The Transformation of Kuwait Television

from 1961 to 2015:

Current Challenges and Future

Opportunities for National Public Service

Television to Promote an Arab Public Sphere

in the Context of Globalisation

by

Abdullah Khayrallah

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

School of Communication

Creative Industries Faculty

Queensland University of Technology

2017 2

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Abstract

Since its 1961 launch, Kuwait television has cemented its status as a superior Middle East broadcasting service. However, it has struggled to remain relevant as satellite proliferated the Middle East from the early

1990s onwards. A more competitive regional media landscape has redefined the relationship between the Kuwaiti Government and its citizens, and Kuwaiti television has found it difficult to maintain relevance in this dynamic, convergent media environment.

This thesis explores the connections between local television viewers and the state-owned Kuwait Television (KTV) operation, in the context of examining the political, economic and socio-cultural forces that animate all aspects of Kuwaiti life. It offers an interpretation of public debate, by critically analysing changing government policies in the context of new dynamics in the relationship between local, regional and global television.

The thesis examines the position of Kuwaiti television in the context of globalisation and the changing dimensions of Arab and Middle Eastern television. In this thesis, I argue a declining KTV viewership is the result of a lack of government attention to the service, and to the changing needs of Kuwaiti television audiences.

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The result is a mismatch of television content and national aspirations, whose significance has been exacerbated in recent years, with the proliferation of satellite channels in Arab nations. Some adverse consequences of declining audiences and poor state policies include the demoralisation of Kuwaiti media professionals, and a decline in the quality of locally produced news and entertainment content.

The thesis concludes with a discussion of the prospects and possibilities of significant media reform in Kuwait. This would require a twofold solution.

Firstly, internal reform of the KTV organisation (perhaps to emulate other successful public broadcasting services (PBSs) throughout the world).

Secondly, a renewed commitment to media regulation and media freedom to preserve an “arm’s length” relationship between media organisations and professionals and the Kuwaiti government is needed.

Such changes would enable KTV to respond in a relevant fashion to the

Kuwaiti peoples’ need for a window into the world. These changes will also create innovative new programs for citizen engagement, which are better able to align KTV’s mission with the expectations of media citizenship – which are essential for a modern, dynamic and socially cohesive Kuwaiti society and culture.

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QUT Verified Signature

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Keywords

Arab media; Kuwait; television; media studies; globalisation.

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Table of Contents

Abstract ...... 3 Keywords ...... 6 Acknowledgements ...... 10 List of figures ...... 12 List of tables ...... 12 CHAPTER ONE ...... INTRODUCTION ...... Background to the Study ...... 13 Study Objectives ...... 16 Thesis Structure ...... 18 Research Methodology ...... 26 Television, Democracy and Culture ...... 30 CHAPTER TWO ...... CONCEPTUALISING THE CHALLENGES FACING KUWAITI TELEVISION: PERSPECTIVES FROM COMMUNICATIONS THEORIES ...... Introduction ...... 34 Conceptual Framework ...... 36 Cultural Studies ...... 37 Political Economy of Media ...... 40 The Public Sphere ...... 44 Studying Media Audiences ...... 49 The Media, Modernity and Modern Nations ...... 52 Historical Perspective on Arab Television ...... 60 Middle Eastern Television Prior to the Gulf War ...... 66 Satellite Broadcasting and the Transformation of Arab Television .. 67 Conclusion ...... 70 CHAPTER THREE ...... KUWAITI TELEVISION: HISTORICAL EVOLUTION AND CURRENT CONCERNS ...... Introduction ...... 73 Historical Background ...... 74 The Historical Development of Kuwaiti Television ...... 83 Kuwaiti Television 1961-1990 ...... 84 8

Kuwait Television after the Iraqi Invasion ...... 87 Contemporary Concerns with Kuwait Television ...... 89 Censorship ...... 90 Internal Problems ...... 97 The Trauma of TV Drama ...... 104 Conclusion ...... 107 CHAPTER FOUR ...... GLOBALISATION AS A THREAT AND CHALLENGE TO KUWAITI BROADCAST MEDIA ...... Introduction ...... 109 Defining Globalisation ...... 110 Historical Perspectives on Globalisation ...... 116 Pros and Cons of Globalisation: A Middle East Perspective ...... 122 A Regional Perspective on Transnational Television ...... 134 Conclusion ...... 138 CHAPTER FIVE ...... THE RISE OF A NEW MIDDLE EAST MEDIA SPHERE ...... Introduction ...... 140 Satellite Television and Transnational Public Spheres ...... 142 Attributes of Arab Media ...... 150 Arab Satellite Broadcasters: An Overview ...... 154 Arab Satellite Television Channels ...... 162 General Audience Channels: ...... 165 Foreign Channels ...... 171 Religious Channels ...... 173 Sports Channels ...... 174 Transnational Satellite Broadcasting and an Arab Public Sphere ..... 175 Conclusion: Arab Media and its Environment ...... 182 CHAPTER SIX ...... CASE STUDY: AL-JAZEERA ...... Introduction: Al-Jazeera and the World ...... 185 Al-Jazeera and the West ...... 198 Al-Jazeera and the Changing Arab Socio-Political Landscape ...... 206 East/West Media ...... 212 Al-Jazeera: Pros and Cons ...... 216 9

Conclusion ...... 221 CHAPTER SEVEN ...... CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A KUWAITI PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTER .... Summary of Main Argument ...... 224 A Public Service Broadcasting Model for Kuwait ...... 228 A Wider Media Policy Reform Agenda ...... 232 Can a National PSB Succeed in an Age of Global Media? ...... 239 Concluding Remarks ...... 242 APPENDICES ...... Appendix One: Interviews with Kuwaiti Media Personnel ...... 253 Appendix Two: Interview Questions ...... 260 BIBLIOGRAPHY ...... 262

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Acknowledgements

First of all, I want to thank Almighty God for giving me the courage to pursue this research. I would like to take this opportunity to thank those who have supported me through this academic journey. I have been privileged to experience Australian culture, and to have met great individuals and families during my stay. However, this journey wouldn’t be complete without my beloved wife, Izumi, and my two precious children, Ayan and Maya, who shared their Australian experience with me, gave me the time I needed to study, and inspired me to complete my thesis.

I want to thank the Kuwaiti Ministry of Information, for its support and for expressing interest in my research topic. I would like to thank, in particular, my former work supervisors, Mr. Abdulatief Bu-Kanan and Dr.

Faisal Al-Banai- I appreciate their encouragement to pursue a study of

Kuwaiti media reform. Furthermore, I want to thank my dearest friends,

Mohammed Rammadhan, Ibraheem Albayrami and Baker Akber, for their permanent friendship with me.

I would like to express my deep gratitude to my Principal Supervisor,

Professor Terry Flew, and my Associate Supervisor, Professor Axel Bruns, for their guidance and extraordinary efforts in making this research 11

possible. I note that the thesis has previously been submitted for examination, and I was asked to make major revisions to the project.

Even though my period of scholarship at QUT had been completed,

Professor Flew has encouraged me to revise the work in order to resubmit, feeling the issues raised about the future of television in

Kuwait, and in the Middle East in general, warrant consideration by a wider audience.

Of course, I would like to thank my fellow PhD students working at the

Creative Industries Precinct for constantly cheering me up, and special thanks goes to Ann McLean, for her language support though my research process. I am also greatly indebted to Professor Brad Haseman and

Professor Rodney Wissler, for their support in the early stages of the PhD journey. There are not enough words to thank my mother, brothers and sisters for their steady support and trust in my endeavours.

Professional editor, Kate Castan, provided copyediting and proofreading services, according to the guidelines laid out in the university-endorsed national ‘Guidelines for editing research theses’. 12

List of figures

Figure 3.1 Map of Kuwait p. 74

Figure 7.1 Four Models of Public Service Media p. 234

Funding

List of tables

Table 4.1 Program production in Selected p. 135

Arab Countries, 2002

Figure 6.1 International News in the Middle p. 197

East – Preferred Satellite Channels,

2009

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Background to the Study

With this thesis, I intend to contribute to making a real change to television in my home country of Kuwait. After working in Kuwaiti

Television in a variety of roles for many years, I have had the opportunity to observe the strengths and weaknesses in the Kuwaiti Government-run channels.

My strong sense was that, over time, the weaknesses were outweighing the strengths. This caused me to think critically about how Kuwaiti television channels may operate more effectively in the future, and become more attuned to the needs of the Kuwaiti people they are intended to serve. I have thus drawn in part upon my own experiences in working for KTV, in addition to the available primary and secondary literature, in developing the main arguments in this thesis.

Kuwait Television (KTV) was established in 1961 as a state-run television service, for many years was among the Middle East’s best national broadcasters. This was a source of pride for Kuwaiti people, as Kuwait is a 14

small nation surrounded by larger neighbours. But KTV had been losing its organic connections to local viewers, This was made painfully apparent in moments of crisis, such as the Iraqi invasion of 1991, which created a public outcry to liberate the voice of local media from government control.

The aftermath of that war created a bitter after-taste for many Kuwaiti citizens. The political uncertainty of the time seriously affected national identity, and the question of what sort of media system the Kuwaiti people deserve remains the subject of passionate debate within Kuwaiti society.

From an outside perspective, Kuwait is a lucrative oil producer, and is considered a country which is among the most progressive, developed and stable nations in the Arab world. However, this reality has changed, as the Kuwaiti people have mixed feelings about the nation’s future distinctiveness. In this changing, uncertain environment, the media has faced ongoing difficulties framing and representing a distinctive Kuwaiti national identity.

Kuwait is a rich country; however, it suffers heavy government spending on social welfare, and a high public dependence on the government for services such as education, health and housing. This has resulted in a top-heavy society, with a societal over-reliance upon the government, and a national economy with an unhealthy reliance on oil revenues for the 15

ongoing economic and social well-being of its people.

These forces have inhibited the development of an autonomous Kuwaiti civil society, and this is reflected in the weakness of the local media.

Government-run Kuwaiti television stations have been on a disturbing downward trend. They have seen a sharp decrease in media viewership coinciding with a great increase in the number of private and regional channels available to audiences, creating ongoing difficulties in articulating the Kuwaiti national identity.

This thesis responds to such critical challenges. But in doing so, I am acutely aware of the limited academic literature that exists on Kuwaiti television, and some of the difficulties involved in applying concepts derived from Western media studies to the very different media environments of the Middle East and the Arabic-speaking world.

In this sense, the thesis is intended to contribute to what Daya Kishan

Thussu (2006) refers to as the ‘de-Westernisation’ of media studies, in terms of its normative assumptions, methodological frameworks, and underlying assumptions about what a “good” media system should look like. 16

Study Objectives

The principal questions this thesis seeks to address are:

1. What factors lie behind the decline in KTV audiences?

2. How have problems with KTV’s organisational structure been

causal factors in its decline?

3. What are the main challenges and threats KTV faces?

4. What lessons can KTV learn from the experience of other

regional and global PSBs?

5. How has the emergence of local, regional and global private

satellite broadcasting affected the performance of KTV and

its overall audience share?

6. What are the views of key decision makers and media

experts within Kuwait on the prospects of reforming KTV?

7. What are the main components of an effective reform policy

the Kuwait Ministry of Information could adopt for KTV?

8. What changes are required within KTV to make it a more

effective PSB and contributor to the informational well-being

of Kuwaiti citizens and Kuwait’s national identity?

A central research hypothesis in this thesis is that there is an urgent need to adopt mechanisms for the administration of KTV, and its relationship 17

with government, to dramatically reduce authoritarian control over this public broadcasting institution. I have concluded my study at 2015 in order to set limits to the number of more recent developments that need to be accounted for.

Thus, the key issue is to identify restructuring models for public broadcasting on independent public service lines, and to draw out the implications for the reform of Kuwaiti television.

There are several innovative, publicly funded broadcasting models around the globe which are central to the contemporary media environment, and can provide useful lessons for non-profit broadcasters like KTV. These include, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), which is one of the world’s most respected broadcasters, and other successful independent

PSBs, such as the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), and the

Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK).

Through institutional reform that is informed by successful overseas models, KTV can meet important political, economic, social and cultural expectations; allowing it to thrive, regardless of economic downturn or a changing political climate. Such work requires changes to KTV, as well as the political and administrative environment in which it operates, to 18

develop policies and strategies that better suit the current television landscape.

Therefore, the main objective of this study is to propose reforms to the organisational structure of KTV, to improve the overall quality of broadcast content on its channels. A secondary goal is to identify the options for a more appropriate arm’s-length relationship between government authorities, KTV managers and creative workers.

I will argue such changes are essential to reverse the audience migration associated with Kuwait television, and that the window of opportunity to make such changes is rapidly shrinking.

Thesis Structure

This thesis is comprised of six chapters, in addition to this Introduction.

Its structure develops from a conceptual and methodological overview, to historical analysis of Kuwait Television (KTV), to empirical analysis that draws upon the insights of globalisation theories and media content analysis, to conclusions based upon the analysis that are intended to have direct relevance to policy-makers in Kuwait.

In Chapter Two, I draw upon different communication theories to develop 19

a conceptual framework for the thesis. Of particular importance are three approaches to studying the media. The first is cultural studies. Pioneered by British academics such as Stuart Hall and Raymond Williams, cultural studies proposes an interdisciplinary approach to the study of communication, that is particularly concerned with questions of cultural power. Regarding this thesis, an important feature of cultural studies is the attention it gives to the study of audiences, and the complex ways in which they relate to the media content available to them.

Second, the thesis makes use of the political economy approach to media and communication, that focuses on the interconnections between economic power as it manifests itself in control over media institutions, and associated questions of political, cultural and symbolic power over the production of social meaning. It presents us with interesting insights into the potential for the media to be instrument of propaganda (Herman &

Chomsky, 1994), as well as the appropriate balance between commercial,

State and public sector interests.

Third, the thesis draws upon public sphere theories. As German philosopher Jurgen Habermas writes (1974, 1989), public sphere theories provide an important normative framework through which to evaluate the media’s role in relation to the empowerment of individuals and communities. They point to a clear tension between the tendencies of 20

commodification found in the historical development of capitalist cultural industries, and the role of mass communications media in realising projects of human emancipation.

While these theories of media and communication are all important for evaluating the performance of Kuwaiti media, they nonetheless possess the problem of being rooted in Western media and cultural theory. I draw upon theories of modernity and the media to consider how we need to think differently about such developments in the Arab world.

Colonialism is a major factor, as is the continual influence of Western and other powers over governments in the Arab world. To this end, the cultural imperialism thesis proposed by Schiller (1991) and others is considered. This is coupled with the high reliance upon imported media, and the ways in which this relates to authoritarian governments failing to adequately enable citizens to gain democratic control over communications media. There are also tensions in the Arab/Muslim world about the prospect of modernity in general, and whether it conforms to

Islamic values.

In Chapter Three, I discuss the historical context of the development of

Kuwaiti Television. I consider the origins of Kuwait as a modern nation that acquired its independence from Great Britain in 1961, and the key 21

political institutions of Kuwait, including the pivotal role played by the

Emir, the Constitution and its guarantees of personal freedoms, and the role played by the National Assembly, as the nation’s parliament.

This provides the context for discussing the development of Kuwait

Television, which, I argue, needs to be considered in two stages: (1) its early development from 1961-1990, as a single channel and, from 1978, two-channel service; and (2) its restructuring after the 1991 Iraqi invasion, as a four-channel service that faced major competition from a growing range of English-language and Arabic satellite channels.

This historical overview enables me to discuss contemporary concerns with Kuwaiti television, including those of government censorship, internal problems at KTV, poor quality programming, the exodus of Kuwaiti audiences from the KTV channels, and declining advertising revenues. In this chapter, I draw upon the interviews conducted by managers and producers within KTV, that were undertaken during 2006.

Chapter Four discusses media globalisation, and the challenge it presents to Kuwaiti television. It considers the various definitions (economic, political and cultural) of globalisation, and different attitudes to it, as presenting opportunities and threats. This allows for a historical discussion of the relationship between different stages of globalisation, 22

Western Colonialism, and the mass media, that have been critical in shaping contemporary Middle Eastern media. I note that this concept is vigorously debated throughout Arab nations, with critics arguing globalisation simply represents the highest stage of Western capitalisit imperialism (e.g. Amin, 2004).

There are those, however, who identify the potential opportunities presented by new technologies to modernise Arab politics and culture.

They point to the role of non-state controlled media, as well as the

Internet and digital technologies, in enabling a wider range of voices to participate in political discourse in the public sphere.

It is this spirit of optimism that existed in the Arab World in the 2000s which frames Chapter Five’s discussion about whether satellite television could point toward a new public sphere. One important consequence of the First Gulf War was the rapid uptake of satellite television, and an increasingly questioning attitude throughout the Arab world towards the traditionally state-run and propaganda driven Arab media. Authors such as Marwan Kraidy (2002) identified the factors responsible for the rapid uptake of satellite television in the Arab world, including common language, relative affluence in some places (such as Kuwait an the Gulf states), and dissatisfaction with the State-run media. A variety of public and private satellite channels have proliferated from the 1990s to the 23

present, with almost 1,300 channels operating in the Middle East in 2004.

The chapter discusses these various channels, noting that what is referred as globalization, may be better understood as regionalisation, or the potential rise of a pan-Arab public sphere. The work of theorists such as

Manuel Castells, Ingrid Volkmer, Brian McNair and Colin Sparks is discussed in relation to these debates.

Chapter Six undertakes a case study of the Middle East’s most internationally recognized satellite television channel, Al-Jazeera. It also outlines which lessons can be learned from the development of Kuwait

Television. I note in the chapter that I was initially a strong advocate of the ‘Al-Jazeera Model’ as an option for restructuring KTV. Its relative independence from government control had enabled it to challenge Arab government in new ways, and to enable new, collective voices to be heard. Arguably, it played such a role from its establishment by the Qatari

Government in 1996, to the late 2000s. But as the Arab political situation has deteriorated since 2011, with the rise of ISIS, the failed Arab Spring movements and the Syrian civil war, Al-Jazeera has become more partisan; a mouthpiece for the Qatari Government’s interests. So, while it initially challenged government-dominated news, it has not come to constitute a new basis for an Arab/Middle East public sphere.

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In the Conclusion, I propose that KTV needs to be fundamentally restructured as a Public Service Broadcaster (PSB), along the lines identified in an a recent influential report by UNESCO (Smith, 2012), as well as in general analyses of PSBs around the world (Hendy, 2015).

The failure of State-funded satellite broadcasters, such as Al-Jazeera to fulfil this need points to the need to return to the first principles in developing a broadcasting service that can genuinely serve the public sphere. This requires structural independence from government enshrined in legislation and protected by parliament and financial independence from dominant commercial interests.

The models for such PSB services include, the British Broadcasting

Corporation (BBC) and Japan’s NHK, among others. But a Kuwaiti PSB cannot simply be an attempt to transplant an imported Western model into the Arab world. It must be able to speak genuinely to the aspirations of Kuwaiti citizens, as well as being broadly reflective of the diversity of

Kuwaiti society, culture and values.

The successful development of a Kuwaiti PSB would obviously require major reforms within KTV. To achieve this, program makers and creative people must be given a degree of autonomy to pursue their craft and express their professionalism, as well as an end to political appointments 25

in management and on the governing board. It also requires a wider program of media policy reform, with the development of an independent regulator that can govern KTV and other Kuwaiti broadcasting services.

To increase transparency, mechanisms allowing the community to provide genuine input into how the national broadcasting service is run is essential. Most importantly, it requires political leaders with the integrity and vision to enable such important democratic media institutions to take root in Kuwaiti society.

As British media theorist James Curran argues “there is a systemic connection between, on the one hand, political structures and cultures and, on the other, ways of organising the media and doing journalism”

(Curran, 2011, p. 28).

In other words, flourishing media which serves the public sphere and

Kuwaiti citizens, coupled with an open, democratic and tolerant Kuwaiti society, are goals which must be pursued. In light of the turmoil that has existed in the Middle East in recent years, and the growing challenges of media globalisation, this may be a beacon of hope to people throughout the region.

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Research Methodology

Research methods in media and communication studies typically involve mixed methods, and a multi-perspectival approach to their subject matter

(Kellner, 1995). As Klaus Bruhn Jensen observes “in recent years, media studies has gone through a process of convergence between social sciences and humanities, and qualitative and quantitative approaches”

(Jensen, 2002:2).

This thesis follows the methodologies proposed by communication theorists such as Jensen (2002), McQuail (2005) and Pickering et. al.

(2007), in combining historical methods, discourse and content analysis, and interviews with key informants, designed to develop qualitative and quantitative research findings, that will be relevant to decision makers in

KTV and the Kuwaiti Government.

The historical context in which Kuwaiti television emerged, and the factors which underlie the current Kuwaiti television crisis must be discussed. The research identifies the contextual factors that shape the critical questions posed to key informants in Chapter Three, to shed light on the embedded factors that lie behind the current impasse.

Expounding the historical background of Kuwaiti television provides the 27

framework through which we can identify the significance of attributes that have caused the current crisis. Most notably, there has been the deleterious and ongoing impact of authoritarian policies and attitudes of the political actors who controlled domestic television for decades. An analytical description of the existing TV problems is needed to highlight the impact of government administrative guidance to KTV, and to illustrate the relationship between the government and Kuwaiti citizen- audiences in terms of information sender and receiver.

The thesis also analyses primary policy documents to enable scrutiny of public discourses surrounding the operations of Kuwaiti Television. This is an attempt to understand the structure, conduct and performance of KTV in the context of normative theories of media performance, such as

Jürgen Habermas’s famous theory of the public sphere (Habermas, 1974; c.f. McQuail, 1992).

I undertook 50 interviews in Kuwait with KTV staff, including media figures, as well as policy makers who are directly and indirectly involved with the Kuwaiti television workforce. The list of people interviewed for the thesis is provided in Appendix 1. Interviews were conducted over

2007-2008, in person and by phone.

These interviews provided insights into how key players view government 28

policies towards KTV, as well as the overall performance of the organisation and questions of structural and administrative reform. These interviews were semi-structured, with the questions indicated in Appendix

2.

These interviews were conducted while undertaking fieldwork in Kuwait during 2007-2008, and the interview methodology was approved by the

QUT Human Research Ethics Committee in late 2006. This qualitative research was accompanied by the distribution of a survey, to provide quantitative insights to accompany the qualitative research methods. The questions are provided in Appendix One.

The key issue needing consideration is not only the performance of the

KTV channels, but the changing media landscape of the Middle East. In particular, the rise of modern satellite TV services such as Al-Jazeera, and the growing audiences they are attracting in Kuwait, and other countries in the region, heighten the pressures on on services such as KTV.

Thus, the thesis draws upon a range of empirical approaches to triangulate the broader findings of the need for reform of Kuwaiti

Television. It combines this empirical research with contextual analysis that highlights the Kuwait’s distinctive sociocultural and political-economic conditions. 29

The historical context considered in Chapter Three includes a discussion of the geo-political and socio cultural development of Kuwait in colonial and post-colonial contexts, including the authoritarian paradigm that shadowed governments in the region.

The crux of this research aims to test the factors underlying the decline in

KTV audiences, and the new challenges presented by international satellite broadcasting. It notes that a major factor has been the shift in the preferences of younger people, who not only prefer international channels, but also increasingly access entertainment media through digital smart phoes and online tablet devices. This analysis enables a richer discussion of the strategic interpretation of media policy in relation to socio-political views that will affect the decisions that need to be made by policy makers.

In developing these arguments, I aim to contribute to what has thus far been relatively sparse academic literature on the Kuwaiti media. This is reinforced by my interviews with the television workforce, as well as key decision makers, and my own personal experience from years of working for Kuwait Television.

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Television, Democracy and Culture

The broader question to be asked is, ”in the context of so many other social, political and other problems in the Arab world, does reform of the national television system really matter?” I believe it does, and make this claim referring to the relationship of media to wider questions of political and cultural citizenship.

Put simply, if a national population are provided with quality media that they are able to participate in and critically engage with, this will have beneficial and positive spillovers into developing political citizenship and a more engaged and robust, civil society. I argue in the thesis this is as true of entertainment media as it is of news and information-focused media.

In his book Television Culture, cultural studies theorist John Fiske (1987) identified two economies of television: financial and cultural. Fiske’s model explicitly assumes television programs are forms of media content arising out of material practices, and shape cultural values. For Fiske, to be effective, media must be entertaining as well as informative. It must address its audiences as citizens of a society, who wish to be engaged with the civic polity, and as consumers seeking to be entertained. The best television content performs both of these functions.

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I argue that good programming is the key to success. Television programming can be divided into three components - acquisitions, production, and scheduling. Therefore, from the perspective of media economics (Doyle, 2013), an organisational environment that provides the best programming is required.

Good organisational practice is shaped by corporate cultures, as discussed in Edgar Schein's famous model of organisational culture. Organisational

Theorist Edgar Schein observes “Culture is to the organisation what character is to the individual” (Schein, 1992: 45), and the ‘health’ of

KTV’s organisational culture has long been a matter of concern, as I will discuss in this thesis.

Some argue countries such as Kuwait simply need to adopt Western media models to better meet the needs of their populations. But a clear difference in the Middle East is the importance of religious norms, and how these feed into the programming requirements of television services in the region. Most religions have complex traditions that are open to multiple interpretations. What is needed, according to this line of consideration, is the capacity to reconcile the values associated with successful modern television services – which include Western models, such as the BBC – with the aspects of the Islamic religion promoting peace, understanding and cooperation. 32

The experience drawn from this study provides the opportunity to benefit from diverse debates sustaining social, cultural and economic actors, to improve future media institutions.

The best approach is to seek an ideal formula which thrusts the citizenship dimensions of media into the spotlight. In the Kuwaiti context, this requires a public service broadcasting model. However, this PSB must grant programmers and other key decision makers a greater degree of personal autonomy than the State dictates.

This attempt to create public service media as a non-commercial, publicly funded broadcast outlet with a mission to meet the civic and educational needs of the community and the broader public. To make a true impact, public service broadcasting must carry programming that challenges the authority and decisions made by the government, even if that government funds its ongoing operations.

Such a reformed broadcasting service could bring about new prestige to

Kuwait, and the wider Arab region, as has occurred – albeit somewhat problematically in recent years – with the Qatari government and the Al-

Jazeera satellite broadcaster.

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CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPTUALISING THE CHALLENGES

FACING KUWAITI TELEVISION:

PERSPECTIVES FROM COMMUNICATIONS

THEORIES

Introduction

As the most popular mass medium of the 20th and early 21st centuries, television is an integral element of the everyday life of people globally

(Hartley, 1999). As a broadcast media, television reaches diverse audiences simultaneously and directly, and provides audiences with information and entertainment at near-zero marginal cost (Doyle, 2013).

As a result, it is capable of exerting great influence on social behaviour in general. It also has the ability to shape and transform the consciousness of viewers in collective ways, while informing and entertaining them.

Moreover, as nations and societies communicate through this transnational medium, they may gain a better understanding of each 35

other, as Marshall McLuhan predicted in the 1960s with his concept of the

“Global Village” (Hanson, 2010).

While early media studies focused on the use of mass media in propaganda and persuasion, more contemporary approaches to media audiences and the possible effect of mass media on society noted its positive attributes, particularly through the influential “uses and gratifications” framework (McQuail, 2005).

In this chapter, I will outline a theoretical framework through which we can better comprehend the relationship of media to citizenship, and more clearly understand the reform tasks facing Kuwaiti television. The chapter engages in an extended critique of the status quo of Kuwaiti television, to identify opportunities that exist for Kuwaiti authorities to remodel national television institutions. It is noted in this chapter, the problems identified in this thesis are all intensified in the context of media globalisation, and the relationship between satellite television and a more vibrant, less controlled media sphere in the Arab world. Through a combination of its inability to anchor an ongoing relationship with local audiences, and the new competition presented by regional and transnational satellite broadcasting services, KTV is currently at a critical stage of its historical development, where it must be restructured, or it will wither and ultimately vanish from the media landscape. 36

I draw upon relevant academic literature from Western and Arab sources to develop key propositions from various communication theories.

Approaches to be considered include, political economy, cultural studies, public sphere theories, audience studies and globalisation theories.

I also consider the general histories of television and mass media in Arab nations, and the complex ways in which the broadcast medium’s development has interacted with the challenges of post-colonial modernity, and some of the limitations that have arisen in practice from propagandistic uses of the medium by authoritarian governments.

The chapter concludes with a discussion of transnational broadcasting, and the manner in which it has challenged the institutional settlements of media in the Arab world in a sustained way since the 1990s.

Conceptual Framework

Three approaches are sought to provide the basis of communications theory research. The first is the cultural studies approach, which seeks to understand cultural identities and how audiences are shaped through broadcast media.

The second is the political economy of media, which enables a broad 37

description and analysis of the operation of television as an institutional form, and the relationship between economic, political and cultural power.

The third is public sphere theories, expanding upon the work of German philosopher and communication theorist Jürgen Habermas, which critically evaluate the contributions made by media to an open, democratic and participatory social order.

I note there are debates among scholars within each of these fields as to the preferred methodological framework for analyzing the media. My aim in this chapter is not to engage with those sometimes polemical arguments, but rather to recognise each approach has a contribution to make to the study of media in general.

At the same time, as I will make clear later in this chapter, all of these frameworks arise primarily out of a Western media context, and that needs to be tested against the different realities of media and communication in the Arab world.

