When Push Comes to Shove: The

When Push Comes to Shove: The Process of Forced Amalgamation in New South Wales Local Government, 2011/2017 Glenn Fahey, Brian Dollery and Joseph Drew Abstract: The controversial forced amalgamation component of the New South Wales Government’s Fit for the Future local government reform program culminated in compulsory council consolidation in May 2016 after a long and tortuous process commenced in August 2011. The municipal merger program has not only been characterised inter alia by significant shifts in the assessment criteria applied to councils and the associated evaluation of council performance (Drew and Dollery 2015b), but also by significant moral hazard in the selection of ‘delegates’ to evaluate proposed mergers and the subsequent choice of ‘administrators’ to run merged councils for an extended period of time. This paper examines the process of forced mergers and considers its efficacy and procedural fairness.

1. Introduction

Across the globe, local government systems in a host of countries, including Australia, have undergone various kinds of reform (Denters and Rose 2005; Faulk and Hicks 2011; Lago-Penas and Martinez-Vazquez 2013). Whereas policymakers have used a range of different instruments, in Australian local government structural change by means of compulsory council consolidation has been the most favoured approach to reform (Dollery, Grant and Kortt 2012). To date, all

Australian state and territory municipal systems, save Western Australia, have been subject to forced amalgamation. Indeed, New South Wales (NSW) local government is presently undergoing its second dose of compulsory consolidation since an earlier program of enforced council mergers in 2004 (Bell, Drew and Dollery, 2016).

The proposition underlying all municipal merger programs implicitly assumes that industry structure has predictable and systematic effects on industry behaviour and industry performance.

This concept originated in the industrial organization literature in the form of the structure- conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm developed by Mason (1949), Bain (1951) and other

1 economists. The SCP paradigm holds that a stable causal relationship exists between the structure of an industry, organizational conduct and organizational performance. In the realm of local government, proponents of structural reform invoke the logic of SCP by contending that

‘bigger is better’, ‘bigger is cheaper’ and sometimes even ‘bigger is smarter’. Accordingly, it is held that policymakers should implement municipal mergers so as to reduce the number of local councils thereby increasing their size. The resultant larger local authorities will then generate scale and scope economies, cost savings, efficiency gains, enhanced administrative and technical capacity, greater ‘strategic capacity’, and other desirable outcomes purportedly contingent upon an increase in size.

These contentious claims have sparked an ongoing debate in the local government literature (see, for example, Boyne 1998; Oakerson 1999; Sancton, 2011). Notwithstanding the popularity of compulsory council consolidation in contemporary reform programs, the empirical literature has offered little support for the efficacy of municipal mergers (see, for instance, Lago-Penas and

Martinez-Vazquez 2013). Despite the continuing controversy surrounding council amalgamation, typically centred on merger programs recommended by state government-initiated public inquiries (Dollery, Grant and Kortt 2012), Australian policymakers have periodically pursued forced merger programs. For example, under the auspices of the NSW Government’s Fit for the

Future reform program, its local government system presently experiences an even more extensive program of municipal mergers than in the earlier 2004 round of NSW forced amalgamations (Tiley 2012).

Empirical scholars of local government have analysed the impact of compulsory council consolidation in numerous countries. For instance, a substantial body of empirical work exists on amalgamation in American local government (see, for example, Leland and Thurmaier, 2010;

2 and Faulk and Hicks, 2011) and Canada (see, for instance, Reese 2004; and Vojnovic 2000).

Scholars have also examined the consequences of local government amalgamation in a number of European countries. For example, contributors to the volume edited by Dollery and Robotti

(2008) considered council mergers in France, Germany, Italy and Spain. Similarly, a Special

Edition of Local Government Studies assessed European amalgamation programs in Eastern

Europe (Swianiewicz and Mielczarek 2010), Denmark (Vrangbæk 2010), Germany (Wollmann

2010), Greece (Hlepas (2010), Macedonia (Kreci and Ymeri 2010), and Belgium and the

Netherlands (De Ceunincka et al. 2010). In a double Special Edition of Public Finance and

Management (volumes 13(2) and 13(3) in 2013) contributors examined the impact of mergers on fiscal viability in local government in Australia, England and Wales, Estonia, Finland, Korea,

New Zealand and the United States. Similarly, numerous scholars, like Koike (2010), have considered the impact of extensive municipal mergers in Japanese local government. The bulk of this empirical literature is decidedly sceptical on the efficacy of compulsory amalgamation in improving the performance of local government irrespective of the chosen performance metric employed.

To date, most research effort has focused largely on the impact of mergers on municipal performance rather than how the process of implementing mergers has affected the nature of the subsequent council consolidation (Dollery, Grant and Kortt 2012). However, in many local government systems, scholars have occasionally examined how the merger process itself has influenced the resultant merger outcome, including in the realm of Australian local government

(see, for example, Dollery, Wallis and Crase 2007; Dollery, Ho Chong Mun and Alin 2008;

Dollery, Crase and O’Keefe 2009).

In the context of the current NSW forced merger program, empirical scholars of local government reform have made a number of useful contributions in terms of how process has influenced subsequent outcomes. For example, Drew, Kortt and Dollery (2015) and Fahey, Drew and Dollery (2016) have thoroughly discredited the assumptions made by the Independent Local

Government Review Panel (2013) in its final report Revitalising Local Government, finding that claimed gains from size and efficiency underlying the Government’s case for forced amalgamation in NSW to be largely false. Similarly, Drew and Dollery (2015a) have shown that while the Panel’s call for the abolition of rate-pegging was justified, it had erred in its analysis.

In a further paper Drew and Dollery (2015b) demonstrated how the criteria for assessing council financial sustainability had not only shifted, but also become inconsistent over the course of the

Fit for the Future process. Along analogous lines, Drew and Dollery (2015c) showed how depreciation could be manipulated by individual councils to modify their financial viability. In their analysis of KPMG’s (2015) modelling of the proposed NSW mergers, Drew and Dollery

(2016) identified a host of errors, most notably in terms of redundancy costs.

In addition to this work, Drew and Grant (2016) have undertaken a particularly insightful analysis of the processes followed under the auspices of the Fit for the Future program. Using the conceptual framework developed by Marsh and McConnell (2010), they show that the Fit for the Future program was characterised by significant ‘process failure’ especially from data distortions and the deliberate ‘gaming’ of performance criteria. This paper seeks to augment the

Drew and Grant (2016) analysis of the Fit for the Future process by considering the mechanics of merger decision-making under the Local Government Act (1993) by appointed Delegates of

4 the NSW Boundaries Commission and subsequent choice of Administrators in terms of its efficacy and procedural fairness1.

The paper is divided into four main parts. Section two briefly sketches the conceptual framework advanced by Marsh and McConnell (2010) which offers an analytical prism for the paper.

Section three provides a synoptic account of the Fit for the Future reform by way of background, especially its most recent processes in terms of determining whether a given merger proposal was endorsed by Delegates. Section four focuses on the NSW Boundary Commission process, the appointment of Delegates to assess specific merger proposals and the subsequent nomination of Administrators for merged municipalities. The paper ends in section five with some brief concluding comments.

2. Conceptual Framework

Scholars of contemporary policy evaluation from various disciplinary backgrounds are generally agreed that almost all public policy is flawed (Dye, 2005). For example, economists acknowledge that real-world public policymaking is routinely sub-optimal since the marginal social costs of public policies frequently exceed their marginal social benefits. Over more than a century a substantial body of thought has evolved which uses the tools of economic analysis to assess public policies, most recently in the public choice tradition of welfare economics. The result has been a voluminous literature on ‘government failure’ (see, for example, Wolf (1989),

Wallis and Dollery (1999), Mueller (2003) and Dolfsma (2013) for surveys).

