Ideas & Issues (Innovation/Future Force Design) Flip the Rank Pyramid Majors as commanders by Col Mark Cancian

or decades, the Marine Corps has had the perverse notion that its most experienced offi- >Col Cancian (Ret) served 37 years in the Marine Corps, active and reserve. An cers should do work rather Infantry and Artillery Officer, he deployed overseas to Iraq (twice),D esert Storm, Fthan lead troops. Thus, battalion and and the evacuation of Vietnam. He currently works at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank in Washington, DC. regimental staffs have lots of majors and senior captains, but captains and even first command companies and batteries. The Marine Corps does it is most likely to influence the fight, by a higher headquarters that could this despite its rhetoric that troop com- to decentralize decision making from provide the experience and expertise mand, especially at the company/bat- staffs to the line commanders, to involve that a company commander lacked. tery level, is key to battlefield success. If battalion commanders more directly in Now, Marine Corps doctrine envisions the Marine Corps believes what it says, conducting operations, and to make moving toward distributed operations it should take the bold step of moving widely distributed operations viable. where smaller units like companies all those majors and senior captains into are distributed widely around the bat- commands and reducing the influence The Importance of Company Com- tlespace, including in day-to-day “grey of staffs. In fact, doing so may be the manders zone” competition across the globe. only way to make possible the distrib- To begin, it is worth reviewing why That means that companies may no uted operations capabilities called for in company commanders are so impor- longer be under the immediate direc- the Commandant’s Planning Guidance.1 tant. First, command is important. It tion of a higher headquarters. Further, The proposal. Reorganize the infantry is the pinnacle of professional respon- companies may have capabilities now battalion as follows: sibility. A commander is responsible resident only at battalion level and • Make the commanders of the three for everything the unit does or fails to higher and, in the future, might have infantry line companies a . do. Second, companies are particularly access to new capabilities such as inter- • Reduce the rank of the S-3 Opera- important because they are the lowest mediate range conventional missiles, tions officer to a . level that routinely coordinates multiple loitering munitions, and tactical cyber • Leave the commander of weapons functions and owns battlespace, yet the fires. The resulting operations require company as a captain. Although the commander still can interact directly more decision-making capacity at lower function is important, during opera- with subordinates.2 An illustration of levels.5 tions, the company operates dispersed, this importance is the most challenging Indeed, during counter-insurgency and the weapons company command- battle Marines have fought in the past operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, er performs a staff function, fire sup- decade—for Patrol Base Fires’ survival companies picked up rudimentary staffs port coordinator. in Afghanistan’s bloody Sangin district. for intelligence and fire support to help • Leave the commander of headquar- As Bing West makes painstakingly clear with the increased responsibilities. ters and service company as a captain in his classic, One Million Steps, had it because the functions, though impor- not been for the company commander’s There are Precedents tant, are mostly administrative. leadership at the decisive moment, Pa- Marine officers today tend to view This article focuses on infantry trol Base Fires could have fallen into the assignment of captains as company units because they comprise the Ma- enemy hands.3 commanders as akin to a natural law, rine Corps’ major element of ground Company commanders will be in- an inevitable and unalterable practice. combat power, but the argument applies creasingly important as Marine Corps In fact, having majors as company com- broadly. Every community would be operational doctrine evolves toward dis- manders has a long history. better off putting more senior officers tributed operations—a move specifically In the (and many oth- (and enlisted for that matter, though called for in Gen Berger’s guidance.4 ers) at the beginning of World War I, that is a separate issue) into line units. When battlefield employment involved majors commanded companies (and The purpose of the change would battalions/regiments/divisions, compa- batteries also). A shift from captain to be several-fold: to put experience where nies would always be closely overseen major company commanders occurred

