Drawing Electoral Districts Boundaries: Between Neutrality and Political Partisanship

policy brief

DRAWING ELECTORAL DISTRICTS BOUNDARIES: BETWEEN NEUTRALITY AND POLITICAL PARTISANSHIP

•• The analysis of the electoral results from the presidential elections extrapolated to the current configuration of the single-member districts demonstrates that their boundaries were gerrymandered, which advantaged at the systemic level the key proponents of the mixed electoral system-PDM and PSRM.

•• The partisan mapping of the single-member districts (SMD) boundaries was performed mainly by squeezing the pro-European opposition voters in several constituencies, thus diminishing the total number of SMD in which the opposition candidates would be able to compete on equal footing with the incumbents and the PSRM candidates in the upcoming parliamentary elections. This approach was predominantly applied in the municipality of Chisinau and the central administrative districts of the country.

•• Recruitment of mayors within the ranks of the ruling party through various means demonstrates the centrality of the local administrative resources that PDM counts on in the upcoming parliamentary elections. Establishment of a tight political control over the local authorities hints at their potential use at district level in order to offset the party’s poor performance within the proportional component of the mixed electoral system.

Sergiu LIPCEAN, CHIȘINĂU 2018 expert IDIS „Viitorul” Drawing electoral districts boundaries: between neutrality and political partisanship Sergiu LIPCEAN About the author:

Sergiu LIPCEAN

Sergiu Lipcean is a PhD candidate in political sciences at the European University Institute, Florence, Italy and holds a master degree in Eastern European Studies from the University of Bologna, Italy. He is a graduate in political science from the National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Bucharest.

Abbreviations

SMD Single-member district IC Independent candidates PAS Action and Solidarity Party PDM Democratic Party of Moldova PSRM Socialist Party of the Republic of Moldova PLDM Liberal Democratic Party of the Republic of Moldova PCRM Communist Party of the Republic of Moldova PDA Dignity and Truth Platform Party PPEM Popular European Party of Moldova PPPN Our Party

Contents

1. Mixed electoral system and the political competition in Moldova: general overview 3 2. Methodological issues and the limits of the analysis 5 3. Gerrymandering in the demarcation of the SMD boundaries 6 4. Malapportionment of voters between electoral districts 8 5. Mixed electoral system and the local administrative resources of PDM 10 6. The effects of the local administrative resources on the electoral outcomes during presidential elections 12 7. Conclusions 15

2 Drawing electoral districts boundaries: between neutrality and political partisanship Sergiu LIPCEAN 1. Mixed electoral system and the political competition in Moldova: general overview

The electoral system reform represents one of the most toral reform, namely the extent to which political controversial institutional reforms enacted since the in- partisanship represented the benchmark in drawing dependence of the Republic of Moldova. The change the SMD boundaries in favour of the reform support- from proportional representation to the mixed elector- ers at the expense of the opposing political actors al system alters in a radical way the underlying rules of and future electoral competitors. Furthermore, this the democratic competition. Yet the manner in which analysis will also address the issue of the potential this reform was conceived and implemented raised impact of administrative resources, deployed at the many doubts concerning the necessity and timeliness lower tiers of public administration, on the electoral of its adoption. Except for the political parties that pro- competition based on the election results from the posed and enacted it, there is a general societal con- last presidential elections. In this context, it should sensus on the negative effects of the mixed electoral be underscored that I will not address two subjects system on the quality of the democratic process and which- albeit very relevant for the overall discussion the electoral competition in Moldova. The same reser- on the electoral reform- lie outside the scope of this vation was clearly expressed also by the international analysis. First, I will not analyse the implications/ actors that warned the Moldovan authorities of the in- consequences of the mixed electoral system for the appropriateness of the electoral system change and of Republic of Moldova, including its associated advan- the associated risks. tages, disadvantages, shortcomings and risks, which are sufficiently covered and scrutinized in other The topicality of the issue has spurred vivid and con- studies, reports and opinion papers1. troversial debates in society both during the draft- ing process, and after the adoption of the electoral Second, I will also overlook the issue of regulatory amendments. While the reformers have attempted shortcomings of the electoral reform, which have to convince the society of the merits of the mixed not received appropriate solutions from the gov- electoral system in strengthening the relationship ernmental authorities. These aspects have also between citizens and their representatives, the op- been dealt with in various analyses, documents and ponents of the electoral amendments have claimed opinions expressed by the representatives of civil that the replacement of the electoral system is noth- society and international organizations2. Therefore, ing but a useful tool employed by the ruling party this analysis will focus exclusively on scrutinizing (PDM) to cling to power by any means. This implied the most contentious aspect of the electoral re- the collusion between the ruling party, seconded by form, namely the application of gerrymandering the PPEM, and its declared opponent-PSRM. techniques in the delimitation of SMD boundaries. The purpose is to see whether the proponents of This brief analysis aims to shed light on and clarify the mixed electoral system disproportionally ben- one of the most controversial aspects of the elec- efited from the partisan demarcation of district

