DOCUMENT ittumE
ED 322 404 CE 055 632
AUTHOR Bailey, Thomas TITLE Technology, Skills, and Education in the Apparel Industry. Revised. INSTITUTION National Center on Education and Employment, New York, NY. SPONS AGENCY Office of Educational Research and Improvement (ED), Washington, DC. PUB DATE Oct 89 NOTE 108p. PUB TYPE Reports - Research/Technical (143)
EDRS PRICE MF01/PC05 Plus Postage. DESCRIPTORS Adult Education; *Automation; *Business Responsibility; Economic Development; Educational Needs; *Fashion Industry; qIndustrial Training; Literacy Education; *Manufacturing; *On the Job Training; Organizational Change; Postsecondary Education; Technical Occupations IDENTIFIERS *Textile Industry
ABSTRACT Although more than 1 million people in the United States are employed in the apparel manufacturing industry,the industry has been increasingly threatened by international competition, changes in consumer tastes, and demands thatmany domestic firms are ill-prepared to mt,et. The traditionalapparel production system emphasized cutting costs, especiallythe cost of direct labor, by breaking down the productionprocess into many separate components. In response to the increase in international competition in the late 1960s and early 1970s, apparelmakers intensified this traditional strategy. However, thisapproach was not successful, both because of technological barriers toautomation and because of changes in consumer demand for apparel thatweakened some previously successful markets. As a result, some apparelmakers are ncw trying to move to production systems that involve greater flexibility, faster production times, greater interactionwith customers and suppliers, and more attention to bothproduct and process innovation. This strategy requires a more sophisticateduse of advanced microelectronic technology as wellas profound changes in human resource philosophy and practice, includingmuch more attention to the educational preparation and continuing trainingof the work force and a change in the orientation of management.Postsecondary textile and apparel schools are well connected to theindustry and have access to information about industry needs, butcommunity colleges are not. The industry must press for bettersecondary education and provide more postsecondary education,especially in technical skills. (42 references) (KC)
**t***************t************* *************************************** Reproductions supplied by EDRS are the best thatcan be made from the original document. *********************************************************************** Technology, Skills, and gz Education in the ApparelIndustry
Thomas Bailey Conservation of Human Resources Columbia University
Revised October 1989
This research was funded by the Office of EducationalResearch and Improvement throughthe National Centeron Education and Employment at Teachers College,Columbia University.
U.S DEPAItTMENT Of EDUCATION Office Educahonal Research and UnprOvement ED T1ONAL RESOURCES INFORMATION CENTER (ERIC) This document has beenreprOduced as received from the person ororganization originating it. a Minor changes have beenmade to improve reproduction Quality
Points of view or opinions stated inthis docu- ment do not neCesaanlyrepresent official OERI Positron nr Racy
2 3EST COPY AVAILABLE Acknowledgments
As a project based on interviews, thisstudy has depended entirely on the generous cooperation ofthe individuals who agreed to talk to me. Ron Blackwell of the Amalgamated Clothingand Textile Wcrkers Union (ACTWU), FredFortess of the Philadelphia College of Textiles and Science, andPeter Harding of Kurt Salmon Associates (KSA) read an earlier draft carefully andgave me detailed and useful comments. In addition to generally strengthening the report, they savedme from several errors.I had very helpful conversations with Stig Kry of KurtSalmon Associates, and with Keir Jorgensen of ACTWU. They were generous with their time and information.I want to thank Frank Hughes, the assistant director of TC2 who was gracious andhelpful during both of my visits to the TC2 center in Raleigh. George Wino, the chief economist at the American TextileManufacturers Institute was not only a crucial source of informationbut he also helped to set up some of the interviews.Billy Bennett who was the directorof the Oxford Industry's training school whenI visited there was also very helpful. Gary Freedman of INA Systems talked tome about his firm's work and helpedme get access to a plant where I couldsee a program developed by INA. I also'want to thank Larry Haddock of the Textile and Apparelprogram at Southern Institute of Technology and Howard Korchin and Jack Wolfishat the Fashion Institute of Technology, who weregenerous with their time, information and insights. Finally, I particularlywant to thank the many employees and officers of the apparel firmsthat were the subject of the study. In some cases they mademany hours of their time available to me and without their cooperation,the study would not have been possible. Shoshana Vasheetz was very helpful inthe preparation of the manuscript.
The analysis and conclusionsare my own and do not necessarily reflect the policy or opinions ofthe Department of Education, the individuals with whom I talkedor the firms and institutions that they represent.
3 Table of Contents
Executive Summary i
Introduction 1 Technology and Skills in the Modern U.S.Economy 4
The Traditional Production System 8 A Fragmented System 8
Strengths and Weaknesses of The TraditionalSystem . . . 13 The Traditional Human ResourceStrategy 16 Automation and Deskilling--The FirstStage Response to Imports ... 20 Wage Cuts 21 The Potential for Automation 24 Skills and Education 29 Conclusion 33
The Failure of Automation and Deskilling 35 Increased Foreign Competition 35 Labor Supply Problems 36 Fragmentation of Markets 37 Limits to Flexibility 40 Flexible Production and the Contractor System . . . 40 Technology and Flexible Production 42 Conclusion 44
The Emerging Systert of Production 46 Organizational Change 49 The Spread of Product-Orientedor Flexible Systems 50 Alternative Human Resource Strategies 54 Unit Production Systems 54 Modular Manufacturing 59 The unit production and module systems compared . . 63 Conclusion 65
Skills, Training, and Education 67 Skills 67 Supervisors 70 Mechanics 71 Operators 72 Education and Training in the ApparelIndustry 75 Conclusion 84
Conclusions and Recommendations 87 Recommendations 89 Bibliography 96
4 Executive Summary
More than one million people are employed inthe apparel manufacturing industry and they representover 6 percent of manufacturing workforce in the U.S. Starting in the late 1960s and early 1970s, however, domestic employmentin this industry was increasingly threatened by international competition. In 1960, imports consumed one percent of theapparel market; by 1988, more than half of the apparel dollarwas spent on foreign- produced apparel. In addition to foreign competition, the industry has also been buffeted bychanges in consumer tastes and demands that many domestic firmswere ill-prepared to meet.
This report assesses the roles thathuman resource policy in general and education and training inparticular can play in the industry's response to its currentchallenges. To understand the human resource component, it isnecessary to assess the types of skills needed for the strategiesthat apparel makers are trying to pursue. The report also addresses the ongoingcontroversy about whether modern technology hasincreased the required skill levels for workers or whether it has beenused to reduce needed skills. The report's argument can be statedas follows:
The traditional apparel productionsystem: The traditional production strategy in apparel emphasizedcutting costs, especially the cost of direct labor,by breaking down the production process intomany separate components. A critical element of this strategywas the accumulation of inventories of inputs, work in process, and finishedgoods that allowed each small step in the productionprocess to be engineered in isolation. The inventories acted as buffers, preventingproblems or delays in one step from spreading toother steps. This approach to productionwas accompanied by a human resource strategy that was aimed both at reducingthe skill requirements and at reducing the direct laborrequired for any item. Far from seeking to enhance t educational preparation of the workforce, this strategywas de,...gned to reduce the educational and training needs of apparel workers. As a result, apparel workers had low levels of educational attainmentand received little formal training once on the job.
In response to the increase in internationalcompetition in the late 1960s and early1970s, apparel makers intensified the traditional strategy. They continued to search forever cheaper labor, more precise engineeringof the individual tasks, and opportunities to automate and toreduce the skill requirements of apparel production workers.
The emerging production system:The intensified traditional strategy was not successful in slowingthe growth of imports, both because of technological barriersto automation and because of changes in theconsumer demand for apparel that weakenedsome
1. of the markets in which U.S. producershad been most successful. As a result, some apparel makersare now trying to move to production systems that involve greaterflexibility, faster production times, greater interaction withcustomers and suppliers, and more attention to bothproduct and process innovation.
This strategy requiresa more sophisticated use of advanced micro-electronic technologyas well as profound changes in human resource philosophy and practice, including muchmore attention to the educational preparation and continuingtraining of the workforce. The strategy requires a fundamental change inthe orientation of top management. It puts new demands particularly on middle-level personnel such as mechanics andsupervisors. But the job of the sewing, machine operatorhas changed as well. Competency at a larger number of tasks,broader skills, a stronger conceptual understanding of workprocesses and business operations, increased ability to interactwith other employees, and the ability to work ina more rapidly changing and less well- defined environment are all increasinglyimportant for new human resource strategy.
The system of education for the apparelindustry: How ready is the system of training and educationfor the apparel industry to prepare the workforce for thosenew demands?The post- secondary textile and apparel schoolsare well connected to the industry and at least have goodaccess to information about industry needs. Although there is some disagreementabout how best to prepare apparelmanagers and engineers for the emerging environment, at leastan institutional framework is in place that can address these needs.
The role of general communitycolleges in preparing managers and technicians for the industry ismuch weak r. Thesa schools lack strong contacts with the industryand do not tend to attract students who start out withan interest in apparel. For example, apparel makers increasingly seekgraduates of electrical engineering associateprograms to fill mechanic and technician positions. But it is difficult to attract thesegraduates to a traditional manufacturing industrysuch as apparel. Especially in the south, students inthese programs often go to community colleges precisely to avoida job in the mills. As a result, training for the middle levelo:cupations--those needing a high school education withsome additional technical training--is problematic. The weakness seems to result froma lack of appreciation of the importanceof these jobs on the part of employers, a lack of intereston the part of students, and poor quality and insufficient capacityin the education system.
The preparation for entry-leveloccupations must rely primarily on the outside educationalsystem. The potential problem here is thatso many of the industry's lower level workers have weak basic skills. In the past, industry managers have seen low educational levelsas an asset to the apparel labor force--they believed that apparel workersdid not need a secondary school education, and that highschool degrees would just increase their expectations. But good basic skills are now more important and to the extent that apparel firmsface a more rapidly changing environment,they need workers at all levels who are adaptable. And solid general education helpsindividuals adjust to change.
Finally, much of the educationalchallenge facing the industry in the future will involvetraining and retraining adult workers and current employees. Continuing changes in technology, products, market characteristics, firmorganization, and production processes will requiremore frequent retraining and updating of knowledge. Informal training has always beenan integral part of workplace education,but informal training is primarily useful for passingon knowledge from one group of employees to another.More explicit and organizedmeans are needed for diffusing more rapidlychanging skills.Moreover, if experienced lower level employeescontinue to be the primary source of mechanics andsupervisors, retrainingand upgrading will be the key to the effectivenessof these increasingly important and demanding positions.
A reform strategy: An educationalreform strategy for the industry would include the followingcomponents: Management training needs to be orientedto be more in tune with the demands of more flexible productionsystems, with an emphasis on the need for organizational innovation withinthe firm and for more sophisticated relationshipsamong firms within the industry and in textile and retail industries. Post-secondary training for technicians and supervisors isparticularly lacking and urgently needs to be strengthened. Entry level preparation is hamperedby weak basic skills and deficientsecondary school systems. Firms must work with local publicschools to improve that system, but they may also need to providebasic skills training to theirown workforce either on theirown or with financial assistance from the public sector, trade unions,or employer associations. The industry needs to put particularemphasis on upgrading and on- the-job training. It is primarily through the educationand retraining of experienced workersthat firms can both meet the rising skill needs of emergingwork processes and continue to play an important social role inproviding employment for workers with low levels of educationalattainment.
The research is basedon information gathered from field visits to 17 apparel manufacturingplants owned by 13 different firms. The smallest plant hadone employee and the largest had 2000. The largest firm in the samplehad 15,000 workers. The sample was chosen to includeplants making a variety of products and using modern as wellas older equipment. I also included
7 plants that were using sewing modules andtwo that were using unit production systems. The plants were located in NewYork, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama,and Wisconsin. Information was also gathered from visitsto six schools Ind educational centers that provide trainingand instruction for the garment industry, and from telephoneinterviews with five additional schools. Chapter 1
Introduction
More than one million peopleare employed in the apparel manufacturing industry. It accounts for over 6 percent of manufacturing employment in the U.S.(USDOL 1989). However, the
importance of the industry cannot beunderstood through its employment totals alone. It has provided a first job in the U.S. for millions of immigrants anda first job in the industrial sector for millions of rural residentsdisplaced from U.S. farms.
Apparel is still a major emploler inmany cities with growing immigrant populations. It remains the largest manufacturing industry in New York City and apparelemployment has actually grown in Los Angeles and southern California duringthe late
1980s. Garment factories continue to bean important source of employment in the south, especially outsideof the major metropolitan areas. The apparel manufacturing industryalso generates demand for the textile andfiber industries, whichare also large sources of employment inthe U.S., and is an essential component of the apparel design andmerchandising centers that play such an important role inNew York and increasingly in other cities such as Los Angeles.
Starting in the late 1960s andearly 1970s, however, domestic employment in thisindustry was increasingly threatened by international competition. In 1960, imports consumedone percent of the apparel market; by1988, more than half of the apparel dollar was spenton foreign produced apparel (AAMA
1
9 2
1988a:Tables 23 and 24). In addition to foreign competition,the
industry has also been Luffeted by changesin consumer tastes and demands that it was ill-prepared to meet.
Apparel manufacturers and their representativesand advisors
still look to various types oflegal import barriers to protect domestic production, but other strategiesare also being used.
Although production technologies had changedlittle in decades, in the last 15 yearssome garment makers have put more emphasis on automation in an attempt to reduce laborcosts, and even more recently some have experimented with combiningmodern technology with organizational innovations.
This report assesses the rolethat human resource policy in general and education and training inparticular can play in the industry's response to its currentchallenges. To understand the human resource components, it isnecessary to assess the types of skills needed for the strategiesthat apparel makers are trying to pursue. The report's argument can be statedas follows:
The traditional productionstrategy in apparel emphasized cutting costs, especially thecost of direct labor, by breaking down the productionprocess into many separate components. A critical element of this strategywas the accumulation of inventories of inputs, work inprocess, and finished goods that allowed each small step in the productionprocess to be engineered in isolation. This was accompanied bya human resource strategy that was aimed both atreducing the skill requirements and at reducingthe direct labor required forany
10 3
item. Far from seeking to enhance the educationalrreparation of the workforce, this strategywas designed to reduce the
educational and training needs ofapparel workers. As a result,
apparel workers had low levels ofeducational attainment and
received little formal trainingonce on the job.
The industry's response to the increasein international
competition in the late 1960s andearly 1970s was to intensify
its traditional strategy. Apparel makers continued to search for
ever cheaper labor, more precise engineeringof the tasks
themselves, and opportunities toautomate and to reduce the skill
requirements of apparel productionworkers.
This strategy was not successful inslowing the growth of
imports, both because of technologicalbarriers to automation and because of changes in theconsumer demand for apparel that
weakened some of the markets in whichU.S. producers had been
most successful. As a result, some apparel makersare now trying
to move to production systemsthat involve greater flexibility,
faster production times, greaterinteraction with custoaers and
suppliers, and more attentionto both product and process
innovation. This approach requiresa more sophisticated use of
advanced micro-electronictechnology as well as profound changes
in human resource philosophyand practice, including muchmore
attention to the educationalpreparation and continuing training of the workforce. This strategy therefo:e representsa
fundamental departure from traditionalmanagement practices, particularly humanresource management practices.
11 4
Technology and Skills in the Modern U.S. Economy
The shifts in the relationship between technology, skills,
and human resources in the apparel industryover the last two
decades reflect similar developments inmany industries and,
indeed, in the economy as a whole inan era of much more
intensive competition and profougld changes inmarkets and consumer demand for goods and services. Those developments can help provide a broader context for this studyof one industry, but the study can also offer insishts intothe more general trends in skill requirements and the controvers;.es.
