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O J C S Office of Justice Programs F A V M F O I N A C I J S R E BJ G O OJJ DP O F PR National Institute of Justice JUSTICE National Institute of Justice R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f Jeremy Travis, Director October 1995 Issues and Findings Resolution of Discussed in this Research in Brief: How eight and Federal by Bert Useem, Camille Graham Camp, George M. Camp, and Renie Dugan have dealt with riots and what strategies and procedures are Because prison riots have occurred all The incidents effective during the stages of a too often, they can be anticipated in prison . Kirkland Correctional the future. An indepth study sponsored (Kirkland)—South Carolina. The Key issues: Safety of prison em- by the National Institute of Justice and Kirkland facility was generally well man- ployees, inmates, and residents of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) aged at the time of the disturbance of April the area in which the facility is lo- examined eight disturbances to under- 1, 1986, and so was the riot’s resolution. cated, plus the financial cost of stand how prison riots have been re- The riot began in a housing unit holding prison riots makes their prevention solved and to consider strategies to the prison’s most violent and disruptive in- and containment a critical issue. prepare for, settle, and recover from Factors that must be addressed in- mates. Inmates seized control of this unit, them more effectively at the lowest clude such issues as scaled the fence around it, and then used cost to all parties. Roadblocks to the how prisons are administered (and construction tools left on the grounds to re- successful resolution of prison riots how command is divided during ri- lease 700 general-population inmates. The often stem from the same misunder- ots), race relations in prisons, how riot command post functioned smoothly, prisons are built and renovated, standings and miscommunications ex- resolving the disturbance in 6 hours. how prisons are staffed, and how perienced in ordinary life, multiplied by staff are utilized and augmented the pressures of the event. Successful U.S. Penitentiary (Atlanta)—Georgia. On during riots. resolutions require a controlled, mea- November 10, 1987, the U.S. State Depart- Findings: On the basis of an sured response: an orderly command ment announced that Cuba had agreed to indepth examination of eight dis- post, clear lines of , effective reinstate a 1984 accord that would permit turbances, the study concluded communication, appreciation of the the repatriation of up to 2,500 Cuban na- that proactive planning and prepa- consequences of alternative lines of tionals. Included would be Cubans who ration along with reactive problem action, and a sense among had fled in the 1980 but solving is the most effective ap- staff that their skills and training are who, once released on “immigration pa- proach to resolution. A adequate to the challenge at hand. role,” had been convicted of a and prison’s riot plan should include: were now detained in one of two Federal This Research in Brief highlights what ● prisons. Three days after the announce- A command structure with well- was learned from prison administrators defined lines of authority. ment, the detainees seized control of the and from reports, interviews, and his- U.S. Penitentiary in Atlanta (part of the ● torical data from the eight incidents. A Clear guidelines on the use of Bureau of Prisons, U.S. Department of Jus- force, including staff and brief description of each event is fol- tice). Their principal demand was that they assignments. lowed by a discussion of strategies and not be repatriated to Cuba. The uprising procedures to use during the three ● lasted 11 days, involved more than 100 Interagency cooperation terms phases of a prison riot: before, during, that specify the roles of such units , and required protracted negotia- and after.1 tions to resolve. continued . . . R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

Issues and Findings Mack Alford Correctional Center (Mack manage), inmates in administrative seg- continued . . . Alford)—Oklahoma. The riot that oc- regation and , and those await- curred at this medium-security institu- ing execution. On September 28, 1988, tion between May 13 and 15, 1988, was inmates in a close-custody housing unit as the State and the local fire preceded by a 6-hour period during refused to return to their cells after hav- department. which black and white inmates milled ing been observed drinking a home- about in crowds, expressing antagonism made alcoholic beverage. They then ● Training programs that address tactical strategies and mental readi- toward each other and toward authori- used an unsecured table to break into ness for emergencies. ties. Despite attempts to defuse the situ- the unit’s control center. The riot was ation, a corrections official was taken eventually brought under control by an Strategies to prevent and deal with late in the evening, marking the and riot squad deployment. riots must address many factors, start of the riot. Over a 2-hour period, in- including: mates seized seven more hostages and State Correctional Insti- tution at Camp Hill (Camp Hill). Since ● took over two-thirds of the prison. No Maintaining supervision of an ex- 1975 Camp Hill had been an adult cor- perienced staff who follow sound se- substantive issues were raised during the curity practices. 3-day disturbance, which was eventually rectional facility, housing minimum- and resolved through a combination of nego- medium-security inmates. On October ● Ensuring the security of the physi- tiation, exhaustion on the part of the in- 25, 1989, inmates returning from an ex- cal plant and equipment. mates, and defection by inmates who no ercise yard in the late afternoon over- whelmed correctional staff and seized ● Discerning the signs of a probable longer wanted to participate. riot from false clues and relaying reli- eight hostages. The riot ended through able information up the chain of Coxsackie Correctional Facility (Cox- negotiations, and inmates were confined command. sackie)—. Coxsackie houses to cells. The next day the superintendent primarily maximum-security inmates; met with the inmates to discuss their ● Selecting the most appropriate the institution’s Special Housing Unit grievances. In a development unknown means of resolving a riot: use of (SHU) is for inmates segregated from the to him, many of the cells to which the in- force, negotiations, or a combination others to serve disciplinary terms for se- mates had been confined were not se- of tactics. rious violations of the rules. For approxi- cure, permitting the start of a second riot ● Using strategies that range from mately 14 hours, on August 1 and 2, later that same day. Five more hostages immediate to waiting 1988, 32 SHU inmates held several of- were taken. Negotiations were again at- until inmate leaders are ready to ficers hostage and destroyed much of the tempted, but the riot finally ended when negotiate. SHU facility. The riot began when an in- State police forcibly entered the mate assaulted an officer in the exercise compound. ● Addressing issues of staff morale yard; the five officers working in the and emotional support after a riot Arizona State Prison Complex ends. SHU that day were not regularly as- signed to this unit, so they were not as (Cimarron) Cimarron Unit. This one- ● Incorporating the lessons learned familiar with procedures as those who hour disturbance by inmates at the from experiences with disturbances worked there routinely. Staff from the fa- Cimarron Unit of the Arizona State into revised riot plans. cility and the central office established Prison Complex at Tucson initially pitted inmates against inmates. It began as a Target Audience: Prison administra- communications with the inmates almost fight over a cigarette lighter and esca- tors, State and local policymakers, immediately after the SHU was over- enforcement practitioners. taken and remained in contact during lated into a large, racially divided brawl. the time it took negotiators to bring When prison administrators intervened, about resolution. inmates turned on them, and force had to be used to end the disturbance. Idaho State Correctional Institution (ISCI). ISCI houses medium-custody in- Federal Correctional Institution mates as well as close-custody inmates (Talladega)—Alabama. Changes (those who are dangerous and difficult to prompted by the 1987 Cuban detainee

2 R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f riots at the U.S. Penitentiary in At- lanta, Georgia, and at the Federal De- tention Center in Oakdale, , Who Should Take Command in a Prison Riot? were put to the test 4 years later when Cuban detainees rioted at Talladega T he level of command during a the commitment of the central office to between August 21 and 30, 1991. Af- prison riot depends on several factors: his or her leadership. ter hostages had been held for 10 days, prison administrators concluded that • Knowledge of the facility. However, if the warden is new, someone their health and safety were at increas- else who has spent more time at the fa- • Effects on the chain of command. cility (a central office administrator, for ing risk and prospects for a negotiated example) may be more familiar with it. • Breadth of experience, responsibility, settlement were dim. A carefully Each situation must be weighed individu- and communication. planned and rehearsed assault, maxi- ally. In some cases, a team approach may mizing the element of surprise, ended • Links between responsibility and be warranted to capitalize on the knowl- the incident without serious injuries to authority. edge and skill of each individual. the hostages or detainees. • The administrative framework. Central office administrator

