The Transition of Soviet Co1d War Po1iey, 1953-1955 ABSTRACT

Short tit1e: The Transition of Soviet Co1d War Po1iey, 1953-1955 ABSTRACT

Master of Arts David Blustein

Department of History

THE CRISIS OF COEXISTENCE: SOVIET COLD WAR POLICY IN THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD BETWEEN 8TALIN AND KHRU8HCHEV

When after the Second World War the Western allies turned against the Soviet Union, Stalin responded with the iron curtain. 80- viet isolation proved to be a liability as the cold war intensified, and for other reasons ,also was impossible to maintain. After Stalin's death the peace faction within the Kremlin, led by G. M. Malenkov, gained control and implemented a policy of peace, or detente, in an attempt to wind down the cold war. Due to Western opposition and to certain contradictions inherent in Soviet policy, the foreign policy of the transition period met significant failures, particularly over the German question. However, the basic premises of the peace policy were not discredited. The development of the policy of peaceful coexistence under N. S. Khrushchev was an affirmation of the line which began to develop in the preceeding periode ABREGE

Après la deuxiême guerre mondiale, quand les alliés occiden taux se sont retournés contre l'Union Soviétique, Staline en réponse a affermi la division totale de l'Europe. Lorsque la guerre froide est devenue plus intense l'isolement Sovétique s'est montré un problème sérieux et devint pour d'autres raisons aussi impossible à maintenir.

Après la mort de Staline la faction qui voulait la paix, menée par

G. M. Malenkov, a pris le dessus et entreprit une politique de la paix, ou de détente, dans une tentative de terminer la guerre froide. A cause de l'opposition occidentale et des contradictions inhérentes dans la politique Soviétique, la politique éxterieure de la période de transition subit des insuccès importants, particulièrement sur la ques tion de l'Allemagne. Cependant, les premisses de la politique de la paix n'etaient pas discréditées. Le développement de la coexistence pacifique avec N. S. Khrushchev était une affirmation de la politique qui commença à se développer dans la période précédente. THE CRISIS OF COEXISTENCE: SOVIET COLD WAR POLICY IN THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD BETWEEN STALIN AND KHRUSHCHEV

1 J

A Thesis, submitted to the Facu1ty of Gradu~te Studies and Research, in partial fulfi11ment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

David B1ustein Department of History McGil1 University March, 1973

@) David B1ustein 1973 TADLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS iii

PREFACE ..•• v

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT • • viii

INTRODUCTION •.. 1

A. Competing Schoo1s of Co1d War Historiography .. 1 B. Sta1in's Dip1omacy. . ••• 9

CHAPTER l • 17

A. The Roots of the Co1d War 17 B. Europe Divided. • . • • • • 24 C. International Conf1ict and C1ass Strugg1e • 31 D. Iron Curtain Ideo1ogy • • • . • • • • • • . 36 E. Soviet Isolation Becomes a Danger • 40 F. The Reconsideration of Iron Curtain Po1icy. 44

CHAPTER II. 52

A. The Peace Party Comes to Power. 52 B. The Peace Po1icy Initiated. • • 57 C. East German Debac1e • • • • • 62 D. Retrenchment and Reform • • • 65 E. Detente Dip10macy and A11ying for Peace • 68 F. Towards an International Conference on Germany •• 74

CHAPTER III 78

A. The Geneva Conference: Background .• 78 B. The Geneve Conference: A Success U1timate1y Qualified. 81 C. In Pursuit of Neutra1ism -- The Indian Connection 85 D. Economic Dip1omacy. 88 E. Europe Wavers • • • • . . . 90

iii iv

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

CHAPTER IV 93

A. Collective Security and the German Prob1em • 93 B. Waiting and Indecision • • • . . . • 95 C. The Collective Security Initiative • . 97 D. Passing Success. • • • •• • •.• 100 E. Ma1enkov's Dip10macy Fai1s 103 F. Change in Leadership • • . • . . • • 108

CONCLUSION . 113

BIBLIOGRAPHY 121 PREFACE

After the second world war, the cold war became the major fact of international relations. This struggle determined policy in all

spheres of public life. In the Soviet Union, in particular, every major national problem became a cold war issue, that is, a question that

had to be dealt with in terms of the overall conflict between East

and West: Eastern Europe, Russian security, reconstruction, and re

form. To all these matters the cold war gave particular definition in

relation to broad international forces.

No one could deny that the cold war changed in the decades fol

lowing World War II. The period immediately following Stalin's death

was the first, and perhaps most decisive, period of change. Yet, des

pite the random emergence of important new factors in the international

relations between the two great powers, the phenomenon of cold war per

sisted and its end, if such has taken place, remains a matter of de

bate. Thus, we are dealing with an organic continuity of events which

began to assert themselves in the dying hours of the war and which per

sisted in that recognizeable form until some uncertain point in the

future. The thesis will deal with Soviet cold war policy at one par

ticular moment in that continuum, during the Malenkov period, the

time of transition between Stalin and Khrushchev. On this subject,

in English, there is a book by G. D. Embree, The Soviet Union Between

the 19th and 20th Party Congresses, 1952-1956 (Hague, 1959), which,

v vi although detailed, lacks a systematic approach. Besides this book, the immediate post-Stalin era is dealt with in periodical literature and as small chapters in general works of Soviet foreign policy.

There has, in effect, been insufficient scholarship done in English on this transitional period which is pivotai to an understanding of that which cornes before and after, and which, therefore, merits greater

treatment.

The thesis will show that immediately after Stalin's death the new government moved decisively to establish a detente with the West but

that Malenkov's foreign policy met significant defeats. The West was

not yet prepared to accept a detente with communism. This was a cri

sis time for the idea of coexistence since the pence policy, as it was

called, met considerable opposition from the United States, which seemed

to base its foreign affairs upon more clearly cold war criteria. Yet,

despite Malenkov's failure to achieve his objectives, we shall see how

the peace policy survived the changes in Soviet leadership because it

was the Soviet Union's only really viable foreign policy alternative.

The study of Soviet foreign policy in this period is made con

siderably more difficult by a controversy concerning the origins of the

cold war. The conflict between the opposing schools of historiography

centres around the issues of responsibility for the cold war and the

nature of Stalinist foreign policy. The introduction, therefore, will

outline the positions of the opposing schools and of fer the explanation

that Stalin's policy was guided by the conservative criteria of great

power statesrnanship.

The definitive elements of Soviet foreign policy were already

established at the onset of the cold war: its defensive nature stemming vii from Soviet economic inferiority and American atomic monopoly, and its conservative nature which often looked with apprehension upon the deepening of the ideological struggle between socialism and capitalism.

Moreover, the transition away from a rigid cold war posture began even while Stalin was alive. Thus, the first chapter will trace the roots of the cold war in the postwar situation and the global spread of so cial unrest, the development of that conflict into its bitterest stage with Stalin's "iron curtain" solution to Soviet problems, the grave new dangers thus caused and the subsequent rethinking of Russia's doctrinaire policy.

After Stalin's death, the peace party within the Kremlin got its real opportunity to act. Chapters two, three and four will fol low the working out of Russia's cold war policy -- the search for de tente -- through the two years that Malenkov was chairman of the Coun cil of Ministers. Malenkov's detente diplomacy had two parts which complemented one another: the campaign to reach an accommodation with the West, and the attempt to overcome Western demands for Soviet ca pitulation by forming an anti-war group wider than the communist countries themselves. Moreover, the peace party tried to attain these objectives by means of conciliation and retreat.

From the rather confusing years of 1953-1955 there emerged a potent and flexible Soviet diplomacy which began to bear fruit under

Khrushchev. Thus, the conclusion will include the briefest look at

the few months after Malenkov resigned; for in a sense peaceful co existence is the conclusion of the policy of detente, and the transi

tional period between Stalin and Khrushchev would not be unified with

out glancing ahead as weIl as studying its roots. viii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The author would like to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of his advisor, Professor Irving Smith, in the preparation of this

thesis. INTRODUCTION

A. Competing Schoo1s of Co1d War Historiography

"A growing number of historians and po1itica1 critics • • • are

cha11enging the view, once so wide1y accepted, that the co Id war was an

American response to Soviet expansionism." In such a way did Christo-

pher Lasch begin his review of the most recent trends in co1d war his- . 1 toriography, pub1ished in ear1y 1968. A review was ca11ed for at that

time due to the attention with which the revisionist interpretations of

American foreign po1icy were being received. The effectiveness of this

revisionism was under1ined by a serious rebutta1 advanced in the pages

of Foreign Affairs by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., the previous year. 2

Since then the body of 1iterature on both sides has grown and the gap

between them, widened. Whi1e interpretations vary, the common charac-

teristic of the main revisionist arguments is that they place on the

United States the primary responsibi1ity for beginning the co1d war,

and for maintaining and augmenting the tensions between the U.S. and

Russia.3 It is this tendency to assign b1ame in the immediacy of the

1Christopher Lasch, "The Co1d War, Revisited and Re-Visioned," The New York Times Magazine (January 14, 1968), 26-27.

2Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Origins of the Co1d War," Foreign Affairs, XLVI (Oct., 1967), 22-52.

3pau1 Seabury, "Co1d War Origins, l," Journal of Contemporary History, III (January, 1968), 169-182. For the significance of the no tion of responsibi1ity in co1d war historiography see Robert Stover, "Responsibi1ity for the Co1d War -- A Case Study in Historica1 Respon sibility", History and Theory, XI (no. 2, 1972), 145-178.

1 2 historica1 strugg1e which heightens the debate. For there is not mere1y controversy concerning the co1d war. There is the most complete disagreement and opposition of views; positions which mirror the strug gles these historians discuss.

The orthodox t'Of, .tion is, basica11y, that containment was a necessary responsè to Soviet expansionism and the deterioration of

Western power in Eastern Europe. A1though critica1 in varying degrees

of the "lega1istic-mora1istic tradition" which kept American states men from framing foreign po1icy according to balance of power consi

derations, these historians do not challenge the basic assumption that

the Soviet Union was a ruth1ess, aggressive power. On1y counter

pressure in the form of containment and the Marshall Plan prevented

Russia from absorbing a11 of Europe and much of the wor1d.

This interpretation was advanced by 1ibera1s under the impact

of a deteriorating wor1d situation and the ons1aught of right-wing at

tacks. These two e1ements cannot be separated. In the ear1y 1950's

there were ferocious attacks from the right upon America's foreign po-

1icy and its po1icy makers, predominant1y Franklin Roosevelt, but in

c1uding Truman, Marshall, Acheson, etc. U.S. leaders were seen as un

witting 1ibera1 agents of communism or simp1y as traitors. They had

appeased Sta1in; had sold out. The administration was accused of

withho1ding its force and handing over 500 million people to the com

munists. Containment had permitted the imposition of communism on 3 much of Europe and Asia. 4 The Hiss case, Truman's 10ya1ty programme and McCarthyism, in fact, the who1esa1e purge of new dealers from government, demonstrated the extent of conservative pressure and influence.

And their critique, which a1so attributes responsibi1ity for the co1d war disaster to the United States, produ.ced a more vo1uminous 1itera ture than the la ter revisionism. 5

The New Deal and the war had, indeed, been administered for

the most part by 1ibera1s in alliance with 1eft "progressive" 1ibera1s and inte11ectua1s, and with strong support from communists in the popu-

1ar front days. The 1ibera1, orthodox view of the co1d war was a res-

ponse to these charges, as we11 as an attempt to exp1ain America's

fai1ures in dea1ing with Russia, for these men saw nothing to ce1e-

brate in the extension of Soviet power. Orthodox historiography sees

the postwar situation as being goverened by the war itse1f and by

great1y increased Soviet strength. Sta1in broke his Yalta agreements

and the U.S. had 1itt1e 1eeway to influence events in the new Soviet

sph~res. This is the rea1ist interpretation, propounded in who1e or

in part by su ch historians as: Herbert Feis (Churchi11-Rooseve1t-

Sta1in; Between War and Peace; The Atomic Bomb and the End of Wor1d

4"For Repub1ican nationa1ists nothing 1ess than domestic vi1- 1any cou1d bear the responsibi1ity for such fai1ure. This deduction rested primari1y on their denia1 that the West no longer commanded overwhe1ming superiority in numbers and techno10gy - that the West was in retreat in Europe, Asia and Africa. Since they be1ieved the United States to be sufficient1y powerfu1 to have its way a11 over the wor1d, any dip10matic defeat must be se1f-inf1icted. The rea1 challenge to American security sprang from United States leadership that invited the Russian occupation of Eastern Europe and de1ivered China to the Reds." (Norman A. Graebner, "Po1itics in Foreign Po1icy," Current History, XXVIII [january, 1955], 8.)

5See Lasch, New York Times Magazine, 44-46, and Seabury, Jour nal of Contemporary History, 180-181. 4

War II); Norman Graebner (Co1d War Dip1omacy); Louis J. Halle (The

Co1d War as History); Martin Herz (Beginnings of the Co1d War).

Attacking the position of the rea1ists on historica1 grounds, the revisionist view of the origins of the co1d war emerges from the works of, among others: William A. Williams (The Tragedy of American

Dip1omacy); Gar A1perovitz (Atomic Dip1omacy); Carl Marzani (We Can

Be Friends); D. F. Fleming (The Co1d War and its Origins); David Horo- witz (From Yalta to Vietnam; Imperia1ism and Revolution); Gabriel Ko1ko

(The Po1itics of War); Isaac Deutscher (Sta1in; "Myths of the Co1d

War;" etc.). In these works, the object of American foreign po1icy at the end of the war was not to defend the West but to force the Soviets out of Eastern Europe. The Soviet menace to the "free wor1d," cited as the justification of containment, did not exist in the mind of Ameri- can p1anners. They be1ieved themse1ves to be negotiating from a position of immense superiority. Nor did the co1d war begin because the Russians broke their agreements. At Yalta the Russians were assigned a con-

tro11ing influence in Eastern Europe. Yet, the revisionists point out,

in possession of atomic weapons, the Americans tried to take back what

they had conceded at Ya1ta. 6 And in their effort to resurrect the for-

gotten facts and sequences of the co1d war, the revisionists have been

credited with estab1ishing a relation between the historica1 facts in

each of the fo11owing pairs: Sta1in's insistence on a sphere of in-

f1uence and the German invasion; Sta1in's intervention in Rumania in

1945 and Churchi11's intervention in Greece in 1944; Soviet conso1ida-

tion in Eastern Europe and American acquisition of aix bases and ato-

6Lasch, New York Times Magazine, 54. In this, the revisionists have agreed with the orthodox Soviet Interpretation concerning the ori gins of the co1d war. "one cannot ••• ignore the fact that the (Fn. 6 continued on page 5) 5 mic bombs; Sta1in's opposition to Marshall aid and the Truman Doctrine. 7

Thus, a growing number of historians have come to see the main theme of American foreign po1icy as containment and counterrevo1ution.

However, it is important to recognize that there are basica11y two kinds of revisionist argument. In the first, the United States cou1d have adopted a more concilia tory attitude toward the Soviet Union and prevented the co1d war. In the second, the dynamics of U.S. capita-

1ism dictate a po1icy of economic and po1itica1 expansion. Moreover, since communism rea11y threatens the wor1d capita1ist structure, co1d war anti-revo1utionism fo11ows the American national interest. From

Fleming, who saw in Truman's reversa1 of Rooseve1t's po1icies the lost opportunities for wor1d peace, to the 1ater writings of Horowitz,8 the progression of revisionist opinion on the co1d war shows a steady ra-

dica1ization.

A1though revisionist historiography goes as far back as 1952 with Marzani's book, it was the Vietnam war and the surge of inte11ec

tua1 opposition to it that gave impetus to the work of revisionism. 9

6 (cont'd'}countries of the Ang1o-American bloc, allies of the U.S.S.R. during the second wor1d war, changed the direction of their po- 1icy immediate1y af ter the end of this war." (Pravda, Apr. 25, 1953, Current Digest of the Soviet Press, V [no. 14, 1949], 7; Hereafter CDSP, V, 14, p. 7. The page number a1ways refers to the Current Digest.)

7Brian Thomas, "Co1d War Origins, II, " Journal of Contemporary History, III (January, 1968), 198.

8"Even on the evidence of the ear1y co1d war period • • • it is c1ear that the global sca1e of the conf1ict was the resu1t of a rea1 global phenomenon: the spread of revo1ution in the contemporary era of wor1d social deve1opment, and the decision of the United States to as sume its ro1e, as the new1y dominant capita1ist wor1d power, of the guardian of the global status quo." (David Horowitz, Containment and Revolution [Boston: Beacon Press, 1967], 10-11.)

9The kind of work produced at that time is demonstrative of this. See for examp1e, Carl Oglesby, "Vietnam Crucib1e, An Essay on the Mea nings of the Co1d War," Containment and Change (New York: Macmillan, 1967.) 6

American intervention in Vietnam seemed to give va1idity to the revisionist arguments, and it was in this context that the question of responsibi1ity for the co1d war became so important.

Perhaps for this reason, as we11, the orthodox counterattack began to be pressed so serious1y. Sch1esinger's article was the first rea1 attempt in this direction. Against F1eming's thesis, he presented the idea that Rooseve1t's death was decisive on1y in the sense that he was the on1y person who cou1d dea1 with Sta1in.10 But Sch1esinger's main purpose in writing the article was, at that moment of great na-

tiona1 introspection, to shift the onus of responsibi1ity back ante the

communists. 11 Writing a short time 1ater, however, Christopher Lasch

had this article in mind when he expressed the opinion that "the opo

nents of revisionism have yet to make a very convincing rep1y."12

Herbert Feis (who, A1perovitz once c1aimed, came close to being America's

official national dip10matic historian13) brought out a book in 1970,14

which cou1d hard1y be ca11ed a rep1y since it makes no mention of the

revisionists and inc1udes no major revisionist works in the bib1iography.

On the other hand, the contours of the important rea1ist counter-

attack were outlined by Paul Seabury i.n his article "Co1d War Origins, 1".

10 Schlesinger, Foreign Affairs, 48-49.

ll"The Co1d War cou1d have been avoided on1y if the Soviet Union had not been possessed by convictions both of the infa11ibi1ity of the communist word and the inevitabi1ity of a communist wor1d. 1I (Foreign Affairs, 52.)

12Lasch, New York Times Magazine, 59.

13Gar A1perovitz, "The Use of the Atomic Bomb" (an essay on The Atomic Bomb and the End of Wor1d War II), Co1d War Essays (New York:-- Doub1eday Anchor, 1970), 51.

14Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Co1d War 1945-1950 (New York: Norton, 1970). 7

He accepts certain important revisionist contributions to historica1

know1edge and then asks whether, given the great materia1 advantage of

the United States, the destitution of Russia and the natura1 suspicions

of its leaders, the prime aim of American foreign policy should have

been to alleviate these suspicions. U.S. power, Seabury contended,

could have encouraged Soviet aspirations and a Soviet-American condomi-

nium, been formed; the "iniquities" of Soviet ru le over Russians and

others could have been over100ked to avoid the cold war. "But whether

such a course of action was possible for the United States, and whether

it would have been supported by Americans is open to question.,,15

Upon this very line of attack a most recent book pursues the

rea1ists' cause.16 Whi1e accepting many of the findings of Kolko and

others (it denies, however, the importance of the "Open Door" and re-

jects the "highly questionable techniques of economic determinism" in 17 just so many words ), this book not surprising1y concludes that the

alternatives of the American leadership were limited by numerous in-

terna1 and externa1 restraints. In such a manner the United States

is abso1ved of responsibi1ity for the cold war in spite of, rather than

in opposition to, the revisionists. However, in so doing, the author

denigrated the purpose and value of historical research, since, to

exp1ain how Truman and his advisors conc1uded that Soviet actions en-

dangered the security of the United States, it became necessary to

state: "In order to understand how they came to this conclusion, it is

l5Seabury, Journal of Contemporary History, 181.

16 John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold 'War 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).

l7Gaddis, 358. 8 necessary to view the situation as they saw it, not as it appears today

in the co1d, but not a1ways c1ear, 1ight of historica1 hindsight.,,18

If the question of responsibi1ity for the co1d war is the es

sentia1 factor motivating the debate -- for the American academic

establishment, considering its ro1e in the formation of foreign po1icy,

it is a persona11y decisive question -- we may expect a certain pattern

to be maintained. Revisionist historiography shou1d continue on its

1eftward shift, ana1ysing in a more thoroughgoing theoretica1 fashion

the base and superstructure of American foreign po1icy. As this runs

against the predominant1y behavioura1ist strain of the American social

sciences, the production of such works will not be great; but the motto

of the revisionists may we11 be (to borrow a phrase from Lenin) "Better

Fewer but Better". On the other hand we may expect a spate of books

based upon some aspect of the new rea1ist interpretation. The notion

of responsibi1ity for the co1d war, by now universa11y considered a

"bad thing", is more important to the 1ibera1s than to the revisionists,

since the latter do not have the same position in America's inte11ectua1

and po1itica1 structures to upho1d. A1though attacking specifica11y

rev.isionist historiography, Seabury undermined the entire received body

of orthodox writing when he said, "the history of the co1d war remains

to be written.,,19 From his point of view it still does. Gaddis, for

examp1e, did not do enough to reinstate orthodoxy.