1 Procedural fairness is the common law principle which ensures probity of decision making and is often used in a fashion synonymous with Natural Justice. There are three rules which underpin the concept of procedural fairness: the hearing rule (whereby persons likely to be adversely affected by a decision must be given the opportunity to present their case), the bias rule (that there must be no actual or reasonable apprehension of bias) and the no- evidence rule (whereby decision makers must give weight to logically probative evidence – this rule is sometimes implicitly collapsed into the hearing rule) (see, for instance, Groves, 2013; Preston, 2013). Moreover, it should be noted that procedural fairness is also a moral principle which can be traced back to the work of Aristotle and Aquinas (Wright, 2000).

The economics approach can be usefully complemented by various strands in the public administration and public policy analysis literature, especially conceptual approaches to the assessment of the ‘success’ and ‘failure’ of public policies and public programs (see, for example, Boyne 2003; Bovens et al. 2001; Marsh and McConnell 2010). Thus Boyne (2003) has identified five models for assessing ‘organizational effectiveness’ in the public sector: the ‘goal’ approach, the ‘internal process’ model, the ‘systems-resource’ approach, the ‘multiple constituency’ models, and the ‘competing values’ perspective. More generally, Marsh and

McConnell (2010) offer a tripartite heuristic approach to evaluating policy success or failure comprised of: (a) ‘process’ which refers to the stages of policy formulation and formalization;

(b) ‘programmatic’ which deals with whether a given policy met its intended objectives; and (c)

‘political’ which considers if a given policy assisted its proponents ‘electoral prospects, reputation or overall governance project’ (p. 574). In the Marsh and McConnell (2010) typology, these three elements are seen as independent rather than interdependent. In the context of the tortuous NSW Fit for the Future local government reform process, the Marsh and McConnell

(2010) evaluation criteria offers obvious and immediate utility, although as we shall demonstrate, elements (a), (b) and (c) are interdependent in a linear relationship.

3. New South Wales Local Government Fit for the Future Reform Process

Prior to the Fit for the Future forced amalgamation program, NSW local government encompassed 152 ‘general purpose councils’, 12 ‘special purpose councils’ and the NSW

Aboriginal Land Council. NSW local councils are regulated by the NSW Office of Local

Government (OLG), the NSW Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART), NSW

Local Government Grants Commission and ancillary bodies under the NSW Local Government

Act (1993). In comparison with most other OECD countries, local government in Australia

6 undertakes a limited range of functions largely concentrated on ‘services to property’. In particular, NSW councils deliver local infrastructure, including local roads, and local services, such as sewage and solid waste disposal, with some regional councils operating local water utilities. NSW local government is financed through property taxes, fees and charges, intergovernmental grants, developer charges and some other minor sources of income. NSW local councils fall under elected councillors and (typically) indirectly elected mayors, who face four-year electoral periods. The operational side of councils is run by a general manager overseeing a Westminster-style bureaucracy.

The Fit for the Future reform process arose from the Destination 2036 Workshop held on 19th

August 2011 under the (then) Minister for Local Government Don Page and attended by councillors and general managers from all NSW local authorities. It led inter alia to the establishment of the Independent Local Government Review Panel (ILGRP) whose Terms of

Reference specifically precluded forced amalgamation. Notwithstanding this stipulation, in its

April 2013 Future Directions for NSW Local Government interim report, the Panel (2013a) proposed sweeping council mergers, focused largely on Greater Sydney. Despite repeated assurances that it would rely on ‘evidence-based’ policymaking, the Panel offered no empirical evidence for its radical merger program. Following public consultation, the Panel (2013b) submitted its Revitalising Local Government final report in October 2013. In essence,

Revitalising Local Government simply reiterated the radical merger recommendations in Future

Directions, albeit to be adjudicated by a ‘strengthened’ Boundaries Commission, which in any event accommodated existing provisions in the Local Government Act (1993).

The NSW Government released Revitalising Local Government in January 2014 and only publically responded to the Panel’s recommendations in Revitalising Local Government in

September 2014 in the form of its Fit for the Future (OLG, 2014a) reform package. Fit for the

Future endorsed all of the council mergers recommended by the Panel and laid out a ‘self- assessment’ procedure by which each local authority would evaluate itself against a number of performance indicators. Based on self-assessment outcomes, local councils were obliged to submit their preferred ‘merger’ proposal(s) or present an ‘improvement’ proposal in order to remain a ‘stand-alone’ council – excepting a limited number of councils deemed, at the time, suitable to propose to operate as a stand-alone ‘rural council’ – to the OLG by 30 June 2015.

The proposals received by the OLG were subsequently to be assessed by the appointed Expert

Panel, constituted primarily of IPART in conjunction with John Combrie, on the basis of the provisions set out in Fit for the Future. However, on 27 April 2015 the Minister for Local

Government declared that IPART (2015a) would instead assess councils on the basis of criteria contained in Methodology for Assessment of Council Fit for the Future Proposals: Local

Government Consultation Paper April 2015 which differed substantively from the earlier Fit for the Future criteria. In particular, the Fit for the Future criteria were superseded by new assessment measures, together with an over-arching but undefined ‘adequate scale and capacity’ criterion (Drew and Dollery, 2015b; Abelson, 2016). In effect, because the ‘adequate scale and capacity’ criteria was to be assessed purely based upon minimum population thresholds under the revised assessment criteria, councils could be deemed ‘unfit’ based on population-based size measures, irrespective of their financial sustainability, or indeed, the effectiveness of their service provision.

Some idea of the chaotic and ever-changing decision-making criteria applied to NSW councils under the Fit for the Future Process can be garnered from Table 1.

TABLE 1 COMES HERE

The information contained in Table 1 demonstrates how the assessments and recommendations for many councils varied over the course of the Fit for the Future process. Indeed, a perusal of

Table 1 shows that – in many instances – councils received conflicting and contradictory evaluations, sometimes recommended for merger and sometimes not. Moreover, for those councils slated for merger the recommended merger partner was also not always consistently prescribed under the various evaluations. The chaotic and disordered nature of the reform process, exemplified by the endlessly shifting ‘goal posts’, served to discredit and delegitimise

Fit for the Future.

On 20th October 2015, IPART (2015b) released its Assessment of Council Fit for the Future

Proposals containing its determinations on the fate of individual local authorities. In sum,

IPART (2015) adjudicated 139 local council submissions from a total of 144 councils and found

52 (37%) proposals ‘fit for the future’ and 87 (63%) not ‘fit for the future’. Of the ‘unfit’ group,

60 councils were deemed to have inadequate ‘scale and capacity’ but met the financial criteria,

18 had sufficient ‘scale and capacity’ but were not financially ‘fit’, and nine had both inadequate

‘scale and capacity’ and failed on financial criteria. In addition, all four ‘merger’ proposals were assessed as ‘fit for the future’.

The NSW Government announced its decision on municipal mergers on 18th December 2015, proposing the establishment of 35 local councils through amalgamation: Fifteen of these mergers were in Greater Sydney and the remaining 20 councils were in non-metropolitan NSW. Under the provisions of the Local Government Act (1993) the 35 proposals would be considered by

Delegates appointed by the Minister and - after a public consultation process - referred to

Boundaries Commission for final recommendation to the Minister. Under the Act, the Minister is

9 not obliged to accept these recommendations and retains the final decision within the common law constraint of procedural fairness.

In January 2016, the NSW Government published a ‘merger proposal’ for each of the 35 proposed municipal mergers which summarised the purported benefits and costs of merging which were developed by KPMG (2015) in its Local Government Reform: Merger Impacts and

Analysis. The NSW Government refused to release Local Government Reform - even to

Delegates assessing specific merger proposals - but instead released KPMG’s (2016) Outline of

Financial Modelling Assumptions for Local Government Merger Proposals Technical Paper which laid out the methodology employed in each Local Government Reform assessment.

