Tet

By John T. Correll

he Tet Offensive of Johnson announced that he would not leadership—which included Gen. Vo 1968 was the turning run for re-election. Nguyen Giap, hero of the defeat of the point of the The press and television are often French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954—fa- War. On the night of blamed for this astounding misjudgment vored a strategy of insurgency and Jan. 30-31, the North of the Tet Offensive, but that is too sim- guerilla warfare. Another faction—led Vietnamese Army and the Viet Cong plistic. The public was indeed misled by by Le Duan, first secretary of the Tattacked cities, towns, and military sensational and erroneous news reports, party, and Gen. Nguyen Chi Thanh, bases all over South Vietnam, striking but the White House, Pentagon, and commander of operations in southern in more than 100 locations from the Military Assistance Command Vietnam South Vietnam—advocated direct, main Demilitarized Zone to the Mekong Delta. (MACV) were equally at fault for what force action. The synchronized attacks came at the happened. By their inept words and Giap’s view prevailed until January beginning of the Lunar New Year holiday, actions, they gave credibility to the 1967, when the party plenum called traditionally a time for mutual cease-fire, distorted output of the news media. for “decisive victory in the shortest when security was relaxed. In a larger sense, Tet accelerated a time possible,” shifting official support The offensive was defeated at every chain of circumstances that was already to Le Duan and Thanh and their main point. The North Vietnamese regulars under way. Public support for the Viet- force position. However, B-52s bombed and Viet Cong suffered enormous casual- nam War was slipping and Tet greased Thanh’s headquarters in South Vietnam, ties, and the Viet Cong were destroyed the skids. The events of 1968 flowed from wounding him critically. He was carried as a cohesive fighting force. It was a strategic decisions made earlier by the across the border to Cambodia and flown clear-cut military victory for the United and . to Hanoi, where he died July 6. States and South Vietnam. The long-running war in Indochina Giap was left to plan the main force In US public and political opinion, entered a new phase in 1960 when the attack, even though it went against his though, Tet was transformed into a de- North Vietnamese Communist Party own strategic principles. He laid out an feat. Within months, the United States declared the liberation of South Vietnam operation with three objectives: a general had tacitly conceded the war to be lost, to be a “strategic task.” uprising in the south, disintegration of curtailed operations, and started plan- There was a division of opinion about the South Vietnamese armed forces, and ning for a pullout. The political damage how liberation of the south was to be convincing the Americans that the war was so great that President Lyndon accomplished. One faction of the party was unwinnable. 50 AIR FORCE Magazine / January 2008 Viet Cong irregulars lead an attack dur- The White House stepped up efforts Sanh in mass, Westmoreland would get ing the 1968 attacks. to put the best possible face on the war the set-piece battle he had wanted ever with a “Success Campaign” in the fall since he adopted the attrition strategy. It of 1967. Walt W. Rostow, Presidential would be a costly fight, but superior US advisor on national security affairs, was firepower would finally have a chance put in charge of an interdepartmental to destroy the enemy. Psychological Strategy Committee to The North Vietnamese moved against promote a positive image. Khe Sanh on Jan. 21 with two regular Tet Westmoreland was called back from Army divisions supported by another Vietnam to help. The most notable of his two divisions nearby, a force of 20,000 North Vietnam’s 1968 appearances was a speech at the National to 30,000 troops. Khe Sanh was soon en- offensive failed, but Press Club on Nov. 21. “The enemy has circled and under siege. With land access public opinion con- not won a major battle in more than a cut off, the combat base depended on air year,” Westmoreland said. “In general, support for its existence. Bombers and verted it into a defeat he can fight his large forces only at the fighters pounded the enemy positions, for the United States. edges of his sanctuaries.” He said the and artillery from US fire bases at the enemy was “certainly losing” and that his Rock Pile and Camp Carroll provided hopes were “bankrupt.” The Press Club further support. speech went down in history because of News media in the United States fol- 14 words. “We have reached an important lowed the fight at Khe Sanh