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When Signaling Status Backfires:

How Signals of Self-Interest Undermine Cooperation

SHALENA SRNA

ALIXANDRA BARASCH

DEBORAH A. SMALL

Shalena Srna ([email protected]) is an Assistant Professor of Marketing, Ross School of Business, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109. Alixandra Barasch ([email protected]) is an Assistant Professor of Marketing, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, New York University, New York, NY 10012. Deborah A. Small ([email protected]) is the Laura and John J. Pomerantz Professor of Marketing and Professor of Psychology, the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA 19104. This research was supported in part by the Wharton Behavioral Lab and the Ackoff Doctoral Student Fellowship Program. Supplemental materials are included in the web appendix accompanying the online version of this article. 2

Abstract

Since Veblen (1899), signaling status through conspicuous consumption is presumed to be socially advantageous. Given the myriad of social benefits granted to high-status individuals, it behooves people to ensure that others can observe their wealth and status. In the present research, however, we examine when it is strategically better to be modest. We demonstrate that signaling status conveys self-interested motivation, which is inherently at odds with prosocial motivation. As a result, people cooperate to a lesser degree with status-signalers because they expect that those individuals are less cooperative. Furthermore, people show some awareness of the benefits of modesty and refrain from signaling status when they desire to induce others to act cooperatively. Thus, despite theory and evidence of the social value of signaling status, when the goal is cooperation, signaling status backfires.

Keywords: status, signaling, conspicuous consumption, bragging, altruism, self-promotion, luxury

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The desire to achieve high status is considered to be a universal and fundamental drive

(Anderson, Hildreth, and Howland 2015; Fiske and Taylor 2008; Frank 1999; Huberman, Loch, and Önçüler 2004). This makes sense given that status typically provides myriad social benefits.

People with high status have greater social influence, power, and access to other resources (Ball and Eckel 1996; Ball et al. 2001; Lin 1990; Lovaglia 1995, 1997; Moore 1968; Nelissen and

Meijers 2011; Ridgeway and Balkwell 1997; Thye 2000).

Yet, people can only reap the benefits of high status if others know that they have it.

Since status itself is unobservable, it needs to be communicated, or signaled to others. One common means of signaling status is through the conspicuous consumption of luxury goods

(Drèze and Nunes 2009; Eastman, Goldsmith, and Flynn 1999; Griskevicius et al. 2007; Mandel,

Petrova, and Cialdini 2006; Rucker and Galinsky 2008). The high monetary cost and the visibility of luxury convey economic status to others, thus enabling the social advantages of having status (Miller 2009; Saad 2007; Veblen 1899).

Whereas past research has overwhelmingly emphasized the social advantages of signaling status, we argue that signaling status is not universally advantageous. Specifically, signaling status involves putting the self above others. Doing so communicates self-interested motivation, which in people’s minds is diametrically opposed to prosocial motivation (Barasch,

Berman, and Small 2016; Lin-Healy and Small 2013). As a result, we propose that it is disadvantageous to signal status in environments where a consumer benefits from appearing prosocial.

In this paper, we examine how signaling status can backfire and result in negative outcomes for the self in cooperative contexts. The next section presents theoretical background for why signaling status may not always be advantageous. We then report a series of controlled 4 experiments that test our theorizing and conclude with a discussion of the findings and their implications. Finally, we suggest future directions for research in this area.

Signaling status through conspicuous consumption

In The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study in the Evolution of Institutions

(1899), Thorstein Veblen coined the term “conspicuous consumption” to refer to the public display of economic status via the acquisition of luxury goods and services. Such purchases provide utility beyond any hedonic or utilitarian value simply by enabling consumers to signal their status to others and thus improve their social standing.

Nowadays, the ubiquity of status signaling via conspicuous consumption is evident by the demand for luxury (Eastman et al. 1997). Indeed, the global market for luxury goods is a $310 billion industry (D’Arpizio et al. 2017). Many luxury brands thrive by including distinctive logos or other characteristics (e.g., Burberry’s plaid) that serve as social signals of status (Han, Nunes, and Drèze 2010). For example, a recent field experiment in Indonesia found that high-income customers were more likely to purchase a credit card marketed as “the platinum card” than a nondescript card with identical benefits (Bursztyn et al. 2018).

Research on conspicuous consumption in marketing has primarily focused on who engages in it and how they do it. People who engage in conspicuous consumption tend to have a high need for status, which can be triggered by a number of factors. For example, people who are asked to identify with a low status group (Ivanic, Overbeck, and Nunes 2011; Mazzocco et al.

2012), who are socially excluded (Lee and Shrum 2012), or who experience existential anxiety

(Arndt et al. 2008) subsequently desire to attain high status products. Similarly, people who feel 5 they have low power or status conspicuously consume as a means of compensating for these shortcomings (Braun and Wicklund 1989; Rucker and Galinsky 2008). Furthermore, conspicuous consumption is triggered by beliefs among less-wealthy consumers that spending on luxury will lead to greater upward mobility (Ordabayeva and Chandon 2010). Finally, in certain domains, gender differences in conspicuous consumption emerge because of the different determinants of status for men versus women (Griskevicius et al. 2007; Kenrick and Griskevicius

2013; Melnyk and van Osselaer 2012; Otterbring et al. 2018; Stokburger-Sauer and Teichmann

2013; Sundie et al. 2011; Wang and Griskevicius 2014)

How do consumers conspicuously consume? By definition, they choose luxury goods and services that are observable to others (Bearden and Etzel 1982; Kastanakis and Balabanis 2014;

Melnyk and van Osselaer 2012; Rucker and Galinsky 2008). Individuals who aspire to be high status may choose to consume loud luxury goods that are recognizable to everybody, while wealthy individuals often prefer to differentiate themselves from the mainstream by choosing subtler goods that are only recognizable to other high-status consumers (Berger and Ward 2010;

Feltovich, Harbaugh, and To 2002; Han et al. 2010). Moreover, when individuals cannot reasonably afford high-end goods, they may instead purchase counterfeits (Wilcox, Kim, and

Sen 2009). Finally, beyond luxury or the appearance of luxury, other goods and services have come to convey culturally-specific status, such as green products (Griskevicius, Van den Bergh, and Tybur 2010), altruistic signals (Berman et al. 2015), or products that convey non-conformity

(Bellezza, Gino, and Keinan 2013). Thus, consumers strategically signal status depending on their expectations about the meaning of particular symbols to different groups.