Little correspondence existed between the IPART (2015) determinations on specific local authorities and the 35 councils proposed by the NSW Government which seems to have indicated underlying political considerations may have played a significant role. Table 2 shows the classifications and recommendations accorded different councils by the Independent Panel,

IPART and Delegates:

TABLE 2 COMES HERE

It is clear from Table 2 that very little correlation exists between the recommendations of the

Independent Panel, the ‘fit for the future’ assessment by IPART, the recommendations by

Delegates and the final merger decisions taken by the Minister on behalf of the NSW

Government.

4. Delegates and Administrators

As we have seen, under the Local Government Act 1993 (as amended) the Minister for Local

Government is required to refer the proposals for municipal mergers to the Boundaries

Commission, or alternatively to the Chief Executive of the Office of Local Government, for examination. For the 2016 mergers proposals, (then) Minister for Local Government Paul Toole decided to refer all proposals to the Acting Chief Executive of the Office of Local Government.

The Acting Chief Executive then delegated the function of examining and reporting on each of the amalgamation proposals to appointed ‘Delegates’.

Under the Act, Delegates must examine and report upon each merger proposal in a thorough manner. This requires Delegates to call for public submissions on merger proposals and to hold a public inquiry into each proposed council amalgamation. A given proposal must be assessed against all the factors stipulated in section 263(3) of the Local Government Act 1993. Delegates must then provide a report to the Minister for Local Government as well as the Local

Government Boundaries Commission. The Boundaries Commission is required to consider each

Delegate report and submit its assessment on each report to the Minister. When the Minister has received a report from the Delegate on a given merger proposal, as well as the assessment by the

Boundaries Commission, the Minister must then decide whether or not to recommend the implementation of the merger proposal to the Governor of NSW. If the Minister recommends a given merger proposal, then the Governor will issue a proclamation creating a new amalgamated council.

Once a new council has been proclaimed by the Minister, then the extant council entities which comprise the new local authority legally cease to exist, elected councillors become defunct and are replaced by an Administrator appointed by the Minister as stipulated in the Local

Government Act 1993. The Administrator enjoys the same powers as an elected council and must perform the same functions. A newly appointed Administrator must inter alia employ a new general manager for the new council to supervise the operations of the municipal workforce.

Administrators run new councils until elections are held and new councillors are elected by local residents. Following the 2016 mergers in NSW, elections are scheduled for September 2017 which will mean that amalgamated councils will have been controlled by Administrators for some eighteen months from their formation.

It is generally held that the common law principle of procedural fairness in decision making extends beyond the courts and into the realm of administrative decision-making (Groves, 2013).

The exception to this may be found where Parliament has expressly excluded the presumption of procedural fairness. No such exclusion is made in the Local Government Act (NSW) 1993.

Moreover, the concept of ‘natural justice’ is a moral principle originating with Aristotle and

Aquinas (Wright, 2000). Accordingly, even were it to be found that administrative decision making was not subject to the legal constraint of procedural fairness, it might still be the case that administrative decision-making would be morally constrained by procedural fairness.

Concerns that procedural fairness was not observed in relation to the examination of the

Minister’s proposals are the predominate cause of ‘mergers’ being deemed ‘pending’ in Table 2.

The first problem raised by opponents to the proposed forced amalgamations has related to the

‘hearing rule’ – which referred to the time allotted to persons wishing to speak at Delegate arranged public inquiries. In most cases, speakers were told that they would be restricted to only three minutes. However, many people were not provided with any opportunity to speak. For example, in Gundagai 140 speakers registered to provide oral evidence which simple arithmetic suggests would take at least seven hours. Yet the public inquiry was only conducted over a period of three hours. In handing down his ruling to the challenge against the forced amalgamation of Gundagai, Oberon, Cabonne and Cootamundra, Justice Preston (2016, paragraph 178) stated that:

The Delegates exercised that discretion to adopt a procedure for the orderly

and efficient conduct of the inquiries that they held, including requesting

persons wishing to speak at the inquiry to register beforehand, imposing time

limits on each speaker….I do not accept that the restrictions actually

imposed…were so great an impingement on people’s ability to speak at the

inquiry as to cause the inquiry not to be an inquiry under s263(3).

A further major point of contention on procedural fairness related to the ‘bias rule’. The test is whether a ‘fair minded layperson’ might reasonably apprehend that the decision-maker might not bring an impartial mind to the exercise of function (Preston, 2013). In particular, questions were asked as to whether Delegates, such as John Turner, former deputy leader of the NSW National

Party, and Garry West, former National Party representative for the seat of Orange, were entirely free of political bias. Moreover, the list of Delegates also included former executives from the

Property Council (keen advocates for council amalgamations), the former Commissioner for the

Public Inquiry into the Administration of Central Darling Shire (who had previously been accused of apprehended bias in his duties as a Commissioner) and a former staffer who had previously been involved in executing the contentious Westconnex road infrastructure project

(which ran through affected councils). In addition, as detailed in Table 4, eight of the Delegates were subsequently appointed to highly remunerated positions as council Administrators for at least 17 months, thus raising further questions with respect to whether there might be at least an apprehension of bias, particularly if delegates knew that they might later be in line for roles as

Administrators). In any case, while the qualifications of these eight appointed Administrators is not necessarily disputed, it seems curious that out of the large pool of former council General

Managers and former Mayors, these persons received their respective appointments.

The third rule of procedural fairness is the ‘no-evidence rule’ which means that logically probative evidence – evidence that tends to rationally prove the existence or non-existence of a fact – needs to be taken into account by decision makers. Put differently, the rule establishes a duty for the decision-maker to ‘consider and to make appropriate findings of fact and draw appropriate inferences of fact based on the evidence’ (Preston, 2013, p. 205). It has been argued in a number of the legal contests that the no-evidence rule was not observed by Delegates. For example, administrator Turner (2016, p. 32) elected to eschew rigorous randomised survey evidence (by IRIS Research), which found that ‘around 90 per cent of those surveyed in every category disagreed with the proposal to merge Gundagai Shire’, in relation to resident attitudes to amalgamation (which must be assessed under s 263(3)(d)) to conclude the following:

Although the attitude of most residents who made submissions from

Gundagai Shire was against the merger proposal, and those from

Cootamundra Shire expressed concerns about its potential success, they

represented only a small percentage of the overall population. Whilst it

cannot be said that by not making a submission the larger sector of the

population is in favour of the merger, the fact that given ample opportunity to

make a submission, and submissions were not made one way or the other, the

majority of the population did not have a strong attitude one way or the other

concerning the merger proposal.

In handing down his judgement on the challenge against the Gundagai amalgamation, Justice

Preston (2016, paragraph 322) observed that:

Proper consideration of a relevant matter does not demand factual

correctness. Establishing the judicial review ground of failure to consider a

relevant matter does not involve the correctness of the decision, or the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting it, or the weight of the evidence

against it, or the regularity of the manner in which the decision maker has

proceeded.

This decision seems at odds with what Preston (2013) earlier published observations outlined in his article on procedural fairness for the courts a few years earlier. This may suggest that Preston

(2016) takes the view that judicial procedural fairness differs to procedural fairness of administrative decision-makers. However, this would be at odds with the generally held opinion that procedural fairness does indeed apply equally to administrative decisions (unless explicitly excluded in the relevant legislation (Groves, 2013). It would also make Preston’s (2013) references to administrative decision-making in his published paper appear rather odd.

Moreover, based on Preston’s (2016) judgement cited above, this would seem to underscore the importance of the bias rule for procedural fairness in public inquiries.