intently, and By John T. Correll point when the end begins to come into it took on great symbolic importance. view,” Westmoreland said. According to Westmoreland, President The US attrition strategy in South (Contrary to an often-told tale, West- Johnson developed a “fixation” about Vietnam was in its third year. In April moreland did not say he saw “light at the Khe Sanh. He had a large aerial photo 1965, fearful of drawing Russia and end of the tunnel.” It was Gen. Henri Na- and a terrain model set up in a White China into the war, President Johnson varre, the commander of French forces in House situation room and he studied and Secretary of Defense Robert S. Vietnam in 1953, who said that.) Other them for hours at a time during the McNamara had downgraded the air Administration spokesmen carried the 77-day siege. campaign against North Vietnam to “success” message far and wide. In the middle of the unfolding action secondary status after only a month of at Khe Sanh, the North Koreans captured halfhearted effort. They insisted that Downgraded Numbers the US intelligence ship Pueblo Jan. 23 the war be decided in the south, even In circumstances that are still disput- and imprisoned the crew, adding to US though it was directed and sustained ed, MACV, in November and December difficulties in Asia. from the north. 1967, reduced its official estimates of Mutual cease-fires for Tet had been In the summer of 1965, the MACV enemy strength. Whatever the intent, observed since 1963, and these had come commander, Gen. William C. West- the effect was to shore up the errone- to be regarded as a holiday truce. In moreland, implemented an attrition ous belief that the attrition strategy was November 1967, the National Liberation strategy with “search and destroy” working. The downgraded numbers Front —the Viet Cong—proclaimed a tactics. Focused as it was on ground were not known to the public but they seven-day cease-fire for the upcoming operations in the south, the strategy helped Administration decision-makers Tet holiday. On Jan. 25, the Viet Cong could do no more than react to North convince themselves. put out a public appeal for observance Vietnam’s initiative. US forces won In late 1967, the North Vietnamese of the Tet cease-fire. firefights and local battles, but made no launched exploratory attacks around The Americans anticipated that the strategic progress. MACV used “body the Demilitarized Zone and along the enemy would violate the truce. South counts” and “kill ratios” to show how Laotian and Cambodian borders to Vietnam had taken over security for the the enemy was being whittled down draw Americans away from the urban cities in December and some US forces by attrition, but the numbers were im- areas of South Vietnam and to screen had been moved into rural areas. For- plausible and MACV lost credibility. infiltration. US intelligence, watching tunately, Westmoreland—at the urging (For more about the attrition strategy the increased enemy troop movements, of Lt. Gen. Frederick C. Weyand, US and its consequences, see “The In- expected offensive action of some kind, commander in the III Corps area which Country War,” Air Force Magazine, possibly around Tet. included Saigon—recalled 15 combat April 2007.) The first major attack fell on Khe battalions from border assignments and The US presence in South Vietnam in- Sanh, a combat base 16 miles below repositioned them closer to Saigon. This creased steadily and by December 1967, the DMZ and 10 miles due east of gave Weyand 27 battalions near the capi- there were almost 500,000 American Laotian border, occupied by 6,000 US tal. The United States persuaded South military members in country. Of these, marines and South Vietnamese rangers. Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu 397,534 were Army and Marine Corps Westmoreland decided, against some to reduce the cease-fire to 36 hours, but ground forces. advice to the contrary, to make a strong half of the ARVN (Army of the Republic In September 1967, a public opinion stand there. of Vietnam) was on leave. poll found—for the first time—that more Khe Sanh was in a strategic corner The enemy made the first of many Americans opposed war than supported of South Vietnam, close to infiltration military blunders on Jan. 30, when local it. The President reacted by stiffening his routes from the Ho Chi Minh Trail, but commanders, who apparently misun- determination. He spoke with disdain of that was not its real importance. If the derstood their instructions, instigated those who wanted to “cut and run.” North Vietnamese Army attacked Khe attacks on seven cities in the northern AIR FORCE Magazine / January 2008 51 AP photo

