DOCSLIB.ORG

THE MILTIADES DECREE There Is Some Evidence for the Debate

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
THE MILTIADES DECREE There Is Some Evidence for the Debate APPENDIX TWO THE MILTIADES DECREE There is some evidence for the debate which preceded the Athenian deci­ sion to meet the Persians in the field in 490. Herodotus, our principal source for the campaign, makes no mention of such deliberation (6.103.1), but Aristotle refers to a decree proposed by the general Miltiades which called for the Athenians to take provisions and take the field (Rh. 141 lalO; cf. Dem. 19.303), and Cornelius Nepos, writing in the first century B.C., refers explicitly to debate in Athens. According to Nepos, Athens' ten generals disagreed about whether the Athenians should meet the Persians or take refuge behind their walls. Miltiades favored engagement, and his opinion prevailed after 1000 Plataians arrived in Athens eager to repulse the in­ vaders (Milt. 4.4-5.2). The historicity of the Miltiades decree and the debate described by Nepos is discussed most profitably in conjunction with a pas­ sage in Herodotus to which Nepos' account bears resemblance. Herodotus informs us that after they had taken the field Athens' generals disagreed about whether they should fight the Persians. The matter was resolved by the vote of the polemarch Kallimachos, who had, however, apparently not taken part in the generals' initial discussions.' Miltiades won Kallimachos' support in the debate by arguing that a battle would minimize the likelihood of the Athenians medizing. The decision to fight thus made, the Athenians nevertheless did not engage the Persians for some days, until it was Milti­ ades' tum to command: according to Herodotus, the presidency (npvravT1- iT1) of the strategia passed daily from one general to another, while the polemarch never held command at all (6.109-111).2 We have evidence, then, for two debates, one occurring prior to the Athenians' departure from Athens, the other when the Athenians were al­ ready in the field. We may believe that neither debate is historical, that both are, or that either Herodotus or Nepos has transposed the discussion from its historical venue. There is nothing inherently implausible about there having been a debate among the Athenian commanders in the field. Herodotus re­ ports that there was a delay of some days between the arrival of the Atheni- 1 He had at least not voted on the first occasion (6.109.1-2). Cf. ch. 4 n. 6. 2 For related discussions see ch. 4 an'd ch. 5 § 2.1. THE MILTIADES DECREE 165 ans in Marathon and the battle itself. 3 He implies that Miltiades was waiting for the day of his presidency before he attacked, but a more likely explana­ tion for the delay is that the Athenians were awaiting the arrival of the Spar­ tans, 4 who had promised to send help after their celebration of the Kameia. 5 During their time in Marathon the Athenian commanders may well have debated amongst themselves the advantages of continued delay versus the desirability of fighting at once, while morale in the army was high and the likelihood of treason in Athens relatively small. That the Athenians eventu­ ally did fight before the Spartans arrived suggests either that the disadvan­ tages of delay had come to outweigh the benefits or that the Persians initi­ ated hostilities and thus forced the Athenians to fight before they were will­ ing.6 That some such discussion occurred in the field among Athens' com­ manders is plausible. 7 It is likewise plausible, indeed virtually certain, that the dispatch of forces to Marathon was preceded by debate in Athens, but I do not believe that Nepos has preserved in his narrative any accurate infor­ mation about that debate. Nepos' account suggests that Athens' generals were alone in deciding whether the Athenians should defend their walls or take the field against the invading Persians: no one other than the strategoi is mentioned as having participated in the discussion, nor is there any indi­ cation either that the generals' opinions were aired in a public forum or that their consensus was ratified by the demos (Milt. 4.4-5.2). This is contrary to what we would expect, namely, that the formal decision to take the field was made by the Athenian demos, however responsible the strategoi may have been for the policy adopted. 8 Nepos is unlikely to be correct in at­ tributing to the generals complete responsibility for decision-making in this 3 Later sources place the battle earlier, on the day of the Athenians• arrival at Marathon (lsoc. 4.87, Suda s.v. Hippias) or the following day (Nep. Milt. 5.3-4, Plut. Mor. 350e), but Herodotus is likely to have had more reliable information about the timing of the fight (cf. Lazenby [1993], p. 59). 