The Lands and Environment Courts has to date dismissed most of the challenges regarding procedural fairness (notable exceptions were Strathfield2, Mosman and North Sydney). However, several councils have lodged appeals that are currently before higher courts. Moreover, as we have noted earlier, procedural fairness is a concept also defined in moral theory, not just in common law (Wright, 2000). Thus, even if it were legal for a former leader of the National Party to examine the Amalgamation Proposal of a National Party Local Government Minister, prevent over half of the residents who wanted to give evidence before him from doing to, eschew robust

2 In the excepted cases, Justice Moore ruled that the delegate that considered the mergers involving Mosman and North Sydney had failed to pay due attention to one aspect of one relevant section of the Act and that the delegate considering the merger involving Strathfield had failed to consider two matters (Saulwick, 2016; Davies, 2016; Davies and Saulwick, 2016). However, it should be noted that in the Strathfield case, Delegate Richard Colley produced an additional amended report in January 2017 which may result in the forced merger going ahead in future

15 empirical evidence in favour of his mere impression and eventually secure a lucrative role as a council Administrator, it may be far from morally legitimate to do so.

The moral uncertainty which has characterised the Boundary examination has led to widespread questioning as to the ‘independence’ of delegates, administrators and the larger amalgamation process. Moreover, the dubious record with respect to the policy process is now giving rise to political failure for the embattled NSW Government (constituted by a coalition of the Liberal and

National parties). In particular, the shock loss of the National Party in the November 2016

Orange by-election (suffering a swing of over 20 per cent), and more recent political casualties, including the replacement of both the Minister for Local Government and the leader of the

National Party, together with the resignation of the Premier of NSW from Parliament, suggest that the ‘process failure’ of the forced amalgamation program has led to ‘political failure’

(Woodburn, 2016). Indeed, opposition to forced amalgamation has been concentrated on procedural, process and moral objections, and has been a proximate cause – with the ill- considered ban on greyhound racing – for the flailing political support of the NSW Government since the 2015 NSW election.

As a result of the political costs of the forced mergers, in February 2017 new Premier Gladys

Berejiklian and Deputy Premier John Barilaro (National Party leader) abandoned the proposed merger of regional councils which remained pending, but remained steadfast on metropolitan mergers which had proceeded or were pending and on regional councils which had already merged. In so doing, the new Premier offered a mea culpa based on the reflection that the ‘one- size fits all’ approach by the NSW Government in imposing mergers had been unfortunate.

However, the Premier judged that differential treatment of regional and metropolitan councils

16 was justified, claiming that the consolidation of metropolitan councils was ‘a pressing issue’ on the basis of inter alia tackling the urban ‘housing affordability crisis’.

The decision to not proceed with additional regional mergers, while leaving all other policy imperatives unchanged, has negated any opportunity to allow residents in affected municipalities to participate in a plebiscite to determine their fate. As a result, the NSW Government has been attacked on the basis that it has applied double standards to municipal mergers between (a) metropolitan and regional councils as well as between (b) pending and already merged councils.

In addition, it is clear that given the differential treatment to councils, the forced merger program has further failed to apply procedural fairness. It is thus hard to escape the conclusion that under the partial reversal of the NSW Government’s compulsory council consolidation program has resulted in not only a calamitous case of ‘process failure’ and ‘political failure’ but is also well on the way to becoming in an equally disastrous ‘program failure’.

TABLE 3 COMES HERE

TABLE 4 COMES HERE

5. Conclusion

This paper has examined the process of forced municipal mergers in NSW over the period 2011 to 2017. We have sought to demonstrate that program process failure has given rise to political failure and thereby a degree of program failure. Indeed, far from being three ‘independent’ dimensions in which policy success or failure may be examined - as argued by Marsh and

McConnell (2010) – in this paper we have shown that the association between these dimensions is instead more akin to ‘linear dependence’. Put differently, over the course of the NSW Fit for the Future process failure seems to have induced political failure and thence program failure

(Drew and Grant, 2016). This supports findings made by other scholars who have identified deficiencies in the assessment process employed by the NSW Government and its various

‘independent’ appointees in its Fit for the Future policy. For instance, Drew and Grant (2016) have argued that the process has failed as a result of its reliance for empirical legitimacy on questionable data. In this paper, we contend that the failure to provide procedural fairness, together with perceived moral hazard, has given rise to substantial legitimacy questions which challenge the forced merger program.

From the outset, the compulsory consolidation program has been haunted by moral ambiguity emanating from the NSW Government’s (then) commitment to ‘no forced amalgamations’ platform in the 2011 NSW election. Indeed, throughout the course of Fit for the Future process the NSW Government has misrepresented the nature of the process, in large part through repeated assurances that it would not force councils to merge. In addition, significant moral hazard has emerged in the process. For instance, the selection of Delegates to evaluate proposed mergers and the subsequent choice of Administrators to run consolidated councils has generated disquiet. In particular, many Delegates – appointed ostensibly in order to offer an ‘independent’ assessment of merger proposals – were offered subsequent highly remunerated positions as

Administrators in merged councils.

Moreover, this paper has cast doubt on the application of procedural fairness in the assessment process for merger proposals. This is mainly because the principles embodying procedural fairness – the hearing rule, the bias rule and the no-evidence rule – were either ignored or inadequately applied during the process of assessing merger proposals. Finally, public unease has been further exacerbated by the political ‘double standards’ which have been applied in the ultimate execution of the policy, not least the differential treatment accorded metropolitan

18 councils and their regional counterparts in contested merger circumstances. As a result, we conclude that the process has been legally and morally fraught. Moreover, this process failure has brought with it political and program failure.

Political failure has been plain for all to see, with substantial political casualties, including the resignation of Premier Baird, and collapse in electoral support for the NSW Government, as evidenced in the Orange by-election. Indeed, political failure resulting from the municipal merger program is not without recent precedent in Australia. For instance, concerted resistance to its proposed forced mergers of Perth councils has seen the Western Australian Government abandon its policy in 2016. As yet, because the amalgamation program itself has not concluded, no firm determination of program failure can be made, though the culmination of process failure and political failure make it look likely.

APPENDIX

Table 1: Shifting Evaluations and Recommendations during NSW Merger Process

Merge r 2016 2015 Propo NSW Council Delegates T Corp ILGRP sal Governme Council Proposal Recommend FSR Preference Expert Referr nt to ation Panel ed to Decision IPART Assessm Delega Reached ent te Merge with Improve Stand Moderat Greater ment Fit No N/A alone Albury e Hume Proposal Proceed to merger as Proceed to Improve Yes Armidale Armidale Moderat Merge with merger ment Not Fit Regional Dumaresq e Guyra Proposal Council Yes Proceed to Merger merger Pending Merge with Burwood, Proceed to Improve Canada Bay, Proceed to merge as ment Not Fit Yes Leichhardt, merger Inner West Proposal Marrickville, Council Ashfield Sound Strathfield Proceed to Proceed to merge as Yes Merge merger Cumberlan Merge with with d Council Parramatta, Auburn Sound Burwood, Fit Yes Proceed to Proceed to Holroyd, Canada merger merge as Ryde*, Hills* Bay Parramatta City Council Improve Northern Stand Moderat ment Fit No N/A Rivers JO alone Ballina e Proposal Not Joint Required administratio Stand to submit N/A No N/A n with alone merger Wentworth Balranald Weak proposal Proceed to Improve merger in Proceed to No change ment Fit Yes Canterbury merger Moderat Proposal - Bankstown e Bankstown

Council

Improve Central West Proceed to Merger Moderat ment Fit Yes JO merger Pending Bathurst e Proposal Improve South East Stand ment Fit No N/A JO alone Bega Valley Sound Proposal Improve North Coast Stand Moderat ment Not Fit No N/A JO alone Bellingen e Proposal Improve Do not Merge with Not Moderat ment Not Fit Yes proceed to Jerilderie Proceeding Berrigan e Proposal merger Improve Stand Moderat No change ment Not Fit No N/A alone Blacktown e Proposal Improve Stand Riverina JO ment Not Fit No N/A alone Bland Weak Proposal Improve Central West Proceed to Merger Moderat ment Not Fit Yes JO merger Pending Blayney e Proposal Improve Stand Blue No change ment Fit No N/A alone Mountains Weak Proposal Moderat Rural Stand Orana JO Fit No N/A Bogan e Council alone Proceed to merge as Merge with Rural Proceed to Snowy Cooma- Not Fit Yes Council merger Monaro Monaro Moderat Regional Bombala e Council Proceed to Proceed to merge as Merge with Merge Yes Moderat merger Hilltops Boorowa Harden, with Fit e Council Young Young Yes Proceed to Not merger Proceeding Merge with Randwick, Improve Proceed to Merger Waverley, ment Not Fit Yes merger Pending Woolahra, Proposal Botany Bay Weak Sydney Not Joint Required administratio Stand to submit N/A No N/A n with alone merger Brewarrina Bourke Weak proposal