Peter Arnett of the Associated Press (with cameras) produced controversial reports on two major events. Walter Cronkite (right) told his TV audience that the US was “mired in stalemate.” part of South Vietnam. These premature and disruption throughout South Viet- on larger battles elsewhere, regarded attacks gave MACV still more warning nam, with numerous civilian casualties the fight at the embassy as a relatively of the offensive about to unfold. and throngs of refugees. On Feb. 1, minor affair until the telephone calls The main offensive began in the small President Thieu declared nationwide started coming from Washington. hours of Jan. 31. Some 80,000 enemy martial law. The embassy complex consisted of a troops struck all over South Vietnam, six-story concrete-reinforced chancery including assaults on 64 district capitals The Embassy Fight building and several other structures, and many smaller towns as well as mili- Neither side understood at first how surrounded by an eight-foot wall. At 2:45 tary bases. The forces in the southern part important the attack on the US Embassy a.m., a Viet Cong sapper team attacked of the country were mostly Viet Cong, would be in the legend of Tet. The Viet the compound, blew a hole in the wall, and the North Vietnamese Army carried Cong sent only 19 inexperienced men to and gained access to the grounds. They the effort in the northern part. do the job. One US officer called it “a pid- blasted the building with rockets and The Viet Cong committed 35 bat- dling platoon action.” MACV, focused a fragmentation grenade, but they did talions to the Saigon area, targeting the Presidential Palace, Tan Son Nhut Air

Base (where the MACV compound was AP photo located), the ARVN armor and artillery command headquarters, and the US Embassy. At Tan Son Nhut, about 1,000 defenders, mainly security police, held an attacking force of 3,000 to a minor penetration until US Army reinforce- ments arrived at dawn. On the outskirts of Saigon, two VC infantry battalions and a reinforced rifle company achieved a minor penetration at Bien Hoa Air Base, but Air Force security police beat back the attack. The Viet Cong captured the govern- ment radio station in Saigon around 3 a.m. They came with radio technicians and tapes proclaiming a general upris- ing and the liberation of Saigon, but the government, following the emergency plan, shut down the transmitter 14 miles away. The VC could not broadcast their tape. US bombers drop ordnance close to South Vietnamese troops defending Khe Sanh. The attacks caused great destruction News reports compared Tet to the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu. 52 AIR FORCE Magazine / January 2008 not get inside. The Viet Cong leaders were killed and the others took cover, returning the fire directed at them from nearby rooftops. of the Associated Press was one of the first reporters on the scene. In the street, he encountered two soldiers who did not know any more than he did but who guessed the enemy was inside the chancery. At 7:25 a.m. (6:25 p.m. in New York), Arnett filed his first report: “US military police on the scene said it was believed about 20 Viet Cong suicide commandos were in the embassy compound and held part of the first floor of the embassy building.” Five minutes later, at 6:30 p.m., the Huntley-Brinkley Report on NBC-TV went on the air, with Chet Huntley soup- ing up the AP dispatch. “Twenty suicide bombers are reported to be holding the first floor of the embassy,” Huntley said. He added that “snipers are in the build- After Tet, President Johnson (left) pulled out of the Presidential race. Gen. Earl Wheeler ings and on rooftops near the embassy (right), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, encouraged sending 200,000 more troops and are firing on American personnel to Vietnam. inside the compound,” which was the exact opposite of what was actually the reporters didn’t believe, and it led chance that such a strategy would be happening. them to discount Westmoreland’s other adopted and it played no part in the Westmoreland arrived at the embassy assurances as well. furor that followed. just after 9 a.m., toured the complex, and What credibility Westmoreland had Daniel Ellsberg of the RAND Corp. told reporters that all of the sappers had left was blown away when his request for obtained a copy of the top secret paper been killed or captured and that none an additional 206,000 troops was leaked proposing the increase, and in a preview of them had gotten inside the building. to . The story behind of his leaking the Pentagon Papers to Nevertheless, UPI reported from Saigon the story was amazing in itself. the news media in 1971, he gave it to at 10 a.m. that a VC suicide squad had the New York