CAL, WAR RESEARCH, AND PORTUGUESE Cornell Aeronautical Lab was given to the University by Curtis Wright Aircraft(along with $675,000 working capital from 7 aircraft companies). In the 1950's, CAL worked on ABM technology, anti-aircraft weapons and aerial photographic analysis. CAL also worked on prevent4.ng aerodynamic forces generated by high speeds from "interfering with the accuracy of bomb d-elivery."* "CAL is a recognized leader in techniques which make it sa_fer to fly a fast airplane at low altitudes"*, a development making low-flying bombers poisible. Also in the '50's CAl successfully devised "means for suppressing the conden­ sation trail:{of planes) so they would no longer be visible to a ground observer."* In the 1960's CAL continued work on photographic surveillance technology with such contracts as "Investigation of Potential Surveillance Research and jevelopment activi­ ties for Counter-Guerilla Warfare." CAL was in the forefront in developing Vietnam · technology with important work on helicopters and other military vehioles such as the F111 and C5A, more bomb aerodynamics, studies on effects of vegetation on munitions performance. For most of the decade CAL did one million dollars per year of chemical-biological warfare contracts including progects Spicerack and Summit. CAL also did Project H.eatwave and a study of anti-personnel weapons, (Contract #DA-18-035-AMC-719A): flamethrowers, fire bomb grenades, hydro­ carbons, fuel, bomb lets, thermite. , white phosphorous, cluster bomb units, and incendiary gels, (napalm). Anoth CBW contract, (No. DA-18-035-AMC-323A), had the purpose , according to a CAL public relations letter, of determining, "effective means for delivering chemical agents as a tactical mtinition." In 1967 CAL was doing counter-insurgency research in Thailand. By that year CAL had already entered the new electronic wai£are -automated battlefield market by bidding on an electronic sensor systems simulator, a vital research tool. In non-military con- tracts , CAL did safety studies for GM, but did not disclose to the public defects which were discovered. The value of military research at CAL is now at an all time peak, (20.7 million dollars). In the past two years, Vietnam related contracts have included:T 1) Non-destructive testing of combat and logistics vehicles, (N00014-71-C-0039) 2) Low altitude radar techniques, (related to bombing), No. F33615-70-C-1647 3) Flying qualities criteria for high speed mass military flight vehicles, (F33615-7Q-C-1755) 4) Cost effectiveness study on 5.56 mm;. .caseless ammunition for the M-16, (DAAA-70-C-0166), caseless ammo was called by~ Magazine one of three

-:· ... ' concepts likely to increase, " lethality and number of hits per pull of trigger". 5) Analysis of penetration aides for manned aircraft 6) Electron~c countermeasures simulation testing, (F33615-68-C-1403), ECM is used in. airwar 7) Application of the surface effect vehicle to the intertheatre transport mission, (YM-2782-G-1 SECRET) 8) Electronic warfare payload analysis of the AGM-86 cruise armed decoy, (F33657-71-C-0156) R1109) 9) Atmospheric effects on aerial reconnaissance color photography, (F33615-71-C-1151- 10) Double base propellent ignition and combustion studies on 81 mm. mortar ammunition, (DAAA-71-C-0170-Q0249) 0015) 11) Advanced development. of 40 mm. ground smoke marker cartridg~, (DAAA-21-71-C-0155-Q Ground smoke markers are ~sed to guide bomb drops. 12) Logistical studies on utility tactical transport aircraft system, (UTTAS) scheduled to replace the standard Bell UH-1 helicopter used in Vietnam, (DAA607-69-C-0235) ALL OF THE ABOVE ARE NON-CLASSIFIED CONTRACTS , WE HAVE LITTLE OR NO INFORMATION-ON CAL 1 S CLASSIFIED WORK {