Not Joint Required administratio Stand to submit N/A No N/A n with alone merger Bourke Brewarrina Weak proposal Not Required Stand No change to submit N/A No N/A alone Very merger Broken Hill Weak proposal Merge with Merge Ashfield, with Canada Bay, Proceed to Merger Canada Fit Yes Marrickville, merger Pending Bay, Leichhardt, Auburn Burwood Weak Stathfield Improve Northern Stand ment Fit No N/A Rivers JO alone Byron Weak Proposal Improve Merge with Proceed to Merger ment Not Fit Yes Orange merger Pending Cabonne Sound Proposal Improve Stand Moderat No change ment Fit No N/A alone Camden e Proposal Improve Stand Campbellto Moderat No change ment Not Fit No N/A alone wn e Proposal Merge with Ashfield, Merge Burwood, with Proceed to Merger Fit Yes Marrickville, Auburn, merger Pending Moderat Leichhardt, Burwood Canada Bay e Strathfield Proceed to Merge with merger in Improve Hurstville, Proceed to Canterbury ment Not Fit Yes Kogarah, merger - Proposal Moderat Rockdale Bankstown Canterbury e Council Rural council in Rural Stand Fit No N/A Murrumbidge Council alone Carrathool Weak e JO Unincorporat Not e under Required administratio Stand to submit N/A No N/A n of Far West alone merger Central Very Regional proposal Darling Weak Authority

Hunter JO Pilot** (No Improve Stand ILGRP ment Fit No N/A alone Moderat Recommenda Proposal Cessnock e tion) Improve North Coast Stand Clarence ment Not Fit No N/A JO alone Valley Weak Proposal Not Required Stand No change to submit N/A No N/A alone merger Cobar Weak proposal Improve North Coast Stand Coffs ment Fit No N/A JO alone Harbour Weak Proposal Proceed to Merge with merge as Rural Proceed to Deniliquin, Not Fit Yes Edward Council merger Murray River Conargo Sound Council Rural Rural Stand Council in Fit No N/A Council alone Coolamon Sound Riverina JO Proceed to merge as Improve Merge with Proceed to Snowy ment Not Fit Yes Bombala merger Monaro Proposal Cooma- Regional Monaro Weak Council Rural Rural Stand Council in Fit No N/A Council alone Coonambie Sound Orana JO Proceed to Not Yes merger Proceeding Merge with Merge Cootamundr Moderat Yes Proceed to Proceed to Boorowa, with Fit a e merger merge as Young Harden Gundagai Council Proceed to Not Yes merger Proceeding Improve Moderat Upper Yes Proceed to Proceed to ment Not Fit e Murray JO merger merge as Proposal Federation Corowa Council Improve Central West Stand ment Fit No N/A JO alone Cowra Sound Proposal Moderat Merge with Improve Proceed to Proceed to Not Fit Yes Deniliquin e Conargo, ment merger merge as

Murray, Proposal Edward Wakool River Council Proceed to merge as Improve Proceed to Western Orana JO ment Fit Yes merger Plains Proposal Moderat Regional Dubbo e Council Do not Not Improve Yes proceed to Merge with Proceeding Weak ment Not Fit merger Maitland Proposal Yes Proceed to Proposal Dungog merger Pending Improve South East Stand Moderat ment Fit No N/A JO alone Eurobodalla e Proposal Improve Merge with Stand ment Not Fit No N/A Liverpool alone Fairfield Sound Proposal Improve Central West Stand Moderat ment Not Fit No N/A JO alone Forbes e Proposal Rural Rural Stand Council in Fit No N/A Council alone Gilgandra Weak Orana JO Improve New England Stand Moderat ment Fit No N/A JO alone Glen Innes e Proposal Do not Not Yes proceed to Proceeding Improve merger Very Mid-North ment Not Fit Yes Proceed to Proceed to Weak Coast JO Proposal merger merge as Mid-Coast Gloucester Council Proceed to Improve merger in Merge with Proceed to ment Not Fit Yes Central Wyong merger Moderat Proposal Coast Gosford e Council Improve Do not Tablelands Not Moderat ment Not Fit Yes proceed to JO Proceeding Goulburn e Proposal merger Proceed to Improve Mid-North Proceed to merge as ment Fit Yes Moderat Coast JO merger Mid-Coast Proposal Great Lakes e Council Greater Moderat Upper Improve Stand Fit No N/A Hume e Murray JO ment alone

Proposal Proceed to Improve Mid-North Proceed to merge as ment Not Fit Yes Greater Very Coast JO merger Mid-Coast Proposal Taree Weak Council Merge with Improve Stand Murrumbidge ment Not Fit No N/A alone Griffith Sound e Proposal Proceed to Not Yes merger Proceeding Moderat Merge with Rural Yes Proceed to Proceed to Not Fit e Tumut Council merger merge as Gundagai Gundagai Council Improve Stand Namoi JO ment Fit No N/A alone Gunnedah Sound Proposal Proceed to merger in Proceed to Yes Armidale Moderat Merge with Rural merger Not Fit Regional e Armidale Council Council Yes Proceed to Merger Guyra merger Pending Improve Stand Very Namoi JO ment Not Fit No N/A alone Gwydir Weak Proposal Proceed to Merge Proceed to merge as Yes Moderat Council in with merger Hilltops Fit e Riverina JO Cootamu Council ndra Yes Proceed to Not Harden merger Proceeding Improve Do not Not Moderat No change ment Not Fit Yes proceed to Proceeding Hawkesbury e Proposal merger Moderat Murrumbidge Rural Stand Not Fit No N/A Hay e e JO Council alone Do not Not Yes proceed to Proceeding merger Improve Yes Proceed to Proceed to Sound No change ment Fit merger merge as Proposal Parramatta City Hills District Council Merge with Proceed to Improve Auburn, Proceed to merger as Holroyd Weak ment Not Fit Yes Parramatta, merger Cumberlan Proposal Ryde*, Hills* d Council

Yes Proceed to Proced to merger merge as Parramatta City Council Proceed to Merger Yes merger Pending Improve Yes Proceed to Proced to Moderat Merge with Hornsby ment Not Fit merger merge as e Ku-ring-gai Proposal Parramatta City Council Merge with Lane Cove, Mosman, Improve Proceed to Merger North ment Not Fit Yes merger Pending Sydney, Proposal Moderat Ryde*, Hunter's Hill e Willoughby Proceed to Merge with Improve merge as Canterbury, Proceed to ment Not Fit Yes Georges Kogarah, merger Moderat Proposal River Rockdale Hurstville e Council Improve New England Stand Moderat ment Fit No N/A JO alone Inverell e Proposal Do not Not Yes proceed to Proceeding merger Yes Do not Not proceed to Proceeding Moderat Merge with Rural Jerilderie Not Fit merger e Berrigan Council Yes Proceed to Proceed to merger merge as Murrumbi dgee Council Improve Stand Moderat Riverina JO ment Not Fit No N/A alone Junee e Proposal Improve Mid-North Stand ment Not Fit No N/A Coast JO alone Kempsey Weak Proposal Improve Do not Not Moderat Illawarra JO ment Not Fit Yes proceed to Proceeding Kiama e Proposal merger Merge with Improve Proceed to Proceed to Moderat Canterbury, ment Not Fit Yes merge as merger Kogarah e Hurstville, Proposal Georges

