The Iranian Influence in and s options in Najaf and ׳Tehran

From the publication series of KCCRC 1 Kurdistan conflict and Crisis Research Center

The Iranian Influence in Iraq and s Options in Najaf and Baghdad׳Tehran

This article is an edited translation of the original in Kurdish. Translated by (Shkow Sherzad).

From the publication series of KCCRC 2 Kurdistan conflict and Crisis Research Center

All Rights Reserved for: Kurdistan Conflict and Crisis Research Center

March 2018 3 The Iranian Influence in Iraq and s Options in Najaf and Baghdad׳Tehran

Yasin Taha these sites for almost Fifteen years until it was finally pushed back by Introduction the Ottoman Empire in 1638.(3) The history of Iranian influence Two centuries later during the period and conflict in Iraq is not a recent of the Qajar dynasty, the Ottomans occurrence; it is almost as old as and Persians were able to establish itself dating back to pre-Christian diplomatic relations leading to the s more signing of the Second Treaty of׳antiquity. However, Iran recent engagements in post-Saddam Erzurum in 1898. However, the Iraq has experienced a shift in scope collapse of the Ottoman Empire in and character of the manner of Iranian 1918 and the establishment of the influence in the country. This article Iraqi State in 1921, was a significant aims to give a brief overview of this shock to the foreign policy and Iranian activity to demonstrate the national security of the Persians who pressure points Iran uses to wield its took a further eight years after the power in Najaf and Baghdad. establishment of Iraq to reluctantly officially recognise the state of Iraq(4) Iranian and Iraqi Relations - A Later in the 20th century, Iran went Brief Historical Overview through a radical Islamic Revolution s political interest in its neighbour giving birth to new Persian doctrines׳Iran Iraq is nothing new and can be dated and an expansionist foreign back as far as ancient Babylon and policy, which rested on the idea of later the Sassanian Empire, which exporting their revolution abroad was able to conquer Mesopotamia and establishing a global Islamic s republic. Given Iraq had a 1350 km׳for an extended period in the 500 BC.(1) Then, at the peak of the border with Iran, a shared history, s strength, in the late culture, religion and society that׳Safavid Empire s, deep-seeded religious beliefs spanned millennia this new Iranian׳1500 intertwined with Persian desires for approach to foreign policy became a conquest resulting in the Persians real and dangerous threat to the Iraqi successfully conquering some of state. (5) However, Iranian vision of s holiest sites in Najaf, their revolution spreading to Iraq was׳ism׳Shi Karbala, Baghdad and Samara. [2] somewhat set back with the resulting The Safavid Empire was able to hold Iran-.

4 Opening Doors changed their position and officially Many experts in Middle Eastern recognised the new Iraqi transitional politics point to the 2003 Iraq war as administration under the leadership of s ability American Paul Bremer. (6) Iran moved׳a watershed moment for Iran to have increasing influence in Iraq. fast to take advantage of the new With the toppling of the Iraqi dictator Iraqi reality and worked to limit the ׳Mujahadeen-e-Khalq׳ Saddam Hussein, the United States and influence of the s Mujahedin of Iran) while at׳the United Kingdom removed one of the (People s orientated׳most significant obstacles confronting the same time aiding Shi Iranian expansionism in the Middle Islamic political parties in getting them East and Gulf regions. Moreover, the into power. Moreover, Iraq quickly resulting political construct of the new became a robust Iranian export market to the extent that Iran was forecasting future trade with Iraq to amount to 20 billion dollars (the equivalent of twice s diplomatic presence the budget of neighbouring states like׳Iran Jordan). (7) in Iraq is far more extensive than any other Iranian influence in Iraq s. Within 1. Embassies and Consulates׳foreign state s diplomatic presence in Iraq is far׳Iraq, Iran enjoys an Iran more extensive than any other foreign s. Within Iraq, Iran enjoys an׳embassy in Baghdad, and state also consulates in , embassy in Baghdad, and also consulates in Basra, Najaf, Karbala, Erbil, and Najaf, Karbala, Erbil, and Sulaimania. (8) What is important to Sulaimania note is that even though these missions are at face value diplomatic they are also used by Iran as avenues for Iranian influence in the country. Take for Iraq put power into the hands of Iranian example the appointment of specific a political parties, where׳aligned Shi some had deep roots in Iran and were Iranian individuals at these posts, such considered Iranian proxies. as Kazmi Qumi, Danai Far, and Iraj In the early days of the Iraq war, the Masjedi. These men all have deep s Revolutionary Guard, and׳s considered Iraq an invaded roots in Iran׳Iranian and occupied the country. However, therefore it is not a significant leap to under president Khatami Iran assume these diplomatic posts conduct their work under the strict advice and