4 Lazenby (1993), p. 59; Burn (1962), p. 246. There must have been some strategic advan­ tage to delaying battle. Herodotus' explanation is not sufficient. (Cf. HW II, p. 357: "Miltiades holds the command for several days by grace of his colleagues, who cede their days to him, and yet, though convinced that the interests of Athens demand instant battle for fear of internal sedition ... he will not engage till his own day comes round ....") 5 Hdt. 6.106. The Spartans were evidently prohibited from engaging in military operations during the Kameia. Cf. Thuc. 5.54.2 and see HW II, pp. 109 and 223. 6 Lazenby (1993), pp. 59-62, argues that, contrarY to the implication of Herodotus, the Per­ sians did take the initiative. 7 It is possible, however, that Herodotus has not accurately described the details of their debate. Specifically, Herodotus' portrayal of Kallimachos as a' minor player in the generals' discussions-may be mistaken. If Athens' generals were subordinate to the polemarch between 501/0 and 487/6 (for discussion of which possibility see chapter 4), we may believe that Kallimachos, as supreme commander at Marathon, had a greater role than Herodotus suggests in whatever discussions of strategy took place before the battle. 8 So also How (1919), p. 53, and Macan (1895), II, pp. 208-209. .
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Historically Speaking
    Historically Speaking Marathon at 2,500 ugust 12 marks an accepted date for By BG John S. Brown Greeks recently conquered by Persia rose the 2,500th anniversary of the Battle in revolt. Athens and the tiny city-state of A U.S. Army retired of Marathon, although the actual date Eretria attempted to assist, but the Per- may instead be September 12, depending upon how one sians utterly crushed the Ionians. Darius resolved to crush interprets the Lacedaemonian lunisolar calendar. The most Athens and Eretria as well and to bring the European Greeks notable commemoration will probably be the Athens into his orbit. Had he succeeded, he would have snuffed out Marathon this year, and other marathons around the world the democratic experiment, independent Hellenic civiliza- will undoubtedly take notice as well. Ironically, the ardu- tion and Greek national identity with a single stroke. ous 26-mile race is based upon an athletic performance by After preliminary operations in Thrace and Macedonia, the legendary Philippides that may not have actually oc- Darius launched a naval expedition directly across the curred. The battle itself did occur and is rightly regarded Aegean Sea. Securing—or devastating—islands en route, as among the most decisive in history. Marathon is ar- the Persians sacked Eretria and landed an army more than guably the first major battle for which we have a reliable twice the size of what Athens could muster in the sheltered record, provided largely by the world’s first actual histo- Bay of Marathon. Hippias recommended the spot, both be- rian, Herodotus.
    [Show full text]
  • Who Freed Athens? J
    Ancient Greek Democracy: Readings and Sources Edited by Eric W. Robinson Copyright © 2004 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd The Beginnings of the Athenian Democracv: Who Freed Athens? J Introduction Though the very earliest democracies lildy took shape elsewhere in Greece, Athens embraced it relatively early and would ultimately become the most famous and powerful democracy the ancient world ever hew. Democracy is usually thought to have taken hold among the Athenians with the constitutional reforms of Cleisthenes, ca. 508/7 BC. The tyrant Peisistratus and later his sons had ruled Athens for decades before they were overthrown; Cleisthenes, rallying the people to his cause, made sweeping changes. These included the creation of a representative council (bode)chosen from among the citizens, new public organizations that more closely tied citizens throughout Attica to the Athenian state, and the populist ostracism law that enabled citizens to exile danger- ous or undesirable politicians by vote. Beginning with these measures, and for the next two centuries or so with only the briefest of interruptions, democracy held sway at Athens. Such is the most common interpretation. But there is, in fact, much room for disagree- ment about when and how democracy came to Athens. Ancient authors sometimes refer to Solon, a lawgiver and mediator of the early sixth century, as the founder of the Athenian constitution. It was also a popular belief among the Athenians that two famous “tyrant-slayers,” Harmodius and Aristogeiton, inaugurated Athenian freedom by assas- sinating one of the sons of Peisistratus a few years before Cleisthenes’ reforms - though ancient writers take pains to point out that only the military intervention of Sparta truly ended the tyranny.