Rockdale River Council Improve Merge with Proceed to Merger ment Not Fit Yes Hornsby merger Pending Ku-Ring-Gai Sound Proposal Northern Rural Stand Not Fit No N/A Kyogle Weak Rivers JO Council alone Improve Merge with Stand Moderat ment Not Fit No N/A Parkes alone Lachlan e Proposal Improve Merge with Stand Lake Moderat ment Not Fit No N/A Newcastle alone Macquarie e Proposal Merge with Hunter's Hill, Mosman, Improve Proceed to Merger North ment Not Fit Yes merger Pending Sydney, Proposal Ryde*, Lane Cove Sound Willoughby Improve Murrumbidge Stand Moderat ment Fit No N/A e JO alone Leeton e Proposal Merge with Ashfield, Proceed to Improve Burwood, Proceed to merge as ment Not Fit Yes Canada Bay, merger Inner West Proposal Marrickville, Council Leichhardt Sound Strathfield Improve Northern Stand Moderat ment Fit No N/A Rivers JO alone Lismore e Proposal Improve Central West Stand ment Not Fit No N/A JO alone Lithgow Sound Proposal Improve Merge with Stand ment Not Fit No N/A Fairfield alone Liverpool Sound Proposal Improve Stand Liverpool Namoi JO ment Not Fit No N/A alone Plains Weak Proposal Rural Proceed to Not Riverina JO Fit Yes Lockhart Sound Council merger Proceeding Improve Merge with Proceed to Merger Moderat ment Not Fit Yes Dungog merger Pending Maitland e Proposal Merge with Improve Proceed to Not Manly Sound Not Fit Yes Pittwater, ment merger Proceeding

Warringah Proposal Yes Proceed to Proceed to merger merge as Northern Beaches Council Merge with Ashfield, Proceed to Improve Burwood, Proceed to merge as ment Not Fit Yes Canada Bay, merger Inner West Proposal Moderat Leichhardt, Council Marrickville e Strathfield Improve Central West Stand ment Not Fit No N/A JO alone Mid-Western Sound Proposal Improve Stand Moderat Namoi JO ment Fit No N/A alone Moree e Proposal Merge with Proceed to Not Yes Hunter's Hill, merger Proceeding Lane Cove, Improve Yes Proceed to Merger Mosman Weak North ment Not Fit merger Pending Sydney, Proposal Ryde*, Willoughby Proceed to Merge with Improve Do not merge as Deniliquin, ment Not Fit Yes proceed to Murray Moderat Conargo Proposal merger River Murray e Council Do not Not Moderat Yes proceed to Proceeding e merger Murrumbidg Merge with Rural Yes Proceed to Proceed to Not Fit ee Griffith Council merger merge as Murrumbi dgee Council Improve Stand Muswellbroo Moderat Hunter JO ment Fit No N/A alone k e Proposal Improve North Coast Stand ment Fit No N/A JO alone Nambucca Weak Proposal Improve Stand Moderat Namoi JO ment Fit No N/A alone Narrabri e Proposal Improve Murrumbidge Stand ment Not Fit No N/A e JO alone Narrandera Sound Proposal Narromine Moderat Orana JO Improve Not Fit No N/A Stand

e ment alone Proposal Mergre with Improve Proceed to Merger Moderat Lake ment Not Fit Yes merger Pending Newcastle e Macquarie Proposal Merge with Proceed to Not Yes Hunter's Hill, merger Proceeding Improve North Moderat Lane Cove, Yes Proceed to Merger ment Not Fit Sydney e Mosman, merger Pending Proposal Ryde*, Willoughby Improve Merge with Proceed to Merger ment Not Fit Yes Bathurst merger Pending Oberon Sound Proposal Improve Merge with Proceed to Merger ment Not Fit Yes Cabonne merger Pending Orange Sound Proposal Do not Not Yes proceed to Proceeding merger Yes Do not Not proceed to Proceeding Improve Moderat Merge with merger Palerang ment Not Fit e Queanbeyan Yes Proceed to Proceed to Proposal merger merge as Queanbeya n-Palerang Regional Council Improve Central West Stand Moderat ment Fit No N/A JO alone Parkes e Proposal Proceed to Proceed to merge as Yes merger Cumberlan Merge with Improve d Council Moderat Auburn, Parramatta ment Not Fit Yes Proceed to Proceed to e Holroyd, Proposal merger merge as Ryde*, Hills* Parramatta City Council Improve Stand No change ment Fit No N/A alone Penrith Weak Proposal Proceed to Not Yes merger Proceeding Merge with Improve Yes Proceed to Proceed to Pittwater Sound Manly, ment Not Fit merger merge as Warringah Proposal Northern Beaches

Council

Improve Mid-North Stand Port ment Fit No N/A Coast JO alone Macquarie Weak Proposal Improve Proceed to Merger Port Moderat Hunter JO ment Fit Yes merger Pending Stephens e Proposal Do not Not Yes proceed to Proceeding merger Improve Yes Proceed to Proceed to Merge with Queanbeyan Weak ment Not Fit merger merge as Palerang Proposal Queanbeya n-Palerang Regional Council Merge with Randwick, Merge Proceed to Merger Botany Bay, with Fit Yes merger Pending Woollahra, Waverley Randwick Sound Sydney Improve Northern Stand Richmond ment Fit No N/A Rivers JO alone Valley Weak Proposal Merge with Improve Canterbury, Proceed to Merger ment Not Fit Yes Moderat Kogarah, merger Pending Proposal Rockdale e Hurstville Merge with Hunter's Hill, Lane Cove, Improve Proceed to Merger Mosman, ment Not Fit Yes merger Pending North Proposal Sydney, Ryde Sound Willoughby Improve Proceed to Merger Moderat Illawarra JO ment Not Fit Yes merger Pending Shellharbour e Proposal Improve Do not South East Not ment Fit Yes proceed to JO Proceeding Shoalhaven Sound Proposal merger Improve Stand Moderat Hunter JO ment Fit No N/A alone Singleton e Proposal Proceed to Merge with Improve merge as Bombala, Proceed to ment Not Fit Yes Snowy Cooma- merger Moderat Proposal Monaro Monaro Snowy River e Regional

Council

Merge with Ashfield, Improve Burwood, Proceed to Merger ment Not Fit Yes Canada Bay, merger Pending Proposal Moderat Leichhardt, Strathfield e Marrickville Improve Stand Moderat No change ment Fit No N/A alone Sutherland e Proposal Merge with Randwick, Improve Stand Waverley, ment Not Fit No N/A alone Woollahra, Proposal Sydney Strong Botany Bay Improve Proceed to Not Moderat Namoi JO ment Fit Yes merger Proceeding Tamworth e Proposal Improve Stand Riverina JO ment Not Fit No N/A alone Temora Sound Proposal Improve New England Stand ment Not Fit No N/A JO alone Tenterfield Weak Proposal Proceed to Do not merge as Rural Riverina JO Fit Yes proceed to Snowy Council Tumbarumb merger Valleys a Strong Council Proceed to Improve Do not merge as Merge with ment Not Fit Yes proceed to Snowy Gundagai Moderat Proposal merger Valleys Tumut e Council Improve Northern Stand Moderat ment Not Fit No N/A Rivers JO alone Tweed e Proposal Improve Stand Upper Hunter JO ment Fit No N/A alone Hunter Sound Proposal Improve Tablelands Stand Upper ment Not Fit No N/A JO alone Lachlan Sound Proposal Improve Merge with Proceed to Merger ment Not Fit Yes Walcha merger Pending Uralla Weak Proposal Proceed to Not Merge with Rural Yes Urana Weak Not Fit merger Proceeding Corowa Council Yes Proceed to Proceed to

