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Foreword 2003 National Money Laundering Strategy i Table of Contents Foreword ............................................................................................................................................................................... i Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................................................... iii Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................................ 1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................................... 2 Goal 1: Safeguard the International Financing System from Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing ........................................................................................................... 5 A. Blocking Assets and Cutting off Worldwide Channels of Terrorist Funding ............................................ 6 B. Establishing International Standards ........................................................................................................... 7 C. Ensuring Global Compliance with International Standards ...................................................................... 9 D. Addressing Financing Mechanisms of Particular Concern ...................................................................... 13 E. Facilitating International Information Sharing ......................................................................................... 17 F. Outreach and Cooperation with the Private Sector .................................................................................. 18 Goal 2: Enhance the United States Government’s Ability to Identify, Investigate and Prosecute Major Money Laundering Organizations and Systems ....................................................................... 19 A. Enhancing Interagency Coordination ........................................................................................................ 20 B. Ensuring that Law Enforcement Agencies and Task Forces Use and Share Financial Databases and Analytical Tools .................................................................................................. 21 C. Focusing Law Enforcement Personnel and Other Resources on Highest-Impact Targets and Financial Systems ......................................................................................... 21 D. Utilizing New and Improved Statutory and Regulatory Authorities ....................................................... 22 E. Increasing International Operational Cooperation .................................................................................. 23 F. Improving United States Government Interaction with the Financial Community .............................. 24 G. Helping State and Local Governments Investigate and Prosecute Money Laundering and Financial Crime Cases ..................................................................................................... 25 Goal 3: Ensure Effective Regulation ................................................................................................................................... 26 A. Strengthen and Refine the Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Regime for All Financial Institutions ......................................................................................................... 26 B. Improve the Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering Controls Through Greater Communication, Guidance, and Information ............................................................................. 28 C. Enhance Regulatory Compliance and Enforcement Efforts ..................................................................... 30 List of Appendices.............................................................................................................................................................. 33 Appendix A: Recent Significant Cases in the War Against Terrorist Financing (Goal 1) ......................................... 34 Appendix B: Comprehensive List of Joint Designations of Individuals and Entities as Terrorists or Terrorist Supporters (Goal 1) ............................................................................................ 37 Appendix C: Progress with Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCTs) (Goal 1) ...................... 38 Appendix D: Trade-Based Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (Goal 1) ..................................................... 42 Appendix E: Recent Significant Money Laundering Cases (Goal 2) 45 Appendix F: Financial Crime-Free Communities (C-FIC) Support Program Grants (Goal 2) .............................. 48 Appendix G: Summary of the Anti-Money Laundering Provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act and the Steps Taken to Implement Them (Goal 1)......................................................................... 49 Appendix H: Terrorist Financing Online (Goal 1)....................................................................................................... 53 Appendix I: Money Laundering Defendants Sentenced in FY 2001 – Highlights (Goal 2) .................................... 81 Appendix J: International Asset Forfeiture Sharing (Goal2) ..................................................................................... 83 Treasury Forfeiture Fund .............................................................................................................. 84 Department of Justice forfeiture Fund ........................................................................................ 85 2003 National Money Laundering Strategy iii Executive Summary he 2003 National Money Laundering Strategy reflects the U.S. government’s ongoing commitment to attack Tmoney laundering and terrorist financing on all fronts, including the formal and informal components of both the domestic and international financial systems. Armed with important new authorities provided by the USA PATRIOT Act, we are taking coordinated and aggressive action using all available tools, including law enforce- ment actions, appropriate financial regulation and oversight, and coordination with our private sector and interna- tional partners. While we continue to make significant progress, much remains to be done to confront the ever-changing, global threat of money laundering and terrorist financing. The 2003 Strategy represents a continuation of our past efforts, and a commitment to move forward by identifying, disrupting, and dismantling high value terrorist financing and money laundering organizations and networks. The central tenet of our 2003 Strategy is the ever-increasing need for all relevant U.S. government agencies, our foreign government counterparts, and our partners in the private sector to pool our collective expertise and coordinate our activities to stop the laundering of criminal proceeds and to staunch the flow of funds to terrorists. By attacking the financial infrastructure of complex criminal organizations and terrorist networks, we do long term damage to their ability to perpetuate their operations. To achieve these objectives, the 2003 Strategy focuses on three major goals: (1) to cut off access to the international financial system by money launderers and terrorist financiers more effectively; (2) to enhance the Federal government’s ability to target major money laundering organizations and systems; and (3) strengthen and refine the anti-money laundering regulatory regime for all financial institutions to improve the effectiveness of compliance and enforcement efforts. The 2003 National Money Laundering Strategy includes, among other items, a commitment to accomplish the following: • Block and seize terrorist assets and identify and designate terrorist organizations. To date, over 315 terrorist- related entities have been designated and over $136 million in assets frozen. • Target countries and institutions that facilitate money laundering and terrorist financing, including using the full range of measures provided by Section 311 of the USA PATRIOT Act. • Take law enforcement action against high value money laundering targets, including those with ties to major narcotics trafficking operations. • Improve the effectiveness of compliance and enforcement efforts to continue to strengthen and refine the anti-money laundering regulatory regime for all financial institutions by identifying new and emerging threats that can be addressed through regulation, improving the effectiveness of anti-money laundering controls through greater communication, guidance, and information-sharing with the private sector, and enhancing regulatory compliance and enforcement efforts. • Encourage foreign countries throughout the world to adopt and adhere to international standards to inhibit the flow of illicit funds, both through the formal and informal financial sectors, and to assist in developing and enhancing anti-money laundering regimes in targeted countries to enable them to thwart terrorist financing. • Improve the Federal government’s partnership with the private financial sector to increase information- sharing and close the gaps in the financial system that allow abuse by money launderers and terrorist financiers. Executive Summary 2003 National Money Laundering Strategy 1 Introduction he 2003 National Money Laundering Strategy both currency shipments; money transmitters; money Ttargets
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