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Reconciling Quinean and Neo-Aristotelian Metaontology

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Reconciling Quinean and Neo-Aristotelian Metaontology RECONCILING QUINEAN AND NEO- ARISTOTELIAN METAONTOLOGY By Zsolt Kristóf Kapelner Submitted to Central European University Department of Philosophy. In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts Supervisor: Philip Goff Budapest, Hungary 2015 CEU eTD Collection Abstract In recent decades the Quinean paradigm of metaontology has been exposed to wide-ranging criticism. Some authors have attempted to deflate the Quinean project claiming that ontological investigations are altogether futile, while others aimed at providing alternatives to Quineanism. One such proposal is that of neo-Aristotelianism, a fairly recent school of thought advocated by Kit Fine, E. J. Lowe, Jonathan Schaffer, and many others, who employ a broadly Aristotelian approach in order to replace Quinean metaontology. I argue that neo- Aristotelianism is not a genuine alternative to Quineanism. That is to say, Quineans can accept the main tenets of neo-Aristotelianism and incorporate them into their own outlook thus improving it. In other words, neo-Aristotelianism does not succeed in overcoming or transcending Quineanism. CEU eTD Collection i Acknowledgements I am indebted to my supervisor Philip Goff for the insightful advices and the lively discussions that helped my work substantively. I am grateful to Thomas Rooney, for his invaluable help during the last two years. I am also grateful to my teachers, Zsófia Zvolenszky, Gábor Forrai, and János Tőzsér who guided me, and to my fellow students, Olivér Tóth, Róbert Mátyási, and Gábor Matula, who always challenged me. I would also like to thank the members of the Philosophy Workshop of Eötvös József Collegium, and the Erasmus College. And finally to László and Tamás Kapelner, and Dóra Takács, who supported me all along. CEU eTD Collection ii Table of contents Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 1 Chapter 1 – Ontology, metaphysics, and metaontology ......................................................... 3 Chapter 2 – Vulgar Quineanism and its critiques................................................................... 7 Chapter 3 – Quinean metaontology ...................................................................................... 12 3.1. The sources of Quineanism proper ............................................................................ 12 3.2. A preliminary characterization of Quineanism ......................................................... 14 3.3. The best theory .......................................................................................................... 15 3.4. The canonical notation .............................................................................................. 17 3.5. Translation as a dialectical strategy ........................................................................... 20 3.6. The final characterization of Quineanism ................................................................. 22 Chapter 4 – Neo-Aristotelian metaontology ........................................................................ 24 4.1. A broadly Aristotelian framework ............................................................................ 25 4.2. Ground-theoretic neo-Aristotelianism ....................................................................... 28 4.3. Essentialist neo-Aristotelianism ................................................................................ 30 4.4. Summary ................................................................................................................... 31 Chapter 5 – Aristotle versus Quine ...................................................................................... 33 5.1. The triviality problem ................................................................................................ 34 5.2. The subject matter problem ....................................................................................... 37 5.3. The autonomy problem ............................................................................................. 47 CEU eTD Collection Conclusion ............................................................................................................................ 53 References ............................................................................................................................ 55 iii Introduction During the last few decades a novel school emerged in metaphysics and metaontology called neo-Aristotelianism (Tahko 2012a, 1; Novotný and Novák 2014, 1). Neo-Aristotelians such as Kit Fine, the late E. J. Lowe, and Jonathan Schaffer often posit themselves in opposition to Quineans, the representatives of the allegedly dominant view of contemporary metaontology originating from W. V. Quine’s works (esp. Quine 1948). Neo-Aristotelians claim that Quineanism is a fallacious account of what ontology is, and they can provide a viable alternative. In the following I argue that this claim is false; neo-Aristotelianism is not a genuine alternative to Quineanism. There is no genuine choice to be made between them; the Quinean does not have to revoke her basic metaontological commitments in order to adhere to the main neo-Aristotelian doctrines, nor needs the neo-Aristotelian think of herself as an antagonist of the Quinean. Their opposition is illusory in that all the main neo-Aristotelian tenets can be accommodated within Quineanism. Thus the neo-Aristotelian proposal fails to transcend the Quinean. If it is able to solve the latter’s problems, it is its saviour; if it is not, it is its companion in distress. My aim with putting forward my argument is twofold. First, I would like to contribute to the deeper understanding of the current metaontological scene which, I believe, is divided along illusory lines. Second, through reflecting on this topic we can gain insight into the nature and the challenges of one of the grandest undertakings of contemporary philosophy, CEU eTD Collection namely, ontology or metaphysics. This discussion, I hope, is not only instructive as to how to understand the specific schools in question, but also enables us to see it more clearly what obstacles ontology and metaontology faces in the twenty-first century. The plan of the present discussion is as follows. In Chapter 1 I define the basic concepts concerning the field to which this investigation belongs, i.e. metaontology. Chapter 2 and 3 1 characterize Quinean metaontology. Their aim is to dispel some widespread misunderstandings concerning it, and to provide a proper account of this tradition. In Chapter 4 I set out to define neo-Aristotelianism and describe its two main branches in more detail. The pivotal part is Chapter 5 in which I put forward my argument to the effect that neo- Aristotelianism is not a genuine alternative to Quineanism. I do so by showing that the neo- Aristotelian answers to the main challenges Quineanism faces can all be incorporated into Quineanism properly understood. This, in my view, suffices to show that the neo-Aristotelian proposal cannot transcend Quineanism. The two views are not in principle irreconcilable; the Quinean can appropriate the neo-Aristotelian solutions and all the theoretical assumptions they presuppose without ceasing to adhere to her own views. In the Conclusion I briefly explain the significance and consequences of the claim I defend here. CEU eTD Collection 2 Chapter 1 – Ontology, metaphysics, and metaontology The present investigation belongs to the field of metaontology. Metaontology is the study of another philosophical discipline, ontology. In this chapter I define these notions as well as the cognate concept of metaphysics. Ontology, as its name suggests, is the study of being. While most fields of human inquiry are concerned with being or beings in one way or another, ontology is specific in that it asks certain kinds of philosophical questions about being or beings. What these questions are, however, as well as how they ought to be answered, is far from obvious. The investigation of these latter issues belongs to the second-order discipline of metaontology. There are two main philosophical questions about being or beings that may be examined by ontology. The first is “what is being?” In other words: what is it for anything to exist at all? There are a number of questions connected to this problem. Is the word “to be” or “to exist” univocal, or there are different meanings to it? Are there different ways of being corresponding to the different meanings of the word? As we will see, often these questions are not addressed on the level of first-order ontology, but rather on that of metaontology. The other question is much more commonly thought of as the proper subject matter of ontology. This is simply “what is there?” There are in fact numerous interpretations of what it means for ontology to be the study of what there is. The question might simply mean: what does exist? It is quite clear that human beings, chairs, and stars do, while witches and ghosts do not. But there are more complicated issues. Are there any non-physical mental substances, CEU eTD Collection unexemplified universals, mind-independent moral truths, and so on? Ontology has to find out about their existence. Another way to understand this question is as follows: what are the most general categories under which different entities fall? On this construal, ontology is concerned with “carving nature at its joints” (Sider 2011, 1). Its aim is to reveal
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