18 Gaddis, 353.

19Seabury, Journal of Contemporary History, 182. 9

B. Stalin's Diplomacy

One of the first questions to be encountered in tracing the roots of the cold war concerns the nature of Stalin's diplomacy and, ultimately, the attitudes of Stalin himself. Under the impetus of cold war a popular conception was created which viewed Stalin as the conspiratorial leader of a worldwide revolutionary movement. Yet this opinion was misconceived. 20 "The Russian leader emerged in 1945 as one of the most conservative statesmen in the world, with a record of non-cooperation with Tito in Yugoslavia and Mao in China worthy of any one of his opponents. The notion of Stalin at that time as a promo ter of communism outside of Russia simply falls down for lack of evidence.

Even in Eastern Europe his approval of the regimes in Poland, Hungary,

Rumania and Bulgaria depended on whether they were pro-Soviet, not on whether they were communist. In time the two became the same, but they were not the same in 1945.,,21 Certainly, Stalin's foreign policy was guided by numerous considerations, and "it is not by applying the tenets of revolutionary Marxism-Leninism that we can make the most

20The foreign policy of the Soviet Union in its earliest period was based upon the conception that socialism could not be established in Russia alone, but must wait upon the spread of revolution to the West. For that reason the Comintern, as originally created, was a re volutionary international. However, with Stalin's thesis of Socialism in One Country, accepted by the l4th Party Congress in March/April 1925, official Soviet policy accepted the possibility of establishing socia lism in one country alone, in Russia. Domestic priorities thus altered, Soviet foreign policy ceased looking for international revolution as much as establishing enduring state relations with the hostile capita list countries. Enduring relations almost by definition demanded the mellowing of Soviet Russia's early revolutionary impetus. Throughout the Stalin period, therefore, Comintern activity was based on the con servative goal of establishing coexistence with the West. In fact, to solidify the wartime alliance, the Comintern had been abolished alto gether, leaving no revolutionary international in existence in 1945.

21 Thomas, Journal of Contemporary History, 188-189. 10 sense of his diplomacy.,,22

Cold war historians from both schools agree that Soviet diplomacy both during the war and in the postwar period was aimed at gaining

Western acceptance for a Russian sphere of influen~e.23 Such a policy was the antithesis of revolutionary communism since, by implication and

agreement, Stalin recognized a Western sphere in return. Soviet fo-

reign policy clearly looked toward the traditional needs of the Russian

state, and sought solutions within the traditional structure of

European spheres of influence.

The wartime alliance set the precedent of collaboration with

the bourgeois democracies. As early as December, 1941, Stalin tried

to clear up the question of Soviet frontiers. He suggested a protocol

which, aside from settling historically troublesome frontier disputes,

would provide for Soviet bases in Finland and Rumania, guarantee So-

viet exit from the Baltic, and allow British bases in Denmark and Nor

way. 24 This is merely one example, but it shows how Stalin was willing

to use great power diplomacy and agreements to solve problems that aad 25 been facing Russia since that state became a European power.

22 Oglesby, 41. 23 See, for example, Schlesinger, Foreign Affairs and L~oyd C. Gardner, "The Origins of the Cold War," The Origins of the Cold War, ed. J. Joseph Huthmacher and Warren l. Susman (Waltham: Ginn and Company, 1970). 24 See Anthony Eden, The Reckoning (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1965), 335-338.

25 lt is indicative of Soviet attitudes that in 1949 Malenkov referred to the "historical injustice" of the Belorussian and Moldavian frontiers which had been removed. (Malenkov's speech on the 32nd an niversary of the Revolution, Pravda, Nov. 7, 1949, CDSP, l, 43, p. 3.) 11

The genera1 considerations which governed the Soviet sphere of influence dip10macy were the need for security and the requirements of reconstruction. In effect, security and numerous economic benefits cou1d be found in Russian predominance in Eastern Europe, and the success of the Red Army presented a unique opportunity to act. 26 That is,

Soviet demands in Eastern Europe were a function of conservative state interests and not revo1utionary ideo1ogy. NO~lhere is this more evident than the Po1ish question, which was the first serious co1d war issue.

In a 1etter of April 24, 1945, Stalin wrote: "Po1and borders on the

Soviet Union, which cannot be said about Great Britain or the U.S.A. l do not know whether a genuine1y representative Government has been es- tab1ished in Greece, or whether the Be1gian Government is a genuine1y democratic one. The Soviet Union was not consu1ted when those Govern- ments were being formed, nor did it c1aim the right to interfere in

those matters, because it rea1izes how important Be1gium and Greece are

to the security of Great Britain." And he conc1uded, "1 cannot under-

stand why in discussing Po1and no attempt is made to consider the in

terests of the Soviet Union in terms of security as we11.,,27

The reference to Greece is particu1ar1y significant. Sta1in

was scrupu1ous1y 1ega1istic and consistent in his dea1ings with the West.

Re demanded no more than he was wi11ing to give. Raving conc1uded the

famous agreement with Churchill which recognized Greece as part of the

26 Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Co1d War, 1945-1965 (New York: John Wi1ey and Sons, 1967), 14-15.

27Letter #439, Correspondence between the Chairman of the Counci1 of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Presidents of the U.S.A. and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub1ishing Rouse, 1957), l, 331. 12

British sphere, Stalin refrained from criticism of or interference in

Britain's intervention in Greece. 28 And a similar situation prevailed in Western Europe, where, after the war, "the Communists pursued a policy of cooperation, surrendered their military units, and adhered to a

'minimum program' which, even during the subsequent period of the great political strikes, never aimed at revolution as the innnediate objective.,,29

Stalin's conservatism pervaded aIl aspects of his domestic and foreign policy, even to the point where it was potentially harmful.

According to a highly placed Czech communist, during the most frenzied period of the cold war Stalin came to believe that a war was imminent. 30

Yet, under his influence, Soviet military thinking maintained its World

War II level which, based upon the idea of Soviet superiority in the

"five permanent factors", fostered complacency and hampered an open minded examination of ideas which many professionals believed essential in the nuclear age. 3l But Stalin's slowly developing military doctrine was consistent with the role of the military instrument in Soviet policy; for defense in case of attack and to garrison the areas of Soviet

occupation. "The only overt use of military power had been the rather

28 See Todd Gitlin, "Counter-Insurgency: My th and Reality in Greece," Containment and Revolution.

29Herbert Marcuse, Soviet Marxism: A Critical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), 55.

30Eduard Goldshticker, "The New Communist," Project 68 (Cana dian Broadcasting Corporation Archives Tape no. 680331-10).

3lSee Herbert S. Dinerstein, "The Revolution in Soviet Strategic Thinking," Foreign Affairs (January, 1958), 241-243. The five perma nent factors were: stability of the rear, morale of the army, quan tity and quality of divisions, the army's weapons, and the organizing ability of commanders. Soviet military doctrine was overhauled by the officer corps after Stalin's death. 13 conservative one of remaining where they had advanced to during the war.,,32

It is 1ike1y that Soviet conservatism mere1y ref1ected pessi- mism about the prospects of revo1ution in the West, that is, a Soviet be1ief in the reduction of revo1utionary potentia1 in the Western pro-

1etariat. "Soviet po1icy at the end of the war, with its series of occupations and 'revo1utions from ab ove , , • indicates that Sta1in did not be1ieve that a revo1utionary system was maturing in Europe, or that the Soviet state cou1d depend for its long range preservation on the colonial revo1utions.,,33 Moreover, be1ieving that the wartime alliance cou1d be continued, Sta1in abandoned to their own devices the communist 1ed resistance movements in the West in favour of working with their bourgeois governments. Sta1in's be1ief that, their longe- vitY assured, it was possible to live with the capita1ist Western

governments (in fact, the who1e deve10pment of co1d war ideo1ogy) is

i11ustrated by the writings of Eugene Varga and the controversy thereby

engendered.

Varga was a 1eading Soviet economist who pub1ished a book in

1946 entit1ed The Changes in the Economy of Capita1ism Resu1ting from

the Second Wor1d War. 34 He expressed the opinion that the ro1e of the

capita1ist state in economics wou1d remain more important than it was

32 Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Mi1itary Po1icy: A Historica1 Ana1ysis (New York: Praeger, 1961), 23.

33Marcuse, 75. 34 For Varga's ideas and the ensuing controversy see Frederick C. Barghoorn, "The Varga Discussion and its Significance," The American Slavic and East European Review, III (October, 1948), 214-236; and Rudolf Schlesinger, "The Discussions on E. Varga' s Book on Capita1ist War Economy," Soviet Studies, l (June, 1949), 28-40. 14 before the war; and that the issue of a 1arger or sma11er share in running the state wou1d form the main content of the po1itica1 strugg1e between bourgeoisie and proletariat. In 1947 and again a year 1ater

Varga was severe1y criticised for this. "Before 1939 such a state ment, with its obvious implications as to the possibi1ity of gradua1 reforms, wou1d certain1y have been described as reformist; and it is not surprising that, in the [co1d warJ tension of international rela tions, the term [was] again being used by Varga's critics. More im pressive is the fact that as 1ate as 1946-47 such a statement was made by the 1eading Soviet student of international relations .••• Near1y a year of increased international tension had to pass before the change of attitude was forma11y announced.,,35 In other words, Varga's con servative appraisa1 of capita1ism and the wor1d situation was accep table to the Soviet leadership unti1 1947 when the co1d war broke fu11y into the open. (The Truman Doctrine was enunciated in March,

1947, and the first discussions concerning Varga were in May.) It was on1y with the intensification of the co1d war that Sta1in gave up

the idea of securing a Russian sphere of influence in mutua1 collabora

tion with the West.

One after another of Varga's ideas was criticized, as the

changing international situation had made them obso1ete. Of particu-

1ar significance was his characterization of the '~democracies of a new

type" as dominated by state capita1ism, a1though the state, being no

longer an organ of the bourgeoisie, therefore used the product of the

nationa1ized enterpreses in the interests of society as a who1e. This

35Rudo1f Schlesinger, Soviet Studies, 35. 15 definition became inadequate after 1947, for it failed to link these new democracies to the progressive camp in a decisively divided world.

"If the general crisis (of capitalism) is essentially characterized by the struggle of the two systems, the socialist and the capitalist, confronting each other on the international scene, everything depends on their comparative strength. It follows that each phenomenon appearing on the international stage has to be classified according to which of the opposite camps it is destined to join according to the inherent dynamics of its development.,,36 By the time of the Truman

Doctrine there was no longer any question about the status of Eastern

Europe.

In 1946, when the possibility of postwar cooperation had not yet disappeared, Varga advanced the modest proposition and by implication the Soviet leadership acceded in his opinion that the specific weight of the Eastern European states in capitalist world economics was too small to influence the prospects of capitalism.37 Six years later Stalin declared: "The disintegration of a single, uni- versaI world market must be considered the most important economic con-

sequence of the second world war. This circumstance determined the

further aggravation in the general crisis of the world capitalist sys

tem.,,38 This loss Stalin used to explain the militarization of U.S.

economy, the Marshall Plan and the War in Korea. 39 In the transition

36Rudolf Schlesinger, Soviet Studies, 36.

37Ibid., 32.

38Joseph Stalin, "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.," CDSP, IV (special supplement, October, 1952), 6.

39Ibid• 16 from one theoretica1 position to the other is to be found the history of the origins of the co1d war. CHAPTER l

A. The Roots of the Cold War

The cold war was a natural outgrowth of the second world war.

War had radically altered the old order of the 1930's and destroyed the Central European power structure and, by virtue of the pre-eminent

Soviet role in the defeat of the German armies, had extended Russian power throughout Eastern Europe into Germany and Austria. The criti-

cal problem which emerged from this changed European situation was the

necessity for new guarantees of mutual security between East and West,

a problem closely related to the overall economic well-being and in-

dustrial potential of both sides. The different needs of the United

States and the U.S.S.R. produced two diplomatic attitudes which were

directly opposed to one another. The United States sought to ex-

tend the principle (rhetorically speaking) of the Open Door, "a fair

field and no favour:" while the Russians pursued their goals by authori-

tarian methods within closed spheres. 1

Every leading nation attempts to apply its own national in

terest as a universal law for aIl nations. 2 Neither of the two "leading"

1 Lloyd C. Gardener, The Origins of the Cold War, 5. For discussions of the American foreign policy of universalism in opposition to the Soviet policy of spheres of influence see Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Foreign Affairs, 26-36, and LaFeber, 1-15.

2See the section "Morality in International Politics," in E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939 (New York: Harper and Row, 1964),146-169.

17 18 powers accepted the other's vision of international organization.

America emerged from the war in a position of undeniab1e strength. Of a11 the great powers she was the most high1y deve10ped; of a11 the great powers, the 1east hurt; of a11 the wor1d's nations the most ex- panded because of the war. American mi1itary and economic dominance made the po1icy of collective security an obvious choice for the postwar international organization -- an international order on the idea of

the United Nations, free from po1itica1 regiona1ism and c10sed blocs.

Within this system, by virtue of the Open Door, the 01d Or der of capi-

ta1ism, which had been in a state of steady co11apse since 1914, cou1d

be restored and 1ibera1ized. 3 And the atomic bomb was to be the guaran

tee of order and security within such a~ructure.4

The Soviet Union, on the other hand, in bearing the brunt of fas-

cism, had suffered terrib1y: over twenty million dead and her western

provinces devastated. She had a large army, it is true, but with such

labour shortages and reconstruction needs that without a secure peace

and rapid demobi1ization the gravest economic imba1ances threatened.

In this situation, the Soviets sought the permanent reduction of Germany

and an international order which wou1d a110w the rapid reviva1 of Soviet

prosperity. But that invo1ved the extension of Soviet influence into

3"The United States used its great wartime and postwar influ ence in a wholehearted effort to turn back thetides of economic na tiona1ism which had run so strong1y in the interwar years. This effort was guided by an exp1icit set of ideas about the kind of world economic order toward which American po1icy was working. The intention was to create an integrated and -- as far as possible -- automatic wor1d eco nomy, 1arge1y free of interference by national governments, on the mo de1 of the 19th-century system, as it was conventiona11y understood." (William Y. E11iott et al., The Po1itica1 Economy of American Foreign Po1icy [New York: Ho1t, 1955), 206.) 4 Gardener, The Origins of the Co1d War, 25. 19

Eastern Europe in order to lift the siege 'l;l7hich the revo1ution had brought upon Russia, to prevent the formation of governments tradi- tiona11y hostile to Russia (Hungary and Rumania had been Axis allies), and to end the po1itica1 instabi1ity which made Eastern Europe the breeding ground of conf1ict and war. 5 And there was an economic aspect to this po1icy as we11, a des ire to break the old patterns of

East European trade with the West, designed to benefit the Soviets

during the difficu1t period of rebui1ding and thereafter.

Russia's foreign po1icy towards the West was a function of

these plans and the wor1d position of communism. The Soviets cou1d com-

pete neither economica11y nor po1itica11y with the incomparab1y stronger

United States. Moreover, the hegemony of bourgeois ideo1ogy, particu-

1ar1y in the conservative area of Eastern Europe, infinite1y comp1icated

the Soviet task. Under these circumstances, Sta1in's decision to work

within a c10sed system, the sphere of influence, was an understandab1e

and obvious choice. And the nature of that sphere, its accessibi1ity

to outside interests and its po1itica1 structures, wou1d depend in the

final ana1ysis upon the avai1abi1ity of other means of achieving Russian 6 goals.

5Upon signing the mutua1 aid and friendship treaty with Po1and Sta1in was to say: "The significance of this treaty lies in the fact that it liquida tes the old and ruinous po1icy of p1aying Germany and the Soviet Union one against another, and substitutes ••• for it a po1icy of alliance and friendship between Po1and and her eastern neighbour." (Pravda, Ju1y 22, 1951, CDSP, III, 27, p. 11.)

6Writing in his capacity as an editor of The Times E. H. Carr stated: "Russia, 1ike Great Britain, has no aggressive or expansive designs in Europe. What she wants on her Western frontiers is security. What she asks from her Western neighbours is a guarantee, the extent and form of which will be determined main1y by the experience of the past twenty-five years, that her security will not be exposed to any threat from or across their territories. Admitted1y she is un1ike1y to regard with favour intervention by other Great Powers in these coun tries." (The Times, November 1, 1944, p. 5.) 20

In 1942 and 1943, when the Soviet Union was on the brink of mi-

1itary disaster, Sta1in ca11ed for the creation of a second front a1- though the successfu1 1aunching of a second front at that time wou1d not have a110wed Russian control within Eastern Europe. As the tide turned, however, the allies began to look more and more to the postwar situation. This was a natura1 state of affairs and the progression of the Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam conferences shows a steady shift of emphasis away from the mi1itary aspect of the alliance to the po1itica1.

Churchill, seeIting to bui1d his own sphere of influence to

protect a crumb1ing empire, had wanted to sett1e European questions with the Russians during the high point of the alliance, to negotiate

the postwar areas of control whi1e the war was still being fought.

Rooseve1t's refusa1 to do so had been attributed to American idea1ism,7

but much more p1ausib1y, it has recent1y been connected with America's

be1ief in its overwhe1ming economic and mi1itary power and its abi1ity

to shape the peace sett1ement on the basis of that power once the war

was over.8 By the time Japan surrendered, an Ang10-American bloc was

in the process of formation against their erstwhi1e, and still wi11ing,

Soviet a11y. The mi1itary basis of this bloc was the atomic bomb for

as Henry L. Stimson, Rooseve1t's Secretary of War, pointed out in his

famous memorandum of 11 September, 1945: "In many quarters [the atomic

bombJ has been interpreted as a substantia1 offset to the growth of

Soviet influence on the continent.,,9

7 John A. Lukacs, A History of the Co1d War (New York: Doub1e- day, 1961), 50-52. 8 Gabriel Ko1Ito, The Politièsof War: TheWor1dand United States ForeignPo1icy,1943~1945 (New York: Random House, 1968), 625.

9Uenry L. Stimson and. McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peaèe andWar (New York: Harper, 1947), 642. 21

It was precise1y Soviet penetration of the continent of Europe that triggered the co1d war. Americans be1ieved that the resumption and improvement of normal prewar trade patterns in Europe was crucial to the recovery of the continent, and was therefore important to Ameri can we11-being and security.10 To President Truman this meant bringing the Eastern and Western ha1ves together as an economic unit. "The prob1em . . • was to he1p unify Europe by 1inking the bread-basket with 11 the industria1 centres through a free f1moJ' of trade." Moreover, the tenets of 1ibera1 capita1ism pointed to the necessity of an open sys- tém of international commerce. Dean Acheson remarked that the United

States cou1d not expect domestic prosperity without a constant1y ex panding trade with other nations and between other nations.12

Therefore, a number of assumptions under1ay U.S. foreign po1icy in the postwar periode Foreign po1icy responded primari1y to domestic needs and pressures, of which economic forces were the most important.

In particu1ar, Americans were motivated by nightmare-1ike memories of

the depression and fear of a new one. The depression, it was fe1t, had been part1y caused and pro1onged by regiona1 trading blocs. A

free f10w of trade was essentia1. The immense wartime growth of Ameri-

ca's economy created the necessary economic power to estab1ish this

desired economic community; and United States po1icy makers determined

to use it.13

10Gardener, The Origins of the Co1d War, 32. See a1so Gar A1· perovitz, AtomicDiplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965), 52-55.

11Harry S. Truman, Memoirs: Year of Decisions (New York: Doub1eday, 1955), 236.

12To the National Association of Manufacturers, Department of State, Vital Speeches, XI (February 1, 1945), 263-265. 13 LaFeber, 6-7. 22

This decision to use showdown diplomacy, as opposed to concilia tion, and the lever of American superiority to compel Russian coopera tion in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, had the effect of solidifying the armistice lines into those spheres of influence so strongly opposed by the United States. The Soviet Union could no more allow the restora tion of Western economic influence within their zone of occupation as they could allow the revival of anti-Bolshevik governments there. In terms of the ideological conflicts which the co Id war generated these would become virtually identical.

The ultimate American failure to carry through their policy is a reflection not of American weakness but of the unattainability of their plans. In the Soviet view, the end of the war marked the emer gence of the American problem. In an open let ter from Henry Wallace to

President Truman, Wallace attributed the deterioration of East-West relations to the U.S. atomic monopoly and the acquisition of air bases close to the Soviet Union. 14 As the international situation clouded,

America's military involvement in Europe became a threat to Soviet se curity even as Germany had once been. In the conflict of aims Russia was always on the defensive. The fact of American atomic monopoly makes the defensive nature of Soviet policy in this period undeniable. And a conservative, cautious approach to aIl international problems remained a characteristic feature of Russian foreign policy.

Yet, however else it may be defined, it is impossible to under

stand the cold war without recognizing in it the manifestation of the

international class struggle. This is not to claim that the Soviet

l4The New Statésman, 28 September 1946, pp. 223-225. 23

Union based its foreign po1icy upon this concept. The contrary was ac tua11y the facto Yet the theme of c1ass strugg1e runs consistent1y throughout, for the October Revolution had cast Soviet Russia into a historie ro1e which cou1d not be easi1y thrown off. The United States, which by virtue of its power dictated the configuration of the co1d war, directed its energies toward preserving the structural bases of Western

(specifica11y American) capita1ist hegemony, and in so doing caused the

Soviets to conform to the patterns set by the revo1ution. The history

of the co1d war shows a po1arization a10ng ideo10gica1 1ines, and as

the conf1ict progressed this aspect of it became more and more overt.