1 Valeriu Pașa, „Evaluarea funcționalității și impactului proiectelor de lege privind schimbarea sistemului electoral”/Assessment of the func- tionality and impact of the draft law on the change of the electoral system (Chisinau: Transparency International Moldova, 2017); Ion Tăbârtă, „Schimbarea sistemului electoral al Republicii Moldova: impactul asupra sistemului politic moldovenesc”/ The change of the electoral system in the Republic of Moldova: the impact on the Moldovan political system, Policy Brief (Chișinău: IDIS „Viitorul”, 2017); Ion Tăbârtă, „Deficiențe în aplicarea modului de scrutin mixt în Republica Moldova: Cazul Transnistriei”/ Shortcomings in the implementation of the mixed electoral system in the Republic of Moldova: the case of Transnistria, Policy Brief (Chișinău: IDIS „Viitorul”, July 2017); Mette Bakken și Adrian Sorescu, „Electoral System Design in Moldova” (Chisinau: USAID, Promo-Lex, May 2017). 2 Venice Commission & OSCE/ODIHR, „Republic of Moldova: Joint Opinion on the Draft Laws on Amending and Completing Certain Legis- lative Acts (Electoral System for the Election of the Parliament)”, CDL-AD (2017)012 (Venice: European Commission for Democracy through Law, June, 2017); Promo-Lex, „The effects of the mixed-member electoral system. Case study: limitation of the constitutional right to elect of the voters with no domicile or residence”, 19 September 2017; Promo-Lex, „The effects of the mixed-member electoral system case study: Students and pupils’ vote can be fate-changing at the elections in some single-member constituencies”, 24 august 2017; Promo-Lex, „Public call on the limited transparency and the flaws found in the adoption of decisions regarding the establishment of single-member constituencies”, 7 November 2017; Promo-Lex & CRJM, „Public appeal on the transparency of the activity of the National Commission for the Establishment of Permanent Uninominal constituencies”, 21 august 2017; Sergiu Lipcean, „Problems and Challenges in the Financing of Parliamentary Elections in the Context of Changing the Electoral System” (Chisinau: IDIS „Viitorul”, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, November 2017); Promo-Lex, „The Effects of the Mixed-Member Electoral System. Case Study: Situation of the Candidate from the National List of the Party, Who is, at the Same Time, an Independent Candidate in the Single-Member Districts”, 24 August 2017. 3 Drawing electoral districts boundaries: between neutrality and political partisanship Sergiu LIPCEAN boundaries. In doing so I will rely on the electoral made it possible for the PDM to forge a coalition results from the last presidential elections, which with PSRM. For the next parliamentary contest, PDM are appropriate to perform such an exercise since will file its own SMD candidates and, whether they they are candidate oriented and capture the politi- will be disguised on the other parties’ lists, compete cal preferences of the electorate at the latest point as independents, or will openly run under the PDM in time. Furthermore, I will also investigate how the logo, at least formally, they will compete with the configuration of SMD, coupled with the potential PSRM candidates. For the time being, it is difficult to use of administrative resources at the district level, conceive of an open pre-electoral coalition between might create additional opportunities for the ruling PDM and PSRM, at least this does not stem from the party to influence the electoral outcomes. official narratives of both parties, which rather dis- play a conflicting behaviour and positions to some While several analyses have partially addressed the policy issues. However, the allegations regarding above-mentioned issues, pointing to the most vul- the existence of cartel arrangements between PDM nerable aspects of the transition to the mixed elec- and PSRM, such as the split of the media advertising toral system, hinting at some possible scenarios3, it market, suggest that in relation with some crucial is not very clear how the allegedly partisan demar- subjects, they succeeded in building up a mutually cation of SMD boundaries in favour of PSRM, will in- beneficial alliance, aiming at stifling political compe- teract with the administrative power of PDM at local tition and the media pluralism. By the employment of level through the potential misuse and/or abuse of dumping practices on media advertisement market administrative resources. Moreover, it is not yet very they attempted to divert the financial resources from clear to what extent the tacit coalition between the other market players who are more independent and PDM and the PSRM will resist the test of elector- non-partisan in their coverage of political events5. al campaign. If one looks at the latest opinion poll, To what extent this undeclared coalition will remain there is an enormous gap between PSRM (26%) and consolidated over a longer time span it is difficult to PDM (2.8%) in the voting intention of the electorate4. predict. Nevertheless, the ill-fated experience of the If PSRM starts from the pole position in both the pro- previous PDM coalition partners does not rule out portional and the majoritarian components of the the possibility of defection, once the balance of forc- new electoral design, the starting position of PDM es will tilt towards one or another coalition partner. is not clear, although the majoritarian component Yet, the consolidation of PSRM is partly the result of is the one expected to entail the highest electoral the PDM’s support during the presidential elections, returns. and the post-electoral developments have revealed that, despite openly expressed ideological and geo- Consequently, the lay of the land is radically differ- political acrimonies, both parties managed to agree ent from the presidential contest in which the with- upon the distribution of some key positions requir- drawal of its own candidate from the electoral race ing the approval of the newly elected president6.

3 sic.md, „Pe placul cui au fost croite circumscripțiile?”/Who was pleased by the drawing of electoral districts, sic!, 11 December 2017; „Care partide vor fi avantajate de sistemul mixt?”/Which parties are advantaged by the mixed system?, sic!, 19 May 2017; Valeriu Pașa, „Gerry- mandering 2.0: cum au fost trasate circumscripțiile uninominale în Republica Moldova?”/ Gerrymandering 2.0: How were drawn the SMD in the Republic of Moldova? (Chisinau: WatchDog.MD, February 2018); Promo-Lex, „Promo-Lex analysis on potential issues and possible effects of the SMD establishment under the current legal provisions” (Chisinau, 23 November 2017). 4 Institute of Public Policies, „Public Opinion Barometer: November 2017” (Chisinau, November, 2017). 5 Jurnal.md, „Cum funcţionează cartelul pe piaţa publicităţii, înfiinţat de Plahotniuc în tandem cu socialiştii; Unul dintre principalele scopuri - să ţină agenţii economici departe de Jurnal TV”/ How the cartel on the advertisement market set up by Plahotniuc in tandem with the socialists works; One of the main goals - to keep economic agents away from Jurnal TV, Jurnal.md - Ca să ştii totul!, January 2018; Radio Europa Liberă, „Piaţa publicităţii televizate și înţelegerile de cartel - În așteptarea unei anchete a Consiliului Concurenţei”/ TV advertising market and the cartel agreements - Waiting for an investigation by the Antimonopoly Committee , Radio Europa Liberă, data accesării 2 martie 2018; NewsMaker, „Лидеры продаж. Как демократы и социалисты подружились сейлз-хаусами”/ Sales leaders. How Democrats and Socialists became sales house friends, NewsMaker, January 2018; „Cutia Neagră cu Mariana Rață: Cartel PDM și PSRM pe piața publici- tății TV?”/The black box with Mariana Rata: the PDM - PSRM cartel on the TV advertisement market. January 2018. 6 Dan Dungaciu, „Binomul Plahotniuc-Dodon. Cronica Unei Manipulări de Stat”/ The Plahotniuc-Dodon Binom. The Chronicle of a State Manipulation, Adevarul.Ro, May 2017. 4 Drawing electoral districts boundaries: between neutrality and political partisanship Sergiu LIPCEAN 2. Methodological issues and the limits of the analysis

While developing this analysis I used the electoral re- Thus, by combining data on the electoral outcomes sults of the first round of the presidential elections, from the first round of the presidential elections which were extrapolated to the SMD configuration with the information on the PDM strength at local in order to assess the extent of gerrymandering as level and the data on the territorial demarcation of underlying yardstick in drawing the SMD boundaries SMDs, I looked at some possible implications of the in favour of the supporters of the mixed electoral sys- electoral system reform on the electoral competi- tem. However, this approach could be applied only tion for the upcoming parliamentary elections. By with regard to PSRM. Unfortunately, given the with- using the electoral results, I analysed how the delim- drawal of the PDM candidate from the presidential itation of the SMD boundaries might have affected race it is not possible to assess its electoral strength the electoral performance of the main presidential based on results of the presidential elections. Like- candidates, representing PAS-PDA and PSRM, under wise, the results of the 2014 parliamentary elections a mixed electoral design. Likewise, I assessed the ef- are not relevant to gauge its electoral strength due fect of the PDM strength at local level on the elec- to the reconfiguration of the political spectrum as a toral performance of each candidate to check for the result of parliamentary switching of many MPs from potential bias in favour or against a certain electoral PCRM and PLDM to PDM, which led to the weaken- competitor. ing of the two parties. In the same vein, the use of the electoral results from the 2015 local elections also At the same time, it should be stressed that two is- bears the risk of being outdated. Despite the PDM’s sues affect the quality and accuracy of this analysis poor score recorded by the opinion polls, the per- – one is the methodological aspect and the second spective and expectation of replacing the propor- is related to the lack of data on the electoral strength tional representation with the mixed electoral design of PDM. Methodologically speaking, a very precise resulted in the party’s offensive towards countryside. assessment of the extent to which gerrymandering This offensive is epitomized by the party recruitment represented the chief yardstick applied to demarcate of mayors and local counsellors from other parties the SMD boundaries is troublesome and even tricky and their enrolling into its ranks, an aspect to be dis- since Moldova is at its first experience of this kind. If cussed in more detail in a separate paragraph. the mixed electoral system had been previously employed and now the task consisted only in redrawing In order to offset this shortcoming, I have complet- of the SMD boundaries, it would be easier to identify ed the data on the presidential election with the which political actors are expected to benefit mostly number of PDM mayors (as a proxy measuring party from this reconfiguration. Such conditions, however, electoral strength) from both those elected on the do not exist and any attempt to establish the SMD party list and those who had joined PDM and open- boundaries from the scratch implicitly assumes a ly expressed their new political affiliation at a later certain degree of partisanship in their delimitation. stage but before the presidential contest. Hence, in The introduction of mixed electoral system is instru- order to obtain a fuller picture of the party strength mental in maximizing the electoral odds of the re- at local level I overlapped data on the PDM mayors’ form proponents at the next parliamentary contest. from the 2015 general local elections with the data Nevertheless, the most controversial issue touches on PDM mayors retrieved from the party official upon the magnitude of using gerrymandering tech- website. However, it should be noted that even this niques in the demarcation of the SMD boundaries. information is not complete, because according to In the case of Moldova, it is imperative to empha- some claims, the actual dominance of the party at lo- size that given the large disparities in the number of cal level is much stronger due to its ability to control registered voters across administrative districts, the about 600 mayors who represent two thirds of the adoption of the mixed electoral design required the countryside mayoralties7. split of more populated administrative units and the