Marine Corps Gazette • March 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette WE41 Ideas & Issues (Innovation/Future Force Design) at the turn of the 20th century when Marines/Sailors) being slightly smaller officer. While this smoothed out the infantry battalions were reorganized to than the World War I battalion (1,040 “rank pyramid” somewhat by ensuring have a smaller number of larger com- Marines/Sailors).8 that the battalion had another major panies (200–250 men). Unfortunately, Today, battalion staffs are smaller to balance its colonel, it also meant that the by the time the U.S. Army and Marine versions of regimental and division could no longer be the battalion’s de Corps consolidated their companies, staffs. Battalion staffs have grown to 11 facto operations officer. The S-3 would they were in the midst of mobilization officers, even though the battalion-size now be the real S-3, and the executive for World War I and just did not have (965 Marines/Sailors) is slightly smaller officer became more of a chief of staff enough officers. Captains were designat- than the World War I and World War II and gatekeeper who controlled access ed company commanders, not because equivalents. Six staff officers are senior to the battalion commander. they were the right rank but because or equal in rank to company command- 6 9 This practice was in sharp contrast there were not enough majors available. ers. to the norm in European Armies. In Ironically, the Marine Corps Reserve French and German battalions, the does this today, though it is rarely dis- company commanders outranked cussed. In theory, reserve infantry bat- Infantry battalion staffs everyone except the battalion com- talions have the same rank structure mander himself. In British and Soviet as active duty battalions. However, be- have been growing in battalions, the commander did have cause the average reserve officer comes an executive officer (the Soviets called off active duty with six years of experi- size and influence over him a chief of staff), but the company ence, commanders tend to be time. commanders outranked all the other captains, and company commanders officers. (British company command- tend to be majors.7 ers were actually majors; captains did all the staff work.) The Marines, how- The Change in Staff/Line Dynamics This expansion of staff size and se- ever, sided with the U.S. Army in that Infantry battalion staffs have been niority has changed the way that line they authorized majors as battalion growing in size and influence over time. units relate to the commander. In ef- S-3 officers as early as March 1944.10 Back in 1914, on the eve of World War fect, a staff has been interposed between The rapid expansion of the Marine I, an Army battalion staff had only one them. The section below, quoted at Corps (and Army) during World War officer, the adjutant, now a junior officer length because of its relevance, comes II was a major reason why this change in the S-1 personnel section. (That is from a study of infantry organization. occurred. The Marine Corps expanded why the adjutant has certain ceremonial Although the analysis focuses on the twenty-fold between 1939 and its peak roles that are much more important than Army, the Marine Corps followed Army in 1944. (The Army expanded 30-fold.) the current position would imply.) The practice: Therefore, a World War II infantry Marine Corps had no equivalent units The Army expanded its infantry bat- company had only a handful of per- at the time, being organized by barracks talion headquarters from just four of- sonnel, maybe just the first sergeant, and ship detachments. By the end of ficers in May 1945 to seven in 1948 who had been in the military before World War I, the Marine Corps had … increased the rank of a battalion wartime mobilization began. The U.S. followed the Army example, growing operations officer (S-3) from captain to military believed that strong staffs were to three staff officers in addition to the major and gave him a lieutenant to act needed to compensate for this lack of battalion commander. In the 1920s, the as his assistant. Although these chang- experience. While the wisdom of that wartime goal for the battalion staff had es seem minor on paper, in practice, decision can be debated for World War grown to five, but except the major XO, their effect was profound. Not only II, it clearly does not apply today. the staff officers were first lieutenants, had battalion staff officers increased in As the discussion above implies, a all junior to the company commanders. number, they had increased in rank as perverse aspect of this system is that At the beginning of World War II, the well. The S-1, S-2, and S-4 were now company commanders answer to several “D” series Table of Organization kept all captains and thus equal in rank to bosses because there are so many senior the battalion staff at five but with the the company commanders. In practice officers on staff. This is particularly true operations officer now a captain. By the (after 1948) all three (especially the regarding the operations officer who end of the war (“G” series Table of Or- S-4) were usually senior to the com- often operates as a deputy commander, ganization), the staff had grown to six, pany commanders because the U.S. but it can also occur with other staff Army preferred (and still prefers) to use with the operations officer now a major junior captains as company command- officers because they are equal in rank and the logistics officer a captain. To ers and senior ones as staff officers. and often senior to the company com- be fair, the battalion had become more mander. Battalion commanders may complicated over time, with a wider Of more significance was that, as a argue that in their battalion there was variety of weapons and capabilities. It major, the S-3 outranked all the com- only one person in charge: the com- had not, however, become any larger, pany commanders. He was also of the mander. They have clearly forgotten same rank as the battalion executive with the World War II battalion (996 what it is like to be a company com-