During the war, for examp1e, the United States had penetrated the Bri

tish economic empire, and under the effects of war ousted the British

from their strong competitive position in such key sectors as oi1 and

trade with Latin America. As the war ended, main1y because of the re-

1ent1ess drive of the Red Army, the conf1ict with the British (inc1uding

that over the question of colonial possessions) was downgraded and a

common anti-Soviet po1icy evo1ved. Moreover, "for this reason the

United States did not advance a tru1y permanent stern peace for Ger

many and Japan, since toward the end of the war many important American

leaders accepted the need to reinvigorate and reform German and Japanese

power to create a balance to Soviet predominance and ta advance Ameri

can objectives.,,15 A union of the old ru1ing order with its c1ass enemy

just cou1d not survive once the emergency had passed.

Therefore, two factors give to Soviet foreign po1icy its defi

nitive nature: the Soviet Union's basic defensive posture and the

15Ko1ko, 621. 24

Soviet position in the international class struggle. The national and ideological roots of cold war, juxtaposed in this manner, produced serious confusions and conflict within Soviet policy. Stalin's acknow- ledged conservatism affected the world revolutionary movement, and wherever he controlled it the international movement was subordinated to Russian needs. The transformation of the original Bolshevik vision, which had occurred within the U.S.S.R., was reflected in the world at large. Nor was the co Id war the first example of this. But at no time was the national aspect of Soviet policy so starkly apparent as the period after

1947 when the world came "dangerously close to a division between re volutionary and counterrevolutionary nations.,,16 This fact is at least as crucial for an understanding of the cold war as the number of ICBM's the Russians possessed, or how many times they used their veto in the

Security Council. On the one hand the Russian state was stamped in- delibly with the mark of revolution. On the other, when revolution finally moved abroad into Eastern Europe, it carried the undeniable charac-

teristics of the Soviet state. And Malenkov's government would inherit

this troublesome duality.

B. Europe Divided

The delimitation of the cold war as a specifie period in the

history of Soviet foreign policy must be set in terms of the des truc-

tion of the anti-fascist alliance and subsequent division of the world

into two camps of nations. Tension between the Soviet Union and its ma-

jor allies was never absent during World War II. As victory approached,

l6Isaac Deutscher, "Myths of the Co Id War," C6ntainment and Revolution, 24. 25 the disagreements became more acute and gave way to unrestrained hos- ti1ity which mounted steadi1y "unti1 some time after the entry of the

Chinese into the Korean War.,,17 That the alliance had devo1ved into co1d war was undeniab1e after 1947 when the iron curtain solution to

Western hosti1ity was fu11y imp1emented. Sta1in erected this barrier, and the end of his 1ife marks the first phase of Soviet co1d war po-

1icy. For the purpose of ana1ysis we may divide this phase into three parts: first1y, transition from cooperation to co1d war and (notab1y po1itica1) fortification of the iron curtain; second1y, intensification of conf1ict in the form of war in Korea and massive Western rearmament;

fina11y, an incomp1ete rethinking of co1d war va1ues. 18

The iron curtain symbo1ized the fai1ure of Sta1in's foreign

po1icy in the initial period of co1d war deve10pment. Sta1in saw the

princip1e of cooperation as being estab1ished by the wartime alliance,

.and upon the fact of cooperation he based his hopes for Soviet post-

war deve10pment. Part1y, this meant the continuation of Western aid

17Barrington Moore, Jr., "The Out100k," The Auna1s of the Ameri can Academy of Po1itica1 and Social Science, CCCIII (January, 1956), 3.

18A periodization of the Sta1inist era of the co1d war as sug gested in the Party's programme of study of Soviet foreign po1icy close1y para11e1s the above. The second and third parts of our division are combined in the section "1950-1953" of the Party programme: "up to 1949: The radical changes in the international situation as a resu1t of the Second Wor1d War. The strugg1e of the U.S.S.R. and the Peop1e's Democracies for a democratic organization of the postwar wor1d, against the im peria1ist 'negotiation from strength' po1icy. 1950-1953: The aggravations of international tensions as a resu1t of the aggressive actions of the imperia1ist states. The strugg1e of the U.S.S.R. and other peace-loving peop1es against imperia1ist aggression and for pre servation and strengthening of peace." (1. F. I"a.shin, "The Periodization of the History of Soviet Foreign Po- 1icy," International Affairs [Moscow: Ju1y, 1958J, 62.) 26 , 19 i nto peac.e t 1me. But more genera11y it meant an international system of spheres of inf1uenc.e based upon the mutua1 ac.c.eptanc.e of one another's rights -- that is, Western ac.quiesc.enc.e to the spread of Soviet inf1uenc.e into Eastern Europe, as we11 as Soviet ac.quiesc.enc.e to the rec.onstruc.- tion of c.apita1ism in Western Eurol'~? Aftel.' 1945 Sta1in was the on1y former a11y who remained insistent upon the workabi1ity of the wartime

a11ianc.e.

Moreover, this a11ianc.e had produc.ed po1itic.a1 agreements to whic.h Sta1in, in an effort to preserve the popu1ar front grouping,

c.arefu11y adhered. The most oft-c.ited examp1e of this was the Soviet

attitude toward Britain's intervention in Greec.e. 20 More important

than that, the Ita1ian and Frenc.h C.P. 's fo11owed Sta1in in his c.on- 21 servative approac.h and adopted a non-revo1utionary stanc.e. On1y

after 1947, when the c.o1d war had intensified, did these parties as-

sume a more mi1itan~ ro1e. Sta1in, c.autious as a1ways, avoided anta-

gonizing the West. In the Far East, where the wartime Cairo dec.1aration

on China was made with a nationa1ist government in mind, Sta1in tried to

c.onvinc.e Mao to inc.orporate his partisans in the nationa1ist army. It

19In his memoirs, General Eisenhower disc.usses a trip taken to Russia just after the German surrender. There, Sta1in to1d him how he needed Americ.an tec.hno1ogy and tec.hnic.a1 experts to aid in postwar re c.onstruc.tion and deve1opment. (Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe [New York: Doub1eday, 1948J, 461-462.)

20Churc.hi11 desc.ribed the great outc.ry against British inter vention whic.h arose both in Great Britain and the United States, and then c.ommented: IfSta1in however adhered stric.t1y and faithfu11y to our agreement of Oc.tober, and during a11 the long weeks of fighting the c.ommunists in the streets·of.Athens not one word of reproac.h c.ame from Pravda or Izvestia.If(TriumphandTràgedy [Boston: Houghton Miff1in Company, 1952J, 293.) 21 See p. 12 above. 27 is a1so true that the Soviets had a1ready reached satisfactory international agreements with the Kuomintang and perhaps wished to keep that government intact.22 Throughout the first postwar period, the Russians attempted to contain the international 1eft to keep theii wartime agreements viable.

The Americans, however, were not amenab1e to this 1ine of ap-

proach because in a rea1 sense Western statesmen be1ieved their own

propaganda. Europe was so vulnerable to revo1ution it was hard to be- 23 1ieve the Soviets wou1d not take advantage of the situation. In si-

mi1ar circumstances the Western nations might not have been so circums-

pect •. American leaders saw the October Revolution primari1y in its so-

cia1ist aspect and the occupation of Eastern Europe as the expansion of

socia1ism, a process intimate1y connected with the growth of revo1ution

everywhere. The Sovietization of Eastern Europe, a1though uneven and

contradictory, seemed to bear out these contentions.

Yet, even in the critica1 area of Eastern Europe Sta1in was

wi11ing to go to certain 1engths to keep the essence of cooperation

22"Sta1in's motive for trying to pacify the Chinese revo1ution was undoubted1y opportunism in his foreign po1icy." (Mi10van Dji1as, Conversations with Sta1in [London: Rupert Hart-Davis, 1962J, 165.)

23There is a vivid description of the panic and certainty that Western Europe was on the verge of co11apse in Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks : February 21 - June 5, 1947 (New York: The Viking Press, 1955), 78-85. 28 24 alive. But the clash of aims was so complete as to make cooperation impossible. Eastern Europe could not at the same time be a Soviet sphere and part of an American led world capitalist structure.

Even in the early postwar years East European industrialization left no room for private investment or uncontrolled trade. 25 lt is important to recognize that the old assumption of East-West trade in Europe was being broken -- to the benefit of Soviet trade -- at Frecisely the time when West European recovery plans were being based upon a resumption of it. For that reason, American diplomacy in this period was preoccupied with trying to make the Russians accept a policy of equal opportunity and investment for the West in the Soviet occupied countries. 26 Because

24Kolko is particularly explicit on this point (The Poli tics of War, 619): "The war utterly and finally destroyed the traditional Eastern European political and economic structure and nothing the Rus sians might do could alter the fact, for not the Soviet Union but the leaders of the Old Order in Eastern Europe themselves made that col lapse inevitable. The Russians could work within that new structural limitation in a variety of ways, and in practice they did exnlore manv political options ••.• MOre aware than anyone else of their weakness in the event of a conflict with the United States, the Russians pur sued a conservative and cautious line wherever they could find local non-Communist groups willing to abjure the traditional diplomacy of the cordon sanitaire and anti-Bolshevism. They were entirely willingto restrain equally the militant Left and the militant Right, and given the complex political admixtures of the region they showed neither more nor less respect for an unborn functional democracy in Eastern Europe than the Americans and British evidenced in ltaly, Greece, or Belgium • and they had no intention of Bolshevizing Eastern Europe in 1945 if - but only if -- they could find other alternatives."

25Before the war, Eastern Europe had acted as a source of ma terials and a market for the industrialized West. In Rumania, for example, half the metallurgical and 85% of the oil industries were owned chiefly by Britain and. the United States, until Germany took over the properties. One French company he Id its copper concessions in Yugoslavia undeveloped for fear of competition with North Africa. (See D. F. Fleming, The Cold War and its Origins '1917,.;,1960 [New York: Doubleday, 1961J, l, 258.

26 For example, on March 1, 1946 the State Department offered to discuss a loan to RUBsia if the Soviets would p1edge "non-discrimination in internatiOnal commerce," (New York Times, April 21, 1946, p. 17.) 29 the Soviets could not compete with the United States economically, they could not allow an unlimited influx of American capital and influence into their most sensitive security zone. Even if the value of

Western los ses in East Europe was small in terms of the world market, there ~.,ere principles at issue which could not be ignored by either side. "From the Soviet point of view, the American insistent requests for both a politically and economically 'open door' in Eastern Europe. seemed to require capitulation of national interest and security concerns. From the American point of view, Soviet failure to concede these views endangered the American conception of postwar peace and prosperity.,,27

The task of paramount political importance for the Soviet Union 28 was the creation of "friendly governments" within that area. In ef-

fect, the complications of creating an East European sphere sucked in

the Russian commitment while, at the same time, American opposition in-

creased. The Polish example is typical of the general situation. The

need to interfere actively in the composition of the Polish government

to secure the formation of a government friendly to the Soviet Union was

stated as early as February, 1944. 29 The final result was a Soviet

sponsored government to counter the one based in London which had a clear

Western bias. This situation was common throughout Eastern Europe,

which caused the increasing and increasingly direct Russian commitment.

And postwar settlements in each occupied state tended to stabi1ize and

27 Thomas G. Paterson, "The Abortive American Loan to Russia and the Origins of the Co1d War, 1953-1946," The Journal of American History, LVI (June, 1969),91. 28 . This problem ls we1l summed up in Fleming, l, 249-262. 29 . . .Correspondence between ·the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S~S~R~etc., 1, 195-197. 30

perpetuate this Soviet involvement. Again the Polish example: by per- mitting the Poles to take Germany's Eastern provinces in return for So-

viet acquisitions in the Ukraine the Russians secured a guarantee that

Poland would always be dependent on the Soviet Union. 30

There was, as well, a natural process of Sovietization which

could hardly be controlled. This was the natural extension of a social

system which had proved its vitality and strength in a great victory.

East-West armistice agreements gave the Soviet military authorities

almost unlimited freedom of action in their zone of occupation. Poli-

tically minded occupation authorities saw to the elimination, through

reform along the socialist model, of the structural conditions which had

bred old enemies (for example, expropriation of the Junkers), not to

mention the e1imination of the old enemies themse1ves. Communists, the

on1y group Russia cou1d trust, quickly occupied key posts in all of what

were to become iron curtain countries. The victory and occupation ser-

ved to carry abroad the revolutionary urge in Soviet society much the

way the French revo1ution was carried abroad on the bayonets of Na-

po1ean's army.

Yet, concerning the political structure of Eastern Europe, the

deciding factor was the state of relations between the former allies.

Soviet politica1 and economic policies within the zone of occupation

were bound to the international situation as a whole. The interconnec-

tion between Soviet-American relations and the internal situation in

East Europe was obvious and direct. Stalin believed there was always a

30Thereafter, the Soviet Union was bound to protect Poland from German revenge. (Isaac Deutscher, Staliù:· A Political Biography CreVe ed., Penguin Books, 1966J, 507-508.) 31 great danger from defeated po1itica1 forces who wou1d try to regain power if they cou1d.31 This was especia11y significant in Eastern

Europe where the United States backed the defeated po1itica1 groups.

Native opposition to Soviet hegemony over these countries derived strength from Western opposition to Soviet aims. They approached U.S. representatives for support. The interna1 stabi1ity of the Soviet

sphere was at stake. U1timate1y the Russians conc1uded that they cou1d

remain in control on1y through direct po1itica1 force. This was the

les son which the Soviets 1earned from these ear1y postwar years. Ameri

can economic power assured the achievement of American aims in most

places with relative ease and 1itt1e violence. The Soviets moving from

weakness and an a1ien ideo1ogica1 position, had to use force to achieve

their ends. The Sovietization of Eastern Europe, necessary to secure

it as a Russian sphere, hurt the communist cause. The spread of Sta1inism

was a great propaganda victory for the United States which cou1d point

to repression within the Soviet zone, a device that did not have to be

used in Western Europe.

c. International Conf1ict as C1ass Strugg1e

The contrast between 1ibera1 economic reconstruction in the West

and the extension of Sta1inism in the East created an idea that the co1d

war was a strugg1e between communism and democracy. This impression

(upon which orthodox co1d war historiography is based) became the offi

cial Western ideo1ogy, embodied in government pronouncements and entren

ched in the popu1ar mind. Essentia11y, it was understood ta be a strugg1e

31Go1dshticker. 32 between good and evi1, for the concept of democracy was not pictured in its historica1 context of bourgeois democracy, but was seen to be a universa1 good irrespect ive of the social system which had produced it.

In contrast, the Soviets recognized the co1d war as the conf1ict between socia1ism and capita1ism. Although the term 'capita1ism' may in this sense be pejorative, the method of dia1ectica1 materia1ism tended to make the Soviets view the co1d war in its perspective as a historica1 strugg1e between opposing systems. The predominant Soviet co1d war emo- tion seemed to be a sense of historica1 justification concerning postwar changes, rather than indignation over the surviva1 of capita1ism e1sewhere. As a resu1t, and contrary to the popu1ar notion of "messiah- nic" Marxism, a mora1istic and crusading instinct under1ay Western po-

1icy, but was 1arge1y absent in the East.

With the defeat of Germany and Japan, the ground was laid for the rea1ignment of national and social forces based upon the rea1ities 32 of the international c1ass strugg1e. A1though Sta1in tried to contain the independent1y strong communist forces in the West, the resumption of

communist po1itica1 activity, even of a 1egitimate nature, troub1ed

those American leaders who were worried about the 1eftward impetus of wor1d po1itics and the radica1ization of 1abour.33 The postwar atmosphere

32David Horowitz, Imperia1ism and Revolution (London: Allen Lane, 1969),190.

33The rea1 threat to the West, as stated by George F. Kennan, first director of the State Department's po1icy planning staff and au thor of the 'X' article on containment; was the threat of revo1ution, particu1ar1y in Europe, 1ed by communists within their respective na

tional orbits. (Geroge F. Kennan J "Phi1osophy and Strategy in American Foreign Po1icy," a mimeographed lecture de1ivered at the Graduate Insti tute of. Internationa1Studies, Geneva, May 11, 1965. Cited in David Horowitz, From Yalta to Vietnam: American Forei Po1ic in the Co1d War [rev. ed., Penguin Books, 1967], 402-403. 33 in the United States offered no easy distinction between combatting

the Soviet Union and the 1eft in genera1. 34 Thus, the co1d war was

a campaign against a most basic challenge to capita1ist society and,

conceived in the historica1 context of the ear1y postwar years, direc-

ted against the new Soviet sphere of influence. America emerged from

the confusion of those years as the apparent backer of conservative

social systems throughout the wor1d; whi1e the Soviet Union seemed to

foster revo1ution in Eastern Europe. By 1947 the conf1ict between ca-

pita1ism and socia1ism had stabi1ized a10ng national 1ines.

Co1d war hosti1ity 1ay part1y in a conf li ct between two social

systems and their respective ideo1ogies. This conf1ict had the effect

of he1ping to stabi1ize and even to freeze both po1itica1 systems and

their official doctrines. 35 Therefore, a1though the co1d war aims of

both the Soviets and the Americans cou1d be stated in traditiona1

terms, the ideo1ogica1 roots of the conf1ict prohibited a traditiona1

solution, some mutua1 compromise, as the very machinery of normal com-

munications broke down. In Russia the rhetoric was in the process of

a 1eftward shift, as the Varga controversy demonstrated. In the United

States the Truman Doctrine out1ined the basic American po1icy.

With the Truman Doctrine the co1d war, which had been building

in intensity over the preceeding years, was forma11y dec1ared in a man

ner which demonstrated the global nature of that conf1ict.36 In des-

34110yd C.Gardener;Atchitects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 19l.1-1949 (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1970), 309-310. 35 . BarringtonMoore, Jr., The Anna1s of the American Academy of Po1itica1 and Social Science, 3. 36 A textua1 ana1ysis of Truman's speech which is not based upon the revisionist thesis.notes: "The statement amounts to a dec1aration of war and p1edges support not on1y to Greece and Turkey but to 'free peop1es' everywhere." (Wayne Brockriede and R. 1. Scott, Moments in (Fn. 36 continued on page 34.) 34 cribing a situation where "nearly every nation must choose between alternative ways of life" Truman explicitly enunciated the doctrine of two camps at a time when the final division of Europe had not yet taken place. While Stalin still looked to a policy of cooperation (a Foreign

Ministers conference had opened in Moscow just two days earlier to discuss the German question), this speech escalated the issues out of the realm of practical considerations to a "Manichean choice between good and evil.,,37 With the Truman Doctrine, America adopted anti-communism as its official ideology. The Russians interpreted it in this way.

The Marshall Plan and Nato were the economic and military ex- pressions of containment, as was Truman's speech the political. The policy of containment was aimed at the Soviet Union and brought tremendous pressures to bear upon that country. The United States developed and stockpiled nuclear weapons and built a ring of air and na- val bases around the U.S.S.R. To this was later added an official pro-

gramme to revive German military power. This was the third major of-

fensive against the Soviet Union in a generation, and the possibility

that this political and economic offensive could develop militarily was

a consideration which haunted Soviet leaders and affected Soviet

planning at every level. 38 In fact, "the Truman Doctrine as later ap-

plied in Guatemala, Lebanon, the Dominican Republic, Vietnam and other

countries -- combined economic aid with direct intervention.,,39 The

e 36(continu d)the Rhetoric of the Cold War (New York: Random House, 1970], 21.)

37 Ibid. 38 Horowitz,Imperialism and Revolution, 199-200. 39 Brockriede and Scott, 21. 35 iron curtain was a defense against this military threat.40 The bur dens which the accompanying rearmament created,4l and the grave obstacles thus placed before the entire reconstruction programme, called even further for the integration of Eastern European social and economic structures into the Soviet system. Containment finalized the So- 42 vietization of Eastern Europe.

Moreover, because of Marshall Plan aid and because the dangers of a powerful anti-capitalist bloc with large numb8rs of supporters in the West created cohesion among the capitalist states, containment resulted in the "restoration of political and economic equilibrium in ·the developed capitalist world.,,43 The class threat symbolized by the So- viet Union polarized the world, bringing the greatest stability to capitalism since 1914. The desire to polarize, to institutionalize the

40"The obvious and inevitable answer to the clearly expounded views of the American fighting services on the value of strategic bombing is to ensure by aIl possible means that her effective military frontiers are pu shed as far away from the Russian homeland as possible. • • . The possession of atomic bonbs by America, and the implicit threat of their use against the U.S.S.R., provided sufficient, even though not the only motive, for the consolidation of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia within the Russian sphere of interest." (P. M. S. Blackett, Fear War and the Bomb: Military and Political Consequences of Atomic Energy [New York: McGraw Hill, 1949], 81.)

4lIn the immediate postwar period the Soviets had demobilized from over Il million men to under 3 million by 1948. (Garthoff, 23.)