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The social consequences of conspicuous consumption

Relatively less research has examined the consequences of signaling status. Yet an implicit assumption of the Veblen account is that the signal value associated with conspicuous consumption is positive. Indeed, most empirical work highlights the myriad benefits of signaling status. Research on person perception finds that perceived status is associated with competence

(Fiske et al. 2002), and that affluence is positively associated with personal abilities (e.g., intelligence, self-discipline), sophistication, and a desirable lifestyle (Christopher and Schlenker

2000). Consistent with these perceptions, signaling status can be an effective strategy for social influence. For instance, people who wear upper-class clothing (e.g., business suits) are more successful negotiators (Kraus and Mendes 2014). Likewise, people comply with and defer to people with high-status logos on their clothing (Lee, Ko, and Megehee 2015; Nelissen and

Meijers 2011). Finally, at least in the short-run, men who conspicuously consume are perceived as more desirable to potential mates (Sundie et al. 2011).

In spite of the social advantages of signaling status, recent work suggests possible negative consequences. For example, in certain contexts for which there is a communal norm, conspicuous consumers are perceived as less warm and more competitive (Fiske et al. 2002;

Scott, Mende, and Bolton 2013). Similarly, luxury consumption can signal arrogance (McFerran,

Aquino, and Tracy 2014), and wealthy people are sometimes seen as less considerate and less likable (Christopher and Schlenker 2000).

In addition, status signaling through conspicuous consumption is a form of impression management, which can lead to disliking of an individual who does it, as well as the brand itself

(Ferraro, Kirmani, and Matherly 2013). People judge materialistic consumers as selfish and 7 prefer not to interact with them (Van Boven, Campbell, and Gilovich 2010). Moreover, individuals who are overly concerned with their appearance are viewed as less moral because people believe that those individuals are trying to misrepresent their true selves (Samper, Yang, and Daniels 2017) and see it as diagnostic information about their underlying character

(Tannenbaum, Uhlmann, and Diermeier 2011). More generally, people do not like braggarts

(Berman et al. 2015; Godfrey, Jones, and Lord 1986; Holtgraves and Srull 1989; Powers and

Zuroff 1988; Rudman 1998; Scopelliti, Loewenstein, and Vosgerau 2015; Tal-Or 2010).

Although braggarts have the intention of making others value them more, this behavior can also be detrimental for how they are perceived.

Building on this previous work, we argue that in spite of the many positive inferences that stem from status itself, signaling status may also lead to inferences that an individual is selfish. By definition, status is zero-sum and a relative distinction (Huberman et al. 2004;

Mazzocco et al. 2012; Ordabayeva and Chandon 2011; Shalev and Morwitz 2011). That is, not everyone can be high in status. If a person has high status, others must have less of it (Podolny

2005). Moreover, gains in status necessarily come at the expense of others’ status. As such, signaling status may imply that an individual is willing to sacrifice others’ welfare for their own benefit.

Thus, we propose that status signaling will be seen as an indicator of self-interested motivation because it involves putting the self above others. Self-interest is incompatible, in people’s minds, with prosociality (Barasch et al. 2016; Critcher and Dunning 2013; Lin-Healy and Small 2013; Newman and Cain 2014). As such, we propose that those who signal status will be evaluated as less prosocial than those who forego status signals.

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H1: Individuals will perceive consumers who signal status as less prosocial, compared to consumers who do not signal status.

Implications of status signaling for cooperation

Building on this trait inference, we expect that status signaling will backfire in cooperative contexts. That is, if status signaling conveys that a person is less prosocial, others may expect status signalers to be less prone to cooperate, and then respond in kind.

Consider a prisoner’s dilemma, a game that models cooperative decision making in the real world. In this game, people face trade-offs between cooperating with others and acting in their own self-interest (i.e., defecting). A player’s dominant strategy is to defect (regardless of what their partner does), and a player’s payoffs are always higher if the other player cooperates.

However, the best joint outcome occurs when both players cooperate.

In sequential prisoner’s dilemmas, players tend to reciprocate the decision of the previous player (i.e., tit-for-tat): if Player A cooperates, then Player B tends to cooperate; if Player A defects, then Player B tends to defect (Andreoni and Miller 1993; Rand and Nowak 2013).

However, if Player B does not observe the decision of Player A, then Player B may infer something about Player A and make their best guess about what Player A’s behavior is going to be (Levine et al. 2018). Thus, to the extent that Player B infers that Player A will act prosocially

(i.e., cooperate), then Player B will reciprocate with cooperation, even in the absence of knowing

Player A’s behavior with certainty. On the other hand, to the extent that Player B infers that

Player A will act selfishly (i.e., defect), then Player B will reciprocate with defection. 9

Thus, if status signaling is associated with lower prosociality, then we expect that Player

As who signal status will be seen as more likely to defect, a selfish action.

H2: Individuals will predict that consumers who signal status will be less likely to cooperate compared to consumers who do not signal status.

The logic outlined above generates two behavioral predictions, which follow from the inferences and beliefs about status signalers. First, Player Bs will be less likely to cooperate with Player As who signal status than with Player As who do not. Second, when given a choice of partners for a cooperative task, Player Bs will be more likely to avoid Player As who signal status. Both of these predictions stem from Player Bs’ inferences about Player As’ traits (that they are less prosocial; H1), and Player Bs’ beliefs about how Player As might behave in a cooperative task

(that they are less likely to cooperate; H2).

H3a: Individuals will cooperate less with consumers who signal status compared to consumers who do not.

H3b: Individuals will be less likely to choose consumers who signal status as partners for cooperative tasks compared to consumers who do not signal status.

Finally, if people recognize status signals as indications of self-interest, then they might also think strategically about how they themselves appear in the eyes of others when they signal status. That is, if a person anticipates a cooperative interaction with someone else, then it 10 behooves them to refrain from signaling status so that the other person will not infer that they will act selfishly. We refer to this as “strategic modesty” and test whether people’s status signaling choices depend on the expectation of a cooperative task.

H4: Consumers will be less likely to signal status when anticipating a cooperative task than when no cooperative task is expected.

In sum, we build on the extant literature by examining the consequences, most notably the negative consequences, of signaling status through conspicuous consumption. In Studies 1a-

1c, we examine people’s inferences about status signalers’ prosociality. Across Studies 2-5, we use a prisoner’s dilemma game paradigm to examine people’s actual cooperation decisions, and operationalize status signaling as a partner’s choice to include a high-status brand logo on an avatar that is displayed during the game. In Study 2, we examine people’s decisions to cooperate as a function of whether their partner signals status or not. In Study 3, we use a similar research design as Study 2 but also give people the choice to signal status to their partner in advance of their cooperation decision. This allows us to test whether people’s own preferences for status signaling affect how they react to a partner’s status signaling decision. In Study 4, we examine who people choose as a partner for a prisoner’s dilemma game, as a function of whether a potential partner signals status. Finally, in Study 5, we explore whether people demonstrate awareness about what status signaling conveys and thus strategically avoid status signals in cooperative contexts. 11

In all studies, our sample size was determined in advance, and we report all measures assessed. No conditions or participants were dropped from any of the analyses (Simmons,

Nelson, and Simonsohn 2011).