During the post World War IIera, rising educational levely,' and advances in automation suggested that theevolving economy required ever imreasing skills. In the early 1970s, some analysts attacked the notion that skill requirementswere rising, arguing instead that production level jobswere being
"deskilled."Not only did these jobs require fewer skills,but production was set up in sucha way as to remove control of work from the shop or office floor, vesting allauthority with , managers. Amdeed the deskilling argument seemed consistentwith developments in the apparel industry, andas has Leen suggested, the increase in international competitionintensified the industry's attempts to find technologythat would simplify and
1The classicstatement of this argument was by Braverman (1974). This controversy is discussed inmore detail in Bailey (1989).
12 5
deskill the lower level jobs inthe industry.
But by the mid-1980s, the deskillinghypothesis began to
lose its appeal as weaknesses in theeducational system were
increasingly blamed for the country'sapparently faltering
position in international markets.These developments were also
accompanied by a more sophisticatedattack on the deskilling
notion. In the 1950s and 1960s, economistshad argued that modern technology itselfwas creating a need for higher level
skills and more education. But it was easy to find examples in which the most modern micro-electronicequipment made some tasks easier. In the 1980s, a new generationof industry analysts shifted the focusaway from technology and argued thatchanges in consumer tastes and demands requireda production process that not only cut costs butwas also more flexible and responsive.
Although the humanresource, training, and educational implications of this have notso far been well-worked out, much of the recent research doessuggest that more flexible production processes in both manufacturing and servicesdo require more educated and skilled workersand a new approach to managingthe firm's workforce.2It appears that despitea strong tradition of
2Piore and Sabel (1984) made one of the firstcomprehensive statements about the need forincreasing flexibility. Some of the particulars of theirargument have been challenged, butthe notion that changes inconsumer demand have broken upmass markets, thus favoring firmsor groups of firms that can produce a wide variety of goods and servicesin small quantities rather than immense batches ofidentical items, and thatcan react flexibly to market shifts, iswidely accepted. Hayes, Wheelwright, and Clark(1988) present a more recentstatement of the need for flexiblemanufacturing and suggest how itcan be achieved. But neither of these sets ofauthors focus on the 6
attempts to deskill the workforce, this trendtoward flexibility
a increasing skill requirements isnow beginning in the apparel industry.
This report first describes the traditionalproduction
system and its accompanying humanresource strategy. I then discuss the industry'sresponse to intensified competitionthe
attempts to preserve and enhance the traditionalproduction and
human resource systems through furtherwage reduction and
automation. The following section looks at theforces that have undermined that traditional systemeven when augmented by automation. Next I describe the emerging flexiblemanufacturing system in the industry andassess the extent to which it has spread. The next sections discuss the educationalimplications of the new system, describe thecurrent educational system in the industry and assess the extent towhich that system meets the industry's current needs.
The research is based on informationgathered from field visits to 17 apparel manufacturingplants owned by 13 different firms. The smallest plant hadone employee and the largest had
2000. The largest firm in the samplehad 15,000 workers. The sample was chosen to include plantsmaking a variety of products and using modern as wellas older equipment. I also included some plants that were using sewing modulesand unit production
skill and training implications.
14 7
systems. The plants were located in New York, Pennsylvania,
Tennessee, Georgia, Alabama, and Wisconsin. Information was also gathered from visits to six schools and educationalcenters that provide training and instruction for thegarment industry, and from telep`tone interviews with five additional schools.3
3 Some of these interviewswere carried out during a project I conducted with Roger Waldinger. See (Bailey and Waldinger 1987).
15 Chapter 2
The Traditional roduction System
Until the last twentyyears, the apparel production process
had changed little since the turn of thecentury. This chapter
first describes the traditional productionsystem and discusses
its strengths and weaknesses. I then describe the associated human resource strategy.
A Fragmented System
Production workers holda much higher share of apparel
employment than they do in other manufacturingindustries. Of
the 1.1 million workers employed inthe industry in 1988, 84
percent were production and non-supervisoryworkers. Only about
68 percent of all manufacturing workerswere non-supervisory production workers. Moreover, the apparel workforce is dominated by sewing machine operators.About 70 percent of all workers employed in the industryare classified as operators. Craft and repair workers and sales workerseach account for about 10 percent of the workforce.'
The fundamental approach to improvingproduction in the apparel industry has been to focuson cost cutting, especially direct labor cost. This strategy pursued twofundamental goals-- the preservation of lowwage levels and the reduction of the
The employment data are frorU.S. Department of Labor 1989. The occupational dataare calculated using data from the public use sample of the March 1988 Current PopulationSurvey.
8
1 6 9
direct labor content of the productionprocess. The basic
approach to reducing labor contentwas to isolate each stage of
the production process, thus allowingmanagers and engineers to
examine, engineer, and rationalizeeach step separately. As a
recent report by the American ApparelManufacturers AsFociation
(AAMA) pointed out, "Manufacturing executivesin the sewn products industry have traditionallyspent their careers maximizing the output of individualoperators" (AAMA 1988b:11).
This fragmented production focuswas reflected in the inventory practices, the organization ofplants, and the industry structure. I will consider each of these below.
A fundamental means for preserving thisfragmentation was the accumulation of in-processinventories. The garment industry has taken this principle toan extreme. Through the use of the "bundle" system, which is stillemployed by the overwhelming majority of apparel makers,substantial amounts of inventory separate each individual operator. In this system, cut garment parts are tied into "bundles"of about 30 pieces. The operator takes a bundle and performsone, usually very small, task suchas sewing a hem, attachinga pocket, or joining a front panel of a shirt to the back. When the operator has performed her taskon the 30 pieces in the bundle, sheprocesses a work ticket to keep track of her work, reties the bundle,and begins work on another.
In the bundle-system plants thatI visited, operators had between
1.5 and 8 hours of work waitingfor them. Although the work of many operators goes into the productionof each garment, each
17 10
operator can be paid according to her actualproduction--piece
rates. In effect, the bundle system, linked to piecerates,
makes each worker an independentcontractor.
Although the bundle system promotes individualproductivity,
it rewires a tremendous amountof in-process inventory. A men's shirt, for example, requires between40 and 60 operations. Each operator usually has two bundles waitingat her station for processing; thus at any given time,there are thousands of garment pieces sitting around the factoryfloor in bundles Most garment producers using the bundle systemdo not have a precise measure of the time that it takes fora particular piece of cloth to move through the factory. According to the AMA, thereare often between 15 and 20 days of work-in-progressin plants producing garments requiringno more than 20 standard minutes of labor, although in well-managed bundlesystems, there can be as little as four of five days ofwork-in-progress (AMA 1988b:12).
While the bundle system isolateseach worker, the typical organization of garment plants isolateseaci step within the overall production process. Factories are set up so that each step in the productionprocess is carried out in large
"functional" departments. For example, traditional shirt plants, even those with some semi-automated equipment,are divided into departments that carry out particularfunctions. Thus for example, pocket settingor button hole machines or operators sewing a given seamare all grouped together, and all ordersgo to a centralized packagingdepartment. Supervisors have
1 8 11
authority over one or perhapsa small number of functions, and
mechanics working in these plantsare only exposed to the
machines needed for the department's functions.Orders move
through one at a time and in-process inventoriesare often accumulated between departments. Like all inventory
accunulations, this guarantees the continuoususe of the equipment in each department, butslows down the throughput time.
Furthermore, large orders with long lead timesare mixed in with short rush orders, and it is extremelydifficult to vary the speed of the process without making awkwardspecial arrangements.
The vertical structure of the industry isalso highly fragmented. Although apparel makers dependon textile producers for inputs and retailersor wholesalers for their sales, there is frequently little communication and interactionamong firms at the different levels. Interfirm relationshipsare at arms length and mediated by the market, and intermediariesoften separate the actual producers from each otheror from the retailers. Thus textile makers sell their goodsthrough converters or wholesalers, rather than directlyto the apparel makers. It is often in the interest of such middlemen to minimize the flow of information and communication betweentheir suppliers and their customers. In general, it is rare thatmanagers of garment firms have & sophisticated understandingof the economics and operations of either the textileor retail firms with which they
19 12 work.5
Even within many sectors of the garmentindustry the
"manufacturing/contractor" system furtherfragments the
production process. In garment centers such as New York, the
apparel is designed and marketed by"manufacturers" or "jobbers."
This system is mostcommon in women's wear and othermore
variable and style-sensitivesectors. Some manufacturers
actually manufacture apparel, butfor the most part theyuse
"contractors" to produce the goods. (Often the manufacturers cut
the fabric and distribute the piecesto the contractors.) The contractors are often small firms ownedby immigrants and
employing a predominantly immigrantworkforce. They also use technoogies that have changed littlein decades (indeed until recently there were few innovationsthat they could use). 6But whatever the production techniquesthey use, the manufacturers are not involved in the day-to-dayprocess of making garments.
Thus the isolation and fragmentationin the market extends from the level of the individualworker to the industry's vertical structure. The bundle system isolates theindividual workers, the functionaldepartmental organization isolatesthe different processes withinthe plant, and the fragmentedvertical structure and arms-length relationshipsamong firms isolate the
s For a u.;eful discussion of antagonisticrelations up and down the supply chain,see MIT 1988:85-86.
6 For a detailed discussion ofthe contractor system and the immigrant role in that systemsee Waldinger 1986:chap. 3.
\
20 13
stages of production within the supplychain.
Strengths and Weaknesses of The TraditionalSystem
This system has some significantstrengths. First, by
fragmenting the productionprocess it allows engineers to focus
on maximizing productivity at each step. And the in-process
inventories protect each task fromproblems occurring elsewhere
in the production chain. However, this high productivity is
bought at a price. The accumulation of inventories addsmonths
to the production cycle, the maximizationof the productivity of
each individual workermay not necessarily result in the best
overall productivity level, andthe minute engineering of each
small step makes it more difficultto change styles. Thus the
system is inflexible and sluggish inresponding to market
changes. This rigidity was captured ina recent statement by the
AAMA: "A work shirt plant made work shirts. It could not change
to another product without literallytearing itself apart.
Merely changing over from shortsleeves to long sleeves eachyear
was a dreaded, disruptive event accompaniedby great anguish and turroil" (AAMA 1988b:11).
This system is most productivefor standardized apparel that
rarely change and that isproduced in large quantities. Indeed,
earlier products tended notto change. The success of much of
the American apparel industry, likemost domestic manufacturing
industries, was basedon the prodnction of low cost, mass produced goods fora huge domestic market that was large enough 14 to absorb enormous quantities of standardizedgoods and in which styles changed very slowly.7
To be sure, the industry c.omprises severaldistinct and disparate segments and this description fitsbest for those segments that produce basic or standardizedcommodities such as jeans and men's trousers, underwear,sweatshirts, sox and hose, and most men's shirts. The production of basics involves the manufacturing of thousanda of dozensof identical garments for which styles rarely change. By the end of the 1970s, the pattern for Levi's best selling 501 jeans had receivedonly minor modifications since itwas first introduced in the early 1880s
(Brooks 1979). The design of men's white shirtswas hardly altered for decades and it still takesa trained eye c spot changes in the design of standard tee shirtsand men's underwear.
7This argument isdeveloped for the economy asa whole in Piore and Sabel 1984. For a more focussed discussion of apparel see OTA 1987.
22 _
, I
15
Women's wear producers andsome firms in other sectors have always had to adjust to the biannual style changes.8
Nevertheless, even in these segments therewere.long lead times
of many months.9 Moreover, even for women'swear, contractors often produced tens of thousands of eachitem. A women's sleepwear producer in Pennsylvania statedthat ten years ago, 90 percent of his orders were large enoughto be sent by truck and only 10 percent were small enough to besent through United
Parcel Service. (Now 99 percent of his ordersare sent through
UPS.) And a Liz Claiborne contractor inNew York City still produces typical orders of 20or 30 thousand pieces.
Nevertheless, despite these large order sizes,the women's wear makers are more flexible than the basicsproducers. Women's wear and other more variable garmentsare usually produced using the contractor system which did allowfor more flexibility.
8 The publisi:ed data do not allowa precise measure of the basics and the style sensitivesectors. In 1982, shipments by makers of men's wear, children'swear, and underwear, which tend to be less affected by stylechange, totaled about $22 billion. Shipments totaled about $21 billionfor the more s4le-oriented sectors that made women'swear, furs, hats, and miscellaneous apparel and accessories (U.S. Bureauof the Census 1982). But this is a very rough estimateand there is wide variation within each of these subsectors. Based on interviews with industry marketing specialists, the Officeof Technology Assessment estimated in 1987 that about35 percent of the market was accounted for by "fashion" items thathad a 10 week life, 35 percent by "seasonal" items witha 20 week life, and 20 percent by "basic" items that are soldthroughout the year (OTA 1987:16).
94 A sweater producer in New York City pointedout, for example, that traditionally hestarted working on the September deliveries in February.
23 16
Indeed much of the apparel factory employmentthat is left in New
York is based on the production of shortruns of styled goods and
fill-in orders. This flexibility dependson an immigrant
contractor system that can quickly expand andcontract the labor
force by drawing on immigrant social networks.1°But as a
result, employment in this sector must below-paid and unstable
and modern technology is almost completelyabsent.
The Traditional Human ResourceStrategy
The traditional production systemwas matched by a
particular human resource managementstrategy. The apparel
industry historically based its recruitmentand employment practices on the search for newsources of labor, such as recent
immigrants or southern rural populations,that had not previously been fully integrated into the mainstreameconomy and labor market. The movement of the apparel industryfrom New York and the northeast to the southwas based on an explicit search for lower labor costs.
The availability of these laborsupplies has allowed apparel manufacturers to pay wages that have steadilyfallen for four decades relative to the average manufacturingwage. In 1950, full-time apparel workers earnedthree-fourths as much as the typical manufacturing worker,but by 19851 they earned justover half as much. Furthermore, more than three-fou:thsof that drop
10 For a more complete discussion of thispoint, see Waldinger 1986:chap. 4.
24 17
took place before the dramatic accelerationof imports during the middle of the 1970s (AAMA1988a:Table 12).
For generations, apparel production inNc; York has drawn on
pools of immigrant labor whoselack of skills, capital, and
English speaking ability restrictedtheir opportunities in other
industries. Moreover, the low wages paid by the industryat
least compared favorably to the alternativeemployment opportunities in their home countries. But immigrants engaged in this type of activity almostalways wanted their childrento find work in more pleasant and remunerativeactivities. Thus the labor supply in these cities dependedon the constant arrival of new recruits from abroad. (In the case of European immigrants this system hadan additional benefit in that it broughtto the industry tailors, seamstresses,and other skilled workers who had been trained abroad.)
In the southeast, immigrants havenever been a significant labor supply, but there the industrytapped a rural labor force that had previously been engagedin agriculture. Although urbanization has spread rapidly inthe south, traditionalnon- durable manufacturing activities(predominantly textiles and apparel) remain concentrated innon-metropolitan areas (Rosenfeld 1985).
Although the industry has reliedon these newcomer labor supplies, garment operative jobscannot be accurately classified as unskilled. The simplest sewing task inany of the factories studied for this reportrequired between 12 and 15 weeksto reach
25 18
normal proficiency." Nevertheless, although the jobs reqiired
some experience, the nature of the productionprocess kept the
skill requirements down. Once experience was acquired ona
limited number of tasks, littlechange or retraining was
required. Long runs of standard goods allowed thesimplification of labor processes in whichworkers could be employed in standard and predictable tasks. Even the relatively advanced skills could be learned on the job by high-schooldropouts. Sewing machine technology appeared intricate, but the machinesoperated on basic electro-mIchanical principles. Moreover, there was little change for many years, so illiterateor semi-literate mechanics could pick up the necessary skillsby trial and error or by assisting more experienced fixers. Thus almost all of the jobsup through first level supervisorswere filled by workers who had enteredas unskilled workers and who hadlearned the necessary skills informally on the job. Formal education or trainingeither as a prerequisite for entry levelemployment or within the firmas not important. Workers learned to do their tasksby observat!on and trial and error and since theirtasks rarely changed, this concrete or experience-basedknowledge was adequate.