Procedures and strategies: Some of these factors favor assigning Because of their experience across a before the riot command to the warden, but others in- range of situations, central office admin- dicate the central office administrator or istrators may have a more developed un- All prison administrators make efforts the commissioner may be more appro- derstanding of resolution strategies. They to avoid disturbances but also prepare priate in particular situations. are more likely, as well, to have greater for their occurrence. In the riots stud- insight into the effects of disturbances on ied, various planning and avoidance The warden the department or corrections as a whole measures were used with varying de- than those whose primary identification Because details vary from one facility to grees of success. may be with a particular facility. Addi- the next, one unit to the next, and one tionally, their experiences in dealing with Riot preparation includes the acquisi- shift to the next, some agencies feel that agencies and resources outside the de- overall authority should remain in the tion of resources (organization, equip- partment can be brought to bear, if hands of the warden, who has greater necessary. ment, and information) for use in a riot overall knowledge of the facility. This situation, the development of a strat- knowledge may enable him or her to The commissioner egy for the use of these resources, and more quickly assess the situation and the mental readiness to respond to an recognize the consequences of different In other cases, it is argued that because incident. The importance of advance courses of action. the commissioner bears ultimate respon- preparation in all its manifestations sibility for the resolution, decisionmaking cannot be overstated. Three elements To many corrections administrators, an- authority should reside in his or her other compelling argument for keeping hands. Moreover, in agencies in which are especially important: command, riot resolution in the hands of the - the decisionmaking power tends to be planning, and training. den concerns maintaining the chain of concentrated in the central office, exist- command in the aftermath. Taking away ing practice may dictate that the com- Riot preparation: issues of the warden’s authority during a distur- missioner take direct of the command bance, it is argued, may undermine his resolution. The commissioner can follow Crucial to the resolution of any riot is or her subsequent authority; midlevel the procedures he or she and others in command—the ability to exercise au- managers, correctional officers, and in- the central office have established. By thority and direction over the forces mates alike will view the central office, contrast, in decentralized departments in and resources available. This encom- not the warden, as the real authority. which wardens have greater latitude, it passes the capacity to deploy the Allowing the warden to remain in com- may be more advantageous for the war- den to remain in command. forces at hand, monitor their actions in mand for the riot’s duration reaffirms the field on a continuous basis, deliver orders promptly and effectively, coor- dinate operations with other State and

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Federal agencies, and gather and in- trust among its members. In the riots In instances in which it is decided that terpret information on what inmates studied this was achieved to varying authority for the resolution of the riot are doing and intend to do. The longer degrees. At Kirkland, the command resides outside the prison, an addi- a riot lasts, the more agencies that be- group evidenced a strong level of trust tional decision must be made regard- come involved, and the larger the area within the group. Members supported ing where to situate the command post. and the number of hostages held by in- each other and allowed open expres- Some of the same advantages of local mates, the more complex command be- sion of views and impartial exploration command may be gained by situating comes. The challenge is met, in part, of options. As a result, the command the command post at the facility itself. through achieving unity of command team could focus on the task at hand On the other hand, it takes time to es- and determining the necessary level and act decisively. tablish and staff a command post in and location of command. the field, and the resources (for ex- Level and location of command. Di- ample, communication networks and Unity of command. Unity of command rectly related to unity of command is office equipment), if mobilized rapidly, refers to the principle that members of level of command (which official in the may be inadequate. If decisionmakers an organization are accountable to a correctional hierarchy will be in operate from an existing offsite facility, single superior vested with the requi- charge) and location of command the amount of time and effort needed site authority to coordinate personnel (where the key command post will be to establish the field command post efforts to achieve common objectives. established). With regard to level of may be focused on the incident itself. In its absence, coordination may still command, decisionmaking authority be achieved through voluntary mutual may reside in the prison, usually with At both Coxsackie and ISCI, the com- cooperation, but this may break down the warden, or within the agency’s missioner took direct control of the if disagreements arise. larger administrative framework, with resolution of the riots. Significant deci- either a regional or agency director. sions were deferred (to the extent fea- Unity of command was not fully (See “Who Should Take Command in sible) until the commissioner arrived achieved at Camp Hill. Although the a Prison Riot?”) Additionally, a prison on the scene. The commissioner be- State Police had traditionally assumed riot is the sort of public emergency in came, in effect, both the final authority control over the resolution of Pennsyl- which higher officials may feel the need and the field commander. At Mack vania prison riots, the division of au- to step in and exercise command Alford, the warden was given the pri- thority between the State Police and themselves. mary responsibility for designing and the Corrections Department had not executing the resolution. The commis- been clearly delineated before the in- With regard to location of command, sioner saw his role as establishing a cident. During the disturbance, ten- offsite decisionmakers may choose to framework to assist the warden. He sion developed between the two go to the facility or may choose to re- served as a sounding board for the war- agencies, and issues that should have main offsite, either in their administra- den, providing advice and direction; he been settled before the disturbance tive offices or a preestablished met with State political leaders to assure (such as the particular type of ammu- emergency operations center. them that all that could be done was be- nition that the State Police would ing done, thus insulating the warden carry) had to be resolved on the spot, Location and level of command should be determined as part of overall emer- from political pressure; and he mobi- taking up precious time. Since the riot, lized resources to put at the warden’s great strides have been taken to estab- gency planning. Arguing in favor of lo- cal control, both in level and location, disposal. The commissioner allowed the lish a firmer working relationship warden to make key decisions so long as among State agencies. is the need for the commander to readily size up the situation. This re- he continued to have confidence in the Unity of command can be impaired by quires knowing the layout of the facil- warden’s performance. divisions among command personnel. ity, the obstacles that might be Kirkland, Atlanta, Talladega, and Although one individual is formally in encountered in an assault, the back- Camp Hill each represents a somewhat charge, command is almost always a grounds of the inmates involved, the different approach. At Kirkland the team effort. One task in riot prepara- multitude of standing orders, and the commissioner and members of his tion is to forge a team and develop capabilities of onsite staff. executive staff met with the warden.

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Although it was clear that the commis- heat of the moment. Guidelines for de- South Carolina facilities. Participants sioner was the ultimate authority, the veloping a riot plan, produced as part later write up their experiences and of- group functioned more like an execu- of this study, are highlighted on the fer recommendations for improving the tive committee working jointly to de- following pages. department’s emergency procedures. velop a solution. Command was These training efforts had observable somewhat fluid, allowing discussion Use-of-force guidelines. A critical el- payoffs in the incidents examined in of the options based on their merits. ement of emergency planning is a use- this study. of-force policy. Which staff members At Atlanta both the Federal Regional are authorized to order the use of In training it is important to ensure Director and the warden were at the force? What responses are appropriate that different components of the re- prison soon after the riot began. It was in various situations? What weapons sponse team will work to assist one an- decided to give local authority to the and less-than-lethal munitions (e.g, other. Exercises should integrate the Regional Director, but because of the ) are appropriate for use in activities of command, hostage nego- duration of the riot, it was necessary to specific situations? These policies tiation teams, and tactical teams; oth- develop teams to rotate in and out of should be based on both sound correc- erwise these components will be leadership positions. In Washington, tional practices and evolving law on unfamiliar with the operation of the the Attorney General and the Director the use of force to quell prison riots. others. If a riot plan calls for the assis- of the BOP maintained direct oversight tance of State Police or other agencies, of the resolution. Interagency cooperation. In the event much can be gained from joint training that the assistance of other agencies is with those agencies. At Camp Hill, the commissioner took required (for medical care, additional the position that responsibility for the security forces, or investigative teams, Riot avoidance riot’s resolution rested with the super- for example), the riot plan should in- Some riots come as a complete sur- intendent. In practice, however, he clude contact names and telephone prise; others flow rather directly from a involved himself in a number of numbers and an outline of existing snowballing set of events in which the important decisions that resulted in agreements between agencies. These forces of disorder gain momentum. some fracturing of command. would have been useful at Camp Hill Still others take place in situations to clarify the roles and responsibilities known to be unusually dangerous and Riot preparation: planning of the State Police and at Idaho, where with a significant degree of warning. A riot plan should be a comprehensive a municipal fire company hesitated in These three configurations present dif- guide that describes the special re- responding to a call for help. ferent opportunities for riot avoidance. sponsibilities to be met, the resources to be used, and the contribution of Riot preparation: training Riots with no warning. The riots at each individual or group involved. It Although planning can be conducted Talladega, Kirkland, Coxsackie, and should embody the correctional in an agency’s central office for the ISCI occurred without significant agency’s principles and strategies for agency as a whole or in the warden’s warning. All but the ISCI riot occurred resolution. office for a particular facility, mental in high-security units. The ISCI riot readiness can be achieved only began in a unit that had been con- Riot plans are too often a weakly inte- through field practice and instruction. structed as medium-security housing, grated compendium of policy state- The South Carolina Department of but the inmates housed there were ments, advice, memos, and agreements Corrections has developed a rigorous classified as close-custody (more dan- among agencies. Cumbersome plans training program for its wardens, gerous and difficult to manage than the are likely to receive lip service but be deputy wardens, and other senior medium-security inmates). ignored during a disturbance. Plans prison managers. An annual 3-day should be well-organized, clearly writ- training seminar combines classroom In units where violent and rebellious ten, and concise. They should include instruction with field practice to en- inmates are concentrated, prison procedures for how the riot plan book sure readiness to handle emergencies. administrators rely in large part on the is to be used during an incident; the In addition, demanding, unannounced physical elements of security to pre- book itself is often left behind in the onsite riot scenarios are conducted in vent violence. When riots do occur,

