The Rise and Fall of Canadian Military Assistance in the Developing World, 1952–1971 Greg Donaghy Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

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Volume 4 | Issue 1 Article 7

1-23-2012 The Rise and Fall of Canadian Military Assistance in the Developing World, 1952–1971 Greg Donaghy Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Recommended Citation Donaghy, Greg (1995) "The Rise and Fall of Canadian Military Assistance in the Developing World, 1952–1971," Canadian Military History: Vol. 4: Iss. 1, Article 7. Available at: http://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol4/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized administrator of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Donaghy: The Rise and Fall of Canadian Military Assistance in the Developi

The Rise and Fall of Canadian Military Assistance in the Developing World, 1952-1971

Greg Donaghy

ince the end of the Second World War, military particularly true when any Canadian venture was S assistance has emerged as an important likely to duplicate Washington's substantial efforts instrument of international diplomacy. Initially to secure regional allies with promises of military employed by the United States in Europe, Latin assistance. As a consequence, the Department of America and Asia for a variety of economic and External Affairs wasted little time and effort in political reasons in the mid-1940s, by the end of convincing a reluctant Department of National the decade American military assistance had been Defence to accept military assistance as part of fashioned into a coherent program "whose its mandate. principal goal was the containment of Communist expansion. "1 By the mid-1950s, both the Soviet By the late 1950s, however, decolonization Union and Communist China had responded with had begun to alter the relatively stable postwar their own assistance programs designed to woo intemational system. Disturbances in Burma and the developing states of Asia and Africa. 2 As the collapse of intemal order in the former Belgian Britain and France dissolved their colonial colony of the Congo brought the importance of empires in the late 1950s, they too chose military military assistance into sharp focus. These aid as an effective way to maintain their links with developments underlined the danger that an the post-colonial state and to demonstrate their inadequately trained military posed to national continued capacity to pursue independent global and international stability. Increasingly, officials initiatives. 3 Other states were also attracted by in the Department of Extemal Affairs saw military this kind of aid. West Germany, for example, assistance as an important means of contributing began distributing military assistance in 1960 as to the maintenance of order in the developing part ofits efforts to gamer intemational support world. Consequently, in 1958 they began to press for its claim to sovereignty.4 the Department of National Defence for a change in Canadian policy. Canada's decision to supply small amounts of military assistance to the developing world The success of the East Block (refering to owed relatively little to the cold war calculations External Affairs, their location on Parliament Hill of the superpowers and the considerations of in Ottawa) in changing that policy in the early national prestige that motivated other donors. 1960s depended on a number of factors. Both Though Canadian diplomats recognized the Diefenbaker and Pearson used military assistance benefits that military assistance might bring to to build personal relationships with new the western world in the early 1950s, they were Commonwealth leaders and lent their not especially anxious to divert scarce resources considerable weight to the department's cause. away from Europe towards the handful of small At the same time, the dynamics of the inter African and Asian states requesting aid. This was departmental debate slowly changed in Canada

