- Civil Society Dynamics: parties to accelerate the reform bilisation and 5 million US dollars process, including the restoration for SSR. A further 1 million dollars of constitutional order and effective Civil society activism in Guinea- peacebuilding. will help support the operations of Bissau is undermined by a lack of the international investigation into coordination. Furthermore, in the the recent political assassinations in current climate civil society remains Early Response Options: the country. politically constrained and the media is virtually state-controlled Given the above scenarios, the fol- UN Dynamics: and limits the coverage of divergent lowing early response options could perspectives or any criticism against be considered by the PSC: the powerful political and military Following the incident of 1 April elites. 2010, the UN Secretary-General Option 1: Ban Ki-moon, urged the military and political leadership of Guinea- Scenario Planning: Bissau to ‘resolve their differences The PSC could maintain the pres- peacefully and to maintain consti- sure on national authorities to tutional order and the rule of law.’ Given the above analysis the fol- accept and respect the mediation Currently, the Secretary-General’s lowing scenarios could potentially and facilitation efforts by the Special Representative for Guinea unravel in Guinea-Bissau: international community including Bissau, Joseph Mutaboba, is the AU, ECOWAS, UN and the working closely with other inter- Scenario 1: Community of Portuguese-speaking national partners including the Countries. ECOWAS and the African Union The adversarial relationship towards peacebuilding initiatives. between the civilian and military Option 2: Mutaboba, is also head of the leadership in Guinea-Bissau’s could UN Integrated Peacebuilding deteriorate precipitating more coun- Support Office in Guinea-Bissau The PSC could support the ter-coups, arrests and assassinations (UNIOGBIS) and is liaising with the ECOWAS initiative to deploy a which could further destabilise UN Peacebuilding Commission in peacebuilding efforts in the country. limited stabilisation force in the New York, which is currently con- country to ensure the security of sidering the situation in the country. the elected civilian leaders, protect Scenario 2: key state institutions and establish Wider International the foundations for genuine dia- This incipient instability could logue between the country’s key Community Dynamics: precipitate even deeper incursions stakeholders. by organised criminal cartels into The international community has Guinea-Bissau’s body politic and expressed its serious concern at increase the frequency of drug traf- the situation in the country. The ficking across the region. >>page 10

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9 Option 3: Commission and ECOWAS to key factor in the lack of peace and genuinely advance security sector security in the country. The PSC could liaise with the AU reform in Guinea-Bissau, which is a

Documentation: RECs Documents: UN Documents:

Relevant AU Documents: ECOWAS No.048/2010 (1 April S/2009/552 (22 October 2009) 2010) ‘ECOWAS Puts Guinea Report of the Secretary-General PSC/PR/COMM.(CCXXII) Bissau Military on Guard’ on Developments in Guinea- (29 March 2010) AU PSC Bissau and on the Activities of Communiqué on the situation in CWW/HOSG/ABJ/37/Rev.1. (16 the United Nations Peacebuilding Guinea-Bissau. February 2010) Communiqué of Support Office in that country the 37th Ordinary Session of the AU Commission Statement (1 Authority of Heads of State and S/RES/1876 (26 June 2009) April 2010) issued by the AU Government in Abuja Security Council Resolution on Commission Chairperson on Guniea-Bissau Guinea-Bissau in Addis Ababa ECOWAS Statement 063/2009 (23 June 2009) ‘Regional Leaders S/2009/302 (10 June 2009) PSC/PR/COMM.5(CXCII) (10 Take Measures To Address Report of the Secretary-General June 2009) Communiqué on The Security Environment in on Developments in Guinea- preparations for the forthcoming Guinea-Bissau’ Bissau and on the Activities of -Bissau the United Nations Peacebuilding ECOWAS Statement 061/2009 Support Office in that Country PSC/MIN/COMM.3(CLXIII) (22 (12 June 2009) ‘ECOWAS Chiefs December 2008) Communiqué of Defence Staff Want Contact on the situation in Guinea-Bissau Mission in Guinea Bissau’