Understanding what theywere doing at a conceptual level was not
VI The large majority of sewing andstitching jobs listed by New York City garment employerswith the New York State Job Service require at leastone year of experience. In a survey of 41 appare. employers in NewYork City conducted in 1984,24 said that the majority of theworkers that they hired were skilledand another 13 said that mostof the workers that they hiredwere semi-skilled. See Baileyand Waldinger 1987:2. These unpublished survey results were provided byRoger Waldinger.
26 19
necessary. In this context, education wasseen as unnecessary
and a possible encouragement to higherwage demands.
Since the overriding goal of the plantorganization was to
fragment the production so that eachstep could be rationalized
separately, the coordination of the varioussteps fell completely to management. This led to the development of centralized hierarchies in which therewas relatively little scope for
individual initiative or responsibilityon the part of the production workers. Education was also a possible threatto this type of autocratic personnel policy.
Therefore, the traditional humanresource system in these industries was characterized bya preponderance of unskilled and semi-skilled workers engaged inwell specified tasks, relianceon informal on-the-job training, lowor non-existent educational prerequisites for entry level jobs,and a strong hierarchical and authoritarian management style withlittle scope for responsibility and initiativeon the part of production workers.
In the next section we beginto look at how this system has been affected by the changes intechnology and markets that have taken place over the last twentyyears.
27 Chapter 3
Automation and Deskilling--The First StageResponse to Imports
In 1950, there were about 1.2 millionemployees in the
apparel industry. They accounted for 8 percent of the entire
manufacturing workforce. For many years--from the mid-1960s
through about 1979--apparel employmentwas stable at just over
1.3 million workers. It then started a steady decade-long decline, losing about 15 percentof its jobs by 1988. But the moderate decline in apparel employment hidesa much sharper loss of market share for the domestic industry.The trade deficit in apparel increased from $1.2 million (1983dollars) in 1967 to
$15.8 million in 1987. In that year, just about one half of total U.S. expenditure on apparel wentto foreign-made garments.12
Apparel is vulnerable to import competitionbecause it has moderate skill requirements and easily-copiedand cheap technology. Although some machines used in apparelmanufacturing
(Ian cost hundreds of thousands of dollars,even advanced sewing machines cost less than $5,000and used machines can be bought for much less.13This leaves the industryopen to direct competition from countries withmuch lower hourly compensation
12 The data in this paragraphare flom the AAMA 1988a:4.
13 Self loading sewing machinescan cost much more, but the purpose of the self-loading features is to cutlabor costs. Since labor is so cheap inmany of the countries that compete with the U.S. apparel industry,these features are notnecessary. See the discussion of automated sewingin Chapter 4.
20 21
costs.
Indeed wages in many countries that compete forapparel
markets are only a fraction of U.S.wages. For.example, in 1985,
hourly compensation for apparel workers inHong Kong was about
one quarter of the compensation in the United States (using1985
exchange rates). And compensation in dollar terms in Korea,
Singapore, and Taiwan were all below theHong Kong rates.14
Hourly earnings (including fringes) in the Caribbeanin 1988 ranged from $.55 an hour in the Dominican Republicto $2.10 an hour in Barbados (Caetan 1988).
Wage Cuts
As imports accelerated in the 1970s, the industry'sfirst response was to intensify its traditional productionand human resource policy. Employers sought to further reducewage levels and they looked to automation to reduce thedirect labor content of the their products.
The accompanying chart displays the ratiobetween average manufacturing apparel earnings. In 1950, apparel earnings were about 77 percent of average manufacturingearnings. The ratio fell sharply during the early 1950sbut stabilized until the end of the 1960s. It once again plummeted during the1970s. By
1987, apparel earnings stood at only54 percent of manufacturing earnings. The second chart shows theaverage weekly earnings for
14 Unpublished data from the U.S.Bureau of Labor Statistics.
29 Ratio of Apparel to Manu.Earnings (1950-1985) Ratio 80%
75%
70%
65%
60%1-
55%
50% 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 Year
Ratio of Earnings
Source: AAMA. &MUM, 1988. table12
Real Weekly Earnings of ApparelWorkers (In 1982 dollars)
Real Weekly Earnings $250
$200 -
$ 150
6100!
$50;
$0 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1960 1985 Year
Real Earn (1982 .
Source ARMA, fveus011985. table 12. 30 22
the industry and for the manufacturingsector (in 1983 dollars) from 1950 to 1985. After adjusting for inflation, apparel
workers earned no more in 1985 than they didin the early 19605
and less than $10 a weekmore than they did in 1950. Obviously falling wages have not been enoughto stem the tide of imports.
Automation was another focus of the anti-import strategy."
But the drive to automationwas very much a part of the traditional human resource strategy--thegoal was to eliminate labor and reduce the skill demandson the labor that could not be eliminated.Many garment manufacturers see thetechnology as a means to relieve themselves of the burden of expensivelabor. A recent article in Bobbin,a leading trade publication, stated the position succinctly.
Our main hope for the return of productionof basic apparel items to the U.S. mainland is automationof the production process. Only with the labor element essentiallyeliminated through robotic automationcan the advantages of the emerging countries beovercome by the U.S. manufacturer [emphasis added] (Riley 1987:76).
Of course, no one witheven a superficial knowledge of the industry believes that the"labor element" will be eliminated from apparel manufacturing withinthe next twenty years. Short of the "lights out" factory, theindustry is looking to technologically based "deskilling" to giveit a boost in the
15 For a description of the state ofapparel production technology about 1980see Hoffman and Rush 1988:11. For a description of developments in sewingtechnology through 1985 and 1986 see OTA 1987 and Riley1987.
31 23
competition. Thus the second part of the Bobbin discussionof apparel technology stated:
Savings in labor costs through the deskillingof sewing operations is becoming a key factor in the apparel manufacturing process, as the mechanization of sewingmoves forward and automated equipment continues to beregularly introduced (Shepherd 1987:93).
Indeed, similar statements can be found in almostevery discussion of apparel technology in the tradepress.
The conviction that a high school education isnot
important, that it will increase the dissatisfactionof the workforce, and that technologycan be used to keep up production standards without increasing trainingor education (or even with an increasingly less educated workforce) is still strong inthe industry. One men's wear maker in New York stated: "We havean engineering staff trying to take the laborcontent out of manufacturing, machines don't get sick anddon't need vacations."
Many employers are perhaps lessopen and direct, but this statement does reflect a broad sentiment inthe industry.
Another employer stated that he preferredoperators who were not high school graduates. He said that his best workers were the older women who did not have high schooldegrees and who were all from surrounding rural areas. They demonstrated loyalty and satisfaction in their apparel jobsthat he did not expect to find in high school graduates.
For other managers, the use of technologyto deskill jobs was considered a necessity dictated by the currentlabor market conditions. In response to a question about educational
32 24
prerequisites for hiring, one manager inthe south said that he
would prefer to have a more educated workforce,but "I can't even
hire a high school graduate,say nothing of requiring a degree
for all my employees." His plant was not particularly automated,
but he was making use of attachmentsto individual sewing
machines such as back tackers, thread trimmersand programmable
devices to control the stitch pattern,and he believed that these
features allowed him to get by witha workforce with no more than minimal literacy and numeracy.
The Potential for Automation
How successful was the industry in producingtechnology that could eliminate and deskill labor? Inorder to understand hownew technology has affected the skill needs, itis first necessary to have some understanding of the technologyitself. Garment production can be separated into fiveprocesses--1) design and sample making, 2) the preparation ofthe pattern, 3) cutting, 4) preparation of the parts, and 5)assembly. Major advances have been made in pattern making and cutting.
Design and Sample Making: This is still primarilyan artistic endeavor in whichthe designer produces sketches which are turned into sample garments by skilledtailors and sewing machine operators. Once sample garments are made, in mostcases, an initial pattern is prepared by hand. Software is slowly being developed that can aid the designer'sjob and may in the future replace sample makers, but skilledworkers are still needed for
33 25 these tasks.
Preparatiot of the pattern for cutting: The greatest level
of automation has been achieved in thestage of the garment production process that follows thepreparation of the initial pattern. Two steps are necessary. One, called grading, adjusts the size of the patterns to producegarments of different sizes.
The other, called marker making, involvespositioning the patterns for each piece in sucha way that they can be cut froma piece of cloth of a particular widthand length. At this point, it is possible to produce gradedmarkers automatically from the initial pattern (a variety of technologiescan be used to make the pattern computer readable). The marker can be generated automaUcally or an operatorcan assist the process by positioning on ascreen the images of the pieces on an imageof the cloth, once the marker is set on thescreen, the actual marker that is laid outon the fabric can be printed automatically. The systems themselves cost about$300,0001 but they can reduce direct labor inthe operation by 50 percent and typically cut 2 weeks offthe production time.
None of the cut-and-sew companiesI visited were still using manual markers. The smaller contractors who didnot have their own system either had computer-generatedmarkers delivered by the manufacturer or contracted with anotherfirm to produce their markers. One small firm that had a system didthis contracting work for other firms. Three mati-plant firms had centralized marker making (and cutting)facilities.
34 26
Cutting: Most cutting is probably still doneby workers
using hand-held electrically-poweredreciprocating or circular
knives. The plies of fabric are spreadon the cutting surface
and the marker is laidon top. The cutter then follows the pattern imprinted on the marker.
In the late 1960s, the Gerber Companydeveloped a computerized cutter basedon numerical control principles that is guided by the markers stored inthe computer's memory. They can cut over 250 plies at a speed ofup to 200 inches a minute.
These modern machinescan therefore cut parts for 200 dozen shirts or 2,400 pairs of pants inan hour, three times the typical output of manual cuttingusing an electric knife.
Perhaps the most ingeniouscomponent of the Gerber Cutterwas the suction system used tosecure the fabric to the table while it was being cut--a function previouslyperformed by the hand of the skilled cutter. The patent on the suction systemrather than on the cutter itself is what has givenGerber its virtual monopoly of computerized cutting. Spreading, the process of unrollingthe fabric from its roll ontothe cutting surface, cannow also be done automatically.
Until recently, the GerberCutter cost about $300,000. It reduces direct labor by between25 to 40 percent. Now that
Gerber's patent on the suctionsystem has expired, the prices of computerized cuttersare falling. Therefore, although only four of the 13 firms I studiedused Gerber cutters, theuse of computerized cutting willundoubtedly continue to spread. 27
Parts Preparation: once the pieces ofa garment are cut,
there are several operations that must be carriedout before
those pieces can be joined together toform the finished garment.
For those operations that can be done in twodimensions--with the
fabric laid out flat--there have alreadybeen important advances in automation. For example, working in two dimensions, shirt cuffs and collars can be prepared, the hemscan be sewn, the shirt pockets can be set, buttonscan be attached, and the button holes can be cut and sewn. Large factories producing standardized products have had semi-automatedmachinery to perform these tasks for more thana decade. The operator's job involved loading the machine whichwould then go through a set cycle. In those functions in which it could beused, the semi- automated equipment used in parts preparationdil result in some substantial reductions in the time requiredfor each operation.
The time necessary to attach belt loopson jeans was cut in half and to make button holes on men's suitswas cut by 75 percent. A good manual pocket setter with six monthsof training could set
30 dozen pockets in eight hours (Hoffmanand Rush 1988). An automated setter in which the operator isessentially a machine loader can easily set 200 dozen in eighthours. Advances have also been made in material handlingso that machines can low pick one ply of cloth from a pile of fabric. In these cases, the operator's job primarily involves positioninga stack of fabric and collecting the pile of finished pieces.
At this point, the level of automation islimited by the
38 28
lack of links between the tasks in parts preparation.Although
each task is more or less automated, it is stillnecessary to
have an operator load and unload each machineand move material from machine to machine.
Assembly: Technological advances in the assembly ofthe
garment in three dimensions have been muchmore limited. In the
early 1980s, a group of government, industry,and union
representatives formed a partnership to developapparel
technology to strengthen the domestic industry. This was called
the Tailored Clothing Technology Corporation--(TC)2(the name was
later changed to Textile/Clothing TechnologyCorporation). In hopes of a dramatic and quick success, thepromoters of the project promised to automateone of the most difficult processes
in apparel manufacturing--setting thesleeve into the body of he garment. After almost a decade, this aspectof (TC)2 has been a disappointment. An equally ambitious sewing automationprogram in Japan has also fallen short of its goals.16
Apparel must still be assembled by individualoperators guiding the material through individualsewing machines. Truly automated assembly is yearsaway. Nevertheless, there has been important progress toward more modestgoals such as the development of programmable stitch controland devices :o
% For a good discussion of the Japaneseprogram see MIT 1988. For an account of the (TC)2,see Kaciz 1989.
37 29 automate thread trimming and tacking."
Thus there have been somesuccesses in the automation of
apparel production. Contrary to popular conception, the industry
has been reasonably successful in increasingproductivity. Over
the last ten years, labor productivityin apparel has grown at an
annual rate of about 3 percent which isslightly better than the
2.7 percent annual rate of increase inthe manufacturing sector
as a whole (U.S. Department of Commerce 1987 and1988:Tables 6.2
and 6.7A). Manual marker making is nowrare. The falling cost
of computerized cutters will alsomake it much more efficient for
smaller apparel makers to shiftaway from manual cutting. There have also been important advances inparts preparation, although this equipment remains expensiveand it is primarily used by the largest firms. Automated assembly is a longway off. In any case, almost all of the modernization hasbeen carried out by the large basic-goods producers who couldexploit economies of scale and indeed the basic-goods factories.
Skills and Education
In the areas thatwere automated, the skill requirements for some jobs did fall. For example, the skill levels ofgrader and marker making occupations have beenreduced. Previously marker makers were skilled draftsmen. Now the skills needed to operate
17 Previously,some operators were entirely engaged in trimming the thread ends leftafter each sewing operationwas complete. Now sewing machines have devicesthat do that automatically.
38 30
the computerized marker makersare easier to learn. Manual
marker makers can usually be trained tooperate the computerized
systems in about 6 weeks. But in one company that had recently
installed a computerized marker maker,the management had simply
trained one of the clerical workersto operate the system.
The skills required for both cuttingand spreading have also
been reduced, although the jobs of maintainingand repairing the
computerized equipment is muchmore demanding than previous
repair or maintenance jobs in the cuttingdepartments. A survey
conducted in 1981 by Kurt Hoffman and HowardRush suggests that
introduction of automatic cutting equipmentcan reduce training
time for cutters by up to 90 percent(Hoffman and Rush 1988:94).
Traditionally, the spreaderswere the assistants to the cutters.
Getting some experience asa spreader was often a path through
which workers learned the skillsneeded to be a cutter, whichwas
one of the highest paid garment occupations. Computer controlled spreading machines havenow assumed many of the spreaders' tasks.
For example, the automatic spreaderssimplify the task of lining up the edges of each ply to minimize thewaste of fabric.
Automation in parts preparationhas simplified many sewing tasks. For some procedures, operatorsno longer guide material under the sewing head. Pocket setting was one of themore skilled sewing tasks, butthe difficult aspectsare now done by the machine. Data from the Hoffman and Rushsurvey suggest that training times for collarattaching can be cut by 60 percent, for setting hip pockets introusers by 40 percent, for making button
:34 31
holes and attaching the buttons by 30 percent, forsetting front
pockets in jeans by 70 percent, and for decorativeembroidery stitching by 90 percent. My own study of two advanced shirt
plants suggest less dramatic reductions intraining time. Ten
years ago, parts assembly workers reached normal efficiencyin 16
to 18 weeks; now that period has droppedto 10 to 14 weeks.