5 s Revolutionary 2. Pro-Iranian Political Parties and׳watchful eye of Iran Guard. In fact, the most recent Iranian Entities in Iraq ambassador in Iraq Iraj Masjedi was Within Iraq, there is the strong previously an aid of Qasem Soleimani view that given the multi-ethnic who is a senior military officer in the and sectarian makeup of the Iraqi Iranian Revolutionary Guard. (9) government and Iranian state influence The Iranian diplomatic posts play an in Iraq stems from the Shi’a politicians influential role in the facilitation of the and political parties of the south rather Iranification of Iraq alongside their other than Iran embedding itself in the Iraqi routine diplomatic and consular activities. government and state. Moreover, it is Perhaps the recent opening of a school in not a hidden fact that a large number Khasina of Shi’a entities consider it a matter׳ the Sunni heartland village of s Nineveh Province, under of pride to act as a direct extension of׳in Iraq ׳Tapa ,s political and sectarian policies׳is a clear Iran ׳Imam Khomeini׳ the name amongst them the Higher Islamic example of the Iranian agenda. (10) ib Ahl al-Haq, and Badr׳Council, Asa Today Iran views Iraq as a military buffer Organisation among many others. for itself against the Western threat Amongst influential Iraqi politicians, rather than an independent state that can most notably former Iraqi Prime- enjoy political and diplomatic relations Minister Nuri al-Maliki, there also with Iran. (11) In the Arab political exists strong and deep-rooted ties to sphere, there is a growing view that Iran Iran. In 2010 as head of the state of is governing Iraq through its embassies, law party al-Maliki was able to rely on consuls and proxies. As evidence the support of Iran to prevent the Iraqi observers point to the extraordinary National Movement, which came out autonomous decision-making powers as the largest party in the 2010 national that these embassies and consulates election, from forming the next federal possess. (12) Moreover, before the government. This event was also withdrawal of United States forces from confirmed by Syrian President Bashar an Iranian׳ the country in 2011 some meetings were al-Assad calling the events This, in turn, opened the way (׳. )conducted between the representatives Veto13 of these diplomatic posts and US foreign for Nuri al-Maliki, head of the State officials regarding the future of Iraq. of Law party, which came in second place, to form the second Iraqi federal Commentators argue that these meetings government. After only two years Iran as evidence of the Obama administration used this Iraqi government as a bridge agreeing with Iran to divide their zones between themselves and to send of influence in the country in the hope aid and supplies to Damascus as Syria of avoiding confrontations with one slowly slid into civil war. another.

6 ׳Promised Day Brigade׳ What is more, going beyond the ideology of the Guardianship of the) ׳Welayat Faqih׳ parties mentioned above Iran has also is established a secure political, economic Islamic Jurist). (16) and social network with Kurdish Another more significant development leaders in the north of Iraq and has also is that numerous personalities with made links with some Sunni political close ties to Iran such as Abu Mahdi players such as Salim al-Jabouri. More al-Muhandis and later Hadi Al-Amiri recently Iran has even tried to establish became commanders and the public s׳s Yezidi communities by political and military faces of Iraq׳ties to Iraq inviting their members to Iran. (14) Popular Mobilization Force (PMF). The s relations with these political PMF is a force established through a׳Iran entities and parties stems back to the Fatwa given by Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani Iran-Iraq war where Iran was a strong and funding from the Iraqi government. supporter and backer of opposition However, many observers argue that the groups within Iraq. PMF is an Iranian proxy force and that its long-term goal is to serve the Iranian 3. Militias and Armed Groups agenda. (17) s establishment, it has׳Since the PMF s second opening to influence the played the role of a uniting force for the׳Iran political situation in Iraq and increase its pro-Iranian Shi’a militias on the ground clout in the country arose in 2014 when in Iraq with 4050- armed military units the and Sham (ISIS) joining this army. (18) Figures from was able to invade Iraq and capture vast some media outlets in the United States swathes of Iraqi territory. Iran seized this explain that of 66 armed groups making opportunity to surpass its regional rivals up the PMF 44 of them take their orders like Saudi Arabia to portray itself as a directly from Tehran (19) and work to leading force in the fight against ISIS. serve Iranian interests rather than the (15) Since the ISIS invasion of Iraq Iran interests of Iraq. was able to use the battle against them Moreover, within the PMF those units as a smokescreen to push its influence in that swear allegiance to Iran and maintain Iraq beyond the political sphere. It was close links with Tehran are favoured able to increase its military presence when it comes to funding and receiving in the country through proxy groups weaponry, whereas the Iraqi government neglects the groups that swear loyalty ׳Promised Day Brigade׳ such as the s to Iraq and hold Iraqi nationalist׳who are considered extensions of Iran Revolutionary Guard. Moreover, just sentiments. This pattern was visible in when the Iraqi government set 2017 ׳Harakat al-Nujaba׳ like s׳s Nobles) aside 1.2 billion dollars for the PMF׳Movement of the Party of God) ite paramilitary annual budget. The al-Abbas Combat׳s Shi׳another of Iraq groups a strong cornerstone of the Division (ACB) only received 1% of