Times, where it was the stormed the embassy “and occupied the Wheeler’s Agenda lead story on the front page on Sunday, first five floors.” Arnett and AP reported In early February, Gen. Earle G. March 10. Westmoreland’s statement and added Wheeler, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Wheeler’s gambit had backfired. If the that according to “some sources,” the of Staff, asked Westmoreland if he enemy was about to run out of steam and embassy had been penetrated. Not until needed reinforcements. Wheeler said the Tet Offensive was nothing to worry 7 p.m. Saigon time did AP say flatly that it might be possible to raise the limits about, why should Westmoreland need the attackers had failed to get into the previously imposed. 206,000 more troops? embassy building. Wheeler did not disclose his actual “Except at Hue and Khe Sanh,” By then, the morning newspapers were agenda. By 1968, about half of the US Westmoreland said, “most of the combat out in the United States. An eight-col- armed forces were tied down fighting that could be considered part of the Tet umn banner headline on the front page or supporting the . Other Offensive was over by Feb. 11.” In the of said, “Vietcong forces were covering obligations and locations where the attacks continued, Invade US Embassy.” The New York requirements elsewhere and the strate- the action was hot and heavy Times headline said, “Foe Invades US gic reserve was at a low level. Wheeler There was hard fighting, house to Saigon Embassy.” and the Joint Chiefs had been unable house, in the old imperial capital at The facts of the attack never quite to convince the President to mobilize Hue. The enemy captured the city and overtook the emotional jolt of the first the National Guard and Reserve to re- the US marines and the ARVN were not reports. Arnett later called the invasion build the strategic reserve. A big troop able to oust them until March 2. Fight- story a minor error. increase in Vietnam would put pressure ing continued elsewhere. By the end of On Feb. 1, the day after the attack on on him to agree. March, Tan Son Nhut had been attacked the embassy, Westmoreland appeared Encouraged by Wheeler, Westmore- half a dozen times, including a rocket at the late afternoon press briefing, the land asked for an increase of 206,756 bombardment on Feb. 18. The US Air “Five O’Clock Follies,” at the Joint US troops and 17 additional fighter squad- Force flew more than 16,000 sorties in Public Affairs Office in Saigon. He said rons. In Westmoreland’s mind, the num- support of US and allied ground forces there was evidence the enemy was “about ber was based on a change in strategy during Tet. to run out of steam” and that 5,800 enemy that would permit ground operations The biggest single battle was Khe troops had been killed in the first two across the DMZ and against the Ho Sanh, and there is disagreement about days. It was the familiar MACV “body Chi Minh Trail and border sanctuaries its significance in the North Vietnamese count” exercise, complete with numbers in Laos and Cambodia. There was no strategy. Westmoreland thought it was AIR FORCE Magazine / January 2008 53 North Vietnamese Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap (far left) planned the offensive. US Army Gen. William Westmoreland was MACV commander at the time. Just before the attacks, US Army Maj. Gen. Frederick Weyand (right) repositioned 15 combat battalions closer to Saigon, blunting an objective of the offensive.

the main effort. Writing in Vietnam with Dien Bien Phu, the remote mountain When the siege ended on April Magazine in 1993, he said, “I believed base in far northwestern North Vietnam 8, the North Vietnamese had been then, and I continue to believe, that the where the French were besieged for 56 soundly defeated. Some 10,000 North ‘General Uprising’ was in reality a feint, days in 1954. Vietnamese and Viet Cong troops had a secondary attack.” Giap said otherwise. “Almost to the end, it was a story been killed by airpower and another “Khe Sanh was not important to us,” he heavily flavored with the suggestion 5,000 were dead from artillery and said. “It was only a diversion.” of impending disaster—a disaster small-arms fire. There was no more In February, Wheeler asked comparable to that suffered by the talk of Dien Bien Phu. Westmoreland whether “tactical nu- French garrison of Dien Bien Phu at Braestrup later compiled the defini- clear weapons should be used if the the hands of General Giap in 1954,” tive study of the news media and Tet situation in Khe Sanh should become said Peter Braestrup, who in 1968 was in Big Story, published in two large that desperate.” Westmoreland said chief of the Washington Post bureau