merger merge as Federation Council Improve Stand Wagga Moderat Riverina JO ment Fit No N/A alone Wagga e Proposal Proceed to Do not merge as Mid-Murray Rural Fit Yes proceed to Murray JO Council merger River Wakool Weak Council Proceed to Not Yes Merge with Rural merger Proceeding Walcha Weak Not Fit Uralla Council Yes Proceed to Merger merger Pending Not Required Stand No change to submit N/A No N/A alone Moderat merger Walgett e proposal Moderat Rural Stand Orana JO Fit No N/A Warren e Council alone Proceed to Not Yes merger Proceeding Yes Proceed to Not Merge with Improve merger Proceeding Warringah Sound Pittwater, ment Not Fit Yes Proceed to Proceed to Manly Proposal merger merge as Northern Beaches Council Improve Stand Warrumbung Orana JO ment Not Fit No N/A alone le Weak Proposal Merge with Waverley, Merge Proceed to Merger Botany Bay, with Fit Yes merger Pending Moderat Woollahra, Randwick Waverley e Sydney Moderat Central West Rural Stand Not Fit No N/A Weddin e JO Council alone Proceed to merge as Improve Proceed to Western Orana JO ment Not Fit Yes merger Plains Proposal Regional Wellington Weak Council Joint Not Stand administratio Required N/A No N/A alone Wentworth Weak n with to submit

Balranald merger proposal Merge with Proceed to Not Yes Hunter's Hill, merger Proceeding Lane Cove, Improve Yes Proceed to Merger Moderat Willoughby Mosman, ment Not Fit merger Pending e North Proposal Sydney, Ryde* Improve Tablelands Stand Wingecarrib Moderat ment Fit No N/A JO alone ee e Proposal Improve Stand No change ment Fit No N/A alone Wollondilly Weak Proposal Improve Proceed to Merger Moderat Illawarra JO ment Fit Yes merger Pending Wollongong e Proposal Merge with Randwick, Improve Proceed to Merger Waverley, ment Not Fit Yes merger Pending Moderat Botany Bay, Proposal Woollahra e Sydney Proceed to Improve merge in Merge with Proceed to ment Not Fit Yes Central Gosford merger Moderat Proposal Coast Wyong e Council Improve Tablelands Stand Moderat ment Not Fit No N/A JO alone Yass e Proposal Proceed to Proceed to merge as Merge with Merge Yes merger Hilltops Young Sound Boorowa, with Fit Council Harden Boorowa Yes Proceed to Not merger Proceeding Table 2: Comparing Councils Recommended for Merger at Different Stages in NSW Reform Process

ILGRP Delegates Merger Constituent IPART Assessment of Recommend Recommendation Proposal Councils Constituent Council ation on Proposal Mergers Proceeding Armidale Merge with Armidale Dumaresq Guyra Not Fit Regional Merge with Council Guyra Armidale Not Fit Proceed to merger Canterbur Bankstown No change Fit Proceed to merger

y- Merge with Bankstown Hurstville, Council Kogarah, Canterbury Rockdale Not Fit Merge with Central Gosford Wyong Not Fit Coast Merge with Council Wyong Gosford Not Fit Proceed to merger Merge with Auburn, Holroyd, Parramatta* Ryde*, Hills* Not Fit Hills* No change Fit Merge with City of Parramatta, Parramatt Holroyd, Proceed to merger a Council Auburn* Ryde*, Hills* Fit Merge with Auburn, Parramatta, Holroyd* Ryde*, Hills* Not Fit Merge with Hornsby* Ku-ring-gai Not Fit Merge with Auburn, Holroyd, Parramatta* Ryde*, Hills* Not Fit Merge with Cumberlan Parramatta, Proceed to merger d Council Holroyd, Auburn* Ryde*, Hills* Fit Merge with Auburn, Parramatta, Holroyd* Ryde*, Hills* Not Fit Merge with Deniliquin, Edward Conargo Murray Not Fit River Merge with Council Conargo, Murray, Deniliquin Wakool Not Fit Proceed to merger Upper Federation Corowa Murray JO Not Fit Council Merge with Urana Corowa Not Fit Proceed to merger Merge with Georges Canterbury, River Kogarah, Council Hurstville Rockdale Not Fit Proceed to merger

Merge with Canterbury, Hurstville, Kogarah Rockdale Not Fit Merge with Boorowa, Gundagai Cootamundra Young Fit Council Merge with Gundagai Tumut Not Fit Proceed to merger Merge with Harden, Boorowa Young Fit Hilltops Council in Proceed to merger Council Harden Riverina JO Fit Merge with Boorowa, Young Harden Fit Merge with Burwood, Canada Bay, Leichhardt, Marrickville, Ashfield Strathfield Not Fit Merge with Ashfield, Inner West Burwood, Proceed to merger Council Canada Bay, Marrickville, Leichhardt Strathfield Not Fit Merge with Ashfield, Burwood, Canada Bay, Leichhardt, Marrickville Strathfield Not Fit Mid-North Gloucester Coast JO Not Fit Mid-Coast Mid-North Proceed to merger Council Great Lakes Coast JO Fit Mid-North Greater Taree Coast JO Not Fit Merge with Murray Deniliquin, Do not proceed to River Murray Conargo Not Fit merger Council Mid-Murray Wakool JO Fit Merge with Murrumbi Jerilderie Berrigan Not Fit dgee Merge with Council Murrumbidgee Griffith Not Fit Proceed to merger

Merge with Pittwater, Manly Warringah Not Fit Northern Merge with Beaches Manly, Proceed to merger Council Pittwater Warringah Not Fit Merge with Pittwater, Warringah Manly Not Fit Queanbeya Merge with n-Palerang Palerang Queanbeyan Not Fit Regional Merge with Council Queanbeyan Palerang Not Fit Proceed to merger Merge with Cooma- Bombala Monaro Not Fit Snowy Cooma- Merge with Monaro Monaro Bombala Not Fit Proceed to merger Regional Merge with Council Bombala, Cooma- Snowy River Monaro Not Fit Snowy Riverina JO Tumbarumba Fit Do not proceed to Valleys Merge with merger Council Tumut Gundagai Not Fit Western Dubbo Orana JO Fit Plains Proceed to merger Regional Orana JO Council Wellington Not Fit Mergers Pending Armidale Merge with Armidale Dumaresq Guyra Not Fit Dumaresq, Merge with Guyra, Guyra Armidale Not Fit Proceed to merger Uralla, Merge with Walcha Uralla Walcha Not Fit councils Merge with Walcha Uralla Not Fit Central West Bathurst, Bathurst JO Fit Oberon Proceed to merger Merge with councils Oberon Bathurst Not Fit Blayney Central West Shire, Blayney JO Not Fit Cabonne, Merge with Proceed to merger Orange Cabonne Orange Not Fit City Merge with councils Orange Cabonne Not Fit

Merge with Ashfield, Canada Bay, Marrickville, Leichhardt, Burwood Stathfield Fit Burwood, Merge with City of Ashfield, Canada Burwood, Bay, Proceed to merger Marrickville, Strathfield Leichhardt, Municipal Canada Bay Strathfield Fit councils Merge with Ashfield, Burwood, Canada Bay, Leichhardt, Strathfield Marrickville Not Fit Merge with Randwick, City of Waverley, Botany Woolahra, Bay, Botany Bay Sydney Not Fit Proceed to merger Rockdale Merge with City Canterbury, Council Kogarah, Rockdale Hurstville Not Fit Dungog Merge with Shire, Dungog Maitland Not Fit Maitland Proceed to merger City Merge with councils Maitland Dungog Not Fit Hornsby Merge with Shire*, Hornsby* Ku-ring-gai Not Fit Ku-ring- Proceed to merger gai Merge with councils Ku-ring-gai Hornsby Not Fit Merge with Lane Cove, Mosman, North Hunter's Sydney, Hill, Lane Ryde*, Cove, Hunter's Hill Willoughby Not Fit Proceed to merger City of Merge with Ryde Hunter's Hill, councils Mosman, North Sydney, Lane Cove Ryde*, Not Fit