Studies 1a-1c

In Studies 1a-1c, we test Hypothesis 1 about trait inferences as a function of status signaling. Specifically, in all studies participants evaluate an individual based on an image and/or description that sometimes contained a status signal and sometimes did not. Based on our theory, we expected that individuals signaling status would be perceived as more self-interested, and therefore evaluated as less prosocial than individuals not signaling status.

For conciseness, we report only the key methodological details, measures, and results below. Additional details, including exact wording of instructions and manipulations as well as exploratory measures, can be found in the Supplemental Materials.

Study 1a

In Study 1a (N = 401; 56% female; mean age = 29.55), participants viewed a photo of a young man and were given some background information about this individual, which was held constant across conditions and was intended to obfuscate the actual purpose of the study. The photos were also identical except that in the status signal condition, the man’s shirt contained a high-status brand logo (Polo Ralph Lauren) whereas in the control condition, his shirt had no logo.

After reading the description and looking at the photo, participants evaluated the man on a number of dimensions. The two key outcomes of interest are items intended to capture perceived prosociality, specifically moral character and cooperativeness. For perceived moral character, participants indicated the extent to which they thought the individual was nice, 12 generous, good, and sincere (α = .92; Barasch et al. 2014). For perceived cooperativeness, participants indicated the extent to which they thought the individual: usually tries to imagine himself in other people’s shoes so he can understand them, would rather be kind than get revenge when someone hurts him, feels that people involved with him have to learn how to do things his way (reverse coded), and believes that everyone should be treated with dignity and respect even if they seem to be unimportant or bad (α = .75; Cloninger, Svrakic, and Przybeck 1993). All items ranged from 1= Not at all to 7= Extremely. Moral character and perceived cooperativeness were highly correlated (r = .67, p < .001), but loaded on separate factors in a principal axis factor analysis.

As a manipulation check of signaling status, participants indicated to what extent the individual likes to show off when he gets the chance, likes to impress others, and is trying to signal his status (1= Not at all, 7= Extremely; α = .89). Confirming the manipulation of the conspicuous brand logo as a status symbol, participants perceived that the target with the logo signaled status more (M = 4.95, SD = 1.22) than the same target without the logo (M = 4.22, SD

= 1.37; t(399) = 5.61, p < .001)

T-tests on both perceived moral character and perceived cooperativeness supported our predictions. Participants perceived the target with the logo to be less moral (M = 4.47, SD =

1.06) than the target without a logo (M = 4.74, SD = 0.94; t(399) = -2.64, p = .009). Similarly, participants perceived the target with the logo to be less cooperative (M = 3.91, SD = 1.04) than

1 the target without a logo (M = 4.38, SD = 1.00; t(399) = -4.59, p < .001).

1Although we sought to hold constant how participants would perceive the wealth of the target individual through the background description of him, judgments of wealth were still affected by the high-status logo (M status signal = 4.30, SD status signal = 1.26; M control = 3.90, SD control = 1.23; t(399) = 3.22, p = .001). Nonetheless, when we statistically controlled for perceived wealth, the results do not change. Specifically, the effect on perceived moral character and cooperativeness remained statistically significant (moral character: F(1, 398) = 5.85, p = .016; cooperativeness: F(1, 398) = 15.52, p < .001). 13

Study 1a provides initial support for Hypothesis 1 using a naturalistic representation of a status signal. However, the brand logo might also have led to additional inferences that could explain the pattern of results. First, the logo in this experiment was Ralph Lauren; therefore, any effects could be specific to this particular brand and its unique personality traits (Aaker 1997).

Second, it could be that any showy aspect of appearance, even if not associated with high status, would lead to the inferences we found. In Study 1b, we attempt to address each of these issues by avoiding reference to a specific brand, and by distinguishing between attention-grabbing clothing that is high status versus that which is not.

Study 1b

Study 1b (N = 301; 48% female; mean age = 37.82) further investigates perceptions of conspicuous consumption. Rather than presenting participants with a visual image of a natural status symbol, in this study we presented a description of a person and explicitly described that they were motivated to either signal status or be modest. We also included an additional comparison condition in which the target dressed in a flashy way to show off their unique personality. We theorize that inferences about prosociality are harmed by signaling status over and above any effect of the desire to grab attention by signaling individuality. This is because of the unique associations between status signaling and self-interest.

All participants read the same short description of a target individual who dresses fashionably. In the status signal condition, they learned that this individual wears “seemingly expensive clothing (e.g., with obvious brand logos) because they want to demonstrate their wealth to others.” In the flashy condition, they learned that this individual wears “flashy clothing because they want to demonstrate their unique personality to others.” In the modesty condition, 14 they learned that this individual wears “seemingly inexpensive clothing (e.g., without any obvious brand logos) because they want to be modest about their wealth.”

To control for inferences about wealth and other personal characteristics, we told participants that this individual is single, earns $100,000 a year, has $30,000 in savings, lives in a rental apartment, grew up in Chicago, and likes to go for long runs.

We measured the same two sets of items to capture moral character and cooperativeness judgments as in Study 1a).2 One-way ANOVAs revealed significant overall effects on both measures (Fmoral(2, 298) = 47.01, p < .001; Fcooperative(2, 298) = 74.48, p < .001). Replicating

Study 1a, participants rated the target who signaled status as less moral (M = 3.68, SD = 1.06) and less cooperative (M = 3.25, SD = 1.17) than the target who was modest (M = 5.16, SD = 0.98 and M = 5.26, SD = 1.00, respectively; moral: t(200) = -9.68, p < .001; cooperative: t(200) = -

11.88, p < .001). Participants also perceived the flashy target as less moral (M = 4.33, SD = 1.21) and less cooperative (M = 3.84, SD = 1.40) than the modest target (moral: t(197) = -5.42, p

< .001; cooperative: t(197) =-8.34, p < .001). However, the target who signaled status was judged as even less moral and less cooperative than the flashy target (moral: t(199) = -4.23, p

< .001; cooperative: t(199) = -3.49, p = .001).3

Study 1b provides additional evidence that people perceive those who conspicuously consume as a means to signal status as less moral and less cooperative than those who are modest. Importantly, status signalers are also seen as less moral and cooperative than those who

2In this and all subsequent studies, we did not measure the item “this person feels that people involved with him have to learn how to do things his way” as part of the cooperativeness scale due to a low factor loading in the previous study. 3Although we presented precise, controlled wealth information across conditions, perceptions of wealth were unexpectedly affected by the experimental manipulation (F(2, 298) = 3.16, p = .044). Controlling for this measure in the key ANCOVAs does not change any results (see supplemental materials).