5 R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f they are primarily a function of oppor- officer should and should not carry between two inmates out along tunity; that is, they take place when when entering the unit. The keys to the racial lines in the chow line and then one or several inmates are able to ini- cell doors were not needed when en- turned into a brawl in the cafeteria be- tiate a disturbance by taking advan- tering the unit, but the officer first fore spilling into the yard. tage of a weakness in or a momentary taken hostage was carrying them, and lapse of the security system and are this permitted the incident to expand. Riot avoidance in these situations lies subsequently able to spread the distur- in managing the stages of escalation. bance by defeating other security sys- • Physical plant and equipment. Physi- At Mack Alford the administration tems. While no system is absolutely cal plant weaknesses allowed distur- had, over a 6-hour period, skillfully foolproof, riot avoidance can be bances at some of the to managed a potentially explosive situa- achieved through a combination of con- spread. At Coxsackie, the wire-rein- tion (made more difficult by a shortage stant vigilance and physical control. forced glass surrounding the control of detention cells). Only late in the center was easily broken by inmates. process was an officer taken hostage. • Experienced staff and supervision. In Funds that had been requested for re- At Cimarron, once the conflict had a high-security unit, the continuous placing the glass had not yet been ap- reached the intensity of a brawl in the presence of experienced staff, both proved. At Talladega the line of vision cafeteria, there was little opportunity line officers and supervisors, is a to the small recreation yard where in- to reverse the process because the of- sound security practice. This was not mates first gained control was ob- ficers on the scene were quickly fully achieved at Coxsackie, where the scured by an electrical transformer. overwhelmed. officers regularly assigned to the high- ISCI’s dayroom contained heavy furni- security Special Housing Unit were ture that inmates used to break into Riots with warning. It is common for absent on the day of the disturbance. the control room. facility administrators to hear rumors The replacement officers were not as and predictions of riots. Of course, familiar with the unit’s procedures. Escalation of existing conflict. The from time to time the warnings are Moreover, responsibility for supervis- disturbances at Mack Alford Correc- genuine. Often, however, such rumors ing the unit, normally vested in a ser- tional Center and the Cimarron Unit of are exaggeration or hearsay. They may geant assigned full time to the unit, the Arizona State Prison at Tucson even be deliberate attempts to create a had been temporarily transferred to a both resulted from escalating events. crisis, either for its own sake or to sergeant whose regular assignment was The events leading to the two riots fol- force change. elsewhere in the facility. One of the lowed a common pattern. First, on the day of the disturbances a dispute How may prison administrators recog- postriot procedural changes was to re- nize a facility that is truly on the brink quire that a sergeant be present in the among inmates inflamed preexisting intergroup tensions. Second, the con- of a disturbance? The American Cor- unit at all times. Relief officers were rectional Association identifies 27 also given more thorough orientation to flicts gained momentum because of a series of retaliatory moves. Third, op- “indicators of prison tension that often SHU procedures. 2 posing groups of inmates mobilized, precede riots and disturbances.” • Post orders. All post orders, espe- leading to the confrontation. They include an increase in disciplin- cially for posts in restricted units, ary hearings, warnings by inmates to should anticipate the possibility of an The two riots actually began when staff officers that they should take vacation incident. At ISCI, correctional admin- intervened and inmates redirected or sick leave, and an increase in istrators removed an inmate from a their hostility against them. At Mack employee turnover. unit while other inmates in the same Alford this occurred when an officer without backup pursued an inmate Yet no such list is infallible. The pres- unit were not confined to their cells. ence of “traditional indicators” might Had the post orders required that all who resisted his transfer to another prison. The inmate took the officer well signal danger, but their absence inmates be in their cells before an does not necessarily ensure safety— inmate was removed, the rebellion hostage; shortly thereafter, other in- mates joined the disturbance, seizing not in the face of other “nontradi- could not have developed. At Kirk- tional” evidence, nor in a situation in land’s Unit D, the post orders did not additional hostages and territory. At specify the keys the evening duty Cimarron the riot began when a fight

6 R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f which tensions are known to be high. ordinary? Are predictions of trouble riot die of its own accord (the waiting Moreover, evidence obtained from widely shared or are they held by only solution). within the prison needs to be com- a few? Do the signs indicate serious bined with an understanding of what unrest among inmates or merely rou- In actual riots, such as those studied, kinds of situations or grievances are tine grumbling? Administrators are the boundaries between these strate- likely to produce riots. much better prepared to interpret the gies may become indistinct. Negotia- answers to these questions if they tions can be used to collect information The events leading up to the start of know their institutions and inmate for a tactical assault or to tire and de- the riot at the U.S. Penitentiary at At- populations thoroughly. moralize the inmates so they will sur- lanta on November 23, 1987, illustrate render. A waiting policy can be used the difficulties of distinguishing valid to strengthen the administration’s tac- During the riot warnings from false ones. During the tical capabilities or, if used in con- 2-day period immediately preceding Prison administrators have three main junction with deprivation of , the Atlanta riot, there was evidence options to attempt to bring about reso- water, or electricity, to force inmates to that a riot might be impending. De- lution. They may forcibly retake the bargain seriously. A visible tactical tainees in one unit had remained prison (the tactical solution), they may mobilization may permit inmates to dressed overnight, the volume of out- end the riot through talking (the nego- see more clearly the consequences of going mail was reported to be several tiation solution), or they may let the failed negotiations or it may wear them times heavier than normal, and much of it contained photographs.3 In retro- spect it appears that inmates were mailing these photographs to avoid Responses to Riot Warnings their being lost or destroyed in the 4 riot. At the time, the increased vol- I f there appears to be a high prob- conflict. At Atlanta, administrators felt ume was explained as the result of a ability that a riot is imminent, administra- themselves forced to choose between a new program allowing detainees to tors may take administrative or diplomatic primarily administrative strategy and a pri- have pictures taken of themselves. actions to prevent it. marily diplomatic strategy. They reasoned However, the staff had observed de- that a lockdown could not be counted on Administrative actions include a lockdown to be effective. Some detainees were tainees removing their family photo- of a unit or the entire facility; transfer of graphs from their lockers. housed in dormitory units that could not suspected instigators to a segregated unit be locked down, and the cell doors in the or another facility; cancellation of activities The Atlanta officials were mindful of administrative segregation section were that give inmates the opportunity to con- the possibility of a riot. The warden old and possibly defective. At the same gregate, such as recreation or work; an in- time, a lockdown might further inflame met several times with his executive creased presence of correctional officers staff and department heads to deter- already angry detainees and precipitate who, by posture and words, convey that “the very riot a lockdown [was] intended mine whether a lockdown was war- they will not permit a disturbance; and a to prevent.”25 Had the BOP had the ranted. Still, the evidence they had search for contraband. names of the inmates who were slated 5 obtained was never quite sufficient. for deportation, it could have locked Diplomatic actions include efforts to con- down those inmates in secure cells and vince inmates that a riot would be costly to Thus, in some contexts, warnings re- used its skills in persuasion to convince them personally, counterproductive to re- ally do predict riots; in others, they others not to start trouble. This informa- form, or unnecessary because their griev- may be discounted. Warning signs tion, however, was not available. Forced ances will be addressed in the future. should be the starting point of an in- to choose between the two strategies, vestigation, not the basis on which Administrative and diplomatic actions can the administration selected a primarily conclusions are drawn and policy is be used in combination. Potential instiga- diplomatic approach. formulated. Questions such as these tors may be removed from prisons and the should be asked and answered in de- issues around which they are mobilizing tail: Is the source of information reli- resolved. Sometimes, however, strategies able? Are such warnings out of the