7 ism׳that budget fulfilling only 28% of the Iranian experience in protecting Shi Abu followers of this faith across the world׳ ,division needs. On the other hand fulfilled 100% of often look up to Iran as an example of ׳Mahdi al-Muhandis the financial needs of the pro-Iranian how the religion should be practiced and .Martyrs of preserved) ׳ib Sayyid al-Shuhada׳Kata׳ Sayyid Battalions). (20) Iran is quick to take advantage of this At the same time as ISIS was pushed fact in its foreign policy agenda to further out of Iraq many of the paramilitary increase its influence and image as the groups forming the PMF also worked leading Shi’a authority in the Iraqi Shi’a s long-term aim׳to carve out an Iranian corridor from heartland of Najaf. Iran im to Damascus and from there in this regard is to replace Ayatollah׳Al-Qa Vilayat-e׳ to Beirut and the Mediterranean Sea. Ali al-Sistani as the leader of in Iraq because the leadership ׳The Iranian Revolutionary Guard used Faqih this corridor for the first time in 2017 of Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani is the only by sending military personnel and obstacle to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei supplies through to Syria. (21) Hence, becoming the sole political and religious this was clear evidence of the fruition authority for Shi’a Muslims across the of the Iranian strategic agenda to reach world. the Mediterranean Sea and create Shi’a Scholars argue that the fragments and clients within Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon. divisions in the Shi’a faith will not This new reality would allow Iran to prove to be a problem for Ayatollah Ali counter the influence of the United States Khamenei in this eventuality as it is not and Europe within the region while at unusual for the Shi’a community to set the same time blocking the Sunni revival aside differences and line up behind one supported by Saudi Arabia. (22) supreme leader. For example, one can look to the leadership of Seyyed Hossein ׳Religion and Sectarianism Borujerdi who was accepted as Marja .4 a community׳by the majority of Shi The religious and sectarian card is after the death of Sayyid Abul Hasan perhaps the most influential card in Isfahani. He became sole Marja in the s arsenal because it calls upon the Shi’a world for 15 years until his death׳Iran belief and ideology of millions of Iraqis in 1961. (23) who subscribe to the Shi’a Sect. Today Reaching this point has not been an the highest Shi’a religious authority is accessible path for Iran. During the athist regime placed׳s the Iraqi Ba׳located in Iran, and as it is incumbent 1980 upon followers of Shi’a Islam to take many obstacles before Iranian religious orders from the most senior Shi’a figures in Najaf reducing their numbers religious authority, Iran finds power from 800 to 150 in 1985. In 1994 the athist regime went further and׳in religion and sectarianism when it Ba comes to expanding its influence across ordered the expulsion of all foreign Iraq. Moreover, given the historical Shi’a religious figures in Iraq. This order

8 reduced the number of Shi’a religious sector to assert its control over the figures in Najaf from 8000 to below primary holy sites in Najaf and Karbala. 1000. (24) However, since the overthrow They have worked to gain ownership of the previous regime in Iraq reliable of the hotels and land around the Imam sources in Najaf point to a noticeable Ali Mosque, Imam Husayn Shrine increase in practicing pro-Iranian Shi’a and the al-Abbas Mosque even though religious figures, in particular, there has these sites a more often visited by Iraqi ite pilgrims. Perhaps the reason for׳been an increase in those who support Shi s grievances that the Iraqi׳Ayatollah Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and this is Iran Vilayat-e organisations do not serve Iranian׳ believe in the struggle for This new reality is in part thanks citizens to the same standards as they do .׳Faqih to 13 thousand religious students and Iraqi. This action has therefore restored s׳religious leaders who are either teaching the balance in between Iraq and Iran or studying in the religious schools of Shi’a pilgrims. Najaf. (25) Furthermore, there is also a current 5. Media Outlets opinion that Iran wishes to see Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, who Iran places great importance on Media is not only an Iranian cleric and narrative to influence public opinion in s official language׳conservative politician but also an Iraqi Iraq. Even though Iran s media outlets׳is Persian most of Iran ,׳Vilayat-e Faqih׳ citizen and supporter of take over from Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. also offer their content in (Fars To support this view commentators News, Tasnim News Agency, Mehr point to increased activity by Ayatollah News Agency, ISNA News Agency, Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi in Najaf and Irna). These outlets also place great and Baghdad in recent years. If Ayatollah emphasis on covering Iraqi affairs in line s foreign׳Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi does with the Iranian government indeed take over from Ayatollah Ali al- agenda. The most famous of these outlets which ׳Alalam News Network׳ Sistani, then this would spell the end is the s beliefs began broadcasting in Iraq in 2003 after׳of the Najaf School of thought that Shi’a religious figures should not the collapse of the Iraqi regime and the interfere in political affairs. (26) lifting of the satellite dish ban across the Another Ayatollah supported by Iraq is country. Moreover, Iran is the leading ism׳Grand Ayatollah Kazem Husseini Haeri producer of historical films about Shi who currently resides in the city of Qom. and targets them at followers of the sect ib Ahl giving Iran control over the cultural׳Asa׳ He holds high authority in the .ites׳League of Righteous People) and religious narrative of Iraqi Shi) ׳al-Haq A simple example is how presenters of ׳.Vilayat-e Faqih׳ and also advocates the 27() Shi’a media outlets belonging to Iraq Other than the religious figures Iran has have copied the styles and dress codes also used the Iraqi state and the private of their Iranian counterparts.

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