    [Show full text]
  • The Satrap of Western Anatolia and the Greeks
    University of Pennsylvania ScholarlyCommons Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations 2017 The aS trap Of Western Anatolia And The Greeks Eyal Meyer University of Pennsylvania, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations Part of the Ancient History, Greek and Roman through Late Antiquity Commons Recommended Citation Meyer, Eyal, "The aS trap Of Western Anatolia And The Greeks" (2017). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 2473. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2473 This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/2473 For more information, please contact [email protected]. The aS trap Of Western Anatolia And The Greeks Abstract This dissertation explores the extent to which Persian policies in the western satrapies originated from the provincial capitals in the Anatolian periphery rather than from the royal centers in the Persian heartland in the fifth ec ntury BC. I begin by establishing that the Persian administrative apparatus was a product of a grand reform initiated by Darius I, which was aimed at producing a more uniform and centralized administrative infrastructure. In the following chapter I show that the provincial administration was embedded with chancellors, scribes, secretaries and military personnel of royal status and that the satrapies were periodically inspected by the Persian King or his loyal agents, which allowed to central authorities to monitory the provinces. In chapter three I delineate the extent of satrapal authority, responsibility and resources, and conclude that the satraps were supplied with considerable resources which enabled to fulfill the duties of their office. After the power dynamic between the Great Persian King and his provincial governors and the nature of the office of satrap has been analyzed, I begin a diachronic scrutiny of Greco-Persian interactions in the fifth century BC.
    [Show full text]
  • The Book of Cornelius Nepos on the Great Generals of Foreign Nations
    THE BOOK OF CORNELIUS NEPOS ON THE GREAT GENERALS OF FOREIGN NATIONS PREFACE I DOUBT not, Atticus, that many readers will look upon this kind of writing as trivial and unworthy of the parts played by great men, when they find that I have told who taught Epaminondas music or see it mentioned among his titles to fame that he was a graceful dancer and a skilled performer on the flute.^ But such critics will for the most part be men unfamiHar with Greek letters, who will think no conduct proper which does not conform to their own habits. If these men can be made to under- stand that not all peoples look upon the same acts as honourable or base, but that they judge them all in the hght of the usage of their forefathers, they will not be surprised that I, in giving an account of the merits of Greeks, have borne in mind the usage of that nation. For example, it was no disgrace to Cimon, an eminent citizen of Athens, to have his own sister to wife,^ inasmuch as his countrymen followed that same custom ; but according to our standards such a union is considered impious. In Crete it is thought praiseworthy for young men to have had the greatest possible number of love afFairs. F.v. N 369 Source: Jeffrey Henderson, Cornelius Nepos: On Great Generals. On Historians, LCL (London: Heinemann, 1929). PRAEFATIO, 4-8 At Lacedaemon no woman without a husband, how- ever distinguished she may be, refuses to go to a dinner-party as a hired entertainer.^ Almost every- where in Greece it was deemed a high honour to be proclaimed victor at Olympia ; even to appear on the stage and exhibit oneself to the people was never regarded as shameful by those nations.