7 Jurnal.md, „Directorul CALM: Cei mai mulţi primari din ţară au câte două sau chiar trei dosare penale pe numele lor.”/ CALM CEO: Most mayors have two or even three criminal cases lodged against them. Jurnal.md - Ca să ştii totul!, January 2018; Radio Europa Liberă, „Viorel Furdui: În administrația publică locală s-a instituit o atmosferă foarte și foarte îngrijorătoare, de frică.”/ Viorel Furdui: In the local public administration, there is a very worrying atmosphere of fear, Radio Europa Liberă, January 2018. 5 Drawing electoral districts boundaries: between neutrality and political partisanship Sergiu LIPCEAN creation of new SMDs, taking into account the total ability to investigate more accurately the potential number of SMDs, as well as the number of registered impact of the administrative resources at local level voters in each district. This was inevitable, but the on the electoral outcomes. Even though we found task of the governmental authorities was to ensure an alternative proxy to account for the electoral the relative equality of votes in each SMD, a require- strength of PDM that might capture even better the ment, which turned out to be grossly violated since lay of the land, we don’t possess the full informa- the malapportionment, to which I will refer in a sepa- tion on the number of mayors and their distribution rate section, is far too obvious to be overlooked. across SMDs. Even so, our findings are more likely to underestimate than overestimate the impact of the Concerning the second aspect - the lack of informa- administrative power of PDM on the electoral per- tion on the PDM electoral strength - it affects the formance of the presidential candidates.

3. Gerrymandering in the demarcation of the single-mandate district boundaries

Putting aside the discussion about the necessity and no systematic evidence was provided to substantiate timeliness of adopting the mixed electoral system, this assumption with respect to all administrative dis- it is worth noting that, by default, it favours larger tricts8. However, as I will show in this section, PSRM parties, which are provided with the opportunity to emerged as the clear winner at systemic level. The consolidate their position based on the SMD com- first and the most obvious indicator proving the de- ponent. On the contrary, a mixed electoral design, lineation of the SMDs boundaries in favour of PSRM by default, disadvantages smaller parties on the (Igor Dodon) at the expense of the PAS-PDA joined same dimension; regardless of how exactly the SMD candidate (Maia Sandu) is epitomized by the gap in boundaries are drawn. This represents a structural the electoral results obtained in the first round of the disadvantage operating against smaller electoral presidential elections held under proportional rep- competitors. Obviously, the demarcation of SMD resentation, relative to the same results overlapped boundaries in a specific way may enhance or, on the on the current SMDs configuration. Hence, although contrary, weaken the built in structural advantage the electoral result obtained by Igor Dodon in the first held by a certain political party in SMD relative to round was almost 48%, while the result of Maia Sandu proportional representation. Therefore, the way in was about 39%, the extrapolation of the same elec- which the SMD boundaries are mapped out repre- toral results to the SMD configuration, indicates that sents a critical issue. Igor Dodon would have won the presidential elections already in the first round. He would have won in Except for few obvious cases such as the squeezing of 2/3 or 67% of SMDs, which represents a difference of the pro-European voters from the Chisinau’s suburbs almost 20%. On the contrary, under a mixed electoral into two SMDs aimed at freeing the space for manipu- system, Maia Sandu would have been disadvantaged, lating the boundaries in other nine SMDs constituted winning only in 1/3 or 33% of SMD compared to 39 % in Chisinau, the picture is not as clear for the rest of ad- of votes obtained under proportional representation. ministrative districts. Although the formation of some This is eloquently illustrated in figure 1, which displays SMDs, resorting to less explicit criteria, hints at the the distribution of votes in favour of each candidate at use of gerrymandering to tailor the SMDs boundaries SMD level, as well as the vote margin by which each in favour of the proponents of the electoral reform, candidate won at district level. Thus, the negative sign

8 sic.md, „Pe placul cui au fost croite circumscripțiile?”/ Who was pleased by the drawing of electoral districts, sic!, 11 December 2017; Vale- riu Pașa, „Gerrymandering 2.0: cum au fost trasate circumscripțiile uninominale în Republica Moldova?”/ Gerrymandering 2.0: How were drawn the SMD in the Republic of Moldova? (Chisinau: WatchDog.MD, February 2018); Promo-Lex, „Promo-Lex analysis on potential issues and possible effects of the SMD establishment under the current legal provisions” (Chisinau, 23 November 2017). 6 Drawing electoral districts boundaries: between neutrality and political partisanship Sergiu LIPCEAN

FIGURE 1. Electoral results from the first round of the presidential elections extrapolated to the single member electoral districts

Candidate: Igor Dodon Maia Sandu 1 -12866 2 -17636 3 -13932 4 -12183 5 -10171 6 -11357 7 -8733 8 -8484 9 -9661 10 -10225 11 -11270 12 -5054 13 -5165 14 5443 15 1175 16 -6181 17 5298 18 3597 19 -604 20 7032 21 1664 22 9108 23 -2476 24 -6384 25 -194 26 183

District number 27 693 28 -1696 District number 29 -1722 30 2065 31 -1805 32 4694 33 8813 34 -3613 35 -3002 36 -3063 37 10114 38 4960 39 1569 40 -4406 41 -598 42 -6001 43 9 44 -14066 45 -23790 46 -23869 0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000 8000 9000 Votes10000 11000 12000 13000 14000 15000 16000 17000 18000 19000 20000 21000 22000 23000 24000 Source: Author’s elaboration Votes