Willoughby

Merge with Hunter's Hill, Lane Cove, Mosman, North Sydney, Ryde Willoughby Not Fit Merge with Hunter's Hill, Lane Cove, North Sydney, Ryde*, Mosman Willoughby Not Fit Mosman Merge with Municipal, Hunter's Hill, North Lane Cove, Sydney, Proceed to merger Mosman, Willoughb Ryde*, y City North Sydney Willoughby Not Fit councils Merge with Hunter's Hill, Lane Cove, Mosman, North Sydney, Willoughby Ryde* Not Fit Newcastle Merge with City, Lake Port Newcastle Macquarie Not Fit Proceed to merger Stephens Hunter JO councils Port Stephens Fit Merge with Randwick, Botany Bay, Woollahra, Randwick Sydney Fit Randwick Merge with City, Waverley, Waverley, Botany Bay, Proceed to merger Woollahra Woollahra, Municipal Waverley Sydney Fit councils Merge with Randwick, Waverley, Botany Bay, Woollahra Sydney Not Fit

Shellharbo Illawarra JO ur City, Shellharbour Not Fit Wollongon Proceed to merger g City Illawarra JO councils Wollongong Fit Mergers not Proceeding Berrigan Merge with Shire, Berrigan Jerilderie Not Fit Do not proceed to Jerilderie merger Shire* Merge with councils Jerilderie* Berrigan Not Fit Merge with Boorowa, Harden, Young Boorowa Young Fit Proceed to merger Shire Merge with councils Boorowa, Young Harden Fit Cootamun Merge with dra Shire, Boorowa, Gundagai Cootamundra Young Fit Shire, Merge with Proceed to merger Harden Gundagai Tumut Not Fit Shire Council in councils Harden Riverina JO Fit Corowa Upper Shire, Corowa Murray JO Not Fit Lockhart Lockhart Riverina JO Fit Shire, Proceed to merger Urana Merge with Shire Corowa councils Urana Not Fit Dungog Merge with Shire, Dungog Maitland Not Fit Do not proceed to Gloucester Mid-North merger Shire Coast JO councils Gloucester Not Fit Goulburn Tablelands Mulwaree, Goulburn JO Not Fit Do not proceed to Palerang* Merge with merger councils Palerang* Queanbeyan Not Fit Hawkesbur No change y City, Hawkesbury Not Fit Do not proceed to Hills Shire merger councils Hills District No change Fit Jerilderie Merge with Shire*, Jerilderie* Berrigan Not Fit Do not proceed to Murrumbi merger dgee Shire Merge with councils Murrumbidgee Griffith Not Fit

Kiama Municipal, Illawarra JO Kiama Not Fit Do not proceed to Shoalhaven merger City South East councils Shoalhaven JO Fit Merge with Pittwater, Manly Warringah Not Fit Merge with Manly, Hunter's Hill, Mosman Lane Cove, Municipal, North Proceed to merger Warringah Sydney, * councils Ryde*, Mosman Willoughby Not Fit Merge with Pittwater, Warringah* Manly Not Fit Merge with Hunter's Hill, Lane Cove, Mosman, North Ryde*, Sydney, North Sydney Willoughby Not Fit Willoughb Merge with Proceed to merger y City Hunter's Hill, councils Lane Cove, Mosman, North Sydney, Willoughby Ryde* Not Fit Palerang*, Merge with Queanbeya Palerang* Queanbeyan Not Fit Do not proceed to n merger City Merge with councils Queanbeyan Palerang Not Fit Merge with Manly, Pittwater, Pittwater Warringah Not Fit Warringah Proceed to merger Merge with * councils Pittwater, Warringah* Manly Not Fit Tamworth Namoi JO Regional, Tamworth Fit Proceed to merger Walcha Merge with councils Walcha Uralla Not Fit

Table 3: Delegates Assessing Different Councils

Recommendation Constituent Councils Name of Delegate of Delegate Boorowa,Harden,Young Proceed to Merger Tamworth,Walcha Amanda Chadwick Proceed to Merger Boorowa,Young Proceed to Merger Ashfield,Leichhardt,Marrickville Proceed to Merger Cheryl Thomas Do Not Proceed to Murray,Wakool Merger Do Not Proceed to Hawkesbury,Hills Garry West Merger Hornsby*,Ku,ring,gai Proceed to Merger Do Not Proceed to Kiama,Shoalhaven Merger Armidale,Guyra Greg Wright Proceed to Merger Armidale,Guyra,Uralla,Walcha Proceed to Merger North Sydney,Willoughby Proceed to Merger Mosman,Nth Sydney,Willoughby Ian Reynolds Proceed to Merger Newcastle,Port Stephens Proceed to Merger Do Not Proceed to Dungong,Gloucester Merger Dubbo,Wellington Ian Tiley Proceed to Merger Gloucester,Great Lakes,Taree Proceed to Merger Dungog,Maitland Proceed to Merger Do Not Proceed to Goulburn,Mulwaree,Palerang* John Rayner Merger Gosford,Wyong Proceed to Merger Bankstown,Canterbury John Roseth Proceed to Merger Cootamundra,Harden,Gundagai Proceed to Merger Palerang,Queanbeyan Proceed to Merger Cootamundra,Gundagai John Turner Proceed to Merger Do Not Proceed to Palerang*,Queanbeyan Merger Manly,Mosman,Warringah* Proceed to Merger Michael Bullen Auburn*,Holroyd*,Parramatta* Proceed to Merger Hurstville,Kogarah Proceed to Merger Mike Allen Shellharbour,Wollongong Proceed to Merger Conargo,Deniliquin Proceed to Merger Corowa,Urana Mike Eden Proceed to Merger Corowa,Lockhart,Urana Proceed to Merger Bombala,CoomaMonaro,Snowy River Proceed to Merger Renata Brooks Bathurst,Oberon Proceed to Merger

Parramatta*,Auburn*,Hills*,Holroyd*,Hornsby* Proceed to Merger Burwood,Canada Bay,Strathfield (this proposal was put into abeyance following successful legal action arising from the Richard Colley Proceed to Merger fact that the Delegate failed to abide by the Local Government Act (1993) in his assessment Pittwater,Warringah* Proceed to Merger Manly,Pittwater,Warringah Richard Pearson Proceed to Merger Blayney,Cabonne,Orange Proceed to Merger Hunters Hill,Lane Cove,Ryde Proceed to Merger Randwick,Waverley,Woolahra Robert Lang Proceed to Merger Do Not Proceed to Tumbarumba,Tumut Rod Nockles Merger Botany Bay,Rockdale Proceed to Merger Do Not Proceed to Berrigan,Jerilderie* Merger Jerilderie,Murrumbidgee Tim Stubbs Proceed to Merger Do Not Proceed to Jerilderie*,Murrumbidgee Merger

Table 4: Administrators of Merged Councils

Previously a Delegate? Council Administrator (Y/N)

Armidale Regional Council Ian Tiley Yes

Canterbury-Bankstown Council Richard Colley Yes

Central Coast Council Ian Reynolds Yes

City of Parramatta Council Amanda Chadwick Yes

Cumberland Council Viv May No

Edward River Council Ashley Hall No

Federation Council Mike Eden Yes

Georges River Council John Rayner Yes

Gundagai Council Christine Ferguson No

Hilltops Council Wendy Tuckerman No

Inner West Council Richard Pearson Yes

Mid-Coast Council John Turner Yes

Murray River Council David Shaw No

Murrumbidgee Council Austin Evans No

Northern Beaches Council Dick Persson No

Queanbeyan-Palerang Regional Council Tim Overall No

Snowy Monaro Regional Council Dean Lynch No

Snowy Valleys Council Paul Sullivan No

Western Plains Regional Council Michael Kneipp No

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