7 R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f down. Still, at any given time prison that they will harm the hostages unless high-security design impeded quick administrators must commit themselves their demands are met. Once such access. Therefore, no immediate action to one course or another based on the threats are made, inmates may find it was taken because the inmates threat- costs and benefits of each option. psychologically difficult to back down ened to kill the hostages if from them. The Atlanta detainees, for tried to use force to resolve the situa- Tactical solutions: the use of example, consistently promised to kill tion, and officials could not have pre- force hostages if an assault were made. Even vented this. In general, a riot can be terminated at though they may have realized the dire any time by using overwhelming force. consequences of such acts, their pub- Planned tactical strike. The essence Nevertheless, such a deployment of lic commitment to this course of action of the tactical strike is to maximize the force can be costly. (This is one of the might have psychologically obligated element of surprise. Administrators lessons of the 1971 Attica riot that re- them to make good on it. One of the deploy staff in an attempt to release tains its force today. In the assault at disadvantages of negotiations, com- hostages or retake the facility before Attica, 39 people died.) As a conse- pared to the early use of force, is that inmates can react. The assault at quence, commanders must develop inmates are given an opportunity to Talladega was this type. Its key ele- strategies to minimize the risks to hos- make threats to which they then may ments were: tages, assault forces, and inmates, as become committed. • Intelligence. There was a continuous well as to ensure that the assault force effort to gather intelligence. Released is invulnerable. Such strategies de- The greatest challenge in the early use hostages were debriefed, and the infor- pend upon the type of force used. of force is assembling the necessary mation obtained from them was used to Three types of force were observed in personnel and equipment with suffi- assess the inmates’ leadership and the the riots under study. cient speed. A squad de- ployed too quickly runs the risk of location of hostages. Immediate force. Force may be used being overrun and taken hostage. The • Drills and rehearsals. Rehearsals as a first response to a disturbance. tension between the opportunities pre- were conducted that accurately simu- Armed personnel may be rushed in to sented by and dangers posed by early lated the planned mission. This was defend or retake specific areas without use of force grew to extraordinary pro- accomplished by conducting drills in a waiting for the riot to expand to its po- portions at Kirkland. In the riot’s nearby housing unit that was similar in tential territorial limit. The key ele- opening stages, correctional officers in construction to the one being held by ment in achieving the desired result is a housing unit reported to the control inmates. the speed with which sufficient num- center that armed inmates were break- bers of staff can be mobilized, ing into the unit, which was filling with • Timing. The assault was timed to oc- equipped, and organized. smoke. Officers were arriving at the fa- cur when there was a maximum oppor- cility, but their numbers were insuffi- tunity of success—in the predawn There are advantages to the early use cient to deploy a squad to rescue the hours when inmates were asleep or of force. As noted above, riots may be- trapped officers. When the number generally more subdued. The team’s gin without plan or organization. The reached 35 (command had wanted at entry was made under cover of night. immediate use of force may prevent in- least 100), an assault force was dis- mates from becoming organized, from patched to rescue the trapped officers. • Unity of command. The assault fashioning weapons, from fortifying Once this was achieved, momentum force’s command unity was at its maxi- their position, and from recruiting ad- was behind the riot squad and they be- mum level. One assault force (the ditional participants and expanding gan to clear the yard of inmates. FBI’s Hostage Rescue Team) assumed the territorial limits of the riot. It will sole responsibility for regaining the also limit the pain and suffering of the By contrast, at Coxsackie, prison ad- building. Other tactical teams from the hostages already taken. ministrators had a compelling reason FBI and BOP were used in support to use force immediately because in- roles. Moreover, force used immediately may mates were observed assaulting cor- deny inmates the opportunity to prom- rectional officers. However, the SHU’s • Weaponry. Arsenal weapons were ise to themselves and to the authorities used to further diminish the capacity

8 R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f of inmates to react. Stun grenades con- size, discipline, and firepower of the put themselves in a position to bargain fused and disoriented the detainees. assembled force to overwhelm inmates with the State. They may see their hos- and make them back down. Unlike a tages and the portion of the facility • Speed. The attack was executed with tactical strike, in which an assault they occupy as “chips”; they want to great speed. Explosives were used to force’s presence is concealed as long trade those chips for publicity, am- breach the entry doors quickly with as possible, a riot squad’s presence is nesty, improved conditions, or other minimal injury to those inside. Using deliberately established. Batons and benefits. The government may respond the intelligence that had been gath- may be carried not only as to inmates’ demands with counter-de- ered, the hostages were quickly lo- weapons, but also to convince inmates mands. The resolution comes when the cated and freed. that resistance is futile.6 right bargain is struck. At Atlanta, this • Surprise. No warnings or was the release of the hostages in re- The general strategy is to establish a turn for a new review process and a were issued to the inmates. A meal cordon around the riot area, using ex- was served to the inmates to foster promise not to prosecute. At Camp isting geographic breaks (e.g., build- Hill (the first riot), inmates released their feelings of success in negotia- ings, exterior or interior fences) where tions and to lower their vigilance. the hostages after the superintendent possible. The purpose of the cordon is promised to meet with them the next The disadvantages of using a tactical to prevent the riot from expanding in day to discuss their grievances and to strike to resolve a hostage situation are area and to prevent other inmates from issue a press release announcing that twofold. First, it might be unnecessary joining the riot. Once sufficient forces meeting. because negotiations may resolve the are in place, the cordoned area is par- incident. Even if they do not, inmates titioned into smaller zones, which are Negotiation as problem solving. given a choice between surrender and then retaken one after another. The Inmates may take territory or hostages having force used against them may riot ends when the last zone is se- simply because they can. In those situ- choose the former. The problem is that cured. The force used to end the sec- ations, negotiations become a dialog they cannot make that choice unless it ond riot at Camp Hill was primarily a aimed less at bargaining and more at is offered to them, either implicitly or riot squad movement. The Cimarron solving actual and perceived problems explicitly. The purpose of an ultima- riot ended through the use of a riot posed by the situation and the indi- tum is make the warning explicit. squad, and at Kirkland a riot squad viduals involved. was deployed to ensure that the sur- Second, material conditions and the render of inmates was orderly. Inmate leaders in the Coxsackie riot vigilance of inmates may make a tacti- issued personal demands that seemed cal strike too risky. If inmates hold a Negotiations disproportionate to the disturbances large number of hostages, disperse In a prison riot the term “negotiation” they created. The main instigator’s them, and threaten to harm them in the refers to a dialog between inmates and principal demand was to speak over event of an assault, as the Atlanta de- authorities that focuses on achieving the phone to his stepfather. Appar- tainees did with more than 100 hos- an end to the incident. Four of the ri- ently, none of the other inmate partici- tages, it may not be possible to ots under study ended through nego- pants challenged his pursuit of the overcome their tactical advantage. An tiations: Camp Hill (the first riot), issue. Inmates also sought assurances assault under those conditions, how- Atlanta, Mack Alford, and Coxsackie. that staff would not retaliate for the ever well-executed, would be perilous Negotiations were also conducted at beatings they inflicted on their hos- at best. Talladega and (very briefly) at Kirkland tages or for the riot itself. but later abandoned in favor of other ap- Over the years, law enforcement hos- Riot squad formations. A third type of proaches. The negotiations observed can tage negotiators have learned that it force is akin to that used by police to be divided into three types. quell an ongoing urban riot. Riot is usually best to respond as if the squads move in unified groups to force Negotiation as bargaining. The dialog hostage holder’s demands are authen- clusters of inmates to move in one di- between inmates and prison authori- tic, however odd or seemingly discon- rection or to disperse. The essence of ties may be primarily an exercise in nected from the situation, and never to 7 this type of force is reliance on the bargaining. Inmates believe they have dismiss them as trivial. At Coxsackie