7 Drawing electoral districts boundaries: between neutrality and political partisanship Sergiu LIPCEAN reflects the difference by which Igor Dodon outscored ti and Orhei epitomize those administrative districts Maia Sandu, while the positive sign indicates the op- subject to the implementation of this strategy in its posite situation. The second source of gerrymander- extreme form. Since Maia Sandu obtained in these ing, although not so straightforward, springs from the districts a landslide victory, they were split in such a uneven electoral support cast in favour of each can- way that each part was attached to those SMDs in didate across the country. The concentration of the which pro-European voters were squeezed, thus re- electoral support in favour of Igor Dodon at region- sulting in much fewer SMDs in which pro-European al level, especially in the northern and the southern parties would have obtained an advantage over the administrative districts, as reflected by the top and pro-Russian voters of Igor Dodon. the bottom SMDs from the figure 1 reduces the room for gerrymandering. Conversely, the concentration of The second strategy in drawing the SMD bounda- Maia Sandu’s electoral support, predominantly in the ries consisted in a more even apportionment of the central administrative districts, offered more possibili- pro-European and pro-Russian voters across sever- ties to use gerrymandering in order to manipulate the al SMDs such as in districts № 27 (Buiucani), № 26 SMD boundaries, as demonstrated by more splits of (Center-Buiucani), № 25 (Center-Botanica ), № 41 (Le- these districts. ova-Cantemir), № 43 (Cahul) and № 19 (Orhei-Duba- sari). Both strategies are more visible if data is disag- Two strategies have been employed to achieve this gregated by the candidate’s level of electoral support goal. The first strategy resembles the one used in in each SMD. Annex 1 illustrates very eloquently this the Chisinau’s suburbs (SMD № 32 and 33), that is, distribution, showing how the central administrative the concentration of the pro-European voters in districts are split by squeezing pro-European voters fewer SMDs. Accordingly, the SMD № 14 (Telenes- in fewer SMDs. Even if this distribution theoretical- ti-Soldanesti-Orhei), № 17 (Nisporeni-Straseni), № ly affects both camps, PSRM has a clear advantage, 20 (Straseni-Orhei), № 21 (Criuleni-Dubasari), № 22 especially if one considers the potential use of the (Ialoveni-Straseni-Calarasi), № 37 (Ialoveni-Causeni) administrative and media resources. Based on these Hancesti) are representative in this respect, by pool- considerations, it becomes obvious that the demar- ing together the largest number of voters who sup- cation of the SMD boundaries was accomplished at ported Maia Sandu in the presidential elections. the expense of pro-European voters who backed the Hence, Ialoveni, Hincesti, Calarasi, Nisporeni, Telenes- candidacy of Maia Sandu.

4. Malapportionment of voters between electoral districts

One of the most contentious aspects of the SMD extent the malapportionment advantages PDM and mapping touches upon the malapportionment of PSRM – the proponents of reform – or, on the con- voters among SMDs, which undermines one of the trary, disadvantages the pro-European opposition fundamental democratic principles – equality of parties. This question is particularly relevant if one votes. As it has been shown in previous analyses, re- looks at how the extra-territorial SMDs (outside the gardless of the benchmark employed to estimate the country) were mapped out, which clearly indicates deviations from the admitted legal threshold of 10%, that pro-European opposition parties have been the law is grossly violated9. Therefore, the ballot of enormously disadvantaged, especially taking into an elector in a SMD in which there are fewer regis- account the turnout figures, for instance in Europe tered voters will weigh heavier than the same ballot and Russia. in those SMDs in which more voters are officially registered. Furthermore, in a SMD with fewer registered Yet, regarding the 46 territorial SMDs, the relation- voters, fewer cast ballots will suffice to win elections ship between malapportionment and the partisan- relative to a larger SMD. In this context, the follow- ship towards PSRM and PDM is not so clear. The with- ing question becomes crucial: whether and to what drawal of the PDM’s candidate from the electoral

9 Valeriu Pașa, „Gerrymandering 2.0: cum au fost trasate circumscripțiile uninominale în Republica Moldova?”/ Gerrymandering 2.0: How were drawn the SMD in the Republic of Moldova?. (Chisinau: WatchDog.MD, February 2018); Promo-Lex, „Promo-Lex analysis on potential issues and possible effects of the SMD establishment under the current legal provisions” (Chisinau, 23 November, 2017).

8 Drawing electoral districts boundaries: between neutrality and political partisanship Sergiu LIPCEAN

race does not allow assessing whether and how the is not surprising since the overlapping of the elec- party may benefit from malapportionment. As for toral results from the presidential elections on the PSRM, the demarcation of SMDs does not seem to SMD configuration clearly indicates that Igor Dodon indicate a systemic preferential treatment concern- would have won in 2/3 of them. Of course, the ab- ing the equality of votes as it occurred with regard sence of a clear pattern indicating the existence of a to the apportionment of the extraterritorial SMDs. If political bias in favour of PSRM does not justify per se one overlaps the votes’ difference between Igor Do- the significant disparities in the citizens’ voting pow- don and Maia Sandu from the first round of the pres- er across different constituencies. Furthermore, as idential elections on SMDs, it appears that in many mentioned-above, it is not possible to gauge the ex- SMDs in which Igor Dodon would have obtained a tent to which PDM – the key actor which lobbied the landslide victory with a difference of more than 10 change of the electoral system – would benefit from thousand ballots represent those SMD with the high- the malapportionment of voters across districts. est number of registered voters. This translates into a lower electoral power per registered voter. It seems However, if one accepts the assumption that the cit- that gerrymandering in favour of PSRM had a price izens’ voting power matters, then it is clearly higher to be paid, reflected by the lower electoral power in those SMDs with fewer registered voters. Therefore, per registered voter. This relationship is clearly seen one would expect that the main beneficiaries of the in figure 2, which displays the relationship between electoral reform would attempt to tailor the bounda- the votes’ difference between Igor Dodon and Maia ries in a way that maximizes their electoral odds. This Dodon-Sandu Diferența voturi de Sandu (y axis) and the number of registered voters in can be achieved easier in those SMDs in which the each SMD (x axis). distribution of voters between parties is more uni- form and there are no significant gaps that would be Hence, in the SMDs located above zero, Igor Dodon difficult to overcome. From this perspective, figure 2 outscored Maia Sandu, while in those below zero provides interesting clues as it underscores the fact Maia Sandu outscored Igor Dodon. Except for the mentioned in the previous paragraph that in several SMDs in which Igor Dodon would have obtained a SMDs in which Maia Sandu would have won, the vote landslide victory, the other districts are almost even- difference is minimal. Although some of them are in ly distributed between candidates regarding the dis- Chisinau, where the probability of using the adminis- parities in the voters’ electoral power. Overall, this trative resources is lower relative to countryside, the

FIGURE 2. Relationship between the number of registered voters in SMDs and the vote difference between Igor Dodon and Maia Sandu in the first round of the presidential contest* Number of votes: 57500 60000 62500 65000 45 24000 46 22000 20000 18000 2 16000 14000 1 4 3 12000 6 10000 5 10 11 8000 8 9 7 24 12 16 6000 42 13 4000 23 40 36 2000 29 35 34 28 31 41 0 25 19 26 27 43 21 -2000 30 39 15 -4000 38 18 14 Dodon-Sandu vote difference -6000 32 17 -8000 33 20 -10000 37 22 55000 55500 56000 56500 57000 57500 58000 58500 59000 59500 60000 60500 61000 61500 62000 62500 63000 63500 64000 64500 65000 65500 66000 66500 67000 Registered voters Source: Author’s elaboration

Note: Taraclia is not shown on the graph but it is the fourth SMD in which Igor Dodon won by the largest margin.

9 Drawing electoral districts boundaries: between neutrality and political partisanship Sergiu LIPCEAN difference is so tiny that may be easily removed. Fur- taining to the delimitation of the SMDs boundaries thermore, except for the SMDs located in Chisinau, but slightly disadvantaged with regard to the vot- there are few SMDs across the country where the su- ing power in some constituencies. This sacrifice was periority of the pro-European vote over the pro-Rus- made to free up the necessary space in the central sian vote is, alike, relatively small and may be cut down part of the country in order to manipulate the SMD by the use of administrative and media resources, as boundaries at the expense of the pro-European op- it happened during the presidential campaign10. In position. Furthermore, one should not neglect the addition, if one considers the number of the officially PDM interests as the political party that fully con- registered voters from the electoral register which is trolled the composition and the activity of the com- well above the number of real voters – which is a crit- mittee entitled with the SMD demarcation12. In this ical and still persisting issue – the rigging of elections regard, it is worth noting that given the PDM aggres- does not seem so unlikely anymore11. sive expansion in the direction of countryside, by the massive enrolment of mayors and local councillors Accordingly, if one approaches the issue of the SMDs from other political parties into its ranks employing configuration from this vantage point, it becomes various means, the mapping of the SMDs bounda- much clearer why PSRM was strongly favoured per- ries, as it was accomplished, gets a special twist.