ECOWAS Statement 039/2009 (20 April 2009) ‘ECOWAS and Member States Rally to Support Guinea-Bissau at Roundtable’

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10

PSC RETROSPECTIVE: Security Sector Reform

The inability to effectively man- government institutions’ as well as has only addressed SSR in a case age or reform the security sector the ‘implementation of disarma- by case basis, and therefore there is at the heart of the majority of ment, demobilization and reinte- is a need for a more focused and peace and security crises on the gration programmes.’ Within the comprehensive strategy. In addi- African continent. The failure to framework of the African Peace tion, SSR has exclusively been genuinely reform security institu- and Security Architecture, further considered in the context of tions in the African post-colonial reference to SSR is highlighted post-conflict peacebuilding and in polities meant that they became in two instruments. The Solemn countries emerging from conflict. causes of insecurity both for the Declaration on a Common African There is also a need for SSR to state and its population. The Defence and Security Policy, of be addressed in the context of inability of the post-colonial state 2004, calls for and aims to: regime transition from authoritar- to provide effective security for ian to more democratically plural all its territory also resulted in societies. the emergence of non-state or • provide best practices and informal security actors operating develop strategic capabilities outside of the official oversight through training and policy A comprehensive continental SSR framework. Post-conflict countries recommendations to strengthen strategy is yet to be launched. also find themselves subject to the defence and security sectors This is necessary due to the inter- the insecurity generated by armed in Africa; and dependence of security threats movements and rebel groups. affecting African countries. The limitations and lack of effective • enable the formulation of policies implementation processes of SSR The security institutions in a to strengthen the defence and initiatives in a number of African number of African countries security sectors at the national countries further supports the continue to be beset by a lack of and continental levels. importance of a coherent and professional capacity and this is integrated continental approach often further undermined by the to SSR. In March 2009, the AU absence of a democratic culture The Solemn Declaration does Commissioner for Peace and that effectively assert transparent not elaborate on the principles Security, Ambassador Ramtane oversight on these institutions. to be adhered to and the ways Lamamra, delivered a speech at a As the case of Guinea Bissau for strengthening the sector. conference on SSR in Africa and illustrates, such a situation leaves Article 19 of the AU Post-Conflict observed that ‘one of the factors the society vulnerable to serious Reconstruction and Development that undermined early SSR efforts security challenges such as the Policy Framework, of 2006, also on the African continent was almost free reign of organised makes reference to SSR and com- the lack of a coherent regional transnational crime syndicates and plements the Solemn Declaration and African continental policy drug trafficking cartels. The recent by elaborating the principles to on SSR.’ The establishment of spate of coups or attempted guide the implementation of SSR. the ASF adds further impetus for coups in Africa also illustrates a developing a comprehensive SSR key structural deficiency in the policy which will be necessary security sector namely the col- In recognition of the importance in terms of ensuring that security lapse or total breakdown of civil- of SSR, between 31 January sector reform issues are integrat- military relations. and 2 February 2008, the AU ed into the work of ASF missions. Assembly of Heads of State and Government convened its 10th Security Sector Reform (SSR) has Ordinary Session, in Addis Ababa, There are countries with weak emerged within the policy fora as Ethiopia, and requested the AU or dysfunctional security institu- a means of addressing these mul- Commission to ‘develop a com- tions which need to consolidate tifaceted challenges. SSR involves prehensive AU Policy Framework democracy for example Guinea a range of legal and institutional on SSR, within the context of the Bissau, Zimbabwe, Madagascar reforms designed to establish Policy Framework on Post-conflict and Kenya. SSR therefore needs a democratic, professional and Reconstruction and Development.’ to be integrated into conflict accountable security sector. In 2009, a SSR project was estab- prevention and peacebuilding lished within the Defense and processes. Security Division of the Directorate Article 14 of the PSC Protocol of Peace and Security. makes reference to SSR when it Currently, the AU SSR Project is mandates the Council to ensure working to develop a Draft SSR the ‘establishment of conditions The PSC routinely emphasises the Policy Framework. Between 17 of political, social and economic centrality of SSR when referring to and 19 May 2010, the AU SSR reconstruction of the society and war-affected and post-conflict coun- tries. However, to date the Council >>page 14