Cultural Studies

While communication theories draw our attention to the relationship between individuals and media texts in the formation of social meaning, it 38

is also apparent such messages are produced through economic institutions that combine technologies, organisational forms and professional practices. So, an approach which combines the study of institutions, media programs and audiences is required to develop a holistic perspective (Kellner, 1995). The cultural studies approach to communication observes that the meanings of messages arise from the combination combination of the formal properties of the text itself, the interpretative practices of audiences, and the different socio-cultural positions from which audiences engages in interpretative practices

(Barker, 2008).

Cultural studies is defined as “an interdisciplinary field … committed to the study of the entire range of a society’s arts, beliefs, institutions and communicative practices” (Nelson et. al., 1992, p.4).

It is particularly concerned with questions of cultural power, or the ways in which the social meaning of cultural forms and practices is contested, with the media being a primary site of such struggles for cultural hegemony.

The famous British-Caribbean cultural studies theorist, Stuart Hall argues

“in 20th century advanced capitalism, the media have established a decisive and fundamental leadership in the cultural sphere … they have 39

progressively colonized the cultural and ideological sphere” (Hall, 1977 p.340). Coleman and Ross (2011) also point out that all public communications in modern mass societies depend upon mediating technologies, techniques, strategies, and performances. Such patterns of mediation cannot be neatly categorised in ways that make them historically distinct from one another.

A central element of a cultural studies approach to media and communications research is the study of media audiences. Denis McQuail observes that early work on media audiences as:

The collective word to denote the receivers in the simple sequential

model of the mass communication process (source, channel,

message, receiver, effect) developed by pioneers in the field

(McQuail, 2005 p.396).

Cultural studies approaches problematise the simple assumption that audiences were simply the receivers of messages, pointing to the vital role of audience agency in the generation of textual meaning, while also situating such readings in complex models of social and cultural power

(Morley, 1990).

In his summary of the cultural studies approach to audience analysis, 40

Boyd-Barrett (1995) observes, such work is characterised by the importance it attributes to different readings of any given text and the relationship of such differences to cultural and social contexts. As a consequence:

The process of “reading” … is influenced by a range of factors

including, the structure of the text itself, the social context within

which the text is read, the cultural affinities of readers, and the

ways in which cultural factors influence their reading competencies,

predispositions, opportunities, and likes and dislikes” (Boyd-Barrett,

1995: 499).

Political Economy of Media

The political economy approach to media and communications was developed in the late 1960s due to a concern with the increasing role of private businesses in cultural production (Mosco, 2009; Hardy, 2013). It has also been concerned with global inequalities in access to, and provision of, media and communication, and how these can develop relations of media imperialism and cultural dependency between rich and poor nations (Schiller, 1991; Hamelink, 2014; Boyd-Barrett, 2014).

41

In their overview of the political economy of media approach, Golding and

Murdock (2005) made a distinction between traditional media economics and critical political economic approaches to the media by highlighting four key differences:

l Critical political economy sees the economy as interrelated with

political, social and cultural life, rather than as a separate domain; l It is historical, paying close attention to long-term changes in the role

of the State, corporations and the media in culture; l Critical political economy is centrally concerned with the balance

between private enterprise and public intervention. l A critical approach goes beyond technical issues of efficiency to

engage with the basic moral questions of justice, equity and the moral

good.

They summarise the approach by arguing:

A critical political economy: … sets out to show how different ways

of financing and organising cultural production have traceable

consequences for the range of discourses and representations in the

public domain and for audiences access to them (Golding and

Murdock, 2005 p.66).

42

Critical political economy is especially interested in the ways communicative activity is continuously structured by the unequal distribution of material and symbolic resources (Fenton, 2007 p.11).

Theorists adopting this approach point to the fact that media production has been increasingly dominated by large corporations and moulded to their own corporate interests.

The expansion and growth of commercialisation has inevitably pushed smaller-scale operations out of business or into consolidation with larger companies. While privatisation has weakened the position of publicly- funded media and cultural institutions as a counterweight to these corporate interests.

Critical political economists argue analysis of the mass media requires not only and economic perspective, but also a historical perspective. A key debate within critical political economy focuses on issues of ownership and control of the media. Jonathan Hardy observes that political economists “focus on ownership, finance and support mechanisms (such as advertising), and how the policies and actions of governments and other organisations influence and affect media behaviour and content”

(Hardy, 2014, p.9).

Early work in the field addressed the extent to which the cultural 43

industries serve the interests of the rich and powerful. More recently, the focus has been upon how the ideas and concepts which people use to make sense of the world and are, to some extent, dependent on the frameworks offered by the media, which are articulated by the institutional interests producing them. A critical political economy looks at the intentional action (by owners, editors etc.) and structural constraints

(such as resources of time and money), at each level of the production process. Put simply, understanding media content and the dominant ideas it conveys requires “addressing how it is produced and distributed in a given society and how it is situated relative to the dominant social structure” (Kellner, 2009 p.96).

In Manufacturing Consent (1994), Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky propose a mass media propaganda model for a modern Western liberal democratic society, in which cultural mechanisms for the maintenance of the status quo are largely as effective as they are in dictatorships and one-party states. For Chomsky and Herman, mass media function to to provide individuals with the values and beliefs that will integrate them into the institutional structures of larger society (Herman and Chomsky,

1994, p.1). Herman and Chomsky’s propaganda model is based on media

‘filters’, through which information must pass before it can reach the public. These filters include the concentration of media ownership and the role of the advertising filter, which links the entertainment industry with 44

other sectors. Another key consideration for the critical political economy of communications which engages with the moral dimension of this approach, is to investigate how changes in the array of forces can limit or promote the public sphere.

Critical political economists are concerned to explain how the economic dynamics of production structure public discourse by promoting certain cultural forms over others. Theorists in this approach argue that restrictions upon ownership and access to the means of communication are at odds with the development of an effective public sphere in liberal democratic societies.

The Public Sphere

The concept of the public sphere has been one of the most important philosophical concepts in media and communication studies. German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, who first proposed the term, defines the public sphere as:

A realm of our social life in which something approaching public

opinion can be formed [and] access is guaranteed to all citizens. A

portion of the public sphere comes into being in every conversation

in which private individuals assemble to form a public body. They 45

then behave neither like business or professional people transacting

private affairs, nor like members of a constitutional order subject to

the legal constraints of a state bureaucracy. Citizens behave as a

public body when they confer in an unrestricted fashion—that is,

with the guarantee of freedom of assembly and association and the

freedom to express and publish their opinions—about matters of

general interest (Habermas, 1974 p.49).

According to Habermas, the public sphere, “may be conceived above all as the sphere of private people come together as a public” (Habermas,

1989 p.27). The public sphere is composed of private individuals whose interconnectedness within society transcends the boundaries of their personal lives.

Craig Calhoun describes it as being “defined as the public of private individuals who join in debate of issues bearing on state authority”

(Calhoun, 1992 p.7), meaning that to the extent that every private person is represented by a public persona, so that individuals are ultimately dependent upon society, and can assert their privacy only in relation to, rather than in isolation from, the existence of other individuals

(Susen, 2011 p.43). The normative potential of the public sphere derives from the capacity of individuals in an open society to communicate freely, and to form a collective public opinions through dialogue and participation 46

in civic institutions.

The history of the public sphere cannot be treated as something divorced from wider social processes; rather, it should be conceived of as integral to these processes (Thompson, 1995).It emerged in early modern Europe as a bourgeois public sphere (i.e. one driven by the perceived interests and needs to an emerging commercial middle class), who found absolutist rule to be a barrier to their own political and economic interests.

According to Habermas, the structural transformation of the public sphere in the late 20th century has constituted a process of social disintegration:

For about a century, the social foundations of this sphere have been

caught up in a process of decomposition. Tendencies pointing to the

collapse of the public sphere are unmistakable, for while its scope is

expanding impressively, its function has become progressively

insignificant (Habermas, 1989 p.4).

According to Susen (2011), theories of the public sphere have to address three interrelated tensions: (a) the tension between universal and particular interests; (b) the tension between communicative and instrumental reason, and (c) the tension between empowering and disempowering potentials. The tension between universal and particular interests referes to the normative discrepancy between a universal or 47

society-wide public sphere, and the freedom of individuals within the wider society. As the emergence of the public sphere was originally driven by the commercial middle classes, their interests could be seen as those of society as a whole, meaning that “it was easy at that time to identify political emancipation with ‘human’ emancipation” (Habermas, 1989 p.56).

Second, there is a tension between communicative and instrumental reason that has weakened the public sphere over time. In liberal-capitalist societies, the public character of the private sphere manifests itself in the commercial market, and the public sphere constitutes not only of a discursive realm, but also a commodified and commercial realm. There is therefore a profound tension between communicative and instrumental reason, or between the freedom to communicate and the dictates of the capitalist market.

Finally, the tension between the empowering and disempowering potentials of the modern era leads to a significant paradox of the modern public sphere, which is that the state and the market can simultaneously promote and undermine the public sphere. The state can turn the public sphere into a system based around bureaucratic administration, that is not open to the citizens, while the market can turn the public sphere into a social realm that is largely driven by capitalist interests. In such an 48

environment, the critical and creative potential of the public sphere is undermined by the regulating state and the capitalist market.

What happens with the media in society is critical to the health and vigor of the public sphere. If it comes to be largely driven by instrumentalism, the the mass media will not fulfil its functions to advance a democratic public sphere. The rational-critical potential of the public sphere would be transformed into a commercial sphere, with critical thought and creative potential inhibited by the tendency of the culture industries towards constant commodification. As Susen concludes:

The tension between the emancipatory nature of communicative

rationality and the instrumental nature of purposive rationality

poses a significant challenge to the organisation of modern public

spheres (Susen, 2011, p. 51).

While Habermas’s account of the public sphere has obviously been a very influential one in meida and communciation studies, it has had its critics.

One criticism, made by Nancy Fraser (1990), has been that in its focus on the rational citizen, it has excluded those to whom citizenship has been denied. While Fraser focused on the feminist critique of the public sphere, there is another dimension in societies such as Kuwait, which is the exclusion of migrant workers and others who are not citizens. As almost 49

70% of the Kuwaiti population are non-Kuwaitis, and as migrant workers have little prospect of becoming citizens, this sets limits to the capacity of

Kuwaiti media to universally represent all people in Kuwaiti society.

Studying Media Audiences

There is an established discourse in which ‘audience’ simply refers to readers, viewers or listeners of particular media channel of a given type of content or performance. The audience is composed of individuals who demand something from the communication to which they are exposed, and who select those communications that are likely to be useful to them.

In other words, audiences as receivers of media messages must get something they value from the senders of such messages. If the senders, are in turn, to receive something from their audience (such as allocation of their time), the communicative process is a success.

The concept of an audience is a form of ‘practical knowledge’ in the media industry, although its nature will differ across media platforms. Webster and Phalen (1997) argue, whenever large numbers of people watch television or read a newspaper, there is the beginning of an audience.

McQuail notes that audiences “is a term that is understood by media practitioners and theories ... and it has entered into everyday usage, 50

recognized by media users as an unambiguous description of themselves”

(McQuail, 2005 p. 401). Audiences are seen as large aggregations of people scattered across time and space that act autonomously and have little or no immediate knowledge of one another, but defined as an entity by their common exposure to media (Webster et. al., 2006). McQuail

(2005) presents some main terms regarding the audience:

Firstly, there is the potential audience—meaning all those who are

able to be reached, depending on several factors, but especially

technological – having the receiving or play-back equipment –

location – residing in the zone of distribution, or market – and some

social-demographic factors such as income, level of education, age

and gender, depending on how the medium is defined.

Secondly, there is the paying audience—this takes several different

forms, but generally regards the purchasers of newspapers, books,

records, video recordings, etc.; those who pay admission to the

cinema; and subscribers to particular media services like cable or

satellite channels.

Finally, the audience reached—this varies from medium to medium,

but for print media it means the number of people that actually read

each newspaper, magazine, etc., while for television or radio it 51

measures the number tuned in to a particular channel or program.

The audience reached is usually expressed in terms of “ratings”

(McQuail, 2005 p. 412).

Audiences are never simply viewers, listeners or readers. Hay, Grossberg and Wartella (1996) observe that audiences: (1) are members of families, households, communities, and nations; (2) that they are gendered, aged, and members of social classes; (3) skilled and unskilled, educated and uneducated; (4) that they watch television while doing other activities and in competition with other things; (5) do so at times and in places, alone and with other people; and (6) do so in ways that mark their activity as powerfully mediated by the social, economic, political, and technological systems and structures of everyday life.

Fiske (1987) proposes that while television programs are part of a material economy, aiming to maximise revenues for producers and distributors by maximizing audiences, the receivers of such products operate within a cultural economy that is associated with deriving pleasure and meaning. The tensions that can result between material and cultural economies are reflective of the openness of media texts to a diverse range of audience interpretations.

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The Media, Modernity and Modern Nations

For the newly emergent, post-colonial states of the Middle East, such as

Kuwait, the challenges of modernity, and the relationship of the mass media to modernity, have been a constant theme of public, policy and academic debate.

Anthony Giddens (1990) defines modernity as “modes of social life or organisation which emerged in Europe from about the 17 century onwards, and which subsequently became more or less worldwide in their influence” (Giddens, 1990, p. 64). Abu-Lughod (1997) argues the State was expected to shape for its people a modern personality, and that this social role of mass communications media constituted a major dimension of the cultural sphere, as it would be mediated in societies that were developing towards modernity.

Thompson (1990) observes that modern societies are defined by the degree to which the transmission of human feelings through symbolic forms is no longer restricted to the context of face-to-face interaction.

Indeed, in modern societies, culture is “extensively and increasingly mediated by the institutions and mechanisms of mass communication”

(Thompson, 1990, p. 4). Drawing upon the work of anthropologist Clifford

Geertz, Thompson defines the symbolic conception of culture as being 53

focused upon ‘the pattern of meanings embodied in symbolic forms … by virtue of which individuals communicate with one another and share their experiences, conceptions and beliefs’ (Thompson, 1990, p. 132). In the

20th century, forms of mass communication increasingly underpinned conceptions of national cultural identity, and these media became powerful conveyors of symbolic menaings attached to conceptions of national culture and national identity (Anderson, 1983).

In developing nations in particular, development communication pointed to the need for the mass media to generate a vision or representation of cultural image that could be embraced as “belonging” to a nation.

Moreover, as nations and societies around the world interact through the exchange of information, communications messages and symbols at different levels, audiences increasingly understand the distinctiveness of their national culture through its differences to others, as local cultures are formed and solidified in at least partial opposition to perceived processes of homogenisation influenced by the dominant global popular culture (Castells, 2009).

At a conceptual level, the development of media and political democracy should go hand-in-hand. In The Long Revolution – a foundational text in

British cultural studies - Raymond Williams made the point that “a good society depends upon the free availability of facts and opinions, and on 54

the growth of vision and consciousness … any restriction of the freedom of individual contribution is actually a restriction of the resources of society”

(Williams, 1965 pp.124-125).

More open media practices combined with higher levels of popular literacy should generate greater public participation in political and cultural institutions, which in turn, acts as a catalyst for democracy.

But this picture of a simple correspondence between media and democracy is complicated by multiple factors, two of which are of particular importance in the Arab world.

First, the achievement of national independence often also saw authoritarian governments install themselves in power, thwarting the democratic potential of mass media, as it was used for propaganda purposes. The combination of politics and power restricted the democratic development of KTV in post-colonial Kuwait, and Kuwaiti media institutions have thus not been able to reflect on cultural identity in its diverse forms.

Second, the problem of national cultural identity and its realisation through mass media is also complicated by excessive reliance upon the importation of media texts, which may not be consistent with the cultural 55

values and morality of Arab societies. And, as a result, traditional values and local cultural identity may be threatened by such imported media texts.

Upholding Kuwait’s cultural identity is an important issue which has been the subject of considerable debate at grassroots and parliamentary levels.

The discussion originated when the Kuwaiti Government failed to frame national identity through State-owned television.

With the spread of Information and Communications Technologies (ICTs),

Kuwait has been increasingly reminded of the complexity of global media and its influence upon culture. Perplexity has emerged from two coexisting forces: firstly, the entrenched growth of media technologies that sustains an ever-present flow of foreign discourses, and, secondly the persistence of a strong sense of national identity (Wheeler, 2000).

To better understand this concept, we must consider existing academic literature on media audiences, as a key component of the cultural studies approach to media and communications.

Modernity has its own beginnings, contexts and evolution, and the concept of modernity can have different meanings to different people and communities. In particular, there is a lively debate as to whether 56

modernity is simply a code word for Western domination. The U.S. communications scholar Herbert Schiller argues that transnational media was dominated by the United States and a few other industrial countries, and that the importation of their media content and underlying values was a form of cultural imperialism, imposing economic, cultural and political meaning on developing countries (Schiller, 1991).

Such arguments have been taken up widely in the Arab world. For example, it has been argued that “television in the Arab world is predominately Western style with regard to production and there is little that is uniquely Arab in Arab-world television” (Boyd, 2002 p.18). A study undertaken by Talal for UNESCO (Talal, 2000) found that, on the whole,

Arab broadcasters import between 40 and 60 percent of their programs, mainly from Western sources such as the United States, Britain, France and Germany (Talal, 2000 p.161).

Moreover, of those locally produced programs, the majority are entertainment-based, leaving Arab audiences with a scant 11 percent of content consisting of local news, current affairs, arts and cultural programs (Sabry, 2005 p.44).

At this point, we approach a familiar debate in Arab media studies - the extent to which the difficulties of media in the Middle East can be 57

attributed to the dominating influence of West, as in the cultural imperialism thesis, or reflect the failings of various post-colonial governments in the region, to achieve a modernised media system.

Tarik Sabry points out that Arab media has been “mostly nation-bound in terms of regulation, programming and power structures” (Sabry, 2005 p.42). Moreover, in performing their tasks, they have often been inhibited by government editorial control and restrictions on content. This has severely restricted their ability to become a genuine, popular-democratic force.

But the Western influence over Arab media has been unmistakably indirect. Sabry argues the stylisation and standardisation of Arab media into that of its Western counterpart, means the incorporation and mimicking of cultural and economic structures that are deeply embedded in structures of Western modernity’ (Sabry, 2005, p.43).

He argues this is indicative of political power being held by “a Western- dependent ruling class that has control over … the circulation of knowledge and cultural production [that] governs all Arab states” (Sabry,

2005 p.44). To this end, Sabry concludes, “state-owned media in the Arab region are also ideologically dependent and cannot therefore adequately play their role as an Arab “public sphere” (Sabry, 2005 p.44). 58

Failure to acknowledge the specifically Western dimension of aspects of modernity can lead to conceptual blind spots, even among critical scholars. For example, James Curran (2000), frames media’s role in society according to liberal theory, as being to act as a monitor for the state. The media should monitor the full range of state activity, and fearlessly expose any abuse of political authority. This watchdog role is said to override the importance of all other functions of the media requires the media to be entirely independent of the government. While

Curran’s points are important, he has nonetheless contextualised the role of media entirely within a liberal framework, where the primary threats to individual liberty appear to come from the State.

In the context of the media in the Middle East, and in many other parts of the world, adherence to Western liberal ideology is less important than promoting the development aspirations of the people. From an Islamic perspective, the contrast between the two systems is significant. Islam does not refuse democracy; in fact, Islamic faith is primarily based on a democratic system that includes respect of individual value and freedom of expression.

The problem seems to be, however, the West tends to claim its own conception of liberal democracy as a universal model, but at least half the 59

world's population has not adopted the Western democratic model, and many argue there are limitations to the Western brand of democracy, such as how money determines who can run for political office in the

United States (Hamdi, 1996).

The Arab/Muslim opinion toward globalisation is complex, and broadly divided into three camps. The first group rejects globalisation as a from of cultural imperialism, arguing that global modernity is a form of cultural invasion that threatens to dominate people’s minds and undermine the distinct culture and identity of Arabs.

The second group, considered secularists, welcomes globalization, in the form of entertainment through advanced technology, enhanced global communications and access to knowledge-based information. They argue interaction in a globalised world will provide many positive benefits and opportunities without the loss of individuality or cultural identity.

The third group calls for an appropriate form of globalisation that is compatible with the national and cultural interests of the people. They argue globalisation is an inevitable phenomenon whether they interact with it or not, and, as such, it cannot be wholly accepted or rejected.

Instead, a middle ground should be found (Najjar, 2005).

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Approaches to globalisation in the Arab world will be discussed in more detail in Chapter Four of this thesis.

Historical Perspective on Arab Television

The term “Arab” refers to Arabic-speaking people tracing their heritage to

Arabic backgrounds and traditions in the Middle East and North Africa.

The Arab League currently consists of 22 Arab countries. The Arabs are not a race and do not all share the same religious or political beliefs, but have some unique characteristics in common.

Countries throughout the region have different experiences with television according to local factors and the influence of local politics. Most Arab countries acquired television services during a period when their countries were still under colonial rule.

Those administrations intended to keep the media under government control from the outset, seeking to use them as an instrument of colonial rule. When the colonial powers departed, they usually turned over broadcasting facilities to the newly independent governments as a vital institution that needed to be preserved (Dajani, 2006).

The history of television in the Arab nations traces back to the mid-1950s, 61

when government broadcast operations were launched in Morocco, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia (Boyd, 1999). Many Arab counties followed in thesefootsteps. As Sabry (2005) notes, the term “Arab television” is in some ways a misnomer, as it largely consisted of a series of national broadcasting systems, with only a limited transnational footprint, until the emergence of satellite television in the 1990s.

Arab media were, for the most part, state-run broadcasting services, largely unknown to the world. The reason being the world had little interest in Arab media, or in the wider socio-cultural and political importance of Arab media.

Prior to the 1990s, most Arab television services were territorially based within nation-states. The rise of satellite broadcasting since the early

1990s, has a particularly strong impact in the Arab world. The rapid growth of the satellite industry in the region during the past two decades would not have been possible without the political changes and technological advancements Kuwait has undergone (Amin and Gher,

2000).

Ayish (2003) provides an historical account of Arab television, identifying three distinct phases. The 1950s and 1960s mark the first, formative phase that constituted the foundations of Arab television. Second, in the 62

1970s and 1980s, national broadcasting was developed and invested in, as part of state-led projects for further nation building and socio-cultural development. The third phase, from the 1990s onwards, saw the regional and global expansion of broadcast television in the region. The period after 1990 was characterised by increased competition, greater satellite proliferation and political transformation.

Ayish argues the three stages of television development occurred in tandem with three Middle East paradigms: the modernisation paradigm; the critique of dependency paradigm; and the globalization paradigm. The

Arab States Broadcasting Union (ASBU) was inaugurated in 1969, with its headquarters in Egypt. As Arab governments became aware of the medium’s power, they started to pool their experience into a collective organisation (Dajani, 2005).

Historically, the development of Arab media institutions is divided into two major camps: revolutionary and non-revolutionary. To elaborate, in the revolutionary camp, countries harnessed the media to promote active social and political engagements with the public. They used media to mobilise social movements and gain political independence from former foreign occupation. These Arab countries tended to give higher priority to the development of television. They exploited the medium as an 63

instrument to mobilise the masses for political, social and economic movement by conveying messages to the populace through the media

(Rugh, 2004). Countries such as Egypt, Iraq, Algeria, Syria and Libya developed their broadcast television services along such lines. In the non- revolutionary camp, the countries in the Arabian Peninsula, such as Saudi

Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, Bahrain and Qatar had less interest in actively engineering mass movements. These countries differ from revolutionary camp countries such as in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Libya, Algeria, South Yemen and Sudan.

Countries in the Gulf region exploited the media by endorsing their continued political legitimacy. Local television avoided controversial issues or views opposed to the ruling regime. Many totalitarian governments in the region have restrictions on what may be broadcast via the medium.

Dajani (2005) defines such Arab media as “a private fiefdom spending fortunes to improve it for their own propaganda.”

Egypt is considered a regional leader in broadcast development, due to its distinctive historical exposure to various civilisations and diverse foreign interactions. Egypt became a unique cultural centre for all Arabs, as they tried to share cultural backgrounds and legal institutional structures, including media centres.

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Various similarities and dissimilarities have affected the Arab community differently, as diverse political institutions have wielded power in the last three centuries of colonial occupation, such as the Ottoman, British and

French occupations (Dajani, 2006).

Upon gaining independence, many Arab countries spent millions of dollars on the medium during the early 1960s and 1970s in an attempt to reach wider audiences. Conversely, governments such as Iraq struggled to control the medium until it was capable of disseminating pure government propaganda.

Generally speaking, television in many Arab countries is still largely underdeveloped in terms of content, mainly because it has remained under the firm control of government interests.

State television ownership has developed an organisational pattern through the Arab world over many years. There are several reasons why broadcasting remains predominately government owned (Assiri, 1990).

Firstly, the high cost involved in establishing such television services was far beyond the capability of most private sector investors in these developing countries prior to 1990.

Secondly, the government had a much greater interest in controlling this 65

medium, or at least keeping it out of hostile hands. And most Arab governments regarded the medium as too important to be left to private interests.

Thirdly, television has developed steadily and has been updated with the latest apparatus to achieve greater authoritarian control over all other media. This is because television was the medium most able to reach the masses in a quick, efficient and timely manner compared to other mass media. In an age of the internet and social media, the question fo whether television remains the primary platform remains one for open debate.

Television development in Arab countries went through two major stages.

The first stage has been addressed in this research as the period prior to the 1990 Gulf War; a stage represented by total authoritarian ownership, censorship and a restricted marketplace. The second stage represents the period subsequent to the 1990 Gulf War. This period can can be seen as the beginning of a new era of broadcasting through the arrival of private operations, partial government ownership, and foreign ownership of satellites that have ultimately led to immense satellite penetration

(Kraidy, 2003). Each of these stages will be evaluated in turn.

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Middle Eastern Television Prior to the Gulf War

Before the Gulf War, television in the Middle East did not exceed beyond the national broadcasting landscape, and the nation-state was defined as its territory of reception. The states exported their television programmes to each other, but cross-border broadcasting signals remained unclear

(Boyd, 1999).

Television broadcasts were not able to penetrate beyond geographic borders due to limited terrestrial signal strength. This is what caused a fundamental paradigm shift in Middle Eastern television. It came in the form of an inaugural transmission from a pan-Arab satellite “ARABSAT,” delivering transnational broadcasting for the first time.

Prior to 1990, most Arab radio and television systems were government owned, for three main reasons. Firstly, Arab governments regarded radio and television as effective political instruments, as they reached most of the population regardless of the population’s literacy and income levels.

During this time, Arab nationalism and anti-colonialism were strong, and governments were eager to use them for political proposes, including the promotion of nationalism and national identity.Governments justified control of the media on the basis of the alleged need to protect the country and the people from both the former colonial powers and from 67

the United States in the context of Cold War politics.

Secondly, broadcasting was not developed by commercial investors, as opportunites for profit could not be identified. In the Arab world, commercial advertising was relatively limited, so revenues did not cover operating costs. This meant that the public sector had to take the lead in developing broadctasiung infrastructure and services.

Thirdly, governments sought to control the national image that was projected to other nations and people through broadcasting content.

There were some exceptions, such as Lebanon’s vibrant television industry (Kraidy, 1998) and, more recently, the new satellite television corporations, but the norm in the Arab region was government control of electronic media.

Satellite Broadcasting and the Transformation of Arab Television

In the first instance, satellite broadcasting meant the importation of overseas services such as BBC World and CCN. During and after the Gulf

War in 1991, people in the Middle East turned to CNN to receive fresh information it had never had before, changing the entire region. CNN television offers transnational audiences the ability to receive news and information from beyond their natural boundaries, while political events 68

are often exploited to attract Middle Eastern viewers.

The emergence of satellite broadcasting services within the Arab region, such as Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabia and other news channels, has revolutionised the television environment by delving into issues considered by traditional

Arab media organisations to be politically or socially taboo (El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2002). The outstanding coverage of Al-Jazeera has helped place it on top of the most watched list of television content. This Pan-

Arab satellite television network was developed to meet the expectations of Arab audiences.

Al-Jazeera’s influence demonstrated how satellite television in the Middle

East is an integral issue worth exploring in this research, as it sets an exemplary model of successful Arab broadcasting. In the last decade, satellite broadcasting in the region has proliferated, and now provides an interesting approach to understanding contemporary Arab issues.

This transnational broadcasting bypasses the two most important communication barriers in the region – illiteracy and government censorship. Mowlana (1997) identifies two primary actors in the trans- border flow of information: government/private transnational cooperation and individuals/groups transnational cooperation. The availability of satellite television has had a major impact on nationally based television 69

services.

A survey conducted by the Arab Advisors Group in 2004 found 90 percent of households prefer to watch satellite channels in Arabic, or with Arabic subtitles, while only 10 percent prefer content broadcast in English (Arab

Advisors Group, 2004). The survey probed the Arab audience consumption of:

• General stations such as MBC, LBC and Future;

• Music channels such as Rotana, Melody and Mezzika;

• Religious Programming Channels such as Iqraa and Al Majd; and

• News channels such as Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya, Al-Ekhabaria and Al-

Hurra, as well as CNN, BBC World etc.