15 wear flashy clothes to show off their uniqueness. This suggests that the inferences from luxury brand logos are not simply because wearing such logos is flashy or attention-grabbing, but because they are conspicuous signals of status.

The previous two studies only examined one type of status signaling: a high-status brand logo. In Study 1c, we extend our test of status signaling to a number of different contexts within and outside the domain of conspicuous consumption. In addition, while we attempted to control for actual status in the previous studies, our status signaling manipulation still had an effect on perceived wealth. In the next study, we carefully hold constant the status of the target, while just varying the signaling of that status.

Study 1c

In Study 1c (N = 201; 55% female; mean age = 36.68), we examined a variety of different types of status signals. Although not our primary hypothesis, we also manipulated the intentionality of the signal. This enabled us to examine whether inferences of prosociality were due to the presence of a signal, or the signaler’s motives. We expected that signaling status will only lead to lower inferences of prosociality when the signal was intentional, since an unintentional signal should not be seen as diagnostic of someone’s character.

Participants evaluated four different individuals in a 4(within subject: scenario) ×

2(between subject: status signal vs. modest) × 2(between subject: intentional vs. unintentional).

For each scenario, the target was always described as having or doing something of significant value that would indicate their status in some domain: (i) owning a $600 designer bag, (ii) winning a marathon, (iii) donating a large amount to charity, and (iv) receiving a prestigious work award. 16

The first between subject factor was whether status was signaled or not. The second factor was whether the status signaling was done intentionally or unintentionally. Specifically, (i) for owning an expensive bag, we varied whether it was described as containing a visible high- status logo or no obvious logo, and whether the owner was described as either purchasing the bag herself or receiving the bag as a lottery prize. (ii) For winning a marathon, we varied whether this information was posted on Facebook or not, and whether the recipient or the race organizers wrote the post. (iii) For donating to charity, we varied whether this information was posted on Facebook or not, and whether the donor or the charity wrote the post. (iv) For receiving a prestigious award, we varied whether the award was displayed publically or privately, and whether the recipient or the recipient’s supervisor was the one displaying the award. After reading each scenario, participants evaluated the individual’s moral character using the same scale from the previous studies (all αs > .85).4

Although the magnitude of the effect differed by context, the pattern was consistent and significant in each of the four contexts (see Figure 1). Using a repeated measures ANOVA, we found that participants perceived the target who signaled their status as less moral (M = 4.76, SD

= 1.05) than the target who did not (M = 5.21, SD = 1.13; F(1,197) = 21.26, p < .001). There was no main effect of intentionality (F(1,197) = 1.78, p =.184). However, consistent with our prediction, there was an interaction between the status signaling and intentionality (F(1,197) =

9.03, p = .003). Specifically, replicating the previous studies, we find that status signalers are viewed as less moral (M = 4.54, SD = 1.04) than the modest targets when that signal was intentional (M = 5.30, SD = 1.19; t = 5.39, p < .001). However, when the signal was unintentional, there is no longer a negative effect of status signaling (t = 1.13, p = .259).

4This study was the first study we conducted and did not include a measure of cooperativeness. 17

Looked at another way, participants evaluated the targets who intentionally signaled status as less moral (M = 4.54, SD = 1.04) than those who signaled status unintentionally (M =

4.97, SD = 1.01; t = 3.03, p = .003). Yet, for the targets who did not signal, intentionality had no effect on judgments (t = 1.20, p = .233).

Figure 1: Evaluations of the target’s moral character by scenario and condition in Study 1c Modesty Status signal 7 *** 6.2 6.1 5.9 *** ** 6 5.4 *** 5.1 5.3 4.8 4.9 4.7 4.7 4.7 5 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.4 3.9 4

3 Moral character Moral

2

1

Intentional signal Intentional signal Intentional signal Intentional signal Intentional

Unintentional signal Unintentional signal Unintentional signal Unintentional signal Unintentional Owning a designer bag Winning a marathon Donating to charity Winning a work award

Note: ** p < .01, *** p ≤ .001

Discussion

Taken together, Studies 1a-1c support Hypothesis 1, providing evidence that people perceive those who signal status as less prosocial (i.e., less moral and less cooperative) than those who are modest. In Study 1a, we demonstrate this using an image-based representation of a target person to capture how people naturally observe conspicuous consumption. In Study 1b, we 18 show that inferences about status signaling are not purely a result of attempts to grab attention or be flashy. In Study 1c, we demonstrate this effect holds across a variety of forms of status signaling, holding constant actual status. Further, we show that there is only a penalty of signaling status when the signal is intentional.

Study 2

Study 1 demonstrates that status signaling can affect inferences of prosociality. Study 2 extends this finding by examining how a partner’s decision to signal status affects participants’ decisions of whether to cooperate with that partner. We further test whether these cooperation decisions are mediated by predictions of what the partner will do themselves, and by inferences of the partner’s prosociality.

Methods

Three hundred and three paid online participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT;

35% female; mean age = 35.10) were asked to complete a tedious task. The task required participants to solve captchas by typing the correct letters of seven-letter words that were visually obscured (see example in supplemental materials).

Participants were told they would be working on this task with another participant. In a variation of a prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game, participants could choose how to allocate work by transferring units of work to their partner.5 In this task, transferring units of work represents the self-interested choice (i.e., defection). If both participants cooperated (did not transfer work), they would each have to complete only 30 units of work. If they both defected, they would each have to complete 60 units of work. If only one of them defected, the player who cooperated

5Because we are manipulating conspicuous consumption, we used units of work rather than money as the currency for our PD game so that the outcomes of the game were not directly related to wealth. 19 would have to complete 90 units of work while the player who defected would not have to complete any (0) units. Figure 2 illustrates the incentive structure of the PD game.

Figure 2: Work based prisoner’s dilemma game used in Study 2

After passing a comprehension check about the payoffs of the game but before playing, participants were randomly assigned to one of three partner conditions. In the no information condition, the participant had no information about their partner. In each of the remaining two conditions, participants read that their partner created an avatar and chose whether to include a luxury-brand logo on their avatar’s clothing. Specifically, they viewed a list of luxury fashion brands from which their partner ostensibly chose (Prada, Gucci, Salvatore Ferragamo, Dior,

Louis Vuitton, Hermès, Burberry, and Polo Ralph Lauren). Their partner could also select an option that said: “I choose unbranded clothing”.

In the status signal condition, participants learned that the partner chose to dress their avatar in luxury-branded clothing. To ensure that participants were not evaluating based on associations to specific brands, they were not told which specific brand the partner chose. In the modesty condition, the partner selected the unbranded clothing option. Note that participants did not create avatars themselves in this study. 20

The key outcome measure of this study was whether participants cooperated in the PD game. In addition, participants indicated their belief about whether their partner would cooperate or defect, and evaluated their partner’s prosociality, which was measured by ratings of their moral character (α = .95) and cooperativeness (α = .88) using the items from Study 1b.