As I pointed out earlier, automation ingarment assembly is
much less advanced than in parts preparation. Skills in the
assembly area have also been less affectedby technology. For
example, in a shirt plant ac.sembly workers stilltake 26 to 33
weeks to reach normal efficiency. Advances in programmability of
sewing cycles and the positioning ofthe sewing head have perhaps
simplified the job of some operators doingassembly operations,
but do not seem to have affected trainingtimes.
Nevertheless, although an operation-by-operationanalysis
does suggest that some operator jobshave been simplified and
automated, it is difficult tosee any evidence of this in
available data. Effective automation and deskillingof operator
jobs should reduce the shareof apparel employment accounted for
by operators and should lower theireducational levels relative
to the overall population. Neither of these developments have
1:aken place. In 1970, 74 percent of the workers employedin the
"apparel and related finished textileproducts" industry were
operators--the large majority sewing machineoperators. By 1980,
that number had only fallen to72 percent. Another eight years only brought the number downto 70.5 percent. Furthermore, these
4 0 32
are not any less educated relative to therest of the population than they were in 1970.18
There is also a broadconsensus that the fixers and
technicians in both the garment andtextile industries need to be more skilled. Many of the experienced sewing machine mechanics
are not only unprepared to work with thenewest computerized equipment, but they do noteven have the educational background
needed to learn the new skills. Semi-literate mechanics who worked their way up from unskilledentry-level positions suchas material handlers often giveway to technicians with post- secondary degrees.
For example, as the Arrow Companybegan to use semi- automated sewing equipment theyopened their own sewing machine mechanic school in Austel, Georgia. The managers establisheda policy that they would recruitholders of two-year associate degrees in electrical engineeringand then send them to the training center for sixmonths to learn sewing machinerepair, followed by supplementalcourses taken periodically. All of the experienced mechanicswere given the opportunity to go to ths training center for upgrading,but many simply were not ableto read well enough to handlethe school. Those who wanted to stay could, but in somecases they only worked on the simpler machines. Oxford Industries has alsorecently started a
16 The 1970 and 1980 dataare from the U.S. Bureau of the Census 1970:table 1 and1980: table 1. The 1988 numbers are from the public use sample of the 1988 Current PopulationSurvey.
41 33
mechanics training center. Another firm that has not changedits
mechanic training requirementshas contracted witha local technical service that ison call 24 hours a day for the repair
and maintenance of electroniccontrollers. The service is
available because the plantis near a large high-techgovernment research facility that hasattracted a pool of skilled technicians to the area. Finally, another multi-plant firmis making do with older technicians without advancedtraining, but one of the firm's engineers isalways on call to step in when needed.
Conclusion
Thus the industry's initialresponse to increased competition was to intensifyits traditional strategy-- straightforward cost reductionthrough the rationalization, elimination, and deskillingof direct labor. This approach has yielded limited success. The industry has had reasonablesuccess in increasing productivity. Automation has been successfulin the pre-sewing stages. There has been limitedsuccess in automating parts preparation and minimal progress inassembly.
Average wages have alsofallen. Nevertheless, there remain profound barriers to automation;significant advancerare limited to the largest firms producing long-runs ofstandardized commodities. The tasks of marker makers,cutters, and some operators have been simplified by new technology, andthere is evidence that some sewing tasks have beendeskilled. But this 34 trend, if it does exist, has notaffected either the occupational structure or the relative educationallevel of operators.
Morecver, to the extent that semi-automatedequipment is available, the skill needs of mechanicshave risen.
More significant, this strategy hasnot worked. Most of the advances discussed herewere available in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Although such commoditiesas jeans, hose and underwear are still predominantlyproduced in the United States, in overall terms, the dramaticacceleration of the trade deficit took place despite fallingwages and after most of the technological advances discussed herehad become available.
4 3 Chapter 4
The.Failure of Automation andDeskilling
Falling relative wages andreasonable productivity growth
have not prevented the continuedforeign penetration of domestic
apparel markets. Indeed the greatest rele-ive deteriorationin apparel earnings since theearly 1950s took place between 1970
and 1979. The growth of the apparel tradedeficit accelerated in the late 1970s after almosta decade of sharply dropping relative
earnings for apparel workers.And many of the advances in semi-
automation described earlierwere already available in the 1970s.
Several factors thwarted thesuccess of a cost-cutting strategy.
Increased Foreign Competition
First, there is a growingsophistication among foreign
producers who are also backedby apparel export policies in
developing countries. U.S. retailers, through theirprivate label programs, and U.S.manufacturers have increasingly
contracted with foreign producersfor the produe-ionor at least
assembly of apparel. As long as U.S. producers tryto compete primarily on the basisof cost, then many segmentsof the industry are vulnerableto low-cost foreign producers. The limits labor saving automationare simply too great to allow domestic producers toovercome the existing wage differentials.
U.S. producers can maintaintheir advantage only inthe most standardized commoditiessuch as blue jeans and whiteunderwear, where long productionruns make automation more cost efficient,
35
44 36
or in bulky or heavy garments, suchas sweat clothes, that are costly to transport.
Labor Supply Problems
Second, the explicit low-wagestrategy marked by years of
falling relative wages have iraidethe industry much less attractive as an employer. The resulting recruitment and retention problems are exacerbatedby apparel's image asa declining industry. Traditionally, the industry has dependedon recruiting an immigrant laborforce, as in New York, Texas, and
California, or a rural, agriculturallabor force, as in the south. But the rural labor suppliesare rapidly disappearing.
The south, for example, has experiencedsolid growth during the
1980s. Although rural-based manufacturingremains an important source of employment in the region, apparelproducers must compete with many other employerswhose jobs carry higher status and usually higherwages. Garment jobs are lower down thequeue of employment desirability. One producer in Georgia said that in one of his plants, every one of his mechanics, whom he paid $8an hour, had been hired bya local refrigerator plant for $10an hour. He also said that he wouldhave liked to increase his operator force by 20 percentbut could barely keep up with the turnover. The personnel manager atan apparel maker in Alabama said that getting firedfrom the firm was in effect onlya temporary suspension sincethey were so desperate for experienced operators that they tookalmost anyone back after three months.
45 37
Three of the 13 firms I visitedwanted to expand, butwere
seriously considering buildingnew plants in rural areas in the
south that were still not heavilyindustrialized or, inone case, in an area in which severalplants had recently closed.
Unless wages or other characteristicsof work improve, the
industry will probably becomemore dependent on immigrant labor.
In a 1987 study in New York,native born owners of apparelfirms reported difficulties in findingskilled workers, while immigrant
owners who had b-tter access to the foreignborn workers had an
adequate labor supply (Baileyand Waldinger 1987). Although
between 1978 and 1987 apparelemployment in the U.S. fell by16
percent and in the south by6 percent, in California, wherethe
industry can tap a largeimmigrant labor force fromboth Mexico
and Asia, appartll employmentgrew by 14 percent during thesame decade. But as we shall see later,there are serious problems
with a strategy basedon an increasing use of immigrant labor.
Fragmentation of Markets
A third factor that hasthwarted the trend toward
deskilling, andone that has far-reaching and complex
implications for the industry,is the increase in varietyand
change taking place inapparel markets. Fashion seasons have started to proliferate. Liz Claiborne, for example,now uses six
seasons--Pre-Spring, SpringOne, Spring Two, Fall One, FallTwo, and Holiday. Even within seasons, retailerswant constantly changing merchandiseon their shelves. In addition, fashion
4 6 38
consciousness has now spread toa wider range of the income distribution.
Industry analysts expect that thecurrent 20 percent market
share of commodity products suchas men's underwear and socks that are sold all year will continueto fall." Moreover, basic commodities now come inmany more styles and colors than
previously. The explosion of so called "activewear," which grew out of the very basic garmentsworn by athletes, is a good example, and denim cannow be bought in hundreds of styles, weaves, and finishes.
The greater segmentation ofmarkets and the faster changing of styles have shrunk the marketfor large production runs of identical garments. Production needs aremore difficult to predict and this has resulted inan increase in markdowns and stockouts. Markdowns are necessary when retailersfail to sell items during the appropriateseason. But since styles now become obsolete much more rapidly,forced markdowns have increasedby 50 percent during the last decade. Losses from stockouts, which occur when retailers run out of hot items,amount to 8 percent of sales (OTA 1987:26-27). In 1984, the consulting firm, KurtSalmon Associates, calculated "theopportunity cost from excessive markdowns, stockouts andexcess inventories amounted to $25 billion a year, or 23percent of the total retail valueof all apparel sold in the United States at that time" (Harding1988).
19 For a discussion of thissee OTA 1987:chap. 2 and AAMA 1988b.
47 39
The ratg of change of the entire environmentin which
apparel firms must operate hasnow accelerated. It is not just
that managers and workers in theindustry must learn a newway of doing things, but that theymust develop the capability of much
more frequent adjustment and adaptation. The industry has
entered a period of faster changeand increasing uncertainty in
which the scope for the exploitationof economies of scale and
capital intensive production isrestricted.
This fragmentation of apparelmarkets and the increased
level of uncertainty representa serious challenge to the U.S.
industry. First, the relative shrinkage ofthe market for basic apparel represents a decline in thoseareas in which the U.S. producers have tended to be strongest. Therefore, just as the opening of domestic markets tolow-wage foreign producers meant that more players were joiningthe cost-cutting game thatwas the focus of the U.S. industry'sproduction orientation, therewas a shrinkage of the share ofthe market in which cost outweighs style and variety.
Second, there is evidence thatimports tend to be higher in the more fashion-orientedsectors. At an anecdotal level, most of the best-known designerlabels are either from foreign designers or American designerswho produce abroad. Indeed consumers who want to be on the cuttingedge of fashion generally turn to Italian designers. At a more general level, importstend to be higher for women's clothesthan for men's (although domestic dress productionremains very strong). Within women's
4 8 40
clothing, slacks and shorts, whichare more standardized, are
still predominantly produced inthe United States, while well
over half of U.S. consumed women's shirtsand blouses are
produced abroad. Sweater production is the king ofimports. Indeed only about 12 percent ofthe wool sweaters for women
consumed in the United Statesare made domestically (AAMA 1988a:Table 3).
Limits to Flexibility
I have emphasized that duringthe 1970s, the industry sought
to confront its competitiveproblems through new technologyand
ever lower wages. This strategy did lead tomoderate
productivity increases and reducedcosts, but there are decisive
limits to its use in developinga flexible manufacturing system.
Flexible Production and theContractor System: Currently the
most flexible sectors in theU.S. industry are those that tapthe immigrant labor supply throughthe contractor/manufacturer system. But as I have emphasized, in thissector, technology is archaic and the manufacturer, who interacts with the customer,is removed from the manufacturingprocess. This fragmentation makes it ditficult for themanufacturer to bring aboutany significant changes in the productionprocess, laving them primarily dependent on a technologically backward system that derivesits flexibility through theinstability and low wages ofemployment in the immigrant sectors. There are three potential problems with relianceon this type of system for flexibility.
4 9 41
First, the immigrant systemappears to be most effective in
the lower to middle level women'swear sectors. At least in New
York, makers of men'swear and better women's wear have had
trouble using the immigrant laborsupply.20
Second, as we shallsee in the next chapter, emerging
flexible strategies in the industryinvolve more sophisticated
links among textile and apparelmakers and retailers. These include integrated computersystems as well as more direct
personal interactions. It remains to be seen what rolea
strategy based on primitive technologyand unstable employment can play in these new systems.
Third, there is some evidencethat the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, which includeslegal sanctions for employers who hire undocumented aliens,pay limit the size and flexibility of the immigrart-basedzontractor system. For example, swimwear makers in LosAngt.les reported that they had serious problems during thefirst year after the law tookeffect.
They eased these problems duringthe second year by trying harder to hold on to workers. The:le manufacturers were accustomedto hiring and laying offas their business fluctuated, butas one executive stated, "Weare forced to produce 52 weeksa year. We can't afford to have people uomingand going." (Women's Wear
Daily 1989) While this strategymay ease their labor problems by making employmentmore stable, it C. ,es reduce the flexibility
20Fora development of this argument,see Bailey and Waldinger 1987. 42
of the production process. A recent report by Roger Waldingeron
the impact of IRCA on the New York apparelindustry found only
minimal impact, primarily because theindustry simply was not
that dependent on illegals. Nevertheless, Waldinger didargue that:
The sanctions' greatest effectappears to be on small, immigrant-owned, neighborhood firms. Since these firms recruit from a local labor supply andcannot compete with the industry standardon wages, working conditions, or weeks of work, they have beenmore dependent on illegal immigrant workers. The enactment of sanctionsappears to have reduced their ability to recruit illegalimmigrants (Waldinger 1989).
And these small firms werea highly flexible component of the
system. Thus for several reasons, it is unlikelythat the
industry can rely on the contractor systemlinked to the
immigrant labor supply to confront the increasingfragmentation and change in apparel markets.
Technology and Flexible Production: I have already
emphasized the severe limitsto automation in the industry. But
technology that can both reduce laborcontent and increase
flexibility--flexible automation--iseven farther off. Indeed most of the advances that have beenmade in automation have been on specialized machines that are not flexible. Thus, micro- electronic technology can playonly a limited, albeit crucial, role in the development of flexibleapparel manufacturing.
It is in marker making and cuttingthat most progress has been made in automation and flexibility. This technology will become even more accessible ifprices for computerized cutters
51 43
drop sharply. But even in this case, computerizedcutting is
most effective for solid colors. If stripes or plaids must be matched, especially if they have tobe matched in two dimensions,
then many of the pieces must becut by hand in order to insure the match. Thus cutting shirts with two dimensionalmatches takes about twice the labor requiredfor cutting pieces for solid colored shirts.
The search for flexible automation insewing is even more frustrating. Of course the sewing machine ischeap and flexible, but the drive to speed up and toautomate the sewing machine led to machine specialization. Expense and specialization escalated as hard automation was developedso that the machines ran through particular cycles. These machines cut labor sharplybut had to be dedicated to one task.
Although recent technologicaladvances do offer new opportunities for flexibility, thecosts are still high. In an industry that is accustomed tousing sewing machines that cost less than $5,000, automated self-loadingsewing machines now cost Intween $15,000 and $40,000. The automatic pocket setter mentioned above costs 440,000and still requires changes in hardware when style changesare made. Thus, because of the cost and the lack of flexibility,most semi-automated sewing machines are still found in large factories producingstandardized garments. Moreover, this type of automationhas been more successfully applied to apparelmade of woven rather than knitted fabric. Indeed, other than intwo shirt factories (usingwoven
52 44
cloth) owned by Fortune 500 companies, Isaw few of these semi- automated machines.
Materials handling remains the centralbarrier to
flexibility. It is in the stage of the productionprocess that
is completely divorced from the materialhandling--grading and
marker making--where flexible automationhas advanced farthest.
It is interesting that even in the pre-materialsstage, the
greatest barrier to the complete computerizationof the
design/pattern-making/grading/marker-makingprocess concerns the inability to define mathematically thedrape of the fabric for
some types of garments--the interaction of gravity,the
characteristics of the fabric, and its positioningon the human
body. This gets to the heart of the problem--ifeven with the
most powerful computers, scientistsare unable to model the
behavior of some fabric, it is not surprisingthat it is
difficult to design a versatile machinethat can handle tht
fabric. Although development projectsare making :::low progress,
dramatic breakthroughs in flexibleautomation ot the assembly process are not imminent.