Al-Jazeera was ranked first in consumption, with viewers in 82 percent of households. This was followed closely by Al-Arabiya with viewers in 75 percent of households, the Saudi Al Ekhbaria with viewers in 33 percent of households, and the United States-sponsored Al Hurra claimed viewers in 16 percent of households. Further down the list of viewing households came CNN with 12 percent, Al Mustakila with 11 percent, ANN with 8 percent, and NBN with 8 percent, and BBC World with 6 percent (Arab

Advisors Group, 2004).

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Middle East satellite television has seen the emergence of vigorous broadcasting competition, with each broadcaster pushing for larger audiences and providing an array of programming aimed towards immensely sophisticated political audiences. As Hafez (2007) has observed, trans-border flows of communication have enabled those consumers with access to these new technologies to interact with a global and regional public sphere, and to bypass state-controlled media.

However, Kuwait television performance has currently declined below universal standards. A combination of poor government attention and the vigorous regional challenges outlined above are the main contributing factors behind the waning influence of government television.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a conceptual framework for understanding the issues facing Kuwaiti Television. It has identified three theoretical frameworks that are particularly useful to understand communications media.

The first is cultural studies, which helps us to understand media audiences and cultural power. The second is political economy of media, which draws out the importance of economic power in shaping political and 71

cultural power. It also provides important insights into the differences between private commercial media and public service broadcasting.

Finally, the theory of the public sphere is explored. This theory considers the ideal conditions for media and civic participation in democratic societies. This is important to better understand what kind of media audiences expect in a reformed Kuwaiti media system.

All of these are Western theories, and there are inherent complexities in applying them in the Arab world. One issue is the colonial past, but also the ways in which national independence has often come through authoritarian governments, who saw the media as something to be under their personal control. There are also unique questions of culture and morality, which will be returned to in the discussion of media globalisation in Chapter Four.

In this chapter, I have also provided a brief overview of how Arab broadcasting has developed since the 1950s. In its early stages, it was nationally based and often under government control. While government control remained after 1990, the rise of privately owned satellite broadcasting channels challenged the dominance of traditional national broadcasters.

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This chapter has highlighted the issues facing Kuwaiti television, particularly as satellite television has proliferated in the Middle East, and asks why no attempt has been made to address the unsustainable situation. It also raises questions about the underlying motives that lead the government to reject policy reform, despite the growth of privately owned commercial television in Kuwait. Ultimately, it asks the question of whether media reform is possible in Kuwait. And if so, where will it come from, and when?

The resulting transformation of television in Arab nations provides the backdrop to the challenges facing Kuwait Television today. In the next chapter, I will focus specifically on how media developed in Kuwait, before returning in Chapter Four to the impact of satellite broadcasting. 73

CHAPTER THREE

KUWAITI TELEVISION: HISTORICAL

EVOLUTION AND CURRENT CONCERNS

Introduction

In this chapter, I examine how television in Kuwait has been shaped by social, political and cultural developments in the country, and how, in turn, the medium has shaped its audiences and culture. An understanding of the historical context of the emergence of television in Kuwait, and its subsequent evolution, enables us to better understand contemporary struggles of Kuwaiti television, and to develop a better understanding of contemporary struggles in Kuwaiti media institutions by understanding their historical context. Therefore, this chapter will provide a clear understanding of the driving forces behind the social, political and cultural influences associated with the current perceived crisis in Kuwaiti media, and its broader threat to national identity.

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It was noted in Chapter Two that the development of modern societies significantly depends on the role of media in disseminating important information. This information is used as a vehicle for the general population in symbolic forms through cultural values and historical understandings of the country projected. As the scholar of modern nationalism, Benedict Anderson (1983) observes, the media does not simply represent the past, but coexists with the present, as it reproduces the products of historical understanding.

In the previous chapter, I also discussed how the media plays a pivotal role in shaping national cultures and spreading the values and ideas of modernity (Thompson, 1995). A historical account of Kuwaiti media development is required to explain surrounding social and cultural norms.

For total accuracy, the account must reference the major historical events which shaped Kuwaiti media, and its role in representing and interpreting these social realities, and the instances when it failed to do so.

Historical Background

Kuwait is a small Middle Eastern country bordered on the east by the

Persian Gulf, between Iraq on the north and east, and Saudi Arabia on the south and west. It is one of six Gulf States in the region, and is about

6,880 square miles in total, located in the Northeast corner of the Arabian 75

Peninsula. In 2014, the estimated population of Kuwait was 4.08 million

(Public Authority for Civil Information, 2014). In this census, the number of Kuwaitis was 1.27 million, while the remaining 2.81 million were non-

Kuwaitis and expatriates.

Figure 3.1

Map of Kuwait

Source: Elizon maps, 2015.

Kuwaiti society has unique historical attributes that distinguish it from neighbouring Gulf States, even though all six Gulf States have comparable tribal backgrounds, and cultural traditions and practices. In

1710, the Sabah, a nomadic community of Arabian descent, settled in what is now Kuwait; the Al Sabah family has ruled Kuwait since 1756. In the mid eighteenth century, other Arabian traveller began to move and 76

settle in Kuwait. The result being that by the early 1800s, Kuwait had developed into an important trading post, with boat building, excavation and cultivation of pearls being tits main industries.

The area's easy access to the Indian market made the pearl industry a very successful trading sector, drawing the attention of the interior. The tribal migrations that occurred around 1800, formed the families that currently control Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE (Sayed, 2004).

Prior to the era of oil extraction, the harsh desert and sea sharpened and strengthened social organisations, based on family and tribes that provided the economic and political support essential for survival.

In return for their support, individuals gave absolute service and loyalty to their superiors. This gave rise to the tribal networks, that remain strong. These strong ties have enabled the crucial social relations between monarchies and citizens to remain vital today, in the face of other modernising and secular influences (Smith, 1999).

Prior to the nineteenth century, various European powers sought to control the Gulf, due to its strategic importance in enabling the establishment of trade links with India and China. The British forces prevailed against the Portuguese and Dutch, and largely controlled the 77

Gulf region. By the beginning of the nineteenth century, Britain had become the major power in the Gulf region (Abu-Hakima & Hakima,

1983).

In 1899, the ruling Sabah family established a relationship with Great

Britain for the purpose of protection and international representation, and

Kuwait became a British protectorate in 1914, which it remained until independence in 1961.

Kuwait achieved its independence from Great Britain in 1961. In 1962,

Kuwait’s first election took place, as the new national constitution was written (Abu-Hakima & Hakima,1983). One of the most important aspects of Kuwaiti politics in the post-independence period has been the formation of the National Assembly, which is still one of the few elected parliamentary bodies in the region.

The Constitution provides for a separation of powers between the parliament and the government. It is based on the principles of democracy that safeguards the sovereignty of the State, and provides for freedom and equality of all citizens.

Freedom of the Press is explicitly articulated in the Constitution, and is generally correlated criticism of the Head of State, insulting religion, or 78

undermining public order. The Constitution provides Kuwaiti citizens with a degree of freedom that is typically greater than that granted to citizens of comparable Gulf States.

The National Assembly (which is the Kuwait Parliament), is composed of fifty members, with ten members from each of the five districts. In addition, the Assembly has Ministers assigned by the Government.

Each Assembly can withdraw confidence in a Minister, including the Prime

Minister. When such a withdrawal of confidence occurs, the matter would be submitted to the Emir, who could dismiss the Prime Minister from the office and appoint a new cabinet, or dissolve parliament (National

Assembly Booklet, 2006).

The relationship between the Emir and the people has been challenged in recent years, with the ruling families becoming socially isolated and having their political power challenged due to accusations of corruption.

Concerns have existed about vote buying by pro-government candidates for the National Assembly, and fears that the Emir and ruling families seek to turn the Assembly into a rubber stamp for their decisions.

The significant freedom drawn from common religious belief and patriotism, has created a strong sense of national identity for citizens 79

national identity. The Government exercises its power through the highly centralised Al - Sabah Royal Family, although the political sphere is structured around the constitutional Separation of Executive, Legislative and Judicial Power.

Even with such forms of political representation, Kuwait is still considered at heart, a tribal state, with large families and strong kin connections. As such, there are many social boundaries: people adhere chiefly to a tradition that has been shaped over time. One result is there is a wide division between the country's political and economic elites and the working classes, with Kuwait's elites being members of the ruling and merchant families. Both factors have set limits to the prospects for liberal democracy in the Kuwaiti nation - state.

The discovery of oil in Kuwait in 1938, and similar discoveries throughout the Gulf region and Saudi Arabia, once again made the area a crossroads for the growth of the modern industrial world, and led to a distinctive social and cultural transformation.

A sense of nationalism arose in the second half of the twentieth century.

During this time, the ruling families in the Gulf States, represented by heads of tribes that had originally settled in strategic areas, established government institutions that have steadily taken over the tribal councils 80

(Hopwood, 1972).

The geographical boundaries of all Gulf States were relatively neglected until the discovery of oil in Bahrain in 1932, and in Saudi Arabia in 1933.

The oil revenues steered the Gulf States to define their geographic territories more clearly, and the oil wealth being created had become a significant factor in the declaration of national independence.

The combination of oil wealth and geo- political importance made Kuwait strategically vulnerable as a nation at the head of the Persian Gulf, surrounded by powerful neighboring states such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq and

Iran. Several border disputes with neighbours amplified, particularly with

Iraq, that challenged Kuwait's legitimacy

In August 1990, Kuwait was invaded by Iraq, an event that led to significant losses of life, major destruction of property and infrastructure, and more than two thirds of the population being displaced.

Of all the Gulf States, Kuwait has expressed the greatest security concerns since its independence. It has thus been a strong ally of the

United States and the West, which in turn, generates tensions with neighbouring Arab states.

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The subsequent action of the US-led forces to free Kuwait under a United

Nations mandate, brought a realisation that the Gulf Co-operation Council

(GCC) was inadequate to provide the Gulf protection. As a result, most of the Gulf States sought defense agreements with the United States, the

United Kingdom and France (Baer, 2003).

Western involvement in the Gulf region has influenced its political and cultural attributes. As a result Western leaders advised Gulf States leaders to consult more with civil society grassroots and with their people, to deepen internal democracy.

The Kuwaiti Parliament has been practicing limited democracy since its independence, but Western calls to democratise Gulf States from outside triggered new concerns about outside interference in domestic affairs that could provide a basis for neocolonial forms of Western hegemony, particularly when combined with the strategic and economic significance of Kuwait and other Gulf states.

Reliance upon Western protection from hostile neighbouring states, has generated an important paradox in relation to Kuwait’s sovereignty. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi forces in 1991, and the Kuwaiti Government's request that Western powers protect Kuwait against the Iraqi intervention, drew considerable attention to the complex relationship that 82

exists among Arab nations and their populations. Kuwait has become progressively politically alienated from Pan-Arab agreements, due to perceptions its foreign policy is too open to pro-Western interests.

After the First Gulf War, many foreign expatriates were recruited to work rebuilding the war-ravaged country. The urgent need for additional workers also led to the emergence of a major labour migration pattern, whereupon many foreigners entered Kuwait for employment.

As noted above, almost 70 percent of those now residing in Kuwait are foreign expatriates, which sharply challenges attempts to develop a common Kuwaiti national identity and culture. Such a cosmopolitan social structure generates, at one level, a society that more strongly accords with the relatively secular nature of Kuwaiti society when compared to other countries in the region, such as Saudi Arabia. At the same time, it can also generate anxieties about the dilution of a distinctive Kuwaiti national-cultural identity. These conflicting tendencies manifest themselves in Kuwaiti media.

The large number of expatriates in Kuwait also presents a challenge for the dominant media and communcaitions models. The Habermasian theory of the public sphere, discussed in Chapter Two, requires that a population becomes citizens through their participation in public 83

institutiuons, that in turn builds a national civic culture. Where the majority of the population are not citizens, and are unlikely to become citiznes, there will be a corresponding lack of investment in civil society and civic institutions. Attempts to build Kuwaiti television in order to build a distinctiuve Kuwaiti national-cultural identity thus come up against this problem. For the mlarge diasporic populations in Kuwait, KTV may be of less relevance to them than Bollywood films or Egyptian dramas, or even

CNN or the many sports channels in the region. There is also the issue of the stateless Bidoon population, who are not considered to be Kuwaiti, but who lack another Arabic nationality to adopt.

The Historical Development of Kuwaiti Television

Kuwaiti Television began broadcasting on November 5, 1961, shortly after

Kuwait gained independence from British colonial rule. At that time,

Kuwait Television (KTV) was the only broadcast operator in the Gulf

States region, which developed over two discrete stages.

The first is from 1961 to 1990, where a series of incremental developments saw the system gradually evolve as a national broadcaster with good standing in the Middle East. The second stage follows the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the far more turbulent media landscape that emerged in the aftermath of the First Gulf War. 84

Kuwaiti Television 1961-1990

Television commenced in 1957 as a private enterprise, run by a local RCA television dealer, who wanted to promote television set sales (Boyd,

1999). However, the first real steps towards television transmission took place in 1961, when the late Emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Abdullah Al-Salem Al-

Sabah, ordered television to be under state control. Kuwaiti Television became part of the Ministry of News and Guidance, now known as the

Ministry of information.

The Ministry of Information have long been the owners, financiers and managers of Kuwaiti Television, meaning the broadcast media in Kuwait did not have a history of structural independence from government

(Kamaliour & Mowlana, 1997). Such structural reliance upon the government was a prominent feature of the early development of television throughout the Middle East (Boyd, 2002).

Television was originally only broadcast for a few hours a day. The broadcast hours increased over time, however, as production resources grew and broadcast staff gained professional experience. A shortage of local programming forced Kuwait to acquire content from other Arab and foreign countries, predominately from Egypt. Devoted Kuwaiti 85

broadcasters travelled to Egypt to gain insight into superior television writing, acting and production. The Kuwaitis whom gained this experience and returned to develop Kuwaiti TV, came to be known the 'artists of

Kuwait.'

At this time, television sets were costly, and those families able to afford it, often shared the viewing with friends, neighbours and relatives. Most of the Gulf States did not have the infrastructure necessary for television broadcast, and the Kuwait Government opted to open a branch of Kuwaiti

Television in the United Arab Emirates, sending programming materials daily by air for UAE consumption.

The historical development of television in Kuwait up to 1990 can be understood as developing over three phases. Phase One began telecasting programs in monochrome for hours daily, from 1961 until 1974. Phase

Two began in 1974, with the transmission of nine hours of colour PAL signals (European standard). Phase Three began with the inauguration of a new building for the Ministry of Information in 1978. Broadcast began operating for twelve hours and it is only relatively recently that broadcast television became a 24-hour service (Boyd, 1999).

The Ministry of Information adopted the European television broadcasting standards in 1974. This signaled the serious expansion of television in 86

Kuwait during the second half of the 1970s, as part of a new Ministry-built complex with new television studios and advanced equipment, providing the way for local talent to produce home - grown programs.

Because Kuwait was well equipped for television production and transmission, relatively few changes took place throughout the 1980s.

There were, of course, program improvements on both pre-invasion channels, although the second channel continued to show English language production exclusively.

There was also a change of interest in local audiences, with the growing home video market (Dajani, 2006). During this period, Kuwaiti Television had two running channels:

1. Channel I: (KTV-One) is the updated version of the original service

that started in the 1960s, and was considered to be the main

program provider.

2. Channel II: (KTV-Two) started in 1978, and ran local and imported

programs in English.

There was no private terrestrial television from Kuwait prior to the 1991 invasion.

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Kuwait Television after the Iraqi Invasion

When the Iraqi army invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the invading troops took virtually all the production equipment, but left in place the transmitters, which were then used to rebroadcast Iraqi programmes from Baghdad via microwave. After the invasion, the television studio had little more than a microphone and no monitors. The Iraqi forces took everything from state-of-the-art tape recorders to archiving, with the damage to Kuwaiti Television estimated to be over $150 million.

The reconstruction process in 1991-92 after devastating invasion, has helped to establish a new foundation for modern television infrastructure and since the rebuilding, Kuwaiti Television has run four government channels:

KTV1: This is the main KTV channel, with variety of programs such as movies, music programs, children's programs and documentaries, all in

Arabic language. This channel is available everywhere in Kuwait and neighboring countries;

KTV2: This channel reaches out to English-speaking people for both entertainment and information;

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KTV3: Broadcasting in Arabic, this is the national sports channel that covers all major national and regional sports events;

KTV4: This is an entertainment channel, with content in English and

Arabic, that was only available at night.

In late 2004, the government granted the first TV license, allowing the private sector to begin commercial broadcasts from Kuwaiti soil. Al-watan became the first television station classified as non-government; it operates 24/7 in Arabic language and is broadcast from the capital -

Kuwait city.

The new privately owned channel is a shadow to government programming. It offers family programming, including daily news, children's programs, music events, documentaries and popular movies.

Although it replicates the government operations in terms of programming type, it has greater editorial independence.

New private operators who obtain media licenses from the Ministry of

Information need to sign a consent form stipulating that they will not broadcast programs that "undermine the public order". The Ministry of information censors all forms of media, books, CD materials, and films shown in local theaters, which have to pass censorship standards prior to 89

general viewing.

As will be discussed in more detail below, the more substantive privatisation of Kuwaiti Television, and the challenge to government control, comes from satellite broadcasting, Pan-Arab satellite services dominate the Gulf region, and these services are predominantly privately owned.

The Gulf countries host the highest number of Arab FTA satellite channels, encompassing close to half of the total channels targeting the region.

White the Kuwaiti Government responded to the challenge by permitting the retransmission of its terrestrial channels by satellite in 2004. Over platforms such as Arabsat and Nilesat, the satellite platforms have undermined the historic hegemony of the Kuwaiti Television terrestrial channels in Kuwaiti society and culture.

Contemporary Concerns with Kuwait Television

Having outlined the structure and historical context of Kuwaiti Television as an institution, and the Kuwaiti broadcasting system more generally, in the remainder of this chapter, I wish to focus upon five contemporary issues of concern with both KTV as a broadcasting institution, and the

Kuwaiti Public Television System. These are: 90

1. Ongoing problems with government censorship, and the failure to

get the institutional balance right between government regulation of

independent broadcasting on the one hand, and direct state control

over the right to freely communicate a diversity of ideas and

opinions on the other;

2. Internal problems within KTV as an organisation, and its relations to

government, that adversely affect the morale of those within the

organsation.

3. Poor quality programming, with particular reference to television

drama;

4. A turn on the part of Kuwaiti audiences away from local programs

and towards imported material;

5. Declining audiences for KTV.

Censorship

One historical feature of the evolution of Kuwaiti Television is the continuing controlling role of the Ministry of Information. The Ministry of

Information has multiple and frequently conflicting roles in relation to

Kuwaiti media and culture.

It finances and administers the Kuwaiti Television (KTV) broadcast 91

channels, it is responsible for ensuring the cultural freedom that is based on the country's Constitutional principles, and it oversees broadcasting standards with regard to questions of national security, social morality, and public order. Not surprisingly, its history is one of conflict with regard to these competing objectives.

Political communication in Kuwait has been relatively open with other Gulf states; it has a functioning National Assembly and democratic elections, and a significant degree of open public discourse and criticism of government occurs. The right to freedom of expression is an essential part of our ability to form and discuss opinions. As Article 19 of the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights states:

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression. This

right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference, and to

seek information and ideas, receive and impart any media

regardless of frontier (UN, 2013).

Yet this right is often challenged by information that is protected by the

State and unable to be expressed for discussion, which shows some governments in the Middle East are violating the right to freedom of expression. Hasim Barakat points out that, "the Middle East Media has often been the private fiefdom of government information ministries, in 92

which disputes are tightly controlled" (Bakarat, 1993, p. 13).

This illustrates the heavy legal and practical constraints on freedom of expression in the Middle East. A civil society presents a great challenge for the Arab world. When the State retains a tight grip over traditional and modern institutions and over the media and the means of cultural production, a corollary of its strength is a weak civil society.

Media theorist Denis McQuail points out that “the pursuit of freedom of expression and publication has been the central theme in the history of the press and is intimately connected with democracy” Such media freedom entails “systematic and independent public scrutiny of those in power and an adequate supply of reliable information about their activities” (McQuail, 2005 p. 193). Fundamental to such freedom to communicate is the absence of censorship, licensing or other controls by government, so there is an unhindered right to publish and disseminate news and opinions and no obligation to publish what one does not wish to.

Stated in this way, we can see that questions of media freedom and censorship can have a complicated side in a country such as Kuwait.

There is the issue of information that is kept from the public by the government for reasons of public order or national security. 93

Kuwaiti democracy does not approve of this type of censorship, but has been seen in the past. An example of this could be before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Information was withheld from the public view to prevent the demoralisation of the government, and to avoid showing

''weakness'' for the enemy to exploit.

Another type of censorship relates to moral issues, and refers to instances where content is regulated for reasons of societal morality. Those in charge of censoring the material may find content questionable that they do not wish their audiences to observe, and would wish to withhold those sorts of ideas. India is a fine example, as it is socially conservative country, which frowns upon pornography, blasphemy or nudity in film.

Some form of content regulation is found in most societies around the world, particularly with regard to mass media such as television

(Hargraves and Livingstone, 2009). This point is also acknowledged by

McQuail, when he observes, freedom of public communication is never absolute, but has to recognise limits sometimes set by the private interests of others or by the higher collectives good of the society. In practice, a “’higher good'’ is defined by the state” (McQuail, 2005, p.

194).

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Censorship is a widely debated and sensitive issue, especially for those who prefer to make their own decisions as to what they view. Some advocates of free speech support a total ban on censorship because it constitutes a violation of their freedoms.

However, a number of social groups and Islamist groups prefer to omit scenes such as sex and violence from television and the Internet. They argue that children are the most vulnerable members of the public audience, and such television is offensive and against cultural morality.

Censorship of Kuwaiti media offers no leniency towards programs and films that, despite some offensive content, still constitute an interest to the broader public.

Nevertheless, the government has gradually lost its censorship powers over the system as a whole due to the increased numbers of satellite broadcasters from around the world that Kuwaiti viewers have access to

(Khazen, 1999).

A pivotal moment in discussions of censorship in Kuwait was the Iraqi invasion and occupation during 1990-91. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi troops that took place on 2 August, 1990 occurred with Kuwaitis going to bed the night before not knowing that 100,000 Iraqi army personnel and

700 tanks were about to cross the border into Kuwait City. 95

As the troops prepared to invade the country, neither Kuwaiti television nor other media outlets informed the public about the danger they faced, as there was a complete news blackout, as the media was kept under government control.

Opening the media space thus became a popular imperative after the defeat of the Iraqis in 1991, and Kuwaitis searched for new information outlets free of State control. Accessing satellite broadcasting was one response, and from the mid 1990s onwards was accompanied by rapid uptake of the Internet. Many Kuwaiti’s have more access to new technologies than their Arab counterparts, given the relative affluence of their society. But the public remain suspicious of KTV channels, perceiving it to be too close to the Royal Family and the Government, and their questions around the secrets such an institution may hold.

In recent years, censors within the Ministry of Information have prohibited a number of books, confiscating them during book exhibitions and applying prohibitive restrictions on publishing houses. Books lovers from Kuwait must travel abroad to Beirut, Cairo, Dubai, and Qatar to find more varieties and purchase restricted materials. This is in spite of the fact that Kuwaitis generally enjoy greater freedoms than these countries.

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Even in the absence of formal censorship, implicit inhibitions on creativity can occur when there are too many higher-level managerial positions have that involved appointments by Royal families or high-level government officials, who have been given dominant roles based on social and political connections.

Such political appointments typically have little or no media background, and have frequently demonstrated insufficient managerial aptitude, preferring to press government guidelines than promoting the autonomy and creativity of their staff.

We cannot discuss a democratic society without recognising the need for the separation of power between the modern media and socio - political interaction. Many materials can challenge the authorities and threaten the system, and censorship occurs when political powers attempt to alienate any information that questions the system.

The Kuwaiti Government hides information or shields facts from the public, opinion within the community. Whatever the nature of the media, it is risk that aids in the development of democracy and human rights.

From a human rights perspective, the media should not overstep social obligations. The question for Kuwaiti television is “how do we validate a 97

system of integrated information based on international rights and freedoms without tackling the legislation principles that punish certain media activities?”

Reform needs to occur based on legislation that separates the media from the government. Indeed, the current relationship between the government and the broadcasters goes against the Kuwaiti Constitution.

Internal Problems

As I have noted above, Kuwaiti Television exists in an ambiguous relationship to the government. While KTV is a publicity-owned broadcasting service (PSB), with only limited reliance upon commercial advertising revenues, it is reliant upon direct government funding, without the statutory independence that an arrangement such as the broadcasting license fee provides for PSBs such as the BBC in the United

Kingdom and NHK in Japan (Hendy, 2013).

While those within the organization have a personal commitment to innovation and the public good, there is the absence of a well-defined ethos of national service, independent of government priorities. These priorities were instilled in the U.K., with the ethos of “Reithianism”, after the first BBC Director-General, Lord Reith (Hendy, 2013, pp. 20-26). 98

Kuwait has failed to establish independent bodies to regulate its broadcasting services. Similar to Ofcom in the U.K., the Federal

Communications Commission (FCC) in the United States, or the Australian

Communication and Media Authority (ACMA).

As a result, the Ministry of Information has both managerial responsibilities over KTV and governmental responsibilities to enforce particular edicts over KTV. The result has been a strong sense of demoralisation among large sections of KTV staff.

In a series of interviews I undertook during 2007-08, I identified a large number of professional staff at Kuwait Television who felt that problems with the broadcaster have been inherited from previous officials, and they have not been given a real opportunity to change the organisational culture or its programming.

Moreover, the Minister of Information has become the battleground for political disputes between the Government and the Opposition: between

1992 and 2011, over eleven Ministers have resigned or been forced to quit the Minister of Information portfolio, as the Ministry has become embroiled in partisan political disputes over censorship, the influence of

Western media content, and political disputes between people of different cultural backgrounds, religions, and ethnicities. They felt the government 99

continued to reject suggestions for reform put forward by any officials, and real change at KTV had to come from within.

Within KTV, there has been a lack of clear performance indicators attached to government funding for KTV. There has also been the maintenance of a highly bureaucratic decision-making structure that leads to the misallocation of resources.

Moreover, the workforce has not been adapted to the technological changes, and changing audience expectations, associated with modern television broadcasting.

Furthermore, there has been a preference for hiring expatriates with limited or no social and cultural understanding of the context in which

KTV operates, alongside inadequate training for local creative personnel.

A combination of poor accountability structures and a lack of flexibility in government funding has also seen the terminations of numerous promising projects over recent years.

It is essential to highlight the internal problems facing Kuwaiti television to better stress the kind of challenge broadcasting in Kuwait has posed.

The internal dispute concerning the status of television is considered to be an expression of the rivalry between the two main occupation divisions. 100

The first group are those who have been hired directly by the government, either due to close Ministerial connections or by members of the Royal Family. The second group are described as media professionals, who are well trained and capable of executing associates media work.

The second group feel that the first are not suitably qualified for their roles at KTV, and in the main, come from outside the media industry. It is felt they are assigned the high executive positions that manage and run the television station due to personal connections, and lack the relevant and necessary experience. The media professionals, by contrast, feel they are given little opportunity to carry out these tasks, due to the dominance of the aforementioned first group. The considerable impasse between the administrative executives and the professional operators is at the expense of higher quality television production.

In the words of one former television employee, ”working at Kuwait

Television smothers my brain and insults my intellect” (interview with

Habeeb Hussain, Television Documentary Director, April 2007). Indeed, the guidelines employees have to follow are often perceived as excessive.

The Ministry of Information provides producers and directors of television with instructions that define a theme, and this is particularly notable in political talk shows where censorship is regularly employed to filter significant information from audiences. 101

The authorities are aware of sensitive and information issues that arrract viewers, yet the presenter disregards any potentially provocative or divisive questions. Producers who successfully sidestep taboo subjects are given higher allowance, while those who oppose the authorised line are marginalised. Overhead expenditure associated with government events are considered by the Ministry elites “as an opportunity to gain extra cash”, to quote one source who preferred to remain anonymous. The combined effect of over – employment and low skills has caused the situation to deteriorate further, with executives working fewer hours and with no accountability (interview with Jasim Awadi, Channel 2 (English)

Director, April 2008).

Kuwaiti TV has an inadequate budget to fund in – house production of television content, and the budget is frequently in deficit before the end of the accounting period. Heidi Abell, a former television presenter at

Kuwaiti Television Channel One, affirmed that the repeated broadcasts of the ‘ Good Morning’ show that airs at 10:00 AM daily, is due to the lack of strategy and a general development plan (Interview with Heidi Abell, former TV presenter, May 2007). She states that such a program needs a large number of writers to keep pace with the demand for daily content.

Kuwaiti Television had good human resources and technical staff, but most of these skilled workers shifted to other broadcasters. Their absence 102

is significantly noted.

Abell suggests that, frustration born of low morale and poor remuneration, caused them to leave. And ultimately, the ongoing disputes between production staff and the executives forced departures that have resulted in a lack of creativity, further weakening the media organisation.

Compounding the situation and contributing to further production problems, is a decrease in the number of program sponsors, especially for live television. As one television director states,’’ I wish we had more money and more skilled writers who were able to delve into profound issues without limitations, so that more information could be added in the daily program’’ (Interview with Abdulmohsen Abduredha, TV Producer,

April 2007).