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as the country's defence budget contracted in the scope for an independent and effective early 1960s. As these budgetary reductions contribution from a smaller country like Canada. deprived Canadian industry of its domestic Consequently, the Department of External Affairs market, the Department of Defence Production was not inclined to spend much effort overcoming became a vocal, and influential, proponent of the doubts frequently expressed by the military assistance. The same budget reductions Department of National Defence. also encouraged a more forthcoming attitude in the Department of National Defence, which could Canada's defence authorities had good reason ill-afford to stand aside while other departments for their hostility to military assistance. The dipped into its training budget for their own steady expansion of the Canadian armed forces purposes. With the support of the Chiefs of Staff, in the early 1950s placed an almost intolerable Canadian military assistance blossomed during strain on their training facilities. In 1951, this the mid-1960s. At the same time, however, the was exacerbated by the government's decision to conflict in Vietnam raised concern among a new train NATO air crew and pilots as part of Canada's generation of Canadian politicians about the mutual aid contribution.6 Complicating matters dangers implicit in any overseas military were the security issues that training non-NATO commitment. As a result, the program was personnel increasingly raised. The Chiefs of Staff exposed to attack when the Trudeau government Committee was diligent in resisting the whole began to adjust its fiscal, military and foreign notion of military assistance. In the fall of 1953, policies during its first term in office. it referred the problem to the Cabinet Defence Committee in a bid to end the East Block's half Canadian policy-makers were first forced to hearted efforts to have the department accept confront the problem of military assistance in the foreign trainees. While agreeing that Canada ought early 1950s, when 'New Commonwealth' to provide friendly non-NATO nationals with countries like India and Pakistan (as well as the military training from time to time, the cabinet occasional South American republic) approached insisted that "where space was available ... first Ottawa for help. Though inclined to respond priority should be given to Commonwealth and positively to these requests, officials in the NATO Nationals.''7 Department of External Mfairs advanced their case in careful and cautious terms. In one of the While the Department of National Defence earliest efforts to articulate a rationale for military enforced this policy vigorously for the rest of the assistance, Charles Ritchie, the deputy under decade - rejecting almost every request on the secretary of state, argued that such aid would grounds of inadequate space-the rapid evolution serve primarily to increase Canada's heightened of the cold war confrontation after 1954 rendered postwar international stature. A forthcoming it vulnerable to criticism. After agreeing to the de response would also promote Canada's facto partition of Vietnam at the Geneva reputation as a proponent of a co-operative Conference in July 1954, Moscow and Peking international order. Only with considerable quickly abandoned their strategy of directly diffidence did he suggest that military assistance confronting the West in guerilla warfare. Instead, might have any relevance to Canada's broader they encouraged the newly independent states of diplomatic objectives: Mrica and Asia to pursue neutrality and non alignment. 8 Almost immediately both communist We should not lose sight of the fact that some of states enjoyed some success. In April 1955, for these requests come from parts of the world in example, China's foreign minister, Chou En-Lai, which western policy is often suspect. Anything assumed a leading role at the Bandung we can do, however small, to offset this suspicion is an aid to our associates in both NATO and Conference of Asian and African nations. By 195 7, the Commonwealth, and is in our long-term the Soviet Union had concluded economic interest.5 assistance agreements with Egypt, India, Syria, Indonesia, Afghanistan, Burma, the Sudan and It was not surprising that Ritchie chose to define Yemen.9 In turn, the forward policy adopted by the benefits of military assistance in such China and the USSR forced the major colonial circumscribed and modest terms. The powers, Britain and France, to hasten the international system's rigid bi-polarity limited the dissolution of their respective empires.10