    [Show full text]
  • Marathon 2,500 Years Edited by Christopher Carey & Michael Edwards
    MARATHON 2,500 YEARS EDITED BY CHRISTOPHER CAREY & MICHAEL EDWARDS INSTITUTE OF CLASSICAL STUDIES SCHOOL OF ADVANCED STUDY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON MARATHON – 2,500 YEARS BULLETIN OF THE INSTITUTE OF CLASSICAL STUDIES SUPPLEMENT 124 DIRECTOR & GENERAL EDITOR: JOHN NORTH DIRECTOR OF PUBLICATIONS: RICHARD SIMPSON MARATHON – 2,500 YEARS PROCEEDINGS OF THE MARATHON CONFERENCE 2010 EDITED BY CHRISTOPHER CAREY & MICHAEL EDWARDS INSTITUTE OF CLASSICAL STUDIES SCHOOL OF ADVANCED STUDY UNIVERSITY OF LONDON 2013 The cover image shows Persian warriors at Ishtar Gate, from before the fourth century BC. Pergamon Museum/Vorderasiatisches Museum, Berlin. Photo Mohammed Shamma (2003). Used under CC‐BY terms. All rights reserved. This PDF edition published in 2019 First published in print in 2013 This book is published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial- NoDerivatives (CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0) license. More information regarding CC licenses is available at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/ Available to download free at http://www.humanities-digital-library.org ISBN: 978-1-905670-81-9 (2019 PDF edition) DOI: 10.14296/1019.9781905670819 ISBN: 978-1-905670-52-9 (2013 paperback edition) ©2013 Institute of Classical Studies, University of London The right of contributors to be identified as the authors of the work published here has been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Designed and typeset at the Institute of Classical Studies TABLE OF CONTENTS Introductory note 1 P. J. Rhodes The battle of Marathon and modern scholarship 3 Christopher Pelling Herodotus’ Marathon 23 Peter Krentz Marathon and the development of the exclusive hoplite phalanx 35 Andrej Petrovic The battle of Marathon in pre-Herodotean sources: on Marathon verse-inscriptions (IG I3 503/504; Seg Lvi 430) 45 V.
    [Show full text]
  • The Family Connection of Alcibiades and Axiochus , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 27:2 (1986:Summer) P.173
    STANLEY, PHILLIP V., The Family Connection of Alcibiades and Axiochus , Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies, 27:2 (1986:Summer) p.173 The Family Connection of Alcibiades and Axiochus Phillip V. Stanley LTHOUGH THE ANCESTRY of the Athenian general Alcibiades A III remains obscure for the sixth century, his genealogy is as­ sumed to be secure for the fifth. The descent of the family from Alcibiades I to Alcibiades IV has been reconstructed by Vander­ pool in the following way:l Alcibiades J2 I Cleinias I I Alcibiades II I I Axiochus Cleinias II I I I I Cleinias III Alcibiades III Cleinias IV I Alcibiades IV I E. Vanderpool, "The Ostracism of the Elder Alcibiades," Hesperia 21 (I952) 1-8, esp. 6. Cr. M. B. Wallace, "Early Greek Proxenoi," Phoenix 24 (I 970) 196f; 1. K. DAVIES, Athenian Propertied Families (Oxford 1971 [hereafter APF)) 10-12. According to Isoc. 16.25f (delivered by Alcibiades IV, son of the general), Alcibiades I, the ally of Cleisthenes when he expelled Hippias from Athens, was the great-grandfather (1TpO- 1Ta1T1To~) of Alcibiades III. The general difficulty stems from the apparent need to reduce the number of generations separating Alcibiades I from Alcibiades III, believed to be five: if the number is not reduced, Alcibiades I would actually be the great-great­ grandfather of the general. 2 Roman numerals are those assigned in PA and APF. These numerals will continue to be used even when homonyms are added to the family's genealogy. In order to avoid the confusion that might result if a major overhaul of the numerical system for this family were attempted, and to preserve the numerical descent established for the branch of the family to which Alcibiades III belongs, the newly identified individual will be assigned the next available Roman numeral, even though he may be earlier than an individual with the same name whose number is lower.
    [Show full text]
  • Transcript of “The Greeks: Crucible of Civilization” Episode One: “The Birth of Democracy”
    Transcript of “The Greeks: Crucible of Civilization” Episode One: “The Birth of Democracy” Transcript of PBS Video - The Greeks: Crucible of Civilization Part 1 – The Birth of Democracy 0:00 – Series Introduction: The Significance of the Greeks The Greeks. A people glorious and arrogant, valiant and headstrong. These were the men and women who laid the very foundations of Western Civilization. Their monuments still recall perhaps the most extraordinary two centuries in history, a time that saw the birth of science and politics, philosophy, literature and drama. [A time that] saw the creation of art and architecture we still strive to equal. And the Greeks achieved all this against a backdrop of war and conflict, for they would vanquish armies, navies, and empires many times their size, and build an empire of their own which stretched across the Mediterranean. For one brief moment, the mighty warships of the Greeks ruled the seas, their prosperity unequalled. These achievements, achievements which still shape our world, were made not by figures lost to time, but by men and women whose voices we can still hear, whose lives we can follow, men such as Themistocles, one of the world’s greatest military generals; Pericles, a politician of vision and genius; and Socrates, the most famous philosopher in history. This is the story of these astonishing individuals, of the rise and fall of a civilization that changed the world. 2:35 – Episode Introduction: The Revolution 508 BC. Five centuries before the birth of Christ. In a town called Athens, a tiny city in mainland Greece, pandemonium ruled the streets.