Nevertheless, Kuwaiti Television should have the capability to produce high – end programs. Its highly skilled people working in graphic design and broadcast technology earned the praise of CNN and BBC during visits to the broadcaster’s premises in 2009.

Its overall budget should be appropriate for the level of content it provides. Those within the organisation repeatedly point to poor allocation decisions among Senior Management, many of whom are political 103

appointees.

The result has been energetic and talented media professionals have been increasingly drawn to the private channels. For many, the lack of moral support and low financial rewards at KTV are a motivating factor.

Many key figures at KTV freely admit television in Kuwait is facing many difficulties in terms of workforce management and content creativity. If people do not like what is on offer due to a lack of real incentives, the media organisation is weakened, claiming “I walk next to the wall and no longer in the open space.”

Does this mean there is an exodus process in Kuwait television? Yes, TV anchors in Kuwait do not feel safe. There is supposed to be a union that protects the rights of television employees in Kuwait, but the administration has wasted these resources as well.

The growing ‘brain drain’ is the responsibility of the government executives that continue to undermine media workers. These are officials hindering the workforce and forcing them to migrate to other channels.

Kuwaiti Television mirrors other Arab government channels. Most Arab media focuses on domestic audiences, who are subjected to a daily dose 104

of government protocol, news, state-directed programming, and in many cases, direct propaganda (Boyd, 1999).

Therefore, broadcasting is frequently seen as being politically and culturally motivated, with programs focusing primarily upon the latest government achievements, and government personalities dominating news coverage. Little is done to critically evaluate government performance and observe its shortcomings, and public criticism is generally avoided.

Khaxen (1999) observes that in Kuwait, as elsewhere in the Arab world, the public often only believe the news when it is officially denied by the government.

The Trauma of TV Drama

While much of the focus on the crisis in KTV has focused on its news and current affairs programming, there is also a strong sense that its local drama production has also been in decline. Kuwait Television was once the leading broadcaster in the region, with many of its programs sold abroad. However, their expertise volumes and budgets have plummeted. 105

During the 1970s, KTV used to offer preeminent programming, disseminating top dramas and variety shows despite its short broadcasting schedule.

Kuwait Television was considered one of the best broadcasters among the

Arab Gulf States, and was able to compete directly with its famed

Egyptian counterpart.

However, recent market research shows Kuwaiti domestic channels are among the least watched television in the Arab world, due to the broadcaster’s poor performance. A report prepared for the Ministry of information by Dr Ibraheem Al- Khadmi, found that in 2004, 20 percent of

Kuwaiti audiences watched local channels, while 80 percent watch pan –

Arab satellite television. As the report notes:

This may be a new beginning to see a radical shift in the way the

culture thinks of watching TV. The decline of local television

watching habit is a phenomenon, which has dramatically changed

television landscape in the recent years (Al-Khadmi, 2007).

Generally, Kuwait Television had a reasonable reputation for its TV drama. However, the production is often narrowly focused, and critics have argued that Kuwaiti dramas do not vary much in terms of style, 106

content and objectives.

Moreover, they have been criticised for over reliance upon a small circle of actors, and as being characterised by well - used stories and repetition of roles. Topics dealt with (i.e. adultery, etc) do not reflect the concerns of everyday Kuwaitis, how current events affect their everyday lives, and women’s issues.

This lack of representation has a negative impact on Kuwaiti society.

Influencing viewers to change their perspectives Kuwaiti drama does not reach the production values evident to most Arab countries-especially those evident in Egyptian and Syrian dramas.

Generally, these foreign series are of a high calibre, prompting the question: “why doesn’t local drama receive a larger budget, in order to increase production values and attract more actors?” By contrast,

Kuwait's series are considered traditional and 'cloned'. That is, the storylines become old due to constant repetition. Local viewers can predict the end of the series after a simple introduction, because the series always use the same dramatic structure.

There is now much greater competition from satellite channels, who are successfully competing to win national television rights to many drama 107

series, soap operas and entertainment shows by signing contracts with artists to buy their works and broadcast them exclusively.

Kuwait lacks independent workers and writers, and secure, locally produced content, in the way that local drama rules have done in the

European Union, and in countries such as Australia (Flew, 2007, Picard,

2011). In the absence of strong government action in relation to local drama content, the situation is likely to worsen, as advertiser income moves further away from KTV and towards the satellite channels, further accentuating the budgetary crisis of KTV.

Conclusion

This chapter has provided the historical context for the current situation facing Kuwait Television. It was noted that while KTV has been a historically progressive force in the Middle East, with producers having a degree of autonomy and independence in government, that was among the best services in the Middle East. As competition increased in the

Middle East, however, weaknesses within KTV, and in its dealings with government, have become more apparent. The key concerns we identified in this chapter were those of growing government censorship, problems associated with poor management within KTV, the declining quality of local drama, and declining audiences for local content broadcast on KTV. 108

The challenges facing KTV are particularly severe in the context of media globalisation and the rise of new transnational satellite broadcasters, which will be considered in the next chapter.

109

CHAPTER FOUR

GLOBALISATION AS A THREAT AND

CHALLENGE TO KUWAITI BROADCAST

MEDIA

Introduction

The problems faced by Kuwait Television as a public broadcasting institution, discussed in Chapter Three, must be considered in the context of a rapidly changing global media landscape, and its complex impacts in the Middle East region. In this chapter, I will consider the debates surrounding globalisation as a concept used to explain these changes, with particular reference to debates in the Arab world about globalisation.

I analyse the rise of the pan-Arab television industry, and transnational channels that broadcast via satellite across the Middle East, in the context of these ongoing debates about globalisation. It is also noted that globalisation has economic, political and cultural dimensions, and media is 110

important to globalisation processes in terms of technologies, media content and industrial dynamics.

Defining Globalisation

Globalisation has become an important topic worldwide, with its impacts being felt across the cultural, political, and economic dimensions of all societies, particularly from the 1990s onwards. In the early 21st century, the world witnessed the emergence of a new set of institutional, technological and socio-cultural arrangements that have been understood theoretically through the concept of globalisation.

While this concept of globalisation was rarely used prior to the 1990s, its influence had become such that Benyon and Dunkerley argue

“globalisation, in one form or another, is impacting on the levels of everyone on the planet … globalisation might justifiably claim to be the defining feature of human society at the start of the twenty-first century”

(Benyon and Dunkerley, 2000, p.3).

In his 2002 BBC Reith Lectures entitled Runaway World, British sociologist

Anthony Giddens observes, “Globalisation is not incidental to our lives today. It is a shift in our very life circumstances” (Giddens, 2003, p.19).

Flew (2007) notes: 111

Globalisation is the hottest topic of our time … visible on the streets

of the world through the global reach of the Nike running shoes

brand or McDonald’s fast-food chain, in our everyday media

consumption through global media coverage of events such as the

Iraqi war, terrorist actions as the video-recorded beheadings that

kidnappers use to draw attention to their actions, and celebrity

events such as the Michael Jackson child sex abuse trial or the

relationship between Brad Pitt and Angelina Jolie (Flew, 2007,

p.66).

The impact of globalisation has become an increasingly important factor, affecting the operation of domestic television in Kuwait. The future of local television production in Kuwait has been widely debated on a grassroots level throughout the last two decades. The significance of ICTs has created increased cross-cultural relations. Cunningham and Jacka

(1996) and Flew (2007) identify a number of concepts under the rubric of globalisation. These include, the expansion of ICTs, enabling massive information flows to be delivered through various platforms, such as television, the Internet and other convergent media, that create greater cross-cultural dialogue.

The resulting transnational blend of values, customs and experiences can 112

potentially lead to greater international sharing of information and knowledge (Cunningham and Jacka, 1996; Flew, 2007). Cunningham and

Jacka argue global television initiated many implications on domestic cultures, but failed to consider how specific local cultural factors, or what the authors termed ‘television ecologies’ influenced the types of television programming which succeed and fail in different countries. There was often an overestimation of the levels of influence of imported programming in most parts of the world (Cunningham and Jacka, 1996).

In an edited collection of essays discussing all aspects of globalisation,

George Ritzer points out that “one of the points that is almost always made about globalisation is how contested almost everything is, including the definition of globalisation itself” (Ritzer, 2007, p.1). One reason for this, according to Ritzer, is that discussions around the concept tend to centre around what he terms globophilia and globophobia, or the question of whether people are for or against the phenomena they are describing

(Ritzer, 2007, p.2).

Globophilia is a term used for strong advocacy of globalisation, and is most likely to come from the dominant Western nations, particularly the

United States. In his best-seller The World is Flat, New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman captured the spirit of such strong globophilia in welcoming globalisation as “the inexorable integration of markets, 113

nation-states and technologies” (Friedman, 2005 p.9), and seeing a single global market as a harbinger of an integrated global culture.

Friedman also sees globalisation as making national economies more equal and national societies more open and democratic. By contrast, globaphobia equates globalisation with a crisis in national societies and economies, associated with the trauma of losing control over the capacity to influence developments that shape the life circumstances of people and cultures.

Economic critics of globalisation, such as Scholte (2005), associate the phenomenon with the reduced capacity of nation-states to regulate their national economies to ends in the best interests of their citizens. To this end, globalisation is associated with a weakening of the influence of national broadcasters, such as Kuwait Television, and the growing influence of transborder and transnational media. It may also be associated with a weakening of cultural influences and the growing fragmentation of national societies.

Lesley Sklair makes the critique that globalisation involves the selective incorporation of national elites into an ersatz cosmopolitan culture, where they become more aligned with the interests of the global elite than with their own people (Sklair, 2001). 114

In general terms, globalisation is defined in terms of greater integration and interconnection among people and places. George Ritzer (2007, p.2) defines globalisation as “an accelerating set of processes, involving flows that encompass ever-greater numbers of the world’s spaces and that lead to increasing integration and interconnectivity among those spaces”.

Roland Robertson defines globalisation as “a concept that refers both to the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole” (Robertson, 1992 p.8). By contrast Anthony

Giddens defines globalisation as “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa”

(Giddens, 1990 p.64).

An important issue raised by theories of globalisation is the need for a historical perspective. The historical dimension will be discussed in more detail below, but its contemporary relevance arises in part from the legacies of colonialism and imperialism in shaping the contemporary world-system. American critical scholar, Noam Chomsky points out that

"globalisation is a phenomenon that is new in some respects, but quite old in others” (Chomsky, 2004 p.2).

115

Alluding to the relationship between globalisation and the expansion of capitalism, Arif Dirlik proposed that “if globalisation means anything, it is the incorporation of societies globally into a capitalist modernity, with all the implications of the latter – economic, social, political, and cultural”

(Dirlik, 2003 p.275).

Debates surrounding the expansion of globalisation, and whether it is beneficial or not, are passionately argued, particularly outside of Europe and North America. Some see increased global interdependence as a destructive force, diminishing unique cultural identities, while others see it as offering a diverse and better life for all. Some argue the world is no more globalised than it was during the British, Spanish and Dutch colonial days, and what we call globalisation as essentially an ideology for continued neo-colonialism. While others see it as a more recent trend of modernity that needs to be further exploited, in all its shapes and forms, to achieve universal benefit.

As the Middle East has been strongly shaped by colonial and globalising forces, such debates have been a recurring feature in the region (Clement and Springborg, 2001). This brings forward the importance of developing a historical perspective on this critical question of our times.

116

Historical Perspectives on Globalisation

If by globalisation, we mean the mixing of people and cultures, through trade, commerce and the exchange of knowledge and ideas, facilitated by transport and communications technologies, then the Arab world and what we now call the Middle East have long been globalised. Historically, the Phoenicians developed the pictographic alphabet, and ancient

Egyptians created ways of exchanging information through a system of common symbols. This remarkable improvement in communications occurred through a process of interaction among diverse cultures, including the Sumerians, the Assyrians, the Persians and others.

The Islamic Caliphate of the 7th and 8th centuries stretched, at its peak, from what we now call Pakistan, across the Middle East and North Africa as far as Morocco, and included Spain and Portugal. The Ottoman Empire was a powerful transnational force in the region from the 14th century to its ultimate dissolution in 1918. So we need to be clear that many elements of what we today refer to as globalisation have a long standing in the Middle East.

The rise of Europe in the modern era was linked in part to developments in communication technologies. The Printing Revolution, began in Europe 117

in the second half of the 15th century, with the emergence of paper (an import originally from China, but proximately from the Arab cultures), and a printing system assembled by the German goldsmith, Johannes

Gutenberg (Fang, 1997).

With the advent of printing, information spread through many layers of society. Printing lent itself to massive political, religious, economic, educational, and personal alterations. Such changes included the

Protestant Reformation, the Renaissance, humanism, mercantilism, the end of feudalism, and the rise of capitalism. Printing marked the start of the modern world, or what Arif Dirlik (2003) calls ‘Eurocentric modernity’.

The rise of the West and associated economic, political and cultural changes created unprecedented patterns of communication. Advances in science and technology occurred in the 18th and 19th centuries, during the

European Industrial Revolution that would expand globally (Hobsbawm,

1979, 1985).

Over time, we would see the mass media revolution, which established media institutions and multi-party electoral political systems, meaning that governments established different media institutions to ensure their message would reach society (Cook, 2005). The media gained its power to interconnect the messages between political institutions and the wider public, and this was also interwoven with powerful socio-cultural forces, 118

such as the rise of mass literacy and the demand for mass popular entertainment (Holmes, 2005).

The development of mass communication media played itself out differently in different parts of the world. Books and printing, in their earliest forms, were international in their origins, as they predated the era of nation states and served cultural, religious, political and commercial purposes throughout Europe and beyond. By contrast, the newspaper largely developed as a national institution, and as Denis McQuail observes:

National boundaries largely delineated the circulation of print media

in general. The national character of early mass media was

reinforced by the exclusiveness of language, as well as by cultural

and political factors. When film was invented, it too was largely

confined within national frontiers, at least until after the 1914-18

war (McQuail, 2005, pp.246-47).

Broadcast media, such as radio and television, have always had a strong capacity for global circulation. McQuail suggests ‘television is still probably the single most potent influence in the accelerating media globalisation process, partly because, as with the cinema film, its visual character helps it to pass barriers of language’ (McQuail, 2005, p.247). The Middle East 11 9

was a site for the competing propaganda broadcasts of the U.S. and the

Soviet Union during the “Cold War”. As Daya Thussu observes:

The Middle East was a particular target for Western broadcasters,

given its geostrategic importance as the source of the world’s

largest supply of oil. It is no coincidence that the Arabic Service,

created in 1938, was the first foreign-language section of the BBC’s

Empire Service, to be followed by the Persian Service in 1940. The

French, British and American broadcasters dominated the airwaves

in the Arab world … Western support for the conservative Arab

countries and the feudal order they perpetuated was also reflected

in the treatment of radical Arab nationalism in Western broadcasting

(Thussu, 2007 p.24).

At the same time, as we discussed in Chapter Three, television in most parts of the world was predominantly terrestrial and nationally based until the 1970s. Communications media have been central to the development of modern nation-states, and the understanding of the world through the framework of a system of states and a diverse range of national cultures:

Communications media have been central to the major

developments of modern societies. Their role has been seen as

critical to the emergence of nation-states and conceptions of 120

national identity; ideas of citizenship, democracy and associated

human freedom; the development of political culture and the public

sphere; and the growth of capitalist commercial enterprises. They

constitute the principle means through which people worldwide are

both informal and entertained, and develop an understanding of

their local, national and global social and culture environment (Flew,

2007, p.1).

But the development of communication satellite technologies from the

1980s onwards, introduced a powerful, globalising dynamic into media systems. As U.S. author Joseph Pelton observes:

Communications satellites have redefined our world. Satellites and

other modern telecommunications networks, together with TV, have

now altered the patterns and even many of the goals of modern

society. Satellites, for better or worse, have made our world global,

interconnected, and interdependent (Pelton, 2010, p.13).

Famous communication theorist James Carey, reached a similar conclusion in his 1993 essay ‘The Mass Media and Democracy: Between the Modern and the Postmodern’, that “Beginning in the early 1970s, the entire pattern of communication began to change … Two technologies in particular were both the symptoms and the symbols of the change: 121

satellites and computers, the consequences of which reconfigured the map of communications and social relationships” (Carey, 1993 p.18).

The media are thus at the forefront of globalisation, but the implications of such developments remain disputed. Referring to the earlier globophilia/globophobia distinction, there are those, inspired by Marshall

McLuhan’s famous writings on the “global village” (McLuhan, 1964), who see global media as opening up dark corners of the world to the forces of freedom and democracy. The News Corporation boss, Rupert Murdoch famously said of satellite television that they were “a threat to totalitarian regimes everywhere” (quoted in McChesney, 1999, p.99). Others have followed Harvard University Political Scientist Joseph Nye, as seeing in such technologies new opportunities to expand U.S. political influence and

‘soft power’ (Nye, 2010).

From the perspective of critical globalism (McGrew, 2007 pp.39-40), globalisation appears primarily as the global expansion of the giant multinational media corporations. Robert McChesney (1999) has argued that “whereas media systems had been predominantly national before the

1990s, a global commercial media market has emerged full force by the dawn of the 21st century” (McChesney, 1999 p.78). Arguing that “the rise to dominance of the global commercial media system is more than an economic matter; it also has clear implications for media content, politics, 122

and culture” (McChesney, 1999 p.79). McChesney argues that the global media system is now dominated by fewer than ten transnational corporations (TNCs), with another 50-60 companies being significant players in regional or niche markets.

McChesney argues the global media system is now on “a trajectory toward vastly greater integration, based on commercial terms, and dominated by a handful of transnational media conglomerates”

(McChesney, 1999 p.79). Such a concentrated global media system, for

McChesney and other critics (e.g. Schiller, 1999; Herman and McChesney,

1997), is one where “political and economic power is resolutely maintained in the hands of a wealthy few” (p.79), and where “to the extent … that the neoliberal global economic order thrives upon a weak political culture, the global media system is a central beneficiary”

(McChesney, 1999 p.113).

Pros and Cons of Globalisation: A Middle East Perspective

Globalisation is a concept that is discussed vigorously among the Middle

East population. As has been noted, the historical context that the people of the region have faced in dealing with Western culture, businesses and governments needs to be recognised in understanding the responses.

U.S. based scholar Fauzi Najjar, observes: 123

The 21st century presents the Arab-Muslim world with a challenge

that may determine its future for generations. The Arabs are quite

concerned with maintaining their cultural identity and independence

in the face of the West’s superiority and its pervading globalisation.

Evidence of this is the huge volume – verging on a deluge – of

Arabic literature on globalisation and its “dangers”. This is in

addition to hundreds of seminars, workshops, and conferences

focusing on “Islam and Globalisation”, the Arab-Islamic heritage,

and national and cultural identity (Najjar, 2005 p.91).

In their historical account of these dynamics, Henry and Springborg

(2001) argue that, in the Middle East and North Africa, globalisation and colonialism provide an analytical framework through which to understand not only the region’s response to “Awlaama” (the newly-coined Arabic term for globalisation), but also the strategies employed by individual countries and particular social movements to deal with them.

The strategic location, cultural heritage and civilisation have made the

Middle East significant to the West. Throughout history, the West has had a great interest in the region’s strategic location. For this reason, there is a long history of conflict, as rival powers have struggled for dominance in 124

the region.

In the Colonial Era, European powers such as France and Great Britain, sought to control key strategic points, and oversaw the dissolution of the

Ottoman Empire. With the discovery of oil in the 1930s, the region became increasingly important to the United States and its strategic interests. The “Cold War” from the 1950s to the 1980s, saw the U.S. and the Soviet Union competing for influence among the newly independent governments of the region, and the legacies of these geopolitical battles remain to this day.

The negative colonial experience in the region has framed Arab acceptance of globalisation today. The first development between the

West and the Middle East was based on economic interests. Western capitalism established the exchange of information and knowledge, as commodities that could be processed packaged and sold, in the form of cultural industries (Mowlana, 1998). The collision between free-market policies, media expansion, and democracy has become unavoidable in the region.

Globalisation is simultaneously a two edged sword-either threat or opportunity. Principally, it is a notion against which countries are struggling to respond. There is the argument, for instance, that 125

globalisation is an essentially ideological concept, used to promote dominant global corporate interests, and as a new form of colonisation.

Asa aresult, while globalisation itself may be an old concept, however, it takes new forms in the current economic and technological environments

(McChesney, 1999; Chomsky, 2004).

In his overview of Arab-Muslim perspectives on globalisation, Najjar

(2005) divides Arab-Muslim opinions toward globalisation in three groups.

The three groups are: (1) Those who reject globalisation as a form of imperialism and cultural invasion, seeing it as a threat to Arab-Islamic culture, beliefs and identity; (2) Those who welcome globalisation as the advance of modernity, and do not see it as a threat to Arab-Islamic cultural values; and (3) Those who seek a form of globalisation that can be made compatible with the national and cultural interests of the people of the Arab-Islamic world.

I will consider each of these in turn. As I will note below, globalisation is commonly equated with “Americanisation”, so attitudes towards

“American power and hegemony, style of life and cultural values” (Najjar,

2005 p 92) are a crucial element in such debates.

The first group reject globalisation as the highest stage of imperialism and cultural invasion that threatens to dominate people, undermine their 126

distinctive cultures, and threaten national identity. For author Husayn

Nalum, “globalisation is the foundation of world order in the 21st century.

The strategy of the world powers, led by the United States is to “promote economic globalisation, or the supremacy of the market over the whole world, and to destroy the political power of states, nationalities and peoples” (quoted in Najjar, 2005 p.92).

Others, such as Muhammad Abid al-Jabiri, argue that this is not simply an economic program to universalise free market capitalism, but “is also and primarily, an ideology reflecting a hegemonic will over the whole world and Americanising it” (quoted in Najjar, 2005 p.92). At a conference of the Muslim World League, held in Mecca in 2002, the Secretary-General of the League, Dr. Abdallah al-Turki, warned that “misfortune would spread all over the world if globalisation succeeds in detaching people from their culture and their identity” (quoted in Najjar, 2005 p.95).

These arguments have a complex series of relationships to arguments about Islam and its relationship to other faiths and to secular culture, the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, and the continued U.S. support for the

State of Israel and the suppression of the Palestinians. But it is important to note that such arguments are by no means unique to Islamic scholars.

As noted above, Western authors such as Robert McChesney, argue that 127

the global media essentially surpresses alternatives and forces all national media systems into a single global media system.

One of the most famous critics of the global cultural domination by U.S. media was U.S. media scholar, Herbert Schiller. In a consistent set of arguments from his first major book, Mass Communication and America,

(1969), to one of his last major essays, “Not Yet the Post-Imperialist Era”,

(1991), Schiller maintains economic power and cultural domination on the part of mostly (but not exclusively) U.S.-based media corporations, was a dominant feature of the capitalist world system (Flew, 2007 pp.32-33). As

Schiller argues in “Not Yet the Post-Imperialist Era”, the cultural influence of “Americanisation” was on the rise, rather than being in decline, even if the media multinational of other nations, were emerging as competitors to U.S.-based media conglomerates:

Domination is precisely what cultural imperialism is all about … the

global pre-eminence of American cultural product is being not only

maintained but extended to new locales … It must be emphasised

that the corporate takeover of (popular) culture for marketing and

ideological control is not a patented American practice, limited

exclusively to U.S. companies. It is, however, carried to its fullest

development in the United States (Schiller, 1991 p.24).

128

It can also be noted that opposition to globalisation in the Middle East is not limited to Islamist scholars. There is an important line of critique that has been associated with Marxism, around the concept of dependency theory. A leading figure in such arguments is Egyptian political economist

Samir Amin, who argues – following Lenin – that globalisation, since the end of World War II, has been an imperialist project led by the United

States. For Amin:

Capitalism has always been, since its inception, by nature, a

polarising system, that is imperialist. This polarisation – the

concurrent construction of dominant centres and dominated

peripheries, and their reproduction deepening at every stage – is

inherent in the process of accumulation of capital on a global scale

(Amin, 2004 p.13).

In Amin’s account, the principal barrier to this imperialist project of the accumulation of capital on a global scale, is the existence of oppositional states. The Soviet Union was such an oppositionist state from 1917 to its dissolution in 1991, as was China, although since the “reform and opening up” under Deng Xiaoping in 1978, it has muted its opposition to the West, as it has become more of a capitalist power.

Amin argues, the Middle East occupies a particularly significant place in 129

the U.S. hegemonic project, on the basis of its oil wealth, its geographical location, and its ongoing political instability. According to Amin, the nationalist and anti-colonial movements of the 1950s and 1960s challenged this hegemony, as do States such as Iran today. But the force of this project has been undermined by its authoritarianism and unpopularity among its own populations – seen most clearly in the “Arab

Spring” uprisings, but which had been gestating for a much longer period, and the more open preparedness of the U.S. to use military force in the region.

The second group, who are generally considered to be secularist, welcome globalisation as it brings advancements in science, advanced technology, enhanced global communications infrastructures, and the rise of a knowledge-based economy (Najjar, 2005 pp.98-100). This group is highly critical of the authoritarianism of many of the region’s political regimes, and the lack of cultural and intellectual openness of civil society that has ensued.

As this group do not necessarily equate globalisation with Americanisation

(the Internet is not seen as a bearer of American cultural values, for instance), they do not see such forces as necessarily anti-Islamic. Rather, such writers argue the need to interact positively with globalisation and benefit from the opportunities it provides, not seeing such engagement as necessarily coming at the loss of cultural identity. Syrian writer Jurj 130

Tarabishi, for instance, argues, Arab critics of globalisation are displaying a “negative attitude” toward modernity in general, and describes as

‘paranoid’ the perception of globalisation as a “great conspiracy, hatched by the multinational corporations, and carried out by the IMF, UN agencies and the media” (quoted in Najjar, 2005 p.99).

Such authors are taking positions on globalisation similar to that of

Thomas Friedman in The Lexus and the Olive Tree, and The World is Flat

(2005). Friedman sees globalisation in terms of modernity and technological progress, versus tradition and cultural backwardness, arguing:

Globalisation is a struggle between those who wish modernisation

and those who cling to their ancient, pre-modern, cultural ways.

The Lexus (the luxury car) represents the temptations of developed

technological capitalism, and the olive tree stands for the weight of

culture and tradition (Friedman, 2002 p.2).

The media would be seen, in this respect, not only as a globalising force but also as a modernising one, challenging State control over the means of communication, and enabling new ideas to circulate, thus connecting the Arab world to leading currents of thought and culture.

131

The argument here, as put by journalists such as Sayyad Yasin, is not that the Arab-Muslim world has been too exposed to globalisation, but that it has not had sufficient openness to the positive aspects of democratisation and liberalisation, due to the controls imposed by authoritarian state rulers and their local backers. According to Najjar:

Yasin asserts that so long as the Arab world is still seized by a

“prohibitory mentality” (aqliyyat al-tahrim) that forbids freedom of

thought and expression, it will remain in a state of backwardness.

There is a clear call to those countries dominated by tyrannical

regimes and closed minds to liberate themselves from the noose of

the past and enter the new world. What is needed is a complete

cultural revival that will do away with the culture of tyranny and

establish a democratic culture instead (Najjar, 2005 p.104).

Such debates continue, although Najjar observes the debate on globalisation is dominated by journalistic treatments, with most scholarly books on the topic that are in Arabic being prepared by economists

(Najjar, 2005 p.104). They are often presented as being polarised between “radicals” and “moderates”, anti-Western versus pro-Western, or

“modernists” versus “traditionalists”.

There is, however, a need to avoid oversimplifying the oppositions. As I 132

note above, questioning globalisation and its economic drivers, is as much a feature of key thinkers and activists in the West as it is in the Arab world. In some respects, these polarities resemble those between

“globophobia” and “globophilia”, discussed at the beginning of this chapter, which may obscure as much as it reveals about the contemporary dynamics of globalisation.

The third group of authors, in Najjar’s account, seek an engagement with globalisation that is compatible with national and cultural interests. They argue globalisation cannot be wholly accepted or rejected; they seek a middle ground, arguing, globalisation is inevitable but that its consequences can be managed in ways that preserve cultural identity and integrity.

North African scholar Muhammad Abid al-Jabiri, argues that Arab-Islamic cultures have long engaged with other cultures, and that the idea of a single, authentic Islam is not well grounded historically. He advocates an open approach to the relationship between globalisation and the Arab-

Islamic heritage, arguing,

In the age of global consciousness, deepened by the

communications revolution, Arabs and Muslims can no longer

remain attached to the past. Just as in certain periods in the past, 133

their heritage assimilated elements from different cultures and was

enriched by them, without losing its fundamental constituents, there

is no reason why it cannot do the same again in the age of

globalisation (Najjar, 2005 p.104).

Rather than seeing this as a kind of “Third Way”, we can recognise the degree to which the observations we have made about globalisation raise issues on both sides of the ledger. It is the case that authoritarian governments, who maintain corrupt and unequal societies and inhibit free speech, have held back development in large parts of the Arab world.

Kuwait has been relatively open by the standards of the region but, as we discussed in Chapter Three, there are important problems with its political system that filter through to its media system. Border-crossing communications technologies such as satellite broadcasting and the

Internet only accentuate the dangers of stasis in a fast changing world.