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Both these developments were cause for considerable extent on the Government's ability increasing concem in Ottawa. In early 1956, the to keep dissident forces in check. 15 Secretary of State for External Affairs, Lester B. Pearson, warned that the Communist bloc's Moreover, the department had begun to think that aggressive pursuit of allies in the developing world Canada, with its reputation for "genuine jeopardized Western influence in Asia, Africa and international cooperation," might be better the Middle East.U Ottawa also feared that the qualified than some of the larger Western powers accelerating pace of decolonization would create to undertake the delicate task of assisting the new a host of weak and unviable states susceptible to nations of Asia and Africa develop the kind of all 16 "Communist infiltration. "12 At the official level, at purpose armed forces they required. least, these concems created an outlook much The significance of developments in the more inclined to embrace military assistance as colonial world was not entirely lost on the an instrument of Canadian diplomacy. In the Department of National Defence. In some spring of 1957, G.R. Heasman, Canada's quarters, support for training assistance had Ambassador to Djakarta, found a receptive already begun to emerge. The Chief of General audience when he attacked a Department of Staff, for example, thought that the army could National Defence decision to reject an Indonesian accommodate some requests for military request for navigation training. Outlining training. 17 The Director of the Regular Officer Moscow's continuing efforts to court Indonesia, Training Plan agreed, noting the minister's Heasman placed considerable emphasis on the interest in the subject and pointing out that it fell important role military assistance might play in within the "[p ]resent government policy ... [of] "keeping Indonesia in the Western camp. "13 fostering closer ties with and between other 18 Though unable to convince General Charles members of the Commonwealth." Yet, Foulkes Foulkes, Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff refused to bend and offered officials in the East Block no grounds for hoping that he would Committee, to meet the Indonesian request, the 19 Department of External Affairs was no longer eventually adopt a more forthcoming attitude. For John Holmes, assistant under-secretary of prepared to accept the present state of affairs. 14 In November 1958, it seized upon a request from state, and George Glazebrook, the head of Burma to press home its point of view. The desire Commonwealth Division, the conclusion was to help offset Soviet influence in Asia by securing obvious: the Department of National Defence the support of newly independent states like must be made to "accept as a new aspect of Burma for the West remained the most important Canadian military policy the expansion of training justification for Canadian assistance. Increasingly, facilities, just as they have come to accept truce commission work as a normal part of their however, the department's case for military aid 20 reflected its growing appreciation of the activities. " intemational implications of decolonization in The opportunity to tackle the Department of Africa and Asia. The department contended that National Defence finally arrived in December Canada had a strategic interest in promoting the 1960, when the prime minister of Ghana, Kwame stability of former colonies with uncertain and Nkrumah, asked the Canadian prime minister, inexperienced central govemments: John Diefenbaker, to provide instructors and In addition to our desire to encourage Western medical officers for the Ghanaian Armed Forces ties with Burma, we have a further interest in (GAF). 21 Diefenbaker, who was committed to the assisting the Burmese to improve their defence co-operative ideals of the emerging forces in order to strengthen their position Commonwealth, was inclined to grant the against external aggression and in the Ghanaian request.22 Following his meeting with maintenance of internal security ... [Burma] is Nkrumah at the 1961 Commonwealth prime faced with almost continuous rebellion on the part of the hill tribes and minority races, ministers' conference, he instructed the Chiefs of troubles with Communist Burmese rebels Staff Committee to send an officer to West Africa depredations by Chinese Nationalist forces and to examine the situation. 23 For the moment at finally incursions from Communist China. The least, the prime minister's intervention muted internal stability of Burma depends to a

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Captain John Hasek of the Black Watch of Canada carries out an inspection of officer cadets at the Ghanaian Military Academy. The Ghanaian Sergeant-Major accompanying Captain Hasek seems to be somewhat distracted by the unojflcial parade in front of the cadets. (CFPU CEN 66-109-9)

opposition within the Department of National Africa underlined the importance of ensuring Defence to Canadian military assistance. stability in former colonies. 25 Canadian military training assistance, argued the department in a The East Block seized this opportunity to submission to cabinet, represented a contribution secure cabinet approval for a more generous to internal and international stability. For the first military assistance policy. The increasingly time, this was advanced as the primary rationale frenzied pace of developments in Africa added a behind Canadian policy: new sense of urgency to the department's efforts. The situation in the former Belgian colony of the Such assistance would constitute a direct, Congo was particularly disturbing. Within two although modest contribution to the weeks of acquiring its independence in June establishment of efficient and stable military forces in friendly countries where armed forces 1960, the Congo erupted into a brutal and are often the largest single group of disciplined disastrous civil war that left over half the country and trained personnel, and usually a good without effective govemment by the end of the influence for law and order. Local armed forces, year. More ominously, the war threatened to bring if properly trained and led, can contribute to the Soviet Union and the United States into direct stability and the preservation ofpeace?6 conflict as neither power was prepared to accept In addition, there remained as an important a power vacuum in the middle of Africa. 24 To secondary objective the desire to discourage Canadian officials, who "very much hoped that developing countries from accepting assistance Africa would not become and would not be from the Communist bloc: regarded as another East-West political and propaganda battleground," the crisis in central