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11

PSC RETROSPECTIVE: Security Sector Reform (continued)

Project convened a workshop to and peacebuilding activities; post-conflict reconstruction to finalise a zero draft of the policy complement SSR; framework. • the key principles and norms to be adhered to and the institutions • Reinforce the capacity of the The PSC as the highest standing to be involved in the effective SSR project within the African decision-making body on peace and sustainable implementation Union Commission up to a and security matters can play a of SSR; divisional level to enable it to lead role in the development of play the role of overseeing the a continental policy framework implementation of the policy by promoting harmonization • the need to ensure the existence framework in the various between the various branches of of coordination mechanisms to the AU. Specifically, it may direct promote synergy between the peace and security as well the attention of those working on AU, RECs, national governments as democratisation processes the draft policy to the following, and civil society; within AU member states. notably:

• the need to ensure efforts to • the need to link SSR to other institutionalise the rule of law and APSA components and constitutionalism, democratic spanning conflict prevention, transformation and constitutional peacemaking, peacekeeping change and peace-building and

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12 Post-Election Analysis: The 2010 Sudan Polls

Previous PSC and AU state governor. For the national established National Election Communiqués and Statements: assembly a combination of PR and Commission (NEC) was tasked plurality electoral systems were with operationalising the logistical Sudan convened an historic general utilised. Accordingly, in the National and administrative arrangements election between 11 and 15 April Assembly 60 percent (or 270) of the necessary for the elections. This 2010, the first in 24 years. In the seats were contested on the basis involved the accurate design communiqué it issued prior to the of geographic constituencies; 25 and printing of about 1268 dif- poll on 10 March 2009, PSC/PR/ percent (or 112) of the seats were ferent types of ballots within the COMM.(CCXIX), the PSC stressed contested on Women’s lists system; required time frame. The logistics the crucial importance of the and 15 percent (or 68) of the seats also required the designation and elections emphasizing that they were elected on the basis of Party establishment of about 13000 would ‘be held in the context of List PR system. polling stations as well as the the January 2005 Comprehensive timely distribution of the required Peace Agreement and will be quantity and correct electoral followed by a referendum on The electoral campaign that run materials to each venue. The NEC self-determination for Southern between 7 February 2010 and 9 task also included delivering the Sudan to be held in January 2011’. April 2010 was marred by opposi- In the aftermath of the elec- tion boycotts. Four of the major training of election administration tions on 15 April 2010, the AU parties in the Sudanese National staff from the central headquar- Commission issued a communiqué Consensus Forces – the SPLM, ters to the polling stations level. commending the peaceful con- Umma National Party, Sudan clusion of the historic elections Communist Party, and the Umma The impact of the complexity in Sudan. The Chairperson of Reform and Renewal Party - with- of the electoral system and the the AU Commission, Jean Ping, drew their presidential candidates substantial logistical and admin- issued a statement commending, at the last minute. However, the istrative challenges was reflected President Omar Al Bashir, the re- elected ruler of Sudan, and Salva names and photos of the candidates in the lead up to the poll as well Kiir, the re-elected leader of the were not removed from the bal- as during the elections. Delayed Government of Southern Sudan. lot papers. The boycotts in effect policy decisions by NEC on the The Chairperson also highlighted assured the incumbent President Al number and size of polling sta- the importance of the elections Bashir of a victory without theneed tions further compounded the while noting the ‘isolated incidents for a second round of votes, even problem hindering the early and challenges’. though the credibility of the elec- distribution of election materials. tion was challenged. Additionally, The delayed but timely distribu- The Electoral System and while the Umma Party withdraw tion of polling materials would not Electoral Administration from all levels of elections, the have been possible without the SPLM pulled out of the legislative intervention of the United Nations and gubernatorial elections in all of Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) par- The elections were conducted the 15 northern states except Blue ticularly in the more remote areas using a complex electoral system Nile and South Kordofan. of . The training of combining plurality and propor- Constituency Election Officers tional representation (PR) systems. was being conducted until the In the plurality system the can- Voters had to complete a number of pen-ultimate day before the elec- didate with the highest number ballot papers which further added tions begun. of votes cast wins the election. to the complexity of the elections. In the PR system political parties In North Sudan, voters cast six sepa- receive seats in proportion to the rate ballot papers for the national The Voting Process votes that they receive from the level elections. In South Sudan, electorate. The plurality system where the UN reports a literacy rate The opening of the polls on first was utilised for the election of of 24 percent, voters were expected day of election was marred by candidates to executive bodies. to complete 12 ballot papers for the serious technical and logistical For the posts of national president national level elections and for the difficulties. In some cases the and the presidency of Southern elections in South Sudan. installation of voting booths and Sudan candidates could only win the distribution of ballot papers if they garnered more than 50 In a country with a limited com- as well as other election materials percent of the vote. In addition, a munication infrastructure, and had not been finalized on time. plurality of votes also determined no comparable recent electoral There were issues relating to the the winners for the positions for experience to draw upon, the newly production and distribution of