At the same time, critics of the impact of media globalisation, and globalisation more generally, rightly point to the risks it presents to national cultures and a shared sense of cultural identity. In Kuwait, this is certainly not the only factor in national fragmentation: the nation’s high economic dependence on various forms of guest workers are also a factor. But the aspiration for media that serve the national interest, and 134

which inform, entertain, and actively engage the citizens of their country, remains a valid one. As the MacBride Commission’s 1980 report for

UNESCO, Many Voices, One World, argued in ways that remain valid today:

Development strategies should incorporate communication policies

as an integral part in the diagnosis of needs and in the design and

implementation of selected priorities. In this respect,

communication should be considered a major development

resource, a vehicle to ensure real political participation in decision-

making, a central information based for deciding policy options, and

an instrument for creating awareness of national priorities

(MacBride, 1980 p.258).

A Regional Perspective on Transnational Television

It is important to note that what we refer to as globalisation in relation to the media often takes the form of regionalisation. In his study of Arab television in the context of globalisation, Ayish (2003) outlined three phases of Arab television development:

1. A formative and foundation phase, when television broadcasting

services were first established (1950s-1960s) 135

2. A period of national expansion and consolidation (1970s-1980s);

3. Regional and global expansion from the early 1990s onwards, due to

vast satellite proliferation and political transformation.

It is the latter phase that is of interest to the globalisation debate, and I will discuss in more detail the impact of satellite broadcasting in the

Middle East in the next chapter. But as Ayish observes, in many instances the growth is not so much in content from outside of the Arab region

(except for specialist channels such as sports and children’s programs).

What it does show is that globalisation allows content from within the

Arab world but outside of the country of origin.

136

Table 4.1

Program Production in Selected Arab Television Organisations,

2002

Production in %

Local Arab Foreign

Jordanian satellite 80 18.5 1.5 channel

Bahrain satellite 40 50 10 channel

Saudi channel (1) 53 47 0

Oman TV 50 25 25

Qatar TV 70 20 10

Kuwait TV 64 31 5

Yemen TV 60 30 10

Sharjah satellite 30 55 15 channel

Source: Ayish, 2003 p.105.

There can, of course, be a lot of debates about the cultural values 137

embedded in such pan-Arabic media content. For critics of these forms of broadcasting, they are seen as being characterised by “the lack of a distinct Arab identity, and the hegemony of Anglo-American values”

(Mellor, 2011 p.27).

As such, satellite broadcasting features alongside other recent symbols of modernisation, such as skyscrapers and giant shopping malls, as merely aping a Western lifestyle and rejecting Arab-Muslim cultural identity and heritage. Mellor points out that “the pan-Arab satellite channels … have been accused of depending on imported programs and copying existing

American programs rather than producing distinctly Arab content” (Mellor,

2011 p.27).

What we identify as the impact of globalisation in countries such as

Kuwait thus has a strong element of regionalisation. Authors such as

Sinclair, Jacka and Cunningham (1996) argue that technologies such as satellite broadcasting were less likely to produce “an Italicise global culture” (Sinclair et. al., 2000 p.302) than to see the emergence of geo- linguistic regions.

For important cultural and historical reasons, the Middle East has been particularly likely to develop in such a way, as the ideas of pan-Arabism and a shared Muslim religion, culture and heritage are pulls on identity 138

that are as strong as notions of statehood and national cultural identity.

This is particularly evident in the smaller Gulf states such as Kuwait.

Kai Hafez refers to this as the “regionalisation of globalisation” (Hafez,

2007, p.71). It provides an important context for considering the rise of satellite broadcasting in the Middle East and the question of a Middle East public sphere, that I will discuss in the next chapter.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have worked through the often complex literature on globalisation, and questions about its positive or negative impact in the

Middle East. I have sought to provide a historical perspective on globalisation and its relationship to media, noting that such media have often been used as instruments of colonial propaganda in global political struggles. The Arab perspective on globalisation is influenced by colonial history, with some critical scholars viewing it as little more than the latest phase of Western domination and capitalist imperialism.

My own perspective has been a more nuanced one. I have argued there are many reasons to be critical of how communciations media can be used as a tool of Western influence and can have negative social and cultural effects. 139

At the same time, we need to be careful not to blame all problems of the

Middle East on meddlesome Westerners, and recognise the potentially positive impacts of communications media. Most importantly, as scholars of global media such as Sinclair, Jacka and Cunningham and Hafez argue, a lot of transnational satellite television in the Middle East comes from the region itself, so it is pan-Arab media as much as it is Western media that is a driver of change in the region. In the next chapter, I will consider whether satellite television has helped to contribute to a new Middle East public sphere.

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CHAPTER FIVE

THE RISE OF A NEW MIDDLE EAST MEDIA

SPHERE

Introduction

This thesis has thus far drawn out a complex connection between national, regional and global forces with regard to the crisis of Kuwaiti television. Chapter Three drew attention to the crisis of Kuwaiti national broadcasting (KTV), observing that there are a number of factors internal to Kuwaiti Government, society, and the broadcasting organisation itself that have been factors behind the current crisis.

Chapter Four discussed the extent to which this crisis is accentuated by the transformation of the Arab broadcasting landscape since 1990, with the surge on provision of pan-Arab satellite broadcasting channels, and the significant shift of audiences from national terrestrial services to these new satellite channels. Such developments are often understood through 141

the prism of globalisation, and questions related to the influence of

Western media and culture on Arabic cultures, religions and traditions.

There is also a regional dimension to this argument, where pan-Arab media could potentially be a unifying force in the region. This would enable the emergence of a new public sphere, which has less ties to particular nation-states than that of the modernist and nationalist project, associated with national terrestrial broadcasting in post-colonial Arab states. This chapter will consider this question in the context of a wider discussion, concerning the relationship between the political system of the

State of Kuwait and regional Gulf States, and whether those systems have similar attributes correlated to media identity.

The surge in demand for pan-Arab satellite broadcasting, and its role as a catalyst for change in the Middle East, has posed the question of whether it has helped to ferment a new political mindset in the region. Drawing upon the pioneering analysis of the relationship between the media and the political process developed by German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, and his theory of the public sphere (Habermas, 1974, 1989). This chapter will consider theories of a transnational public sphere, such as those proposed by Manuel Castells (2010), Ingrid Volkmer (2003a, 2003b,

2014), Cottle and Rai (2008), and Brian McNair (2006), as well as critiques of these presented by authors such as Colin Sparks (2007,

2016). 142

This chapter outlines the various media institutions and their contribution to shape Arab socio-culture, socio-political and socio-economic attributes.

It must be acknowledged, however, that each change is dependent upon the country’s unique political circumstances and how they are interwoven within the local media context.

Communications technologies are simultaneously tools for both social development and domestic and international propaganda. I elaborate on this discussion to provide a broader perspective on the issues related to

Arab television audiences in the Middle East, outlining a clear contrast between the various Arab satellite channels and Kuwaiti Television institutions.

Satellite Television and Transnational Public Spheres

In the period since 1990, satellite technologies wrought swift and decisive changes in broadcasting throughout the Middle East. A new television landscape emerged in the context of significant regional turmoil. Rising violence in Iraq and Syria, political unrest in Egypt, Libya and Yemen, struggle for women’s suffrage in Kuwait, political assassinations in 143

Lebanon, continuing hostilities between Israel and Palestine, and the recent rise of ISIS, have framed political media in the region. The unrestricted exposure and unprecedented satellite proliferation provided the base for media to revolutionise the Arab World.

Following the events of 11 September 2001, war in Afghanistan, Iraq,

Libya and now Syria have made many television viewers around the world familiar with a number of Arabic news channels. In many instances, these news channels offered an alternative version of events from that presented in mainstream Western media. The West retains a negative view of Arab media, assuming all television outlets are under government control, and offer only limited freedom of expression (Amin, 2003).

Arab television certainly did not gain worldwide recognition until the news reporting of Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabia and Al-Manar. The pan-Arab satellite news network revolutionised the way the world viewed Arab television.

These outlets played a vital role in reshaping the Arab media landscape.

El Mustapha has captured the extent of the change, and the central role played by Arabic language satellite channels as a driver of change:

Before the war on Afghanistan in 2001, Arab media was almost

unheard of; however, Al-Jazeera’s monopoly over the coverage of

the war on Afghanistan has put Arab media on the map … Today, 144

the Arab world is undergoing a radical media change, featuring the

launch of satellite and cable television channels. This has ended an

era of state-controlled media and given way to privatization (El

Mustapha, 2011, p. 1).

Theories of television broadcasting have been largely developed from a

Western perspective, and more research is needed in tracing its unique development in the Middle East and its impact on Middle Eastern society.

In this chapter, I define the television narrative of the Middle East since its inception, until its most recent standpoint. Television arrived in the

Middle East at a different time and under different circumstances to that of the West, and development went through several stages, eventually transforming Arab communities in various ways.

Hisham Sharabi notes that “in modern Arab history, including during the revolutionary period of the 1960s and 1970s, there has been nothing to equal the power of the Arab satellite channels to change the nature of popular consciousness and perhaps in the political attitudes of popular forces in the Arab world” (Sharabi, 2003).

Arab satellite television significantly evolved the role in regional affairs, 145

especially in reporting each country’s internal and external affairs in the light of ongoing political, economic, social and cultural changes. The technologies have shaped the programming, providing new content through the high penetration of satellite channels in the region. For this reason, it is important to provide a broad picture of Arab television performance and its association with today’s political climate, as well as the government and business interests associated with these satellite channels.

Before the Gulf War, television in the Middle East did not exceed beyond the national broadcasting landscape, and the nation-state was defined as its territory of reception. The states exported their television programmes to each other, but cross-border broadcasting signals remained unclear

(Boyd, 1999).

Television broadcasts were not able to penetrate beyond geographic borders, due to limited terrestrial signal strength. It is for this reason that a paradigm shift occurred in Middle Eastern television, with the establishment of the Arab Satellite Broadcasting Organisation (ARABSAT) in 1976, which enabled pan-Arab satellite broadcasting. While all Arab

League states contribute to the financing of ARABSAT, its major shareholders are Saudi Arabia (36.7 percent) and Kuwait (14.6 percent)

(ARABSAT, 2010). 146

Prior to 1990, most Arab radio and television systems were government- owned, for three main reasons. Firstly, Arab governments regarded radio and television as effective political instruments for reaching most of the population, that could be accessed regardless of the population’s literacy and income levels. Arab broadcasting underwent its first major expansion during the period after World War II, when Arab nationalism and anti- colonialism feelings were strong, and governments were eager to use them for political purposes and strengthening national defense.

Governments justified control of the media on the basis of the alleged need to protect the country against old enemies, such as the former colonial powers, and new ones, often the Untied States in the context of

Cold War politics. In the same vein, radio and television facilities have been prime targets of revolutionaries seeking to seize power, and governments have subsequently taken special measures to protect them.

Secondly, broadcasting was not a lucrative source of income for commercial investors. Commercial advertising in the Arab world

(especially in the electronic media), was relatively limited and revenues did not cover operating costs. Most broadcasters ran their operations at a financial loss, that was met by their national governments.

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Thirdly, governments were concerned about the national image that is conveyed in other countries and subsequently want to control the broadcast content. There have been a few exceptions to this principle, most notably, the vibrant television industry in Lebanon. And, more recently, among the new satellite television corporations, but the norm has been for government control of electronic broadcasting.

The paradox has been that, given the dull nature of much broadcasting on the government-run channels, they did little to present a positive image either at home or abroad, often being seen as little more than propaganda channels.

Prior to the 1990 Gulf War, television content was almost exclusively directed towards local audiences. At the same time, and in spite of the national bias of broadcasting systems, Arab audiences have long had exposure to the media of other countries.

During the 1950s and 1960s, foreign radio was introduced as an alternative source of news and information. The popular Monte-Carlo

Arabic radio service, Radio France Internationale, the BBC World Service, and the Voice of America, were integrated into Arab culture from the early days. Because radio was a difficult medium to control territorial flows over, Western broadcasters had long used it to promote their democratic 148

ideas among Arab populations (Thussu, 2006 pp.16-26).

However, operational success also depends on the ability of such services to understand and meet the needs of diverse audiences. In that context,

Arab media had early exposure to foreign outlets, in the geopolitical environment of the Cold War and the strategic significance of the Middle

East.

After the First Gulf War, the arrival of satellite television brought with it positive audience reception and a new cosmopolitan television culture to

Arab nations. Coverage on the new satellite services extended to longer hours, and talk shows and investigative reporting extended beyond national limitations, both geographic and social. The new television landscape enabled the gaze to turn towards regional political, social, economic and cultural settings. The significance of the media as a catalyst to debates in the public sphere increased, as did the calls for greater integration in the Arab world. Since then, satellite television has played as a key role in endorsing pan-Arab issues around development and intercultural exchange. It has enabled the Arab population to discuss their common views and focus on mutual progress, and to advance broad social, political and cultural development.

The first private satellite channel launched in the region was (Middle East 149

Broadcasting Centre MBC), which was launched in September 1991, by a private Saudi tycoon who sought to reach the pan-Arab market.

Operations were based offshore in London, in an effort to avoid potential difficulties around censorship. This privately owned Arab satellite TV broke the domination of government ownership, as it could reach all Arab homes capable of receiving the signal, offering a variety of content with only limited broadcasting restrictions. A new frontier in television broadcasting was being born. This prompted other countries to acquire satellite operations and opening the door to other interest groups to utilise this new space.

As Arab television expanded beyond authoritarian limitations, governments were finding themselves less able to dominate and control the television landscape. Monitoring the unprecedented television overflow in the region shows the broadcasts go beyond their historical reach. As Marwan Kraidy observed:

The proliferation of the Arab television can be explained by the

region's geopolitical importance as a world centre for oil production

and the cradle of Islam. The common language and bulk of many

small countries has made the operation much easer to penetrate

cross Arab natural boundaries (Kraidy, 2002, p.3).

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Attributes of Arab Media

Television can be a force to promote national, social and economic development, and also can convey the urgency for development in areas such as education, health and agriculture.

During the 1950s and 1960s, foreign radio was introduced as an alternative source of news and information. The popular Monte-Carlo

Arabic radio service, Radio France Internationale, the British Broadcasting

Corporation’s World Service, and the Voice of America were integrated into Arab culture from the early days, as radio was a medium that crossed boundaries, and through which the West sought to enlighten Arab populations about democracy. However, operational success also depends on the ability of such services to understand and meet the needs of diverse audiences.

In that context, Arab media had early exposure to foreign outlets, in the geopolitical environment of the Cold War, and the strategic significance of the Middle East.

The Middle East is fragmented along different political lines. Therefore, the tensions surrounding the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the

1970s Lebanese civil war, the Iraq-Iran war, and the first and second Gulf 151

Wars define the Middle East as probably the most volatile region in the world. The region has rarely been at rest and is constantly facing crisis, yet each crisis has also brought some aspect of transformative modernisation.

Satellite broadcasting in the region brought a greater political challenge.

For example, Saudi tycoon Al Waleed Bin Talal, the owner of the MBC

Middle East Cooperation channel, and advocate for the Saudi Kingdom’s own four major news channels, challenged the rival Al-Jazeera, to make a political statement against Sheik Hammed of Qatar. Likewise, Al-Manar of

Hezbollah goes against the LBC Lebanese government channel due to political unease.

Each station does not represent a unified Arab public, but seeks to serve a particular political agenda. Meanwhile, government-owned television in the Middle East is hampered by harsh laws and restrictive policies designed to protect the government from criticism. At the same time, as

El Mustapha hjas observed, transnational satellite broadcasting enables the emergence of a ‘pan-Arab consciousness’ (p. 34), as the broadcast of public demonstrations and debate among different participatns in the public sphere demonstrates that ‘the Arab public is no longer a passive audience who will accept information without questioning its authenticity’,

(p. 31) in ways that were impossible with the dominance of the traditional 152

state-run broadcasters.

Media and information have become an integral part of people's lives and play a vital role in shaping public opinion. They are an essential part in modern democracy. The risk with the media in the Arab world is that the ability of the satellite services to rapidly deliver news and events may lead to them lacking the necessary objective analysis. Critics argue that the vast expansion of satellite broadcasting in the region has ignored important social issues, and the fostering of a civil society. Nevertheless, more freedom and transparency can be seen in satellite television than on state-owned television.

Post-Gulf War Arab media conveys two types of wars: the real war, and the “media war”. The “media war” can be considered more effective, because information is itself the central weapon, as can be seen during recent events in Arab countries. Although the media is the most important feature of the new Arab landscape, it still misleads the public opinion by amplifying small victories, mixing news with opinion, misinterpreting outcomes, and not providing depth and details.

This does not detract from the fact that the Arab press, in particular, has been contributing enormously to the regeneration of intellectual dialogue, and has enjoyed much success in establishing constructive dialogues 153

across the region. Thanks to new communication technologies – particularly the Internet – there is a new freedom that cannot be denied, media is important to our lives because of its influence in socio-political systems. And in order for the media to develop and change community awareness, it must be accountable, objective and balanced.

Media globalisation is pervasive, and we see evidence of this in two ways: firstly, the expansion of communications technologies, such as mobile satellite media; and secondly, the globalisation of ideologies.

The final form of authoritarian ownership in Arab television operation is expressed through the state-owned channels (Sakr, 2003). There are many such examples in the region, as most Arab governments have now repackaged their terrestrial channels and retransmitted them via satellite to reach the wider area. Barakat (1993, p.24) described the Middle East’s social pattern since the mid-19th century writing, “the right to freedom of expression is an essential part of our identities to form ideas and opinions. Yet, can the right include the information that protected by the state ” The manner in which Arab media is subjected to heavy constraints placed upon freedom of expression shows the problems facing civil society in the Arab world. When the State retains a tight grip over traditional and modern institutions and the means of production, a corollary of its strength is a weak civil society” (Barakat, 1993 p.25). 154

Satellite investment in the region, and the wide variety of programming it has made available, have made it difficult for political media to reach audiences. Despite the fact that peoples from the Gulf states are generally well educated, they can be misinformed about their governments through the purposeful manipulation of information.

Political affairs are still considered incomprehensible, especially in regards to segregating between sectarian rights.

Arab Satellite Broadcasters: An Overview

Arab satellite broadcasters are at the forefront of media globalisation in the Middle East. At the same time, as I note in Chapter Four, this may be as much regionalisation as globalisation, since most of the new channels – with the major exception of Al-Jazeera – basically broadcast into the

Middle East region. The rapid growth of the satellite industry in Arab nations over the past decade has been made possible through technological developments, but also through a series of significant political changes in the post-1990 period (Amin, H., 2002).

The first private satellite operation began with the launch of MBC in 1991, 155

followed later by the Egyptian Satellite Channel (owned by the Egyptian

State), and numerous other government-owned and private-owned Arab satellite stations (Amin & Boyd, 1993). The First Gulf War spawned a wide spread need for Arab audiences, hungry for useful information, to attain their own satellite services.

Western services, such as CNN and the (BBC) captured local audiences for a time – the Middle East was a leading case study of the so-called “CNN effect” in world news (Strobel, 1996) – but dissatisfaction with their perceived biases were a catalyst for other services more representative of views in the Arab world.

The First Gulf War triggered a series of developments that led to the establishment of private television in Arab countries. The combination of new services and the audience adoption of these services, as they acquired satellite dishes in growing numbers, had an impact upon state censorship and the activities of government, owned television channels.

A recent survey of satellite channels undertaken by the Arab States

Broadcasting Union found there were 1,294 satellite channels operating in the Middle East as of 2014 (BBG Strategy, 2015). Of these 1,294 channels, 165 were government-run, with the remaining 1,129 being 156

private. The report notes there are 758 Arab corporations currently broadcasting or rebroadcasting channels via satellite. In terms of stations with specialised formats, 170 aired sports, 152 aired drama series and movies, 124 focused on music and variety, and 95 had a religious focus.

According to the report, there are 68 full-time news channels, while just

26 channels reported youth or children’s formats. The vast majority of channels broadcast in Arabic and Arabic dialects, with English a distant second, with 161 channels. Other languages include French (25), Urdu

(19), Kurdish (9), Persian (4), and Hebrew (2).

Satellite broadcasting helped to overcome the most significant communication barrier facing Arab television: that of circumventing government censorship (El-Nawadi and Iskandar, 2002). The Middle

East’s experience with non-governmental television came mostly via satellite television. A new style of reporting emerged offering alternative takes on political events to those dominated by the government perspective.

A real and notable change was seen in the news. It was presented to the

Arab audiences by Arab reporters and, for the first time, not filtered through government censors or framed by a foreign lens. Finally, Arab viewers were able to witness the suffering of Palestinians directly.

Spokespersons for the Palestinians appear regularly on the satellite 157

channels expressing their thoughts freely, and relaying their opinions to other Arabs and to Muslims throughout the world.

Pan-Arab broadcasting means the focus is now on regional issues and international responses. A more balanced reporting style helped create diverse opinions amongst audiences, news analysis and talk shows were able to discuss issues freely, and viewers were able to voice their opinions on crucial issues freely on air with less government censorship (Kraidy,

2002).

Two events triggered the establishment of satellite television in the Arab world: firstly, the presence of CNN operations in the region and secondly, the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (Mowlana, 1997). During the Gulf crisis of 1990-91, Arab viewers had access to the international CNN television channel that was not available before. The US-led operation “Desert

Storm” introduced an ideal climate to begin satellite operations in the

Middle East. Arab audiences began to pick up CNN and BBC news satellite broadcasting, fueling further the demand for satellite broadcasts of their own.

In the mid 1990s, four prominent channels emerged: Al-Jazeera, Al-

Manar, Abu Dhabi TV and LBC-Al-Hayat, which together covered as much as 70-80 percent of the entire Arab region. Al-Manar and LBC-Al-Hayat 158

are privately owned, while Al-Jazeera and Abu Dhabi TV receive government support. Nevertheless, despite their political dependence, Al-

Jazeera and Abu Dhabi enjoyed broad editorial freedom (Sharabi, 2003).

In 2014, the top three news channels were Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya and Al-

Manar.

These news channels have revolutionised the Middle East, and regions beyond. Their operations broadcast throughout Europe, the United States and Asia, with the exception of Al-Manar, which does not broadcast in the

West due to the perception that it is anti-Israeli. These channels are the most watched in the region and are considered, by most to closely represent and reflect Arab mainstream media.

Egypt, Lebanon and the Gulf States have continued to lead the development of Arab television. Arab Information Ministers have articulated the importance of satellite television, highlighting the principles and goals of the medium. They have asserted television is a unique medium, able to assist the integration of various social and cultural activities undertaken by the Arab League (Arab League Online,

2012).

According to the Transnational Broadcasting Studies journal, Middle

Eastern and North African (MENA) countries have now developed 159

integrated satellite markets. Drawing on the common language, the relative wealth and the work of the more liberally-minded governments in the region, the economic and social ties that consolidate Pan-Arabism have been further promoted through a few outstanding private terrestrial broadcasters in conjunction with the vast satellite network.

This unique factor underlines effects of globalisation on social, economic and cultural settings and the role media plays within global movements.

Arab governments increasingly consider satellites to be a major driving force for modernisation.

The Arab League has started sponsoring television media through economic incentives that urge the acquisition, adoption and expansion of national media systems. Nevertheless, such initiatives are not able to reshape Arab media in its entirety. Instead of all Arab countries using television media to promote greater unity, each country is instead continuing to push its own political views and aspirations. Television has become a battleground for diverse political interests. While media tycoons dominate the regional satellite network, Saudi Arabia and most of its royal family members are the major stakeholders in MBC, ART, Al-Arabia and

Orbit network. The goal of these networks is to advocate Saudi policy, creating some tensions within regional politics. 160

In the Middle East, Saudi Arabia is the economic leader of the Arab world, and a key player in media, owning large satellite communications businesses and supplying a range of communication ventures in the region since the late 1980s (Amin, H., 2002). Saudi tycoons are venture capitalists and key satellite distributors in the region. Egypt has long history of film and TV production and has an integrated television industry including a satellite platform, satellite television channels and an advanced capacity for content production. Market forecasters suggest

Kuwaiti media investment will continue to emerge as a regional satellite and communications force, as Kuwait enjoys a moderate practice of democracy, that will eventually led its market to the forefront in the region.

In 2004, the Kuwaiti Government granted four television licences to private sectors operating from Kuwait. This was an attempt to break the foreign satellite market monopoly and engage in the regional media marketplace.

While these stations operate under private ownership, their operations are very similar to the government channels, in terms of contents and style.

Whilst commercial television may have potentially opened a new financial avenue, it remained subject to the same political influences as the 161

government-run KTV channels.

The development of media in the Arab World has improved recently, as is reflected in the socio-political, economic and cultural characteristics of the media. However, the region’s religious sentiment continues to influence society and politics.

The Islamic faith rejects suppressive regimes in the area, along with

Western imperialism. For this reason, continuous political domination might create future havoc in the region. The region requires a major shift to introduce true democracy, a genuine agreement to the Israeli-

Palestinian conflict, and greater transparency in government, free elections and bipartisanship.

Television battles have emerged as channels push for larger audiences.

The public has developed an appetite for new content, and audiences can now choose between any of the 1,300-plus Arab and foreign satellite channels, where they had previously been limited to government- controlled channels.The recent trend has enabled audiences to become more selective, and subsequently, more difficult to please.

Foreign outlets are pushing for a greater market share, bringing extensive exposure to new political and social ideas to the region. The Iranian, the 162

United States, German, Russian and British decisions to launch Arab language satellite channels to communicate with Arab audiences, s an explicit indication the technology is able to shift the power of human- defined, national borders.

The pan-Arab satellite has begun altering the media landscape, its programming and advertising, and political thinking by conceiving of the

Arab audience as one (Kraidy, 2002). People watching Arab satellite channels are sensing the change toward greater pan-Arab integration, as people throughout the Middle East tune into the same programme at the same time. Arabic channels reach Arab expatriates in Europe, America and elsewhere. Arab satellite broadcasting is helping to preserve the ties between emigrants and their countries of origin.

Arab Satellite Television Channels

The number of television channels swelled in the Arab world over the

2000s and 2010s. Pintak (2007, p.1) made the observation that ‘new television stations, radio stations and websites are sprouting like incongruous electronic mushrooms in what was once a media desert.’ The number of satellite television channels grew from 700 channels in 2010 to

1,000 in 2011, and reached more than 1,320 channels in early 2013, using at least 17 Orbit satellites (ARABSAT, 2015). 163

This sudden increase of satellite television in Arab nations over the last two decades has provided audiences with programming ranging from music videos to news, from reality TV to religious talk shows. The new

Arab satellite television channels have been central to the evolving relationship between Arab television and sociocultural/political transformation.

I provide a general overview of the most watched satellite networks in the region, and categorise those channels in relation to their influence on the

Arab regional public sphere.

It is important to understand the continuing importance television has in the region. Although Arab homes now have multiple interests and various online media to choose from, television continues to be the most consumed domestic medium.

Zenith OptiMedia found that the number of minutes per day watching television in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region continued to significantly exceed time spent on the Internet, accounting for 46 percent of media consumption in 2014 (Austin et. al. 2015, p.8).

It is, however, important to note the viewing habit has shifted in the 164

recent years. It began to change the face of information access, as ICTs present populations with new experiences through mobile phones, and through platforms such as Facebook and Twitter, that transformed the way and speed at which information travels. The new digital services have challenged traditional broadcast and cable TV networks, as viewers are able to watch the news and programs on digital streaming, as well as on

TV.

Audiences in the MENA regions exhibit a distinctive appetite for television.

The region’s constant political apprehension marks television as a significant medium to its followers. Although Middle East conflict is deeply rooted in its history, ironically, most conflicts are interpreted differently, whether by governments or oppositions, who are often legitimising their own action.

Vast shifts in television ownership occurred, most notably from the established traditional media players such as Egypt, Syria and Lebanon to the Gulf States. Within the last decade, oil rich Arab Sates with ample investment power have emulated Western television styles, to form their own hybrid versions. The competition is enormous among the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia, and includes Western channels that have been dubbed for Arab viewers.

165

There is also a marked absence of a specialized, regulatory body governing the broadcast market, meaning the content of these channels is frequently problematic.

Although there are a vast number of private channels operating in the region, in many instances, governments hold large stakes in these nationally private companies. This incorporates a typical marriage in the television industry; a showcase between media, business and politics.

Evidently, mutual ownership controls rhetoric in the satellite sphere.

The major television networks in the Middle East are outlined below, ranked by their popularity. The channels are categorised by highest watched outlet in the region, in addition to local channels in every particular country. Respectively, each network has been ranked by its genre, based on local and regional audience readings.

General Audience Channels:

MBC (Middle East Broadcasting Center)

Most Arabs spend vast amounts of time watching entertainment channels, like MBC, LBC, ART, and some local television channels that broadcast in their particular country (especially during the month of Ramadan, a time 166

that broadcasters program ratings peak). MBC comes in at the top for its popular reality entertainment shows like Arab Idol, The Voice and Arabs

Got Talent, that continue to be incredibly popular. Clearly, MBC has dominated the Arabic channels, with their range of program varieties.

MBC was the first free-to-air satellite network television channel in the region, and remains the largest. MBC is considered the most prestigious

Arab network broadcaster in the region. It offers continuous, 24/7 programing, in Arabic and English languages. Aiming to be broadly reflective of Arab interests, MBC produces a variety of programming developed entirely by the network, including movies, soap operas, social/cultural programmes, news, public affairs, live coverage of local and national elections and community events, sports, science, children's shows and family entertainment.

