Chinese/Taiwanese Rivalry in the Pacific Islands 79 before WW II. Many of these states are located in the Pacific Islands re- gion of the Asia-Pacific area. Sovereignty and Responsibility: Some Issues in The Pacific Island states have been warned repeatedly by their Chinese/Taiwanese Rivalry in the Pacific Islands Western sponsors of the risks of abusing their sovereign rights over the past decade and more. Complaints have focused on perceived abuses such as providing flags of convenience, the sale of passports, poorly regulated Richard Herr offshore banking facilities, providing tax havens for businesses and the like. These warnings have been regarded by many of these small states as an intrusion into their internal affairs. Thus, for example, the OECD’s ef- The images in March 2006 of Honiara’s Chinatown burnt to the forts to bring offshore banking and haven procedures into conformity ground and hundreds of Chinese residents being airlifted to China re- with international standards provoked overt resistance from Nauru, Niue invigorated the stereotype of a ‘failed state’ at Australia’s doorstep. The and Vanuatu before moving toward compliance. The bilateral attempts at Solomon Islands Government was depicted as unable to deliver the basic intervention to manage the risks of ‘failed states’ have produced a similar services of state including that of personal safety for both its own citizens ambivalence. Thus, in recent years, the small Pacific states have found and foreign residents. This picture was perhaps over dramatic and culti- themselves squeezed between their limited resources and the rising inter- vated more to generate domestic support for a resolute and determined national expectations held for them. Innovative and unconventional Government that had invoked an Iraq-like threat when it used ‘shock and means of reducing the pressure look increasingly attractive as a result. In awe’ tactics in the 2003 intervention in the Solomons. Yet the ethnic fo- consequence, the ongoing rivalry between the People's Republic of China cus of the rioting also drew attention to another growing issue within the (‘PRC’) and the Republic of China (‘Taiwan’) has loomed large to some region. This was the claimed deleterious effect of the not always diplo- Pacific Island states as a possible source of assistance. Equally, as this ri- matic rivalry between the Peoples Republic of China and the Republic of valry has intensified over the past half decade, the small scale of the Pa- China (Taiwan) for recognition. It was alleged that this contest had sub- cific Islands has made them attractive as international partners for Taiwan orned officials and provide slush funds that the Island politicians used especially since the investment costs - both financial and diplomatic - ap- corruptly in pursuit of power. In short, the struggle between the two drag- pear relatively small. ons was directly linked to the erosion of state responsibility in the Pacific This paper looks at the recent developments in this issue to assess Islands. some of the implications of using sovereignty as an economic resource by Sovereignty has always been a double-edged sword - it confers small island countries. Are the Pacific Island countries involved in this ri- rights but it also imposes responsibilities. Decolonisation, particularly valry really attempting to ‘sell their sovereignty’, that is, to trade diplo- during the Cold War era, minimised the issues of state responsibility in matic recognition for development assistance? Or, are they merely exer- order to allow as many subject peoples as possible to achieve independ- cising their sovereignty to pursue their own national interests in the same ence. Indeed, the right of self-determination was raised to the level of an way that larger states do? Even if their entry into the diplomatic market international humanitarian right during this period. The post-Cold War for state recognition is technically no different from the actions of larger order, however, has put a premium again on the responsibility of states to states, does their small size prevent these small states from being effec- each other and to the international community especially since the events tive players? Some of these questions cannot be resolved definitively of September 11, 2001. The burden of meeting these re-asserted demands since it would be necessary to know the precise motives of the various ac- on states, however, has exposed the weaknesses of many of the small tors in taking the steps that they have. Nevertheless, the record on the states that achieved independence in the previous era. Indeed, arguably, contention is that Beijing and Taipei in the South Pacific do offer some the costs of exercising sovereignty are higher today than any period since fruitful grounds for speculation on the rationale and consequences of this aspect of selling sovereignty. Perhaps the most important of these is the role that appearances play in this issue. The impression that sovereignty is Fijian Studies Vol. 4 No. 2 © Fiji Institute of Applied Studies available for sale has reinforced an adverse view of the Pacific micro- 78 80 Fijian Studies Vol. 4 No. 2 Chinese/Taiwanese Rivalry in the Pacific Islands 81 states as responsible state actors at a time when ‘failed states’ are widely economic viability. regarded as sources of threat to more established states. The participation of some Forum Island Countries (FICs) at recent International Whaling Commission (IWC) meetings illustrates the grey Sovereignty as an Economic Resource areas between the dubious and the disreputable in ‘selling sovereignty’. Australia, New Zealand and the FICs, through both SPREP and the Fo- That sovereignty has economic consequences can scarcely be de- rum, have committed themselves repeatedly to the pursuit of a South Pa- bated. States have taken it away from other states in order to seize control cific Whale Sanctuary since 1998. This proposal was advanced and en- of their wealth. Subject peoples have fought to recover their sovereignty, thusiastically endorsed by Australia and New Zealand who regularly took inter alia, to enjoy the benefits of their economic resources. Even the sell- it fruitlessly to the IWC for acceptance. A significant impediment to the ing of sovereignty has been less controversial in the past than it seems to success of the South Pacific Whale Sanctuary at the IWC has been the re- be today. In earlier days, sovereigns of cash-strapped states routinely sistance of a number of FICs to maintain the regional commitment to this leased their armies to other states as an acceptable means to raise funds to initiative. meet the expenses of the state. They arranged marriages to exchange Japan has long been accused of buying votes in the IWC by paying wealth through dowries for alliances to obtain security. Undoubtedly, the for the participation costs of a small school of sovereign minnows to en- contemporary concern for states appears to be grounded in a belief that able Tokyo to put commercial whaling back on the IWC menu. At last the ideological rivalry of the Cold War caused many to turn a blind eye to year’s IWC meeting in Korea, this shoal of minnows included five FICs - the consequences for international order of decolonising states incapable Kiribati, Nauru, Palau, the Solomons and Tuvalu. At one time or another, of meeting fully the obligations of state responsibility. Many new states these five voted against the regional position or against Australia and were states in name only – lacking either the legitimacy of nationality or New Zealand initiatives to prevent a return to commercial whaling or us- the capacity to contribute effectively to international order, either by ing ‘scientific’ whaling to supply commercial markets. This was despite maintaining internal stability or meeting external obligations. These are promises prior to the IWC’s Ulsan meeting from FIC states that they the entities that Robert Jackson has grouped together under the rubric of would support Australia when Senator Ian Campbell, Australia’s Envi- ‘quasi-states’ (Jackson, 1990). ronment Minister, went through the region earlier in the month seeking The misuse of sovereignty can be clearly identified when it involves these assurances (Johnson, 2005: 10)1. activities that are patently improper or even illegal. Using diplomatic As noted above, at one level it could be argued that if Japan is buy- pouches to transport contraband is just such an example. However, when ing the sovereign rights of small, developing states to participate in inter- it involves operations that could be legal if conducted properly and with national decision-making as stakeholders in the whaling issue-area, it is appropriate restraints, the threshold between use and abuse is less evident. nothing new. However, there are real problems with the apparent oppor- The sale of passports is one controversial activity that appears to many tunism of those FICs that participated in the IWC meetings. In this case, critics as indefensible when practised by small states. Yet, larger powers assisting Japan is not just a question of very small and economically weak undertake a very similar exercise by fast-tracking citizenship through states seeking financial advantage at the expense of a virtually non- schemes such as ‘business migration’. The instances of flags of conven- existent national interest in whaling. The benefit to national interest is far ience for shipping, offshore banking facilities, provision of tax havens from clear. The minor financial reward to the FIC delegations from their and the like, similarly straddle the line between the licit and the illicit. supported travel overseas and the perhaps greater advantage to the na- The larger and more established the state; the more likely it will be able tional economies through increased Japanese aid must be offset against to invent euphemisms or regulatory controls to make such practices ac- the cost to confidence in the regional system for achieving collective ob- ceptable to the international community.