Finally, participants answered the same manipulation check questions from Study 1a (α

= .95). At the end of the survey, participants learned the outcome of the PD game and completed the amount of work dictated by that outcome.6

Results

Manipulation check. The results of an ANOVA revealed an effect of condition on the manipulation check (F(2, 300) = 110.03, p < .001; all contrasts p < .001). Participants evaluated their partner as most motivated to signal status when the partner chose a high-status logo for their avatar (M = 5.18, SD = 1.28), less motivated when no information was provided about such a choice (M = 3.50, SD = 1.32), and least motivated when the partner chose no logo for their avatar (M = 2.42, SD = 1.41).

Key Results. Participants cooperated differently across conditions (χ2 (2, N=303) = 13.63, p = .001; see Figure 3, Panel A). Specifically, when their partner chose to display a status signal on their avatar, 35% of participants cooperated with them, which was significantly lower than the

56% who cooperated when their partner chose modest attire for their avatar (χ2 (1, N=203) =

9.23, p = .002). Participants also cooperated more with a partner who chose modest attire than when they had no information about their partner (33%; χ2 (1, N=202) = 10.70, p = .001). There was no difference in cooperation rates between when a partner signaled status and when participants had no information about status signaling choice (χ2 (1, N=201) = 0.06, p = .804).

6For simplicity of payment administration, all participants were matched with a partner who had ostensibly cooperated at the conclusion of all PD game studies. 21

Participants’ also predicted that status signalers would be less likely to cooperate (χ2 (2,

N=303) = 14.06, p = .001; see Figure 3, Panel B). When their partner chose to display a status signal on their avatar, 32% of participants predicted their partner would cooperate, which was lower than the 58% of participants who thought their partner would cooperate when they chose modest attire (χ2 (1, N=203) = 14.04, p < .001). In the no information condition, 46% predicted their partner would cooperate which was higher than the status signal condition (χ2 (1, N=201) =

4.34, p = .037) and only marginally higher than the modesty condition (χ2 (1, N=202) = 2.84, p =

.092).

Finally, ANOVAs revealed an effect of status signaling on judgments of moral character

(F(2, 300) = 11.47, p < .001) and on cooperativeness (F(2, 300) = 13.62, p < .001, see Table 1 for contrasts).

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Figure 3: Study 2 results. Panel A represents cooperation decisions by condition. Panel B represents predictions of partner’s cooperation decision by condition.

A: Cooperation decisions **

60% 56% **

40% 35% 33%

20% % cooperation %

0% Modesty Status signal No information Partner's signal

B: Predictions of partner’s cooperation decision

58%

*

60% *** 46% 40% 32%

cooperation 20%

% predicted partner's predicted % 0% Modesty Status signal No information Partner's signal

Note: *p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001

Table 1: Evaluations of partner’s moral character and cooperativeness in Study 2

Modesty Status signal No information Dependent variable M(SD) M(SD) M(SD)

Moral character 4.82 (1.22) 4.09 (0.94)a 4.39 (1.09)a

Cooperativeness 4.76 (1.36) 3.89 (1.03)a 4.44 (1.17)b

Note: “a” indicates a significant difference from the modesty condition (ps < .01). “b” indicates a significant difference from the status signal condition (p = .001).

23

Mediation analyses. To examine whether participants’ predictions and inferences about their partner explained their decisions of whether to cooperate or defect, we performed separate mediation analyses using the following measures as mediators: predictions of partner’s cooperation (defect = 0, cooperate = 1), judged moral character, and judged cooperativeness. In each analysis, the independent variable was the signaling condition (status signal = 1, modesty =

-1) and the dependent variable was their cooperation decision (defect = 0, cooperate = 1).7 All three variables mediated the effect of status signaling on cooperation decisions (predictions:

Indirect effect = -0.18, SE = .05, 95% CI [-0.28, -0.07], Z = -3.32, p < .0018; moral character:

Indirect effect = -0.18 SE = 0.08, 95% CI [-0.35, -0.06]; cooperativeness: Indirect effect = -0.24,

SE = 0.09, 95% CI [-0.44, -0.11] (PROCESS Model 4; Hayes 2013; Herr 2018).

Discussion

The results of Study 2 are consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2. People judge status signalers as less moral and less cooperative, and they predict that status signalers are less likely to cooperate. Consistent with these judgments and predictions, they respond in kind by cooperating at lower rates with partners who chose to signal status than with partners who eschew them, supporting Hypothesis 3a. This is the case even when it is costless to include a signal of status on one’s avatar. Thus, the response to status signalers, it seems, is more about the partner’s choice to signal than about their actual wealth and status.

Study 3

7For simplicity, we report the mediations excluding the no information condition so that we can directly contrast the modesty condition with the status signal condition. However, results do not change if we include the no information condition in the mediation analyses. 8Of note, the bootstrap procedure for estimating the indirect effect is incompatible with a binary mediator. 24

Study 2 demonstrates that people cooperate to a lesser extent with status signalers.

However, it does not take into account participants’ own preferences for status symbols, and whether that affects their decision of whether to cooperate or defect with their partner. In Study

3, participants designed their own avatar and had a choice to include a high-status brand logo on their clothing, akin to the choice they observed by their partner in Study 2. By measuring participants’ own choices, we can test an alternative explanation for the previously observed effect. Specifically, it could be that participants are less cooperative with status signalers because they feel distant or dissimilar from those who choose to adorn their avatar with luxury brands. If true, then those participants who choose a high-status logo for their own avatar should be more, or at least not less, cooperative toward other status signalers.

Methods

One hundred ninety-nine paid online participants from AMT (47% female; mean age =

34.88) were instructed to create an avatar in a web application. All participants were told that their avatar would be displayed to another participant. First, participants indicated the gender, hair color, hair length, and skin tone they wanted their avatar to have. Participants then navigated to another page in which they could dress their avatar by selecting one of six different outfits and one of six different pairs of shoes. See Figure 4.

25

Figure 4: Avatar creation task in Study 3

Finally, participants could choose a brand to put on the clothing that they had selected for their avatar. The brands included were the same as those used in the Study 2 stimuli: Prada,

Gucci, Salvatore Ferragamo, Dior, Louis Vuitton, Hermès, Burberry, and Polo Ralph Lauren, or they could select “I choose unbranded clothing.” Overall, 26% of participants (n = 52) chose to put a high-status brand on their avatar’s clothing. This decision preceded the experimental manipulation and thus could not have been affected by it (and indeed was not, p = .97). 26

After creating their avatar, participants navigated to the second part of the survey and read instructions for the same PD game as Study 2. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In both conditions, participants read that their partner created an avatar and chose whether to include a high-status brand logo on their avatar’s clothing that would be displayed to their partner. In the status signal condition, the partner chose to dress their avatar in high-status branded clothing, whereas in the modesty condition, the partner chose clothing with no logo. Once again, participants in the status signal condition were not told which specific brand their partner had chosen to ensure that they were not evaluating their partner based on associations with specific brands.

