Reconciling Quinean and Neo-Aristotelian Metaontology

CEU eTD Collection

In partial In partial R A ECONCILING ECONCILING RISTOTELIAN RISTOTELIAN fulfi lment the of requirements the degree for of Central European University Department of Supervisor: Philip Goff Zsolt KristófZsolt Kapelner Budapest, Hungary Submitted to Q 2015 M By UINEAN AND UINEAN

Philosophy ETAONTOLOGY

Masters Arts of N EO

CEU eTD Collection transcending Quineanism. neo words, other In it. improving thus can main Quineans the accept say, to is That Quineanism. to alternative genuine a not is Aristotelianism neo that argue I metaontology. Quinean replace to order in approach Aristotelian broadly a J E. Fine, Kit by advocated thought neo of that is proposal such One Quineanism. aimed others while futile, altogetherare investigations ontological to attempted have authors Some criticism. wide to exposed been has metaontology of paradigm Quinean the decades recent In tenet of s

neo - Aristotelian . Lowe, Jonathan Schaffer, and many others, who employ employ who others, many and Schaffer, Jonathan Lowe, . - Abstract rsoeins de nt uce i oecmn or overcoming in succeed not does Aristotelianism ism i and incorporate them into their own outlook outlook own their into them incorporate and deflate

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to to - CEU eTD Collection rsu Clee Ad ial t Lsl ad aá Ka supported meall along. Tamás and László to finally And the College. and Erasmus Collegium, József Eötvös of Workshop Philosophy the of members the thank to Zsófia like also Iwould me. challengedalways who GáborMatula, and Mátyási,Róbert Tóth, Olivér teachers, my m to guided grateful who Tőzsér also János and am Forrai, Gábor I Zvolenszky, years. two last the during help his for invaluable Rooney, Thomas to grateful am I insig substantively. work the my helped for that Goff discussions Philip supervisor my to indebted am I

Acknowledgements ii

pelner, and Dóra Takács, who who Takács, Dóra and pelner, , n t m flo students, fellow my to and e,

htful advices and the lively lively the and advices htful CEU eTD Collection References Conclusion Chapter 5 Chapter 4 Chapter 3 Chapter 2 Chapter 1 Introduction 4.3. Essentialist neo 4.2. Ground 4.1. Abroadly Aristotelian framework 3.6. The final of characterization Quineanism 3.5. Translation asa dialectical strategy 3.4. The canonical notation 3.3. The best theory 3.2. Apreliminary characterizationof Quineanism 3.1. The proper sources ofQuineanism 5.3. The autonomy problem 5.2. The subject matter problem 5.1. The triviality problem 4.4. Summary – – – – –

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CEU eTD Collection concerning the field to which this investigation belongs, i.e. metaontology. Chapter 2 and 3 and 2 Chapter metaontology. i.e. belongs, investigation this which to field the concerning obstacles ontologyand metaontology inthetwenty faces what clearly more it see to us enables also but question, in schools specific the understand ho to as instructive only not is hope, I discussion, This metaphysics. or ontology namely, philosophy, contemporary of undertakings grandest the of one of challenges the and nature l illusory along divided is believe, I which, scene metaontological current the of understanding deeper the companion indistress. is it problems, latter’s the solve to able is it If Quinean. neo the Thus Quineanism. within accommodated neo main the all that in illusory is opposition Their Quinean. the neo orderdoesher in have commitments not toadhere basic torevoke tothe metaontological main t alternative viable a provide can they andalternative. is, ontology what of account fallacious a is Quineanism Quin V. W. from originating Quineans to opposition in themselves posit often Schaffer Jonathan and Lowe, J. E. late the Fine, Kit neo called metaontology and metaphysics in emerged school novel a decades few last the During The plan of the present discussion is as follows. In Chapter 1 I define the basic conce basic the define I 1 Chapter In follows. as is discussion present the of plan The to contribute to like would I First, twofold. is argument my forward putting with aim My neo false; is claim this that argue I following the In - - Aristotelian doctrines, nor needs the neo the needs nor doctrines, Aristotelian Aristotelianism , the representatives of the allegedly dominant view of contemporary metaontology contemporary of view dominant allegedly the of representatives the ,

o Quineanism. There is no genuine choice to be made between them; the Quinean Quinean the them; between made be to choice genuine no is There Quineanism. o ns Scn, hog rfetn o ti tpc e a gi isgt no the into insight gain can we topic this on reflecting through Second, ines.