42Geroge Kennan has since said that once Nato was formed, "the peaceful solution of Europe's greatest problems on any basis other than that of the permanent division of Germany and the continent, with the implied consignment of the Eastern European peoples to inclusion for an indefinite period in the Soviet sphere of power, became theoretically almost inconceivable." (George F. Kennan,. "Philosophy andStrategy in American Foreign policy," cited in Containment and Revolution, 12.)

43Horowitz, Imperialism and Revolùtion, 96-101. 36

East-West conf1ict, was imp1icit in containment -- and conscious as we11. "American observers tended to look at the Soviet rejection of the . 44 Marshall Plan as a triumph."

D. Iron Curtain Ideo10gy

The iron curtain, that is, the isolation of communism in the

Soviet, sphere, was the defining e1ement, po1itica11y and ideo10gica11y, in Soviet co1d war attitudes at this time. Russia's 10ss of prestige and the damage done to the communist movement in the West by Soviet repression in Europe tended to heighten the notion of Soviet expansionism and thus obscure the significance of the iron curtain. In fact, the

consolidation of Soviet power in East Europe manifested the national

orientation of Soviet foreign po1icy. By iso1ating the zone which Rus-

sian armies had occupied, Sta1in adopted a national solution to the c1ass

hosti1ity represented by containment since, in this period, Western

pressure was aimed predominant1y at the Soviet state as the carrier of

revo1ution. However, the iron curtain symbo1ized as we11 the extension

of revo1ution, a1beit behind the 1ines of Soviet mi1itary advance. The

contradictory way in which the Soviet Union thus fu1fi11ed its revo1u-

tionary ro1e characterized its entire co1d war po1icy. The iron curtain,

more than a physica1 barrier, was an attitude which invested official

acts with that confusing mixture of 1eft and right tendencies so evident

in Sta1inist dip10macy.

44Brockriede and Scott, 26. 37

Soviet isolation in the postwar period was created as a reaction to the American po1icy of "situations of strength".45 This concept, which under1ay the containment po1icy, was based on the be1ief that a sufficient preponderance of American power cou1d force the Soviet Union to accept a peace structured by the West; and the various aspects of containment constituted the attempt to create such a situation of sufficient strength.

Against this -- the antithesis of the princip1e of negotiated sett1ement the iron curtain was erected, not aIl at once and everywhere, but in various places over a period of time to meet the American prob1em.

Russia's susceptibi1ity to pressure was proven by her new isolation,

Sta1in's attempt to create his own situation of strength and make communism unassai1ab1e.

Soviet po1icy in Eastern Europe started from nationa1ist premises, but in estab1ishing Russian predominance it became necessary to attack the economic and social bases of anti-Soviet power. In other words, the Soviet Union was increasing1y forced, in its occupation po-

1icies, to act a10ng c1ass 1ines. 46 This was an important modification of the otherwise conservative po1icy which Sta1in pursued after the war.

From 1947 onwards there was a genera1 1eftwards shift in a11 aspects of

Sta1inism, the most significant examp1e of this shift being the extension

45president Truman made it c1ear that there were no divergencies between his own and Dean Acheson's views that "direct ta1ks with the Russians wou1d be unavai1ing unti1 the West had sufficient1y strengthened itse1f to give the Soviet Union a motivation for actua1 sett1ement rather than.dip1omatic maneuver." . (Marshall D. Shulman, Sta1in's Foreign Po1icy Reappraised [Harvard University Press, 1963], 116.)

46Anti-Soviet po1itica1 power was e1iminated by land reform, na tiona1ization of industry, and the reduction of the power of the Catho1ic Church. (SeeF1eming, 250-260. Also Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conf1ict [New York: praeger, 1961J, 97-103.) 38

of revo1ution throughout East Europe. 47 Under the pressure of containment, the Soviet power abandoned any thought of coexistence within the

new Russian sphere, and rejected a11 notion of compromise over any ques-

tion concerning Eastern Europe.

In this manner the Soviet Union accepted the wor1d division in-

to two camps, and adopted an u1tra-1eft militant stand based upon that

concept. Understandab1y, Moscow had a harsh 1ine toward neutra1s

"Those not with us are against us" -- the natura1 extension of the two

camps or iron curtain ideo10gy.48 Yet, in a manner consistent with so

much e1se Sta1in had done, this militant stand was hedged with qua1ifica-

tions. The fierce strugg1e against the vestiges of capita1ism being

waged within Eastern Europe and Russia was not extended uniform1y beyond

the borders of the socia1ist camp, where the possibi1ity of coexistence

was not ru1ed out. Sta1in remained the conservative, and co1d war in-

ternationa1ism was as bound by national interest as ever. Just as Co-

mintern po1icy in the prewar period had, broad1y speaking, turned from

promoting international revo1ution to exerting pressure on national

ru1ing classes to coexist with Soviet communism, the new Cominform be-

came an agent of Soviet foreign po1icy. Its membership -- on1y the East

European pm:"ties and the French and l ta1ian C. P • 's -- "ref1ected the

defensive nature of the new militant 1ine adopted by the C.P. 's in the

47Trotsky had written: "If the Russian proletariat, having tem porari1y obtained power, does not of its own initiative carry the re vo1ution onto European soi1, it will be compe11ed to do so by the forces of European feuda1":,,,bourgeois reaction." . (Leon Trotsky, Resu1ts and Prospects (19061, printed in The Permanent Revolution [New York: Pioneer, 1967], 240.)

48In its May Day.editoria1 of 1950;pravda boasted that "fewer people than.ever occupy positions of neutra1ity in the fightbetween the tlvO camps." (CDSP, II, p. 25.) 39 ensuing period.,,49 Revolution having been used to secure Soviet aims,

Russia's chief foreign po1icy goal became the conservative one of se curing Western acceptance of this new deve10pment. 50

Iron curtain mi1itancy was a corrupt ref1ection of internationa-

1ism because Sta1in never sought revo1ution to cross the 1ines of So- viet occupation. The iron curtain, in that sense, was a new version of the old attempt to secure a division of spheres with the West. In terms of power po1itics this was, again, a sensible procedure. Yet the revolutionary roots of Soviet Russia would not be denied. That the world could be divided peacefully into spheres of communism and capitalism shou1d have been as inconceivable to the General Secretary of the CPSU as to the liberal bourgeois leaders he faced; and the class struggle, like Nemesis, came back to haunt Stalin with the impossibility of his

own schemes. Two camps signified a world divided into revolutionary and

counterrevolutionary countries. This tended to b1ur c1ass divisions within the West and strengthen the ru1ing bourgeoisie. And, based upon

the inevitability of the class struggle, the iron curtain ideo10gy

pointed to a catastrophic clash between the camps.

For their part the West did not discourage such a view. Un-

yielding tension, an important part both of containment and the organiza-

tional discipline of Soviet society, became the chief characteristic of

49Horowitz, Imperialism and Revolution, 200.

SOIn his report to the Cominform in 1947, Zhdanov stated: . "So viet foreign policy proceeds from the fact of the coexistence for a long period of the two syscems -- capita1ism and socia1ism. From this it fol1ows that cooperation.between the U.S.S.R. and countrieswith other systems is possible, provided that the princip1e of reciprocity is observedandthatob1igations once.assumed are honoured." (For a LastirtgPeace, for a people's Democracy, Nov. 10, 1947, p. 2.) 40 international relations. These relations fo11owed radica11y abnorma1 patterns and the Russians cou1d not operate effective1y within the abnormal structures that greater American strength had created. Soviet dip10macy entered upon a period of litt1e success and considerable hardship which did not begin to improve unti1 1952. During that time, iron curtain dip10macy had only intensified the wor1d strugg1e by heightening the already dangerous confrontation between the camps of

socialism and capita1ism.

E. Soviet Isolation Becomes a Danger

The single most important event 1eading to the eventual trans-

formation of Soviet po1icy was the victory of the Chinese revo1ution.

A1though the Soviet Union had staked its security upon the isolation of

communism behind the iron curtain, the Chinese revolution, in one b1ow,

broke this isolation and demonstrated conc1usively the global nature of

co1d war. Within a year, bitter international antagonisms had produced

open warfare in Korea and an escalation in Europe that threw Sta1in's

entire co1d war po1icy into question.

The American Japanese conf1ict in Wor1d War II was a batt1e for

hegemony in the Pacifie. The main prize was the Chinese 'p1um' over

which the rhetoric of the Open Door had been formulated those many years

before. But after a dear1y won victory, that p1um, so to speak, got

off the table and wa1ked away. The Chinese revo1ution was successfu1

despite the fact that in three years of civil war with the communists

the U.S. gave the Kuomintang two times the mi1itary and economic sup- 51 portas it had in eight years of war with the Japanese. The inter-

51 John Gittings, "The Sources of China' s Foreign 'Policy," Con tainment and Revolution. 41 national status quo thus upset, it was as much Sta1in's calcu1ations as

the West's which were affected. In the situation of co1d war, charac-

terized by the global interrelation of a11 forces and the intensity of

international invo1vement, every event is critica1. The possibi1ity

to maneuver safe1y is 10st. The Korean War, which grew out of Ameri-

cats primary defeat in China, so intensified the co1d war as to graphi-

ca11y under1ine the dangers of an iron curtain posture.

The Korean War was a co1d war issue. North Korea was a client

state of the Soviet Union and had been armed by it. America's inter-

vention was based on co1d war 10gic. 53 It was an examp1e of how inter-

national 1aw, as typified in the U.N., was used by the counterrevo1u-

tionary states in their campaign against communism. Other states --

the Dutch in Indonesia, the Arabs over Israel -- had disregarded U.N.

ceasefires with impunity. What brought down upon North Korea the weight

of Western arms was its membership in the socia1ist camp; and the compo-

sition of the U.N. army accurate1y mirrored the global capita1ist coa-

1ition against that camp. The Soviet absence from the Security Council

in June, 1950, rea11y a non-event much b10wn up by the 'factua1' ac-

counts of those events, was symbo1ic of Russia's complete isolation and

vu1nerabi1ity to these forces.

Containment was fai1ing in Asia. Revolution had taken place

in China and national 1iberation movements were f10urishing in Southeast

Asia. Overnight, intervention into the Korean War brought about: the

bo1stering of Syngman Rhee's tottering and repreasive regime, invo1vement

intheChinese civil war by the protection of Chiang Kaishek on Taiwan,

52 . Fleming, II, 603-604. 42 and great1y increased aid to fight 1iberation movements in Indochina and the Philippines. In other words, the Korean War was concurrent with, and must be considered part of, the activation of containment in 53 the Far East. The extension of the war by the U.N. to North Korea manifested the essentia1 ro11back idea on which containment was based; and this aspect of the Korean War was very near1y extended to China.

War in Korea soon turned into a serious threat to the security of the Soviet Union. "The po1arization of wor1d po1itics and the hos- ti1ity associated with it may have reached its height during the Korean conf1ict.,,54 In the global context, Soviet Russia was at the geopo1i- tica1 heart of the great conf1ict between socia1ism and capita1ism which mere1y came to fighting in Korea. Along with American invo1vement in

the war came demands for a preventative war against Russia, which issued

from important segments of the mi1itary and po1itica1 estab1ishments.55

Even if it is c1aimed (and the argument is not conclusive) that it was

a fringe element propagating this view, it must have become apparent to

Sta1in that the iron curtain brought not stabi1ity but new dangers. As

in periods of crisis throughout Soviet history, the ear1y co1d war

53"A stage of the co1d war had come which seemed to compe1 a defense of the [TrumaüJ Doctrine in Asia." (Fleming, II, 603.)

54 Barrington Moore, Jr., The Anna1s of the American Academy of Po1itica1 and Social Science, 3. 55 In August, 1950, the then Secretary of the Navy, Francis P. Matthews, proc1aimed publica11y: ,,"To have peace we shou1d be wi11ing •• ,. to pay any,price, even the price of instigating a war to compe1 cooperation for peace. • . • This peace seeking po1icy, though it cast us in a character'new to a true democracy -- an,initiator of a war of aggression -- it wou1d earn for us a pro~d and popu1artitle-- we wou1d 'become the firstaggressors forpeace." , (Cited in Marzani,We Can, be Friends: Origins of theCo1dW'ar (New York: Topica1 Books, 1952J, 303- 304.) 43 brought Draconian discipline and an officia11y induced war fear to aid comp1iance. Yet, when Truman mentioned the possible use of atomic weapons in Korea (November 30, 1950), a move which provoked intense

European reaction and brought Prime Minister At1ee running to Washing-

ton, the Kremlin considered it po1itic not to report Truman's comment

to the nation. Sta1in was serious1y a1armed.

The global essence of co1d war governed the esca1ation provoked 56 by conf1ict in Korea. American reaction to ChinaIs ear1y victories

was the proclamation of a state of emergency on December 16, 1950 and

a qua1itative1y significant increase in American mi1itary spending. 57

War psychosis was as effective1y generated in the United States as was

anti-Western nationa1ism in the Soviet Union. America's drastic re-

armament was an attempt to crea te a decisive situation of strength where

previous efforts had fai1ed. And the Russians, to whom American foreign

po1icy had a1ways seemed spearheaded by a mi1itary view of the wor1d,

56 When the Korean War began the Truman administration had a1- ready approved a National Security Counci1 study, NSC-68, which, starting from the premise that the overa11 international picture was one of "an indefinite period of tension and danger," ca11ed for a massive re building of the West unti1 it far surpassed the Soviet bloc. This in c1uded both a series of alliances and an increase in mi1itary spending to $50 billion ($13.5 billion was the budget a110tment for that year). NSC-68 denied any distinction between national and global security. (LaFeber, 90-91, 114.)

57America's mi1itary programme in this heightened period of co1d war grew out of the emergency created over the Korean issue. It in c1uded massive mi1itary spending fo11owing the NSC-68 guide1ines; air groups doub1ed to number 95; new bases in Morocco, Libya and Saudi Arabia; interna1 repression (for examp1e, the McCarren Interna1 Security Bill passed September, 1950); an anti-communist peace treaty with. Japan; mutua1 defense treaties with the Philippines, Austra1ia and New Zea1and. 44 became more convinced than ever of the dangers which the Western al liance presented. 58

The most alarming escalation was the rearming of Germany. This plan, approved by the Joint Chiefs in April, 195059 and revealed by

Acheson the following September, was justified by the claim that the

Korean War threatened the security of Europe as weIl as Asia. 60 Even milder cri tics of American foreign policy have since admitted what the

Russians said then, that German rearmament meant not merely a commit ment to defend the West, but to liberate Eastern Europe as well.6l The

Soviets saw America as having moved from the preparation for war to open aggression in Korea, and now to the preparation of new aggression in 62 Europe. As the tempo of containrnent increased, the iron curtain no longer seemed a guarantee of Soviet security. This realization produced a rethinking of cold war values among the Russian leadership.

F. The Reconsideration of Iron Curtain Policy

The division of Germany represented the broader division of

Europe writ small. Russia viewed aIl aspects of the German problem as

having an importance in direct relation to the devastation wrought by

the Nazis during the war. Germany constituted the microcasm of cold war

development precisely because the permanent reduction of Germany, and

58"The Soviet people will • • • intensif y their viligance to ward the aggressive powers and particu1arly toward their international intrigues." . (Pravda, Dec. 19, 1950, CDSP, II, 49, p. 14.)

59See LaFeber, 102-103.

60New York Times, October 24, 1954, p. 1. 61 . For examp1e, Fleming, Il, 627.

62pravda, Nov. 5, 1950, CDSP, II, 45, p. 29. 45 the European threat which Germany represented, was the critica1 Soviet war aim. Four-power control in Germany began to break down a1most im- mediate1y after the war, just as the cooperation between the wartime allies was ending. The Marshall Plan made the Ruhr the central feature . 63 of American planning for European recovery; and the reconstruction of

German indus trial power gave rise to Soviet fears of the eventua1 use of that power against the U.S.S.R. "In the context of the overa11 anti- communist containment programme the po1icy of reviving German strength

soon began to have distinct1y ominous overtones of the anti-Comintern

Pact of the interwar years.,,64 Moreover, in the eyes of the Soviets,

the co1d war restoration of German capita1ism was accompanied by the

restoration of those same economic ru1ers who had supported Hitler as 65 an a11y against domestic and international communism. After the for-

mation of the German Federal Repub1ic (FRG) the Soviets continua11y ex-

pressed fears that the United States was systematica11y preparing to 66 rearm Germany and bring it into the Western a11iance. But it was not

63Secretary Marshall to1d Congress: "The restoration of Europe invo1ves the restoration of Germany. Without a reviva1 of German pro duction there can be no reviva1 of Europe's economy." (Cited in LaFeber, 52.)

64Horowitz, Imperia1ism and Revolution, 92.

65The Russians viewed the American alliance with Germany as being an alliance with the most reactionary e1ements in German society, against whom in particu1ar the war had been fought. James S. Martin, Chief of the Decarte1ization Branch of the U.S. mi1itary government in Germany stated: "What happened is that within a period of two years U.S. po1icy for the treatment of Germany has changed its course 180 degrees. Now in a11 important respects it coincides withwhat the German financiers, industria1ists and po1itico'!"'mi1itaris.ts. have wanted us. to do ever since they surrendered." . (New Repuo1ic, Oct. 6, 1947, p. 13.}

66See, ·for.examp1e, Ptavda,·Apri1 19, 1949, CDSP, l, 16 and pp. 54-55; Izvestia, Apri123, 1949, CDSP, l, 17, pp. 39:""40; "The Ruhr and American Monopo1ies," VoproSy ekoilOmOki, III (}1arch, 1949), CDSP, l, 20, pp. 4~12; Pravda, May 20, 1949, CDSP, l, 21, pp. 3, 21; and 80 on. 46 unti1 the Korean War that Western opposition to German rearmament, both in the United States and in Europe, cou1d be overcome by the emergency that was created.

From the Soviet point of view war in Korea produced a qua1ita- tive esca1ation of the co1d war because, in the face of these serious new dangers, the definitive functions of the iron curtain were cast into doubt. The Soviet response was primari1y an attempt to re-estab1ish nor- ma1ity in international relations; for the co11apse of dip10macy had out1ived its usefu1ness and wou1d, in the future, on1y injure the Soviet

cause. The deve10pment of Russian foreign po1icy in this direction was hesitant and contradictory, but a rethinking c1ear1y took place when

the disadvantages of isolation presented themse1ves. The first signs

of this were serious Korean proposa1s made by Jacob Malik over U.N.

radio on June 23, 1951, about which it was conunented inPravda: "Ending mi1itary operations and a peacefu1 sett1ement: of the conf1ict in Korea

will e1iminate one of the most important causes of tension in the present

international situation.,,67 Just previous to this, in an unsuccessfu1

attempt to set an agenda for a Foreign Ministers conference, the Rus-

sians had offered to discuss their treaties with East European countries

and China if the West wou1d a110w discussion on the issues of Nato and

American bases. 68 The e1imination of the causes of international tension

became the theme of a reinvigorated Soviet peace campaign.

As might be expected, the most serious. attempt to bridge the

gapthat the iron curtain had consummated concerned Germany. This at-

67pr~vda, June 26,1951, CDSP, III, 21, p. 12 •. 68' .... Pravda, June 23, 1951, CDSP, 11'1, 25, p. 14. 47

tempt was embodied in a note de1ivered March 10, 1952, accompanied by a

draft treaty whose most significant provisions were the fo11owing: withdrawa1 of occupation forces and liquidation of foreign mi1itary

bases; the right of Germany to have defensive armed forces and mi1itary

industry; and, most important, "German p1edges not to enter into a co a-

1ition or mi1itary alliances whatsoever directed against any power which

took part with its armed forces in the war against Germany.,,69 Imp1icit

in this particu1ar initiative was the understanding that an agreement on

Germany wou1d be the prelude to some genera1 co1d war solution. "The

prob1em of a peace treaty with Germany and the prob1em of a full restora

tion of peace in Europe are one and the same.,,70 This was a serious ini-

tiative based upon a guaranteed German neutra1ity. The Soviets offered

important concessions, concerning a German defense force, for examp1e,

but the significance of this notemust be found between the 1ines. Re-

unification of Germany wou1d obvious1y me an the e1imination of commu-

nism in the Eastern zone. The broad implication of the note is that in

1952, Sta1in was moving toward a position where he wou1d give up the

Soviet footho1d in East Germany in return for guarantees of German neu-

tra1ity. The West did not respond favourab1y, however, and nothing came

of it. A rethinking, though, was c1ear1y taking place.

The Czech communist leader, Grotewohl, once remarked that Europe

begins in the Ura1s not west of the E1be. 71 Since the revo1ution, and

except for the war against Fascis.m, po1itica1 rea1ities. had not ref1ected

69 . "Soviet Government Draft.of.Veace Treaty with. Germany, " Pravda, March 11, 1952, CDSP, IV, 7, p. 7. 70 ... '. Pravda, March 12, 1952, CDSP, IV, 8, p. 3. 71 ' .... Pravda, Sept. 22, 1951, CDSP, III, 38, p. 17. 48 this geographica1 opinion, for the po1icies of both Russia and her enemies tended toward the isolation of communism. The dia1ectics of coexistence saw communism, in the Soviet bloc of nations, reintegrated into the dip10matic and economic structures of Europe. The Western ru1ing c1ass resisted it. Contradictory tendencies, within Soviet po-

1icy obstructed the c1earcut adoption of such a po1icy.