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13 Post-Election Analysis: The 2010 Sudan Polls (continued) ballot papers including missing confirmed Bashir as the victor in seven of the ten states. In the run ballot papers, delivery of ballots the presidential election. Some up to the elections, political divi- to wrong stations, incorrectly opposition leader like Dr. Hassan sions and tensions also emerged. printed ballot papers and in some Al-Turabi was quoted as publicly Rejecting the party nominees, cases insufficient number of stating that ‘the voting and counting several erstwhile key support- ballot papers. There were also processes are fraudulent. We will ers and members of the SPLM some incomplete and misplaced take the matter to court and if the registered to run as independ- voter lists, resulting in the dis- judge does not rule in our favor, we ent candidates for the powerful enfranchisement of significant may have to sue other alternatives state governor posts, as well as percentage of registered voters. than the ballot box.’ Subsequently for national, regional and state The names of some candidates on 16 May 2010, Al-Turabi was assembly seats. There have also who withdrew two weeks before summarily arrested from his home. been reports of harassment and the polls were still on the ballot Similarly, opposition groups in the intimidation of opposition parties, papers, which caused confusion South have pledged to petition the independent candidates and their for some voters. A number of result in court. NCP’s invitation to supporters by security forces dur- political parties thus called for the opposition parties to take part in ing the campaign. Despite some extension of the voting period. the formation of a national unity predictions of possible violence, The NEC responded positively by government is seen as an attempt to the voting process was acclaimed adding two more polling days. acquire legitimisation and has not as having largely been peaceful eased the rejection of the results and orderly. Although the elections were gen- by the opposition. erally free from violence, there The Situation in Darfur were widespread allegations of Salva Kiir’s landslide victory as vote rigging, intimidation and President of South Sudan has been The situation in Darfur is by far under-age voting. On 20 April interpreted by his supporters as the most complicated. Nearly 2.7 2010, local election observers symbolizing the South Sudan’s million people live in IDPs camps released video footage of ballot determination to vote for independ- and a large number of Darfur staffing by election officials. The ence in the referendum, which refuges are in Chad. In the lead African Union Election Observer has been designated for January up to the elections several areas Mission in its preliminary state- 2011. Bashir’s victory according to in the region were still experienc- ment also acknowledged that his supporters legitimizes his rule ing significant levels of insecurity. ‘there were complaints that some and will be marketed as evidence The agreement signed in February voters who went to cast their vote of his popular support in Sudan 2010 between the main rebel were told that records show that and a rejection of the charges of group JEM and Sudan in Doha, they had already voted.’ allegded war crimes and crimes Qatar, did not lead to a stabilisa- against humanity in Darfur, which tion of the situation. Further talks The Results of the Elections were instituted against him by the have effectively stalled and there International Criminal Court (ICC). have been recent reports of low Naturally, the Prosecutor of the Presidential results were an- level clashes in the aftermath of ICC, Louis Moreno-Ocampo, has nounced on 26 April 2010. the elections. JEM has threatened strongly criticised the re-election of According to the NEC, the incum- to withdraw from the Doha peace Bashir. bent President Omar Al Bashir process. won the national presidential election with 68 percent of the The Situation in the South A significant percentage of eli- votes cast. In South Sudan, Salva gible voters in Darfur were not Kiir won the elections with 93 per- South Sudan went to elections registered to vote and exercise cent. SPLM Candidates won 9 of against a background of a popula- their rights. As with South Sudan, the 10 gubernatorial seats in the tion that had not historically been substantial areas of Darfur were South. The SPLM also won in Blue provided with access to civic educa- inaccessible to election officials Nile and Unity states. tion. The region is also plagued by and candidates, and the insecurity poor communication infrastructure caused by banditry and ongoing Some opposition parties and civil and logistical systems. In 2009, conflict also restricted candi- society groups in the North have more than 2500 people were killed dates’ freedom of movement. rejected the election results that and 400,000 displaced as a result Amid such safety fears, the EU of inter-ethnic clashes that affected withdrew its election observers