MBC TV produces programs aimed at the special interests of the Arab-

Western audience. It started operating from London and has moved to

Dubai Media City, to extend its reach throughout the Middle East, Europe,

Africa and South America. MBC is considered as the network watched by the most families in Arab nations.

News Channels

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As noted above, many of the new satellite television channels in the Arab world are supported by governments, even if they are nationally-owned by private companies. Arab and Middle Eastern audiences actively seek political news and analysis, and this has become the key factor for the news genre to expand.

Every country wants their own channel to influence others in the region, and this has influenced news coverage on the respective channels.

Regionally, the Sunni-led Saudi Kingdom is locked in a rivalry with Shia

Iran that is reinforced by mutual mistrust and religious-ideological enmity, and this rivalry between the two countries is being fueled everyday by newscasters. There are two types of broadcast players in the region (Arab, and Foreign operators), which are described in detail below:

Arab satellite TV channels

Al-Arabiya

The Saudi satellite broadcasting company, Middle East Broadcasting

Center Group (MBC), owns Al-Arabiya. Al-Arabiya is a news outlet with great network popularity, covering the entire world with the exception of

South America. Al-Arabiya targets Arab audiences, interested in politics, business, current affairs, finance, sports, science, lifestyle, documentaries, talk shows and social-educational programs. Al-Arabiya 168

airs rapid and detailed hourly news bulletins, along with analytical programs to update Arab audiences on the latest developments in political and economic events. It is the most Arab watched news source in the

Middle East (El Mustapha, 2011, pp. 109-114).

Al-Jazeera

Al-Jazeera is discussed in detail in the next chapter, but it is worth noting that Al-Jazeera has struggled in recent years to maintain its audience rating. One possible reason being that Arab viewers have become increasingly aware of Al-Jazeera’s geopolitical interest; the prompt shifting emerged after the political conflicts in Egypt, Syria, and Yemen with dubious reports, such as its ongoing coverage of the Syrian uprising, compared to denial of the Bahraini uprising. Liberal Arab, moderate

Muslims and Shia Arabs have increasingly seen Al-Jazeera clearly being pro-Wahhabi, as well as being pro-political Islam, and having a strong anti-Iranian, anti-American, anti- West and anti-Shia bias.

Compared to all the other networks, Al-Jazeera seldom broadcasts atrocities committed by the Muslim extremists, such as ultra-conservative religious Wahhabi-Salafi, Al-Qaida, the Muslim Brotherhood and ISIS groups. The networks also never broadcast anything critical of Qatar's ruling family. 169

Al-Jazeera America’s closure this year shows the disappointment level, despite the board announcement that the decision was driven by the fact that their business model is simply not sustainable in light of the economic challenges in the U.S. media marketplace.

Al-Jazeera was considered the most watched Arabic News Channel in the

Middle East, disseminating 24-hour news coverage from around the world. It focuses on the most important news from their perspectives, covering the Arab region and beyond. Popular programmes such as headline news, political talk shows, documentaries, uncensored debates, open arguments and coverage of live events are considered central to its popularity.

Al-Jazeera have had the largest share of the prime time news audience, and was considered the most influential for its followers in the region.

With the establishment of Al-Jazeera English (AJE) in 2006, the station faced the challenge of whether it could promote intercultural dialogue and communication, overcoming the mutual mistrust of U.S. and Arab audiences outlined in the “Clash of Civilizations” framework (Brown &

Youmans, 2012).

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Al-Manar

Hezbullah’s Al-Manar’s popularity became prevalent when the Israel-

Hezbullah conflicts of 2006 galvanised audiences across the Arab world – many of whom switched to Al-Manar from Al-Jazeera and Al-Arabiya – generating widespread support for Hezbullah among all Arabs, Sunnis and

Shia alike.

However, with the arrival of the so-called “Arab Spring”, and with

Hezbullah’s support for Syria’s Assad Government in its fight against rebels/Al-Qaida/ISIS, Arab public opinion turned into criticism of

Hezbullah, Al-Manar and its leader, Hassan Nasrallah.

In December 2015, the Arabsat Satellite Communications Organization, which, by this time, was controlled by the Gulf States, ousted the broadcasting license of Hezbullah-run Al-Manar television channel in an attempt to silence the channel’s voice, and as part of the growing

Sectarian War in the region.

Al-Manar (translated into English as “The Beacon”) is the official television station of Lebanon-based Hezbollah. Al-Manar emerged after years of

Sectarian civil war in Lebanon, to offer a unique rich menu of news, commentary, and political/religious programs. Hezbollah exploited its 171

position in South Lebanon to launch its guerrilla war to end the Israeli occupation. Therefore, the station is viewed as a “station of resistance”, and has become a flagship for freedom fighters that resist occupation and dismiss Western imperialism.

Foreign Channels

Historically, citizens living in the Middle East had to rely on foreign-based,

Arab-language, shortwave radio broadcasts — such as the Voice of

America, Radio Monte Carlo, and BBC World Service Arabic Radio – to receive a steady flow of a foreign view of events. This meant that until recently, large sections of the Arab population were reliant upon foreign sources of news, due to heavily censored Arab news channels.

Today, foreign-based, Arab-language channels have a significant impact on the region’s broadcasting landscape. Governments in many parts of the world have sought political, and cultural engagement with Arab populations. The emergence of global telecommunications technology brought dramatic changes in broadcasting experience, and today, vast foreign outlets compete with each other for audience share.

BBC Arabic

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The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) launched its Arabic-language news channel in March 2008. Funded by a levy on British television and radio users through a licence fee, it is seen as providing transparent and impartial news targeting large Arab viewers in addressing global issues.

The BBC estimates that the audience for BBC Arabic was about 36.2 million in 2015 (Chisholm, 2015), as part of an audience of 265 million globally. (BBC, 2015). The channel holds the largest increase recorded, due to its popularity in news sources, its credibility, perceived impartiality and objectivity.

RT Arabic

RT (originally Russia Today) is a Russian government-funded network that runs cable and satellite television channels to audiences inside and outside of Russia. RT Arabic, RT’s Arabic-language news channel, has a significant daily audience in MENA countries, particularly Egypt, Morocco,

Saudi Arabia, Jordan, UAE and Iraq, where it is claimed RT Arabic is watched by 6.7 million viewers every day (RT, 2015).

RT has provided Arab viewers in the region with the Russian point-of-view through live broadcasts of official Russian discourse, presenting its political outlook. RT is unique in the region, and has adopted a motto to 173

affirm that “Russia is an old Arab nation’s friend”. The channel provides an opportunity for Western and Arab officials, as well as the Russian

Government, to present their point-of-view in the region.

Religious Channels

With the arrival of the Arab Spring in 2011, a new wave of Sectarian conflicts in Arab nations were linked to the arrival of new satellite channels. The fact that a large number of these new channels are religious in nature raises the question of whether governments in Middle

East use religion as a weapon to incite Sectarian violence in the area.

Unfortunately, these regimes employ media for political gains.

Arab governments are large investors in religious satellite channels, despite the fact they are not economically-driven, but political/ideological in nature. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and Iran are the main financial guarantors for religious movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Wahhabi and the Shi’ite groups.

In this context, the Sectarian conflict began raging in the Arab region, religious parties involved in the conflict nourish fighting, and the result becomes disastrous for Arab communities, disregarding that war despairs millions of lives. 174

Religious TV channels are on the rise across the Middle East. The number of religious television broadcasters across the Middle East has risen by 50 percent, reflecting a rise in Sectarianism in the region.

According to a study of media industry published by the Northwestern

University in Qatar, the number of religious free-to-air channels had jumped to 75 in 2014, from 50 years earlier (AFP, 2016). Sunni television channels remain by far the highest in number, and increased to 55 from

43, three years previously.

The rate of growth in religious programming is huge in the MENA regions, where Sunni Islam is the dominant religion. Growth has been even higher for Shi’ite and Christian broadcasters. Eleven Shi’ite channels are now broadcasting in the region, up from five in 2011, while the number of

Christian stations has risen to nine from two, over the same period.

Sports Channels

The final set of channels to consider are sports channels. In most instances, these have been available on a free-to-air basis, but the emergence of the beIN sports channel puts an end to free access to many sports events. The beIn Sports Network is a subsidiary of Al-Jazeera 175

Sport, which is based in France, and consists of a number of channels that cover major sports events around the world. beIN launched its first channel on June 1, 2012, with UEFA competitions and in July kicks off the

Olympic Games in Europe. beIN is part of Qatar Sports Group’s quest to expand in the field of international sports media, covering Middle East,

Asia, Europe, America, Africa and other parts of the world. The brand symbolises the giant sport network, through direct and exclusive sporting events around the world.

Transnational Satellite Broadcasting and an Arab Public Sphere

It was noted in Chapter Two that one of the most important concepts in media and communication studies is the public sphere. Developed in a philosophical context by Jürgen Habermas, the public sphere refers to ‘the communicative institutions of a society, through which facts and opinions circulate, and by means of which a common stock of knowledge is built up as the basis for collective political action’ (McNair, 2006 p.136). Brian

McNair (2006 pp.137-40) has argued, the structural conditions for the media to perform its functions as part of an open and democratic public sphere are:

1. Accessibility: information must be readily available to all citizens, in

forms they can access and interpret. This means, the overall level of 176

literacy in a society is important, but also the cost of technologies

used to access content, and the openness of the media system to new

entrants and diverse points of view;

2. Independence: media must have a degree of structural independence

from governments, but also from dominant commercial interests;

3. Influence: media should have the capacity to influence political

decision-making, by enabling the formation and expression of public

opinion, and thus collective pressure or action on government.

McNair noted that a functioning public sphere “does not imply or require the existence of fully-fledged democracy” (McNair, 2006 p.139). The bourgeois public spheres of 17th and 18th century Europe emerged in the context of absolutist states, although they played a central role in democratising the societies they were a part of, most notably Britain and

France. A well-functioning public sphere will, however, strengthen democratic forces in a society, and democratic rule, with its associated checks and balances on the executive power of political leaders, will provide necessary safeguards to the media to better perform public sphere-function.

As we have discussed in this thesis, Arab Television, for the most part has 177

failed to fulfill these public sphere functions. There was a wide adoption of television. And, national broadcasting systems played some role in advancing the literacy and awareness of national populations, as part of the general nation-building function of development communication

(Mowlana, 1997).

But strong government control over these broadcasters, in terms of their internal organisation and the content they produced, prevented them from being an active participant in the public sphere. Indeed, in periods of collective action by citizens to try and change government policies, the state-run media could generally be relied upon to support the government, and denigrate the activists for change. This was not inevitably a function of government ownership. Successful public broadcasters in other parts of the world, such as the BBC in Great Britain,

NHK in Japan, and the ABC in Australia, have been able to perform critical functions while being government funded. Rather, it reflected a strong government censorship culture, and the reluctance of broadcasters to take a stand to criticise their national governments.

Arab Satellite Broadcasting opened up new possibilities for dialogue, critical scrutiny of government policies, and freedom of expression. It enhanced the public sphere by providing citizens with alternatives to the state-run media. Lynch (2006), noted there was a new momentum to the 178

television coverage of elections, with the satellite channels being more inclined to pay attention to opposition parties, to promote democracy, and not be the mouthpieces of government. While access to satellite channels is restricted by income, and hence these channels are unavailable to many poorer citizens and in some rural areas, they nonetheless attracted enough audiences to begin to influence public opinion. This influence could be felt within countries in the Arab world, and on Arab politics, society and culture more generally.

The idea of an independent Arab perspective on world events, a long-held dream of pan-Arab nationalists, began to re-emerge as distinct possibility.

The rise of Arab Satellite Broadcasting has featured prominently in debates about transnational satellite broadcasting and a global public sphere.

Ingrid Volkmer (2003, 2014) has given Al-Jazeera a central role in promoting what she terms the “transnationalisation of ‘national’ public spheres” (Volkmer, 2014 p.25). For Volkmer, there are two key roles satellite broadcasters such as Al-Jazeera play in this regard. First, it promotes what Volkmer (2014 p.26) calls “intra-societal deliberation”, where national political debates can be engaged with by those from outside the nation-state, such as expatriates and diasporic populations, 179

(or indeed the Arabic-speaking world more generally in the case of Al-

Jazeera). Given that diasporic populations make up almost 70% of the

Kuwaiti population, and their relationship to Kuwaiti culture and society is a highly attenuated one, Volkmer’s concept is highly revant to the Kuwaiti case.

Second, they are connecting agents, where populations from throughout the world can get information, opinion and critical reflection, on not only events in the Middle East, but also global events from a Middle Eastern perspective. It is in this second respect that Al-Jazeera occupies a somewhat different position to the other Arabic satellite channels, in that it broadcasts in multiple languages.

This places it closer to the top tier of global satellite broadcasting services, such as BBC World, CNN International, CCTV, Russia Today,

Deutsche Welle and France 24, whereas, other satellite broadcasters are largely confined to the Middle East territorially and Arabic speakers linguistically.

Manuel Castells (2010, 2012) is another author who has written about a global public sphere. Arguing that the tasks of the nation-state become more difficult and the crises of national institutions of governance become more severe in what he terms the ”Global Network Society” Castells 180

identifies a growing role for non-governmental actors that operate transnationally. Global media are significant here, as they are influential public actors in their own right, and the platforms that others use to influence public opinion on a transnational scale, as “the globalisation of communication leads to the globalisation of media politics” (Castells, 2010 p.41).

As a result, we sit uncertainly between national and transnational public spheres, as “there is a shift from a public sphere anchored around the national institutions of territorially-bound societies to a public sphere constituted around the media system” (Castells, 2010 p.44). But this begs the question, “who governs the global media”?

In the national public sphere, the relationship between media and politics was seen as dialogical: the media could influence and shape the political sphere, but the political agencies of the nation-state could regulate and govern the media.

In the absence of some form of generally recognised institutions and norms of transnational governance, this points to an unresolved tension in the current world system.

Others have been critical of the idea of a global public sphere. Sparks 181

(2007) argues the proposition is based on the false premise that globalisation means the power and influence of nation-states is withering away. He argues that, while the relative power of nation-states clearly differs around the world, the most powerful nation-states retain considerable influence over their media systems, and indeed over satellite broadcasting.

As we will note in the next chapter, Al-Jazeera has frequently had its service cut off by national government, and it can often be difficult to access BBC World in China, as the Chinese Government is sensitive to what it perceives to be an overly critical view of its government.

More generally, the issue of the size of the audience for these services remains a critical one: they are sometimes perceived as being ‘hotel room television’, viewed by international travellers in the Hilton or equivalent, but with otherwise relatively limited local reach.

Cottle and Rai (2008) point out that we need to consider how different satellite broadcasting services cover news events to get a sense of their contribution to democratic discourse and the public sphere. They argue that, in these debates, insufficient attention has been paid to ‘how the news media … organise and present conflicts, in terms of the contending arguments and perspectives in play’ (Cottle & Rai, 2008 p.159). 182

They may be more prepared to do investigative reporting, or to give more space to critical and oppositional voices, than government controlled channels do. This has been an important part of the appeal of satellite broadcasting in the Arab world. They may, however, trivialise and sensationalise news from other countries, viewing it either through an entertainment frame, or through the prism of the national interests of their own governments.

Many satellite news channels around the world are government supported, and this generates its own tensions. The relationship of Al-

Jazeera to the Qatari Government is a case in point, as I will discuss in the next chapter.

Conclusion: Arab Media and its Environment

The Arab media lacks controlling professionalism and ethics, which are sometimes collapsed under the idea of democracy. This weakness is due to the lack of professional scrutiny that governs modern Arab media, and television, in particular. Arab media stands out, because local television media is less trusted than print media in terms of credibility.

The speed of news, which is characterised by the pursuit of live television 183

events may only offer surface content, while lacking objectivity. However, this criticism of Arab media is not to suggest we should leave it to governments to develop mechanisms through which to control the media.

Professionalism must come from within the media itself. If a professional workforce is equipped with a large margin for open and free reportage, the media will be able to develop appropriate mechanisms for their work.

Media organisations face many hurdles in overcoming the limits to free speech that have existed for many years. Some of these problems require retraining workers in this sector, and developing a professional code of ethics. However, in the absence of democracy, Arab media serves as a viable alternative. A public sphere that averts the unrestricted rotation of power would end the authoritarian control of the media, and enable greater freedom of expression.

Despite new developments in Arab media, the concept of democracy is not yet fully understood, and instead, the authoritarian structure of state to manipulate the facts on regional and international level remains. In the

Gulf States, media has emerged without the capacity for freedom, because competition occurs between political dynasties, commercial interests and regional politics that have invested in the media. This kind of pluralism and mobility has been substituted for democracy and political achievement. 184

A government that seeks to promote its rhetoric through propaganda, will find it costs them profoundly in the end, as it will not be able to sustain such methods, as the truth always emerges. Exhaustive propaganda campaigns will not find audiences willing to watch and follow its programs continuously. The advantages ICTs bring to Arab media are insignificant without radical reform and further comprehensive policy shifts.

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CHAPTER SIX

CASE STUDY: AL-JAZEERA

Introduction: Al-Jazeera and the World

Of all developments in broadcast media in the Middle East since the

1990s, the one that has most caught global attention is the rise of Al-

Jazeera. The Qatari-based media service, launched as a news and current affairs satellite channel in 1996, has been considered central to what Marc

Lynch (2006 p.3) has termed “the structural transformation of the Arab public sphere”.

New York Times columnist, Thomas Friedman famously described Al-

Jazeera in 2001 as “not only the biggest media phenomenon to hit the

Arab world since the advent of television; it is also the biggest political phenomenon” (Friedman, 2001). Daya Thussu has described Al-Jazeera as “a prominent example of contraflow in global media products” (Thussu,

2006 p.190), while Brian McNair (2006, p.111) identified it as “the first locally-produced Arab-language real-time news channel with transnational reach and global influence”. In Understanding Global Media, Terry Flew 186

observed that:

Al-Jazeera has come to fill not only a media void in the Middle East,

through its lack of censorship and willingness to address

controversial issues … [but] has also been filling a political void, as

an outlet for dissenting and oppositional voices in a region where

tolerance of political opposition is in most countries highly limited

(Flew, 2007, p.183).

This chapter will critically assess the contribution of Al-Jazeera to a more open and democratic Arab public sphere, as the leading international example of satellite broadcasting from the Arab world that has a transnational reach. In doing so, I aim to assess how important Al-

Jazeera is in Arab nations, and how it influences wider media discourses in the region. I also will consider how Al-Jazeera’s news and current affairs broadcasting has played a role in forming Arab public opinion, and the dominant political discourses in the Middle East region.

I will examine the conception and the function of Al-Jazeera in the context of the ‘Arab Spring’ and its continuing role in shaping politics and culture in the Middle East.

As the media has been very important to the political revolutions of 2011- 187

12 that we have come to call the ‘Arab Spring’, among other social, political and economic factors, Al-Jazeera has played a pivotal role in shaping pan-Arab public opinion, especially in light of the absence of other media free of government influence, and strong civil society institutions. At the same time, both its role and the question of its independence from the Qatari monarchy, have been increasingly questioned, particularly in light of the rise of the Islamic State movement

(ISIS) and radical Wahaabism sponsored by Saudi Arabia, but tacitly endorsed by the Qatari government.

I was a strong advocate of Al-Jazeera and Arab transnational news channels in their early operations. However, my perception of Al-Jazeera adversely shifted in recent years, due to the channel’s perceived ideological swing. It is imperative to highlight the ethical aspects of media reporting, as I strongly believe the power of the media penetrates into the lives of individuals, forming a moral struggle.

It would be advantageous to identify the size of Al-Jazeera’s influence in light of forming Arab public opinions, and its potential to positively influence social, culture, and political actors in the region. It arguably played this role in its first decades of operations, in the late 1990s and the 2000s. Through its relative independence from direct government control, the channel was able to challenge governments in the Arab world 188

in new ways, as it was less inhibited by state censorship than the official national channels.

But as I will indicate below, questions now exist about whether it is serving as a force of openness and dialogue in the region, or being associated with extremist movements and ideologies.

Consideration of Al-Jazeera’s trajectory from the 1990s to the present, has considerable implications for debates around media reform in Kuwait.

It has been the most influential of the many Arabic-language satellite TV channels that emerged in the Middle East after the First Gulf War, and many Kuwaitis turned away from their local services towards the likes of

Al-Jazeera.

As noted above, it has also been seen by global media analysts as constituting a beacon of hope in the Arab world, and projecting an image of dynamics and professionalism from Arab media to audiences around the world, particularly through its English-language service.

It also appeared to have combined the “Holy Grail” of public service broadcasting: a service that can be supported by government funding, and is hence not completely dependent upon commercial advertising, but which can maintain a degree of structural independence from the 189

government of the day, as quality public service broadcasters such as the

BBC in the UK and NHK in Japan have been able to do.

The question of whether such radical utopian hopes that were attached to

Al-Jazeera have been realised, or whether it has been overtaken by political sectarianism sponsored by its funders, makes it an important case study to be considered closely in any recommendations to be made abut the future of Kuwait Television.

Al-Jazeera’s Background and History

Al-Jazeera commenced broadcasting as a satellite television service in

November 1996, and became a 24-hour news and current affairs channel on 1 January, 1999. During the First Gulf War, and the popularity of CNN in the Arab world during that period, had demonstrated a large, unmet demand for satellite broadcasting of news unfiltered by governments, and the potential for a local service that was less pro-American than CNN.

The first major move towards establishing such a service was the BBC’s

Arabic language channel, established through a contract signed in 1994, between the Rome-based but Saudi-owned Orbit Radio and Television

Service and the Arabic TV division of the BBC News Service. While this 190

was intended to be the region’s largest satellite news service, the contract was abruptly terminated in 1996, amidst Saudi discontent with the new network’s content, which included reports on executions and interviews with dissidents in Saudi Arabia (El-Nawadi and Iskandar, 2002).

In light of this closure, Al-Jazeera executives who were seeking media professionals for their fledgling service, quickly hired the staff formerly employed by the BBC Arabic News Service and relocated them to Doha to develop Al-Jazeera.

The second factor promoting the rise of Al-Jazeera, was shifting power relations in the Gulf State of Qatar. Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifi Al-Thani gained power from his father and became the Emir of Qatar, in a bloodless coup in 1995. Sheikh Hamad promoted a modernising agenda for Qatar, including parliamentary elections, giving women the right to vote, and lifting government censorship and controls over the flow of information.

As a key part of this agenda, Sheikh Hamad provided financial support to

Al-Jazeera in the form of a loan of QAR 500 million ($US137 million), to sustain the new service through its first five years of operation, and the

Qatari Government is a shareholder in Al-Jazeera. As it is funded through loans or grants, rather than direct government subsidies, the channel 191

claims to maintain independent editorial policy, and to operate as an independent network, free of government control.

At the time of Al-Jazeera’s launch in the mid-1990s, the popularity of satellite broadcasting remained, but CNN was losing its grip on the growing satellite market, while the BBC was winding back its services due to increasing costs (Jaber & Bauman, 2011). Al-Jazeera became one of a number of new pan-Arab media services to become popular, alongside the

Arabic ‘Alsharq Alawsat’ (The Middle East) newspaper, which became more popular as a pan-Arab news media service as it went online.

Al-Jazeera’s capacity to finance its operations through the financial support of the Qatari Government, meant it was less reliant upon advertising revenues than its competitors.

There is no doubt the launch of Al-Jazeera was a very significant moment in Middle East television history. Al-Jazeera’s inception has challenged the viewer’s consciousness in the Arab world, by exposing diverse social and political concerns throughout the region.

The new network enabled the concept of ‘Arab public opinion’ to take a concrete form, and promoted a long-held goal of pan-Arab broadcasting, not constrained by the artificial boundaries of national governments and 192

nation-states. Al-Jazeera quickly became the most prominent media outlet transmitted from the Middle East, and it was estimated to have a nightly audience of about 35 million by 2000, surpassing the Saudi

Arabia-sponsored Middle East Broadcasting Centre (MBC) and London's

Arab News Network (ANN) as the largest satellite broadcaster in the

Middle East (El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2002 p.74).

Its exclusive media coverage transformed the Arab world, and it repeatedly “scooped” the traditional government outlets in breaking stories and opening up new debates. Al-Jazeera dominated the Arab public space, and influenced collective Arab views of television and how it could broker new relationships between the citizenry and governments.

In the 2000s, Al-Jazeera expanded its operations to reach global audiences. It was considered to be the first Arab media outlet to go beyond its natural boundaries, and first outlet to operate out of the “Third

World” or the “Global South”, that was able to play an important role in regional and international politics. Al-Jazeera successfully challenged international newsmakers, marking a critical element of what Thussu

(2006) termed ‘contraflow’ in global news, where the information flows were from the "Third World" to "First World" (Mikhlafi, 2009; Al-

Khazendar & Ali, 2013).

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It launched an English-language website in 2003, and launched the

English-language Al-Jazeera International service in November 2006.

Nigel Parsons, Al-Jazeera’s International Managing Director, commented that the launch of Al-Jazeera International would “offer viewers around the world independent news broadcasts. It will cover all sides of the story, from all parts of the world” (quoted in Vallely, 2005).

Its stable of presenters included internationally famous presenters, such as British television journalist Sir David Frost and former CNN news anchor, Riz Khan. Proof of Al-Jazeera’s growing international significance in building a strong global brand, could be seen in its position as the fifth most influential global brand in 2005, alongside such global behemoths as

Apple and Google (Vallely, 2005).

In 2013, it purchased the U.S. service Current TV (partly owned by former U.S. Vice-President Al Gore) for the very high price of $US500 million, and commenced the Al-Jazeera America service in November

2013.

Financed by one of the wealthiest countries in the world, Al-Jazeera quickly established itself as the primary news channel in the Arab/Islamic world, covering issues not typically dealt with on Arab media. Al-Jazeera’s sudden influx shaped the media discourses of the Arab world in collective 194

ways.

The story of Al-Jazeera is not just the story of any news organisation. The station’s slogan ‘This is Al-Jazeera Television from Qatar’ is heard every day by millions of viewers worldwide – words that have put Qatar on the world news map (El-Nawawy & Iskander, 2002).

The station operates from Qatar, one of the hottest and most inhospitable parts of the world, with a temperature of 50°C and a population of 2.1 million. Qatar shares many similar attributes with its neighbouring Gulf

States; at the same time, the existence of the Al-Jazeera television channel established an important point of difference between Qatar and other Arab Gulf States in the region.

The need for political reform to promote democracy was widely felt in the

Arab world. For example, a 2002 poll conducted by U.S. pollster James

Zogby, head of the Arab-American Institute, found that 90 and 96 percent of respondents respectively rated “civil and personal rights” and “political democracy” as their highest priorities (Gause, 2005).

A more recent study by Al-Khasendar and Ali (2013) identified high perceptions of Al-Jazeera’s objectivity and professionalism among a survey of over 600 Media and Political Science professors. It is also 195

interesting to note, those surveyed found that its levels of professionalism were higher than those perceiving it to have a high level of objectivity:

78.4 percent saw it as highly professional, as compared to 36.4 percent, who saw Al-Jazeera as being highly objective (Al-Khasendar and Ali, 2013 p.75).

Both secular and Islamist media and non-governmental organisations had become a part of efforts to open up discussion about the urgent need for change. It was in this context that the Al-Jazeera Network rose to prominence. It appealed to long-dormant dreams of pan-Arab unity, while sharing many aspirations with the West, such as being consistently critical of Arab regimes that reject democratisation (Zayani, 2005).

Al-Jazeera raised two central political exercises that enhanced its objectivity. Firstly, it opened the door to greater dialogue between East and West, including promoting Western democracy and freedom of expression in the region. Secondly, Al-Jazeera news coverage established a sense of contrast and balance of opinions between the East and West.

Al-Jazeera promoted critical political voices in the Middle East, providing a stage for those for whom there had not been equivalent previous media outlets for the voicing of opposing views. It provided a high-profile platform for political dissidents, of whom many lived abroad or are in exile 196

from authoritarian governments (Zayani, 2005). Al-Jazeera challenged a prevailing media culture of complacent interviews of government public officials that had previously dominated the Arab airwaves. It delivered intense political talk shows and provocative news coverage, focusing on a number of issues that governments in the Middle East had typically avoided having broadcast on their own national media channels.

The network emulated the ‘CNN’ Western style of broadcasting, which was appealing to Arab audiences at that time. At the same time, the channel modified its presentation to meet Arab cultural attributes. Its commitment to promote, protect and support Arab issues has endorsed its accountability. The channel’s discussions about the importance of Arab unity helped to animate the latent sentiment of a pan-Arab political culture.

Al-Jazeera played a leading role in creating new public discourses that shaped the transformation of the Middle Eastern political landscape

(Wadah, 2004). Al-Jazeera news was internationally recognized for its journalistic integrity, professionalism, commitment to freedom of expression, and diversity, and the channel has transformed itself from regional news reporter into an international newsmaker (Armbrust, 2006).

The popularity of Al-Jazeera can be demonstrated in several ways. To 197

take one example, a survey was conducted by Zogby International, for the annual Arab Public Opinion Survey during April-May 2009, in four

Arab countries: Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates

(Telhami, 2009).