The difficu1ties stemmed from the basic unity of foreign and

domestic affairs. Russia's rethinking invo1ved, as the March 10 pro-

posa1s showed, a retreat from Soviet iron curtain positions as a means

of securing normal relations with the West. It was not mere1y a ques-

tion of compromise. Pacifying the West, which above a11 demanded an ac-

ceptab1e German solution, invo1ved the appeasement of anti-Soviet forces

on both sides of the iron curtain. Nor was it mere1y a question of re-

leasing Eastern Germany. To the extent that the iron curtain was a so-

cia1ist front against bourgeois ideo10gy and particu1ar1y against the

remnants of bourgeois ideo10gy in the socia1ist sphere, that is, to the

extent which the iron curtain represented the integra1 body of Soviet

communism, any softening of the stand against capita1ism in the West

cou1d reverberate throughout the who1e structure of Eastern Europe into

the Soviet Union itse1f. This was particu1ar1y true since the ideo10-

gica1 retreat wou1d invo1ve the actua1 transformation of the socia1ist

base in Germany. For this reason, the co1d war debate within Russia

involved every aspect of foreign and domestic po1icy.

The antagonistic 1ines of anti-appeas.ement and conci1iati.on CQ- 72 existedwithin Soviet society. In their o.irthday messages to Stalin,

72 . Ca11ed important documents in the history of S·talinist foreign po1icy.C"On the Tasks of .. Studying the History.of theStalinist Foreign Policy of the U.S.S.R.," Voprosy istor!i [April, 1950J; cnsp, II, 31, pp. 3-7.) 49

Malenkov and Molotov bespoke these differing views, Molotov saying:

Two camps have been formed. • • • A situation has arisen in which the imperialists, unleashing a new world war, will inevitably pro voke a universal rebuff on the part of • • • the whole democratic camp, which will lead not simply to the defeat of this or that ag gressive power, as has been the case up to now, ~~t to the liqui dation of the whole system of world imperialism.

And Malenkov:

Comrade Stalin has repeatedly declared • • • that the Soviet Union proceeds from the fact of the inevitable coexistence for a prolonged period of the two systems -- Socialism and Capitalism • • • with aIl those states that display a des ire for friendly cooperation, under the conditions of observing the ~~inciples of reciprocity and fulfillment of obligations undertaken.

In this way the conflict between those who expected war and those who believed accommodation was probable rose to the surface of Soviet foreign

policy in the last years of Stalin's life. The debate centered around

the question of whether the threat of capitalist encirclement had so

diminished that discipline within Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. could . 75 be eased and consumer production increased. That is, could an altera-

tion of the iron curtain organization of Soviet society and the Soviet

satellites be safely accommodated?

Stalin had stated his view that war between the camps was not in-

evitable, 76 agreeing with the appeasers. Both before the war, with the

policy of "socialism in one country", and later in the iron curtain,

Soviet isolation signified the tremendous pressures Russia felt from a

hostile encirclement. When, in his speech before the Nineteenth Party

Congress, Stalin welcomed international communism's new "shock brigades"

73 ··· . ·d·· prav a, Dec. 21, 1949, CDSP, 1, 52, p. 9.

74ibid. , p. 3.

75 See Shulman, 111-123. 76 . Joseph Stalin, "Economic Proolems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.," CDSP, 8. 50 i n Europe and AS1a,· 77 h e was d escr ihing t h e en d 0 f t h e i so 1 at i on 0 f revo1ution within the Soviet Union. And Sta1in's thesis on the economics of socia1ism can be seen as offering an ideo10gica1 basis for easing the co1d war. 78

There was, indeed, a significant Soviet attempt to soften their position towards the West, to tone down the sense of abso1ute and a11- out ideo10gica1 strugg1e which the co1d war had produced. Reporting for

the Party to the Nineteenth Congress Malenkov stated, '~e have no in

tention of forcing our ideo10gy or our economic system upon anybody.,,79

Sta1in had gone ever farther in setting the 1imits of Soviet po1icy vis-

à-vis the West when he exp1icitly characterized the peace movement, in

which communists p1ayed the 1eading part, as waging a mass strugg1e

that did not aim at overthrowing capita1ism and estab1ishing socia1ism,

but 1imited itse1f to the (bourgeois) democratic aim of preserving

peace. 80

In fact, as ear1y as 1948-1949 the intransigent communist stra-

tegy in the West was petering out and was being rep1aced by a new "united

front" po1icy. 81 Thi s was the essence 0 f t h e d emocra tic s t rugg 1 e, b ase d 82 not upon pro1etarian c1ass interests but upon the mass desire for peace.

77 Pravda, Oct. 5, 1952, CDSP, IV, 38, pp. 9-10. 78 Edward Crankshaw, Russia Without Sta1in: The Emerging Pattern (London: Michael Joseph, 1956), 134.

79pravda, Oct. 6, 1952, CDSP, IV, 38, p. 34. 80 Sta1in,. "Economic Proh1ems. of SQci.a1is.m in the U.S.S.R •. ," CDSP, 8. 81 Marcuse, 57.

~2"In this struggle for victory over imperia1ism, the C.P.'s are raising to po1itica1 1ife the broad masses, not on1y of pro1etarians, but of semi-pro1etarians, the masses of the peasants and other strata of the petty bourgeoisie." (~. Ponamarev,. "On the Thirtieth Anniversary of V. 1. Lenin' s Work, 'Left-Wing Communism; An Infantile Disorder '.," CDSP, II, 17, p. 39.) 51

The struggle against imperialism, that is, the campaign against America's militarization of international relations, was not to be mistaken for

the preparation of revolution. By 1952 it would seem that the Russians were beginning to enunciate an important aspect of coexistence -- communist adherence to bourgeois political principles in the West, in ex-

change for an international truce.

It is likely, however, that Stalin never made a final decision

on either view, which would account for the "peculiar indecisiveness

and lack of direction" which characterized Soviet diplomacy at this

time. Even when geared to a peace policy, this diplomacy could not

dispel its iron curtain nature. In Korea, the Russians successfully

initiated the armistice talks, but allowed a hitch concerning the last

point on the agenda to keep the talks dragging on endlessly, "The con-

ciliators in the Kremlin saw the stage set for an armistice; and their 83 opponents were satisfied that a cease-fire would not be sounded." It

would be left for the Malenkov government to achieve the predominance

of one tendency over the other.

83Isaac Deutscher, Russia After Stalin (London: Jonathan Cape, 1953), 146. CHAPTER II

A. The Peace Party Comes to Power

International Life gave the aim of Soviet foreign po1icy as being the creation of conditions favourab1e to the deve10pment of com 1 munism in the Soviet Union. The Malenkov part in that deve10pment was a po1icy of reform which aimed at eradicating the po1itica1 and economic

1iabi1ities of Sta1inism. The easing of international tension was an essentia1 condition for the suc cess of this domestic reform. 2 P1anned de-Sta1inization added a sense of urgency to the pursuit of foreign po1icy goals; and these goals, insofar as they pertained to the co1d war, remained more or 1ess constant after Sta1in died. The victory, represented by Ma1enkov's resignation, of one set of economic and po-

1itica1 ideas over another was not matched by a corresponding change in international out1ook. This was simp1y because the necessities of the wor1d situation created a more or 1ess common view among Soviet leaders, cutting through the factiona1ism on interna1 issues. Despite important disagreements, the consensus supported an active po1icy of peace. The events which put the reform party into power assured a more or 1ess consistent foreign po1icy from the very start. Thus was begun

in 1953 a genuine1y new period most accurate1y characterized as the

1 International LUe (no. 4, 1957), cited in Wolfgang Leonhard, The Kremlin Since Sta1in (New Yo.rk: praeger, 1962), 2. .

2 Deutscher, RùssiaAfter Sta1in, 146.

52 53

search for detente. This was not to be a passive policy. Released by his death from the rigidity, contradictions and personal involvement which had hampered Stalin's foreign relations, his successors were able

to stabilize and invigorate Soviet diplomacy. As the calculated attempt

to dismantle the physical and psychological apparatus of the cold war,

the struggle for detente could only contain a dynamism that would pro-

foundly affect the diplomatic configuration of the world.

Previous to the death of Stalin, it had not yet been decided

whether a detente with capitalism was possible. Even as Russia probed

warily the possibilities of easing the cold war, the Russian home front

was confronted by the spectre of a new purge called forth to uproot an

enemy which, in the symbolism of the doctors plot, conspired against the

very core of Soviet life. The watchword was vigilance. 3 ls it any

wonder, therefore, that an international relaxation was difficult to

achieve when diametrically opposite opinions concerning the dangers of

capitalism seemed to govern respectively the integrated spheres of

foreign and domestic policy.

This contradiction was considerably eased by the events which

followed Stalin's death. At that time, the Malenkov faction which had

secured powerbegan to consolidatp. its position through a series of far

reaching reforms. Establishing collectivity as the guiding principle of

3"Certain propagandists have engaged in an academic dispute over whether capitalist encirclement of the Soviet Union continues to exist or has faded into the pasto Dogmatists and doctrinaire people have been found who have begun to as sert that once the People's democracies friendly to us appeared on our Western and Eastern t'rontiers the ques tion of capitalist encirclement was removed. Certain would-be theore· ticians have even gone so far.as to say that since the powerful camp of socialism has been formed, imperialism has ceasedto be a danger to us. Such discourses are anti-Marxist and harmful." cPravda, Feb. 6, 1953. Cited in Garthoff, 71.) . 54 government, Russia's new leaders e1iminated the one man dictatorship over the party and set about reducing the machinery which had supported it. The reforms inc1uded a retraction in the Kremlin doc tors case and a genera1 amnesty. The 1ast, especia11y, was high1y significant being sure to disgrace Sta1in and the po1itica1 police. Important police of ficia1s were executed for abusing their powers. In these ways, insofar as the police constituted the vital instrument of the discip1ine-under siege of Soviet society, Ma1enkov's government indicated that the danger had eased. Now there was nothing in the Soviet domestic situation which wou1d impede the smooth application of the po1icy of detente.

Yet, for the transformation to a c1ear1y adopted po1icy of con ciliation such as took place after 1953, significant changes must have

occurred in the international situation as a who1e. The essentia1 fact

of the co1d war, the preponderance of American'power, did not change.

Nor did the international c1ass strugg1e abate with Sta1in's death.

Far from it. Ma1enkov's period saw the success of German rearmament,

the beginnings of American intervention in Southeast Asia, a p1ethora

of containment oriented alliances, the po1icy of massive reta1iation -

in short, John Foster Dulles and Repub1ican foreign po1icy. But within

the broad scheme of Western anti-communism, Russia's relative position

vis-à-vis America was a1tered enough to give the peace po1icy its first

rea1 chance of success.

The death of Sta1in came 1ike a violent shock to the structure

of the Soviet Union. Malenkov cou1d on1y have been impressed and en

couraged by the fact that the panic and unrest which many undoubted1y

feared wou1d fo11ow had not occurred. The stabi1ity of Soviet socia1ist

society had been demonstrated. The successfu1 first stage of postwar 55 reconstruction, Russia's remarkab1e recovery, provided the economic base. For a nation which from weakness acts imp1accab1e and withdrawn,

the emergence of a tendency to compromise shows a growing awareness of

its own strength. A1though this is one implication to be drawn from

the March '52 initiative concerning Germany, it was 1eft for the new

government to draw the proper conclusions from the fact of Soviet

strength.

Moreover, whi1e the Korean War i11uminated the dangers of iron

curtain dip1omacy, it a1so helped crysta11ize a new situation where a

po1icy of detente might prove to be effective. Three factors were in-

volved in this. The Chinese revo1ution, having independent1y broken

the isolation of Soviet Russia, fu1fi11ed itse1f when communist China

and Korea absorbed the brunt of capita1ist encirc1ement and its mi1itary-

economic power. The co1d war had begun to shift its emphasis away from

Europe to the new area of capita1ist instabi1ity in the underdeve10ped

wor1d and particu1ar1y Asia; a process which eased Western pressure up-

on the Soviet Union in the long run, giving the Russians greater room

to maneuver.

Second1y, the Korean War and German rearmament which grew out

of it bared serious rifts in the Western a11iance.4 These were as yet

mere1y cracks, but successfu1 European recovery and a conci1iatory

Russian 1ine were removing the interna1 and externa1 pressures that had

forged a Western mono1ith'. The historica1 contradictions resu1ting

4France, for examp1e, was. concerned not SQ much. with. a Russian threat as with the possibi1ity of a rearmed Germany breaking out of the proposed European Defense Community (EDC) at a time when Britain and the U.S. no longer had sufficient strellgtn on the continent ta deter it. ("The Eur~ean Defense Community: Prob1ems of Ratification," Wbr1d Today, X LAugust, 1954], 328.) --- 56

from a resurgent European capitalism confronted by aggressive American monopolies could now reassert themselves, and to detente diplomacy would

accrue the as yet unseen rewards of playing upon the awakening political

sensibilities of America's allies.

Lastly, during the Korean War a bloc of neutral states led by

India began to take an anti-imperialist stand on that issue. 5 This de-

velopment could not be ignored for it had the effect of independently

blurring the rigid bi-polar divisions of the early cold war period. It

complemented certain other aspects of a changing cold war: growing

restiveness in colonial and neo-colonial are as, the attraction of de-

veloping nations to the Soviet model of economic organization and the

shifting capitalist focus onto the third world.

In Europe, greater stability on both sides of the iron curtain

enhanced the possibility of detente. But divergent tendencies prevailed

on either side of the iron curtain. In Russia the new leaders showed

signs of a desire to break away from the chain of commitments that char ac-

terized much of Stalin's diplomacy. Their policy may be characterized

as a retreat, executed to consolidate Russia's position by bringing

about an end to the cold war. 6 This was, therefore, an ideal moment to

negotiate with the Russians. Yet under Dulles' leadership in foreign

policy, America resisted the loosening of the cold war and, construing

compromise as wavering, felt the moment had come for the great roll-back

5When the Korean.War broke out Nehru offered his good offices for a settlement and supported China's ri,ght to a seat in the U.N. Stalin sent a "prompt and encour.aging, reP1Y.[" ., ("Indian Stateamanship and Communist Opportunism," Wbrld Today, XI Mar ch., 1955], 110.) 6 Barrington ·Moore, Jr., Terror ·and Prof'iress U.S.S.R.: Some Sources of Change and Stabilityinthe Soviet Dictatorship (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), 5. 57 before Russia had power to neutra1ize this effort.7 The opposition

thus encountered to the creation of a detente, at a moment when a de-

tente was first being proferred in earnest, made these years a critica1

point in the deve10pment of the idea of coexistence.

B. The Peace Po1icy Initiated

Pro10nged coexistence demanded the reintroduction of stabi1ity

and norma1cy into international affairs. The co1d war had stopped

a1most a11 communication between East and West. Not since 1949 had

the four powers met, and Sta1in's successors were faced with the particu-

1ar1y difficu1t task of having to re-estab1ish the very princip1e of

international negotiation. The co1d war having out1ived its usefu1ness,

Russia's new leaders wou1d be flexible in their search for an East-West

accommodation. But coexistence first demanded that ideo1ogy cease to

be the determinant factor in shaping foreign relations. The end of

Sta1in, as the end of the war, seems to have created a favourab1e op-

portunity for the great powers to sett1e differences between them.

With a11 the energy of a new idea wanting to prove itse1f, the

peace party moved decisive1y for a quick sett1ement. Sta1in's funera1

provided an easy forum for airing the new po1icy. Of the eu10gies de-

1ivered by the Soviet leaders it cou1d justifiab1y be said that the y

came to bury Sta1in not to praise him. The haste with which a new look

in foreign po1icy was enunciated served to under1ine Soviet eagerness

for a sett1ement; and the great attention paid to the funera1 throughout . 8 thewor1d made each. speech a significant document. Malenkov, in par-

7 Lukacs, 107-108. 8 An important 1ead editoria1, "On President Eisenhower's Speech," Pravda, April 25, 1953, stated: "The speeches of Comrades G. N. Malenkov, L. P. Beria, and V. M. Molotov on March 9, 1953, express the inflexible will of the Soviet oeoo1e to strengthen universa1 peace." (CDSP, V, 14, p. 5.) 58 ticu1ar, probed toward the idea of detente. He stated that "the most correct, essentia1 and just foreign po1icy is the po1icy of peace among a11 peop1es, founded on mutua1 trust, an effective po1icy resting on the facts and confirmed by the facts.,,9 This was an imp1icit denunciation of the ideo1ogica1 framework in which co1d war questions were t~en posed. Ma1enkov's party understood the two way nature of detente. At

1east one observer has since noted the constraints which, by this po1icy, the Soviets put upon themse1ves. 10 "Facts" constitute a two edged sword p1acing the burden of compromise ~qua11y on both sides. The essence of detente was that the a1ignment of forces dictated the necessity of peace, confirmed by actions and organized in a business-1ike manner.

The style of Soviet dip10macy changed immediate1y. It initiated those gestures of conciliation which signa11ed a new approach: dea1ing in a friend1y spirit with incidents in the air corridor to Berlin, agreeing to the compromise e1ection of Hammerskjo1d as Secretary General to the U.N., making its dip10mats more open and accessible. The official 1ine brimmed with confidence concerning the possibi1ity of peace.

Then, 1ess than a month after Sta1in died, Molotov made an official statement on Korea concerning the dead10ck that existed over the 1ast

question preventing an armistice. This was the first rea1 application

of the new look in foreign po1icy. He emphasized: "The Soviet govern-

ment a1so expresses confidence that the propos al will be correct1y 11 understood by the government of the United States.". The proposa1 of

whichhe spoke had been made by the communi.st si.de in Korea a few da~s

9pravda, Mar ch. 10, 1953, CDS~, V, 7, p. 9.

10Deutscher, Russia After Sta1in, 141-143. 11 Pravda, April 2, 1953, CDSP, V, 10, p. 12. 59 previous, at which time they abandoned the demand for unconditional re- patriation of aIl prisoners which had held up the armistice on that last point. Molotov was emphasizing the fact that a Korean truce could no longer be delayed. Yet there lvas much more for the West to correctly understand. Molotov's statement was undeniable indication that the peace party had emerged victorious; that the kind of reasoning which had pointed to settlement in Korea was now the basis of Soviet policy in general.

The Soviets viewed a Korean truce as the first step in a long term process 0 f establ 1S' h'1ng coex1stence.. 12 The Soviet Union had reached such a level of strength as to make America's ultimate cold war aim of rolling back communism unfeasible. Was it not to be expected, therefore,

that American leaders would come to recognize the compelling nature of detente? If the communists had allowed a minor issue to delay the Korean

cease fire the same could be said of the U.S. The cold war could be

ended only in conjunction with the West and, significantly, it was in

conjunction with a new administration in Washington that an end was

being put to the Korean War. This diplomatic success could be laid at

the feet of the peace policy.

On April 16, 1953, President Eisenhower delivered a major foreign

policy speech which the Russians justifiably claimed was a reaction to

communist initiatives.13 To be sure, it was not a completely satisfactory

12 Andrei Vyshinski said before the U. N. General As,semblr: "There can be no doubt that the outbreak of war in Korea increased the threat of a world Wax. There is also no doubt that an unconditional termination of the war in Korea will lessen such, a threat and cannot but facilitate settlement of 'a number of other important problems which. to date remain unsolved and which are complicating international relations and impeding the strengthening ,of peace and international security." , (pravda, April Il, 1953, CDSP, V, 15, p. 10.)

l3"On President Eisenhower's Speech," CDSP, 5. 60 reaction in one important sense. The Eisenhower administration was under pressure in the United States to engage in no dip10macy with Rus- sia unti1 that nation agreed to re1inquish her control over European peop1es. 14 In his speech, President Eisenhower recognized that recent

Soviet gestures indicated a desire for peace, but he demanded "deeds" to prove Russian sincerity, the first step being peace in Korea, th en peace in a11 Asia and freedom in Eastern Europe. 15 In this manner the

United States de1ayed serious dip10macy by setting pre1iminary conditions for negotiations.

Despite the shortcomings of Eisenhower's statement, and despite the fact that Dulles pub1ica11y interpreted his president's words in a 16 harsh co1d war manner short1y thereafter, the Russians accepted the

speech, though critica11y, as a step in the direction of norma1ization

and detente. Accompanying its answer, Pravda printed the text of Eisen-

hower's speech as a gesture of goodwi11 and a symbo1 of confidence.

Confidence in the effectiveness of their foreign po1icy and the prospects

of an international sett1ement, strengthened by an unexpected and warm

response from Churchill in May, was a singu1ar feature of the first

three and a ha1f months of the new collective. In contrast, American

leaders were working under different assumptions which pointed to the

intensification of the co1d war. This contrast was a significant fea-

ture of the Malenkov periode

If the Soviet Union sought peace in Korea as. the beginning of a

wor1dwide sett1ement, to America a Korean armistice mere1y ended a divisive

14 Graeb ner, Current Hîstbry,. 11. 15 ...... New York Times, April 17, 1953, p. 4. 16 .. .. . See the New York Times, April 19,1953, pp. 84-85. 61 and hope1ess conf1ict. This conclusion fo110ws from the fact that

American co1d war po1icy was at that time hardening and becoming steadi1y more determined to alter those historica1 rea1ities which Malenkov considered as pointing ine1uctab1y towards a detente. A1though there were no obvious means short of war by which a Soviet withdrawa1 from Europe

cou1d be achieved, the Repub1ican campa:J.gn ca11ed for a repudiation of 17 Yalta an.d the 1iberation of European peop1es from Soviet aggression.