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The alternative to the provision of training months later to a Nigerian request for training assistance is not always the supply of such assistance, for example, seemed designed to assistance by another western country. In some forestall any attempt to saddle it with a large cases the countries we fail to assist may feel it necessary to tum to the Soviet bloc for a helping military aid program. The Nigerian request was hand. Experience has shown that the substantial: Lagos asked for 30 officer cadet Communist countries are always eager to take training places in Canada and for Canadian advantage of such opportunities whenever they instructors for its military academy.30 Informally, are offered. Nigeria also asked for help in developing its own air force. The level of assistance eventually For good measure, the department added that proposed by the Department of National Defence personal contact between Canadians and foreign was disappointingly small. It agreed to make military personnel "would provide a wider available places for Nigerian cadets within existing understanding of Canada based on actual army, navy and air force training facilities but experience." Finally, there was also a need to declined to dispatch a training team to Nigeria demonstrate the benefits of continued and ignored completely the request for air force membership in the Commonwealth to many of help.31 these countries. 27 In the East Block this attitude raised two The possibility raised by the Ghanaian disturbing considerations. First, the Department request - that training assistance might be of National Defence was abandoning a possible delivered abroad provided the departments of market for Canadian aircraft by refusing to External Affairs and National Defence with the address the needs of the Nigerian air force. slender basis necessary for a compromise. Second, and far more important, the department's Overseas training would certainly meet Canada's limited program jeopardized at least part of the political objectives as defined by officials in the rationale behind Canadian military assistance: East Block. At the same time, it would avoid some of the obstacles which were responsible for the Canada has sent a full training team to Ghana, Department of National Defence's earlier a neighbouring but smaller Commonwealth hesitations. There would no longer be fears that country, whose government follows a neutralist such training might impinge on prior and occasionally anti-Western foreign policy. We commitments to Canadian and NATO training in believe that from a purely political point of view, it would be inadvisable to come up with a Canadian facilities, or that it would jeopardize significantly smaller proposal to the Nigerians security on Canadian bases. In addition, who follow a generally friendly line. 32 Canadian instructors would be able to adjust their teaching methods to meet local language Howard Green, the secretary of state for external requirements and educational standards. Any affairs, suggested instead that Ottawa send an extra costs associated with this kind of assistance, officer to Nigeria to explore how Canada might the two departments agreed, would normally be provide some help. The minister of national met by the recipient country. From now on, defence refused to be drawn and rejected further training in Canada would be offered only in the suggestions from his colleague that Canada most exceptional circumstances and when all should explore a possible contribution to the security, language and other requirements were Nigerian air force and that Canada should agree met. 28 In June 1961, cabinet approved the to pay half the cost of training the Nigerian conditions under which the two departments cadets.33 Cabinet, alive to the consequences of agreed that Canada would henceforth "accept as appearing to favour Ghana over its west African part of its defence commitments the training, if neighbour, sided with Green and agreed that and when requested, of military personnel of Canada would train 32 Nigerian cadets and would Commonwealth countries. "29 absorb over half the estimated cost of $275,000. Further, Canada would provide a Commandant Despite the compromise endorsed by cabinet, and a Director of Studies for a military academy doubts about the value of military assistance soon as well as a six-man naval training team. re-surfaced in the Department of National Altogether, the program would cost Canada Defence. The Department's response a few

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approximately $250,000, roughly the amount Tanganyika seemed likely to provide the ideal being spent on the program in Ghana.34 opportunity for a wide-ranging inter-departmental discussion. 36 This was not quite the victory desired by the Department of External Affairs. It pegged This discussion, however, was a long time Canada's military assistance at a fairly low level coming. The Tanganyikan request, which was first and failed completely to deal with the informal forwarded to the Department of National Defence Nigerian request for help in setting up their air in early April 1963, was quickly shunted aside force. The refusal to exert a greater effort in by the new Minister of National Defence, Paul Nigeria, which left the Department of External Hellyer.37 Intent on re-organizing the Canadian Mfairs reluctant to meet several new Ghanaian military, Hellyer refused to undertake any further requests for fear of upsetting the balance of commitments until the process was finished. 38 Canadian efforts in West Mrica, disturbed officials Over the next few months, the Department of in the East Block. 35 The whole question of military External Mfairs became increasingly distressed assistance clearly needed to be re-visited by the at Canada's inability to respond to requests for two departments. A request in the spring of 1963 assistance from such countries as Ghana, for instructors and equipment to set up a joint Malaysia and the West Indies. The Tanganyikan air force school for the three East African request for assistance, however, remained Commonwealth countries of Uganda, Kenya and particularly frustrating. In part, this was due to