volumes in 1977. He examined 2,100 he did not need nuclear weapons at in Saigon. articles, telecasts, and commentaries that point. “Although I established a from the three television networks, the small secret group to study the sub- “Invisible to the Press” news magazines, the New York Times, ject, Washington so feared that some Such reports overlooked key differ- and the Washington Post. word of it might reach the press that ences. At Dien Bien Phu, the airstrip He found that 90 percent of the I was told to desist,” Westmoreland was destroyed by artillery early in reports from Vietnam were from three said. Lyndon Johnson later denied the battle. The only way in was by locations: Saigon, Khe Sanh, and Hue. that use of nuclear weapons had ever parachute, and there was no way out. “The net result, in terms of media treat- been considered. The Dien Bien Phu defenders were ment, was that the fighting in Saigon, Air support for the combat base at supported by only a handful of air Hue, and Khe Sanh became the whole Khe Sanh was massive. On an average support sorties, none of them by heavy war, a war in which, seemingly, no day, it consisted of 350 tactical fighter bombers. or few ARVN forces fought and US sorties, 60 B-52 bombers, a dozen C- The B-52 strikes were “largely in- forces were particularly hard pressed,” 123 and C-130 airlifters, plus forward visible to the press,” Braestrup said. he said. “The overall—and inaccu- air controllers, reconnaissance missions, Television couldn’t see them, so it rate—impression given, especially on and gunships. didn’t show them. The emphasis was film, was that, well into March, the The B-52s were especially effective. on the enemy attack. News reports and outcome on the Vietnam battlefield A formation of three B-52s could lay photos tended to depict the Marine was very much in doubt.” Braestrup waste to an area more than a mile long Corps at Khe Sanh as hunkered down also found that there were more than and half a mile wide. The bombers struck under fire. During the battle, News- twice as many negative reports and enemy positions as close as a half-mile week ran 29 photos from Khe Sanh. commentaries as positive ones. from the base, and the fighter and at- “About half—13—showed American Arnett, the Associated Press cor- tack aircraft worked the area between. or ARVN troops dead or wounded,” respondent who reported the embassy “The thing that broke their backs was Braestrup said. “None showed US invasion, scored again on Feb. 7. He basically the fire of the B-52s,” West- troops firing back.” was one of several newsmen visit- moreland said. CBS correspondent Murray From- ing Ben Tre, a town of 35,000 in the The base was sustained by C-130s, son’s report from Khe Sanh on Feb. 14 Mekong Delta where the battle had C-123s, and C-7s running a gauntlet was indicative of the prevailing tone. lasted two days. The Viet Cong force of machine gun fire from the hills and “Here, the North Vietnamese decide of 2,000 outnumbered the local de- ridges to deliver or air-drop supplies to who lives and who dies,” Fromson fenders by six to one and except for the garrison. Aircraft and helicopters also said, “and sooner or later, they will US air strikes, would have wiped them landed to evacuate the wounded. make the decision that will seal the out. A substantial part of the town was Khe Sanh was compared constantly fate of Khe Sanh.” destroyed in the fighting. 54 AIR FORCE Magazine / January 2008 in stalemate seems the only realistic, on a strong operation to impress the yet unsatisfactory, conclusion.” Americans, but that did not happen Lyndon Johnson responded to the either. The public reaction in the United attacks with a continuation of his States was a lucky windfall for the “Success Campaign.” He sought to North Vietnamese. It was not because minimize importance of the Tet Of- of anything Giap accomplished in the fensive and made no effort to rally the offensive. nation. Talking with reporters at the As Giap knew all along, his forces White House on Feb. 1, he said the could not defeat the United States and offensive had been expected, that there ARVN in open battle. A bad strategy would be no change in US strategy, was weakened further when Giap chose and that he had seen nothing in the Tet to strike simultaneously in so many Offensive to change his evaluation of locations, spreading his force too thin the situation in Vietnam. for effective concentration. In “Tet II” or “mini Tet” in May, Hanoi sent Verdict of the Public 80,000 to 90,000 replacement troops In a Gallup poll the last week in south for a final effort. They attacked February, 61 percent—compared with at 119 locations but gave it up when 41 percent in November—said the