* J..o~h a.nniAai lefOr!;. Cor-N(J/1 AeroNo.u,f,co.l La.hJ 1'16.> 1 71 t" Oete'h£e fYla.('ket ~&rv;po Defer.ue/ Aero.s;oace Co111trad Guarferly !f/70 J '~ · CAL SOLD? Cal has been essentially a non-profit war research lab. 75-90% of its contracts in any one year are federal contracts, 50% of which will be classified. Cornell directly controls CAL by appointing its Board of Directors, (Cornell Controller Arthu~Perterson is chairman of the Board.) Cal maintains an exchange system with the university and many professors receive consultant fees for their work on CAL projects. Up until now, profits have been reinvested to improve research facilities. Disclosure of the military contracts induced Cornell students and faculty to agitate in 1967~68 for dissolution of the university's ties with the lab. Later events showed this to be an ill-fated attempt to purify the university, ill-fated from the start since the university never in~ended to sever all ties. THE REAL ISSUE IS THE NATURE OF THE RESEARCH NOT .CORNELL'S INVOLVEMENT IN IT. In response to student and faculty pressure, the Trustees decided .to sell CAL for a profit. Electronic Data Processing Technology, a firm born suspiciously at the same time the decision to sell was made, won the bidding largely due to the influence of Chairman of the Board Purcell. (The source of this information was a private interview.) How was a firm with three million dollars in assets to buy another for 26 million dollars? In 1969, EDP recorded a net loss of 1.2 million dollars; and the company's auditors said," to complete the acquisition (of CAL), it would be necessary for the company to seek and arrange outside financing." After a two year court battle won approval for the sale, EDP's financial weakness prevented consummation. On March 3, 1972 , Cornell's Trustees ' new plan for CAL became official public knowledge. The plan will create a profit-making corporation& sell CAL to it. Cornell would then buy all the stock in the new company. "In effect," said the Cornell Daily Sun," Cornell would be selling CAL to itself and converting it to a profit-making enterprise." Cornell says it intends to sell the new corporation stock; but this will take many years, at least five, before Cornell would even lose con- , trolling interest. Before any stock sales occur, the "new company" CAL will have to prove its success as a profit-maker for a couple of years. Then stock will be sold slowly in small blocks, over the years, so as to avoid depressing the market value. This means that Cornell will continue .to control CAL for a long time to come ••• Five years from now, will Uornell still be under pressure to sell CAL? In the interim, war profits will continue to fill Cornell's coffers. Even if Cornell eventually sells the stock, ties btwn.the Engineering School and CAL will still remain. Recor~removed this week from Carpenter Hall,( properly re- named Giap-Cabral Hall), indicate a 1967 university committee recommended a closer relationship between the university and CAL. On page nineteen of a segment of the report marked PRIVILEDGED, the committee considered disengagement of the university from CAL and said, "It is also worth emphasizing that disengagement need by no means ter­ minate many of the useful interchanges which now go on between CAL and Cornell University scientists and engineers. The desirability for such interchange need not be affected by~disengagement and the advantages should remain. 11 Obviously, the university always intended to keep the ties. None of its plans would end the war research. CAL is signing new military contracts every week; thus, our 1 demand is to e.nd that research a3 a first step to reducing science s contribution to genocide. Professor Franklin Long on Thursday night that objectionable research at CAL could be closed down in 10 minutes if the university were willing to accept the loss of employment for most CAL workers during the period of reconversion. Most workers could readily adapt to new, socially useful disciplines. Professor Franklin Moore, engineering, with close CAL contacts, said in an interview fourteen months ago, "These people have a remarkable set of survival skills; they are very flexible."

' C~ has been important in developing Vietnam technology. But its impact has already reached beyond Vietnam into , Guinea , and . There, as in Vietnam, CAL-developed napalm burns;and U,S,-made helicopters, improved by CAL's technology, fly military missions. GULF AND GULF IN :roRTUGEEE ? .A.n:gola, Mozambique, and Guinea Bissau

1- The Portugese have been in Africa for more than 500 years,. though their fUll control is less than a century old, resistance ne~er completely ended and is now building ltP again strongly. vfuile other countries yielded to the popular demand ( and sometimes t.o force) for independence in Asia and Sfrica afier Vl'w II, merely changed the technical name.of her colonies to"overseas provinces" an inte~ral part of Portugal. ( She claimed a "" and acknowledged as "civilzed11 only th those Africans who are "assimilated" that is educated in the Portugese, language; culture, and religion. By 1960 Portugese figures indicated that only 15 percent of the populatipn of :tvKlzambique could read and write, and many of these had become J..iiee~s:te- literate vmile working in the gold mines of Africa. In Angola, literacy was only 10 percent. In Guinea, only 11 Africans ( out of a population of 1 million) had obtained a university education. Portugal itself has long been recognized as apolice state, and the colonies are run "Vr.ith even less democracy and greater brutality. The overseas provinces are all ruled from through the overseas ministry. Allo~fficials are appointed and top officials are chosen in Lisbon. About 90 per cent of the Africans in Angola still live on the land, most of which ismore or less owned by farmers of EUropean descent. Portugal is too poor a country and too small to keep her empire without help. Help is duly given her by N-A-T-0- allies and through her military alliance with the U-S-­ invaluable fip.ancial support is given in the form of taxes and royalties by U.S. corporations ( such as Gulf Oil Corporation) in return for their operation in the African co colonies. Peaceful resistance and p+otests by Africans against Fbrtugese rule was met invariably with arrests and brutality. Hundreds of unarmed demonstrators were brutally shot down. For example, in , 500 people were killed at Mireda, in MOzambique after being ih-rited·Jby the authonties to come and present theii: grievances. In the early 1960's, popular rebellion broke out in each colony and has escalated with continuing success since that time. The liberation armies now control almost all of Guinea-Bissau, about one-third of MOzambique and a large area of Angola. Schools, health clinics, and loval governments have been set up in the liberated areas ( Where none exmsted before). Portugal is being forced to spend halfof her national budget in an attempt to suppress _the African liberation movenumts. About 150,000 Portugese soldiers have already deserted or defected to_ the cause of the African liberation movements.