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14 Post-Election Analysis: The 2010 Sudan Polls (continued) from the region a few days prior census and establishing new voters the South. Therefore, for many to the poll. On the day voting register, the elections in Blue Nile in the South the elections have started, a Darfur rebel group produced mixed results. While the served to establish a popularly known as Peoples Democratic SPLM won the position of gover- mandated government ahead of Struggle Movement abducted four norship, it received only 18 of the 2011 to enable them more peace- South African UNAMID Police 48 seats in the State Legislative fully manage both the referen- officers, who were later released Assembly. As the Legislative dum and the post-referendum on 26 April 2010 after lengthy Assembly is responsible for con- processes. negotiations. ducting the Popular Consultations, it will be difficult for SPLM to suc- Potential for Conflict Escalation There are also fears that the victo- ceed in these Consultations. ry by President Bashir may further On 23 April 2010, a fighting negate the prospects for peace in The Democracy versus between Darfuri nomads and Darfur, because it will embolden Peace Dilemma the South Sudan Army report- him not to actively pursue peace. edly claimed the lives of 58 The announcement in early May Given the issues highlighted above people and wounded 85 others. by JEM of attacks by government the dilemma that is facing the AU Police killed two members of forces does not at all help to allay and other members of the inter- a group protesting the loss of such fears. national community is what to do their candidate in Unity State. In with the compromised elections. If Jonglei State, there is an increas- The South Kordofan, Blue in upholding accepted standards of ingly deteriorating crisis involving Nile and Regions democracy they seek to reject the repeated incidents of fighting elections, this would endanger the involving different factions of the The 2005 Comprehensive Peace very future of the CPA and in the SPLA. On 30 April 2010, reports Agreement (CPA) has a Three process contribute to the poten- suggested that ‘mutinous’ troops Areas Protocol which stipulates tial escalation of violent conflict of the SPLA, allegedly under the that in South Kordofan and the between the north and the south. command of George Athor who Blue Nile ‘Popular Consultations’ If on the other hand in the interest lost the election for the governor will be conducted in the last year of peace they accept the election of Jonglei state in South Sudan, of the interim period. In addition, outcome, then Sudan will in effect attacked the region’s army base the CPA states that a referendum have a compromised democratic resulting in the death of eight will also be convened in Abyei transition. people. Although he initially during the 2011 referendum in denied involvement in the April the South to determine the future This democracy versus peace 30 attacks, Athor has subsequent- status of this contested border dichotomy is to some extent mir- ly publicly called for the forma- area. The ‘Popular Consultations’ rored in the divergence of opinions tion of a transitional government are due to be conducted by the among observer groups in their in South Sudan and the dissolu- newly elected members of the pre-assessment of the elections. tion of the current government two states’ legislative assemblies While the EU and Carter Centre of Salva Kiir, and warned against in South Kordofan and Blue Nile. observer mission characterised the what he described as an imminent These Consultations will focus on election as falling short of accept- comprehensive war in Southern the question of whether or not to able international standards, the AU Sudan unless his demands are continue with their special auton- observer mission declared the elec- met. omous status under the CPA with- tions ‘free and fair’ in the prevailing in northern Sudan. The modalities circumstances of Sudan and IGAD There have also been reports for conducting the vaguely formu- deemed the elections to have been of army movements by the lated and less understood ‘Popular ‘credible’. Government of Sudan. The SPLA Consultations’ and for reflecting complained that government forc- the view of the people could pose For some sections of the interna- es were involved in the fighting some difficulties. tional community and SPLM, this of 23 April in Raja district in the election is merely a stage in the Southern state of Western Bahr While the elections in South process for implementing the CPA al-Ghazal, which borders Darfur. Kordofan has been postponed and laying the foundations for the The Government of Southern pending the holding of new 2011 referendum on the status of Sudan also formally expressed its concern regarding the increased