9 R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f these strictures were followed with they articulate them. The third sees bance he seemed to be losing control success. Administrators arranged for negotiation as a means to stabilize the over the others. the inmate leader to talk on the phone situation and, if necessary, to prepare with his stepfather. An agency negotia- for a tactical assault. Negotiations al- In the early stages of the Atlanta inci- tor spent much of his time trying to ways involve all three components. dent, no individual inmate or group calm the inmates and reassure them The distinctions among them are a emerged with whom officials could ne- that they would not be injured when matter of emphasis.8 gotiate, although on the first day four they gave up. A videocamera was put inmates presented government nego- in place to record the surrender. These Parties to negotiations tiators with a list of demands, claiming concessions were sufficient to solve In approaching negotiations, adminis- that they represented the rest. Soon, the problems and end the disturbance. trators may assume that they are pitted however, other inmates contacted gov- against a single, unified group of in- ernment negotiators asserting their au- Negotiations as situation management. mates when, in fact, there may be thority. At that stage none of the State authorities may use negotiations schisms among the inmates or no orga- groups seemed genuinely interested in primarily as a means to manage the nization whatsoever. Over time, in- reaching a settlement.10 This absence situation. The measure of success is mates may fuse into a coherent group; of leadership took government negotia- not whether an agreement is reached fractionate into competing groups; or tors by surprise. Eventually, a loose (either through bargaining or by meet- dissolve into small, antagonistic coalition of inmates formed and bar- ing inmates’ personal needs), but “pockets.”9 gained with government officials in whether other goals are achieved: sta- good faith. By the 11th day of rioting, bilizing the situation, obtaining infor- In many types of negotiations, such as the coalition had gained sufficient lev- mation about conditions in the unit, labor-management bargaining, the dis- erage among the rioters to effect the and/or lowering inmates’ vigilance tinctions between individuals at the release of the hostages after signing against an assault. negotiating table are relatively clear- the agreement. cut, with managers on one side and At Talladega, negotiations aimed at elected representatives of the work- The problem of inmate leadership was bargaining reached a dead end after force on the other. Prison riots are more grave at Talladega. The detain- several days. After this, they became more complicated, and identifying who ees argued among themselves from the primarily an instrument to manage the should sit at the bargaining table is beginning. Administrators attempted situation. BOP and FBI negotiators more difficult. to create a leadership group among the tried to calm the detainees and thereby detainees. In one instance they ac- reduce the threat to the hostages. In Inmate negotiators. For progress in ceded to a demand made by a rela- the riot’s final stages, negotiations negotiations to occur, there must be an tively moderate detainee in the hope were used primarily to support a tacti- inmate or group of inmates with whom that he would gain stature in the eyes cal operation. They were used to ob- officials can talk with a measure of of the other detainees. However, a tain information and try to render the continuity. These negotiating inmates moderate leadership group never inmates less vigilant. must be able to sway other inmates; coalesced; the detainees and the ad- otherwise an agreement to end a riot is ministration remained far apart on the The distinction among negotiation as of little value. At Mack Alford the in- issues. bargaining, as problem-solving, and as mates who initiated the disturbance situation management should not be continued to exercise control over the Agency negotiators. The theory be- overdrawn. The first definition sees disturbance and negotiated with prison hind hostage negotiation teams is now resolution as being achieved by bring- administrators. At Camp Hill (the first well established. A small group of ad- ing together the interests of the agency riot), a group of inmates also emerged ministrators receives special training and the inmates. The second views as leaders with whom prison authori- in hostage negotiations. They are cho- resolution as being achieved by meet- ties could negotiate. At Coxsackie one sen carefully, on the basis of intelli- ing the immediate needs (especially inmate took responsibility for negotia- gence, levelheadedness, verbal skills, the emotional needs) of the inmates as tions, but toward the end of the distur- ability to think on their feet, and over-

10 R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f all appearance. Their job during a dis- Coxsackie and Mack Alford followed At Mack Alford, two trained depart- turbance is to negotiate a settlement different sequences. At Coxsackie, the ment negotiators were brought to the through bargaining and problem first conversations occurred between prison. After about an hour, however, solving. Those with command the inmates and the department’s ne- the inmates broke off the dialog, (decisionmaking) authority refrain gotiators as well as the deputy superin- claiming that the negotiators had lied from talking directly to inmates. tendent of the institution. About 5 to them. They then insisted that they hours into the disturbance, the Assis- would speak only with a particular The separation between commander tant Commissioner for the department captain, whom they trusted. The cap- and negotiators is said to have several began to talk to the inmates in re- tain remained the chief negotiator advantages. The commander can make sponse to their demand that they speak throughout the disturbance. decisions under less stressful condi- to an official “from Albany”; that is, tions. Negotiators can stall for time by someone with authority from the cen- The Coxsackie and Mack Alford nego- referring requests and demands to a tral office. From that point on, the As- tiations, while successful, did not fol- higher authority. If negotiators become sistant Commissioner became the lead low the model. In both cases, however, overinvolved in the process, begin to negotiator, although he worked closely important principles were preserved. lose objectivity, or experience high with the department negotiator and the Neither the assistant commissioner at levels of stress, command personnel deputy superintendent. Coxsackie nor the captain at Mack can take corrective action. There may Alford exercised authority in the situa- be information the negotiators should not have because they might inadvert- ently reveal it (for example, that an as- sault is imminent) but which the person in command knows. Addition- Third-Party Negotiators ally, the division between command and negotiation may allow negotiators I n some instances, bringing in an agreement. To overcome a last-minute to develop greater rapport with hostage individual from outside the correctional snag in the negotiations, Bishop Roman holders. The government negotiator agency may prove useful in negotiations. assured the detainees that BOP personnel can appear to the inmates to be taking Third parties were used in negotiations at who signed the agreement had the au- their side in gaining concessions from Atlanta, Mack Alford, and Talladega. thority to make a binding commitment. command and so develop the inmates’ They played several roles: goodwill.11 • As mediators searching for middle • As initiators of conversations. At ground. At Atlanta, a legal services attor- This model was followed at both At- Mack Alford, two popular inmate leaders ney worked to develop a solution that was lanta and Talladega. At Atlanta, sev- who were not participating in the riot acceptable to both sides. He raised sub- were recruited during its opening stages stantive issues with BOP administrators, eral hours after the riot began, a BOP to initiate conversation with the rioting and they responded in a written memo lieutenant made the first contact with a inmates who (at that point) refused to clarifying the Bureau’s position. At the detainee and arranged for a face-to- talk to the administration. same time, the attorney helped persuade face negotiation session. He was soon the Cuban detainees to accept the agree- joined by FBI negotiators, who then • As guarantors to a promise. At ment without a clause declaring that de- assumed control over the negotiations Mack Alford, three State legislators were portations would cease. for the duration of the event. At present at the surrender to reassure in- Talladega a counselor assigned to the mates that they would not be mistreated • As government bargaining chips. At by corrections staff. Talladega, the BOP allowed a reporter to unit made the initial contact with the talk to the detainees and report their story detainees and started negotiations. • As guarantors that an agreement is in return for the release of a hostage. At Later that evening, he withdrew from authentic and in the inmates’ inter- Coxsackie, commanders allowed the in- the negotiations; and trained negotia- est. At Atlanta, Bishop Agustin Roman mates’ leader to have a 2-minute tele- tors from the prison, the FBI, and the (auxiliary bishop of Miami) made an au- phone conversation with his stepfather. BOP took over. diotape stating that he supported the