A Canadian instructor, Captain John Sharp, watches mortar instruction at the Ghanaian Army Training School, December 1966. (CFPU CEN 66-109-50)

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Prime Minister L.B. Pearson's promise of aid the size and nature of Canadian military which he gave to the Tanganyikan prime minister, assistance. Finance, External Affairs and National Julius Nyerere, during the latter's visit to Ottawa Defence moved quickly to ensure that commercial in July 1963. Tanganyikan defence authorities considerations, despite their role in sparking this were not the least bit shy about recalling the prime re-consideration of Canadian policy, supplied very minister's commitment whenever military little of the official rationale for a continuing assistance was discussed with the Canadian High program of Canadian military assistance. 45 Commission.39 The department was also growing Instead, military assistance was treated as an concerned that Tanganyika might turn to adjunct to Canada's general aid policy. Its Communist sources for its aid. 40 Before Ottawa foremost purpose was to help recipient could resolve the question of aid to Tanganyika, governments maintain the internal stability the context in which military assistance was necessary for political, social and economic considered changed dramatically. The catalyst growth. Naturally enough, officials tended to see was West Germany's decision to help Dar-es Communist bloc aid as inherently destabilizing. Salaam develop a small air force by providing a Hence, the program had a second objective: it was training team and a handful of aircraft. 41 to discourage recipient countries from accepting military help from the Communist bloc. Military In Ottawa, the Department of Defence assistance was also intended to strengthen Production reacted with alarm at the West Canadian and Western influence. German decision. C.M. Drury, its minister, had already expressed his concern at Canada's failure In order to determine whether specific to assist Nigeria with its air force and had been requests appeared likely to meet these goals, this brushed aside by Hellyer. 42 Drury now angrily ad hoc group of officials proposed that cabinet insisted that something be done to avoid the establish an interdepartmental Military fumbling that characterized Canada's efforts to Assistance Committee. Composed of respond to the Nigerian and Tanganyikan representatives from four departments-External requests for air force assistance. Canada was Affairs, Finance, National Defence and Defence clearly in danger of losing substantial markets Production - the committee would submit its for its aircraft and needed to develop a more recommendations to the Cabinet Committee on cogent policy on military assistance. 43 This time, External Affairs and Defence for approval. In the Department of National Defence was ready to addition, they proposed endowing Canada's new oblige. During the preceding year, the department military assistance program with a $5 million had grudgingly come to conclude that its budget, a figure which was to account for whatever unsuccessful opposition to military assistance aid cabinet eventually decided to send to Tanzania threatened its ability to influence the nature of and Malaysia. In separate memoranda, cabinet Canadian military aid while leaving it responsible was also urged to send survey missions to these for all of the costs. Clearly, it made more sense to two countries to explore their long-standing establish a comprehensive program with its own requests for aid. establishment and its own budget over which the department could exercise some control. 44 In August 1964, cabinet considered the recommendations proposing a general program Officials in the Department of External Affairs of military assistance and the problem posed by happily embraced their new allies. During June Tanzania and Malaysia. Several ministers and July 1964, they met frequently with their questioned the proposed scale of Canadian aid. colleagues from the departments of Finance, The minister of national defence, though he Defence Production and National Defence to generally approved of the recommendations, consider how more adequate machinery might worried that the provision of aid might "involve be developed. At the official level it was agreed us in commitments for the security of these quickly that both new procedures and new funds countries which would be inappropriate for would be required to deal with the problems Canada and might better be undertaken by other plaguing military assistance. Though they western powers."46 The prime minister, in remained uncertain which department would particular, worried about the dangers involved in administer these funds, officials were united on assisting developing nations build up their