2- Gulf started- prospecting in Angola inl951.!.. They struck oil at Calinda in 1966, where they now extract 99,000 barrels0of crude· oH: d'ail.y. · ·Irt· r-etuxn fot the oil concession they are expected to pay Portugal thirty million dollars by the end of this year. Their total investment· in· Angola is worth 250, 000, 000 do:craTS; they are now drilling for oil off the Angolan coasts:,' wher'e· they expect to fin rich deposits, similar to the one they have recently struck in MOzambique. Before Gulf's oil findings in Calinda, tha.t area was about 90 percent controlled by liberation forces. The oil strike led to Portugal's military conc.entration in that area which they have now regained, which they currently patrol in order to protect Gulf's oil camps. People living o'n that land were moved into resettlement camps ( 11 strategic hamlets" as in Vietnam)- "Boom farms such as Calinda have severe shortages of everything, including jobs- unless you are a highly paid technician. Although Gul~ did employ about 2000 "nationals" in the height of exploration activities, they now employ only about 200. "Nationals" means both European-Angolans and AfricanTAngolans. Gi_ven the level of literacy of Africans, only unskilled jobs are open to them. Gulf claims to be politically non-partisan, but their authorized operation in Angola dep~nds on P0 rtugese military protection. The P0 rtugese_ army depends on the oil companies for fuel, which is essential for modern war mac~ines.

3- Pf~· su~ort of Portugal - most of Portugal's military eq1h.ipment comes from U-S. throug N-A~-0: Until laSt year the U-S. paid &l million a year to Portugal for use of an air base in the . On Dec. 9th 1971 Nixon met vr.ith Premier Caetano of Portugal in the Azores and pushed up the ' rent' for this base to ¢ ;i$f#; b';' )/ff;{,'j!{ lr. 36. 5 million with a'n additional loan of l+OO million throvm in - 836.5 million in all, "for domestic use". This frees PortugJ{tese ·funds for the African w·ars, of course. This sum is more than all aid given to Portugal simce ·i h6* and more than the total aid given to black African cou....'1tries s*ince '!;6. · This time the agreement also has provision for U-S- use of 3 air bases in Mozam­ 11 bique '"'in time of meed • This escalation of aid to Portugal comes at a time when 1) Large oil deposits are being discovered in Angola. and Mozambique (by @llf) t 2) The liberation movements' success threatens to put an end to removal of tiatural resources f10om Africa by U.S. corporations. (should they achieve self-determination); 3) Geihlogists predict that in 30 years time this country will need stable oil reserves outside its borders; ~-) The presence of U-S- advisors has been established in :Mozambique and Angola - heli­ copter, napalm, anti-personnel bembs, 'strategic hamlets', and.saturation bombings (all part of U-S- tactics in Vietnam) are being used more and more ~j by Portugal's army; 5) A brutally repressive Portugese regime is denying self-determination to the\ peoples of the colonies, in opposition to international pressure from all sides - except the U.S.

Eornell has 93, 500 shares in Gulf, worth/~t/~ two and a half million dollars (in· June ' 7J). This ;rear Gulf' s mana.gement was under pressure to divulge their activities and administrative policies in Angola before their annual shareholders' meeting an April 25th (last Tuesday). Cornell's trustees ignored the advice of the Investment Advisory Connni ttee (that they had appointed) and pressure from Operation STOP and voted with Gulf' managem:ents·' s· decision not· to divulge their Angolan affairs until the summer.- ~ ~:pyort Operation -~'! demand that Cornell use its role as a. shareholder to force Gulf to disengage from Angola. We feel that this is a reasonable demand. Institutions such as Cornell and other.major u..11iversities have moral obligations to see that they art not setting an example to other investors by owning stock in corporations directly involved in genocide. Our demand: is· negotiab:le, because we realize that :time is needee\1 to realise our goals. 1-Te demand negotiations (not discussion) because we feel that recognition of the necessity for acting now can no longer be avoided.

VNION I.U. SHOP 450 •, 308 St...... Ave., Ithaca, N.Y. 14850