The key outcome measure in this study was participants’ decisions about whether to cooperate or defect. Again, participants also indicated their belief about whether their partner would cooperate or defect, and judged their partner’s moral character (α = .94) and cooperativeness (α = .87) using the same measures as the previous study. Finally, participants answered the manipulation check questions used in Study 2 (α = .97).

Results

Manipulation check. A t-test revealed that participants evaluated their partner as more motivated to signal status when the partner chose a high-status logo for their avatar (M = 5.50,

SD = 1.09) compared to when they did not (M = 2.48, SD = 1.28; t(197) = 17.98, p < .001).

Results. We regressed participants’ cooperation decisions (defect = 0, cooperate = 1) on the condition representing their partner’s signaling choice (status signal = 1, modesty = -1), participants’ own choice to signal status (status signal = 1, modesty = -1), and the interaction.

Full regression results can be seen in Table 2. 27

First, replicating prior results, we found that people cooperated to a lesser extent when their partner signaled status (supporting H1). In addition, the regression revealed that participant’s own choice to signal status was negatively associated with their likelihood of cooperating. The interaction between their own choice to signal status and their partner’s choice was not significant. When we replaced the dependent measure of the regression with participants’ predictions of their partner’s decision (defect = 0, cooperate = 1), we found that participants own choice to signal as well as their partner’s signal each had a significant negative effect on cooperation, but did not interact. The lack of an interaction for both of these outcomes provides evidence against the similarity proposition.

Table 2: Regressions on actual and predicted cooperation decisions, and judgments of moral character and cooperativeness in Study 3 1 2 3 4 Participant's Participant's Judgments of Judgments of cooperation prediction Moral Cooperativeness decision about their Character partner's cooperation decision Constant -0.48* (0.19) -.18 (.17) 4.69*** (.08) 4.79*** (.09) Partner's signal -0.44* (0.19) -.42* (.17) -.22**(.08) -.32*** (.09) Participant's signal -0.61** (0.19) -.48** (.17) .06 (.08) .07 (.09) Partner's signal × Participant's signal -0.18 (0.19) .08 (.17) .16# (.08) .22* (.09) R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11

Note: We used logistic regression in columns 1 and 2 and linear regression in columns 3 and 4. Signals are coded such that status signal = 1 and modesty = -1. The dependent variable for the first two columns is coded such that defect = 0 and cooperate = 1. # p = .052, * p < .05. ** p < .01, *** p < .001

28

Figure 5: Cooperation decisions in Study 3

59% 60%

47%

38%

40% % cooperation% 20% 15%

0% modest partner status-signaling modest partner status-signaling partner partner participant who chose modest attire (n=147) participant who chose to signal status (n=52)

We next regressed participants’ evaluations of their partner’s moral character and cooperativeness on the same predictors. We observed an effect of partner’s signaling choice such that status signalers were evaluated as less moral and less cooperative, and we observed no effect of the participant’s own choice. For both dependent variables, these results were qualified by an interaction between the two independent variables. Specifically, participants who chose modest attire judged the partner who signaled status as less moral and less cooperative than the partner who did not signal status. However, these effects attenuated for participants who chose to signal status themselves.9 See Table 3 for descriptives.

9Predictions of partner’s cooperation decisions, judgments of moral character, and judgments of cooperativeness all mediate the effect of signal condition on participant’s cooperation decision (see supplemental materials). 29

Table 3: Evaluations of partner’s moral character and cooperativeness as a function of whether the participant signaled status and whether the partner signaled status in Study 3 Dependent variable Modest participant Status-signaling participant Modest Status-signaling Status-signaling Modest partner partner partner partner M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) M(SD) Judgments of moral character 5.01 (.95) 4.25 (.96)*** 4.81 (.98) 4.67 (1.18) Judgments of cooperativeness 5.25 (1.02) 4.18 (1.12)*** 4.96 (1.02) 4.76 (1.18)

Note: For participants who chose modest attire (left hand columns), status-signaling partners were judged significantly less moral and cooperative than modest partners. There were no significant differences in these judgments among the participants who chose to signal status themselves (right hand columns). *** indicates a significant difference from the modest partner conditions (ps < .001).

Discussion

Study 3 replicates the findings of Study 2: participants cooperated to a lesser extent when their partner chose to signal status by dressing their avatar with a high-status logo than when their partner eschewed a status signal for their avatar. This pattern is driven by participants’ predictions of what their partner will do in the game and their judgments of their partner’s moral character and cooperativeness. In addition, Study 3 shows that this pattern holds regardless of whether participants themselves chose a high-status logo for their avatar. This finding is inconsistent with the explanation that participants are less cooperative with status signalers because they feel distant or dissimilar from them. If that were true, then we would expect participants who choose to signal status themselves to be less punitive toward other status signalers.

Interestingly, we do observe an interaction between participants’ choices to signal status and their partner’s choice when participants evaluate their partner’s moral character and cooperativeness. For these measures, participants who chose to signal status judge someone who made a similar choice as more moral and more cooperative than participants who chose not to 30 status signal. Thus, similar signaling choices do affect character judgments but nonetheless do not moderate cooperation decisions in the PD game.

Study 4

Studies 2 and 3 examined the decision to cooperate in a PD game as a function of whether one’s partner signaled status. In Study 4, we instead examine participants’ choices of who to play the PD game with as a function of whether a potential partner signals status. Just as people cooperate less with status signalers because they infer that status signalers are less cooperative, we also expect that people will be less likely to choose status signalers as partners for this game.

Methods

Two hundred and two paid online participants from AMT (44% female; mean age =

36.68) engaged in the same PD game as in the previous studies.

After passing a comprehension check but before playing, participants were randomly assigned to one of two partner choice conditions. In both conditions, participants were told that they could choose either a partner who had made an avatar, or a partner who had not made an avatar. The partner contained the experimental manipulation, whereas the partner who had not made an avatar was included as a neutral outside option. Specifically, we described that the partner who made an avatar could choose to display a high-status logo on their avatar’s clothing, which they knew would be seen by others. Similar to the previous studies, in the status signal condition, the partner who made an avatar chose to adorn their avatar’s clothing with a luxury brand, whereas in the modesty condition, the partner who made an avatar chose not to put a logo on their avatar’s clothing. 31

The key outcome measure of this study was the participant’s choice of partner for the game: between a partner who created an avatar and a partner who had not made an avatar (the neutral outside option). After choosing their partner, participants chose whether to cooperate or defect, and evaluated the person who made an avatar regardless of whether they chose that person as their partner or not. Participants then indicated their belief about whether that person would cooperate or not and judged their moral character and cooperativeness using the same measures as in the previous studies (αs > .85).10,11

Finally, participants answered the same manipulation check questions used in the previous studies with respect to the partner with an avatar (α = .93).