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Fli~ht Lieutenant K.R. Johnson of the RCAF briefs two Tanzanian pilots pnor to an operational flight at Dar-es-Salaam. The aircraft in the background is a de Haviland Canada Caribou. (CFPU CEN 66-109-15)

military forces. He clearly considered military assistance too sensitive a subject to be left solely that Canada would train and equip a small air in the hands of the bureaucracy. Instead, he force wing at a cost that approximated the $9.2 suggested that cabinet examine "each future million originally allotted the project by Bonn. 7 proposal... singly and on its merits. "4 By now Canada was operating programs with Nevertheless, Pearson and his colleagues a total cost of $7,664,316 for the 1965-66 fiscal endorsed the arguments in favour of a more year.48 In addition to the major programs involving dynamic military assistance program, instructed Ghana, Nigeria, Malaysia and Tanzania, Canada their officials to establish the proposed inter had agreed to train a small number of officer departmental Military Assistance Committee, and cadets from Jamaica and Zambia. Early in the despatched survey teams to Asia and Africa. summer of 1965, the Department of External Despite its reluctance to establish a Affairs took steps to place the whole military 4 continuing program of military assistance, assistance program on much firmer footing. 9 In cabinet's decisions seemed clearly headed in that addition to resolving a number of administrative direction. In December 1964, upon receipt of the irritants, the program changes sought from survey mission's report, cabinet agreed to send a cabinet would significantly expand the Military training mission to Tanzania and to accept Assistance Committee's terms of reference. Tanzanian officer cadets. Intended to operate for Specifically, the committee would be given five years, the Tanzanian program was expected supervisory authority over the implementation of to cost over $5 million. The following January, in military assistance programs once they had been response to a recommendation received from the approved by Cabinet. This authority would allow Military Assistance Committee, cabinet agreed to the committee to adjust those programs so that spend over $4 million assisting Malaysia during the needs of recipient countries might be met the next 27 months. Finally, in late February 1965, better within the financial ceilings approved by displeased that Dar-es-Salaam had decided to Cabinet. accept an East German consular representative, The proposed memorandum to cabinet also Bonn withdrew all its aid and Nyerere turned to contained a more far-reaching proposal. The Canada to fill the void. Quickly, cabinet agreed

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Military Assistance Committee was to be Asia, the possibility that Canada might find itself authorized to approve without reference to drawn into a Vietnam-like civil war was advanced ministers the provision of training assistance as a reason for caution. 54 Such arguments helped "which would not involve significant political erode support for military assistance at the considerations, numbers of trainees or total political level. This was clearly reflected in the expenditure." The proposed $300,000 budget scale of the program cabinet agreed to revive: the represented a significant increase over the $500,000 budget allotted to the Military Training approximately $15,000 then being spent on Assistance Program represented only one-sixth equivalent short term aid provided to Zambia and the average annual expenditure between 1961 and Jamaica. Though several of its members 1969. This program, which would provide expressed continued doubts about the value of training in Canadian facilities only, and military assistance, the Cabinet Committee on specifically precluded the transfer of military Extemal Affairs and Defence approved these equipment abroad, was much more modest in recommendations in February 1966.50 its expectations. Eschewing the larger strategic considerations that had motivated the Canadian With this decision, Canada's military program since the late 1950s, the new Military assistance program at last had all the elements Training Assistance Program reflected the of an established and coherent operation. For the reduced Canadian commitment to first time, officials in the East Block could hope internationalism that characterized Canadian to respond quickly and efficiently to modest foreign policy under Trudeau. requests for specialized types of training. The Department of External Affairs, however, had no opportunity to build on this small victory and combine the discretionary spending program with Notes the four larger programs into a fully-integrated 1 military assistance scheme. 5 With the election of