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15 Post-Election Analysis: The 2010 Sudan Polls (continued) movement of government troops partnership in the months ahead • Monitor and assist in managing to the border with Southern and emphasised the need for learn- disagreements pertaining to the Sudan. Such developments in the ing lessons from the elections to results of the poll, and request context of entrenched mistrust prevent similar shortcomings in the Sudanese authorities in the towards the North will further future polls. Other decisions taken north and south to regularly undermine progress in the imple- include undertaking the neces- provide the Council with mentation of the CPA. sary preparations, particularly at updates on key challenges; the technical level, to successfully convene the 2011 referendum. The Courses of Action for the PSC • Encourage, support and meetings also highlighted the need ensure the implementation to support capacity building and The PSC will need to continue of the interim constitution conflict mitigation in Southern monitoring the implementation as stipulated in the CPA, as Sudan as well as ensure the coor- of the CPA and consolidation and necessary condition for holding dination between AU High Level expansion of the narrowly opened a free and credible referendum Implementation Panel and UNMIS. democratic space during the post- in 2011; election period and prior to the The PSC could also undertake referendum in 2011. • Recommend the establishment further initiatives including: of an International Contact On 7 May 2010, the AU-UN Group on Sudan to coordinate Strategic Review Meeting was • Promote and support mechanisms with the AU Panel and ensure convened and on 8 May 2010 a for political dialogue and national the effective participation follow-up Consultative Meeting consensus in South Sudan and and coordination of the was also held in Addis Ababa, raise awareness about the efforts international community efforts Ethiopia. The meetings underlined the AU High Level Panel; in the country. the importance of NCP-SPLM