Conclusion
Increased import competition, laborsupply problems, and the
fragmentation of apparel markets haveall called into question
the viability of the industry's costcutting, labor reduction strategy. Automation and wage cuttingare not adequate for successful competition ,asedon cost cutting alone. Moreover,
53 45 developments in apparel markets and thegeneral acceleration of change have reduced the market sharefor standardized commodities produced in long runs. It is in these lines that the traditional strategy has been most successful.
The greatest advantage thatU.S. producers seem to have is their proximity to the huge domesticwarket. But the traditional
Production system was not basedon the flexibility and fast turnaround times needed to exploitthe advantage of proximity.
If U.S. producers moveaway from their traditional reliance on cost cutting through the detailed rationalizationof the production process, whatcan replace it? We will turn to those issues in the next chapter.
54 46
Chapter 5
The Emerging System ofProduction
Some apparel firms havenow begun to shift away from a
system that emphasizes cost cuttingthrough the reduction of
labor content and the rationalizationof separate tasks in the
production process. These firms are trying to developsystems
that emphasize greater flexibility,faster production times, and
greater interaction and cooperationamong textile makers, apparel
firms, and retailers. I argued in the last chapter thatneither the contractor systemnor modern technology alone can meet the
emerging needs for changeand flexibility. Therefore in this
chapter the role of organizationalchange is emphasized. I
assess how extensive the change hasbeen and, through a concrete
example of two alternativeproduction systems,argue that the movement from a cost reductionstrategy to a more flexible,
market-oriented strategy requiresfundamental changes in human resource policy.
The Quick Responsemovement is one of the most widely heralded developments inthe apparel industry. The goal of Quick Response is to minimize the length of time betweenan order at the retail level and thefinal delivery of the goods,a process that traditionally tookmany months. Materials had tu be ordered months before a fashion season and once the season started,there was no time to reorder hotitems. During the months of waiting, the material was actuallybeing worked on fora few hours at most. Except for foreign goodsshipped by sea, includingeven
55 47
essential travel time wouldonly increase the total bya few
days. Ideally, Quick Response wouldallow retailers to order
only small quantities before theseason, and then reorder popular
styles, thus avoiding bothstock-outs and mark-downs. Shorter
production times saveon inventory carrying costs and allowmore
immediate responses to changingmarket demands. Production
planners can reduce their relianceon market forecasts, which
were never reliable, but which havebecome even less usefulas
product changes have acceleratedand markets have becomemore fragmented.
Cutting the in-process timecan be done by reducing the
delay between theemergence of a trend and the order to the producer, by reducing the time ittakes to produce the goods,or by reducing the time thatthey sit on loading docks and in warehouses. So far, the main thrust of QuickResponse has not been focussed on productiontime. Certainly for standardized items this makes sense. Given past advances in productivity,by far the greatest savings intime could be realized by reducing ordering and warehousingtime.
Indeed most attention hasso far been given to inventory control at the retaillevel and inventory-generatedorders to suppliers. In theory, an order toa sheet producer, for example, would be generated automatically when the sheet inventory ata department store falls belowa given level. Ironically, the key here is the buyer's inventorycontrol. The communication to the producer may be a convenience, but the sine Qua non of thesystem
51 48
is the information on sales. Another key aspect of this system
is the development ofa universal nomenclature and the use of
computer readable labels (bar codes)on product packages to
facilitate inventory tracking. Other important features involve
timing of production to minimizewaiting, and more attention to
quality in order to cut downon inspection and to reduce the need
for back-up inventories. According to the more ambitious Quick
Response scenarios, trucks will be loadedand deliveries will be timed to minimize handlingupon delivery.
One of the most important developmentsassociated with Quick
Response has been the growth of cooperativeinteractions among
suppliers and customers. This growing cooperation contraststo
the more adversarial, arms-length,and market-mediated
relationchips that previously dominatedthe industry. But
without increases in flexibilityand throughput speed in the
manufacturing processes themselves,the Quick Response movement
could degenerate intoa struggle over who holds the inventories.
Retailers can respond quicklyto shifts in market demand if their
suppliers have goods in theirwarehouses. It is not surprising that most of theprogress in Quick Response has taken placeamong commodity producers--forexample, between denim mills andblue jean manufacturers thatproduce relatively standardizedproducts.
But inventory at any level isprecisely the problem that the strategy is designed to avoid,especially in styled goods. The process must also includemore flexible and responsive manufacturing processes. In the previous chapter I argued that 49
the flexibility demands ofmodern apparel markets could not be
met either by expansion of thecontractor system based on
immigrant labor nor by technologyalone. Thus apparel makers
have turned to organizationalchange.
Organizational Change
The reorganization of the flow ofmaterial among workers is
an important component of efforts to increaseflexibility and
production speed. This reorganization comprisesa movement away from the functionally-orientedorganization that characterized
the traditional apparel productionsystem. Rather than dividing
factories into large departmentsspecializing in carrying outone function, managersare increasingly using a product-oriented
strategy in which plantsare organized into smaller departments
that can carry outmore steps of the production process. These
departments are oriented towardparticular products, markets,or
customers. For example, while functionallyorganized plants
process orders one at a time, product-orientedplants can process several orders of differentsizes and cycle times simultaneously.
This allows more flexibilityin handling each order. The
reduction in in-processinventories that accumulatesbetween functional departments isa central component of product-oriented organization. FuLthermore, in a product-orientedorganization,
some output from several orders willbe completed every day, thus
allowing a more efficientflow of goods to the customer. In addition to changes inthe general organization of the
58 50
departments within plants,some apparel firms are trying to
eliminate the in-process inventoriesthrough developing
alternatives to the bundle system.While it may take several
days for a garment to move througha bundle system factory, the
process using one of the alternativesystems can take only a few
hours. (These alternatives will be discussedin more detail below.)
Early experience with product-orientedsystems and attempts
to reduce in-process inventoryhave been encouraging. The
consulting firm, Kurt Salmon Associates(KSA) estimates that in
some cases, Quick Response can cut theoverall cycle from fiber
production to the retail salefrom over 60 to about 20 weeks.
And, according to RSA, QuickResponse, through lower inventor:
levels, lower risks, and fasterinventory turnaround, couldsave enough to compensate fora 25 to 35 percent differential in cost between the wholesale priceof domestic and foreign produced apparel (Kurt Salmon Associates1986:1-2 and Kurt Salmon Associates 1988b:13).
The Spread of Product-Orientedor Flexible Systems: How extensive is the shifttoward more flexible, product-oriented production systems?Certainly the industry's majorinstitutions are very much involved with testing,implementing, and promoting the Quick Response strategy.Almost every issue of the major industry publications inboth textiles and apparelsuch as
Textile World and BobbinMagazine includes articleson some aspect of Quick Response. The industry's leading consultant,
59 51
Kurt Salmon Associates, and the mostbroadly based trade
association, the American ApparelManufacturers Association, are
both at the forefront of the QuickResponse movement. And
representatives of retailers, apparelmakers, and textile and
fiber producers have made significant,Jrogress in developing
communications standards thatare necessary for the type of
interfirm coordinationnecessary for Quick Response. The
activities associated with QuickResponse are significant partly
because they represent the creation ofan institutional framework
for cooperation among previously antagonisticfirms and industries.
The current obsession with flexiblemanufacturing contrasts
sharply to the industry preoccupationwith automation as rec:ently
as the early 1980s. The evolution of (TC)2 is acase in point.
It was started as an attempt todevelop straightforward labor
saving automation, but itsheadquarters in Raleigh, North
Carolina now emphasizes technologicaldiffusion and
experimentation with flexiblemanufacturing work organization
using commercially availableequipment. The Technical Advisory
Committee of the AAMA makesa presentation every year at the
Bobbin show (the industry'sannual trade show). In 1988 and
1989, this presentationwas about flexible manufacturing but had
very little to say about technologyper se, instead concentrating
on production process organization,personnel policy, and management issues.
These developmentsare also reflected at the plant level.
60 52
All of the plants that / visited,whether they were owned bya
small contractor in New York witha handful of workers or by a
Fortune 500 firm with thousands ofemployees, were rroducingmore
styles and products than theywere ten years ago. For example, a sleepwear manufacturer had increasedthe number of styles he
produced from 100 in the mid-1970sto over 300 in 1988.
Previously he had shipped 90percent by truckload and 10 percent
by United Parcel Service. Now 99 percent of his shipmentsare
through UPS. He had typically had $5 millionto $6 million in inventory but now he rarely hasas much as $2 million, even at
the peak season. Another producer of men's slacksand shirts
said that his average cuttingsize had fallen from 100-150ten years ago to 40 today. He also said that he sends out orders through United Parcel Serviceas small as one or two items. A formal men's wear producer hadincreased the number of styles from 12 ten yearsago to 90 in 1988. A women's intimate wear maker in the mid-west producedfour times as many itemsas he had
10 years ago. Previously there had been twoseasons a year, but that had increased to fourand now in each of thoseseasons, they are producing 300 styles in threeor four colors. A sweater maker in Queens commented thatduring the 1970s he producedmore or less the same small number ofstyles during the entire production season fromFebruary to September. Now he has weekly and sometimes daily changesand his rush season is much shorter-- from May to September. In the 1970s, 85 percent of the production of an integratedknitter in Tennessee had been white
1 53
underwear. Now they produce underwear,"fleecewear" and other
active wear in many differentcolors. Textile producers also
point out that their ordersfrom apparel makers'are much smaller, thus textile plants are also producing more styles (Bailey1988).
In one well publicized example,at Greenwood Mills, theaverage dye-lot had dropped from120,000 yards to 11,000 (Kurt Salmon Associates 1988b:14).
Six of the seven firms thatI visited outside of New York
were at least experimenting withsome form of product-oriented
organization. All of these efforts had been initiatedwithin the last five years. To assess the spread of new production techniques, the AmericanApparel Manufacturers Association conducted a survey of its members in1989. Ninety-two apparel manufacturers employing 143,000workers in 508 plants responded.
In 1985, only one percent ofthe production workers in these firms were being used inproduction processes designedto reduce in-process inventory. By 1988, that share had risento 7 percent, and according tocurrent plans, 20 percent wouldbe used by the early 199,s (NAMA1989:3-4).
There are clearly segmentsof the industry in whichthese developments are muchmore common. None of the firms in New York that I interviewed were using advanced flexible systemsdesigned to redune in-process inventories. Most New York producers continue to rely on a strategy based on the availabilityof a low wage immigrant labor force. Nevertheless, given the conservative tradition of theindustry--many contractors stilldo not use
62 54
cheap, off-the-shelf technological advancesthat have been available for 20 years--ina short time, there has been
significant growth in the developmentof more flexible systems.
In the next section we takeup the question of whether this
development requires major changes inhuman resource strategies
or whether technology can be med to bringabout the necessary cilange within the old system of labor relations.
Alternative Human Resource Strategies
So far I have argued that there isa growing shift away from the traditional production system.What does that imply for.the viability of the traditionalhuman resource management system?
This section addresses thatproblem by examining two alternative apparel production techniques--themodule system and the Unit
Production System (UPS). Both of thesr systemsare designed to reduce in-process inventory, althoughthey are based on contrasting humanresource strategies. Indeed, the UPS can be seen as yet another attempt to finda teOlnological solution to the industry's problemsthat avoids major changes in human resource policy. The module system requires muchmore extensive changes in personnel philosophyand practice.
Unit Production Systems: The Unit Production System (UPS) is a device for transporting in-process work among operators. In the system, all of the piecesneeded for one garmentare hung from a hangar whichmoves along a rail. Each hangar is routed to appropriate stations wherethe operator performs her procedure, 55
often without having toremove the pieces from the hangar.When she is finished she sends the hangarback to the central rail to
be routed to the next station. The actual tasks that the
operators perform are very much thesame as in the bundle system.
The UPS can significantly lowerthroughput time and
inventory levels. Garments that enter the system in theearly morning are usually complete bynoon. The two UP systems used by
firms in the study sample bothallowed less-than-one-day cycle times. In one, throughput time fell from 2 weeksto 4 hours and according to one plantmanager, in-process inventory had fallen from 4000 dozen units to 400 dozenunits. And sometimes in this plant they were actually running16 different styles at a timeon their two UPS lines. Also, accordirg to publishedreports, work- in-process inventory droppci by70 percent at an Oshkosh B'Gosh plant in Kentucky after theinstallation of a UPS (AAMA 1988b:21).
The newest unit productionsystems also have sophisticated information capture and retrievalcapabilities that allow the manufacturer to track each garment,to plan the sequencing of the various orders, and tokeep track of the productivityof each operator. The ability to route each hangarindividually also allows more thanone type of garment to move through thesystem at the same time (although thenumber of work stationson the system limits this since it isinefficient to have thesame operator work on differentgarments at the same time).
Savings on direct laborcontent have been reported as high
64 56
as 20 percent, but it is unlikely that operationsthat were well
run before the ' ,stallation of the UPScan reduce their direct
labor by more than 10 or 12 percent. About half of the savings
comes from the elimination of bundle handling--whenthey finish
each bundle, the operators muststop work, fill out a slip of
paper, and tie up the completed bundle--andhalf from the greater
ease with which the hung garment pieces--asopposed to picking up
a piece from a pile--can be handled (Roberts1986).
The UPS is essentiallyan assembly line and as with most assembly lines, it introducesan element of mechanical pacing of the work speed. Because of the mechanical control ofthe work pace and the elimination of interruptionsneeded to handle bundles, employers point outthat one of the advantages of the
UPS is that it enhances the"rhythm" of the work. As one report on the UPS stated, "There can be littlequestion that a UPS provides a positive pacingeffect. The pressure to produce is heightened, and constant workflowsets the tempo" (Roberts 1986).
Moreover, the way most UP systemsare set up, each operator is surrounded by hanging garmentparts and is therefore isolated from her co-workers. Individual piece rates continue tobe the basis of compensation. Thus one effect of the UPS is simplyto intensify the workprocess for the individual.
At least on paper, the UPSseems to solve many of the industry's problems withoutany changes in human resource practice. The piece rate systemcan be maintained and the actual sewing tasks are not changed. Indeed, material handling is 57
somewhat easier. All of the planning and coordinationis still
in the hands of the supervisors andengineers. Moreover the supervisors ;.ow havemore immediate information and more direct
and immediate controlover the routing of material among the
operators. The operator's job is simplyto sit and sew the material that is deliveredto her station by the system. Thus, from this point of view, the UPSappears to be more consistent with traditional fragmentedwork organization and the searchfor ever-simplified tasks for lower levelworkers rather than a move toward more employee involvement.
But this image of the UPS is misleading. There remain thorny problems for management andplanning that result from the attempt to maintain the individualproduction orientation and piece rates while tryingto eliminate in-process inventories.
Since it is impossible to predictexactly how fast an operator will work, in the absence of buffer inventories, variationsin work speed can causesome operators to run out of work,or the limited space for work waitingbetween operations to be overwhelmed. Since employees are earning piecerates, running out of work is a majorcause of employee discontent. Thus in unit production systems,the supervisors are constantly shifting workers among tasks or simply removingwork from the rails in an attempt to balance the productionline. In one plant workers often changed jobs fiveor six times a day. Shifting workers creates additional problems. The variation in speedas an operator gets accustomed to thenew task can wreak havoc with the
C6 58
process. It also reduces her piece rateincome unless the firm
pays premia above the basic rate until theoperator reaches
normal efficiency.And while the operator is gettingup to
speed, the supervisor mustuse additional workers to keep work
flowing to downstreamprocesses; once the operator has achieved
the expected efficiency level, theadditional workers will
overload the downstream capacity tohold in-process work. Thus
to the disappointment of those who wouldlike to deskill the
apparel plant, the UPS operatesmore efficiently with operators
who are proficient and experienced ata variety of tasks.