One p1ank in the victorious p1atform (written by Dulles) read: Il Con-

tainment is defensive, negative, futile and immoral in abandoning

count1ess human beings to a despotism and God1ess terrorism."18 Nor

cou1d such statements be shrugged off as pure1y making po1itica1 mi1eage

from the issue of communism because, throughout this period, there was

noticeab1e pressure from inf1uentia1 groups in Washington which fa-

voured a preventive war. 19

Eisenhower was e1ected president in the fa11 of 1952. Evident1y,

the idea of detente was conceived with full know1edge of the Repub1ican

foreign po1icy and was, in fact, Russia's response to it. It is this

reaction, taken so decisive1y despite the dangers of the Repub1ican vic-

tory, which immediate1y sets off Ma1enkov's period from what came before.

The peace party's answer to rising international tension was the decision

to risk the first steps in what wou1d hopefu11y become a mutua1 retreat

from rigid co1d war positions.

17 . Graebner, Current History, 11. 18 La~eber, 135-136 •

. 1~Michae1 T. F10rinsky,. "United· States - Soviet Relations," Current History, XXVrIT (January, 1955), 16. 62

C. East German Debacle

AlI hopes of successfully ending the cold war hinged around the possibility of a viable solution to the German question. In the early

cold war, the Western failure ta offer Russia the guarantee of a German

disarmament and security treaty fixed the division of Europe, for with-

out such a guarantee it was not possible to reopen for review the war- 20 time Anglo-Russian political and boundary settlements. By the time of

Malenkov's ascendance Soviet concern had ceased to be for the prevention

of German revival. It became necessary to prevent the absorbtion of

Germany, already revived under the impetus of the Marshall Plan and

containment in general, into the Western military system. German re-

armament, particularly in the cold war structure of the EDC, constituted

a direct challenge to the Soviet Union's satellite structure and, ipso

facto, to the Soviet Union itself.2l The EDC, no matter how much the

treaty emphasized defense, represented a grave threat to a Russia in

possession of East Germany and aIl of East Prussia. 22

It is true that where once German power alone had posed the

greatest danger to Soviet security, nuclear technology and Soviet eco-

nomic growth had finalized the shift toward clear Russian superiority

that had been taking place since Soviet industrialization. But Nato

strategy rested upon the hope that any war would be contained east of

20 Gardener, Architects of Illusion, 317-318.

2l"To the West Germans the EDC means primari,ly th.e creation of a position of strength which.will sooner or later ind~ce the Russians to return Ea.st Germa.ny to its 'rightful owners' and w:tthdraw to Slavic regions. n. CFrederick H. Hartmann, "Soviet Russia and the German Problem," Yale Rev iew , XLI!I June, 1954 , 5l9.}

22 Ibid., 520. 63 the Elbe. For this a large conventiona1 force wou1d be needed. In the context of the cold war, therefore, German rearmament was an attempt to neutra1ize Soviet superiority in conventiona1 arms and lend a perhaps decisive edge to Arnerican nuc1ear power. 23 "It is Arnerican mi1itary power, its bases built up around the Soviet bloc, and its presence in

Europe that give rise to genuine fear in Moscow.,,24 Malenkov recognized that a de tente dernanded mi1itary disengagement in Europe. In

Korea disengagement wou1d be effected by a truce. In Germany this meant unification and withdrawa1.

This is hm., the Soviets ana1ysed the situation. "The issue in- vo1ved is to conclude a peace treaty with Germany as rapid1y as pos- sib1e, enab1ing the German people to reunite into a single state and to take their proper place in the cornrnunity of peace-1oving nations, and then to withdraw the occupation forces from Gerrnany.,,25 A1though the Russians official1y rejected American demands for Soviet concessions before negotiations, }~lenkov's first po1icies seem to have tacitly ac-

cepted this demande The dead10ck in Korea had been broken by communist

concessions and the truce was pursued despite Syngman Rhee's provoca- 26 tions. Bolstered by the progress being made in Korea, the peace party

began to explore the 1ines of retreat in Germany. The mi1itary gover-

nor, Chiukov, was reca11ed and the iron curtain between East and West

23 LaFeber, 124-125. Horowitz, From Yalta to Vietnam, 262-264. 24 Isaac Deutscher, Russia, China, and the West, 1953-1966, ed. Fred Ha1liday (Penguin, 1970), 15.

25"On President Eisenhower's Speech," CDSP, 5.

260n June 18, 1953, Rhee averted an imminent signing of the truce when he released 25,000 anti-Red prisoners. (Fleming, II, 647-648.) 64

Germany nearly abolished. Labour policy was reversed; the Evangelical

Chur ch regained its former privileges; collectivization was stopped and farmers invited back to take possession of their property; and private capital was invited to return to industry and trade. These events de veloped in a consistent and apparently frictionless manner. 27 Seen in conjunction with overall European pOlicy,28 it is clear that the peace party was at that time in full control and boldly striking out toward detente.

It soon began to appear as if the German communist regime had 29 already been half dismantled. From the Russian point of view, these moves in Germany made no sense except as part of a policy calculated to bring about the unification of Germany and the withdrawal of occupation armies. There was little doubt that Moscow was ready to abandon the

Pieck-Ulbricht government as Soviet representatives negotiated frankly with non-communists about a change in regime. In this manner the Soviet

Union induced the Berlin rioting, which was an attempt to remove at

once the puppets Russia seemed willing to abandon. 30

The Berlin riots of June 16-17 were disastrous for the Soviet

Union. Washington addressed a calI to revoIt to Eastern Europe, thus

responding to Moscow's appeasement with war-like noises. The Berlin

revoIt was followed by serious disturbances in Czechoslovakia and

27 Isaac Deutscher, "The Beria Affair," International Journal, VIII (no. 4, 1953), 227-229. 28 On June 10, Russia established diplomatic relations with Aus- tria and ended the occupation regime. On the same day she renounced ~he claims on Turkey which had played such an important role in opening the cold war. 29 Fritz Shenk and Richard Lowenthal, "Khrushchev's Changing Empire: l-How Malenkov was Undermined," The Observer, Nov. 9, 1958, p. 6.

30Deutscher, International Journal, 229. 65

Hungary. It seemed as if this attempted retreat might become a rout

throughout the Soviet bloc. The June riots were a serious defeat for

the group which advocated appeasement as that po1icy seemed to crumb1e

before the comp1ementary pressures of Western anti-communism and East

European instabi1ity.

D. Retrenchment and Reform

Beria's fa11 marked the end of a distinct phase in the deve1op-

ment of Russian foreign po1icy after Sta1in. Whatever interna1 consi-

derations produced a new coalition between Malenkov and Khrushchev, the

demise of Beria was a1so associated with the fai1ure in Germany. 31 The

Soviets had been overhasty in showing readiness to make far-reaching

concessions. These were merely interpreted in the West as weakness.

This policy in Germany had been premature and had nearly brought about

the collapse of the communist regime there. Such risks were justifiable

in the context of an overall settlement, only after the West had agreed

to the withdrawa1 of occupation armies and an end to the arms race. The

continuation of a tough policy in the West strengthened those groups

in Russia happy to see conciliation fail. As well, the men of the

"centre", those who had backed Malenkov's new policy, must have become

convinced that a change in tactics was called for, even as they continued . 32 to support peace f u 1 coex~stence.

The cry against appeasement which arose after the Berlin riots

did not stem the tide of domestic reforme Perhaps, in this case, the

German debacle pointed to a different lesson. If events in Germany

31 Leonhard, 72, 75.

32Deutscher, International Journal, 232-233. 66 strengthened conservative e1ements they a1so demonstrated that a danger point had been reached and hastened the imp1ementation of p1anned economic reform within the Soviet Union itse1f. 33 On August 8, 1953, the Consumer Goods Programme -- the New Look -- was announced, which dispensed immediate relief for the population whose standard of living had been depressed to accomp1ish rapid industria1ization. The New Look was a p1anned move away from dogmatic concentration on raw materia1 production to great1y increased investments in consumer industry.34

Thus, the "si1ent de-Sta1inization" which had been imp1emented since

Sta1in's death, in bureaucratic fashion without any ideo1ogica1 pro nouncement, was extended to the economic sector. 35

The New Look within the Soviet Union ensured the continuation of Russia's de tente dip10macy despite important fai1ures, and despite

Western resistance to an easing international situation. To carry out promises for a significant increase in consumer goods which Malenkov made on August 8, Soviet leaders required a reduction in international

tension. 36 Soviet reforms constituted an ambitious and far-reaching

33 Shenk and Lowentha1, The Observer, November 9, 1958, p. 6. 34 See Ma1enkov's speech to the Supreme Soviet, August 8, 1953, "On Immediate Tasks in the Sphere of Industry and Agriculture and on Measures for further Improvement of the We11-Being of the People." (CDSP, V, 30, pp. 3-8). See a1so the relevant reso1utions of the Counci1 of Ministers and the Central Committee: Khrushchev's report on agriculture in Pravda, Sept. 13,1953 (CDSP, V, 37, pp. 3-8; V, 38, pp. 3-6; V,.39, pp. 8-10); the reso1ution on de1iveries and private holding in Pravda, Sept. 26, 1953 (CDSP, V, 39, pp. 13-24, 41-42); the reso1ution on interna1 trade in Pra~ Oct. 23, 1953 (CDSP, V, 39, pp. 3-7,42). 35 Plans throughout the bloc were great1y in excess of avai1ab1e resources, for the success of ear1y reconstruction had caused the crea tion of targets that cou1d not be met. The decision to reverse gear was probab1y made as ear1y as April, 1953. (Shenk and Lowentha1, The Observer, Nov. 9, 1958, p. 6.) 36 Barrington Moore Jr., Terror and Progress U.S.S.R., 37-38. 67 programme. Expenditures in unproductive areas such as armaments had been swo11en by the co1d war. In fact, it had been one of the signal successes of containment to force Russia into a drastic remi1itarization, impeding industria1ization and reconstruction and thus weakening the

Soviet system as a who1e. Considering the demands of consumer produc tion and the 1imited resources avai1ab1e it became necessary to be re-

1eased from this burden. And it was equa11y necessary, for the success

fu1 imp1ementation of reform, for calm to be restored, which meant re

leasing the nation from the nightmares of interna1 and externa1 terror.

As we11, the need for goods immediate1y to fi11 demand, and the need for

markets and techno10gy to take up the deficiencies in the economic plan,

fostered a trade po1icy aimed at the restoration of normal economic re

lations, which was impossible without the restoration of norma1cy in

international relations in genera1. In such a manner did domestic pri

orities define the direction of foreign po1icy.

Even in Germany, so quick1y crad1ed back within the Soviet orbit,

the reaction to revo1t was not a return to Sta1inism. The theme of

dea1ing with Germany was one of reconci1iation; improved po1itica1 work,

improved living standards, a 1essening accent on co11ectivization, in

centives for private initiatives and consumer goods. 37 At the same time,

however, the New Look in the GDR made the prospects of reunification that

much more unattainab1e. Germany had been ruth1ess1y pi11aged through

reparations and, its future being uncertain, nothing much was done to

deve10p the country. But as long as East Germany was a member of the

socia1ist camp it wou1d have to be stabi1ized. In a protoco1 signed in

37 Pravda, June 23, 1953, CDSP, V, 22, pp. 8, 45. 68 la te August 1953, large scale aid was dispensed mainly by freeing Ger- man revenue for development and of course the New Look. The GDR as a state could not help but be strengthened by it.

E. Detente Diplomacy and Allying for Peace

The Malenkov-Krushchev coalition (which la ter events showed

to be a compromise) that ernerged out of the June crisis produced a con-

siderably more cautious approach to foreign affairs; but it did not

change the long range Soviet objective of establishing peaceful coexis-

tence. That the failure to deal away East Germany in exchange for a de-

tente did not reverse the direction of Soviet foreign policy is tribute

to the flexibility and ingenuity of Sta1in's successors. As the peace

policy took shape, one cou1d distinguish in it two basic e1ements. The

first was to reach sorne kind of accommodation with the United States.

The Soviets had tried to accomp1ish this by withdrawa1, but fai1ed.

The second, however, was to counter American demands for a sett1ement

invo1ving Soviet capitulation by forming an anti-war group far broader

than the communist powers themse1ves. 38 The Soviet periodization of the

co1d war which we noted above analyses the post-Sta1in era on this basis,

as "the strugg1e of the Socialist camp, 1ed by the U.S.S.R., and other

peace-1oving peop1es for a detente, peacefu1 coexistence, and the co

operation of states with different systems, for friendship among peop1es. 39

38Rudo1f Schlesinger, "From the XIX to the XX Party Congress," Soviet Studies, VIII (July, 1956), 12. 39 Ivashin, above p. 25. 69

Before Sta1in's death it had not yet been decided what the So viet Union's foreign ro1e cou1d be. 40 If war between socia1ism and ca- pita1ism were inevitab1e, Russia's task was a straight revo1utionary strugg1e. If not, the Soviets might we11 decide to seek capita1ist allies and encourage popu1ar front tactics. In the Economic Prob1ems

Sta1in made a cautious appea1 for the latter but, in theorizing the in- evitabi1ity of war among capita1ists, he suggested the inevitab1e break- down of the Atlantic alliance under its own impetus. In either extreme,

Western disintegration or revo1utionary war, there was no scope for the positive participation of Soviet dip10macy. The peace po1icy, as it evo1ved after Sta1in, reso1ved this question in recognizing the necessity of Soviet participation to prevent or de1ay the bui1dup of anti- communist mi1itary power.

The Malenkov period revived an old tactic, and combined the

forces of socia1ism and patriotism by building pro1etarian support for

national bourgeoisies against U.S. imperia1ism. 41 The emergence of

competing centres of capita1ism had a1ready started to weaken the Western

mono1ith. Now, the Soviet peace initiative and relative c1ass peace

which came in its wake began to remove the pressure which he1d the Western 42 alliance together despite strong centrifuga1 forces. Important con-

40Isaac Deutscher, "The Nineteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," International Affairs (London), XXIX (April, 1953), 155.

41"Defense of national sovereignty and the strugg1e against the threat of foreign ens1avement have become vita11y important for the working c1ass and the working people of a11 countries in the present epoch." (Kommunist (June, 1953], CDSP, V, 28, p. 4.)

42"Even the first indications that Moscow was slackening the co1d war made a considerable impression both in Eng1and andin France." (Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "The Grand Alliance Hesitates," Foreign Affairs, XXXII (October, 1953], 53.) 70 flicts became apparent in the aims and attitudes of the main Western powers, caused in part by the attempt to rearm Germany, but not by that alone. In addition to a widespread desire for full exploration of the possibility of securing a negotiated settlement of the cold war, there was open divergence from the adamant American attitude toward China. 43

The latter was particularly true of Great Britain. One of the first successes registered by Malenkov's diplomacy was in May, 1953, when no less a figure than Winston Churchill appealed for cold war reconciliation.44

As Churchill's gesture showed, within a short space of time since the beginning of the cold war -- a significant element within the

Western leadership began turning away from the rigours of the interna-

tional class struggle. Soviet attempts to exploit this were more than

opportunism. From the Russian point of view, rigid American treaty

systems had caused the abnormal international situation. Greater inde-

pendence from American control for countries of the West might be de-

cisive in easing relations between the camps, in winding dOl~ the cold

war. To this end, Russia appealed to the national consciousness of each

state involved, stressing aIl the time the illusory nature of "the com-

munist threat." France, divided over Germany, embroiled in Indochina,

and politically unstable, was particularly vulnerable to this approach

which strengthened elements within that country opposed to the cold war.

The Soviets could justly point to American pressure and the fact that

Germany was taking France's place in Europe, knowing the national intro-

43Rupert Emerson, "Indo China,1I Yale Review, XLIV (September, 1954), 61.

44Unlike the Americans, Churchill did not posit peace as a Western victory, and this attitude was warmly received in Russia. See "On the Present International Situation," Pravda, May 24, 1953, CDSP, V, 18, pp. 8-11. 71 spection this might trigger. 45 National communist parties organized themse1ves over these issues in conjunction with Soviet foreign po1icy aims.

The dip10macy of peacefu1 coexistence, effective in Europe, fu1- fi11ed itse1f most comp1ete1y in the underdeve10ped wor1d. There, where the Korean War saw the rise of neutra1ism as a po1itica1 force, the

Soviet Union was able to use its anti-imperia1ist and anti-co1onia1ist history to great effect. No nation, the Americans had argued at the start of the co1d war, cou1d remain tru1y neutra1. 46 Likewise, in their iron curtain conception of co1d war rea1ities, the Soviets viewed senti- ments of neutra1ism with extreme suspicion. But the peace po1icy, more c1ear1y than anything before, ca11ed for an end to the "old 1ine . of setting states against one another on the basis of ideo1ogy and socio po1itica1 system.,,47 Where once it had been a denia1 of progress to

take a neutra1 stand in the c1ass strugg1e, Sta1in's successors ac-

cepted and fostered neutra1ism in furtherance of a broad anti-war group

to inc1ude important third wor1d participation. At a time when the 1ines

of American foreign po1icy hardened the Russians were out to win the minds

and markets of the uncommitted.48 These new1y independent states were

understandab1y anti-Western. Moreover, the turn away from mi1itancy

45 For examp1es of such dip10macy see G. Rassadin, "What Session of Council of North Atlantic Alliance Showed," Pravda, April 28, 1953, CDSP, V, 17, pp. 21-23; and Yu. Pavlov, "After Washington Ta1ks," PraVda, April 26, 1953, CDSP, V, 17, pp. 23-24. 46 LaFeber, 57.

47"On the Present International Situation," CDSP, 11.

48The divergent directions of American and Soviet po1icy in this regard are treated in Lukacs, 98-117 and Robert D. Warth, Soviet Russia in Wor1d Po1itics (New York: Twayne, 1963), 420-421. 72 opened up new vis tas of activity to the Soviet Union at the same time as a number of emerging nations were turning to the Russian experience 49 as a mode1 of social deve1opment.

For a11 these various reasons the thaw progressed despite Ameri- can foot dragging and the fai1ure to achieve a German solution. A Korean truce was signed on Ju1y 27, 1953. In the same month relations were re- sumed with Israel. The Soviet Union exchanged ambassadors with Greece and estab1ished a detente with Yugos1avia. Fina11y, one witnessed a qualitative improvement in the size and nature of Soviet trade.

In regards to trade, Malenkov had condemned the co1d war because

it rep1aced normal relations with an artificia1 situation -- the disrup

tion of international economic ties.50 Specifica11y, Western co1d war

embargoes made it impossible to fi11 gaps in the economy through trade,

as Soviet imports of machinery dropped by over two thirds from 1947 to 51 1950. In Ju1y, 1951 (concurrent with Jacob Ma1ik's important radio

address on the Korean question the month previous), the U.S.S.R. 1aunched

a trade drive aimed at procuring the who1e range of capital goods for-

mer1y imported from the West. But Sta1in's trade offensive had 1itt1e

resu1ts, and it was on1y after his death that Soviet negotiators were 52 able to produce a number of important bi1atera1 trade agreements. The

49"The impressive growth of the Soviet economy has had a notice able impact on the underdeve10ped countries, some of which consider the Soviet rise to power as a mode1." (Robert F. Byrnes, "Soviet Po1icy to ward Western Europe Since 8ta1in," The Auna1s of the American Academ of Po1itica1 and Social Science, CCCIII [January, 1956 , 1967.)

50 Ma1enkov's August 8 speech to the Supreme Soviet, CDSP, 10. 51 Leon M. Herman, "The New Soviet Posture in Wor1d Trade," Prob- lems of Communism, III (November-December, 1954), 11. 52 "By a11 odds, the crop of inter-governmenta1 agreements con- c1uded after the Geneva meeting [April, 1953J represented the first prac tica1 resu1ts of the Soviet trade offensive which had been underway since Ju1y 1951." (Herman, Prob1ems of Communism, 13.) 73

Consumer Goods Programme created special demands for trade as, for examp1e, the Soviet Union became oneof the wor1d's 1argest importers of butter.

With the advent of Ma1enkov's New Look Soviet imports in genera1 regis tered a striking increase.53 And in terms of co1d war ideo1ogy it is significant that the peace po1icy rejected Sta1in's approva1 of the wor1d 54 separation into capita1ist and socia1ist markets, and ca11ed for "ex- pans ion of economic cooperation and normal trade relations with a11 55 countries, for restoration of a single international market."