(Tahko 2012a, 1; Novotnýand 1; 2012a,(Tahko

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characterization of ontology is reminiscent of the definition of another philosophical philosophical another of definition the of reminiscent is ontology of characterization –

and for the purposes of a more detailed discussion it should should it discussion detailed more a of purposes the for and that is, in the questions of questions the in is, that

do believe that an intelligible distinction between metaphysics and ontology can can ontologyand metaphysics between distinction intelligible an that believe do , so much so much so , (see Wedin 2009) Wedin (see

that it , that is, the study of being in terms of its most general and general most its of terms in being of study the is, that , would be counterproductive in the present case. For this this For case. present the in counterproductive be would today’s literature ontology and metaphysics are often not not often are metaphysics and ontology literature today’s (Putnam 2004, 78 2004, (Putnam metaontology 4

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mrc a body Aristotelian” “broadly a embrace , it is true that many scholars take Quineanism to be the standard or default default or standard the be to Quineanism take scholars many that true is it , (2009) l ad tpe Yablo Stephen and , ics, however, take another line claiming that while ontology ontology while that claiming line another take however, ics, neo - Aristotelianism providing - rsoein ees ti sos ht hr i n real no is there that shows this tenets; Aristotelian constructive that it is true that neo that true is it that Fn 21a 8) 2012a, (Fine

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and the main criticisms it faces. This discussion prepares the ground both ground the prepares discussion This faces. it criticisms main the and – ception, metaphysics is continuous with science in its methods and methods its in science with continuous is metaphysics ception,

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vs ad h crepnig lnusi tr” n philosophy in turn” “linguistic corresponding the and ivism –

he argues. Ontology properly understood is not about words or words about not is understood properly Ontology argues. he ujc mte problem matter subject rmined.” rmined.” - called - rbes Ti v This problems. 10 to say about the world. There is no genuine genuine no is There world. the about say to -

hoy t ad “hr wl b n further, no be will “there hand, at theory (Dumme autonomy probl autonomy (1998) I i te ocr ta Quineanism that concern the is It . he end of the day linguistic and and linguistic day the of end he tt 1991,14) tt

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address in Chapter 5. Now I turn to the proper proper the to turn I Now 5. Chapter in address

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bjects” bjects” 12 - Aristotelianism is genuinely different from from different genuinely is Aristotelianism

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(1948) , and then in in then and ,

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CEU eTD Collection (2015, 83) (2015, first of case the in apply principles metaontological these how shows “Meta his in ontology” metaontology Quinean of accounts elaborated most the of one formulated have authors remarked. many as extent large very a to commitment ontological of account Quine’s Worlds of Plurality the On o of method and nature the on views His tenets. Quinean central some to part his on loyalty great show writings later his the and under Quine of dissertation supervision his wrote Lewis thinkers; two the between connection theoretical twentiethmetaontologicalgreat century views havehad whose impact. the of metaphysicians influential most the among unquestionably are They Inwagen. van contem on influence great had who authors main two to discussion my limit I account, into taken be can them of all not Since Quineanism. Relativity” butbearing strik Quantification” and “Existence his example, those only account into take will I reason, this For commitment. ontological of criterion his especially Is”, There What “On in forward put views his to refer mostly Quineans Later metaontology. “Thingsin Theories”and Their Place (1960) 3 2 ph a Inwagen, bo is There Quinean. unmistakably is metaontology Lewisian self as out stand figures several Quine from Apart ha ideas relativistic later These

For more on Quinean relativism see Bergström Bergström see relativism more Quinean onFor For more on the methodological similarities between Lewis and Quine see Nolan Nolan see Quine and Lewis between similarities methodological the on more For

e him led

and Weatherson Weatherson and 3

(2001) works of Quine which remain faithful to these early conceptions. These are, for for are, These conceptions. early these to faithful remain which Quine of works

t a eaiitc iw eutn i “nooia Relativity” “Ontological in resulting view relativistic a to a

lspe o n ls iprac, s lo card a also is importance, less no of ilosopher n elsewhere and (2014, sec. sec. 6.1.) (2014,

ing similarities to “On What Thereing What Is”. to“On similarities

(1986)

ve not exerted a great influence on the Quinean tradition of tradition Quinean the on influence great a exerted not ve eg: nae 2009) Inwagen (e.g.: .