Many of the difficulties caused by theproblems of
production sequencing and balancewould be reduced if the ups
were used primarily for standardized commodtitygarments. Indeed,
one sleepwear producer emphasized the differencebetween the use
of the UPS to produce the dozensof style variations for women's
sleepwear. and its use to make thefew standardized children's
sleepwear styles he produced.He was very satisfied with the
children's production line whichran smoothly and efficiently,
but he had serious problems with linebalance and operator
dissatisfaction in his women'swear pmduction line. The manager
of an intimate wear plant whuhad installed a UPS remaineda
strong backer of the concept buthad found the line balance
problems more difficult and frustratingthan he had expected. In another plant, in order to reestablishbalance, some supervisors were in effect accumulatingmore in-process inventory by removing hangers from the rails and storingthe incomplete apparel in
67 59
bins. Another alternative is touse some of the stations simply
for storage. But these measures mitigatethe benefits of the system.
Modular Manufacturing: Modularmanufacturing is an
alternative technique for organizingthe workflow among
operators.21 This system, when it works, isflexible and
minimizes in-process inventory,but it requires a fundamental
change in human resource managementand training.
In modules, groups of operatorswork together to assemnlean
entire garment. The machines are usually placedin a circle or
U-shaped configuration. After each operator completes hertask, she passes each piece or garmentdirectly to the next.operator.
Ideally there should be onlya few pieces between two operators.
Thus modules drastically reduce in-processinventory. Another
advantage is that they eliminatethe time involved in handling
the bundles. For most garments it only takesa few hours for a given piece to go throughthe production line.
Although the actual sewing taskscarried out by workers in
modules do not differ from thetasks performed by bundle workers,
the module system requiresfundamental changes in the indultry's
human resource practices. Supervisors and engineerscan no
longer focus on workers in Asolationbut must consider the effect
of the action of each workerand of the design of each taskon
V For descriptions of the modulesystem see Bennett 1988 and AMA 1988b and 1989). Five of the thirteen rimsthat I studied for this project had sewinamodule pilot projects.
68 60
the contemporaneous functioning ofthe group. Workers themselves must become involved in the qualityand pace of production of
their co-workers. Theoretically, if one operatorfalls behind,
then ancther group member willhelp her catch up. In well-
functioning modules,any imbalances in the productionprocess will be corrected in thisway without any intervention by the
supervisor. This obviously requiressome of the operators to be able to do a variety of tasks.
Machine maintenance and repairare much more important in
modules than in the bundlesystem since a machine breakdowncan
quickly stop the entiregroup. In some cases, the mechanicsare
also members of the module. For example, in one shirt plant,the managers plan to teach the operatorssome of the basics of
machine maintenance and repairso that the operators can either repair small problems or at least have some sense of thecause of the problem when a mechanicarrives to correct it.
In three of the five modulesI studied, group members had
some role in setting thegroup goals and deciding how they will
be met. Some managers placea good deal of emphasis on develop-
ing a team spirit andencourage competition among the teams. Module advocates argue that the system will be mosteffective if
each group is encouragedto take responsibility,as a group, for
the amount and qualityof the output.nPeer pressure plays an
22 If the group is responsiblefor the quality, then each worker in effect inspectsthe previously completed As a result errors procedures. are corrected immediately. With the bundle system, operators haveno incentive to notice or to do anything about quality problems from earlier operations. Indeed, taking 61
important role. For example, a worker inone plant habitually
skipped part of her lunch hourso that she could be sure that she kept up with her group. Every manager who had trieda group system argued that peer pressure tendedto result in lower absenteeism.
With the elimination of buffgrinventories, problems atone stage of the process will rapidlyspread to others. In the UPS, it is the supervisor who must scrambleto adjust. The module system is premised on agroup solution to these problemsmutual assistance among the workgroup. Since the production in this configuration is a group effort, piecerates must be abandoned.
Operators are paid a straight hourlyrate or some form of group bonus. In general apparel makers plan to increasetheir use of group incentive plans. According to the AAMAsurvey, in 1985, only 7 percent of the workersemployed by firms in the sample were paid at least partly througha group incentive system. By
1988 that number had risen to 8percent, and according to current plans, would rise to 25 percent bythe early 1990s (AAMA 1989:27).
Since the focus shiftsfrom the individual to thegroup, the management of the interactionsamong the members of the group is a fundamental determinant of thestrength of the module approach.
time to point out upstream qualityproblems would actually reduce an individual's piece rate income. Not onli does the group asa whole pay more attention to quality,but the individual members feel pressure from thegroup to avoid errors since everyone is affected. 62
The training director ofone firm that had module pilot projects
at several factories emphasizedthat the single most important
factor in the relativesuccess of the projects had to do with how
the team dealt with its slowermembers. For example, while most
of the groups had increasedproductivity afthr switching from the
bundle system, the prcductivityof one group that produced pants
had actually declined. Sharp resentments developed againstthe slower members because theywere holding doun the team
prcduction, while the slowermembers resented the hostilityof
their colleagues. Clearly, the dynamics of thegroup interaction
are a powerful force in the behavior ofthe team, yet those
dynamics can develop in constructiveor destructive channels.
The interactions among theteam members can be a powerful motivator, but there is alsopotential for the developmentof antagonism and hostility. Thus modular configurations requirea high degree of communication and cooperation among theoperators, the mechanics, and supervisors. This type of activity is completely absent in a traditionalbundle plant. And since group cohesion and the nature ofpersonal interactions areso irportant, the typical 30percent annual turnover ratesamong operators becomes a greater barrierto successful operation.
Pilot projects have indicatedsome dramatic improvements.
Arrow cut its throughput timefor the assembly of men's shirts from five days to one how.; Joseph & Feiss, a men's-wearmaker in
Cleveland, cut cycle times inthe cutting room from thirteendays to two days; and the ArtexCompany was reported to have cut cycle
71 63
time for screen printed tee shirtsfrom eight days to one day.
Oshkosh B'Gosh reduced sewingthroughput time from 15 to two
days. The N,L. Miller Company,a producer of women's dresses,
cut its sewing cycle time from60 to 15 days. These experiments
also suggest other benefits suchas reduction in space
requirements, better quality,and greater employee satis-
faction.23 It remains to be seen how effectivethe concept will be when it moves froman experimental stage to firm-wide
implementation and if it spreadsto a wider variety of firms.
Selected employees can be used in pilotprojects and many of the firms that have carried themout so far have traditionally been the most pr3gressive and innovative. Moreover, work process innovations are notorious for dramaticearly results that fade after the novelty wears off. Nevertheless, the initial experience is encouragingfor managers who have tried modulesor other types of group-orientedinnovations.
The unit production andmodule systems compared. Although both the UTeS and the modularsystems are designed to speedup production and reduce in-processinventories, they represent fundamentally different humanresourct strategies. While the UPS increases the isolationof each operator, the modularsystem throws them together ingroups--indeed, pay is basedon collective output. With the increase in theinterdependence of the operators, there isa concomitant increase in the importance
23 These examplesare drawn from AAMA 1988b and 1989; i.nd Kurt Salmon Associates1988b.
72 64
of coordination. While in the UPS the interdependenceis managed
through the technology of the systemsupplemented extensively by the floor superNIsor, in themodular system, this coordination is
achieved by a groupprocess that increases the pressureon
interpersonal and social skills. The supervisors in modulesare therefore much more involved withthe dynamics of the interper-
sonal relationships within thegroup. In the urs, the super-
visors are in a constantbattle to keep the operatorsemployed and the line balanced.
Does the UPS offer a realisticopportunity for flexible, fast throughput productionthat does not require fundamental changes in humanresource management?Experience with these systems is only beginning toaccumulate, but it appears that this is unrealistic. Cross training is more importalit,and given the low inventory levels, machinebreakdowns are potentiallymore costly. Although the UPS appears toallow the maintenance of the traditional human resource strategy, it may be most effectiveif it is combined withchanges in personnel practicJ.Thus it cDuld be used as a transpert facilityfor a module system. Newer UP systems are now being configuredto reduce the isolation pf each individual worker and toallow them to help each otheras they would in the team approach. (TC)2 is alsoexperimenting with a
UPS configured thisway. The manager of one plant believedthat his UPS would be more effective if thr, plant abandonedpiece rates and moved to agroup bonus system.
73 65
Conclusion
The traditional apparel productionsystem was based on
maximizing, in isolation, theproductivity of each stage of
production. The maximization of productivityat each step, so
the logic goes, will result inmaximum productivity for thewhole process. There are two problems with thisargument. First, sacrificing productivity atone step may increase overall productivity. The second problem results inparticular from recent developments inconsumer tastes and in the structure of competition. Even if the fragmented approachwas most productive, it was no longerable to deliver the right productat the right time. A highly productiveprocess is not much use if its output sits ina warehouse or never gets produced.
Traditional production techniquesstill dominate the industry in manyareas, particularly those that haveaccess to an immigrant labor pool, but inthe last five years, apparelmakers have recognized theseproblems and a growing numberhave begun to develop production processes, internal factory organization,and inter-firm relationshipsmore appropriate for the current environment. Modern technology is crucial, but thisonly accounts for a part of the change. Lead times, buffer inventories, and othertypbs of slack and margins forerror and relaxation are, at least inprinciple, all being squeezedout of the production system. Workers within firms and firmswithin the supply chain are now involved in a more integratednetwork and are therefore much more interdependent. In the following
74 66 sections we will examine what implicationsthis new system has for human resources, skills, and education.
75 Chapter 6
Skills, Training, and Education
The traditional cost- and production-orientedproduction
systems was matched by a set ofcommon recruitment, employment,
and training practices. These in turn were characterized by
attempts to reduce the skill requirementsof employees,
especially operators. As pressure has mounted on the traditional
production system, its associatedhuman resources practices have also become increasingly troublesome. This chapter first examines the skill requirementsof the more flexible systems beginning to emerge in the industry. The second part of the chapter describes the existingsystem for educating and training apparel workers and discusseswhether it is adequate to meet the future needs of the industry.
Skills
When a firm moves froma functional organization to a product-oriented organization andespecially if teams are introduced, it is muchmore difficult to rely on extreme specialization among workers.As we have seen, apparel firms that have adopted unit productionsystems or modular configurations have increased theiremphasis on cross training.
According to the AmericanApparel Manufacturers Association survey, in 1985 only 12 percent of theworkers in the firms in the sample were cross-trainedfor more than two jobs. By 1988 that number had increased to 16 percent, and according tocurrent
67
76 68
plans, 27 percent would be prepared fortwo or more jobs by the
early 1990s. In all of the cases described in theAAMA's 1989
report, all firms that used modulesor unit production systems
had more workstations than operators. Thus, at least some
workers always performedmore than one task (AAMA 1989:13, 29).
And as styles change more rapidly,workers will have to be more
adept at those tasks egNired to reconfiguretheir equipment.
Moreover, the efforts to increasethroughput speed through
the elimination of buffer inventoriestransforms the production procesE within a factory. It creates an immediate
interdependence among the variousworkers and processes involved
in production. Now the planning, execution, andmanagement of
each task must take into accountthe multiple relationships with
all of the other tasks in the plant.And as a result of the
reduction in inventories,the proliferating rroduction variety, the increase in throughput speed,and the accelerating pace of product as well as technologicalchange, it is much more difficult, and less efficient,to plan out every contingencythat an employee rust face, to refer problemsto specialized departments, or tc3 await instructionor permission from superiors. More than in the past, workers willhave to be able to figure things out forthemselves.
In product-oriented organizationand especially in teams, workers experiencemore frequent and complex interactions with their co-workers. Indeed, as I have pointed out,the success of many teamwork experiments dependsprimarily on how those
77 69
interactions are managed. Furthermore, this increasing level of
interaction extends across occupations--amongsupervisors, mechanics, and operators.
The changes in the relationshipsamong firms called for by
the proponents of Quick Response amplifymany of these new
demands. While firm reorganization integratesthe worker into
broader aspects of the operation of thefirm, the increasingly
interactive links among firms projectthat integration beyond the
boundaries of the firm.More employees in any given firm must
have a stronger understanding of theoperations, stratec,ies, and
needs of supplier and customer firms.There may also be ,1
increase in direct interactionamong employees in different firms.
The increasing pace of change isa fundamental
characteristic of the emerging environmentin which apparel firms must operate. It seems reasonable to expect thatchanges in technology, markets, and productionprocesses will continue to take place at a much fasterpace than in the past. It is this
increasingly endemic change,as much as the specifics of the new technology or work organization, thatis driving changes in required skills and abilities. This need for adaptability involves a switch froma concrete understanding, based on experience and informally acquiredon-the-job training, toa more conceptual or theoretical understandingof the work i which employees are engaged. Only if workers understand the deeper logic undaf2ying their workcan they adjust to new tasks without
78 70
having to be shown, step-by-step,what to do.
There is a now a well-establishedbody of research that
associates education with abilityto cope with change. Charles
Schultz argued 15 years ago that educationimproved a worker's
ability to deal with "disequilibria."Other research shows that
industries experiencing faster technologicalchange tend to
employ workers with higher levels ofeducational attainment and
to provide more on-the-job trainingto their employees (Schultz
1975, Tan 1989, and Bartel and Lichtenberg1985).
In the next paragraphs I lookmore concretely at changing
skills and educational requirementsfor supervisors, mechanics, and operators.
Supervisors: One of the most serious problems inproduct- oriented factoriesconcerns education and skills of the
supervisors. Without inventories, all of thesteps of production
interlock, whether it is througha mechanical device such as the
UPS or through direct interactionamong workers as is true with
the modular system. The supervisors must havean integrated view
of the process that theyare overseeing and must be aware of the
multiple relationships betweenthe parts of the system. They can
no longer deal with each problem in isolation. When a supervisor moves an operator from one task to another,he or she must be able to understand the eventualeffects of the withdrawal of that operator from the original task. This requires an ability to conceptualize the entireprocess that was not necessary before.
Indeed, in plants organized intofunctional departments,
79 71
supervisors not only did not have tounderstand the interactions
among the functions, but they often only had responsibilityover one function or a restricted range of functions.
Supervisors must also have the abilityto manage the more
conplicated group dynamics in product-orientedfactories. Indeed
in modules or tec.As the supervisors'role is ambiguous. They must manage a more interactiveprocess, yet as a result of the
group decision-making process, they have less directc-pntrol.
Mechanics: Mechanics needmore advanced technical skills,
but their jobs have changed in otherways as well. If plants use
multi-function departments, it ismore difficult for mechanics to
specialize in a small number of machines. Successful operation without buffer inventories requiresmechanics with deeper and more abstract knowledge of the equipment. For example, when one large firm first installedsome sophisticated semi-automatic equipment, the management expectedthat their mechanics would have trouble with the advancedelectronic and hydraulic components of the machines. And ind,,ed they did. But the managers also found that the mechanics hada poor understanding of the sewing components that theyhad been repairing foryears.
Previously, they could take theirtime in repairing a broken machine, thus using a trial-and-errormethod. If that did not work, they could take the machineout of service and tinker around with it until they got itgoing. Their knowledgewas entirely experience-based. As one manager put it succinctly,
"those mechanics couldn't fixa damn thing that they hadn't fixed
80 72
before." Without the buffer inventories,broken machines quickly led to downstream disruptions. One manager estimated that ina
sewing module, each minute thata sewing machine was out of
service cost $3 to $4. In one company, these problemsled to the
development of training proceduresdesigned to give zhe mechanics
a much more sophisticated and completeknowledge of all
components of the machines theyhad to work with, but the
catalyst for changes wasas much the new system of productionas the nature of the new equipment. Among the apparel firms thatI visited, two had not workedon upgrading their mechanics,
depending rather on one of thefirm's engineers, who serviced
several plants, or on an outsiderepair service. But these two firms did not emphasize flexibleor quick turnaround
manufacturing. It was therefore less crucialthat equipment be repaired immediately.
