ISSN: 2560-1601

Vol. 13, No. 4 (GR)

December 2018

Greece external relations briefing: Greek Foreign Policy in 2018 George N. Tzogopoulos

1052 Budapest Petőfi Sándor utca 11.

+36 1 5858 690 Kiadó: Kína-KKE Intézet Nonprofit Kft. [email protected] Szerkesztésért felelős személy: Chen Xin

Kiadásért felelős személy: Huang Ping china-cee.eu 2017/01

Greek Foreign Policy in 2018

Greece employed a dynamic foreign policy in 2018. Following more than two decades of impasse in negotiations with FYROM under UN aegis, the two countries came to a compromise. The Prespes Agreement provisionary solves the problem and paves the way for FYROM (now ) to join NATO and the EU. Additionally, 2018 was a good year for Greek- American and Sino-Greek relations as well as for the strengthening of collaboration between Greece, Israel and in the Eastern Mediterranean. As far as Greek-Turkish relations are concerned, the first semester was intense while the second – despite ongoing disagreements – comparatively milder. The year ended with an effort of Greek Prime Minister to elaborate with Russian President Vladimir Putin on steps to restore trust following the serious bilateral diplomatic crisis of the summer period.

The year of 2018 was significant for Greek foreign policy. To start with, the June Prespes Agreement reached between the governments of and Skopje paves the way for the name issue to be solved after more than two decades of serious disagreements between the two sides. In order to be able to join NATO and the EU in the medium and long-term the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) – under its current Prime Minister Zoran Zaev – accepts the official name: Republic of North Macedonia (short name: North Macedonia). This shall be the constitutional name to be used erga omnes. By making this necessary compromise to safeguard his country’s Euroatlantic orientation, Premier Zaev is certainly crossing the red line of his predecessors, principally Nicola Gruevski. This is the main reason why President Gjorge Ivanov remains hesitant to give his consent for the discussed constitutional changes.

The author had the opportunity to interview President Ivanov in the autumn of 2010, approximately eight years before the Prespes Agreement. At that time, FYROM was considering the name dispute a bilateral issue. The author asked President Ivanov why FYROM referred to the name dispute as a bilateral issue from the moment negotiations were only taking place under the UN aegis and Greece called for an erga omnes solution. President Ivanov replied, inter alia, that an erga omnes solution as proposed by Greece was not realistic as a basis for solution because it was against any international principles regulating relations among countries. In his view at that time (in 2010), an erga omnes solution was not acceptable in a situation when two thirds (129) of the UN member-states had recognized FYROM under the

1 constitutional name. It thus become evident the Prespes Agreement serves the Greek national interests as far as the erga omnes usage of the new name North Macedonia is concerned and constitutes a diplomatic defeat for FYROM.

Of course, the Prespes Agreement could not have been signed if Greece had remained intransigent to some demands of the other side. A compromise requires mutual concessions. This said, Greece accepted that the nationality of North Macedonia (previously FYROM) shall be Macedonian citizen and the official language shall be Macedonian language. Article 7 of the Prespes Agreement stipulates the two countries acknowledge their respective understanding of terms ‘Macedonia’ and ‘Macedonian’ refers to a different historical context and cultural heritage. North Macedonia (previously FYROM) notes its official language, the Macedonian language, is within the group of South Slavic languages while both sides note the official language and other attributes of North Macedonia are not related to the ancient Hellenic civilization, history, culture and heritage of the north region of Greece. Stemming ambiguity is causing serious concern among opponents of the Prespes Agreement in Greece. For example, in December, Premier Zaev reportedly told lawmakers that the deal would allow the teaching of the ‘Macedonian’ language in Greece to ‘Macedonians’.

The Prespes Agreement has an impact not only on relations between Greece and FYROM but also affects the relationship between Greece and the US as well as . The US is openly supporting the Prespes Agreement in order for FYROM (under its new name North Macedonia) to enter NATO. By contrast, Russia opposes the deal and believes FYROM’s NATO membership will strengthen US presence in South Eastern Europe following that of Montenegro in August 2017. Against this backdrop 2018 saw Greek-American relations flourish while Greek-Russian ones suffered by a serious crisis. The Balkan Peninsula has been a field of American-Russian rivalry and Greece could not but take sides.