The result showed 55 percent of the audience nominated Al-Jazeera as the most watched channel in the Middle East. Following Al-Jazeera were

Al-Arabya with 14 percent, MBC and Al-Manar each with 10 percent, Abu

Dhabi with seven percent and LBC with four percent.

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Figure 6.1: International news in the Middle East – preferred satellite channels, 2009

Satellite TV channel

Al-Jazeera 55 percent

Al-Arabiya 14 percent

MBC 10 percent

Al-Manar 10 percent

Abu Dhabi TV 7 percent

LBC 4 percent

Source: Telhami, 2009.

Al-Jazeera and the West

Al-Jazeera came to prominence beyond the Middle East region during and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq and the Second Gulf War. Its news stories were frequently quoted by international news organisations such as the

BBC, CNN, CNBC, and Sky News channels, and its footage was frequently used in the international overage of stories from Iraq and Afghanistan. 199

For its supporters, Al-Jazeera was seen as a channel dedicated to the promotion of news values associated with objective and unbiased reporting, promoting dialogue between people and governments, and supporting the right to acquire information and strengthen the values of tolerance, democracy, and the respect of liberties and human rights

(Amin, 2002).

In 1999, Al-Jazeera received the IBN Rushd Fund for Freedom of Thought in Berlin for its contribution to media and journalism, and in 2003 received an award from Index on Censorship for its contribution to the free exchange of information in the Arab world and actions against government censorship.

Its critics in the West, however, saw it as a propaganda outlet, that was anti-American and gave voice to organisations they saw as terrorist, such as al-Queda. Critics, such as former U.S. Defense Secretary, Donald

Rumsfeld referred to Al-Jazeera’s coverage of the U.S.-led wars in

Afghanistan and Iraq as ‘inaccurate and inexcusable’, and U.S. missile strikes hit the Al-Jazeera news bureaus in Kabul in 2001, and Baghdad in

2003, although the U.S. claims, in both instances, that these were accidents.

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The objective of Al-Jazeera International was to provide international audiences with better and more accurate representations of Arab and

Muslim values, culture, and history: a prospect that opens a new door for new West and East relationships. MacLeod and Walt (2005) argued that since the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003, Al-Jazeera had toned down its anti-US rhetoric.

An unofficial boycott, led by Saudi Arabia and followed by other Arab states, had an impact on the station’s finances. Arab governments closed many of Al-Jazeera’s offices, due to its criticism of the regimes. The live- to-air program The Opposite Direction, hosted by academic Fasial Al-

Kassim, which has brought together opposing views around controversial issues, has come, on occasions to, resemble a battleground.

The presenter raises provocative questions for discussion, allows viewers to call in and raise difficult questions to guests, and has become very popular (El-Nawawy and Iskandar, 2002).

The uncontrolled talk shows instigated controversial discussion, popular talk show, ‘The Opinion and The Counter Opinion’ angered numerous monarchies in the region, due to its use of provoking language. Some described the channel as anti-Arab, anti-Jewish, and anti-American. The program stirred Arab society into a frenzy, by allowing viewers to express 201

their feelings in a manner seen by many as negative. Recently, the prime- time talk show ‘Minbar Al-Jazeera’ opened discussions that allow Arabs from all over the world to talk without scripts, rules or filters (Lynch,

2005).

In a review essay for the prestigious U.S. publication Foreign Policy, written in the context of the Second Gulf War, Hugh Miles (2006) addressed a number of perceptions about Al-Jazeera in the West:

1. Al-Jazeera supports terrorism: Miles makes the point that while Al-

Jazeera has broadcast interviews with figures such as Osama bin

Laden, it did so not to endorse their views, but to present all points of

view on conflicts.

2. Al-Jazeera is anti-Semitic: On the contrary, Miles argues that Al-

Jazeera was the first Arab channel to broadcast the direct statements

of Israeli officials, again in the interests of media pluralism.

3. Al-Jazeera is spreading political freedom: This is a complex issue, since

it raises the question of the distinction between promoting greater free

speech, which Al-Jazeera is seen as being an important part of, and

promoting political change. The question of the network’s relationship

to the Qatari Government has also become more pressing in the 202

increasingly volatile environment of the Middle East in the 2010s and

with the rise of ISIS.

4. Al-Jazeera is biased: Miles acknowledges there is some basis to this

claim, but argues it needs to be considered in the context of the biases

of other satellite broadcasting networks such as FOX News and CNN.

He argues:

This bias in no way invalidates the network’s news. Knowing it is

scrutinised more rigorously than any other news channel in the

world, Al-Jazeera is fastidious in presenting all sides of a story.

Certainly compared to most other Arab news stations, Al-Jazeera

remains a model of professionalism and objectivity (Miles, 2006,

p.23).

5. Al-Jazeera is censored: Miles argues that it was freer than other Arab

news services, but acknowledged the relationship with the Qatari

Royal Family remained a troubling one.

British journalist, Robert Fisk defines the relationship between Al-Jazeera and the West media in a remarkable way, observing that when the Al-

Jazeera first broadcast across the Arab world, the Americans called it a symbol of freedom amid the dictatorships of the Middle East (Fisk, 2005). 203

Also, New York Times columnist, Thomas Friedman praised Al-Jazeera, calling it as a beacon of freedom. Likewise, United States officials have described the station’s success as proof that Arabs want freedom of speech. However, when Al-Jazeera began broadcasting, statements from

Osama bin Laden, and the tune of the State Department changed.

In 2003, the United States Deputy Defence Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz, claimed Al-Jazeera was ‘endangering the lives of American troops’, and

Donald Rumsfeld told the media the channel was cooperating with Iraqi insurgents. No media outlets around the world have perfect journalistic integrity, however, and these negative comments reflect the attitudes driven by Western interests.

America’s view of Al-Jazeera changed in the aftermath of September 11, when American officials expressed anger over the station's negative coverage. U.S. officials stopped appearing on Al-Jazeera shows, losing the opportunity to talk directly to Arab audiences.

The Bush administration frequently accused Al-Jazeera of provoking the

Arab public against coalition forces, by airing bad images of the United

States. The Bush administration went beyond criticism, when Allied Forces bombed Al-Jazeera offices in Bagdad and Afghanistan. These actions are 204

examples of American hypocrisy; America claims to be the nation which stands for democracy, while its first response to the situation was to abuse the freedom of the press (Miles, 2005).

Fuad Ajami, the Director of the Program in Middle East Studies, published an article critical of Al-Jazeera in The New York Times Magazine, shortly after the events of 11 September 2001, criticising Al-Jazeera for not promoting Arab civil society. He called Al-Jazeera an irresponsible promoter of hatred and a Jihadist. This turned the channel into a public enemy, rather than a public utility.

The US Government worked hard to access regional media to establish public diplomacy. They launched an Arabic satellite television station called Al-Hurra, delivering an American standpoint to the region. Al-Hurra commenced its operation in 2004, to become the first Arabic channel run by foreign ownership in the region (El Mustapha, 2011, 94-108).

The United States was pleased to speak to Arab people directly, but the station failed to impress many Arab audiences. The channel’s rhetoric smelled propaganda, particularly when Arab audiences acknowledged the

U.S. government is behind the operations. The channel made little impact on Arab public opinion; it failed to reflect the reality on the ground.

205

Lieutenant-Colonel Josh Rushing, the American Media Liaison during

‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’, favourably compared Al-Jazeera’s approach to news to that of the U.S.-based Fox News, highlighting the bias of Fox. The news information from East/West are examined in the documentary

Control Room (2004). The documentary showed these two media representing a particular political ideology, with Fox’s coverage of the

United States military operation depicting heart-warming stories, whereas

Al-Jazeera’s coverage highlighted Iraqi suffering.

Both stations present a different ideological interpretation of the same circumstances. Fox News represented the ideological perspective of

American Conservative Hardliners, whereas Al-Jazeera news represented the Arab mainstream. Both Fox and Al-Jazeera news demonstrated opposing views.

Al-Jazeera’s constant attempt to meet Arab public solidarity regardless of the circumstances, shows in the event of the fall of Baghdad, Al-Jazeera staff were distressed as to the situation, stating, ‘No National Guard or people were fighting back against the Americans’ (Jehane, 2004: Al-

Jazeera Documentary). This indicates that Al-Jazeera is advocating for

Arab solidarity, even during the worst scenarios. Surprisingly, Al-Jazeera has been criticised for promoting the wrong political view and ignoring the need for change. 206

Al-Jazeera and the Changing Arab Socio-Political Landscape

In the aftermath of the 1990-91 First Gulf War, there was an intensification of international engagement with the Middle East region.

The United States and its European allies became more interested in the reform of Middle East, domestic politics, and civil society, as a major priority in their foreign policy agenda.

There was also growing advocacy of socio-political reform among Arabs themselves, particularly among moderate Islamist/secular voices who saw greater secularisation of the region, openness to public debate, and reform of political systems.

The Arab Human Development Reports, undertaken through the United

Nations Development Program (UNDP), have painted a bleak picture of the state of political freedom in the Arab world. The first Arab Human

Development Report, Creating Opportunities for Future Generations, was undertaken in 2002 (Arab Human Development Report, 2002). It found that while the 22 nations of the Arab world had experienced progress over the last two decades, by investing in education, improving life expectancy, and reduction in absolute poverty, there were three critical deficits among the nations of the region. 207

The first was in relation to political freedom. The report found that out of the seven regions of the world, Arab countries had the lowest freedom score (Arab Human Development Report, 2002 p.4). The “freedom score”, developed by the U.S.-based Freedom House, aims to measure civil and political freedoms, including the right to vote, freedom of association, and the independence of civil society institutions.

The low level of freedom in the Arab region was also identified by another set of indicators, known as “voice and accountability”. These indicators aim to measure various aspects of the political process, the state of civil liberties, the political rights of citizens, and the independence of the media from government. The Arab region has the lowest value of all regions of the world for voice and accountability, and political participation in the Arab region is still limited, compared to other regions

(in spite of noticeable improvements in some Arab countries).

Importantly, it was noted that, overall, the media was, at best, partly free

(Arab Human Development Report, 2002 pp.25-28).

The two other major deficits were in relation to women’s empowerment and knowledge, particularly with regard to the Internet. It was observed that women occupied only 3.5 percent of all seats in parliaments of Arab countries, compared to 11 percent in sub-Saharan Africa and 12.9 percent 208

in Latin America and Caribbean countries, and that in many countries of the region, women suffered from unequal citizenship and legal entitlements (Arab Human Development Report, 2002 pp.29-30).

The knowledge gap arose from a combination of high levels of illiteracy, deficiencies in the education system, low levels of investment in scientific research and development, the “brain drain” of skilled Arabs to the advanced industrial nations, and low levels of personal computer ownership and Internet access (Arab Human Development Report, 2002 pp.65-75). The last of these would significantly change over the course of the 2000s.

The number of Internet users in the Middle East grew from three million

(3.7 percent of the total population) in 2000, to 90 million by 2012, or 40 percent of the total population (Internet World Stats, 2012).

Nonetheless, other issues remained, such as the dominance of English language materials on the Web, low levels of quality Arabic language content, and the use of the Web for propaganda and misinformation purposes.

The poor state of the media in the Arab world was a recurring theme of the Arab Human Development Reports. The 2002 report observed: 209

Any society is only as free as its media. A few Arab countries have

made important strides in promoting freedom of expression with

respect to press coverage, although state control over broadcast

media that reach large segments of society, including the illiterate,

remains widespread. In its Press Freedom Survey 2001, Freedom

House reported that its ratings system for assessing press and other

media independence showed that not a single Arab country had

genuinely free media. Only three states, had media rated as partly

free with the best of them being Kuwait; those in other Arab

countries were rated as "not free" (Arab Human Development

Report, 2002 p.118).

The 2004 Arab Human Development Report, titled Towards Freedom in the Arab World (Arab Human Development report, 2000, was also highly critical of the media’s overall performance in the Arab world, finding that it was:

Characterised by one-sided views and a tendency to puff imaginary

achievements and glorify “the one leader”. Many also served up

forms of cheap entertainment aimed at gratifying the senses rather

than edifying the mind. As a result, the public mind is not opened to

opportunities for self-development, knowledge acquisition or new 210

thinking, let alone to criticism of contemporary events and to

creative ways of changing it (Arab Human Development Report,

2004 p.148).

At the same time, alluding to the rise of satellite broadcasters such as Al-

Jazeera, the report observed that, ‘for those able to access them, the

“new wave” media … have started to provide avenues for knowledge acquisition and for freedom of expression and opinion that were previously unattainable’ (Arab Human Development Report, 2004 p.148).

In this perspective, does Al-Jazeera’s transnational broadcasting exemplify the actual role of media in society? How does the media influence it’s audience? Is there any real commitment to religion, politics and traditional cultural practices? Is the media shaped by public opinion, or, does it mirror it?

For a significant part of the 2000s, Al-Jazeera chimed in with a growing sentiment in the Middle East for democratic reform and greater political and media freedom. It covered topics such as corruption, human rights, persecution of political dissenters, Islamic Sharia Law, and the status of women in Arab societies, that had been taboo on the government- controlled channels (Zayani, 2005). 211

Criticism of Al-Jazeera by other governments in the region, such as those of Algeria, Bahrian, Egypt and Iraq, as well as by the Bush Administration in the United States and by Israel, suggested it was doing its job as a fearless, independent broadcaster.

It appeared to be performing the role of the media as identified by James

Curran, as characterising that of liberal media theory, to ‘monitor the full range of state activity, and fearlessly expose abuses of official authority …

[and] to ensure the media’s complete independence from the government’ (Curran, 2000: 126).

But there was always a caveat to Al-Jazeera’s independence, and that was its relationship to the Qatari Government and the Qatari royal family. The station owed its existence to the financial support and the personal patronage of the Emir of Qatar, and members of Qatari royal family are on Al-Jazeera’s board.

Given that Qatar is in no way a democratic state, the absence of commentary on the lack of democracy and political freedoms in Qatar was a notable silence on Al-Jazeera’s part, particularly given how vocal the station was on such absences elsewhere in the region (Kuhn et. al., 212

2013). Moreover, in the increasingly volatile Sectarian conflcits in the region after the Arab Spring, with the rise of Islamic State and growing tensions in relations between Sunni Muslims, Shia Muslims and ethnic minorities in the region, and the partisanship of Qatar the role played by

Al-Jazeera in stoking such Sectarian tensions, increasingly came into question.

East/West Media

No one denies the importance of Al-Jazeera media in the Arab arena, it has played vital role politically, and culturally reporting information. In the last two decades, media happened to be the only moving force marking direct effectiveness in all aspects of political and social life. But this did not mean there is no absence of true information that reflects on the imbalance and weaknesses. There is fine line in the news performance illustrated within covert national policy that has great influence beyond average citizen to comprehend. Thus, all these aspects determine media legitimacy, and justification, comparable to counterpart media. Arab and

Western television networks are working for the same target; the speed and rhythm are the crucial factors in addressing the issues. Al-Jazeera’s topics of the discussion are comprised of Arab struggles, despite the fact most Arab channels borrowed their style from Western television, with little understanding of performance that’s capable of shaping the Arab 213

audience representation.

The Arab media environment is completely different from the Western environment, due to its traditional applications. Middle East media orientation has a complex influence on the political, cultural, and social composition. The nature of social and cultural consensus frames the public in profiling issues. Contrarily, Arab society accepts certain idea or performance, while same idea or performance from another environment is not accepted without any reservation. The complexity of political structure between Al-Jazeera and Western media has used different applications.

Not too long ago, the media had used different terms to explain the events of Middle East crises. Al-Jazeera used the term ‘War on Iraq’ rather than ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’. Indeed, the interpretation of war usually causes resentment between nations, as can also be seen in cultural and national stereotypes. Media hostility is expressed freely during war or peace. The historical backdrop usually creates negative stereotype in an individual’s mind. Examples include, United States media named former Egyptian president Gammal Abdul Nasser, the ‘Hitler of the

Nile’ in the 1950s, the PLO leader and its group as ‘terrorists’, Libyan leader, Moammar Qaddafi as a ‘mad dog’, and finally, Saddam Hussein as a ‘madman’. The use of these terms can only inflame further hostilities. 214

Al-Jazeera and the Arab Spring

The year 2011 saw a series of popular uprisings throughout the Middle

East that have come to be known as the ‘Arab Spring’. These uprisings saw the fall of longstanding regimes in countries including Tunisia, Egypt,

Yemen and Libya. Such uprisings were initially triggered by particular events, such as the murder by Egyptian Police in June 2010, of activist

Khalid Said, after he posted a video on YouTube exposing police corruption, and the self-immolation of street vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi in the small Tunisian town of Sidi Bouzid, in the face of repeated confiscation of his produce by corrupt officials to whom he refused to pay bribes. But it is generally acknowledged that media in all its forms - broadcast, Internet and social media – played a critical role in bringing scores of activists to

Tahrir Square, in Cairo and the Place du Gouvernement in Tunis, in actions that would lead to the fall of leaders such as Hosni Mubarak, in

Egypt and Ben Ali, in Tunisia. As internationally renowned sociologist

Manuel Castells observes:

Demonstrators recorded the events with their mobile phones, and

shared their videos with people in the country at large and around

the world via YouTube and Facebook, often with live streaming.

They deliberated through Facebook, coordinated through Twitter, 215

and used blogs extensively to convey their opinions and engage in

debates (Castells, 2012 p.57).

The Arab uprisings of 2011 triggered a wave of discord on media and social movements. As interest grew, so did questions about the scope and impact of media, particularly that of Al-Jazeera news media on unfolding events. The emerging media in the events of Arab Spring meant increasingly political media were a vital part of civic engagement, and citizen journalism reached wider audiences than ever before.

Al-Jazerra’s role in the ‘Arab Spring’ is a controversial one. It clearly sided with the forces seeking to remove leaders from power, for which it can be criticised for a lack of impartiality and objectivity in reporting unfolding events. The channel utilised its platform to mobilise the crowds and encourage them to rise up against selected regimes in countries such as

Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Syria.

The channel challenged the public order adversely, and used its regional media platform to wield its power by organising coalitions, to delegitimise foes and legitimise its friends. The station gave a great deal of coverage to the Syrian and Libyan opposition forces, but showed little interest in dissidents in its own country, or in those of other Gulf States such as

Bahrain, or in Saudi Arabia. 216

Al-Jazeera was an instigating force in propagating Arab uprisings quickly from one place to another. The channel was also a factor in the ousting of

Tunisian President Zein al-Abedin Ben Ali, Egyptian President Hosni

Mubarak, and Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, as well as supporting the

Syrian opposition against Bashar Al-Assad of Syria. Material released by

Wikileaks in 2010, found that contrary to claims of editorial independence, Qatar was using Al-Jazeera as a bargaining chip in foreign policy negotiations by adapting its coverage to suit other foreign leaders, and offering to cease critical transmissions, in exchange for major concessions (Booth, 2014).

With the rise of Iraq’s Islamic State and its claims over territory in Iraq and Syria, the concerns over Al-Jazeera’s role intensified, as Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States were suspected of tacitly supporting the rise of

Islamic State, through the spread of radical Wahaabism among Sunni

Muslims, and the increasingly Sectarian civil war taking place in Syria.

Al-Jazeera: Pros and Cons

In considering the case of Al-Jazeera and its influence in the Arab world, one can see some of the pros and cons of relying upon transnational satellite broadcasting to address problems with national broadcast media systems. An important part of the appeal of Al-Jazeera lay in its 217

willingness to tackle subjects considered taboo to the national broadcasters, constrained by undue government influence over their operations.

In a region characterised by a lack of political freedoms and strong civil society organisations, independent media is highly valued. As such, Al-

Jazeera successfully captured the interest of audiences in satellite broadcasting that CNN had uncovered during the First Gulf War. It also brought the news values associated with the big transnational broadcasters to Arab nations in Arabic language, and focused on the issues facing the people of the region.

But as Cherribi (2006) notes, it can be misleading to describe Al-Jazeera as the “CNN of the Arab world,” as many Western commentators do. In some respects, it is more like an Islamic version of CBN (Christian

Broadcasting Network) than the secular or nonreligious CNN (Cable

Network News), due to the time it devotes to the views of Islamic religious leaders and the ways in which it promotes Islamic practices.

Rather than being a channel like the BBC or CNN, Al-Jazeera is frequently a religious channel as well as a news channel; while the balance shifts from time to time, an underlying religious influence can be identified. In this respect, the commitment to objectivity and professionalism that was 218

originally the hallmark of Al-Jazeera can be compromised in its reporting on world affairs.

The vast financial resources Qatari rulers have committed to Al-Jazeera gives it the capacity to cover events that has no parallel in the Arab region. However, it also constitutes “invisible purse-strings” that can compromise its commentary on events where the Qatari rulers feel they have an interest, most notably, the recent conflicts in Iraq and Syria. Al-

Jazeera has managed, in varying degrees, to enrage officials of nearly every Arab country, and many non-Arab countries, in which it maintains bureaus. Thios could be taken as an indicator of Al-Jazeera’s independence and objectivity.

Al-Jazeera claimed its role as a news leader on the events of September

11, 2001, and Operation Desert Fox in Iraq in 2003, when news timing was already changing the game. It began reporting stories as they broke, rather than waiting to report in the evening. The stories of second

Palestinian Intifada (Palestinian Uprising) in October, 2000, showing a 12- year-old boy dying in his father’s arms, including the 2003 fall of Saddam

Hussain’s statue in Bagdad, gave Al-Jazeera news domination in the Arab world.

The channel advanced its coverage by establishing base reporting from 219

the frontlines transmitting unprecedented images, conveying realism. In every conflict or dispute, Al-Jazeera presented itself as a newsmaker mirroring broad public sentiments. Throughout war coverage, Al-Jazeera influenced high-level decision makers, including the public, on profound issues.

The news reporting established an appealing appearance and signified Al-

Jazeera as a persuasive umpire. The continuous reporting, with the constant video effects, shifted audience consciousness, as viewers were able to see what is happening as it occurs.

But the question arises, as Philip Seib (2008) observes, of whether such a network can become a ‘virtual state’, influencing political elites and policy makers in ways that may facilitate greater peace and understanding, but also may foster conflict and division. Western media have long had such an ambivalent influence in the Middle East; the fact that Al-Jazeera is a network owned and run by Arabs themselves, should not prevent us from asking whether it too can have a mentally colonising influence upon people in the region.

Al-Jazeera’s relationship with the Qatari Government has become apparent, in terms of the news themes it explores. The network has a sponsor which reflects its political views on various complex issues. 220

Evidently, the persistent reporting on selective issues has caused public stress and raised integrity doubts.

The recent political unrest seen in the ‘Arab Spring’ movement and Al-

Jazeera’s involvement is clear evidence of political intervention. If the

Vietnam War was the first televised war, then the ‘Arab Spring’ is the

24/7 media war. The ongoing political unrest in Syria, Libya, Tunisia,

Egypt and Yemen provide clear evidence of the growing attachment of media and politics in what can be termed ‘media wars’ (Seib, 2008).

Factions are waging propaganda offensives through media outlets, thus

Al-Jazeera is recognised as a major player, with its mission to endorse political approval in the region. The rulers of Qatar established close ties with the religious icon Youssef Al-Qaradawi, the spiritual guide of the

Muslim Brotherhood, who inspired the Islamist movements in Egypt,

Tunisia, Libya and Syria. He rarely allowed negative coverage of Qatar, but his rhetoric was aimed at selective Arab governments. In the aftermath of the 2011 Arab Spring uprisings, Doha supported Islamist organisations and Muslim Brotherhood-led administrations, including that of Egypt’s former president Mohammed Morsi. Also, after Morsi was deposed, the Qatari Government hosted exiled members of the

Brotherhood from Egypt and Syria, and Qatar is accused of collecting funds to radical groups fighting the regime of Bashar Al-Assad, including 221

Islamic State. In all of this, Al-Jazeera was at risk, in its reporting of the

‘Arab Spring’, of being seen to be reporting events in ways that were of advantage to Qatar’s rulers.

Overall, Al-Jazeera was an important source of news for the Arab masses, when, people had lost confidence in their national media. However, growing concerns about the absence of ethical principles and standards of media created a new sense of cynicism and distrust towards Al-Jazeera in the Arab world.

Conclusion

This research finds that in spite of challenges between television channels in the Middle East region, Al-Jazeera has no more credibility than any other television network, whether Arab or Western and state or privately- owned. Every channel in the world is based on sets of underlying facts.

Selective omission, choice of words, and varying credibility ascribed to the primary source, all convey a radically different impression of what actually happened.

The debate surrounding Al-Jazeera continues, and there are many questions surrounding its coverage and mission. Many scholars are still uncertain about its objectivity; therefore, it is up to the audience to 222

determine the answer.

Nevertheless, one of the principal beneficiaries of Arab politics has been the existence of Al-Jazeera Television. The comprehensive coverage of the revolt created a signature for Arab and Western worlds. However, the network and its state sponsor, Qatar, have created political and media turmoil, the scope is beyond the size of the network.

The network’s coverage of conflicts has affected governments in

Arab/West countries. Al-Jazeera often seems polemic, biased and politically aggressive, but according to public opinion, it is by far the freest media outlet in the world.

Ultimately, Al-Jazeera have had shaped Arab/Muslim public opinion; created an open-minded audience, capable of perceiving information in unprecedented way. Certainly, Al-Jazeera transformed traditional culture; it opened up a new perspective of transnational communications, associated with public relations outside of the normative Western paradigm.

In some ways, Al-Jazeera has been a victim of its own success. Since the beginning of the ‘Arab Spring’, the network was both praised and criticised for tackling contentious political issues. Al-Jazeera played a 223

vital role in spreading news about the uprisings throughout the region.

The network’s critics may argue its coverage was dramatic, but the channel delivered information that challenged governments, and was keenly sought by viewers throughout the region. It also helped lay the foundations to challenge the long history of government-dominated media.

224

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONCLUSION: TOWARDS A KUWAITI

PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTER

Summary of Main Argument

In this thesis, I have sought to demonstrate two main points. First, I have argued the State-run Kuwait Television (KTV) service has failed to meet its obligations in advancing the political, economic and cultural development of Kuwait. In particular, it has failed to adequately represent the diversity and dynamism of Kuwaiti society and culture, and has not enabled the development of a robust and supportive public sphere.

The decline of KTV, which was once considered one of the Arab world’s leading broadcasters, has arisen primarily from a lack of attention being given to its audience and their changing expectations of a national broadcaster. Poor administration of the service has led to a growing gap between what is sought from national television and what KTV provides, 225

and the 50 interviews undertaken as a part of this thesis, attest to a sense of demoralisation and frustration at the barriers that exist to journalistic autonomy and expressions of creativity on the part of program makers.

This situation arose from a combination of poor strategy and a lack of government funding to its local channels, as well as a history of political interference, state censorship of content, and government-driven appointments to key management positions.

The explosion of satellite broadcasting in the Middle East after the 1990-

91 First Gulf War with Iraq drew profound attention to the structural and content weaknesses of KTV, as it did to state-run broadcasters throughout the Arab world. While state broadcasters that were essentially propaganda arms of government had previously maintained their standing by virtue of the lack of alternatives, audiences could now access international broadcasters such as CNN and BBC Arabic, as well as the new pan-Arab satellite channels such as Al-Jazeera, Al-Arabiya, Al-Manar,

MBC, and many others.

It has been estimated that the number of satellite television channels in the Middle East grew from 700 in 2010 to over 1,320 by 2013 (ARABSAT,

2015). As these channels had more diverse content than the traditional 226

state-run broadcasters, and were not subject to the same forms of state censorship of news and opinion, Kuwaiti audiences migrated to the new channels, as they did across the Arab world.

Pan-Arab satellite television has been seen by a number of prominent global communications theorists as heralding the rise of a new Arab public sphere. Authors such as Lynch (2006), Volkmer (2003, 2014) and Castells

(2010, 2012) have made such arguments.

The major case study for such claims has been the Al-Jazeera satellite network, based in Qatar. From its founding in the mid-1990s to present,

Al-Jazeera has been highly influential, and its content hotly debated (El-

Nawawy & Iskander, 2012). It has also expanded globally, including the establishment of Al-Jazeera America in 2013.

At the time of the Second Gulf War in 2003, Al-Jazeera was hotly criticised by the Bush Administration in the U.S., and its news bureaus in

Kabul and Baghdad were both hit by U.S. missile strikes. It was accused of supporting terrorism and of an anti-Western bias. At the same time, Al-

Jazeera had influential advocates in the West, and was clearly the most popular satellite channel in the Middle East. From the time of the Arab

Spring, however, Al-Jazeera has been subject to growing criticism within the Middle East, particularly for what is seen as its implicit support for 227

regime changes in countries such as Egypt, Libya and Syria, and for being increasingly manipulated by the rulers of the Qatari State.

According to German philosopher Jürgen Habermas, the discursive nature of the public sphere manifests itself in three forms of critique: (a) the critique of the absolutist state, (b) the critique of the democratic state, and (c) the critique of the public sphere as a mediating force between state and society (Habermas, 1974; Susen, 2011). The media should monitor the full range of state activity, and fearlessly expose abuses of political authority. This watchdog role is said to override the importance of all other functions of the media and requires that the media be completely independent of government.

As it is now apparent that pan-Arab satellite broadcasting cannot be expected to fill the function of a pubic sphere, and as the Arab Spring and the rise of ISIS have revealed – in quite different ways – the limitations of the concept of a pan-Arab public sphere, we must reconsider the possibility of Kuwait Television (KTV) being restructured to enable it to fulfil the role of serving the Kuwaiti public sphere and a democratic society.