Operators: Operator jobs are also affectedby the new
environment. They must mastermore tasks; they must engage in
more extensive interactions with otherworkers, mechanics and
supervisors; and they mustbe more able to change andadapt to
new equipment and to faster changingstyles and tasks.
Information from the firms inthe study sample suggeststhat firms that are developinga more responsive and flexible production process lookfor a higher quality and bettereducated workforce.
For example, one firm hadtwo factories, one specializingin standardized goods producedin long runs and anotherthat made
81 73
small batches of special order items. Workers were trained ata central location and assigned toone of the factories when their
training was complete. They had established a policyof
assigning the best operators to thespecial order factory.
Another manager of operators ina large apparel establishment pointed out that because of theaccelerating number of changes in machines and sewing operations, itwas often difficult to give complete and detailed instructionsto all of the operators for every small change, thus operatorswere more likely to have to make adjustmeats on theirown. This firm arranged literacy remediation for employees whowere interested and required all employees under the age of 19 toattena adult basic educat.!_on classes. And in a factory that had introduceda modular system, in order to minimize machinedown time, which could quickly disrupt the production ofthe entire group, operatorswere instructed in how to do simpletrouble shooting when their machines broke down. If they could not get the machinegoing, then at least they had donesome preliminary analysis Ly the time the mechanic arrived.
In another example that is atleast suggestive, one firm that had factories in differentregions found that they hadan easier time implementinga completely new production system in one factory in which over 80 percent ofthe workforce had graduated from high school. The process was much slower inthose factories in which the highschool graduation ratewas lower. To be sure, somemanagers argue that sewing machine 74
operators do not need a high schooleducation. Nevertheless, in
my sample, those employers who assertedthis most strongly also
tended to be those who usedolder equipment and'who did not
emphasize flexibility. For example, the men'swear maker in New York who stated that his engineerswere there to reduce the need
for labor had an antiquatedfactory. He had increased the number of styles in the last decade but he still considered himselfa mass producer of a standard commodity,albeit an expensive
commodity. Moreover, he was in a very specializedniche in which he onlY had one major domestic competitor and in which therewas virtually no foreign competition. Another manager who favored
workers without high schooldegrees had had to reduce thenumber of styles that he produced over the last three years in orderto save on the changeover costs. And a third who was unableto attract high school graduates had made no attempt to adjusthiL. production process to incr,aaseturnaround time despite the interest on the part of hismost important custoners todevelop a quick response relationship. This manager did shipvery small orders, as small as one item, but he dJA this by mathtaininga very large inventory af finishedgoods.
Of course, these examplescannot prove a direct link between the educat5onal level ofthe operators and thesuccess of the firm. Nevertheless, in this sample offirms, there was avery strong relationship betweenconcern about the basic education of the workforce and attempts to implement modern technologyor innovative productionprocesses.
83 75
So far I have focussedon che educational implications of
changing markets, technology,and productionprocesses. It is
also important to consider theimplications for humanresource practices of the changingeducational level of the available
labk:r supply. The flow of immigrationmay continue to provide a supply of workers willing to work at traditional garmentoperator jobs. But in the absence ofa major and long lasting recession,
which in anycase is hardly something to be wishedfor,
attracting a broad-basedlabor force will be increasingly
difficult. The programs and experimentsthat some apparel firms are trying have the potentialnot only to improve productivity
but also to make the appareljobs more desirable. Many firms may not have the luxury of clinging to traditional humanresource practices even if itwere te:thnological3y feasible.
Education and Training inthe Apparel Industry
The employment structureand training system in taeapparel industry has been and still is simple and straightforward. The closer employees got to the:ictval prc,'Iction of theapparel, the less likely they were to have any significant formaltrainiag.
Operators, mechanics, andmost supervisors enteredthe plants as unskilled workers andlearned their skillson the job.
Some plants bad vestibuletraining (formal trainingthat takes place at the plant off the factory floor) forbeginning operators and others simplystarted young workerson the sewing room floor, assigning them thesimplest tasks at first. Usually
84 76
one of the experienced operatorswas given the responsibility for
training the novices untilthey got up to an average level of
proficiency. Highly skilled seamstresses and tailorssometimes
did have formal training,but this war often acquired inEurope. Second generation immigrants sometimeslearned more or less as
apprentices from relativesor fellow immigrants, but these
skilled workers arenow reaching retirement age, creatinga serious problem forsome sectors of the domestic industry (Bailey and Waldinger 1987).
The supervisors were usurllypromoted from the ranks of
older experienced operators. Formal supervisor training didnot
exist. Mechanics received even less formaltraining than the
operators. They usually learned their skillsby following
experienced mechanics around whilethey worked. If more sophisticated equipmentwas purchased, the machinery manufacturer provided some instruct:Ion.
Thnre has been a longer traditionof formal education for some of the higher positions in the industry. Schools such as the Fashion Institute ofechnology (FIT) in New York trained thousands of designers, purchasers,managers and marketers. The closest that these schools gotto training production workerswas in their programs formarker and sample makers. Engineers in the industry who designed equipmentand plant layout and who set piece rates either graduated from general engineeringschools or from the specialized textileand apparel schools suchas FIT,
Philadelphia College of Textilesand Science, or Southern College
85 77 of Technology.
The substantial formal trainingat FIT, Southern Tech and
similar schools is overwhelminglyorieated toward design,
marketing, engineering, andvarious management positions. The
interest in theseprograms and the demand for their graduateshas risen in recent years. In the early 1980s, the textile/apparel
program at Southern Tech was almost de-ad,enrolling only 45
students. In 1988 they had about 100students in their two and
four year programs--60 in appareland 40 in textiles. According to the director of theprograms, even more graduates could be
placed if they were available. Similar reports come fromthe North Carolina State UniversitySchool of Textiles and the
Philadelphia SChoo1 of Textilesand Science, Large apparel and textile firms also recruit from general universities andbusiness schools. Obviously many firms in theindustry have recognized the need for post sccondarygraduates in a variety of technical and managerial positions (although apparel firms undoubtedlylrg behind textile firms inthis respect). Indeed, a Southern Tech advisory committee ofindustry representativesactually paid the salary and expenses for a full time staff member to recruitfor the textile and apparelprogram.
The industry seems pleasedwith the graduates of these programs and if demand staysstrong, they till undoubtedly expand. It is not clear how much emphasisis put on education for the new environment in which the apparel industrymust operate. Certainly personnel atmost of these schoolsare well
86 78
aware of most of the technological, market,and organizational
trwids that are taking place. The specialized schoOsare all closely associated with industryconsultants and the major trade
associations and thereforecan keep up with the most recent
developments. The Defense Logistics Administration(DLH) has
recently funded technologydemonstration projects in fourschoc
and the DLA has emphasizedmana'jement for innovative production processes.
One indication of greater focuson preparing students for
the new production systemswould be an increased emphasison
human resource management. The engineering basedprugrams such
as at Southern Tech still do notstress this--Southern Tech
offers one course in LaborRelations. The apparel proauction management program at FIT doesoffer several courses entirelyor partly devoted to humanresource issues. The program offers both a course in personnel administration and labor relations andone in industrial organizationand management. The production management and analysiscourse covers issues in operator recruitment and training. FIT's program also tries to give students who will not beinvolved in manufacturingsome sense of the problems that factorymanagers must face. Thus Narketing majors can take a course in which they study thetension between consumer demand and manufacturingconstraints, and desiyn majors are also given a background inproduction techniques including labor management issues. This type of cross-fertilization between designers, marketers,and manufacturers will become
87 79
increasingly important inmore flexible and integrated production systems.
But despite this impressivemenu of options, most of these
are not required courses. The implications of the latest
deve'opments in humanresource management and training in the
industl-y are only beginningto work their way into the
curriculun. It is fair to say that educatorshave not developed
a strong consensus of what itmeans to train a manager fora flexible manufacturing environment.
The education of mechanics isless well developed.
Graduates of post secondary institutionsare in general not interested in taking a factory floor job in an apparelplant. As
the director of the SouthernTech program said, "graduatesof my
two year apparelprogram would see ending up ina mechanic's
position as a failure tomeet their expectations." Arrow tries to hire two yelr electrical engineering graduates for itssewing
machine program, but hastrouble finding enough. If employers want to hire community college graduates for technicianjobs,
they usually must sendone of their own employees. To some
extent, the industry itself isfilling this gap by developing
schools for sewing machinemechanics. In 1973, the Union SpeciLl
Corporation starteda mechanic's school in Illinois.24
The Arrow Company hasa sewing machine mechanic school in
Austel, Georgia. The managers try to recruitho3ders of two-year
24 For a dk:cription of the UnionSpecial School see Santora 19C7:108-9. 80
associate degrees in electricalengineering. They then send them to the training center for sixmonths to learn sewing machine
repair. After the first six months, the mechanicscome tack to
the center frequently forsmall courses, and the trainingstaff
estimates that it takes aboutthree years of this programto
produce a fully competent sewingmachine mechanic. Oxford
Industries has also recentlystarted a mechanics trainingcenter and takes in students from otherfirms as well.
These schools appear to traingoot; mechanics, but the output
is only a few dozena year. Other firms have not opened training
centers but have taken othersteps to upgrade their mechanics.
For example, Russell Corporationrecently established a special poLiticm within the personneldepartment to oversee the hiring and training of the technical (machine repair) staff. MecAanics for the electronic equipmentare sent out to a local community college to upgrade their skills.
Nevertheless, the preparationof mechanics is a weakness in the industry training system. Few young post-secondarygradue.es are interested in entering theoccupation and upgradingprograms are inadequate. Employers are continuing tomake do with more informally trained mechanics. Given the increasing costand complexity of the machinesand the importance of machine reliability and speed ofrepair in a production settingwith minimal inventories, thisinadequac7 is potentiallya serious problem.
There are very few training;rograms for floor level
89 81
supervisors in the industry. Supervisors are still drawn primarily from among experiencedoperators and receive little
formal training. Firms that have installed unit production
systems or modules or try to reduce inventoriesin other ways find the supervisors' jobs becomemore complex and sometimes more difficult. Strengthening super0.sor training and improving upgrading programs to allow operatorr tomove into supervisory positions should be a priorityas the industry moves from a mass production emphasis tomore flexible systems.
At the s4gestion of the DLA, FIT is inthe planning stages of a training program for supervisors. This would not be part of one of the regular degree programs, but rathera shorter term program possibly to be offered at the worksite.And the Oxford
School also offers supervisor trainingcow:ses. The most common supervisor training in the sampleof firms that I visited involved short-term training conductedby consultants of between one and several days associated with varioustypes of organizational innovaions. When modules are introduced, supervisors (and operators and mechanics)attend training sessions where theyPre presumably taught to work ingroups. The module orientation progiam at Russelllasted three days, and it lasted for 40 hoursover a pariod of several weeks at Oxford.
The Oxford School also offersa general training progran, not only associated with the introductionof modules, that brings sup, ,risors, mechanics, and operatorstogether to help each better underctand the functions andproblems of the others and of
so 82
the overall production process. According to the school's staff,
this program is particularly well receivedby plant managers.
Fornal training for operators outside of thefactory is still rare. There are soma s-condary-school-level training
programs in New York City that provide trainingfor operators. There are a small number ofvery short term programs for disadvantaged participants. Two high schools in the city have
special apparel programs--the High Schoolof Fashion Industries
and William Maxwell High Schoo)--andthere are two proprietary schools that train students for apparelcareers--Mayer School of
Fashion Design and the IndustrialCareers Institute. But the large majority of the graduates of.theseprograms go into the design and marketing ends of theapparel industry. Industry representatives in the city believe thatthese and other programs produce a reasonable number ofgraduates in non-factory jobs such as designers and pattern and marker makers. The Maxwell High
Schocl is the only one that emphasizesentry-level manufacturing jobs, blat the enrolliwnt inthe program has been falling for the last few years (Bailey and Waldinger1987).
Only two of the factories I visited providedvest1bu1 e training for operators. One held the trainees in theprogram until they reached expectednormal speed--usually about 13 weeks.
In the other, the operators left the trainingcenter after five or six weeks. All of them did at least assignan experienced operator to oversee the training. The lack of a vestibule program did not seem to indicatea lack of commitment to
91 83
training, but rather a reasonablec:onviction that it could be
done best on the sewing room floor. Some of the mo:.t modern
plants had no vestibuleprogram. Nevertheless, if there is a
widespread abandonment of the bundle system,it seems likely that
it will be more difficnit toput beginners into an operating
module or unit production system, andmore vestibule training will be required.
Certainly factory-based operator trainingcould be
strengthened. Operators will need to havemore skills and a
better understanding cf the machines withwhich they work and the
production processes of which theyare a part. Perhaps the most
serious problem aith operator trainingis the low quality of
secondary school education and the relativelylow levels of high school conpletion. Most of the new skills and competencies
called for in a product-orientedproduction setting will be much
easier to impart if theoperators have a strong secondary school
preparation.A firm cannot adapt easily tochanges in
technology, work processes, andproducts if most of its labor force is illiterate. A very few firms have developed theirown basic literacyprograms or enccurage workers to attend local public progr,ms, but it isup to the public educational system to provide a solid foundation of basicskills. As a low-wage industry, apparel hasa particularly important stake ina solid educational foundation for theentire population.
92 84
Conclusion
How ready is the system of trainingand education in the industry to prepare the apparelworkforce for the new
environment? Given the fundamental changes takingplace in the
industry, there must also bea corresponding change in management
training. Without the enthusiastic commitmentof the industry's
leadership, the changes willbe limited and superficial. The
post-secondary textile and apparelschools are well connected to
the industry and at least havegood access to information about
industry needs. Thre may be some disagreement abouthow those
schools can best prepare apparelmanagers and engineers for the emerging environment, but theinstitutional framework is inplace to address these needs.
The role of general communitycolleges in preparing managers and ,echnicians for the industryis much weaker. These schools lack the strong contacts withthe industry and do not tend to attract students who start outwith an interest in apparel.
Thus, for example, it is difficultto attract electrical engineering associate degreestudents to a traditional manufacturing industry suchas apparel. Especially in the south, these students oftengo to community colleges precisely to Poid a j b in the mills. As a result, training for themiddle level occupations--positions needinga high school education withsome additional technical training--isproblematic. The weakness seems to result from a lack of appreciationof the importance vf these jobs on the part ofemployers, a lack of intereston the
93 85
part of students, and poor qualityand insufficient capacity in the education system.
The preparation for entry-leveloccupations must rely
primarily on the oUtside educationalsystem. The potential problem here is that somany of the industry's lower level
workers have weak basic skills. In the past, industrymanagers have viewed low educational levelsas an asset to the apparel
labor force--if apparel workers didnot need a secondary school
education, then high school degreeswould just increase their
expectations. But to the extent that apparel firmsface a more
rapidly changing environment, theyneed workers at all levels who
are adaptable. And solid general education helpsindividuals adjust to change.
Finally, much of the educationalchallenge facing the
industry in the future will involvetraining and retraining adult
workers and current employees. Continuing changes in technology,
products, market characteristics,firm organization, and
production processes will requiremore frequent retraining and updating of knowledge. Informal training has always beenan
integral part of workplace education,but informal training is primarily useful for passingon knowledge from one group of employees to another.More explicit and organizedmeans are needed for diffusingmore rapidly changing skills. Moreover, if experienced lower level employeescontinue to be the primary source of mechanics and supervisors, retrainingand upgrading will be the key to the effectivenessof these increasingly
90 86 important and demanding positions.