    [Show full text]
  • Cleisthenes Knows That for His Revolution to Succeed, It Must Give People Sufficient Incentive to Participate in It to Make It
    First Draft (Incomplete) Kleisthenes and the Ascent of Democracy Krishna K. Ladha <[email protected]> Department of Politics, New York University, New York, NY 10003 Abstract Who is Kleisthenes? What is democracy? How did it come into being? Kleisthenes conceived democracy as a strategy to attain power by proposing the Athenian constitution as an instrument of a lasting compromise between two militarily equipped factions of Athens: the hoplites and the nobility. Based on the history of Athens, this paper formulates a dynamic game of complete information that Kleisthenes faced in the sixth century BCE. The innovative solution to the game is a new system of government: democracy. To implement democracy, Kleisthenes faced two problems: the problem of constitution design and the problem of factions that lay beyond constitution. The solution to the first is the Athenian constitution, and the solution to the second is the tribal reform. The main accomplishments of the Athenian democracy are the following: (a) it offered domestic peace, economic well being, and the capability to withstand or dominate foreign powers, and (b) it was self-enforcing. The paper seeks to highlight Kleisthenes’s thinking, a thinking that reflects a great command of the economics of information, mechanism design and game theory. 1 October 2003 Kleisthenes and the Ascent of Democracy Krishna K. Ladha [email protected] Department of Politics, New York University, New York, NY 10003 Cleisthenes … [established] laws and a constitution that was admirably balanced so as to promote harmony between the citizens and security for the whole state. Plutarh (1960, p. 167) Introduction Kleisthenes installed democracy in Athens in 507 BCE.
    [Show full text]
  • The Persian Wars: Ionian Revolt the Ionian Revolt, Which Began in 499
    The Persian Wars: Ionian Revolt The Ionian Revolt, which began in 499 B.C. marked the beginning of the Greek-Persian wars. In 546 B.C. the Persians had conquered the wealthy Greek settlements in Ionia (Asia Minor). The Persians took the Ionians’ farmland and harbors. They forced the Ionians to pay tributes (the regular payments of goods). The Ionians also had to serve in the Persian army. The Ionians knew they could not defeat the Persians by themselves, so they asked mainland Greece for help. Athens sent soldiers and a small fleet of ships. Unfortunately for the Ionians, the Athenians went home after their initial success, leaving the small Ionian army to fight alone. In 493 B.C. the Persian army defeated the Ionians. To punish the Ionians for rebelling, the Persians destroyed the city of Miletus. They may have sold some of tis people into slavery. The Persian Wars: Battle of Marathon After the Ionian Revolt, the Persian King Darius decided to conquer the city-states of mainland Greece. He sent messengers to ask for presents of Greek earth and water as a sign that the Greeks agreed to accept Persian rule. But the Greeks refused. Darius was furious. In 490 B.C., he sent a large army of foot soldiers and cavalry (mounted soldiers) across the Aegean Sea by boat to Greece. The army assembled on the pain of Marathon. A general named Miltiades (Mill-te-ah-deez) convinced the other Greek commanders to fight the Persians at Marathon. In need of help, the Athenians sent a runner named Pheidippides (Fa-dip-e-deez) to Sparta who ran for two days and two nights.