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16

PSC RETROSPECTIVE: Women and Armed conflict

The PSC convened a special subjugate women. Surveys have in armed conflict. These include: session on 30 March 2010, and demonstrated that at least one in the AU Solemn Declaration on issued a communiqué, PSC/PR/ three women around the world is Gender Equality in Africa, adopt- COMM.(CCXXIII), which stressed a victim of physical violence and ed during the Third Ordinary the need to address the gender sexual exploitation. In some coun- Session of the Assembly of Heads dimension of violent conflict. In tries this rate of abuse is close to 70 of State and Government in particular, the Council highlighted percent. Addis Ababa, July 2004; the AU as an urgent priority the need to Protocol to the African Charter identify the root causes of the on Human and Peoples’ Rights vulnerabilities of women in situa- In the context of violent conflict, on the Rights of Women in tions of armed conflict. The PSC even though both men and women Africa; the African Commission emphasised the need to develop are victims of war, it has become on Human and Peoples’ Rights; concrete recommendations to mit- evident that civilian women are the African Court of Justice igate the risks to women in armed more vulnerable to indiscriminate and Human Rights; and the AU conflict, as well as establishing attacks and kidnappings within Post-Conflict Reconstruction ways to ensure accountability their communities. In situations of and Development (PCRD) Policy and end impunity by prosecuting war and armed conflict, women Framework. These instruments perpetrators of violence against and young girls are often deliber- suggest that at least on paper women at the national and conti- ately targeted for sexual abuse as a the AU is committed to address nental level. means of defiling the ‘enemy’ and gender equality and address the ‘dishonoring” their male cohorts. scourge of gender-based vio- lence. According to the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality For the last forty years Africa has A range of international mecha- in Africa, AU Heads of State endured the scourge of violent nisms and conventions have been and Government are obliged to conflict which has undermined established within the United report annually on their progress the social, political and economic Nations framework to address wom- towards gender equality. well-being of its citizens. Among en’s issues, in particular, key institu- the continent’s 54 countries, 48 tions which include: UN Human have witnessed some form of Rights Council; UN Commission Through its communiqué, PSC/ conflict on their territory in the on Elimination of All Forms of PR/COMM.(CCXXIII), the Coun- form of civil war, a border conflict Discrimination Against Women, UN cil urged AU member states to or a secessionist insurgency. In Committee Against Torture and the implement the key aspects of the the past decade, it has become UN Commission on the Status of Protocol on the Rights of Women evident that women and children Women. In addition, the independ- and uphold the recommenda- have become among the most ent and permanent International tions of the Solemn Declaration vulnerable affected victims of Criminal Court (ICC) also has a on Gender Equality in Africa. atrocities committed during criminal jurisdiction over war crimes The PSC also encouraged civil conflict situations. Gender-based committed against women in armed society to participate and engage violence has acquired epidemic conflict. In 2000, the Security their member states as well as proportions and some analysts Council issued Resolution 1325, the AU in addressing the condi- have argued that the violence which acknowledged the responsi- tion of women in armed conflict that emerges against women in bilities of UN member states to end situations. conflict zones is often an exten- the impunity for all forms of sexual sion of the gender discrimination crimes against women and girls. that already exists in peacetime. The resolution also emphasizes the To complement its revitalized gen- As with other parts of the world, central role that women are cur- der focus the PSC still needs to Africa’s predominantly patriar- rently playing in promoting peace consider developing and enhanc- chal governments and societies and security. ing the range of mechanisms perpetuate gender discrimination that can be deployed by the AU in times of relative peace. In the to ensure the security of women context of a violent conflict this The African continent has also in times of war. Even though the discrimination acquires a more enumerated its own raft of mecha- PSC is only focusing on this issue sinister dimension with the wide- nisms and protocols to address the for the first time in its five year spread and pervasive use of gen- discrimination of women generally, existence, this attention augurs der-based violence, including rape as well as specific instruments to well for addressing issues relating and sexual slavery, as a means to address the exploitation of women to gender equality in Africa.

PSC Report Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, T: +251-11-372-11-54; F: +251-11-372-59-54; [email protected]; www.issafrica.org