5. Mixed electoral system and the local administrative resources of PDM

Beside the fact that the mixed electoral system advan- ing stations’ committees. Hence, the more extended tages large parties, it also favours the political parties the ranks of PDM mayors and councillors, the easier to with a well-developed territorial infrastructure which exercise this control. This is a crucial issue in light of inter- can rely on local administration. The control of local ad- national practice, which reveals that, in majoritarian and ministrative resources as reflected by the enrolment of mixed electoral systems lacking free and fair elections, mayors into the PDM ranks, represents currently one of the manipulation of the electoral process occurs espe- the key priorities in preparing the ground for upcoming cially at the SMD level through the control of the district parliamentary elections and highlights the importance electoral councils, whose composition is dominated by attached to the territorial domination at local level. Yet, it civil servants and budgetary employees who are under should be stressed that this expansion is not only about direct executive subordination. The OSCE/ODIHR mon- the increasing capacity of the countryside electoral mo- itoring reports provide compelling evidence in this re- bilization. It is rather about the vertical management of spect, showing how in the less democratic former-sovi- the electoral process, ranging from the control over the et republics, the administrative control at the local level nomination and composition of the district electoral creates a favourable environment to ensure the victory councils to the control over the composition of the poll- of incumbents and to harass the opposition candidates13.

10 API și CJI, „Monitorizarea mass-media în campania electorală pentru alegerile prezidenţiale 2016: Raport final 15 septembrie 2016 – 11 noiembrie 2016”/ Media monitoring in the campaign for the presidential elections of 2016: Final report 15 September 2016 – 11 November 2016 (Chișinău: Asociația Presei Independente, Centrul pentru Jurnalism Independent, 2016); Promo-Lex, „Observation Mission for the Presidential Election in the Republic of Moldova on 30 October 2016” (Chisinau: Promo-Lex, ianuarie 2017), 37-39. 11 Victor Ciobanu, „Mizerabilii.md”/The Miserables, Ziarul Național, 5 April 2016; Victor Ciobanu, „Suflete moarte sau ce facem la alegeri?”/ Dead souls or what do we do in elections, Ziarul Național, May 2016; Rise Moldova, „Cimitirul din listele electorale”/The cemetery from the electoral register, Rise Moldova, 9 September 2016. 12 Valeriu Pașa, „Gerrymandering 2.0: cum au fost trasate circumscripțiile uninominale în Republica Moldova?”/ Gerrymandering 2.0: How were drawn the SMD in the Republic of Moldova? (Chisinau: WatchDog.MD, February 2018); Promo-Lex, „Promo-Lex analysis on potential issues and possible effects of the SMD establishment under the current legal provisions” (Chisinau, 23 November 2017); Promo-Lex & CRJM, „Public appeal on the transparency of the activity of the National Commission for the Establishment of Permanent Uninominal constituencies”, 21 august 2017. 13 OSCE/ODIHR, „Russian Federation: Elections to the State Duma 7 December 2003” (Warsaw: OSCE/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 27 January 2004), 5; OSCE/ODIHR, „Russian Federation: Elections to the State Duma 4 December 2011” (Warsaw: OSCE/Of- fice for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 12 January 2012), 5-12; OSCE/ODIHR, „Republic of Azerbaijan: Parliamentary Elections 6 November 2005” (Warsaw: OSCE/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 1 February 2006), 7; OSCE/ODIHR, „Republic of Azerbaijan: Parliamentary Elections 7 November 2010” (Warsaw: OSCE/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 25 January 2011), 6-7; OSCE/ODIHR, „Republic of Kazakhstan: Parliamentary Elections 18 August 2007” (Warsaw: OSCE/Office for Democratic Institu- tions and Human Rights, 30 October 2007), 9-10; OSCE/ODIHR, „Kyrgyz Republic: Parliamentary Elections 20 February & 12 March 2000” (Warsaw: OSCE/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 10 April 2000), 8-10; OSCE/ODIHR, „Republic of Tajikistan: Elections to the Parliament 27 February and 13 March 2005” (Warsaw: OSCE/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 31 May 2005), 5-6; OSCE/ODIHR, „Republic of Tajikistan: Elections to the Parliament 28 February 2010” (Warsaw: OSCE/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 6 July 2010), 9. 10 Drawing electoral districts boundaries: between neutrality and political partisanship Sergiu LIPCEAN

FIGURE 3. Party switching of mayors to PDM

Source: Author’s elaboration

Even if one admits that the freedom of the electoral pro- inal cases, leaves no doubt about the party’s real intentions cess in the Republic of Moldova cannot be compared with in monopolizing the control over the local authorities15. If such authoritarian regimes, one could recently notice a the information on the number of mayors controlled by backslide concerning the democratic development. The the PDM is true and reaches about 600 mayors, one can fight against grand corruptions is stalling, thus bringing see that the party succeeded in expanding its ranks at the back the discussion on state capture, associated with the expense of mayors elected on the other party lists. From undermining of state institutions and their deployment less than 300 PDM mayors elected in 2015, their number to promote the agenda of narrow vested interests14. Fur- has more than doubled in a relatively short time span. Fig- thermore, the siege of the local administration via recent ure 3 illustrates the mayors’ party switching quite tellingly, attempts to restrict local autonomy, as well as the harass- albeit it does not capture the full scale of this migration ment of the non-affiliated to PDM mayors by filing of crim- and only depicts those mayors who officially unveiled their