the Trudeau government in June 1968, the 1. Chester J. Patch, Jr., Arming the Free World: The Origins officials responsible for military assistance found of the United States Military Assistance Program, 1945- themselves increasingly preoccupied with the 1950, (Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, struggle to defend and justify other, more 1991}, p.5. 52 2. R.B. Smith, An International History of the Vietnam important, elements of Canadian defence policy. War, Volume 1: Revolution versus Containment, 1955- With little waming, in July 1969, Cabinet decided 61 (London: Macmillan, 1983), pp.15-16, 31 & 105-106. to phase out military assistance over a three year 3. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, The period beginning in fiscal year 1970-71.53 Arms Trade with the Third World, (New York: Humanities Press, 1971), pp.236, 261-62. 4. Ibid, pp.308-309. Cabinet's decision was taken within the 5. Charles Ritchie, "Memorandum For the Minister," 5 context of a cost-cutting exercise and there is no October 1953, DEA File 11384-40, National Archives of reason to doubt the view that military assistance Canada (NAC). was primarily a victim of budgetary pressures. 6. For the origins of Canadian military assistance to NATO nationals, See James Eayrs, In Defence of Canada, However, a glance at an attempt to reverse this Volume 4, Growing Up Allied, (Toronto: University of decision the following year- a concerted effort by Toronto Press, 1980), pp.192-230. the Department of External Affairs, the 6. B. Claxton, "Memorandum for the Cabinet Defence Department of National Defence and the Committee," Cabinet Defence Committee Document No. D-42-53, 2 October 1953, RG 2, Vol 2752; Cabinet Department of Industry Trade and Commerce - Defence Committee Conclusions, 6 October 1953, RG reveals why military assistance was so vulnerable. 2, Vol2749, NAC. This effort to revive the program was strongly 8. John Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation: the retreat opposed by a number ofliberal-minded ministers. from empire in the post-war world, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988), pp.l69-170; R.B. Smith, An After a decade or more of military assistance International History of the Vietnam War, pp.103-115. programs, they argued with some justification, 9. James Eayrs, Canada in World Affairs, October 1955 most recipient states had sufficient resources to to June 1957, (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959), preserve internal order. Canadian aid could be p.211. 10. John Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation, p.1 70: J.D. better spent on a variety of projects that met more Hargreaves, Decolonization in Africa, (New York: basic human needs. In addition, as the last Longman, 1988), pp.148-149. remnants of colonial order collapsed in Africa and 11. James Eayrs, Canada in World Affairs, p. 211.