(1981a) n elsewhere and (2006) (1969b) . 2 13

. porary metaontology: David Lewis and Peter Peter andLewis David metaontology: porary

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tence. For example, the famous Quine famous the example, For tence. - known Quinean arguments, the so the arguments, Quinean known - unding theorists do not develop these formal systems so so systems formal these develop not do theorists unding formal notation in order to answer to order in notation formal are . And if the paradigmatic Quinean argument has has argument Quinean paradigmatic the if And . 39

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to exist, i.e. if it proved to be impossible to dispense with it while ontologically clarifying ontologically while it with dispense to impossible be to proved it if i.e. exist, to This argument is sound onl sound is argument This ofabstract account showing best an isneededthatour argument then, In tojustify(2), order u scientists Simply saying that (2) isjustified. how lookat closer a take Let us,however, ot commit us to the existence of an average person because once it is clarified it it clarified is it once because person average an of existence the to us commit ot w ogt o od ht t ely os ad 2 ol rprs ht t ely is really it that reports only (2) and does, really it that hold to ought we n y if one assumes that the average person, if it exists, has to be a a be to has exists, it if person, average the that assumes one if y ta mks xseta cmimns ot la ral does really clear most commitments existential makes that m 40

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whatsoever.

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the nature of numbers canno numbers of nature the ti. s h rvril oa i S. Augustine’s St. in woman proverbial the As is. it 41

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a material being and what the relationship of parthood is. He is. parthood of relationship the what and being material a mental or platonic entities platonic or mental terested in what there is there what in terested 42

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(2008a) it is science that needs ontology’s help to be complete, complete, be to help ontology’s needs that science is it - : We know it for a fact that the Ev the that fact a for it know We : ic. It is, then, not metaphysics that needs the help of of help the needs that metaphysics not then, is, It ic. known example of empirical discovery. But how do do how But discovery. empirical of example known a genuine and autonomous role to play in the the in play to role autonomous and genuine a .

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are not at all reconcilable with Quineanism. I myself mentioned several of several mentioned myself I Quineanism. with reconcilable all at not are

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- Aristotelianism. There is the pure logico pure the is There Aristotelianism. - philosophical knowledge on the basis of which philosophical which of basis the on knowledge philosophical and linguistic philosophy, nor takes it to be a matter of pure pure of matter a be to it takes nor philosophy, linguistic and - - Aristotelianism sometimes approximate, but never quite never but approximate, sometimes Aristotelianism Aristotelian solutions to the to solutions Aristotelian 51 of metaphysics does not constitute a genuine a constitute not does metaphysics of ioohcl nweg wih hwvr is however, which, knowledge hilosophical

- Aristotelianism does not succeed in in succeed not does Aristotelianism - Aristotelianism can be made made becan Aristotelianism autonomy problem can also also can problem autonomy - Aristotelianism. The latter Aristotelianism. cism or science worship science or cism - linguistic approach of approach linguistic

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- Quinean stance is that the legacy of Quine is much much is Quine of legacy the that is stance Quinean 52