14 Transparency International Moldova et al., „State Capture: the Case of the Republic of Moldova” (Chisinau: Transparency International Moldova, Association for Participatory Democracy, Legal Resources Center from Moldova, IDIS „Viitorul”, June 2017); Transparency Inter- national Moldova, „Schimbarea sistemului electoral înainte de alegeri – o încercare de autoconservare a guvernanților compromiși”/ The electoral system change before the elections - an attempt of self-preservation by the compromised incumbents, May 2017. 15 Radio Europa Liberă, „Viorel Furdui: În administrația publică locală s-a instituit o atmosferă foarte și foarte îngrijorătoare, de frică.”/ Viorel Furdui: In the local public administration, there is a very worrying atmosphere of fear, Radio Europa Liberă, January 2018; Radio Europa Liberă, „Viorel Furdui: Cum de se întâmplă că aceia cotaţi cu cea mai mare încredere de către cetăţeni să fie indirect considerați criminali?”/ Viorel Furdui: How does it happen that those who are the mostly trusted by citizens are indirectly considered criminals?, Radio Europa Liberă, 11 September 2017; Point.md, „Le-au promis că se vor pomeni cu droguri și muniții. Primarii PN ar fi amenințați”/ They were pro- mised to be compromised through drugs and ammunition. The Our Party mayors would be threatened, Point.md, 15 September 2017; Radio Europa Liberă, „Centralizarea descentralizării și reforma fără formă...”/The centralization of decentralization and the reform without form…, Radio Europa Liberă, January 2018; Jurnal.md, „Directorul CALM: Cei mai mulţi primari din ţară au câte două sau chiar trei dosare penale pe numele lor.”/ Most mayors have two or even three criminal cases lodged against them, Jurnal.md - Ca să ştii totul!, January 2018; Unimedia, „(video) Primarul orașului Fălești, amenințat și șantajat ca să părăsească «Partidul Nostru»”/The mayor of Falesti threatened and blackmailed to leave the Our Party , UNIMEDIA, 5 April 2017. 11 Drawing electoral districts boundaries: between neutrality and political partisanship Sergiu LIPCEAN new political affiliation and are listed on the PDM official an impressive figure and can heavily weigh in shaping the webpage. While much more countryside mayors who outcome of the future parliamentary elections. In addition, switched to PDM are not registered on the party’s website, the likelihood that the PDM’s offensive against the non-af- the magnitude of the voluntary or forced enrolment in the filiated mayors will cease is very low. On the contrary, with PDM ranks is considerable. As one can notice, while PLDM the approaching of elections, it will rather intensify. Given is the mostly affected party by this phenomenon, the the PDM poor rating in the opinion polls, which primarily PDM’s strong gravitational force equally attracted a num- affects the party’s capacity to successfully compete in the ber of PCRM mayors and former independent candidates. proportional component of the new electoral design, it will Assuming that data on the party switching of mayors is au- try to offset this handicap by focusing on the majoritarian thentic, it appears that one third of the local elected repre- competition through the extensive use of the local admin- sentatives have changed their political affiliation, which is istrative resources.

6. The effects of local administrative resources on the electoral outcomes during presidential elections

The deployment of the PDM’s administrative and me- comes, I excluded from the model those constituen- dia resources in favour of an electoral competitor was cies formed in the municipalities of Chisinau and Bal- tested in the 2016 presidential elections. Despite the of- ti, in which it is not possible to apply the same tools ficial statements expressed by the PDM leaders in sup- of administrative control relative to rural areas. I also port of Maia Sandu following the withdrawal of Mari- excluded the other three SMDs formed in Gagauzia an Lupu from the electoral race, some politicians and and Taraclia, in which the prevalence of the geopo- media claimed that Igor Dodon was the presidential litical vote leaves little room for administrative influ- candidate who actually benefited from the PDM ad- ence, even if I do not entirely rule out their potential ministrative support and favourable media coverage16. impact. Overall, there are three possible scenarios While the favourable media coverage is confirmed by in assessing the effects of the PDM’s administrative the monitoring results of the election campaign which resources in favour of the PSRM candidate: positive, demonstrated that the broadcasting outlets affiliated negative or no effects. A positive relationship, in this to PDM had clearly favoured Igor Dodon17, there was no respect, implies a better electoral performance of evidence of administrative support at local level, which Igor Dodon in those SMDs in which PDM controls a is more difficult to prove. However, the PDM’s empha- higher number of mayors. That is, the more mayors sis on colonizing the countryside mayoralties suggests PDM controls in a constituency, the more votes Igor that it matters. For this rationale, in this paragraph we Dodon is expected to receive. Vice-versa, a negative will try to identify whether there is a positive relation- relationship implies a poorer electoral performance ship between the PDM electoral strength at local lev- of Igor Dodon in those SMDs in which PDM controls el across SMDs, measured as the number of politically more mayoralties. Exactly the same potential sce- controlled mayors, and the electoral performance of narios are valid for Maia Sandu. If the PDM’s official Igor Dodon in the first round of presidential elections. declarations in support of Maia Sandu were truthful, one would expect a better electoral performance in Since we are primarily concerned with the effects those SMDs in which it controls more mayors and vice of local administrative resources on electoral out- versa. Therefore, in order to check for the presence

16 Adevarul.ro, „Sergiu Mocanu: Plahotniuc îl poate face pe Dodon preşedinte din primul tur”/Sergiu Mocanu: Plahotniuc could make Dodon president from the first round, adevarul.ro, 22 September 2016; Point.md, „Năstase: «Plahotniuc vrea să-l facă pe Dodon preşedinte din primul tur»”/Nastase: Plahotniuc wishes to make Dodon president from the first round, Point.md, 28 October 2016; Deutsche Welle, „Pla- hotniuc îl susține pe Dodon «din tufiș»”/ Deutsche Welle , Plahotniuc supports Dodon from “the bush”, dw.com, November 2016. 17 API și CJI, „Monitorizarea mass-media în campania electorală pentru alegerile prezidențiale 2016: Raport final 15 septembrie 2016 – 11 noiembrie 2016”/ Media monitoring in the campaign for the presidential elections of 2016: Final report 15 September 2016 – 11 November 2016.

12 Figura 4. Corelația dintre scorul electoral al lui Igor Dodon și numărul primarilor contro- lați de PDM în circumscripțiile uninominale

Drawing electoral districts boundaries: between neutrality and political partisanship Sergiu LIPCEAN

FIGURE 4. Correlation between the electoral result of Igor Dodon and the number of PDM mayors in each SMD

Votes: 12000 16000 20000

23000 Ocnita-Donduseni 22000 r = 0.42 21000 Edinet Drochia-Dond-Sor 20000 Riscani-Drochia-Dond 19000 Falesti Briceni-Ocnita 18000 Ungheni 17000 Soroca 16000 Glodeni-Riscani Floresti Soldanesti-Rezina Anenii Noi 15000 Singerei-Floresti 14000 Orhei-Rez-Criu-Dub 13000 Causeni-Aneni Stefan Voda Criuleni-Dubasari Cantemir-Cahul

Votes - Igor Dodon Chisinau-10 12000 Calarasi-Ungheni Basarabeasca-Cimis Leova-Cantemir 11000 Telenesti-Sold-Orh 10000 Cahul Orhei-Calarasi Dodon Igor obținute – Voturi Straseni-Orhei Cimislia-Leova-Hin 9000 Chisinau-11 Ialoveni-Stras-Calar Hincesti Nisporeni-Straseni 8000 Ialoveni-Causeni 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Number of PDM mayors Source: Author’s elaboration

Note: Chisinau 10 and Chisinau 11 represent SMDs constituted from the Chisinau suburbs.

of this relationship and its strength, I correlated the represents the correlation between the number electoral score of each presidential candidate with of PDM mayors and Igor Dodon’s electoral results, the PDM administrative strength in the countryside. clearly indicates a positive relationship. Although the correlation coefficient of 0.42 does not indicate However, before analysing the effects of local ad- a very strong relationship, it is sufficiently robust ministrative resources in favour of/against the pres- and quite suggestive in the present context. De- idential candidates, it should be noted that this cor- spite the significant differences across districts, the relation which measures the potential impact varies general trend is pretty clear – the electoral perfor- between -1 and 1. Between -1 and 0, the score re- mance of Igor Dodon is positively associated with flects a negative relationship, while between 0 and a stronger presence of the PDM’s mayors in the 1 – a positive one. The closer this score approaches countryside. to -1 or 1, the stronger the relationship between the PDM’s administrative strength and the candidate’s Unlike the positive relationship found in the case of electoral performance, although in different direc- the PSRM candidate, the correlation is negative in tions, irrespective of who is the candidate. On the relation to Maia Sandu. Hence, the correlation coeffi- contrary, the closer the score approaches to 0, the cient of -0.45 demonstrates very clearly an opposite weaker the relationship. Hence, if the score lies be- pattern in which the electoral performance of Maia tween -1 and 0, it means that a larger number of Sandu, on average, decreases as the number of the

mayors controlled by PDM in a particular constitu- PDM’s mayors increases. Even though the existence Sandu Maia obținute – Voturi ency is, on average, associated with a worse elec- of a sufficiently robust correlation does not allow us toral performance of the presidential candidate. to make bold assumptions that the political control Conversely, if the score lies between 0 and 1, the over the of local administrations had decisively con- PDM’s administrative strength is, on average, as- tributed to Igor Dodon’s victory over Maia Sandu, sociated with a better electoral performance. The these results are more than suggestive for the prop- result of these correlations is depicted in figures 4 er evaluation of the PDM’s partisan behaviour during and 5, separately for each candidate. Figure 4, which the presidential campaign.