11 R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f tion. Thus, the advantages that come negotiation sessions as an “opportunity announced over the public address with splitting the command and nego- to express their longstanding frustra- system that the riot squad had been tiation functions were not forfeited. An tions”15 rather than achieve a settle- deployed, that it was instructed to use additional advantage was the in- ment. However, this changed during force if necessary, and that the in- creased credibility of the negotiators the course of the disturbance. Govern- mates should lie face down on the in the inmates’ eyes. ment negotiators noted that the detain- ground. The warden used language ees became increasingly punctual at that was simple, direct, and forceful. Third-party involvement. In some negotiation sessions, sometimes even In both instances there were no retali- situations, the assistance of parties arriving early, which was taken as an ations against hostages, and the riots from outside the agency may advance indication that they had become in- ended shortly thereafter. process. The purpose creasingly serious about them.16 of third-party involvement must be Issues related to the use-of-force ulti- kept clearly in mind by administrators, On the other hand, a similar cycle matum concern how to handle the who must be certain they make the de- did not develop at Talladega. The transition from negotiation to force. cision to implement it on the basis of Talladega detainees and the govern- Should government negotiators be merit alone. Other criteria (such as ment were as far, if not farther, apart alerted that an assault will occur? the political prominence of the indiv- at the end of the disturbance than at Many say no, because the negotiators idual volunteers) must not be factors in the start. Likewise, at Coxsackie in- might inadvertently reveal the plan. the decision. Third-party negotiators mates seemed more anxious and hos- Others point to possible advantages: must be carefully screened and agree tile as the incident progressed. In The negotiators might be able to dis- not to raise new issues or to act as ad- cases like these, issuing an ultimatum tract the subject at the start of the as- vocates for inmates.12 may be in order when negotiations sault, provide reassurances that would appear unproductive. lower his or her defenses, or position Cycles of negotiation him or her for a shot.17 None of Studies of negotiations in other do- Ultimatums these advantages was foreseen by com- mains, especially labor-management When negotiations deadlock or are not manders at Talladega, and the Re- bargaining, have found that they tend taken seriously, commanders may gional Director elected not to inform to follow a common cycle. Initially, decide to issue ultimatums. In prison the government negotiators of the both parties make exaggerated de- riots they can be categorized as use- planned tactical strike. mands. This is followed by a period of of-force ultimatums and issues withdrawal and a return to negotiations ultimatums. What are the consequences if inmates with more moderate demands. When refuse to surrender? At Kirkland and parties try to circumvent this ritual, The use-of-force ultimatum. A use- Camp Hill, use-of-force ultimatums negotiations tend to break down.13 of-force ultimatum can be given in the were successful; in both instances riot Even concessions made too early in expectation that inmates, given a clear squads were visible to inmates as they the negotiation process can be coun- choice between surrender and an were deployed, a situation that may terproductive because parties “need armed assault, will choose surrender. have contributed to the inmates’ will- the opportunity to experience exhaus- In the riots studied, such ultimatums ingness to choose surrender. But a tion of their demands before they can were issued at Camp Hill (the second use-of-force ultimatum should be is- be satisfied that they had drained what riot) and at Kirkland and led to suc- sued with every intention of following was there to be had. Premature move- cessful resolutions. through. Otherwise, future ultimatums 14 will have less credibility. ment robs them of this experience.” At Camp Hill, the State Police de- This pattern seems to have been fol- clared over a public address system The “issue” ultimatum. The principle lowed at Atlanta. During the first sev- that inmates were to release their behind issue ultimatums is that once eral days, government negotiators hostages, surrender by exiting the inmates are told that some or all their perceived the detainees were not inter- cellblocks, and lie face down on the demands will not be met, they will stop ested in making progress in the nego- yard. At Kirkland, the warden making these demands and focus on tiations. The detainees used matters that can be negotiated. Police

12 R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f negotiators generally discourage the they might retaliate against the hos- forcement, hostage negotiators often use of this type of ultimatum and ad- tages. The detainees refused to drop stall for time.19 The theory behind this vise: “Never tell the subject ‘no.’”18 In- the issue, however, and the negotia- strategy holds that hostage-takers tend stead, negotiators should try to recast tions reached an impasse. Finally, a to develop sympathy for their hostages, demands so that they can be met or so government negotiator told the inmates develop a rapport with police negotia- they pose no immediate threat. that their demand would not be met tors, or just get tired of doing what under any conditions. In this instance, they are doing. In light of this theory, This advice seems reasonable for a straightforward “no” broke the im- police hostage teams are encouraged prison riots. An exception was the passe without provoking retaliation to avoid the temptation to “get it over situation observed at Atlanta. Over the against the hostages and allowed the with” but rather to patiently wait out course of 6 days, the detainees, Cuban negotiations to go forward. the situation unless material threats to nationals, demanded assurances that a hostage’s safety or other consider- they could remain in the United Waiting ations force a reassessment of tactics. States. Administrators were reluctant A third strategy for handling a prison to tell the detainees that this issue was disturbance is to wait it out, usually At Talladega continued waiting may not negotiable because they feared while maintaining a dialog. In law en- have endangered the hostages because

Exhibit 1: Key Factors of Eight Prison Riots Studied

Institution Duration Number of Method of Hostages Resolution

Kirkland 6 hours 22 Ultimatum Correctional and riot squad Institution

U.S. Penitentiary, 11 days More than 100 Negotiations Atlanta, Georgia

Mack Alford 3 days 8 Negotiations and Correctional “waiting” strategy Center

Coxsackie 14 hours 5 Negotiations Correctional Facility

Idaho State 1 day None Ultimatum and Correctional riot squad Institution

Pennsylvania State 3 days First riot: 8 First riot: Correctional (two riots) Second riot: 18 negotiations Institution Second riot: at Camp Hill State Police Force

Arizona State About 1 hour None Immediate force Prison Complex by riot squad (Cimarron Unit)

Federal 10 days 11 Negotiations used Correctional and abandoned in Institution, favor of planned Talladega tactical strike