WE42 www.mca-marines.org/gazette Marine Corps Gazette • March 2021 mander and receive a radio order from leaving that to the staff, and especially career damage might be small. Career a senior battalion staff officer. It has all the S-3. Orders to the line companies progression for individual officers is ap- the force of an order from the battalion would more often come directly from parently more important to the Marine commander—and company command- the battalion commander rather than Corps than unit combat effectiveness. ers get many such calls. from the staff since the company com- Although majors are rarely seen as Thus, the purpose in reducing the manders would now outrank the staff. company commanders, it is common rank of the operations officer S-3 from This will be a difficult change for many to see first lieutenants in these billets major to captain is not just to reduce battalion commanders who have be- because they may be the only officer the number of additional majors needed come accustomed to the role of oversight available (after the staff positions are to implement this proposal but also to rather than one of direct command. filled). Often one hears the argument change the dynamic between staff and Further, the change would push that this is not a problem because a good line—giving company commanders battalions to implement more fully the makes a fine company more voice and reducing the influence maneuver warfare concept of mission commander. While it is true that some of the staff. tactics; that is, giving the line units a first lieutenants do make good com- mission and letting them figure out how pany commanders, the argument is de- Commanders Favor Staffs to accomplish that mission. MCDP 1, lusional when applied broadly. If first Another reason for this staff/line Warfighting,praises such an approach: lieutenants are just as good company balance is that commanders focus on Mission tactics are just as the name im- commanders as captains or majors, what their staffs. This is a hard thing to say plies: the tactics of assigning a subor- is the point of all that training and ex- because most commanders rightfully dinate mission without specifying how perience that more senior officers get? think of themselves as warfighters who the mission must be accomplished. We The implication is that it is worthless focus on combat. However, the human leave the manner of accomplishing the because it does not produce a better inclination is to favor nearby activities mission to the subordinate, thereby al- company commander. Yet, the Marine and ensure that they operate smoothly lowing the freedom—and establishing Corps as an organization does not be- day-to-day. More distant activities get the duty—for the subordinate to take lieve that because every year it sends so less attention. Thus, commanders want whatever steps deemed necessary based many officers to advanced training. smooth staff operations and will put on the situation. Mission tactics rely This line of argument does raise their best people on staffs to ensure on a subordinate’s exercise of initia- the point that organizations must be this smooth functioning. Distant ac- tive framed by proper guidance and designed for personnel averages rather tivities—the line companies—then get understanding ... It is this freedom for than the extraordinary. That means what is left. initiative that permits the high tempo that tables of organization must be Martin van Creveld discussed this of operations that we desire. Unin- constructed based on the average per- line/staff dynamic in Fighting Power, his hibited by excessive restrictions from formance of personnel. Thus, having a above, subordinates can adapt their classic study of the U.S. and German 12 major as a company commander will, personnel systems in World War II: actions to the changing situation. on average, result in better performance [The ] systematically However, the existence of large and than a captain or first lieutenant. Build- and consistently sent its best men intrusive staffs makes implementation ing tables of organization that can only forward to the front, consciously and of mission tactics difficult because such be executed successfully by extraordi- deliberately weakening the rear ... Ger- staffs enable the opposite: direct control nary personnel is a recipe for failure. man commanders at all levels were to by central authority. select essentials and concentrate on There are Enough Majors them while leaving the details to sub- Career Progression Comes First A fair question is whether there are ordinates to work out. The U.S. Army One perverse practice built into the enough majors to fill all the proposed aimed at confronting the enemy with current organizational structure and company commander spots. After all, the greatest possible firepower ... To personnel system is that as soon as a personnel become scarcer at higher rank deploy all resources as well as possible, captain company commander is pro- levels so the Marine Corps may need to put every man and screw in their moted major, that person is whisked out to use captains just because it doesn’t proper place, a centralized organiza- of command and put on a staff even if have enough majors. Fortunately, this tion, and vast amounts of detail infor- there is no good spot for them. Com- is not a problem. mation were needed ... Far too many manders do this because it is considered The first reason is that making this officers had soft jobs in the rear, far 11 harmful for careers to stay in a billet that change requires only a few majors. To- too few commanded at the front. is lower than one’s rank. Thus, being day, there are 72 infantry line compa- Thus, an important element of this a major in a captain’s billet would not nies in the active duty Marine Corps reorganization would be to change be “career enhancing.” This shift has (24 infantry battalions x 3 companies command dynamics. Battalion com- even happened on deployments when [excluding headquarters and service and manders would need to be more person- the need for experience is greatest be- weapons] per battalion = 72), and if ally involved in operations rather than cause of real-world operations, and any the S-3 billet is downgraded, then only