13 Drawing electoral districts boundaries: between neutrality and political partisanship Sergiu LIPCEAN

FIGURE 5. Correlation between the electoral results of Maia Sandu and the number of PDM mayors in each SMD

Votes: 6000 9000 12000 15000 18000

19000 Chisinau-11 Ialoveni-Causeni 18000 r = -0.45 Ialoveni-Stras-Calar 17000 Straseni-Orhei 16000 Chisinau-10 Criuleni-Dubasari Telenesti-Sold-Orh 15000 Hincesti Nisporeni-Straseni 14000 13000 Calarasi-Ungheni Orhei-Rez-Criu-Dub Orhei-Calarasi 12000 Ungheni Cahul Cimislia-Leova-Hin 11000 Anenii Noi Leova-Cantemir Soldanesti-Rezina 10000 Causeni-Aneni Stefan Voda Soroca

Votes - Maia Sandu 9000 Singerei-Floresti Floresti 8000 Falesti Cantemir-Cahul Drochia-Dond-Sor 7000 Basarabeasca-Cimis Edinet Glodeni-Riscani 6000 Riscani-Drochia-Dond Ocnita-Donduseni 5000 Briceni-Ocnita 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 Number of PDM mayors Source: Author’s elaboration

Note: Chisinau 10 and Chisinau 11 represent SMDs constituted from the Chisinau suburbs.

The PDM’s bias in favour of Igor Dodon is confirmed or is, on average, associated with an increase by almost by the use of another statistical tool that sheds more 300 voters in favour of Igor Dodon. On the contrary, the light on and clarifies the strength of this relationship. To same mayor is, on average, associated with a decrease check the validity of the correlation result, I employed a by more than 300 votes in relation to Maia Sandu. This simple linear model (ordinary least square regression/ represents a robust indicator on the potential effects of OLS), which allowed to estimate more precisely how administrative recourses employed at district level to af- the PDM’s local administrative strength is associated fect the outcome of the electoral competition. with the electoral performance of the two presidential candidates. In this model, the number of the PDM’s mayors stands as independent variable, i.e. the variable TABLE 1. The effect of the local administrative expected to affect the electoral performance, while the resources on the electoral performance of presi- electoral result, measured as the number of ballots cast dential candidates for each candidate, represents the dependent variable. Therefore, according to the advanced hypothesis, Igor Dodon Maia Sandu which was confirmed by the correlation coefficient, a larger number of the PDM controlled mayors is associ- (1) (2) ated with a better electoral performance of Igor Dodon Votes Votes and a weaker performance of Maia Sandu. PDM mayors 298.4** -306.0***

The results of regression model are shown in table 1 (2.51) (-2.76) and fully validate the correlation results for the 32 countryside SMDs. Hence, the coefficient for each candidate Constant 10056.1*** 14971.2*** from the table reflects the number of cast ballots contin- (6.26) (10.00) gent on the PDM’s territorial strength. On the one hand, the data reveals the same positive relationship between N 32 32 the PDM’s mayors and the PSRM candidate. On the R2 0.174 0.203 other hand, it also confirms the negative relationship t statistics in parentheses: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, between mayors and the electoral performance of the *** p<0.01 PAS-PDA joint candidate. Accordingly, every DPM may- Source: Author’s estimations 14 Drawing electoral districts boundaries: between neutrality and political partisanship Sergiu LIPCEAN

Even if one acknowledges the fact that there are resources is heavily dominated by PDM, one may as- many factors affecting the candidates’ electoral per- sert that the prospect for fair and free elections is se- formance, the data, however, leaves no doubts on verely compromised long before the official start of the identity of the presidential candidate who ben- the election campaign. The only uncertainty touches efited from the PDM’s local administrative resourc- upon the development of the relationship between es. Furthermore, if one lumps together the data on PDM and PSRM along with the approaching of elec- the partisan use of administrative resources with the tions. While during the presidential campaign PSRM data on the positive media coverage of Igor Dodon received the PDM’s support given the lack of a more by the PDM’s affiliated broadcasters, plus the data acceptable alternative, the next parliamentary con- regarding the use of other legal and administrative test is going to be different. In this regard, it is diffi- tools, which undermined the electoral odds of the cult to believe that PDM will not use its administrative pro-European candidate, it might well be that the resources at district level to back up its own candi- cumulative effects of all these factors tilted the bal- dates, thus undermining the electoral odds of other ance in favour of the PSRM candidate. competitors including PSRM. Even though we do not know the distribution of all the mayors politically con- Therefore, the demarcation of SMD, as it was per- trolled by PDM across the countryside constituencies, formed, coupled with the electoral results of Igor Do- the available data shows that there are several dis- don as well as the possibility to employ administrative tricts from the northern and north-eastern part of the resources, eloquently demonstrates who are the main country in which the relatively high presence of the beneficiaries of the mixed electoral system at the PDM’s mayors cohabitate with an electorate which upcoming parliamentary elections. It should be un- cast their vote predominantly in favour of the PSRM derscored, that the correlation and regression results candidate. Hence, if one accepts the widespread opin- presented above are based on the political control of ion about the existence of a political cartel between about 400 mayors who were already enrolled in PDM PDM and PSRM, these constituencies are won long at the time of the presidential elections. before the campaign’s start. However, if one admits the possibility of an eventual competition between At present this figure reaches about 600 mayors and it them during the next election campaign, the peace- is not so difficult to imagine how this resource can be ful cohabitation between PDM and PSRM at the local used to influence the electoral outcome for the next level is not so certain. Regardless of the unfolding sce- parliamentary contest. Thus bearing in mind that the nario shaping the development of this relationship, demarcation of the SMDs boundaries clearly advan- the pro-European opposition is going to be exposed tages PSRM, while the control of local administrative to pressure from both sides.