I argued in this chapter that for KTV to do so, it needs to be rethought along the lines of a public service broadcasting model. Such models have 228

been promoted by agencies such as UNESCO, and there are international examples to draw upon for such a service oriented towards Kuwaiti citizens, civil society and a democratic public sphere.

A Public Service Broadcasting Model for Kuwait

The evidence of Kuwaiti Television, and of other state-run broadcasters in the Arab region, is that there is a desperate need to genuinely develop the public service broadcasting (PSB) model, in Kuwait and in the Middle

East generally. The PSB model is one where where broadcasters continue to receive government funding and are thus not solely dependent upon commercial advertising revenue, but have structural independence from the government of the day, that is guaranteed by legislation.

In A Road Map to Public Service Broadcasting, a 2012 report prepared for the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

(UNESCO) chart, it is observed:

PSB is broadcasting made, financed and controlled by the public, for

the public. It is neither commercial, nor state-owned. It is free from

political interference and pressure from commercial forces. Through

PSB, citizens are informed, educated and entertained. When

guaranteed with pluralism, programming diversity, editorial 229

independence, appropriate funding, accountability and

transparency, public service broadcasting can serve as a

cornerstone of democracy (Smith, 2012, p. 7).

In this report, a number of indicators are identified as the weakness of state-run broadcasters around the world, that are very much applicable to the Kuwaiti case. It is observed that they often lack independence from the government, and ‘the culture amongst the content producers is often one of being a civil servant rather than a journalist or creative person

[and] the dominant expectation is loyalty to the government of the day rather than to the ethics of politically impartial journalism’ (Smith, 2012, p. 10).

Such broadcasters are highly vulnerable to competition from digital and satellite channels, as well as from mobile and PC-based news platforms, as their output is regarded by audiences as being ‘tired and too pro- government’ (Smith, 2012, p. 11). The crisis point is reached when ‘the credibility or the audience for a state broadcaster sinks too low [and] the station becomes increasingly irrelevant. Eventually, a point is reached when even a government keen to have the support of a state broadcaster cannot justify its cost’ (Smith, 2012, p. 11). As the interviews in this thesis with journalists and creative producers at Kuwait Television have indicated, KTV is close to the point of no return. 230

The importance of Public Service Broadcasting lies in its accountability to citizens. As UNESCO has discussed, this arises from six key features of the PSB model:

• The public service remit of the PSB is clearly defined in law;

• The goals of PSB are legally defined;

• The PSB has specific guarantees on editorial independence and

appropriate and secure funding arrangements to protect it from

arbitrary interference;

• The PSB is publicly accountable, through its governing body;

• The PSB has a proven commitment to consultation and

engagement with the public and civil society organisations,

including a complaints system;

• Public involvement in appointments to the governing body (cited in

Smith, 2012, p. 8).

What this highlights is that while the internal reform of KTV is important, it needs to occur in the wider context of legislative change that secures the statutory independence of Kuwaiti public television.

Unlike other countries in the Middle East, Kuwait has maintained the institution of parliamentary democracy, but the continued health and 231

vitality of Kuwaiti politics, society and culture require a vibrant and independent public sphere, to which the national broadcaster is critical. It is in this context that I have become a strong advocate for the PSB model to be applied in Kuwait. I take the concept of public service television seriously, both as a contribution to the revitalisation of Kuwaiti culture and as a process that can reconstitute major institutional repair for contemporary society.

Serious inquiries into the meaning of public television need to be addressed in light of the complexity of public interest. One of the key ideological challenges is the reform of television in the Arab world has been the view that media reform requires a greater role for the market.

This line of thought emerged from the counter-movement against the overbearing nature of state authority over people’s lives, exemplified in the state censorship of media and state-run broadcasting. As was noted in the thesis, considerable hope was invested in this regard in the pan-

Arab satellite television channels, most notably Al-Jazeera, that were seen as able to create a post-national, pan-Arab public sphere.

Events since 2010, in particular, pointed to two problems with this model.

First, such satellite channels were never fully independent of their national governments, and as the turmoil of the Arab Spring and the malignant influence of ISIS became more apparent. Al-Jazeera and other 232

government-supported satellite channels ceased to be neutral observers, and took sides in the conflict. Second, the debate about cultural values is strongly embedded in such pan-Arabic media content. Critics of the satellite broadcasting services have seen them as being characterised by

“the lack of a distinct Arab identity and the hegemony of Anglo-American values” (Mellor et. al., 2011, p. 27).

Satellite broadcasting thus features alongside other recent symbols of modernisation, such as skyscrapers and giant shopping malls, as merely appropriating a Western lifestyle and rejecting Arab-Muslim cultural identity and heritage.

Mellor et. al. point out that “the pan-Arab satellite channels … have been accused of depending on imported programs and copying existing

American programs rather than producing distinctly Arab content” (Mellor et. al., 2011, p. 27).

A Wider Media Policy Reform Agenda

Public service television needs to be able to speak intelligently to citizens about the norms of modern societies, and about politics, without being a mouthpiece of government. This will not happen in the absence of a clear 233

reform philosophy; that goes beyond simply making changes at KTV.

Audiences need to develop the sense of public opinion, or the public interest, and government officials need to be tolerant of diverse public opinion, so the community as a whole have better chance of effective interaction with the government. UNESCO point out:

Moving from State to full Public Service Broadcasting cannot be

done without Government agreement, but it also needs the broader

involvement of civil society and ordinary members of the public. It

may only be possible to achieve PSB in societies where there is

freedom of speech and where a party will relinquish power following

defeat at the polls (Smith, 2012, p. 11).

The reform concept represents the most serious effort to express a positive, alternative vision of government-supported media. Public service television aims to return services to active engagement with a

Habermasian notion of the public sphere, and regain public trust. Public television operation should be conceived as a public theatre of the wider society, and should not personalised as simply a government domain.

The public must be able to actively engage with the service through consultation, discussion forums, formal and accountable complaints systems, and merit-based appointments to the governing body. It also 234

needs to be a universal service, to fulfill their responsibility to citizens, which is why satellite and cable channels, only available by subscription, are not an adequate alternative (Hendy, 2013, pp. 98-99).

Although Kuwait is a more open and democratic polity than other Gulf

States, there is no reference point in Kuwait for an independent media regulator primarily accountable to the community, rather than to the current government. Thus, what is required is a new three-way relationship between KTV as the public service broadcaster, the independent media regulator, and the government of the day.

There are numerous PSB models that exist internationally, and provide an insight into how a Kuwaiti PSB could be structured. The most famous example is the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), but other examples that merit consideration include, the Australian Broadcasting

Corporation (ABC), the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), the

Canadian National Broadcasting Commission (CNBC), and the American

Public Broadcasting Service (PBS) (Hendy, 2013, pp. 1-5).

A key issue in all of these cases is financing. The licence fee model that historically funded the BBC and NHK, is now difficult to apply with the proliferation of media devices, and is also inequitable in its impact. But reliance upon direct government subsidy contains risks that the current 235

government will use its financial power over the PSB to maintain political influence over its content.

As Lowe and Berg (2013) observe, a public service broadcaster that is primarily oriented toward citizens and society as a whole, must be collectively financed; it cannot simply be reliant upon advertising, subscriptions, or pay-per-view models, as shown in Figure 7.1 below.

Figure 7.1

Four Models of Public Service Media Funding

Source: Lowe & Berg, 2013, p. 81.

236

It is also important to emphasise that the new institution must be grounded in a strong vocabulary of local identity. It is impossible to simply transplant a model of broadcasting such as the BBC or NHK into a society such as Kuwait. This public institution has to respect race and the society’s religious and moral beliefs to enhance public confidence in the institution. As increased funding to KTV would be arising in the context of competing priorities for the Kuwaiti Government, it may be that direct government support should be complemented by support from non- government organisations and non-profit institutions, and even from private donations, as with the American PBS. The key is that any approach to funding does not compromise the editorial and creative independence of the organization, and those who work within it.

Media policies need to be totally overhauled and updated in order to provide suitable scaffolding for a Kuwaiti media system oriented towards public interest criteria. There needs to be legislation that clearly sets out the roles and responsibilities of a public interest regulator, and selection and appointment criteria to its board that are subject to the scrutiny of parliament. The models of the Federal Communications Commission in the

United States, Ofcom in the UK and the Australian Communications and

Media Authority, all provide appropriate guidance for developing media regulatory institutions that maintain a sufficient degree of structural independence from the government (Lunt & Livingstone, 2011; ACMA, 237

2015).

An important element of media policy reform in Kuwait is the appointment of people with professional expertise to key roles, overcoming decades of patronage, with managerial responsibilities being given to people with contacts to the Ministry of Information with ties to the Kuwaiti Royal

Family.

Governance responsibilities for Kuwait Television need to be shifted away from direct government control, and towards practices that demonstrate transparency, and a focus on the public interest. This can be partly achieved through legislation, but also requires mechanisms to include the wider public, including the creation of elected Community Advisory

Councils for the channels.

Commissioning Editors, Executive Producers and Editors in Chief are all seeking editorial independence and the opportunities to pursue creativity and diversity in their programming. A commitment to equity, transparency and accountability should be central to public broadcasting charters, and the governing board will have a responsibility to enhance accurate reflection of Kuwait’s diversity (ethnic, age, geographical, socio- economic, cultural, and political) in its programming, including attempts to increase dialogues within communities. 238

Alongside these mechanisms, there should be an independent research think-tank established to persue appropriate qualitative and quantitative research, to determine adequate programming requirements. This could be based in one of the Kuwaiti universities, where there is considerable expertise in media and communications research, including awareness of international best practice models.

This new organisation anticipates public interest and trust, therefore, it is important to appoint a Commissioner for Public Appointments (CPA), independent of the Government and the Civil Service. The CPA regulates the board’s actions as public body appointments, and operates according to a Code of Practice. The Code mandates the involvement of an

Independent Assessor in the selection process for every executive appointment, fair and transparent, which results selecting the best candidates appointed for the public interest that have the capacity as individuals to promote civic engagement of opinion and formation.

Such a step goes beyond the sphere of media policy, but indicates the interconnectedness between reforms to media policy, to enhance the public sphere and democratic communication, and a wider commitment to openness, diversity and pluralism in how Kuwaiti society is governed.

239

Can a National PSB Succeed in an Age of Global Media?

The argument for transforming KTV into a PSB has so far focused on the institutional arrangements and the political conditions within Kuwait, that would enable such a change to occur. But there is another criticism that could be made of such a project, which is that it focuses on the national broadcaster of a small country, at a time when the media is increasingly global.

Given that Kuwaiti audiences, as with others in the Middle East, have been turning to satellite television and increasingly to the Internet for their news, information and entertainment needs, is it old fashioned to focus on reviving the national broadcaster? Should we simply say such broadcasters were creatures of the 20th century, and in the 21st century, we need to focus on global and digitally convergent media?

This is, of course, part of a larger debate about the continuing relevance of television in an age of the global Internet. Australian cultural studies scholar Graeme Turner argues, in his recent book Re-inventing the Media

(Turner, 2015), that television continues to occupy a central place in the media consumption habits of people throughout the world, more so than social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter (Turner, 2015, p.

131). This is the case in countries where there is a high level of internet 240

adoption, such as the United States, the United Kingdom and South

Korea, and it is more strongly the case in developing countries. Television continues to have a central place in framing national conversations and shaping national culture, through its news, current affairs, documentary and entertainment programming.

Television has always had an important relationship to the formation of nation-states and national identity. Like most other countries in the

Middle East, one of the first things the Emir of Kuwait did after the nation became independent in 1961, was establish a national television service.

As this thesis has noted, the picture has become more complicated in the

Middle East, particularly since the 1990s, with the rise of pan-Arab satellite channels, and the crisis of state-run broadcasters. This is in keeping with a range of changes which, as Turner argues, “complicate the once standard model of a central national broadcast television system gathering the attention of a convergent audience … as national citizens by programmers and regulators” (Turner, 2015, p. 61). At the same time, as

Turner argues, international evidence on television points to “the continuing importance of the nation-state as the location through which the media mostly addressed their audiences, as the key influence on the structure of the operating environments for the media industries, and as a continuing political rationale for the development of communication and 241

media infrastructure” (Turner, 2015, p. 63).

One of the reasons Kuwaiti audiences turned to channels such as Al-

Jazeera, was the poor quality of KTV, and the negative perceptions of state censorship of content. But these international channels are – with the exception of the United States - dependent upon national governments for financial and other support (Sparks, 2016).

In the case of Al-Jazeera, it has become more apparent with growing divisions among Arab nations since 2011, that its news content is shaped by the Qatari government. Therefore, it is inappropriate to develop the kind of national public sphere that is so important to Kuwait’s future as a democratic society.

It could be argued that Kuwaiti society is now too diverse to be represented by a single national public service broadcaster. As we have discussed, Kuwait has a diverse society, with Kuwaitis representing only one-third of the country’s population of about 3.5 million. Most foreigners are Arabic-speakers from other countries in the Middle East, such as

Egypt and Lebanon.There is, however, a considerable non-Arabic speaking minority, such as the large communities from India and the

Philippines, as well as a sizeable community from Western countries.

English is Kuwait’s second language, making Kuwait a cosmopolitan and 242

bilingual society. As the Kuwaiti media space is penetrated with foreign discourse, it would, therefore, be wise to build a platform capable of linking locals with expatriates. This would further connect the population, as they would speak the same common cultural language. This can be done by having English-language as well as Arabic-language channels on the revised Kuwait Television as a PSB. It continues to draw attention to the need for a well functioning and independent public service broadcaster, that can serve all interests in Kuwait, and help to unify the nation. By developing quality media content, such a service would enable

Kuwaiti citizens to deal better with the challenges of globalisation, by having more reliable news and information based on local interpretations of the global situation.

Concluding Remarks

In this thesis, I have extensively discussed Kuwait’s historical context, in reference to colonial and post-colonial theoretical frameworks, to recognise Kuwait’s geo-political and socio-cultural development, including the authoritarian paradigm that shadowed the Government’s media control.

I have also discussed at length the distinctive socio-cultural and socio- economic factors influencing Kuwaiti television. I have argued that a more 243

independent Kuwait Television (KTV), operating along public service broadcasting lines, could forge new relationships between the State and society, and the reform of Kuwait Television provides a critically important bridge in building a new relationship between political reform and media liberation.

My primary interview sources and secondary material have identified key factors that lie behind the decline of television audiences, and the new challenges which arise with satellite proliferation in the region. I have unpacked the strategic interpretations of media policies, that tie up television progress and decision-making. Noting the relatively sparse academic literature on the Kuwait television media, I undertook interviews with 50 key informants, who have developed views on the problems with Kuwaiti Television, including media professionals and policy makers directly and indirectly involved in Kuwaiti television workforce.

The interviews identified common and continuing problems, including authoritarian attitudes towards television operations, poor management subject to political influence, and an inability to cede control to creative people within KTV.

This has created a passive relationship between the Government and the citizen-audience, in terms of information sender and receiver. Internal 244

qualitative research accompanied with a quantitative survey, revealed negative employment internal moods and exhibited adversative outcome.

It was surprising to see how the key players viewed the outdated policies.

In order to evaluate television media policies, it is necessary to revise old regulatory models and develop new approaches that meet new challenges, especially in relation to the coexistence of traditional state- funded national broadcasting and new transnational satellite television services.

A broader question outlined is “does reform of the national television system really matter?” I believe that it does, and have argued both the continuing importance of television and the nation-state, emphasising the historical and ongoing relationships that link citizenship and media.

When the population is provided with highly valued information, this enables them to participate and critically engage in civil society. That will, in turn, have beneficial and positive spillovers for a healthy democracy and a positive outlook towards the nation and its culture.

I argue the need for uncensored information and quality entertainment.

These elements are required to build connections between the outlet and the public. This will eventually improve the endeavour, drawing upon the 245

public sphere concept first proposed by Jürgen Habermas.

The media has to play a key role to reach and address the general audience in important issues. In present day Kuwait, where there are great public concerns about political corruption and the absence of public morality, the media must play a more essential role than ever in our daily lives. Their role relates to citizens’ need for reliable information and education, delivered in an accurate, engaging manner. By doing so, the

Government will also help shape public opinion and strengthen Kuwaiti society as a whole, especially in light of current regional political apprehensions.

I have addressed the importance of Kuwait Television, and what needs to be done to achieve national integration, education, social and cultural aspirations. This includes developing television programming which mirrors local reality and links citizens to each other, is responsive to current political issues, and raises social and educational beliefs, including institutional values to sustain the community. Most importantly, we need to open debates that critically examine the need for reform to KTV as the national broadcaster, to reverse the trend towards audience migration to satellite services.

In order to be effective, media must be entertaining as well as 246

informative. It must address its audiences as citizens in a society, who wish to be engaged with the civic polity, and as consumers seeking to be entertained by media programs. The best television content manages to perform both of these functions. There is no definite solution for media reform; good programming is the key ingredient for its success. But we can identify institutional reforms that make better television more possible, including guaranteeing independence to KTV as a public service broadcaster, and ensuring citizen engagement with media regulation that is not subject to routine political interference.

Also, as organisational theorist Edgar Schein observes, “culture is to the organisation what character is to the individual” (Schein, 1992, p.45), and the ‘health’ of KTV’s organizational culture has long been a matter of concern, is addressed. External reform of media institutions needs to be accompanied by internal reform of KTV’s organisational culture.

If the restructuring of KTV as an effective PSB were to be successful, it may have appeal outside of Kuwait. It is vitally important that a national public broadcaster provide local coverage and local perspective on events, whether they are local, national, regional or global, as this enables them to speak with the local grassroots and build connections with Kuwaiti civil society.

24 7

In today’s fast-paced media world, local news experience can help to build trust. Adopting live on-air coverage can add credibility; guaranteeing the chances of interactions creates quality, assembly of programs means attracting a larger audience.

There is a need for innovative local news developed by professional journalists, acting independently of government, and to take local news stories very seriously, in order to gain credibility for local viewers when also reporting on regional and global events.

Such a television service should also be well prepared to carry advance programming that challenges the authorities, corruption and abuse of power, in spite of receiving government financial contributions. Such a new reformed institution could also bring media prestige for Kuwait as a country, a new pattern for regional operations that is a counterpoint to the Qatari Government and the Al-Jazeera Network.

There is no doubt that, for decades, leaders have been resistant to reform of Kuwaiti Television, and there is a growing gap between the hopes of the public and experienced media professionals and the reality of current television services, which are generally held to be of a low level and detached from citizens’ interests. There is no one-way unique vision to do this reform, but excuses are no longer valid to sustain this impasse. 248

Policy and decision makers have to understand the overall disadvantageous situation of current television, and how it undermines the true benefits of this medium. The new television administrations need to devise a clear reform plan, including policy reformation, to meet the new television age of the 21st century.

Television is a chief catalyst in reflecting the interests of its society. The majority of Kuwaitis prefer their own music, dance and art. They like to see themselves, their lives, their concerns and their experiences reflected on the screen. Television programming characterised by national cultures that truly mirrors Kuwaiti society, coexistence, traditions and values, would enhance national pride and civic engagement with Kuwaiti politics, society and culture.

Great television programs harvest an informative citizenry, and help to build trust among people and bring people together. Primarily, good television means better programs that can increase the public’s knowledge and make them more aware of the world around them. We need to focus on a television that provides great messages, broadens knowledge, and promotes tolerance and global understanding on regional and international issues.

249

My research has implicitly drawn upon my own experience working for

Kuwait Television, observing the strengths and weaknesses of the government-run channel. I have thought critically and independently about how to identify the ways in which the channels may operate more effectively and be more attuned to serve, creating an outlet designated for the general public.

Despite the fact that Kuwait State-run television service began in the early 1960s and was among the best national broadcasters in the region, it has lost its organic connections to local viewers. This became painfully apparent in moments of crisis, such as the Iraqi invasion of 1991, which created a public outcry to liberate local media voices from the control of government.

The aftermath created a bitter after-taste of political uncertainty that affected national identity associated with media accountability ever since.

The migration of audiences to pan-Arab satellite channels such as Al-

Jazeera, has been one of many reflections of this.

One important consequence of the First Gulf War was the rapid adoption of satellite television, and an increasingly questioning political attitude throughout the Arab world towards traditionally state-run television. As a component of globalisation, such phenomena cannot be wholly accepted 250

or rejected. Television in the Arab world encounters immanent challenges, characterised by an aggressive increase of competition, creating greater satellite proliferation, and political transformation. Countries in the region mostly exploited media to endorse their political legitimacy; hence, the government had greater interest in controlling this medium, keeping it out of hostile hands, and finally achieving greater authoritarian control.

The pan-Arab network bypasses the two most important communication barriers, illiteracy and censorship. The technological advancement profoundly changed the media landscape, making a return to the old ways conceptually and practically impossible.

Arab media has suffered from lack of professionalism and ethics, which are sometimes challenging in the context of democracy (Sakr, 2003;

Mellor et. al., 2011). Arab media stands out internationally because local television media is less trusted in terms of credibility, which has made it a particularly fruitful space for the expansion of regional satellite broadcasting.

However, this criticism of Arab media is not to suggest we should leave it to governments to develop mechanisms through which to control the media. Professionalism must come from within the media itself, through a professional workforce, equipped with a large margin of free expression. 251

It also requires an engaged citizenry, prepared to fight for fundamental change towards a more open, civil society.

In conclusion, Kuwaiti television can greatly improve its performance by relying on productive financial and human resources, currently not available because the Government has not enabled it to do so. The new reform proposal requires serious initiatives that strengthen the determination to leave a distinct mark on the institution’s output.

In addition to the critical thinking and writing required for this reform proposal for Kuwaiti television, I have noted that no immediate decisions or progress can be made without the awareness of capacity of authorities to fully accept the concept, and understand their reform obligations.

Remarkably, this idea has been discussed in the past, with the former

Information Minister Dr. Ali Al-Rashid, who enthusiastically expressed the need for public television that was neither biased to government nor private interests (personal communication with Dr. Nasser Al-Shimiri, former advisor to Minister of Information, May 2013).

Now is the time for immediate decisions to be made to form a Kuwait public service broadcasting outlet that counterbalances political and economic power, with effective media power in the public interest. A nationally defined public service television model would promote a 252

stronger sense of civic culture and a stronger civil society in Kuwait, hwile also producing content that would engage local audiences and possibly those throughout the Arab region. Significant public interest media reform in Kuwait would be of benefit to the Middle East as a whole, in what is a time of great political transition and civic turmoil. 253

APPENDICES

Appendix One: Survey Questions

A set of questions for key individuals in Kuwait Television developed in order to determine the service performance and prospects for future development:

1. What aspect of Kuwaiti cultural identity are currently incorporated into domestic television programming? 2. What role is domestic television playing to promote local culture in light of the government policy guidelines? 3. What is the status of KTV in relation to the country’s political, economic and social situation? 4. What is the balance between secular and conservative ideas around the reform of KTV? 5. How can the government best address social issues with its current media? 6. What is the relationship between authoritarian censorship and cultural values and morals? 7. To what extent is the government is exploiting media to serve its political agenda? 8. What are the Kuwait government benefits for maintaining public ownership of KTv channels? 9. What issue arise when the Kuwaiti government granted private licences to operate from its soil? 10. What the kind of measurement are being undertaken of viewer satisfaction with KTV performance? 11. The region has invested in satellite television business. Are there government initiatives to exploit this medium in order to promote democracy? 12. What is the role of civil society in reshaping the local cultural sphere? 13. What are the main factors behind the decline in audience share for KTV?

254

Appendix Two: Interviews with Kuwaiti Media Personnel

List of fifty interviews in Kuwait to KTV staff including media figures, as

well as policy makers who are directly and indirectly involved with the

Kuwaiti television workforce.

No. Name Position Date & Method of

Time of Interview

Interview

01 Dr. Dashti, Academic in Media/Gulf April 2007 By Phone

Ali University-Kuwait

02 Dr. Researcher/Kuwait Scientific April 2007 By Phone

Mohammed Research Institute

Ramadhan

03 Dr. Al- TV Consultant/Kuwait April 2007 By Phone

Khadmi, Television

Ibraheem

04 Dr. Al- Professor/Media Department- April 2007 By Phone

Failakawi, Kuwait University

Yousef

05 Al-Ghabra, Board Member Kuwait April 2007 By Phone

Shafiq 255

Information Office

06 Hussain, Television Documentary April 2007 By Phone

Habeeb Director/Kuwait TV

07 Abduredha, TV Producer/Kuwait TV April 2007 By Phone

Abdulmohsen

08 Al-Qalaf, Media May 2007 By Phone

Redha Person/Advertising/Hadhood

Media

09 Ashkanani, Media and IT Specialist May 2007 By Phone

Baker

10 Abell, Heidi Former TV presenter, Kuwait May 2007 By Phone

TV One Channel

11 Dashti, Videographer/ Kuwait May 2007 By Phone

Shaker Television

12 Al-Enazi, Undersecretary Ministry of May 2007 By Phone

Hamed Information

13 Al-Shimeri, TV Editor June 2007 By Phone

Hamed

14 Khaja, Media Specialist June 2007 By Phone

Nazeeh

15 Ali, Fahad Theater Stage Artist/Academy June 2007 By Phone

of Art-Kuwait 256

16 Amer, Ali Actor June 2007 By Phone

17 Noor, Amel Actor June 2007 By Phone

18 Najem, Video Archives/Kuwait July 2007 By Phone

Ahmad Television

19 Abdulkhader, Sound Editor July 2007 By Phone

Majeed

20 Khaleel, Studio Manager/ Kuwait July 2007 By Phone

Mansoor Television

21 Ashkanani, Minister’s Office Consultant July 2007 By Phone

Mohammed

22 Mohammed, Television Audience Complaint July 2007 By Phone

Waffaa Office

23 Hussain, Public Relation/Ministry of Feb. 2008 In Person

Jamela Information

24 Al-Ward, Director/ Kuwait Television Feb. 2008 In Person

Khaled

25 Al-Hazaa, Technical Director/ Kuwait Feb. 2008 In Person

Mansour Television

26 Al-Fadhly, Script Writer/ Kuwait TV Feb. 2008 In Person

Abdullah

27 Mahmood, Video specialist/Alray Feb. 2008 In Person

Khaled Television Channel 257

28 Hassen, Cameraman/Freelancer Feb. 2008 In Person

Dawood

29 Al-Mulla, Head of Documentary Feb. 2008 In Person

Nasser Department/Kuwait TV

30 Al-Reshaad, Human Resources/ Kuwait TV March In Person

Hamad 2008

31 Al-Mansoor, Programming March In Person

Jamal schedule/Kuwait Television 2008

32 Malek, Finance department/ Ministry March In Person

Khaled Of Information 2008

33 Birami, Public Relation/Kuwait TV March In Person

Ibraheem 2008

34 Bu-Kanan, Television Presenter/Kuwait March In Person

Abdulateef TV 2008

35 Bu-Dastoor, Marketing Director/ MediaLink March In Person

Salah Co. 2008

36 Bo-Nashi, Staff of Alwattan Private March In Person

Nadhem Channel/Kuwait 2008

37 Al-Dohsari, Online Media Blogger/Private March In Person

Mohammed 2008

38 Al-Abdullah, Media Specialist April 2008 In Person

Matook 258

39 Salim, Salah Media Analyst/ TV & Media - April 2008 In Person

Media Inc.

40 Dr. Faysal, Media April 2008 In Person

Taher Department/Researcher/UBC,

Canada

41 Awadi, Jasim Channel 2 (English) Director April 2008 In Person

42 Shimeri, Drama Writer/ Private Sector April 2008 In Person

Saleem

43 Sabah, Jaber Floor Manager/KTV April 2008 In Person

44 Bu-Shihree, Live Studio Manager April 2008 In Person

Ali

45 Tarah, Graphic Designer/Channel May 2008 In Person

Qassim 2/Kuwait TV

46 Amer, Assistant Director May 2008 In Person

Mohammed

47 Nasser, Freelancer Television May 2008 In Person

Salman Producer

48 Yaseen, Head of Drama May 2008 In Person

Sultan Department/Kuwait TV

49 Al-Hamad, Online Television Streamer/ May 2008 In Person

Anwer Specialist

50 Madi, Anwer Media Instructor/American May 2008 In Person 259

University of Kuwait

260

Appendix Two: Interview Questions

1. To what extent is current television programming representing local

cultural identity?

2. What are the guidelines to promote Kuwaiti culture on television?

3. To what extent does the government interfere in the channel’s editorial

policy?

4. What is the audience feedback regarding their fulfilment for

programming?

5. Kuwait Television is a flagship for local culture. How this can be

sustained in the light of the satellite proliferation in the region?

6. How satisfied are people currently working in KTV with how television

is being developed there? Do they have concerns about government

interference?

7. Is the local audience passive or active in relation to choosing,

criticising and rejecting the current television content? 261

8. How are broadcasting policies are discussed on the national level?

9. What is the civil society role in the context of reform of Kuwaiti

broadcasting institution?

10. What kinds of media reform have been approached in the past? Are

there reasons why such approaches have failed?

11. What are factors behind local audiences moving away from KTV

towards imported television content?

12. What is the most appropriate relationship between the television

institution and its audience?

262

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