With reference to Greek-American relations, Washington is considering Athens a reliable ally in a turbulent region. The perplexed nature of Turkish-American relations along with the Russia’s deepening involvement in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans has pushed the US to boost its partnership with Greece. The inaugural strategic dialogue launched in December is indicative. According to the official statement, the US lauded Greece’s leadership and vision in promoting regional stability and cooperation, in particular the latter’s initiatives in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Balkans to facilitate common regional economic and security benefits, as well as in reaching the Prespes Agreement with Skopje and working towards its implementation. Among other things, the two sides expressed their desire to modernize and expand their multifaceted defense relationship in order to better meet their

2 needs and to more effectively address regional and global security challenges, citing recent successes in combined joint training and security exercises, and an increase in joint activities.

By contrast, Greece and Russia experienced an unprecedented misunderstanding in 2018 taking their cultural and historical proximity into account. Specifically, Athens accused Moscow of intervening in its internal affairs and decided to expel Russian diplomats in the summer. For its part, Russia responded by expelling Greek diplomats. The tone of announcements in the Greek and Russian Foreign Minister became aggressive and the visit of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov to Athens was cancelled. Although no improvement could be easily expected in the autumn, Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras travelled to Moscow in December and met with President Vladimir Putin. The two leaders discussed the summer crisis and decided to make steps in order to restore trust. The meeting was successful but it remains to be seen whether Greek-Russian relations can return to normalcy indeed. In December Premier Tsipras and President Putin also talked about the possibility of Turkish Stream pipeline to be extended in Greece and transport Russian natural gas to Europe. It is difficult for this project to be realized though because the European Commission will hardly grant permission.

Concerning other developments in the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece, Israel and Cyprus continued their institutional dialogue. Two tripartite summits took place in 2018, the first in May in Nicosia and the second in December in Beersheba. Prime Ministers Alexis Tsipras Benjamin Netanyahu as well as President Nicos Anastasiades agreed to establish a permanent secretariat to be based in Nicosia and to proceed with the construction of the East Med pipeline. The three countries intend to collaborate on cybersecurity, smart cities, innovation with emphasis on supporting young entrepreneurs, education, environmental protection, research on agriculture, meteorology, health, and tourism. The Beersheba summit was attended – for the first time – by US Ambassador to Israel David Friedman who said a few words on behalf of President Donald Trump. His participation added gravitas to the trilateral collaboration scheme.

With reference to Greek-Turkish relations, the first semester of the year was marked by tensions in the Aegean. The likelihood of a military accident had been widely discussed as Turkey was heading towards its June presidential election. The arrest of two Greek soldiers and their detention – without charges – by Turkish authorities further fueled tensions but the crisis scenario was finally averted. In the aftermath of the Turkish presidential election and President’s Tayip Erdogan victory the bilateral relationship was improved in comparison to the first semester. The meeting between Prime Minister Tsipras and President Ergodan on the sidelines of the NATO Brussels summit in July was catalytic. The two Greek soldiers, for

3 example, were released in August and returned to Greece. But the violation of the Greek airspace by Turkish jets has remained a recurrent feature. More importantly, Athens has been skeptical about Ankara’s tactics to violate the Greek continental shelf and block natural gas discoveries in the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone. Until now the US has preferred to adopt a policy of equal distances.

Last but not least, 2018 was a fruitful year for Sino-Greek relations. Former Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Kotzias visited Beijing in August and met with his counterpart and State Councilor Wang Yi. They jointly signed a memorandum of understanding on inter- governmental cooperation in the joint construction of the Belt and Road Initiative. Greece thus became the first developed Western nation to ink such a deal with China. Additionally, in September 2018 the new Ambassador of China to Greece Zhang Qiyue presented her credential to the Greek President Prokopis Pavlopoulos and succeed Ambassador Zou Xiaoli. Despite the good momentum throughout the year some obstacles undermining the advancement of the Sino- Greek partnership have not been overcome. The most important one is the delay in the approval of COSCOs’ master plan aiming at developing the Piraeus port.

Conclusion

If there is a person who was the driving force behind Greece’s initiatives in world politics in 2018, this was Nikos Kotzias. The Prespes Agreement, the strengthening of Greek-American relations and the improvement of the Sino-Greek partnership could not have been achieved without his spirit and systematic work. Of course, Kotzias was also the one who initiated the Greek-Russian diplomatic crisis when he decided to react against what he saw as an intervention of Moscow in Greek domestic politics. Kotzias resigned in October 2018 following rounds of disagreements with Defense Minister over the Prespes deal. Premier Tsipras, who also undertook the portfolio of foreign affairs, elaborated on an improvement of Greek- Russian relations towards the end of the year. In the handover ceremony Tsipras praised Kotzias’ ‘patriotic duty’ and his insistence on a proactive and multidimensional foreign policy.

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