13 R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f hostility among the detainees was be- Talladega detainees and hostages went guidelines for the immediate postriot ginning to increase. Negotiations for- 10 days with very little food. Adminis- period. mally ended the disturbance at Mack trators were also concerned about a Alford, but in large measure the dis- breakdown of order among hungry de- After the first disturbance at Camp turbance succumbed to massive defec- tainees. In this situation, rather than Hill, some of the essential post-riot tion and inmate exhaustion. After 3 follow the theory of “increasing situ- tasks were not completed. The count 23 days of rioting, only a fraction of the ational stress if the subject is too com- was not cleared, and weapons and original participants remained on the fortable,” it seemed more prudent to other debris were left in the hallways yard. follow the corollary of “decreasing of blocks to which inmates were re- stress if the subject is very anxious.”22 turned. Although the locking mecha- Although a waiting strategy may imply Since the detainees at Talladega were nisms of cell doors had been passivity on the part of the administra- showing signs of increasing tension and compromised, inmates were returned tion, usually the opposite is the case. hostility toward the hostages, food was to them, and inmates were observed Research on police hostage negotia- provided to ameliorate that situation, to wandering outside their cells through- 20 tions, as well as negotiations in other lower the detainees’ defenses, and, out much of the night after the first 21 contexts, emphasizes the importance hopefully, get food to the hostages. riot. The institution’s administrators of active listening: paying careful at- were largely unaware of these prob- tention to what is said, asking the lems because the information never After the riot speaker to clarify what she or he meant, reached them. In hindsight it seems and communicating to the speaker that A riot’s aftermath consists of short- that they should have gone to the she or he was understood. Active lis- term problems such as securing the blocks to assess the damage them- tening can be extraordinarily demand- prison, medium-term problems related selves instead of relying on the reports ing. The regional director in charge of to repairing the damage and returning of others. Unaware of these problems, Talladega’s resolution reported that of- staff to work, and long-term problems the superintendent at Camp Hill dis- ficials at the scene were continuously related to restoration and change. The missed all but 25 of the 260 State Po- trying to discern what the detainees specific short-term tasks should be in- officers who had been called to wanted and what they were trying to cluded in the riot plan. help quell the first disturbance. The do, and to gather clues about their tac- 25-officer contingent fell far short of tical situation. The short term the number needed to prevent the far After the inmates surrender, com- more destructive riot that began the A waiting strategy can employ tactics manders must coordinate a search for next day. that will, by increasing inmates’ dis- contraband, move inmates to secure comfort, directly motivate them to end units, conduct damage assessments, In the other disturbances studied, the incident more quickly or create and ensure that all inmates are ac- these tasks were handled without ma- needs that prison administrators can counted for. Medical care must be pro- jor problems. At Cimarron, a pressing then use to effect a bargain. At Atlanta vided to injured hostages and inmates. issue in the immediate aftermath was helicopter overflights put pressure on Evidence must be collected for future the provision of medical care to the in- inmates, and water and heat to the prosecutions. If outside staff or law en- mates who had been injured. One was compound were cut off. At Talladega, forcement personnel were requested, evacuated by helicopter for emergency food, which was in short supply to they must be released from duty as or- surgery, and 10 others were trans- begin with, was denied. At Coxsackie der is restored. ported to hospitals by ambulance. The and Mack Alford, the electricity was remainder of the inmates were turned off. Each of these deprivations The importance of performing these searched and locked in their cells, and became negotiating points for the tasks cannot be overstated. Having re- a count was taken. The inmates identi- government. solved the riot, the temptation to lower fied as being most active in the riot vigilance and assume that the worst is were placed in the facility’s detention Hostages, however, have to endure the over may be premature. Therefore, riot unit. The entire prison was searched same deprivations as inmates. At plans should contain checklists and

14 R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f for weapons, but no buildup of weap- The medium term ments. Official inquiries into the eight ons was found. In the medium term, prison adminis- riots under study varied in several trators must provide continued support ways, discussed in the following At Coxsackie the immediate aftermath to employees in coping with their ex- sections. of the incident was handled with an perience, repair the damage done to especially high level of control and, the facility, work toward normalization Issuing agency. At Camp Hill the Gov- therefore, a greater certainty of results. of institutional operations, and under- ernor commissioned a blue-ribbon Inmates not requiring immediate take the administrative followup asso- panel to investigate the disturbance, medical attention were moved to the ciated with a disturbance. and two legislative committees each gymnasium, separated from one an- wrote independent reports. Following other by 20 feet of space, instructed Public recognition of the sacrifices the Cimarron incident, the Director of not to talk, and supervised by one, and made by hostages, as well as an ex- Corrections requested that another later two, correctional officers per in- pression of appreciation for the exem- State agency, the Department of Public mate. Each inmate was examined by plary action of staff during the riot, Safety, conduct the investigation to en- medical staff and then interviewed by may be important in reintegrating the sure objectivity, in light of the fact that the State Police, staff members from corrections community. Following there had been racial tensions at the the department’s Inspector General’s Talladega, for example, the Acting At- unit. The investigations of the ISCI Office, and staff members from the torney General commented that he felt and Mack Alford riots were conducted Commission of Correction. Five hours “grateful beyond words and proud be- by members of the respective States’ after the riot’s resolution, they were yond measure.” This recognition can central offices. At Coxsackie, the New transferred in small numbers to other also be made at public ceremonies York State Commission of Corrections facilities. such as one held by the Oklahoma (the body responsible for monitoring State Legislature. Ongoing all correctional facilities in New York) Immediate postriot tasks at Atlanta and support for former hostages may conducted the investigation (its staff mainly involved transferring the de- be necessary as well. had been on the scene soon after the tainees to other facilities. Over a 24- riot started). In response to both the hour period, they were escorted out of Damage to the structural integrity of Atlanta and the Talladega riots, the the compound one at a time. BOP staff the facility must be addressed. At Cox- BOP established teams consisting pri- searched detainees with the aid of a sackie the inmates destroyed the con- marily of senior staff and representa- fluoroscope, placed them in restraints, trol center of the SHU so they could tives from the other Federal agencies and put them on a bus for transfer to not immediately be returned to their involved in the riot’s resolution. another facility. cells. The inmates at Idaho knocked holes between cells, rendering many Scope of the investigation. The re- One of the immediate responsibilities of them unusable. In the largest, most ports on the Camp Hill disturbance of the governing agency is to help em- destructive riots, such as those at were the most far reaching, raising is- ployees overcome the short- and long- Atlanta and Camp Hill, major recon- sues about the riot’s management and term traumas of the disturbance. struction was needed. related concerns such as prison crowd- professionals may play a ing and alternatives to incarceration. crucial role in debriefing staff after During the medium term, a report may The reports at Coxsackie, Mack 24 disturbances. In general, prison ad- be commissioned to find out why the Alford, and ISCI focused primarily on ministrators and officers interviewed incident occurred. The report may the riots themselves rather than any for this study stated that such debrief- help corrections officials, policymak- far-reaching implications. The authors ing sessions were useful. In some de- ers, and the public understand what of the reports on Atlanta, and to a partments, such as South Carolina’s, the riot was about, thereby helping to lesser extent Talladega, used the op- they are mandatory. At Coxsackie each establish a long-term reform agenda. It portunity to rethink the BOP’s entire of the released hostages was accompa- may help answer the question of emergency preparedness effort. At nied by a mental health professional whether systemwide changes are Cimarron the focus was primarily on and a close friend during initial medi- needed or only policy adjust- whether the use of force was justified cal treatment and debriefing. and complied with department policy.