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12. G.C. Mcinnes. "Memorandum For File." 7 October 1955, 36. Defence Liaison (1) Division to the Under-Secretary of DEA File 9764-40, NAC. State for External Affairs, 29 March 1963, DEA File 13. Canadian Ambassador to Djakarta to the Under 11384-40, NAC. Secretary of State for External Affairs, Dispatch No 418, 37. Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to 17 July 1957, DEAFile 11384-40, NAC; On the USSR's Chairman, Chiefs of Staff, 9 April 1963; Paul Martin to efforts to win Indonesian affections, the definitive work Paul Hellyer, 10 July 1963, DEA File 11384-J-40, NAC. remains Uri Ra'anan, The USSR Arms The Third World: 38. Paul Hellyer to Paul Martin, 18 July 1963, DEA File Case Studies in Soviet Foreign Policy (Cambridge, 11384-J-40, NAC. Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1969). 39. Canadian High Commission in Dares Salaam to Under 14. Acting Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Secretary of State for External Affairs, Numbered Letter Chairman, ChiefsofStaffCommittee, 19August 1957, No 712,8 October 1963, DEAFile 27-20-5-Tanzania. DEA File 11384-40, NAC. 40. Dares Salaam to Ottawa, Tel No 549, 6 November 1963; 15. N.A. Robertson to the Deputy Minister of National See also Dar Es Salaam to Ottawa, Tel No 595, 28 Defence, 26 November 1958, DEA File 11384-40, NAC. November 1963; Dares Salaam to Ottawa, Tel No 635, 16. Ibid. 19 December 1963, DEAFile 27-20-5-Tanzania. 17. Chief of General Staff to Chairman, Chiefs of Staff 41. Dares Salaam to Ottawa, Tel No 259, 1 April1964; Dar Committee, 24 September 1959, RG 24, Vol21167, File es salaam to Ottawa, Tel No 277, 8 April 1964; J.C. esc 1427:1, NAC. Coussineau, "Memorandum For File," 15 April 1964, 18. Director, Regular Officer Training Plan to Chairman, DEAFile 27-20-5-Tanzania. Chiefs of Staff Committee, 26 January 1959, RG 24, Vol 42. C.M. Drury to Paul Hellyer, 16 December 1963; Paul 21167, File esc 1427:1, NAC. Hellyer to C.M. Drury, 10 April1964, RG 19, Vol4929, 19. R.L. Raymont to Chief of Joint Staff, 26 September 1959, File 8381-00(1), NAC. RG 24, Vol21167, File CSC 1427:1; Chairman, Chiefs 43. C.M. Drury to Paul Hellyer, 11 May 1964, DEA File 27- of Staff Committee to the Under-Secretary of State for 20-5-Tanzania. External Affairs, 26 February 1959; Chairman, Chiefs 44. Coordinator, Joint Staff to Chairman, Chiefs of Staff of Staff Committee to Under-Secretary of State for Committee, 28June 1963, RaymontCollection, File 73/ External Affairs, 19 March 1959, DEAFile 11384-40, 1223-438, D-Hist. NAC. 45. C.L. Read, "Memorandum for R.B. Bryce," 19 June 20. N .R.J. Gwyn, "Memorandum for P. Tremblay" 14 April 1964; W.A. Tusky, "Memorandum for Dr. G.F. Davidson," 1959; Ralph Collins, "Memorandum for Mr. Holmes," 26 June 1964, RG 19, Volume 4929, File 8381-00(1), 22Aprill959 and Holmes' marginalia, DEAFile 11834- NAC. 40. 46. M. Cadieux, "Memorandum For The Minister," 26 August 21. Accra to Ottawa, Tel No 334, 16 December 1960, DEA 1964, DEAFile 27-20-5. File 10283-A-3-40, NAC. 47. L.D. Hudon, "Memorandum for Mr. A.W.F. Plumptre," 22. On Diefenbaker and the Commonwealth, see H.B. 10 September 1964, RG 19, Vol4929, File 1091-7-2, Robinson, Di~enbaker's World: A Populist in Foreign NAC; Confidential source. Affairs, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989), 48. Annex I to "Memorandum to Cabinet," 3 February 1966, p.4. DEAFile 27-20-5. 23. H.B. Robinson, "Memorandum to Africa and Middle East 49. Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to Chief of Division," 5 January 1961; Prime Minister's Delegation Defence Staff, 22 June 1965, DEA File 27-20-5. to Ottawa, Tel No 14, 13 March 1961, DEAFile 10283- 50. L. Denis Hudon, "Memorandum for R.B. Bryce," 9 A-40, NAC. February 1966, RG 19, Vol4929, File 8381-00(1), NAC. 24. J. Darwin, BritainandDecolonisation, pp.253-254; R.F. 51. H. Tellier to the Under-Secretary of State for External Holland, European Decolonization, pp.I83-190. Affairs, 24 January 1969; Michael Shenstone, 25. M.N. Bow, Memorandum for Defence Liaison (2) Memorandum for H.B. Robinson, 8 April1969 RG 24, Division, 30 November 1959, DEA File 9764-40, NAC. Volume 21577, File 2-5040-12, NAC. 26. N.A. Robertson, "Memorandum For The Minister," 3 May 52. On the defence policy review, see Robert Bothwell and 1961 and attached "Memorandum To The Cabinet," 3 Jack Granatstein, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and May 1961, DEA File 11384-40. Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto 27. Ibid. Press, 1990). 28. Ibid. 53. Record of Cabinet Decisions, Meetings of July 25, 28, 29. Cabinet Conclusions, I June 1961, RG 2, Vol6176, NAC. 29 and 30, 1969, RG 19, Volume 4929, File 8381-00, 30. Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs to The NAC. Canadian High Commission in Lagos, Numbered Letter, 54. Confidential Source. DL-301, 13 October 1961. DEA 11384-40. 31. Douglas Harkness to Howard C. Green, 30 November 1961, DEA File 11384-40, NAC. 32. N.A. Robertson, "Memorandum For The Minister," 22 November 1962, 11384-B-40, NAC. 33. Douglas Harkness to Howard Green, 30 November 1961; Greg Donaghy works for the Department N .A. Robertson, "Memo For The Minister," 18 December of Foreign Affairs and International 1961; Douglas Harkness to Howard Green, 22 December 1961, DEAFile 11384-B-40, NAC. Trade as an historian in the Historical 34. Cabinet Defence Committee, Record of Decision, 31 Section of the Corporate January 1961, DEA File 11384-B-40, NAC. Communications Division. 35. N.A. Robertson to Douglas Harkness, 22 March 1962, DEA File 11384-40, NAC.

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