17 Spotlight on the PSC and Chairperson of the AU Commission

The is interim-Chairperson, of relating to these peace support mis- the administrative branch of the Côte d’ivoire, during the organisa- sions. In particular, the Chairperson continental body, and it represents tion’s transition from the Organisation can issue periodic and comprehen- the Union in international fora and of African Unity (OAU) to the AU sive reports as well as other rel- implements the decisions of its between 2000 to 2002. evant documents in order to enable member states. The Chairperson of the PSC and its subsidiary bodies to the Commission is the chief admin- perform their functions effectively. istrative and executive officer and Article 10, paragraph 1, of the is assisted by a Deputy Chairperson Protocol Relating to the Establishment and ten Commissioners respon- of the Peace and Security Council According to the PSC Protocol the sible for different portfolios and of the African Union states that ‘the Chairperson of the Commission supervising subordinate staff. The Chairperson of the Commission shall, also has the prerogative to bring to Commission implements AU poli- under the authority of the Peace and the attention of the Council issues cies, prepares its strategic plans and Security Council, and in consultation which may threaten peace, security coordinates the body’s activities with all parties involved in a conflict, and stability in the continent. The and meetings. deploy efforts and take all initiatives Chairperson of the Commission, deemed appropriate to prevent, however, can play and does play manage and resolve conflicts.’ The an active role through the use of The Chairperson of the Commission Chairperson of the AUC is therefore his or her good offices in collabora- is elected by the AU Assembly of responsible for ensuring the imple- tion with the Council. Ultimately, Heads of State and Government mentation and follow-up of the deci- the role of the Chairperson of for a four-year term. Since the sions of the PSC, including mounting the AU Commission is therefore establishment of the African Union, and deploying peace support mis- central to the activities of the PSC. the Commission has been headed sions authorised by the Council. The This partnership can however be by two Chairpersons: Alpha Oumar Chairperson of the Commission, enhanced through an increase in Konare, of Mali, from 2002 to working through the Commission for the staff complement within the AU 2007; and Jean Ping of , Peace and Security, is obliged to keep Commission that is responsible for from 2008 to the present; and one the PSC informed of developments the efficient functioning of the PSC.

PSC Report Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, T: +251-11-372-11-54; F: +251-11-372-59-54; [email protected]; www.issafrica.org

18 Important Forthcoming Dates

31 May to 11 June 2010 – International Criminal Court Review Conference, Kampala, Uganda

19 to 27 July 2010 - The 15th Summit of the African Union, Kampala, Uganda.

Specific dates of the different organs of the AU will include:

19 to 20 July 2010: Ordinary Session of the Permanent Representatives Committee (PRC)

22 to 23 July 2010: Ordinary Session of the Executive Council of Ministers

25 to 27 July 2010: 15th Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government

Country Election Date Burundi Presidential 28 June 2010 Tanzania Zanzibar Constitutional July 2010 Referendum Guinea Presidential 1st round 27 June 2nd round 18 July 2010 Côte d’Ivoire Presidential Mid-2010

Kenya Constitutional Referendum 4 August 2010 Ghana Local Government August 2010 Rwanda Presidential August 2010 Chad National Assembly 28 November 2010 Egypt People’s Assembly Shura November 2010 Council (half of the members) Equatorial Guinea Presidential December 2010

PSC Report Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, T: +251-11-372-11-54; F: +251-11-372-59-54; [email protected]; www.issafrica.org

19 Contributors to this Issue:

ISS PSC Report Programme: Dr. Tim Murithi, Dr. Solomon Dersso, Hallelujah Lulie, Eden Yohannes Yoseph

Donors: This Report is published through the support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, the Government of Denmark, the Foundation Open Society Institute, and the Humanity United Foundation. In addition, the Institute for Security Studies receives core support from the Governments of Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands.

As a leading African human security research institution, the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) works towards a stable and peaceful Africa characterised by sustainable development, human rights, the rule of law, democracy and collaborative security and gender mainstreaming.

© 2010, Institute for Security Studies

Copyright in the volume as a whole is vested in the Institute for Security Studies, and no part may be reproduced in whole or in part without the express permission, in writing, of the Institute. The opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute, its trustees, members of the Advisory Council or donors.

Contact

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PSC Report Programme, Institute for Security Studies, Addis Ababa, T: +251-11-372-11-54; F: +251-11-372-59-54; [email protected]; www.issafrica.org

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