losses reached 4,000 a week. Arnett’s report quoted an anony- United States was losing the war or In the final tally for Tet, between mous Air Force major, who said, “It standing still. In the New Hampshire 40,000 and 70,000 North Vietnamese became necessary to destroy the town primary in March, anti-war Sen. Eu- and Viet Cong were killed and many to save it.” Nobody else heard it and gene J. McCarthy got 42 percent of the more wounded. The Viet Cong were Arnett would not reveal who the major vote versus 49 percent for Johnson. thereafter reduced to a marginal role was, but his statement became one of Also in March, the Johnson campaign in the conflict. Le Duan’s “main force” the most famous lines of the war. adopted a “Peace With Honor” theme, faction lost credibility and North Viet- Dan Southerland of UPI, at Ben Tre which represented a softening of the nam returned to its previous emphasis on the same trip, quoted an Air Force President’s position. on insurgency. sergeant who said, “The Viet Cong On March 25-26, Johnson convened It is impossible to say what the effect were holed up in a lot of buildings and a meeting of two dozen of his senior of- of the slanted news reporting might there was no way to get them out but ficials and advisors to get their counsel have been if the US government had to shell and bomb them out.” Nobody on the war. All but five of them favored not bungled its response to the Tet Of- much repeated what Southerland and disengagement or de-escalation. fensive. Harry G. Summers Jr., noted the sergeant had to say. On March 31, Johnson quit the author of On Strategy and longtime On March 24, William Tuohy of Presidential race and ended the bombing editor of Vietnam Magazine, said that the went to Ben over most of North Vietnam as a “first “the real reason for the debacle was Tre on follow-up and reported that step to de-escalate the conflict.” On the void created by President Lyndon “only 25 percent of the city—rather June 26, Khe Sanh—where the use of Johnson’s ‘psychological defeat.’ His than the reported 80 percent—was tactical nuclear weapons had been con- two months of inaction after Tet al- actually destroyed by the Viet Cong sidered four months previously—was lowed critics to define the terms of this attack and the Vietnamese artillery abandoned. On July 1, Westmoreland perceived disaster.” and US air strikes that followed. And was succeeded as MACV commander The Administration’s credibility, al- the US advisory group doubts that the by Gen. Creighton W. Abrams Jr., who ready low when Tet began, got steadily statement [reported by Arnett] was promptly moved away from the attrition worse. Most of what the government did actually said in that form.” strategy, but the heart had gone out of and said added to the impression that a The coup de grace was delivered the US commitment. Bombing of North defeat was in progress. It was as if the by Walter Cronkite, anchor of the Vietnam was completely stopped Nov. White House and the Pentagon had set CBS Evening News. As first reports 1. The incoming Nixon Administration out to undermine their own case. Tet of Tet streamed into the newsroom in adopted a policy of “Vietnamization” was the catalyst that prompted Lyndon New York, Cronkite exclaimed aloud, of the war. Johnson’s own politicos and advisors “What the hell is going on? I thought By the summer of 1969, “we were to bail out on him. we were winning the war.” He went to clearly on the way out of Vietnam by Despite the North Vietnamese and Vietnam in February, saw the fighting negotiation if possible, by unilateral Viet Cong losses, Tet did not change still under way in Hue, talked to both withdrawal if necessary,” said Henry the military prospective that much. The officials in Saigon and troops in the A. Kissinger, the new national security best the US could do was to resume field, and gave his opinion in a CBS advisor. marching in place. Any chance of news special Feb. 27. Giap’s offensive failed. The “general victory had been cut off years before “To say that we are closer to vic- uprising” did not occur. The South Viet- with the decision to fight the war in the tory today is to believe, in the face of namese armed forces did not collapse south. Tet altered the timetable but not the evidence, the optimists who have or switch sides. Giap was counting the outcome. ■ been wrong in the past,” Cronkite said. “To suggest we are on the edge John T. Correll was editor in chief of Air Force Magazine for 18 years and is now of defeat is to yield to unreasonable a contributing editor. His most recent article, “Caught on the Ground,” appeared in pessimism. To say that we are mired the December 2007 issue. AIR FORCE Magazine / January 2008 55