Results

Manipulation check. The results of a t-test showed that participants viewed partners who chose a high-status logo for their avatar as more motivated to signal status (M = 5.55, SD = 1.14) than those who did not (M = 2.96, SD = 1.36; t(200) = 14.59, p < .001).

Key Results. To examine participants’ preferences for partners in the PD game, we compared the proportion of participants who chose the avatar partner across conditions. When the avatar partner chose to signal status, 27% of participants chose to play the game with that partner over a neutral outside option. However, when the avatar partner chose modest attire, 71% of participants chose to play the game with that partner (χ2 (1, N = 202) = 40.12, p < .001).

Results for predictions about cooperation and judgments of prosociality can be found in Table 4.

10We also measured two exploratory items that asked participants how likable and how competitive they thought the person was, which are reported in the supplemental materials. 11Participants also rated the neutral partner on all above items (see supplemental materials). 32

Table 4: Evaluations of partner’s cooperation decision, moral character, and cooperativeness in Study 4 Dependent variable Modesty Status signal Prediction about partner's cooperation decision 53% 15%*** Judgments of moral character M = 4.80 (0.96) M = 3.98 (0.87)*** Judgments of cooperativeness M = 4.83 (1.07) M = 3.79 (1.03)***

Note: *** indicates a significant difference from modesty condition (ps < .001). SDs in parentheses.

Mediation analyses. To examine whether participants’ predictions and inferences about status signalers’ propensity to cooperate would explain the effects on partner choice, we conducted separate mediation analyses using the following measures as mediators: predictions of partner’s cooperation (defect = 0, cooperate = 1), judged moral character, and judged cooperativeness. In each analysis, signaling condition was the independent variable (status signal

= 1, modesty = -1) and partner choice was the dependent variable (avatar = 1, neutral = 0). All three variables mediated the effect of status signaling on cooperation decisions (predictions:

Indirect effect = -0.10, SE = .04, 95% CI [-.18, -.02], Z = -2.37, p = .018; moral character:

Indirect effect = -0.28, SE = 0.11, 95% CI [-0.57, -0.12]; cooperativeness: Indirect effect = -0.27,

SE = 0.11, 95% CI [-0.53, -0.08]; PROCESS Model 4).

Discussion

Study 4 finds that people’s inferences and predictions about status signalers also translate to their choices of whom to partner with in a PD game. People prefer partners who are cooperative and thus avoid playing with status signalers because they infer that status signaling is a negative signal for cooperativeness. This finding supports Hypothesis 3b.

33

Study 5

In Study 5, we examine whether people intuit these negative consequences and refrain from signaling status when expecting to interact with another person in a cooperative task. We compare how participants design an avatar to represent themselves across two contexts: one in which participants’ avatars will merely be shown to another participant and one in which their avatars will be shown to another participant before they play a PD game together. This way we can examine whether people are strategic about their usage of status signals over and above their baseline preference for designing a luxury-branded avatar that others will see. Thus, we test

Hypothesis 4 and predict that fewer people will choose to adorn their avatar with a high-status logo when they are motivated to evoke a cooperative response from their partner.

Methods

Two hundred and fourteen paid participants (61% female; mean age = 28.48) from a behavioral lab at a northeastern university were instructed to create an avatar in a web application that would be shown to a partner. First, like in Study 3, participants selected gender, hair, and skin tone for their avatar and then chose an outfit. Next, participants chose whether to put a luxury brand on their avatar’s clothing, or to wear unbranded clothing.

In the display only condition, participants were told that their avatar and choices would be shown to a partner, but that partner would not make any decisions with regards to them. In the cooperative task condition, prior to making their avatar, participants read the instructions describing the PD game used in the previous studies. They were told that their partner in the game would first see their avatar before making a decision in the PD game.12 Therefore, in both

12In the cooperative task condition only, participants ended the survey by choosing whether to cooperate or defect, and predicted their partner’s choice. 50% of people cooperated and 50% predicted that their partner would cooperate. These were highly correlated, r = .69, p < .001. 34 conditions, the participant’s avatar would be observable to their partner, but only in the cooperative task condition, would their partner make a decision about whether to cooperate or defect with them. Presumably, in the cooperative task condition, participants would strategically consider how their avatar choices might affect their partner’s willingness to cooperate. Our primary dependent variable in this study is whether participants chose to put a luxury logo on their avatar’s clothing.

Results

When participants only displayed their avatar with no expectation of a cooperative task,

50% of participants chose a high-status logo for their avatar. However, when they anticipated a cooperative task, only 33% of participants chose a high-status logo for their avatar (χ2 (1, N=214)

= 6.59, p = .010).

Discussion

The results of this experiment support Hypothesis 4. Specifically, people refrain from status signaling when they expect to participate in a task requiring cooperation from another person. This suggests that participants intuit that status symbols are unwise in cooperative settings. As a result, they are strategically modest when they will benefit from appearing cooperative.

General Discussion

The current research examines how signaling status can be socially disadvantageous in cooperative contexts. In our studies, we find that people who signal status are perceived as being less prosocial using a variety of stimuli representing different forms of status, including photos of targets, social media posts, descriptions on a target’s motives, and observed choices of 35 adorning an avatar with a high-status logo (Studies 1-4). These inferences have important, negative consequences for cooperation. Specifically, people cooperate less (Studies 2 and 3) and prefer not to partner with status signalers (Study 4) because they expect that those individuals are less moral and less cooperative. Furthermore, people show some awareness of the benefits of modesty and refrain from signaling status when they desire to induce others to act cooperatively

(Study 5).

Theoretical Contributions

Whereas most research on conspicuous consumption focuses on who does it and how they do it, there is little research on the consequences of status signaling. That which has been done has mostly focused on the benefits of status itself (e.g., Ball and Eckel 1996; Ball et al.

2001; Lin 1990; Lovaglia 1995, 1997; Moore 1968; Nelissen and Meijers 2011; Ridgeway and

Balkwell 1997; Thye 2000). Only recently has consumer research started to explore the downsides of status-signaling behaviors like conspicuous consumption (e.g., Ferraro et al. 2013;

Van Boven et al. 2010). The current studies contribute to this literature by examining the relationship between signaling status and prosociality. We find that people make inferences that individuals who signal status are less prosocial, and predict that they will be less cooperative.