Conclusions

This analysis has conclusively shown that the enact- that it might be overcome through the manipulation ment of the electoral reform was mainly driven by of the electoral process. As a consequence, the map- the political partisanship in the demarcation of the ping of the SMDs in this way contributed to the dis- SMDs boundaries. Gerrymandering techniques were proportional consolidation of the PSRM advantage applied to the advantage of the main proponents and diminished the electoral weight of the PAS-PDA and beneficiaries of reform, i.e. PDM and PSRM. candidate relative to the electoral results obtained Overall, two alternative strategies were used to under the proportional system. shape and strengthen their competitive advantage. On the one hand, the voters of the pro-European While the malapportionment of voters among dis- opposition were squeezed in several constituencies, tricts does not directly favour incumbents or PSRM, thus reducing the total number of SMDs in which the agglomeration of the PSRM voters in certain the opposition candidates would be able to com- constituencies and the weakening of their voting pete on equal footing with the PSRM and the incum- power aims at achieving two objectives. On the bent candidates. On the other hand, where the ap- one hand, their crowding ensures the victory at the plication of this strategy was not possible, the SMD upcoming elections in those SMDs and, on the oth- boundaries were drawn in a way that the relative ad- er hand, it frees up the space for the discretionary vantage of the opposition candidates was so feeble tracing of the SMDs boundaries in the central ad- 15 Drawing electoral districts boundaries: between neutrality and political partisanship Sergiu LIPCEAN ministrative districts in a way that it would ex offi- Data analysis on the relationship between the political cio diminish the electoral odds of the pro-European control of the countryside mayors and the electoral opposition. performance of the presidential candidates confirms, once again, that the demarcation of the SMD bound- The aggressive offensive of PDM against local au- aries was performed in a rather arbitrary manner, aim- thorities and the intensification of the recruiting ing at strengthening and maximizing the competitive attempts of mayors from other political parties by advantage of the reform supporters and beneficiaries employing various methods, demonstrates the rel- at the upcoming elections. Despite the PDM’s official evance of the local administrative resources the par- statements to support the PAS-PDA candidate, data ty is counting on in the upcoming elections. Due to clearly reveal that, de facto, the PDM’s local adminis- the party’s low rating in the opinion polls, which will trative resources have been deployed in favour of Igor negatively impact on its performance particularly Dodon and against Maia Sandu. Under these circum- related to the proportional component, the party stances, the introduction of the mixed electoral system is trying to compensate this gap by focusing on the entails the risk of suppressing political pluralism in the majoritarian component of the electoral system by Republic of Moldova and of undermining electoral establishing a wider political control over the local competition in the upcoming parliamentary elections authorities. well before the start of the election campaign.

16 Drawing electoral districts boundaries: between neutrality and political partisanship Sergiu LIPCEAN

ANNEX 1. Extrapolation of the electoral results of presidential candidates to the administrative districts by candidate and electoral district

Candidate: Igor Dodon Maia Sandu

Balti Briceni Donduseni 20000 17500 17234 15000 12500 14122 10000 11313 8508 7500 4966 532 5000 5139 2749 2158 2500 4528 158 0 661 Drochia Edinet Falesti

20000 20689 17500 18913 15000 14098 12500 10000 7500 6380 6757 7643 5000 5057 2500 1315 2263 0 810 Floresti Glodeni Ocnita Votes 20000 17500 14492 15000 16685 12127 12500 10000 8201 7500 5000 2615 2176 4776 2500 962 0 1295 191 Riscani Singerei Soroca

20000 17686 17500 15000 11662 12500 12058 10000 7885 7500 8953 4635 4798 5000 4661 2500 3770 1358 0 1815 1396 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 101112 District number

17 Drawing electoral districts boundaries: between neutrality and political partisanship Sergiu LIPCEAN

ANNEX 1. Continuation

Candidate: Igor Dodon Maia Sandu

Botanica Calarasi Criuleni 17500 17685 15041 15000 14289 12565 12500 9826 9666 10000 11301 7500 5000 6338 2445 2108 2500 1735 1823 1667 739 0 Dubasari Ialoveni Nisporeni 17500 15000 12500 11350 10000 11791 7500 4601 7519 5000 4073 4537 2500 3047 1114 0 Orhei Rezina Soldanesti

Votes 17500 15000 12500 10210 10000 9607 7235 7500 6466 6494 6435 5000 6414 4501 2775 2500 963 940 1503 510 1580 934 720 0 Straseni Telenesti Ungheni 17500 17523 15000 12500 13509 14073 11342 10000 7500 7672 8300 4357 5000 6065 3752 2219 2500 1193 2503 0 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 District number

18 Drawing electoral districts boundaries: between neutrality and political partisanship Sergiu LIPCEAN

ANNEX 1. Continuation

Candidate: Igor Dodon Maia Sandu

Anenii Noi Botanica Buiucani 17500 14813 15000 14151 12500 13504 9627 10000 11200 9417 7500 7360 5000 4819 2500 899 0 826 Causeni Centru Ciocana

17500 15619 15000 12500 13554 12638 10431 10000 8084 8725 9563 6101 7500 5381 8469 5000 4988 4979 2500 1615 0 148 Rascani Stefan Voda Suburbii-1 Votes 17500 15628 16337 15000 12500 13932 12041 9297 11643 10000 10445 7241 7500 8697 5000 5180 2500 616 0 570 Suburbii-2 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36

17500 18506 15000 12500 10000 9693 7500 5000 2500 0 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 District number

19 ANNEX 1. Continuation Candidate: Igor Dodon Maia Sandu

Basarabeasca Cahul Cantemir 25000 22500 20000 17500 15000 12500 10936 10000 10927 9283 7500 5484 4724 5000 4207 4379 4277 2500 2839 3110 0 Causeni Ceadir Lunga Cimislia 25000 22500 24146 20000 17500 15000 12500 10000 7500 6394 5000 2302 2247 4633 2500 277 0 1570 1841 Comrat Hincesti Ialoveni

Votes 25000 22500 24125 20000 17500 16038 15000 13913 12500 10000 8953 7500 6828 5000 5572 786 4512 2500 335 0 406 Leova Taraclia 25000 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 22500 20000 17500 14593 15000 12500 10000 7500 6413 5000 2248 5368 2500 527 0 1907 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 District number

Source: Author’s elaboration Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung IDIS „Viitorul” (FES)

Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) is a German social democratic IDIS “Viitorul” is an institution for research, training and pu- political foundation, whose purpose is to promote the prin- blic initiatives active in a number of areas related to: econo- ciples and foundations of democracy, peace, international mic and social analysis, governance, policy research, strategic understanding and cooperation. FES fulfils its mandate in planning and knowledge management. IDIS acts as a joint the spirit of social democracy, dedicating itself to the public platform bringing together young intellectuals preoccupied debate and finding in a transparent manner, social democra- with the success of the transition to the market economy tic solutions to current and future problems of the society. and open society in the Republic of Moldova. The Institute Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung has been active in the Republic of for Development and Social Initiatives (IDIS) “Viitorul” is the Moldova since October 2002. successor of the Viitorul Foundation, and maintains largely the traditions, objectives and principles of the foundation, ADDRESS: including: creation of democratic institutions and develop- 14/1 Banulescu Bodoni, Chisinau 2012 Republic of Moldova ment of accountability among politicians, civil servants and Tel: (373-22) 88 58 30 citizens of our country; strengthening of the civil society and Fax: (373-22) 85 58 31 of critical spirit; promoting the freedoms and values of an E-Mail: [email protected] open, modernized and pro-European society. www.fes-moldova.org The opinions expressed in this publication belong to the authors. Neither IDIS “Viitorul” nor the Administrative Board of the Viitorul Institute for Development and Social Initiati- ves, nor Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung are responsible for the esti- mates and opinions expressed in this publication.

For more information on this publication or subscription to the publications issued by IDIS, please contact the Press and Public Communication Service of IDIS “Viitorul” directly. Contact person: Victor Ursu - [email protected], ADDRESS: 10/1 Iacob Hîncu Str., Chișinău,2004, Republic of Moldova Tel: (373-22) 21 09 32 Fax: (373-22) 24 57 14 www.viitorul.org

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