THE MILTIADES DECREE There Is Some Evidence for the Debate

APPENDIX TWO

There is some evidence for the debate which preceded the Athenian deci• sion to meet the Persians in the field in 490. Herodotus, our principal source for the campaign, makes no mention of such deliberation (6.103.1), but Aristotle refers to a decree proposed by the general Miltiades which called for the Athenians to take provisions and take the field (Rh. 141 lalO; cf. Dem. 19.303), and Cornelius Nepos, writing in the first century B.C., refers explicitly to debate in Athens. According to Nepos, Athens' ten generals disagreed about whether the Athenians should meet the Persians or take refuge behind their walls. Miltiades favored engagement, and his opinion prevailed after 1000 Plataians arrived in Athens eager to repulse the in• vaders (Milt. 4.4-5.2). The historicity of the Miltiades decree and the debate described by Nepos is discussed most profitably in conjunction with a pas• sage in Herodotus to which Nepos' account bears resemblance. Herodotus informs us that after they had taken the field Athens' generals disagreed about whether they should fight the Persians. The matter was resolved by the vote of the polemarch Kallimachos, who had, however, apparently not taken part in the generals' initial discussions.' Miltiades won Kallimachos' support in the debate by arguing that a battle would minimize the likelihood of the Athenians medizing. The decision to fight thus made, the Athenians nevertheless did not engage the Persians for some days, until it was Milti• ades' tum to command: according to Herodotus, the presidency (npvravT1- iT1) of the strategia passed daily from one general to another, while the polemarch never held command at all (6.109-111).2 We have evidence, then, for two debates, one occurring prior to the Athenians' departure from Athens, the other when the Athenians were al• ready in the field. We may believe that neither debate is historical, that both are, or that either Herodotus or Nepos has transposed the discussion from its historical venue. There is nothing inherently implausible about there having been a debate among the Athenian commanders in the field. Herodotus re• ports that there was a delay of some days between the arrival of the Atheni-

1 He had at least not voted on the first occasion (6.109.1-2). Cf. ch. 4 n. 6. 2 For related discussions see ch. 4 an'd ch. 5 § 2.1. THE MILTIADES DECREE 165 ans in Marathon and the battle itself. 3 He implies that Miltiades was waiting for the day of his presidency before he attacked, but a more likely explana• tion for the delay is that the Athenians were awaiting the arrival of the Spar• tans, 4 who had promised to send help after their celebration of the Kameia. 5 During their time in Marathon the Athenian commanders may well have debated amongst themselves the advantages of continued delay versus the desirability of fighting at once, while morale in the army was high and the likelihood of treason in Athens relatively small. That the Athenians eventu• ally did fight before the Spartans arrived suggests either that the disadvan• tages of delay had come to outweigh the benefits or that the Persians initi• ated hostilities and thus forced the Athenians to fight before they were will• ing.6 That some such discussion occurred in the field among Athens' com• manders is plausible. 7 It is likewise plausible, indeed virtually certain, that the dispatch of forces to Marathon was preceded by debate in Athens, but I do not believe that Nepos has preserved in his narrative any accurate infor• mation about that debate. Nepos' account suggests that Athens' generals were alone in deciding whether the Athenians should defend their walls or take the field against the invading Persians: no one other than the strategoi is mentioned as having participated in the discussion, nor is there any indi• cation either that the generals' opinions were aired in a public forum or that their consensus was ratified by the demos (Milt. 4.4-5.2). This is contrary to what we would expect, namely, that the formal decision to take the field was made by the Athenian demos, however responsible the strategoi may have been for the policy adopted. 8 Nepos is unlikely to be correct in at• tributing to the generals complete responsibility for decision-making in this

3 Later sources place the battle earlier, on the day of the Athenians• arrival at Marathon (lsoc. 4.87, Suda s.v. Hippias) or the following day (Nep. Milt. 5.3-4, Plut. Mor. 350e), but Herodotus is likely to have had more reliable information about the timing of the fight (cf. Lazenby [1993], p. 59). 4 Lazenby (1993), p. 59; Burn (1962), p. 246. There must have been some strategic advan• tage to delaying battle. Herodotus' explanation is not sufficient. (Cf. HW II, p. 357: "Miltiades holds the command for several days by grace of his colleagues, who cede their days to him, and yet, though convinced that the interests of Athens demand instant battle for fear of internal sedition ... he will not engage till his own day comes round ....") 5 Hdt. 6.106. The Spartans were evidently prohibited from engaging in military operations during the Kameia. Cf. Thuc. 5.54.2 and see HW II, pp. 109 and 223. 6 Lazenby (1993), pp. 59-62, argues that, contrarY to the implication of Herodotus, the Per• sians did take the initiative. 7 It is possible, however, that Herodotus has not accurately described the details of their debate. Specifically, Herodotus' portrayal of Kallimachos as a' minor player in the generals' discussions-may be mistaken. If Athens' generals were subordinate to the polemarch between 501/0 and 487/6 (for discussion of which possibility see chapter 4), we may believe that Kallimachos, as supreme commander at Marathon, had a greater role than Herodotus suggests in whatever discussions of strategy took place before the battle. 8 So also How (1919), p. 53, and Macan (1895), II, pp. 208-209.