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hs s n o te an points main the of one is this CEU eTD Collection evn te bhn, f t s osbe t l, eurs uh oe noain ad probably and innovation, more much requires all, at possible is it if behind, them Leaving philosophy. analytic contemporary of corner every almost permeate ideas Quinean that. than h But defy. to easy foe a be to seemed extensionalist” “confirmed a remained neo than overcome to harder much f the are results the concerned, is aim first the as far As metaphysics. contemporary of challenges the of understanding deeper gain to second, and illusory are it within oppositions and divisions some that showing scene metaontological present investigation? the of consequences actual the then, are, What it. about qualms no have they Quineanism, a insofar that agree well very can they but proper, Quineanism and Quineanism vulgar conflating in mistake their neo that suggest do I compared. and described only evaluated, invalidated. way any in or refuted hereby image,the Quineanfails totranscend tradition. ot and philosophical non and formal various of terms in is there what on account an give to attempts own her recognize can Quinean the essence, variou build to efforts immense truly neo main the accommodate neo of sake the for Quineanism abandon to needs one that neo that argued I In the Introduction I stated that my aims here were twofold: first, to provi to first, twofold: were here aims my that Istated Introduction the In neo that mean not does It result. this misinterpret to not important is It - Aristotelianism is not a genuine altern genuine a not is Aristotelianism e kn o kolde f elt. Neo reality. of knowledge of kind her tee s mr lbrl ls hard less liberal, more a is there s

- Aristotelian tenets within their theory. In the neo the In theory. their within tenets Aristotelian - - formal idioms relying on the best available, scientific, scientific, available, best the on relying idioms formal Aristotelians hoped. Quine, the stubborn naturalist, who naturalist, stubborn the Quine, hoped. Aristotelians s formal systems to capture the nature of grounding and and grounding of nature the capture to systems formal s Conclusion (Quine 2004) (Quine is legacy is much stronger and much more pervasive more much and stronger much is legacy is

The traditions discussed here were not in any in not were here discussed traditions The

ollowing: the Quinean legacy proved to be to proved legacy Quinean the ollowing:

even after Kripke and Putnam may have have may Putnam and Kripke after even ative to Quineanism. It is not the case the not is It Quineanism. to ative

- - rsoeins, ept is self its despite Aristotelianism, eddy miiit eso of version empiricist headedly - - rsoeins. unas can Quineans Aristotelianism. Aristotelians should recognize should Aristotelians - de insight into the the into insight de Aristotelianism is Aristotelianism - Aristotelian’s way -

CEU eTD Collection and difficult questions. Answering them is a quest forand a difficult themis future Answering quest questions. studies. important these raising by end to has inquiry present The anymore? themselves things the to but systems, formal and theories their of elegance and parsimony the about talk only can they where impasse an reaching from them prevent will What supervenience? andmereology about quarrelsQuinean the than fruitful moreany be to grounding prove about never their would Why problematic? find themselves they that philosophy signifyneo tradition, philosophical the and g reality, dependence, neo of efforts endless the not Does committed. it mistakes same the to victim falls Aristotelianism two grand achieving traditions thus a result. trulyremarkable synthetize to manages Quineanism, to alternative genuine a being not it, Instead, Aristotle. metaphysics, neo case this of In metaphysics. saviour today’s the as is well as it Quineanism then does, it If Aristotle? of spirit the resurrecting by turn this about structur their to themselves, things the to things, about talk we ways the from arguments, parsimony empty and debates verbal prominent still the from away turn a metaphysics,today’s in neededis indeed turn A difficult. neo problems the that here, it for argue cannot I dominated the lasthalf century philosophy. of el core some abandoning t s ut psil, h possible, quite is It I meansbelieve,contemporary ofontology this What forchallenges thealthough isunclear. - rsoein t cm u wt icesnl cmlx oml ytm aot essence, about systems formal complex increasingly with up come to Aristotelians

e ata b a etr ln rl o eprcs, ak o t tu ros to roots, true its to back empiricism, of rule long century a by astray led round, and to reconcile these systems with science, everyday intuitions, intuitions, everyday science, with systems these reconcile to and round, mns f h kn o tikn ad nelcul tiue that attitude intellectual and thinking of kind the of ements wvr ta big nbe o vroe unaim neo Quineanism overcome to unable being that owever, e and nature. Does neo Does nature. and e - Aristotelianism’s inevitable descent to the level of of level the to descent inevitable Aristotelianism’s

- Arist - otelians formulate are genuine and and genuine are formulate otelians Aristotelianism succeed in bringing in succeed Aristotelianism

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