Marine Corps Gazette • March 2021 www.mca-marines.org/gazette WE43 Ideas & Issues (Innovation/Future Force Design)

Number of Majors in Marine Corps Notes 4500 1. Gen David Berger, Commandant’s Planning 3994 Guidance, (Washington, DC: 20190). 4000 2. John English, A Perspective on Infantry, (New 3500 3162 3001 York, NY: Praeger, 1991). 3000 2550 2521 3. Bing West, One Million Steps: A Marine Pla- 2500 toon at War, (New York, NY: Random House, 2014). 2000

1500 4. Commandant’s Planning Guidance.

1000 5. For a concept about what such a company 500 might look like, see Jeff Commings, Scott Cuo- mo, Olivia Garand, and Noah Spataro, “Marine 0 Warbot Companies: Where Naval Warfare, 1958 1963 1975 1992 2020 the U.S. National Defense Strategy, and Close Combat Lethality Task Force Intersect,” War Figure 1. on the Rocks, (June 2018), available at https:// warontherocks.com.

48 additional majors are needed (54 if personnel? This experiment needs to 6. For discussion of this transition, see “Bat- the three battalions of MARSOC are be measured carefully because the in- talion Organization,” Brigadier-General Fred- included). clination will be to focus on smooth erick Ivor Maxse, reproduced in The Tactical The second reason is that there are operations of staff functions because Notebook, (Quantico, VA: November 1993). a lot of majors in the Marine Corps these are easier to measure. (3,914). The chart below shows the One could imagine sister battalions 7. For a discussion of the reserve officer struc- number of majors in the Marine Corps complaining about the higher perfor- ture, see LtCol Mark F. Cancian, USMCR, at four times in the past when the Ma- mance of the restructured battalion. “Marine Corps Reserve Forces in Southwest rine Corps was approximately the same Of course, they performed better; they Asia,” Marine Corps Battle Assessment Team, (September 1991). size that it is today (186,000). Since had majors in key billets. But that is 1958, the number of majors has grown the point: if the performance improves, 8. All figures from John Sayen,Battalion: An by 1,364, or 53 percent. This reflects then the change is worth making. Organizational Study of the United States Infan- the increasing importance of staffs and try, unpublished monograph, Appendix, tables a change in command philosophy to Aligning Doctrine and Organization 1.3, 2.6, 3.25, 5.31, 5.36. more centralized direction. It is time for the Marine Corps to align its organization with its doctrine. 9. How to count staff officers gets tricky as the Test the Concept by Conducting an It claims to value company command number of special staff increases. This count Experiment but puts its most experienced officers on excludes special staff who primarily oversee sup- Implementing this proposal involves the staff. It claims to believe in decen- port sections, such as the supply officer, the com- munications officer, and the battalion surgeon. breaking many long-standing habits and tralized tactical operations but central- It counts those officers whose primary function tables of organization. Therefore, the izes control with the staff. It claims to is to provide staff support to the commander. Marine Corps should first conduct an follow the precepts of maneuver warfare experiment to see whether it works. and mission command but does not 10. Battalion. In this experiment, the Marine Corps trust lower echelons enough to let them should organize a single battalion along make decisions. 11. Martin Van Creveld, Fighting Power: Ger- the lines described as the battalion is This proposal will reverse, in a mod- man and U.S. Army Performance, 1939–1945, getting ready to deploy. Then indepen- est way, the long-term expansion of bat- (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1982). dent evaluators should observe that the talion staffs and the centralization of battalion’s performance during train- authority that they represent. It puts 12. Headquarters Marine Corps, MCDP 1 ing and deployment and compare the higher levels of training and experience Warfighting, (Washington, DC: June 1997). performance to that of a standard bat- on the front line in contact with the en- talion. Does the improvement in field emy and therefore enhances the Marine performance of the companies as a result Corps’ reason for existence: victory on of having more experienced leadership the field of battle. make up for the loss of staff function- ing because of having less experienced

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