    [Show full text]
  • Homologiai Are Meant to Be Broken: Trickery and Miltiades' Paros
    Homologiai Are Meant to Be Broken: Trickery and Miltiades’ Paros Expedition in Herodotus This paper will discuss the account of Miltiades’ failed campaign against Paros as given by Herodotus (6.132-136); it will analyze the narrative with regard both to other portions of the Histories, as well as alternative accounts of the expedition preserved elsewhere. In doing so, it will demonstrate that Herodotus suppresses the standard version of the expedition in favor of one which deemphasizes and exculpates Parian Medism during the Marathon campaign. An exposition of the author’s motives will thus determine that we should regard the historicity of his testimony with considerable skepticism. The primary focus of research into the account has been to determine its accuracy with respect to particular historical details. These include the date of the campaign and the stated motives behind the expedition (Bicknell 1972, Develin 1977). In contrast, the reasons behind Herodotus’ preference of this version and its role in his broader narrative have thus far received comparatively little attention. As Herodotus tells it, Miltiades undertakes an unsuccessful expedition against the island of Paros shortly after his triumph at the battle of Marathon. At the height of his success, the commander petitions and wins the support of the Athenian populace for a fleet to attack the island of Paros, which had Medized during the campaign against Marathon. While the general claims their support of the Persians as a pretext, Herodotus notes that the truest cause for the expedition was that an individual Parian had defamed Miltiades before the Persians (6.133.1).
    [Show full text]
  • Ionian Revolt to Marathon
    2/26/2012 Lecture 11: Ionian Revolt to Marathon HIST 332 Spring 2012 Life for Greek poleis under Cyrus • Cyrus sent messages to the Ionians asking them to revolt against Lydian rule – Ionians refused After conquest: • Ionian cities offered to be Persian subjects under the same terms – Cyrus refused, citing the Ionians’ unwillingness to help – Median general Harpagus sent to conquer Ionia – Installed tyrants to rule for Persia Ionian Revolt (499-494 BCE) 499 Aristagoras, tyrant of Miletos wants to attack Naxos • He can’t pay for it – so persuades satrap to invade – The invasion fails • Aristogoras needs to repay Persians • leads rebellion against Persian tyrants • He goes to Greece to ask for help – Sparta refuses – Athens sends a fleet 1 2/26/2012 Cleomenes’ reply to Aristagoras • Aristagoras goes to Sparta to solicit help – tells King Cleomenes that the “Great King” lived three months from the sea (i.e. easy task) “Get out of Sparta before sundown, Milesian stranger, for you have no speech eloquent enough to induce the Lacedemonians to march for three months inland from the sea.” -Herodotus, Histories 5.50 Ionian Rebellion Against Persia Ionian cities rebel 498 Greeks from Ionia attempt to take Satrap capital of Sardis – fire breaks out • Temple of Ahura-Mazda is burned • Battle of Ephesus – Greeks routed 497-5 Persian Counter-Attack – Cyprus taken – Hellespont pacified 494 Sack of Miletus Satrap installs democracies in place of tyrannies Darius not pleased with the Greeks • Motives obscure – punishment of Athenian aid to Ionians – was
    [Show full text]
  • Ancient History
    ANCIENT HISTORY 500 – 440 BC Evaluate the contribution of Miltiades and Themistocles to the Greek victory over the Persians from 490 to 479 BC. During the Persian Wars a number of personalities arose to challenge the threat from across the Aegean, all of them with personal motivations, strategies, diplomatic initiatives and policies. Greek politics were tense at the time of the Persian wars as Herodotus reports,“Among the Athenian commanders opinion was divided”. Some of the prominent personalities of both Athens and Sparta include Aristides, Themistocles, Leonidas, Miltiades and Pausanius. However it was Miltiades and Themistocles that made the greatest contribution to Greek Victory. Both Miltiades and Themistocles used their prior experience as well as thought out tactics to outplay the ‘unbeatable’ Persian army. Separately, these two personalities successfully led the Greeks to victory through the battles of Marathon and Salamis, as well as a number of significant catalysts. Despite this, the contribution of Themistocles to the Persian Wars may have been greater than that of Miltiades due to the lasting effect his changes made to the entire war effort but this may have been due to the length of their time in power. Miltiades was not always respected by his Athenian counterparts as previous to the Persian Wars he had acted as vassal to the Persian King, Darius I. The Ionian Revolt proved a great turning point for many Greeks who were under Persian influence. Miltiades joined the revolt and returned to Athens but was imprisoned for the crime of tyranny with the sentence of death. However, he was able to prove himself anti-Persian and was released.
    [Show full text]