15 R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

Audience. The results of the investiga- ample, the BOP developed the idea of Camp Hill provides an example of tions at Cimarron, ISCI, and Mack setting up a center for the hostages’ some serious problems facing correc- Alford were intended primarily for use families—a place where they could tions administrators in a prison riot’s by those in the central offices of the obtain information and support. Its wake, but also shows how such chal- State agencies. The reports on Cox- success led the Bureau to make this a lenges can be met. A new commis- sackie, the two distur- standard feature of its response. sioner of corrections and a new bances, Atlanta and Talladega, and superintendent were hired. The com- Camp Hill were written for those Relationships with other agencies are missioner reorganized the central of- within the agency, policymakers con- improved. During a riot new relation- fice, secured a grant from the National cerned with corrections, and to some among agencies may emerge or Institute of Corrections to revamp the degree, the general corrections the need for them may be demon- department’s system for emergency community. strated, as at Camp Hill. After a dis- preparedness, and improved relation- turbance, gains should be consolidated ships with other State agencies in- Long-term solutions and relationships strengthened. volved in emergency planning. The A prison riot, by definition, means loss Innovations are made in the recon- new superintendent helped direct the of control by prison administrators. struction process. The postriot period rebuilding of the facility. Once they are resolved, prison riots can be used to restore what existed be- can provide an opportunity for correc- fore the disturbance or to depart from Conclusion tional leaders to develop policy that tradition. For example, after the Mack reflects what they have learned, pro- The eight riots in this study are obvi- Alford disturbance, the employees, in- vided they listen carefully and think ously not representative of every cluding correction officers, case man- clearly about the events. A corrections prison disturbance. The unique char- agers, and maintenance workers, department can become stronger, less acteristics of each institution, its staff, became involved in developing plans likely to lose control, and more effec- administration, and inmate popula- to reconstruct the prison. A delegation tive in resolving disturbances when a tions, as well as the State or Federal was sent to several prisons in another prison riot is followed by one or more agency to which it belongs, shape the State to develop ideas about architec- of the following outcomes. precipitating conditions, resolution, tural design. This break with tradition and aftermath of a riot. Comprehensive Gains are made in the ability to fore- (previous architectural planning had planning based on awareness of other cast a disturbance, and the flow of in- been conducted only in the central of- incidents and lessons learned from the formation is improved. Corrections fice) helped create a sense of owner- past cannot prevent all prison riots. It officials, having experienced a distur- among Mack Alford staff. can, however, help correctional admin- bance, may be more aware of and bet- Morale is addressed. A riot is unlikely istrators avoid some disturbances, take ter able to interpret future warning to leave employees’ morale untouched. action to prevent the small incident signs. Much depends on what happened dur- from expanding into a full-scale riot, limit the extent of damage of riots in Previously unrecognized problems ing the riot and the outcome. If the resolution went well, if employees per- progress, and terminate riot situations are remedied. Riots may reveal weak- in the least costly way. nesses in facilities, operating proce- ceived that corrections management dures, or organization. It is better to faced the crisis squarely and with Notes ask how the problems can be resolved adequate resources and preparation, than argue about whether certain ac- and if the responses of the political 1. The study is reported in full in Bert tions contributed to the riot. community and media were positive, Useem, Camille Camp, and George then the disturbance may actually en- Camp, Strategy and Outcome in U.S. The outcome of innovations made hance the prison staff’s sense of mis- Prison Riots, New York: Oxford Uni- during the disturbance are reviewed sion, loyalty, and confidence in their versity Press, forthcoming. and incorporated into riot plans. Dur- agency. Where these factors are ab- ing the Atlanta disturbance, for ex- sent, morale may plummet. 2. American Correctional Association, Causes, Preventive Measures, and

16 R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

Methods of Controlling Riots and Disturbances in Correctional Institutions, Third Edition, Laurel, Maryland: American Correctional Association, 1990.

3. Federal Bureau of Prisons, A Report to the Attorney General on the Disturbances at the Federal Detention Center, Oakdale, Louisiana, and the U.S. Penitentiary, Atlanta, Georgia, February 1, 1988, Atlanta-52 (Hereinafter referred to as Report, 1988. The site name and numbers indicate page numbers).

4. Report, 1988, Atlanta-52.

5. Report, 1988, Atlanta-50–Atlanta-52.

6. American Correctional Association, Controlling Riots and Disturbances: 42.

7. Bolz, Frank, and E. Hershey, Hostage Cop, New York: Rawson, Wade, 1979: 240; Dolan, John T., and G. Dwayne Fuselier, “A Guide for First Responders to Hostage Situations,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, 58, 4 (April 1989):12.

8. Fagan, Thomas J., and Clinton R. Van Zandt, “Lesson from Talladega: Even in ‘Non-negotiable Situations,’ Negotiation Plays an Important Role,” Corrections To- day, 55, 2 (April 1993):12, 134, and continuing.

9. For a general discussion of negotiations involving multiple parties, see Howard Raiffa, The Art and Science of Negotiation, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982:251–55.

10. Report, 1988, Atlanta-62.

11. Fuselier, G. Dwayne, “What Every Negotiator Would Like His Chief to Know,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (March 1986):14; Wargo, Michael G., “The Chief’s Role in a Hostage/Barricade Subject Incident,” The Police Chief (Novem- ber 1989):59–62.

12. Report, 1988, Atlanta-62–Atlanta-63.

13. Boulding, Kenneth E., Conflict and Defense: A General Theory, New York: Harper and Row, 1962:319–320; Walton, Richard E., and Robert B. McKersie, A Behavior Theory of Labor Negotiations, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965; Schellenberg, James A., The Science of Conflict, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982:203–219; and Friedman, Raymond A., Front Stage, Backstage: The Dramatic Structure of Labor Negotiations, Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1994.

14. Douglas, Ann, Industrial Peacemaking, New York: Columbia University Press, 1962:42.

15. Bell, Roger et al., “Hostage Negotiations and Mental Health: Experiences from the Atlanta Prison Riot,” American Journal of Preventive and Neurology, 3:2 (Fall 1991):8–11.

16. Bell et al., “Hostage Negotiations and Mental Health”:10.

17. Fuselier, “What Every Negotiator Would Like His Chief to Know”:15.

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18. Dolan and Fuselier, “First Responders to Hostage Situations”:12. Bert Useem, Ph.D., is Professor of Sociol- 19. Lanceley, Frederick J., “The Antisocial Personality as a Hostage-Taker,” ogy at the University of New . Journal of Police Science and Administration, 9, 1 (1981):32. Camille Graham Camp and George M. Camp, Ph.D., are Principals and Renie 20. Dolan and Fuselier, “First Responders to Hostage Situations”:11. Dugan is a Research Associate at the Criminal Justice Institute. This study was 21. Fisher, Roger, and William Ury, Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement With- performed under NIJ Grant 90–IJ–CX– out Giving In, New York: Penguin, 1981: 35–37; Ury, William, Getting Past No: 0026. Negotiating With Difficult People, New York: Bantam, 1991:37–40. Findings and conclusions of the research re- 22. Fuselier, “What Every Negotiator Would Like His Chief to Know”:15. ported here are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official position or poli- 23. “Clearing the count” means accounting for all inmates. cies of the U.S. Department of Justice.

24. Van Fleet, Fred, “Debriefing Staff after the Disturbances Can Prevent Years of Pain,” Corrections Today (July 1991):102, 104, 106, 107. The National Institute of Justice is a component of of Justice 25. Report, 1988, Atlanta-48. Programs, which also includes the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, and the Office for Victims of Crime.

NCJ 155283

18 R e s e a r c h i n B r i e f

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Buchanan, R.A. and K.L. Whitlow, Guidelines for Inciardi, James, A Corrections-Based Continuum Developing, Implementing, and Revising an Objec- of Effective Drug Abuse Treatment, Research in tive Prison Classification System, NIJ Research Progress Seminar, VHS Videotape, NCJ 152692, Report, 1987, NCJ 108408. $19, includes postage and handling.

Clark, Cheri L., David W. Aziz, and Doris L. Inside Prisons, Crime File Series, VHS Video- MacKenzie, Shock Incarceration in New York: Fo- tape, 1985, NCJ 100743, $17, includes postage cus on Treatment, NIJ Program Focus, August and handling. 1994, NCJ 148410. Jacobsen, V.J., R. Miller, and G.E. Sexton, Cronin, Roberta C., with assistance of Mei Han, Making Jails Productive, NIJ Research in Brief, Boot Camps for Adult and Juvenile Offenders: 1991, NCJ 132396. Overview and Update, NIJ Research Report, Octo- ber 1994, NCJ 149175. MacKenzie, Doris Layton and Claire Souryal, Multisite Evaluation of Shock Incarceration, NIJ Greenwood, Peter W., Three Strikes, You’re Out: Research Report, November 1994, NCJ 150062. Benefits and Costs of California’s New Mandatory- Sentencing Law, VHS Videotape, NCJ 152236, McDonald, Douglas, Managing Prison Health $19, includes postage and handling. Care and Cost, NIJ Issues and Practices, March 1994, NCJ 152768. Hammett, Theodore M., 1992 Update: HIV/AIDS in Correctional Facilities, NIJ/Centers for Disease Prison Crowding, Crime File Series, VHS Video- Control and Prevention, NIJ Issues and Practices, tape, 1985, NCJ 097229, $17, includes postage January 1994, NCJ 143398. and handling.

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