Improved continuing educationcan be carried out through a
mix of local junior and seniorcolleges and technical schools,
equipment manufacturers, trainingvendors, consultants, and
internal training departments. Two large questions remainopen. The first involves the contentof continuing education--for
example, the mix between conceptualand practical preparation,
methods for increasing interactionamong workers in different
occupations, the development ofteamwork and so forth. The
second involves training in thesmaller firms which constitute
the large majority of apparelmanufacturing establishments.
While the institutionalframework for continuing educationmay be in place for the largest firms,it is much less effective for small firms.
41,
95 Chapter 7
Conclusions and Recommendations
The apparel industry thrived for manyyears using a
traditional approach to manufacturingthat emphasized cost
cutting through reduction of directlabor costs. These costs
could be cut both by maintaining lowwages, seeking out regions
with reserve pc.as of labor,ar '. rationalizing the production process by breaking it down into many small tasks and then
engineering each task separately. For decades, production
technolog/ hardly changed. Growing competition from imports in
the late 1960s and 1970s generateda response that consisted of
further reductions in the relative earningsof apparel workers
and some developments in hard automation. This constituted a
classic attempt to deskill the workprocess and turn workers into - unskilled machine tenders. But there were serious technolcrical
limits to automation and most ofthe automation that was developed was inflexible or expensive. Thus, the strategy based on deskilling and automation was effective only foriligh volume makers of standardized goods. Market changes in the 1980s further weakened this strategy by reducingthe market share for commodity apparel.
Apparel firms have now begun tomove away from an exclusive focus on cost cutting and to concentrateon competing on the basis of flexibility, quality,innovation, fast turnaround time, and greater interaction withcustomers and suppliers. These new systems certainly involve advancedtechnology, but they also
87
96 88
require major changes in personnel and trainingpolicy. Cross
training, broader skills,a stronger conceptual understanding of work processes and business operations, increasedability to
interact with other employees, and greaterscope of action and responsibility among production workers allplay a par.': in the new human resource strategy.
The apparel case has interesting implicationsfor the controversy about the relationship betweenskills, technology and other economic changes. An analysis of skills and training in the apparel industry in the early1980s would have provided support for the deskilling hypothesis. More recent events have not shown that the deskillinej argument isnecessarily incorrect, but that it applies to a specific historicalera of the industry that was characterized bya particular combination of technolot3ica1 development and marketand labor supply conditions.25 For apparel manufacturing in general, those conditions are passing.
25 Patricia Flynn (1988) has developeda theory based on a technological life-cycle. Skill requirements changeover the life-cycle of a given technologyor process, and since there are always technologies at differentstages of their cycle, skill requirements will be rising andfalling in different sectors of the economy at any given time. Without denying the importance of cycles for particular technologies,I am emphasizing a broader historical trend toward greaterchange and uncertainty that affects the entireeconomy although its effects will be stronger or come more quickly in some sectors than inothers.
97 89
Recommendations
The system for training and preparing theapparel workforce
that has evolved over the last severaldecades was attuned to the
conditions in the industry duringthat era. As I argued in the
previous chapter, given the changes intechnology, markets, and
labor supply that have taken place in thelast 15 years, that
education system has serious weaknesses.The following steps
would strengthen the system's capabilityfor preparing the
industry's labor force fora more flexible production system.
Training for management and higherlevel technical
personnel: Management training is criticalsince no fundamental
change in the operation of the industrycan take place without
the commitment of the leadership. The industry is already served
by a network of post-secondaryinstitutions that can promote
change in the industry by theway that they prepare managers,
designers, marketers, andupper-level technicians. But as they
are currently designed, theseprograms need to focus more on the manufacturing process and particularlyon the human resources
functions. In general there should bea greater emphasis on coordination between training,engineering, human resources, design, and marketing.
Centers for the development and demonstrationof technology and organizational innovation:Many of the changes that the industry needs involve theapplication and customization of technologies and organizationalinnovations that have already been developed. This creates an important rolefor demonstration
98 90
and development (as opposed toresearch) centers such as the
(TC)2 headquarters inRaleigh and the projects setup by the
Defense Logistics Agency both for technologicaldiffusion and for
the continuing education of theindustry's managers and workers.
Community colleges can alsoserve this function. These centers
are programs particularly important for smallfirms.
Training for middle levelpersonnel: Middle level personnel
such as front-line supervisorsand technicians play critical and demanding roles in a more rapidlychanging environment.
Nevertheless, even now, little formaltraining exists for these workers. This may be one of the greatestdeficiencies of the overall system of apparel education. Public sector educational institutions, private sector trainingproviders, and larger apparel firms should developstronger programs to prepare these middle level personnel. Particular emphasis should be puton programs to upgrade lower level workers forthese positions.
Basic skills: Basic skillshave become increasingly important in the industry. This research suggests that thereis a relationship beZ;ween a firm's emphasison training and education and its ability to introducemodern technology and organizational innovations. More education has also been shown to promote adaptability. A basic secondary school education isa reasonable foundation for theindustry's labor force. Since in many areas the apparel industry is stillan important force, large employers or employerasr .ations have a unique opportunity to work withthe local secondary schools to improve
99 91 the basic skills of the local labor force.
Upgrading for immigrant workers:In many areas, it is
increasingly difficult to find highlyskilled tailors and sewing
machine operators. On the other hand, immigrant-owned firmsthat
are primarily in lower-skilled sectors of theindustry can still
tap a local immigrant workforce. Programs designed to train
these lower-level immigrant workersfor the skilled jobs and to
help them find jobs outside of the immigrantsector would be in
the interest of the industry andwould also open better employment opportunities for these workers.26
On-the-job training: Training carried outor funded by
firms and retraining of experiencedworkers must also be
strengthened. There is already in placean institutional
framework for continuing education.This includes local junior
and senior colleges and technicalschools, equipment
manufacturers, training vendors,consultants, and internal
training departments. There are two broad reasons why on-the-job training needs to be strengthened.
First, one of the industry'simportant contributions is that
it provides employment formany workers with low levels of education and skills. Indeed this employment function isa fundamental political justificationfor tariffs and other import restrictions for apparel. If the industry is to continueto play this particular emoloymentrole despite rising skil1
2 6This recommendationis discussed in detail in Baileyand Waldinger 1987. 92
requirements, then the gap must be filledby training and
upgrading of experienced workers. Moreover, many apparel makers
may not have the choice of using more educatedworkers since they
already have trouble finding such recruits. On-the-job training
also tends to reduce turnover and reducingturnover eases the pressure on recruitment--if workers do not leave,new recruits do not need to be found to replace them.
To the extent that the industry is expectedto play a broader social function through training,there is some justification for giving assistanceto firms, especially small firms, for providing that training. Already a small number of apparel firms take advantage offederally financed programs to teach their workers basic skills. Funds for upgrading may also be available in someareas from the Job Training Partnership Act.
Training provided by local communitycolleges is partly subsidized since tuitionnever covers the full cost of the education. The unir,ns in the industry andemployer associations might also sponsorsome training. This has the advantage of spreading the cost of the trainingso that individual employers will not lose their investmentin a worker's training if that worker leaves.
The second broad reason why firmsmust put more emphasis on training and upgrading theirexperienced workforce is purely economic. As the pace of technological and marketchange quickens, skills and knowledgewill become obsoletemore quickly.
Formal training will benecessary to guarantee that workers keep 93
up with the latest technologies. It is just as important that
the training be organized to facilitate continuousadaptation to changing technology and products.
Increased on-the-job training could alsobe combined with
efforts to promote both process andpruduct innovation. For
example, the training programs thatteach operators, technicians,
and supervisors to work witha new technology could also be a source of ideas about the most efficientway to use that new technology within the particularcontext of the firm. And if those receiving the training includesales, marketing, or design personnel, then the trainingprocess could also be used to promote product innovation.
Comprehensive trainingprograms to promote flexible production in the apparel industryare still new and have not been subjected to rigorous evaluation. Nevertheless, firms are trying a variety of approachesthat seem promising. For example, in addition to craining specificskills, some training efforts try to impart to workersa basic understanding of the fundamentals of both the overall productionprocess and the business of the firm. The content and organization ofthe training in somecases is designed to foster communicationand interaction among workersat ,:ifferent levels of the employment hierarchy and in differentdepartments. This is based on the concept that if production isincreasingly a groupor joint activity, then training shouldfollow suit. Training that brings together workers froma variety of positions not only broadens
102 94
the individual worker's knowledge of theoperations of the firm,
but improves the direct communicationsamong departments that is
important for flexible productionprocesses.
In the past, employers in the industry haveseen a direct
conflict between improving apparel jobsand the firm's bottom
line. Firms competed by driving down theircosts, but making
jobs more attractive required raisingwages x.hich increased
costs. The new realities of the output andlabor markets both doom this approach and offer away out. Cost is no longer the king of competition. Faster throughput time, greater flexibility, better and more interactiverelations with customers and suppliers, improved service,and innovations in design and manufacturing processes have allincreased in importance.
Deskilling and labor cost cutting willcontinue to be in the interests of apparel makers insome sectors of the industry. But those will be shrinking sectors.
Meeting the new demands will requirechanges in work design; changes in training; and changes inrelationships between supervisors and production workers,among production workers, and among firms in the supply chain. These changes, called for by developments in the markets for apparel,can also be used to improve the jobs of apparel workers. Thus apparel makers must begin to take a much broaderand more imaginative look at the employment process and search forways in which they can 95
restructure jobs that will bothstrengthen their firms' positions
and make the jobs more attractive. It remains to be seen whether
such policies will be enough bothto attract and preparean adequate labor force and to maintainthe industry's international competitiveness. But without them, over the longterm, garment production in this countrycan only continue the decline that has already cost over two hundred thousandapparel jobs in the last decade.
104 96
Bibliography
Abend, Jules. 1928. "Modular Cutting." Apparel Industry Magazine (June), p. 60-64.
American Apparel Manufacturers Association. 1988a. 1988 Focus: An Economic Profile of the Apparel Industry. Washington, DC: AAMA.
1988b. The Coming Revolution: Flexible Apparel Manufacturing. Technical Advisory Committee. Washington, DC: AAMA.
1989. Making the Revolution Work: How to Implement flexible Manufacturing Through People,Technical Advisory Committee. Washington, DC AAMA.
Bailey, Thomas. 1988. "Education and the Transformation of Markets andTechnology in the Textile Industry," Technical Report #2. New York: National Center on Educationand Employment,Teachers College, Columbia University,May.
1989. "Changes in the Nature and Structureof Work: Implications for Skills and Skill Formation."New York: National Center on Education andEmployment, Teachers College, Columbia University andBerkeley: National Center for Research on Vocational Education.
Bailey, Thomas and Waldinger,Roger. 1987. "A Human Resource Development Strategy for the New York CityGarment Industry," report prepared for theGarment Industry Development Corporation, New York City,September.
Bartel, Ann and Lichtenberg, Frank. 1985. "The Comparative Advantage of Educated Workers in ImplementingNew Technology," The Review of Economicsand Statistics (February).
Bennett, Billy. 1988. "It's a Mod, Mod, Mod Environment,"Bobbin (October), pp. 50-55.
Berkstresser, Gordon and Takeuchi,Kazuo. 1986. "The Present State of Automated Sewing SystemDevelopment in Japan, Western Europe and the United States,"in Automation and Robotics in the Textile and ApparelIndustries, Gordon Berkstresser and David Buchanan (eds.).Park Ridge, NJ.: Noyes Publications.
Braverman, Harry. 1974. Labor and Monopoly Capital: The Degradation of Work in the TwentiethCentury. New York: Monthly review Press.
105 97
Brooks, John. 1979. "A Friendly Product," The New Yorker (November 12), pp. 58-94.
Flynn, Patricia. 1988. Facilitating Technological Change: The rumen Resource Challenge. Cambridge, MA.: Ballinger Publishing Company.
Gaetan, Manuel. 1988. "Going for the Gold in 807/CBI," Bobbin Magazine (June), pp. 888-92.
Harding, Peter. 1988. "The Strategic Role of Technological Innovation in the Textile Industry,"speech presented at the International Forum sponsored by the Antonio Ratti Foundation on "The Textile Sector and theNew Technological Era: What Prospects?" Como, Italy, September23.
Hayes, Robert H., Wheelwright, Stevor, C.,and Clark, Kim B. 1988. pynamic Manufacturing: Creating the Learning Prganization. New York: Free Press.
Hoffman, Kurt and Rush, Howard. 1988. MIcro-Electronics and
ndustr . New York: Praeger.
Johnston, ussell and Lawrence, Paul. 1988. "Beyond Vertical IntegrationThe Riseof the Value Adding Partnership," Harvard Businegg_Review, (July-August),pp. 94-101.
Kaciz, Richard. 1989. "Rags to Riches? One Industry's Strategy for Improving Productivity," TechnologyReview (August/September), pp. 42-53.
Kurt Salmon Associates. 1986. KSA Pers ectives. March.
. 1988a. "Vertical Integration Createsa New Breed of Consumer Products Companies."ysA Perspectives (January), pp. 1-4.
. 1988b. quick Response Implementation: ActionSteps for Retailers, Manufacturers & Suppliers. New York: Kurt Salmon Associates.
MIT Commission on Industrial Productivity.1988. "Report of the Commission: Textile Sector Study."Unpublished, Massachusetts Institute of Technology,March.
Office of Technology Assessment.1987. The_U.S. Textile and Apparel Industry: A Revolution inProgress. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Piore, Michael and Sabel, Charles. 1984. The second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity. New York: Basic 98
Books.
"Retailers Move Into the QR Drivers Seat." 1987. Textile World (November), p. 61.
Riley, Sid. 1987. "The Industrial Revolution: Our Time Has Arrived," Bobbin, April, pp. 67-88.
Roberts, C. Zeb. 1986. "An Appraisal of UPS for Quick Response Manufacturing," Bobbin 28 (April).
Rosenfeld, Stuart. 1985. After the Factories: Changing Zmplovment Patterns in the Rural South. Research Triangle Park, NC: Southern Growth Policies Board.
Santora, Joyce. 1987. "The Mechanics of Training, Union Special Style," Bobbin (April), pp. 108-109.
Schultz, Theodore W. 1975. "The Value of the Ability to Deal with Disequilibria." Journal of Economic Literature 13 (September), pp. 827-846.
Shepherd, Jacob N. 1987. "Mechanization in the Sewing Room," Bobbin, May.
Tan, Hong. 1989. "Private Sector Training In the United States: Who Gets It and Why."Unpublished conference paper. New York: The Institute on Education and the Economy,Teachers College, Columbia University, February 1989.
U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1970. Census of Population: 1970. Occupation by Industry Final Report PC(2)-7C. Washington, DC.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
. 1980. Censtiscalopulati Industry Subject Reports PC80-2-7C.Washington, DC.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
. 1982. 1982 Census of Manufacturers. MC82-S-1 (part 1), Subject Series, General Summary. Washington, DC.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
U.S. Department of Commerce. 1987. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts of the UnitedStates, July.
1988. Bureau of Economic Analysis, National Income and Product Accounts of the United States, July.
U.S. Department of Labor. 1989. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Employment and Earninys 36 (January), tables 63 and64.
107 99
Waldinger, Roger. 1986. Through tbe Eye of the Needle: Immigrants and Enterprise in New York's Garment Trades. New York: New York University Press.
1989. "The Impact of IRCA on the New York Garment Industry."Preliminary Report Prepared for the Division of Immigration Policy and Research of the U.S. Departmentof Labor, September.
Women's Wear Daily. 1989. "Gtting Over the Labor Crunch." Wednesday, July 12, pp. 6-7.
S