More broadly, this work also provides new insight into how non-verbal cues affect interpersonal perception and behavior. Past research has found that people judge the personality of others based on cues from their appearances, such as their emotional displays (e.g., Barasch,

Levine, and Schweitzer 2016; Frijda 1986; Van Kleef 2009), their facial structure (e.g., Berry and McArthur 1985; Todorov et al. 2015), and their physical attractiveness (e.g., Dion,

Berscheid, and Walster 1972; Verhulst, Lodge, and Lavine 2010). We build on this literature by 36 showing how cues related to status can lead to inferences that a person is selfish, which has downstream negative consequences for cooperation.

This work also contributes to research on the determinants of cooperation using economic games (e.g., Rand and Nowak 2013). While a large body of research has studied what influences cooperation (e.g., individual differences, motivational and contextual factors), there is far less work on what people choose to signal and the impact of signals on behavior (but see Levine et al.

2018). We identify an important interpersonal cue, frequently used by consumers, that harms judgments of prosociality and decreases cooperation. Furthermore, we find these detrimental effects using a novel PD game where people can transfer work as opposed to money, and signal various traits and preferences through an avatar. These tools may be useful to future researchers studying the effects of signaling on cooperation or other actions and outcomes, especially in contexts where monetary outcomes may have special significance (as with status signaling).

Implications for Consumer Behavior and Marketers

As evident by the demand for luxury goods, signaling status through conspicuous consumption is ubiquitous (D’Arpizio et al. 2017; Eastman et al. 1997; Han et al. 2010). This demand is typically explained by the social advantages of signaling status (Veblen 1899). We do not dispute that status signals are beneficial in many contexts. However, our research suggests a more nuanced view of the social effects of status signaling. Specifically, our research cautions against using this strategy indiscriminately. When individuals signal status, they could be causing others to judge them as self-interested, which we have demonstrated can be harmful in cooperative contexts. Thus, consumers should consider how important it is for them to appear cooperative, and strategically refrain from status signaling when the goal to be perceived as prosocial dominates other goals. 37

These strategic concerns are particularly important in the era of social media, where consumers can easily broadcast their consumption choices to large audiences. Many people show off their conspicuous consumption and other status signals (accomplishments, charity work, etc.) through posts on Instagram, Twitter, and Facebook (e.g., Sekhon et al. 2015). Such posts may be beneficial for communicating that one has social capital and access to resources, but as we’ve shown, they can also backfire. A boastful post could wind up on social media accounts such as

“Rich Kids of Instagram” which highlights extreme acts of conspicuous consumption and has over 400,000 followers and countless angry comments (Swanson 2015). Celebrities and other public figures also risk their reputations when they post about their conspicuous consumption.

For instance, when Louise Linton, wife of the Treasury Secretary, posted a photo of herself on an official government visit with many luxury-brand hashtags, she was vilified on social media and in the press (Calfas 2017).

Given that the value of high status goods is diminished in cooperative contexts, marketers should consider this in deciding how and where to advertise their brands. For example, our findings suggest that it would be ineffective and possibly detrimental for a luxury marketer to target consumers who desire to appear prosocial, such as volunteers, community organizers, and public servants. Marketers might also consider promoting less conspicuous products (i.e., those without obvious status signals) in situations where consumers are expected to be selfless (e.g., charity events). Furthermore, marketers should consider how to best design loyalty or reward programs where status is often conspicuous (e.g., visible airline status lounges).

Future Directions

Across our studies, we operationalize status signaling in several different ways; yet we did not exhaustively test every type of status that could be signaled. Some forms of status 38 signaling could moderate the effects. For example, certain signals might convey types of status with more nuanced meaning. A shirt with an Ivy League logo could convey wealth but also intelligence, competence, and hard work. Similarly, social media posts of exotic travel could convey sophistication but also an adventurous nature and tolerance of cultural differences. We expect that the effects might be weaker if status is less central to the signal at hand. For instance, a Nike logo may convey some status but its dominant characteristic is athleticism, and Patagonia and Tesla may show off status while also communicating concern for the environment.

Additionally, the negative effects of signaling status in cooperative contexts may depend on the nature of the signal and its intended audience. For instance, we expect the effects to be greater when the signal is louder or flashier, and also when consumers communicate to larger audiences.

Moreover, the same signal could be interpreted differently depending on other knowledge about the signaler. People may soften their view of status signalers when they perceive that the status is deserved, or when they already have favorable impressions of the individual (e.g.,

Berman et al. 2015). In addition, acting “humbly” while signaling status at the same time might mitigate the negative effect, or it could make it worse (cf. Sezer, Gino, and Norton 2018). The gender of the status signaler may also matter in certain contexts.13

Finally, the effects of status signaling could depend on who is observing the signal. In

Study 3, we did not detect moderation based on the similarity between people’s own decisions to signal status and their partner’s decision to signal status. However, consumers may have more favorable impressions of others who signal status using specific brands (which were not revealed to observers in our experiments), especially when the consumers themselves identify with or

13We did not experimentally manipulate gender of the target in any study. However, we found support for our key prediction across both female and male stimuli in Studies 1a and 1c. The stimuli in remaining studies did not reveal the gender of the target. 39 have connections to that brand. In addition, it could be the case that reactions to status signalers depend on the judge’s own status level. For example, prior research has found that certain animals react more strongly to those who are close to them in status, leading to an inverted U in aggressive behaviors (Hobson and Dedeo 2015). Thus, if we could measure relative status across an appropriate range, we might find a similar pattern for cooperation.

In terms of the studies herein, it is important to note that we examined our predictions in a controlled environment where cooperation was the only goal and the signal of status was a salient manipulation. Such an experimental design improved the internal validity of our studies by allowing us to isolate the effect of signaling status while controlling for status itself and other inferences. However, in the real world, the same individual might signal a mix of motives, and observers accumulate information about others across repeated interactions. Future research might examine these more complex, natural settings where a variety of signals will shape impressions, and examine the relative strength of these diverse signals for prosocial inferences and behavior.

Additional work could also further explore when and why people favor modesty. In

Study 5, we find that people have some awareness that they should refrain from signaling status in cooperative contexts. However, we do not know whether consumers’ signaling choices are optimal or whether they make systematic mistakes. For instance, it could be that people overweight the benefits of signaling status even when their primary goal is something other than to appear cooperative. On the other hand, given a heterogeneous population, some people may aim to signal status to a small set of consumers who will respond positively, even though it will be perceived negatively by others. 40

In summary, although there is a myriad of advantages of signaling status, there are also disadvantages. We highlight how status signaling can have detrimental effects on cooperation, which is driven by inferences of lower prosociality and predictions that status signalers will not cooperate themselves. Thus, when the goal is cooperation, signaling status backfires. 41

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