In terms of co1d war ideo1ogy, however, the most significant manifestations of the peace po1icy concerned relations with India and

Yugos1avia. A1ready in April, 1953, the May Day slogans fai1ed to re- fer to the Yugos1av peop1e's strugg1e against Tito. On the 29th of that mon th Molotov received the Yugos1av chargé d'affaires in Moscow, after which a new Soviet chargé d'affairs was appointed to Belgrade. By

September, ambassadors had taken up their posts in the respective ca- pita1s. As for India, it took on1y six months for that country to be accorded special recognition as an important e1ement in the strugg1e for wor1d peace.56

"If interna1 conditions had not made the changed attitude to

Sta1in possible, the Soviet leaders wou1d not have been able to give way to Tito's demands and wou1d have had to treat their re1ationship

53 Oleg Hoeffding, "Recent Trends in Soviet Foreign Trade," The Auna1s of the American Academy of Po1itica1 and Social Science, CCCIII (January, 1~56), 76.

54Sta1in, "Economic Prob1ems of Socia1ism in the U.S.S.R.," CDSP, 7-8. 55 Kommunist (May, 1953), CDSP, V, 20, p. 4. 56 See Ma1enkov's August 8 speech before the Supreme Soviet, CDSP, 9-10. 74 with India as a mere liason of convenience.,,57 The reaction against

Stalin allowed his successors to go about building their anti-imperialist front with forces that had been outside the pale of orthodoxy in the preceeding period. Gandhi's politics had been condemned as recently as 1949.58 But in the case of Yugoslavia the contrast was more brutal for Tito was originally condemned for following a policy which Bukharin had died for advocating.

F. Towards an International Conference on Germany

The main drift of Soviet policy appeared to be toward a reduction of international tension to free the Soviets for concentration on urgent domestic problems. The peace policy was threatened by the fact that it might not succeed in inducing the U.S. to relax its pressure. The cru-

cial test was whether this policy could prevent the rearmement of Ger- 59 many. The conciliators believed that in a negotiated German settlement

lay the general European solution. Should disengagement fail, agreements

would have to be secured within the unpropitious framework of a parti-

tioned Germany. The peace policy in general was severely handicapped by

the continuation of the iron curtain status quo in Germany.

The cold war was an exercise in mutual exclusion. As evidence

of their desire to re-establish normal channels of communication, the

Soviets responded favourably to Churchill's proposaI to hold a conference

57Rudolf Schlesinger, "From the XIX to the XX Party Congress," Soviet Studies, 12.

58See "The Class Nature of the Gandhi Doctrine," Voprosy filosofii (June, 1949), CDSP, I, 37, pp. 3-7.

59Barrington Moore, Jr., The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 4. 75 as soon as that proposaI was made. 60 Part of the cause for the June failure in Germany could be traced to the fact that the Soviet measures had not been prepared in advance with United States participation but, as most else in the cold war, were taken unilaterally. In any case,

caution dictated that future concessions in Germany must be preceeded

by firm international agreements. Quite apart from any American reluc-

tance to negotiate, however, conservative arguments carried considerably

more weight among the Soviet leadership after June, 1953. The anti-

appeasers were especially influential in October and November when the

Soviet Union refused to go to a conference in Lugano although only the

spring of that year had seen the Russians in a mood of "eloquent

friendliness." 61

In the accommodation which the peace party sought with the United

States the central issue was security. Was it possible to combine the

security of Russia with that of Western Europe? Churchill thought it

was and the Soviets agreed. 62 As Malenkov appraised the international

situation, detente was necessary and unavoidable. He expressed this

view when he stated that the configuration of forces and firm resolve

of the democratic camp to defend its vital interests made coexistence

the dut y of aIl countries.63 But Soviet conservatism was strengthened

by the general drift of American policy. The United States continued

to expand its extraterritorial military structure. There were military

60 "On the Present International Situation," CDSP, 11.

61 Deutscher, Russia, China, and the West, 14.

62 "On the Present International Situation," CDSP, 8.

63In his August 8 speech to the Supreme Soviet, CDSP, 26. 76 agreements with Spain and Greece in the fa11 of '53, and a mutua1 security arrangement produced which kept U.S. forces in Korea. The Ameri- can campaign to secure ratification of the EDC by its European allies was intensified. Even as the groundwork for the eventua1 Berlin Con-

ference was being prepared, German remi1itarization continued, an ominous persistence of the "positions of strength" po1icy.

In these circumstances the peace faction encountered great dif-

ficu1ty in comp1eting arrangements for a conference with a suitab1e

agenda. Any four-power ta1ks had to be given the status of genuine 64 co1d war negotiations. In furtherance of a rea1 detente, the parti-

cipants had to agree to identify the German prob1em with the broader

prob1em of European security.65 From the Soviet point of view, the

security question hinged main1y on the issues of an incipient EDC and

the proliferation of American bases bordering on the socia1ist camp;

so it fo110wed that any German sett1ement had to dea1 with, for examp1e, 66 the liquidation of these bases. Moreover, it was necessary to prevent 67 the conference from being inva1idated by prior ratification of the EDC.

Origina11y the United States had proposed to ca11 a conference with the

1imited aim of organizing the e1ection of an a11-German government which

cou1d then participate in framing a German treaty. When, therefore, the

64Mo10tov said of the Berlin Conference that he wanted the meeting to be 1eft open to discuss any issue whose sett1ement wou1d faci1itate a detente. (Pravda, Nov. 15, 1953, CDSP, V, 46, p. 8.)

65Soviet November 3, 1953 note to Britain, France and the U.S.A., New York Times, Nov. 6, 1953, p. 6.

66Ibid• See a1so Voroshi10v's speech on the 36th anniversary of the Bo1shevik Revolution, New York Times, Nov. 27, 1953, p. 6.

67The Soviets made it c1ear that the West cou1d not simu1tane ous1y discuss Germany at a conference and a1so ratify the European Army Treaty. (Soviet Nov. 3, 1953 note.) 77 agenda of the Berlin Conference was finally set -- to examine the pos sibility of five-power talks to reduce tension (i.e. with China parti cipating), and to consider aIl aspects of the German question amongst

those four powers concerned -- this represented a victory for the Soviet peace line.

The effect of German remilitarization would be to cement the cold war status quo in Europe along the lines it had assumed during the most

bitter period of that struggle. After the setback in June, Russian dip

lomacy had spent the second half of 1953 preparing the groundwork for

another attempt at solving the German problem. This time, in the form

of a conference, they were going about it in a much more cautious and

less optimistic manner. Despite the importance of the Berlin talks,

which re-established the principle of East-West negotiation after a

tense five year delay, it is probable that the Soviet leaders did not

expect any real solution to come out of them. As long as America's

co Id war ideology was on the ascendance, as it most certainly was under

Dulles, Russia's willingness to compromise would not suffice. The

prospect of detente ran contrary to the needs and aspirations of the

American nation; and the campaign to ring the U.S.S.R. with steel,

spearheaded at this stage by German rearmament, was rooted in the logic

of containment and dreams of the great roll-back. This was the long

term significance of Russia's failure to secure a Ge1~an settlement in

the spring of Malenkov's office. CHAPTER III

A. The Geneva Conference: Background

Mere1y that the four powers met in the Berlin Conference was a

significant facto This was the first time they hàd met since before the

Korean War intensified the international c1ass strugg1e and revea1ed the

hope1essness of dogmatic co1d war foreign po1icy. Now again there were

high-1eve1 negotiations and the concept of the thaw was being popu1arized.

The Berlin Conference turned out to be on1y a 1imited success in the long

term process of easing the co1d war but a significant justification of

the new look in Soviet foreign po1icy. The peace po1icy had prevai1ed

over U.S. resistance -- the Berlin agreement to ca11 a conference in

Geneva with Chinese participation contradicted American efforts to keep

the Peop1e's Repub1ic from being recognized -- and over conservative e1e

ments within the Soviet Union as we11. Despite the fact that a credible

German solution was conspicuous by its absence from the final communiqué,

Malenkov was strengthened by the who1e affair. The Geneva decision, the

most important resu1t of these ta1ks at Berlin, was a rea1 feather in

his cap.

The Geneva Conference demonstrated the critica1 position Asia

had some to assume in the conf1ict between capita1ism and socia1ism.

First, a socia1ist revo1ution which the Soviets did not control had

achieved victory in China. Then the Korean War brought home the dangers

of capita1ist reaction anywhere, the true global focus of the co1d war.

By the time of Sta1in's death it was common1y understood that detente

78 79 between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. demanded the sett1ement of Asian questions between them. In April, 1953, the Soviets had ca11ed Eisenhower's fai-

1ure to mention China in a major peace appea1 "astounding."l And the

Russian attempt, throughout the maneuverings which preceeded the Berlin

Conference, to find sorne formula for inc1uding China in negotiations

(u1timate1y successfu1 with the decision for five-power ta1ks at Geneva) signified the new 1eadership's appreciation that, geography notwith standing, norma1ity cou1d not be restored in Europe if Asia were 1eft in turmoil.

Asia was precise1y in a state of revo1utionary turmoi1. Wor1d

War II had heightened the great popu1ar strugg1e against co10nia1ism and neo-co10nia1ism so characteristic of our times. A1though the dis-

solution of forma1 empires proceeded, the expansion of economic imperia-

1ism, 1inked especia11y with the American empire, brought the histori-

cal structures of c1ass strugg1e to the fore. "The major turn of events

in Indochina came as a reaction to the Communist take-over in China,

which in the course of 1949-1950, brought about a definitive sharpening

of international lines.,,2 Even before Korea the West ra11ied to support

France whi1e the communist bloc recognized the Vietminh. The United

States began increasing1y to meet the cost of the war which became a war

against communism rather than a colonial strugg1e. In France, Vietnam

became a national crisis verging on disaster. Whi1e to Russia, the Indo

china question gathered together sorne various strands which were the

fibre of their new po1icy.

l"On President Eisenhower's Speech," CDSP, 6. 2 Emerson, Yale Review, 56. 80

During the first months of Ma1enkov's chairmanship, when the peace po1icy was deve10ping in a11 directions, the Soviets had a1ready begun to address themse1ves to the issue of revo1ution in Southeast

Asia as one of the chief obstacles to a genera1 easing of international 3 relations. The eruption of national 1iberation movements in Southeast

Asia was being met by growing and determined reaction in the West. That

these movements had a va1idity and momentum of their own quite apart

from any support, moral or armed, which might accrue from communism in

state form, was never admitted by people 1ike Dulles. The new govern-

ment in Moscow was not mere1y afraid that America might construe Soviet

activity behind genuine revo1ution. In genera1, as long as the United

States refused to accept historica1 change in Asia and maintained the

ro1e of international gendarme, a rea1 peace -- a detente and relief of

tension was impossible to achieve.4

If the expansion of 1iberation strugg1e was preventing an East-

West accommodation, it is a1so true that the prob1em of Asian revo1ution

cou1d be overcome if Russia wou1d effective1y tone down such revo1ution.

The national 1iberation movements were not as independent as the Chinese

1iberation army had been. Herein 1ay a new potentia1 temptation to su-

bordinate revo1ution to the demands of Soviet foreign po1icy. This pos-

3From the editoria1 "On President Eisenhower's Speech" (CDSP, 6): "It is difficu1t to expect a correct understanding of international prob lems whi1e the national 1iberation movement is viewed as resu1ting from the inspiration of ill-intended individua1s."

4"The more that government leaders of the West take the actua1 facts into account when eva1uating the causes of the growing national and national 1iberation movements in Asia or any other part of the globe, the greater will be the chances for mutua1 understanding between 'West' and 'East' and the greater will be the possibi1ities of averting unne cessary complications and b100dshed." ("On the Present International Situation," CDSP, 11.) 81 sibility was aIl the more heightened since the Soviet Union, rather than China, held sway over communist parties in Asia. 5 The denial of internationalism, anyway a traditional Soviet device, would be especially likely with appeasers in control, as they were after Berlin.

B. The Geneva Conference: A Success Ultimately Qualified

The Geneva Conference lasted three months (April 26 - July 21,

1954) and resulted in an armistice in Vietnam, its partition and neutralization. From the beginning, the Soviets went to Geneva to indulge in major cold war negotiations. It was not a coincidence that on the day the conference opened Malenkov spoke before the Supreme Soviet: "The

Soviet policy of strengthening peace is based on the premise that under the present conditions it is the peaceful coexistence of states, ir- respective of their social systems, that can and must determine the de velopment of international relations.,,6 Wh en , after difficult negotiations, the conference ended with sorne measure of agreement, the communists betrayed hopes that it was specifically co Id war solutions which had been wrought. Russia celebrated the elimination of another "nidus of war" in Asia; Chou En-lai dwelt upon the projected neutrality of Asia. 7

China wished to avoid any possibility of another American intervention in Asia. AS.for the Soviets, their Asian policy was but part of a concerted effort to effect detente overall.

5 Isaac Deutscher, The Great Contest: Russia and the West (Oxford University Press, 1960), 56. 6 G. M. Malenkov, Speech at the First Session of the Supreme So- viet of the U.S.S.R., April 26, 1954 (Moscow: Foreign Languages Pub lishing House, 1954), 23.

7"Important Victory for the Forces of Peace," Pravda, July 22, 1954, CDSP, VI, 29, p. 16. 82

"It is indeed in the broad context of international strategy that the communist attitude over Indochina ought to be seen.,,8 The

Soviet Union expressed this in their evaluation of the conference:

"The restoration of peace in Indochina also heralds a new stage in the struggle for normalization of international relations.,,9 In effect, communism surrendered its local advantages in Indochina in pursuit of an international detente. Largely this was done at the expense of the

Vietminh movement. The Vietnamese communists had to accept partition and agree to a two year postponement of elections in a settlement less favourable to themselves than their military situation might have en abled them to demand. lO The creation of the Democratie Republic of

Vietnam in the north was hardly sufficient compensation for a movement which had the conquest of aIl of Vietnam within its grasp. 11

Again major concessions; again the policy of retreat. Back in

April, 1953, as one of the preconditions he set for negotiations,

Eisenhower asked the Soviet Union to use its influence to bring about peace in Asia. The Russians responded indignantly, but thraugh the

Geneva Conference they did precisely what the U.S. president had asked.

They did so, of course, in expectation of greater diplomatie settlements elsewhere. The hand of the appeasers was evident in the Geneva talks,

as was the Soviet Union's global cold war approach inherent in its de-

cisions.

8Deutscher, Russia, China, and the West, 17. 9 "Important Victory for the Forces of Peace," CDSP, 16. 10 Emerson, Yale Review, 52. Il Even in 1954 knowledgeable observers understood that reunification would not be effected. See Deutscher, Russia, China, and the West, 20. 83

France in particu1ar was 1ike1y to be wooed by concession at 12 Geneva. When the agreements were made, Russia was quick to shower praise on France for her good sense, for it was the e1ection of a

French government sworn to end the war that had put the sea1 on the

Geneva agreements. According to the Soviets, it was France's will to peace and it was her government's "positive stand" in accordance with

French national interests which faci1itated these achievements. And the Russians,were quick to point out how France had ended the war des pite American opposition.13 France was a1ready at that time the weakest 1ink in the Atlantic alliance. In view of the impending EDC de- bates, the Russians sought to exploit this w'eakness, to convince French public opinion of Soviet goodwil1 and the benefits of cooperating with the U.S.S .R.

The Geneva accord pointed to Europe. They created "favourab1e conditions" for the sett1ement of other important matters, above a11,

European security and the German prob1em. 14 Geneva generated a mood in which further negotiations seemed a better answer to the wor1d's prob1ems than bombs. "The notion of peacefu1 coexistence to be secured around a conference table began to take precedence over the American tendency to assume that communists will heed on1y force.,,15 More than

12Hartmann, Yale Review, 516.

13 See Pravda, Ju1y 23,. 195 4 , CDSP, VI, 29, p. 15, and Pravda, Ju1y 22, 1954, CDSP, VI, 29, p. 16. 14 The Soviet government statement on the Geneva Conference dec- 1ared: "Conclusion of the Geneva Conference with the reaching of agree ments among the interested countries is fresh proof of the fruitfu1ness of international negotiations, ••• proof of the possibi1ity of sett1ing in this way important issues which are yet unreso1ved." (pravda, Ju1y 23, 1954, CDSP, VI, 29, p. 15.) ---- 15 Emerson, Yale Review, 52. 84 the recognition of a new communist state, the extent to which Gemeva popu1arized the Soviet concept of coexistence among the Western powers constituted the important measure of Russia's diplomatie success. From whatever angle, the Geneva conference was viewed as a resounding suc- 16 cess for the communists and a bitter defeat for American po1icy.

U1timate1y, however, the Geneva agreements did 1itt1e to sett1e issues either in Europe or Asia where, in Vietnam, neither the e1ection clause nor the proscription against intervention were honoured. For that reason, the conference was just a short term success, and important on1y in relation to Ma1enkov's dip10macy in this period. It is often forgotten that the question of Korea was a1so on the agenda. Perhaps the u1timate significance of the Geneva Conference can be found in its fai1ure to achieve any Korean sett1ement. On the matter of Vietnam, the Americans were in a weak position and cou1d not prevent the armistice or the formation of the Democratie Repub1ic of Vietnam. French war weariness and the Vietminh position of strength were too much to overcome. But it was the Korean question which more c10se1y represented

the co1d war situation as a who1e. There, in Korea, the balance of mi-

1itary and global po1itica1 forces had created a stalemate, extending

the cold war division to yet anothercountry. A large sca1e war having

been fought against the combined forces of international capita1ism, the

communists wou1d make no unilateral concessions in Korea. Nor were the

Americans in an inferior position. To achieve a Korean solution wou1d

have meant a mutua1 retreat from entrenched positions, a genuine co1d

war agreement. The Soviet fai1ure to effect such a solution foreto1d

16"The Lessons of Geneva," Wor1d Today, X (August, 1954), 323. A1so Emerson, Yale Review, 63. 85 more accurate1y than did the accords the prospects of a European sett1ement.

C. In Pur suit of Neutra1ism -- The Indian Connection

As a resu1t of the Geneva de1iberations, China became firm1y estab1ished on the diplomatie map. This fact was significant not because it broke the isolation of China -- that did not occur -- but because it estab1ished the princip1e of a formative ro1e for Asian nations in matters which concerned them. In opposition to Western co1onia1ism the Soviet

Union had ear1y recognized this princip1e of international se1f-determi-

nation. The immediate beneficiary of this advance was, however, not

China but India.

According to Sta1in, the colonial bourgeoisie goes over to the

side of the metropo1itan bourgeoisie in the final stages of national

1iberation.17 In 1950, before Indian neutra1ism had shown its sympathy

with the communist side in Korea, India was branded a semi-co1ony where

bourgeois nationa1ism served as a powerfu1 weapon of Ang1o-American im- 18 peria1ism. But as post-Sta1in reform paved the way for a change in

po1icy, close relations with India became the means through which the

Soviet Union attempted to en1ist the forces of third wor1d neutra1ism

in their anti-imperia1ist front. In this regard, the latter ha1f of

1954 witnessed "a new and momentus diplomatie strugg1e.,,19

17 Rudolf Schlesinger, "From the XIX to the XX Party Congress," Soviet Studies, 12. 18 "Indian Statesmanship and Communist Opportunism," Wor1d Today, XI (Mar ch , 1955), 107.

19Ibid . 86

The affable manner which Soviet dip10mats had acquired after

Sta1in's death, and the new style of Soviet dip10macy in general, was used to woo the Indians. In pushing the coexistence po1icy the Rus- sians showered Nehru with rare acc1aim and approva1. India and the

U.S.S.R. exchanged de1egations of experts and scho1ars. The Soviets officia11y encouraged Indian studies and staged cultural exhibitions.20

By these demonstrations of courtesy and interest Russia showed its ap- prova1 of what India stood for, and did so in a manner that cou1d hard1y he1p appea1 to astate which was unti1 so recent1y, a co10ny. In con-

trast, the United States was "scornfu11y impatient of India's posit:t.on 21 as a leader among Asian neutra1ists."

For Asians with neutra1ist inclinations the issue of co10nia1ism

far outweighed the threat of "Red imperia1ism." The Asian regiona1ism

to which Moscow appea1ed natura11y had great attractions for the nationa-

lis tic Indian bourgeoisie, trained as it was in the strugg1e for inde- 22 pendence to be anti-Western in foreign affairs. This cou1d not be

otherwise. In its co1d war against the threat of socia1ist revo1ution,

the United States was becoming increasing1y caught up in the affairs of

former colonial areas where nationa1ism and cornmunism were often a1igned

in strugg1e against a cornmon enemy. Such had been the case in Vietnam

where Ho Chi Minh was the national leader of the Vietnamese people.

The co1d war had brought America to support old wor1d imperia1ism when

that force meshed with anti-cornmunism anù, a1so in alliance against

20 Wayne S. Vucinich, "The Russians Look Eastwards," Current History, XXX (January, 1956), 42.

21 Emerson, Yale Review, 61. 22 "Indian Statesmanship and Cornrnunist Opportunism," Wor1d Today, 111. 87 social revolution, all manner of comprador governments which had achieved nominal independence only. In either situation, neutralists laid great blame at the fe~t of the United States for the continuation of colonia- 23 lism. Therefore, the results of the Geneva Conference constituted an advance for the third world and enhanced Soviet prestige immeasureably.

In the second half of 1954 the foreign policies of India and

the U.S.S.R. joined on issues which were common to them both. To re-

cover sorne of the losses sustained on the Indochina issue, the United

States sponsored an anti-communist alliance for Southeast Asia (Sept.

8, 1954), which included Pakistan. India, afraid that American aid to

Pakistan would be used against themselves in the Kashmir dispute, joined

the Soviet Union in opposing this pact. Likewise, when the newly emergent

nations prepared themselves a conference at Bandung, and invited the

Asian communists, Moscow supported this display of third world nationa

lism from the perspective of its own struggle against the cold war. 24

The ideology of the Malenkov government was manifested by a rejection

of class criteria for foreign policy in favour of a "peoples" front

against imperialism, as a result of which the transitional leadership

was able to crea te this nascent alliance with India.

23"India feels that without the active support of America in money and material, and her acquiescence, reluctant though it may be, in French policies, the French could not have maintained their position in the far east and their colonial footholds." ('P', "Middle Ground between America and Russia: An Indian View," Foreign Affairs, XXXII [January, 1954], 264.)

24Izvestia lauded the growing solidarity of Afro-Asia and com mented: "The peoples of Alia and Africa are deeply disturbed by the ag gressive policy of the ruling circles of the U.S.A." (Izvestia, Dec. 30, 1954. Cited in "Indian Statesmanship and Communist Opportunism," World Today, 115.) 88

D. Economic Diplomacy

In this transitional period the Soviet Union began to show great skill in maximizing the political effects of its trade by focusing its efforts where trade lent most support to foreign policy.25 In Europe, the political ends were clear. The issue of peaceful trade lent itself readily as a vehicle for demonstrating the good intentions of Soviet policy and for popularizing the detente. On a practical level, differences in the economic policies of the various Western nations, as these differences were revealed in the conduct of trade with the Soviet bloc, presented opportunities for diverting the cleavage between the

camps into conflict within the West, specifically between Western Europe 26 and the United States. The objective of the Soviet trade campaign was

to remove Western cold war restrictions on trade with communist countries.

"Strat:egic goods" was an elastic definition vigorously applied to pro-

hibit the export of almost the whole range of indus trial equipment needed

by the Soviet bloc. The embargoes, enforced throughout the West by

American dollar diplomacy, were loathsome both to Russians and to many

Europeans whose countries had experienced recession after the first gains

of Marshall Plan aide

The countries of the Soviet bloc, which engaged in little mutual

trade before World War II, exchanged something in the vicinity of six

billion dollars worth of goods in 1953. This was a four-fold expansion

25Hoeffding, The Aunals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 82. For example, the U.S.S.R. eventually underbid Western competition for the construction of the Indian steel mill since cultivation of Nehru's neutrality was a major political objective.

26Herman, Problems of Communism, 15-16. 89 of bloc trade since 1948. 27 The co1d war had given the Soviet Union firm economic control over Eastern Europe and eased the threat of Western economic dominance which had existed in the shattered postwar situation.

The New Look economic reforms, as they were extended into Eastern Europe,

removed the old Sta1inist methods of control to be rep1aced more and more 28 by shared economic planning and cooperation. But the U.S.S.R. re1in-

quished its direct ho1d on1y after having weaned the satellites from their 29 traditiona1 trading partners. lu his new economic dip10macy Malenkov

1ured the West Europeans with sorne of what they had lost in the co1d war.

The Malenkov government met the main points of foreign criticism

of Soviet trade. The Russians agreed to accept amounts of foodstuffs

and consumer goods instead of asking on1y for capital goods. This fitted

the New Look. They began to place orders from hard hit Western industries.

The Soviets made it c1ear, however, that orders for soft goods were a re-

ward for essentia1 industria1 equipment, often under embargo. 30 Through

its trade po1icy, the peace party tried to foster the idea of coexistence

by combining the interests of the Soviet Union with different countries

27Hoeffding, The Anna1s of the American Academy of Po1itica1 and Social Science, 84.

28Shenk and Lowentha1, The Observer, Nov. 9, 1958, p. 6; Nov. 16, 1958, p. 12.

29"Handing Back the Soviet Mixed Companies," Wor1d Today, X (December, 1954), 512.

30Herman, Prob1ems of Communism, 13-15. For examp1e, British businessmen visited Moscow in January-February, 1954. The Soviets gave them a 1ist of desired machinery va1ued at $750 million and indicated that "under the proper conditions with respect to the norma1ization of Ang1o-Soviet trade," Russia wou1d order $375 million of raw materia1s, foodstuffs and consumer goods. (Ibid.) 90 of the West. 31

E. Europe Wavers

"Sta1in's death had brought in a Soviet government that seemed more inc1ined to peacefu1 negotiation, and there was a growing re1uc- tance in many countries to be dragged a10ng behind American po1icies 32 that seemed unnecessari1y provocative." The New Look made many people in the West be1ieve that the prospects of peacefu1 coexistence had been improved. Cornmunist initiative toward the Korean and Viet.nam ceasefires was considered by many to be definite proof of the friend1y intentions of the Soviet Union. 33 The efforts of Soviet dip10macy to estab1ish a detente and spread the idea of coexistence were meeting with success.

As a resu1t, the Western alliance lost the unity it had attained

at the onset of the co1d war, as divisive forces within the capita1ist

bloc began to take their effect. The year 1954 and the Geneva Conference

were significant in this process. The idea that one cou1d not do business

with the cornmunists was cha11enged by the success of the negotiations at

Geneva. By their efforts, the Soviets created some coo1ness between the

United States and her West European Allies. 34 In terms of the priorities

31From a 1954 issue of Kornmunist: "Owing to their interest in trade with the Soviet Union and the Peop1e's Democracies, countries 1ike Denmark, Be1gium, Ita1y, Norway, and other countries of Western Europe have begun to ignore the embargo 1ists foisted upon them by America •••• These countries are receiving an opportunity to export to the democratic market various types of consumer goods, in the export of which they are particu1ar1y interested." (Cited in Herman, Prob1ems of Cornmunism, 14.)

32Emerson, Yale Review, 60.

33uMa1enkOV's Resignation: The Abandonment of the New Course," Wor1d Today, XI (March, 1955), 100-101.

34"The tessons of Geneva," Wor1d Today, 323. 91 which America had set for itse1f and for the world, the United States fai1ed bad1y in being unab1e to ho1d even its c10sest friends in 1ine on "the proposition that the containment of cornrnunism (not to mention

the prob1em of a '.colJ.-back) overrode a11 issues. ,,35 For the other powers the restoration and maintenance of peace was more important.

Western ideo1ogues of the co1d war began to show great concern

that the front against cornrnunism was crumb1ing. Defeated in Geneva,

these men considered the peace po1icy more dangerous than Sta1inism

because it p1ayed upon men's hopes rather than fears: hopes of Gerrnans

for reunification, hopes of the French to end the threat of German re-

surgence, hopes of Britons for Eastern markets, and hopes of everyone 36 to be free from the burdens of the arrns race. Two propositions in

particu1ar the Soviet peace po1icy had underrnined. The first one con

cerned keeping the rea1ity of the cornrnunist threat a1ive. 37 The second

proposition tried to restrict the idea1 of a federation of European

states to the capita1ist nations. Grotewoh1's remark that Europe began

in the Ura1s and not west of the E1be38 might be taken as a slogan of

the peace 1ine. Within just months of Sta1in's death there seemed to be

ideas afoot concerning the reunification of Europe. There seemed to be

a danger that the co1d war division of Europe, based upon a moral oppo-

35 Emerson, Yale Review, 51-52.

36F1orinsky, Current History, 18. 37 "There are many . . • points of discord among the free nations and new onew si11 no doubt arise. But as long as the basic issue -- the rea1ity of the Soviet menace and the necessity of keeping the West rea sonab1y united and economica11y sound -- is rea1ized, there is no rea son to despair that to1erab1e solutions of difficu1ties will be found." (Florinsky, Current History, 20.) 38 See p. 47 above. 92 39 sition to communism, would be lost. Perhaps the greatest success of

Malenkov's diplomacy was to awaken the strong opposition to the cold war which existed beyond the borders of the socialist camp.

39"In European public opinion, ,then, the presence of new masters in the Kremlin has meant the end of a static situation, and the end of the assumption that the cold war will. continue indefinitely, as was uni versally assumed in the Stalin era. And by the merest and practically inaudible hint of the possibility of peace, the Kremlin has achieved its preliminary goal, that of accelerating the revis ion of the methods and goals of [Western] European federation. Now hopes and dreams of uniting the whole Continent have begun to appear less unreal, and the limited federative efforts of the six Schuman Plan countries precipi tate and unwise. The neutralists are back in strength and the Commu nists are not unsuccessful in their efforts to show that a people's democracy is better than the alternative of a clerical or reactionary government." (Mario Einaudi, "Europe After Stalin," Yale Review, XLIII [September, 1953], 31.) CHAPTER IV

A. Collective Security and the German Problem

Whatever the possibilities for successful negotiations at the

Berlin Conference, it is likely that the deliberations had been doomed by congressional pressure in the United States before the talks got 1 underway. Perhaps that accounts for the fact that the three-powers submitted one proposaI and stuck with it throughout; that is, they in-

sisted that Germany be free te choose with whom to ally knowing it could

only be the West she would choose. 2 The Russians on the contrary pro-

duced three proposaIs, which demonstrated the development of their

thought on that subject over the previous couple of years. On February

1 the Russians presented a draft treaty for a reunited and neutralized

Germany. On the 4th, they suggested that a provisional alI-German

government, formed from the Parliaments of East and West Germany, be

created to draw up a national election law. Six days later, February

10, accompanying a proposaI to temporarily continue the status quo, the

Soviets submitted a draft treaty on collective security in Europe.

The first Soviet proposaI of German reunification on a neutral

basis, in the form presented at the Berlin Conference, came in March of

1952, in response to the European Defense Community plan. That is, neu-

tral reunification was designed to meet the danger of a rearmed West

lGraebner, Current History, Il. 2 Hartmann, Yale Review, 511.

93 94

Germany a11ying with the West. 3 By their rejection of neutra1ization the Western powers demonstrated their preference for either al1 of Ger many as an a11y or, fai1ing that, West Germany in the EDC. 4 Therefore, on February 4, the Soviet Union presented a further scheme which represented an alternative method of insuring an anti-co1d war basis for

German unification -- through equa1 communist participation in the formation of the new German state. But in no form wou1d the West give up their German interests in return for an uneasy neutra1 buffer of a reunited Germany. Therefore, Molotov ca11ed for the continuation tempo- rari1y of the status quo with the withdrawa1 of foreign troops from 5 both sectors even before any elections. It appears that Molotov envisaged a solution for the German prob1em in the broader context of a

European peace. Reunification had lost its top priority status. The scheme for collective security in Europe provided the guarantees acceptable to the Soviet Union, whose plan conceived of the neutra1ization 6 of Germany within a genera1 European treaty.

The diminution of emphasis upon reunification manifested the dec1ine of the German prob1em. What had made Germany the key to de-

tente was the matter of disengagement which, in the critica1 area of

Central Europe, shou1d have 1ed natura11y to a 1essening of tension and

an improvement in relations. The EDC plan was the negation of de tente

precise1y because it prec1uded any possibi1ity of disengagement. The

3Ibid., 518.

4Hartmann, Yale Review, 515.

5"Ber1in Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Four Powers," Pravda, Feb. 20, 1954, CDSP, VI, 4, p. 3. 6 Ibid., 4. 95

long term significance of great power reliance on nuclear weapons and recent technological advancement was that it made the problem of op-

posing land armies recede into the background. In terms of disengagement, the future would find the German problem that much less, and the

question of disarmament that much more, important. The Malenkov govern-

ment was transitional in this process; close enough to nuclear stale-

mate to be innovative in the field of disarmament -- not far enough

away from traditional patterns of European poli tics to escape the con-

sequences of German rearmament. The collective security idea was for-

mulated to prevent just that: "If peace and security in aIl Europe

could be guaranteed sorne other way, there wou Id be no need to form a de

fense community of six European nations.,,7 The Soviet resolution on

collective security stipulated that, pending reunification, Germany

could join the European agreement in its two parts, East and West.

The peace party staked its position on thus trying to stave off the

EDC.

B. Waiting and Indecision

In the period between the Berlin and Geneva Conferences, the

Soviet leadership was by no means unanimous in its appraisal of the

possibilities of detente with the United States. As an interesting

contrast to the official conciliatory line, the theme of "vigilance"

in foreign affairs became fairly common in the press and in official 8 statements. In his election speech in 1954, Malenkov justified his .' '

7pravda, March 31, 1954, CDSP, VI, 13, p. 21.

8See for example Khrushchev's election speech on March 6, 1954, pravda, March 7, 1954 (CDSP, VI, 10, pp. 3-4); Bulganin's speech, Pravda, March Il, 1954 (CDSP, VI, 10, pp. 11-12); and the 1954 May Day editorial in pravda, May~1954 (CDSP, VI, 18, p. 18). 96 rejection of the po1icy of co1d war on the grounds that it wou1d 1ead to "fresh wor1d carnage which . means the ruin of wor1d civi1ization.,,9

He 1ater withdrew this opinion and stated that a war will "inevitab1y

1ead to co11apse of the capita1ist social system.,,10 His retreat to a more dogmatic position is indication of the conservatism which was still strong in the transitiona1 period.11

Concerning Germany-, those who be1ieved a solution cou1d be found had an edge but it was not decisive. Bo1stered by the Berlin and

Geneva conferences, they still waited upon resu1ts to secure their position. The dynamics of the co1d war, which themse1ves gave form to

the issues, resisted a solution on this particu1ar question. The Re-

pub1ican administration was determined to carry through the next phase

in a continuing co1d war offensive -- creation of an Arnerican-German

alliance. The United States was not to be dissuaded from a course set

upon much ear1ier, of ringing the U.S.S.R. with increased firepower

and bo1stered allies. Despite its inherent logic, the desire to reach

an accommodation remained unfu1fi11ed simp1y because this sentiment

was not returned. The conci1iators were severe1y restricted in their

range of alternatives. A certain risk cou1d be taken in Indochina

mere1y on the basis of its possible or probable benefits to the overa11

thrust of detente dip1omacy. But this approach had a1ready co11apsed

in Germany, in June, 1953; and even in Asia the progeny of a bad comp-

romise wou1d return to haunt the communists soon enough. Unab1e to

9pravda, March 13, 1954, CDSP, VI~ 11, p. 8.

10Malenkov, Speech at the First Session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., April 26, 1954, 18. 11 See Leonhard, 93-94. 97 see a definite end in terms of detente, and unwi11ing to become the victims of appeasement, Soviet schemes for a German solution were hesi-

tant and unpromising.

Soviet po1icy as revea1ed at the Berlin Conference was one of waiting and hoping that the trumpcard of a reunited and neutra1ized

Germany may yet prove to be a feasib1e compromise; waiting to see if

they cou1d not avert the EDC by a European collective security scheme;

waiting to see if France wou1d ratify the EDC. 12 When, in the spring

of 1953, the attempt at reunification had fai1ed and that who1e effort

had co11apsed with such consummate abruptness, the Soviet Union had to

change its tactics to prevent America from rearming West Germany. Po-

1icy toward Germany entered a period of transition. A1though it stopped

emphasizing ear1y reunification, Soviet dip10macy still cou1d not ac-

cept permanent division. "Throughout 1954, whi1e the Western campaign

for Gerrnany's rearmament was not yet conc1uded, Soviet po1icy was in a

state of suspense. Moscow encouraged French opposition to EDC and

then sought to obstruct the passage of the London and Paris agreements.

The fai1ure of these efforts ended the state of suspense; after Ma1en-

kov's fa11 Molotov relegated his schemes for an aIl-German government u13 to the archives.

C. The. Collective Security Initiative

Commenting upon collective security, Pravda stated: "A united

camp of a11 countries shou1d be created in the strugg1e for peace, inde

pendent of the differences in their social systems.,,14 The concept of

12Hartmann, Yale Review, 521-522, 524.

13Deutscher, Russia, China, and the West, 48-49.

14Pravda, Feb. 20, 1954, CDSP, VI, 4, p. 3. 98 a united camp cut away the suppositions which had given rise to the

iron curtain in the first place; for the idea that po1itica1 a1ignments

did not have to be formed on the basis of c1ass antagonisms under1ay

the notions of detente and coexistence. This proposa1 was "a serious

move, serious1y made.,,15 Malenkov said that "given a rea1 desire to

guarantee security in Europe, it wou1d be possible to surmount the ob-

stac1es to conc1uding the General European Treaty on Collective Securi-

ty in Europe and to examine carefu11y proposa1s arising in connection

with i t. ,,16

Western sources accused the Soviets of trying to spread confu-

sion on the Defense Community question and to undermine the Atlantic

alliance. 17 In fact, the collective security treaty was an a1terna-

tive to EDC, and was an attempt to undermine the Atlantic alliance in

the same sense that the peace dip10macy sought to undermine the co1d

war. Collective security represented an attack upon what was described

as the "fa1se argument" that the presence of states with differing so-

cial systems presup~osed the setting up of opposing mi1itary groupings.

This -- the co1d war argument -- de1iberate1y ignored the possibi1ity

and necessity of competitive coexistence. 18

The Soviet Union, meanwhi1e, was not just sitting back and

waiting for the American answer. Contingency plans were in existence

out1ining Soviet countermeasures to the EDC. Before the Berlin Con-

15Hartmann, Yale Review, 514.

16Pravda, March 13, 1954, CDSP, VI, 11, p. 8. 17 New York Times, April 1, 1954, p. 1.

18See the Soviet March 31, 1954, note to the Western powers, New York Times, April 1, 1954, p. 4. 99 ference warnings were already being given concerning the European Army, references that the peace-loving peoples would "take into account" the 19 threat. The March 31, 1954, note was quite explicit: "It should also be borne in mind that the creation of one military group of countries inevitably precipitates corresponding action on the part of other countries to guarantee their security.,,20 Moreover, the Soviets stressed that collective security in Europe would prevent any part of Germany from being involved in military groups,2l which forcast the GDR participation in a socialist military organization.

The security issue reached its peak after the Geneva Conference.

The Soviet Union hoped that success at Geneva would make a decisive dif-

ference on the European situation. Vietnam had been neutralized, des-

pite its partition, within a general security arrangement covering the

entire area. The lessons of Geneva seemed to indicate that the same

formula would work for Germany. These are the connections to be made

when, immediately after the neutralization of much of Indochina, 22 the Soviets renewed their proposaI for the neutralization of Germany.

The Soviet Union proposed the convention of a European security con-

ference and amended thèir draft of a collective security treaty with a

provision for cooperation in the economic sphere. 23 A security con-

ference would haIt the momentum of Western diplomacy rushing headlong

19Soviet Nov. 26, 1953, note to Britain, France and the U.S.A., New York Times, Nov. 27, 1953, p. 6. 20 New York Times, April 1, 1954, p. 4.

2lIbid •

22Soviet Ju1y 24, 1954, note to Britain, France and the U.S.A. on collective security in Europe, New York Times, Ju1y 26, 1954, p. 2.

23 Ibid. 100 toward German rearmament. But we wou1d be narrow in our appreciation of Soviet foreign po1icy to define this proposa1 as being mere1y an obstructionist tactic. To put socia1ism and capita1ism, East and

West, together at such a conference wou1d 1egitimize the concept that

European security was a mutua1 prob1em to be solved in concert. It wou1d negate the co1d war.

It has yet to be shown that international tension and conf1ict were either beneficia1 to the Soviet system or an inherent aspect of it.24 On the contrary, the West was being offered a tangible a1terna- tive to pro1onging, and by definition exacerbating, the co1d war, for not to press the offensive in such a conf1ict is to acknow1edge its dec1ine. The Russians spoke of the possibi1ity and practicabi1ity of coexistence, and they lent a certain dynamism to the idea of mutua1 security by viewing it as but part of a continuing process toward

"lasting peace.,,25 On a11 1eve1s the Soviets were desperate for agreement. Contingency plans in the event of German rearmament struck at

the heart of the conci1iators' concept of peace, and at Ma1enkov's New

Look economic po1icy, then in a state of dec1ine. In the midst of do-

mestic change and beset by serious economic difficu1ties, the conci1ia-

tors sought a stable wor1d order.

D. Passing Success

Ma1enkov's dip10macy registered a start1ing, if short-1ived,

24George Kennan dec1ared in 1958: "1 have never thought that the Soviet government wanted a genera1 wor1d war at any time since 1945, or that it wou1d have been inc1ined for any rational po1itica1 reason, to inaugurate such a war." (George F. Kennan, Russia, the Atom and the West [New York: Harper, 1958), 53.) 25 Pravda, Ju1y 26, 1954, CDSP, VI, 30, p. 14. 101 success when the French parliament failed to ratify the EDC on August

30, 1954. Powerful segments of French opinion were historically opposed to a resurgence of Germany. But, to a large extent, opposition

to German rearmament within France formed around considerations of the new Soviet peace posture and a changed world situation, as the following

excerpt from an anti-EDC pamphlet (published in April, 1954) shows:

"German rearmament was originally envisaged at a time of great inter-

national tens~on .••. In 1954, conditions are no longer the same; the

danger of war is less threatening and the military disequilibrium has 26 already been reduced."

Since the Defense Community Treaty had been drafted there was

considerable pressure upon France to ratify. On December 4, 1953, for

example, Dulles said at a meeting of the Nato council in Paris that if

EDC were not ratified soon, the U.S. would be forced to make a reapprai-

saI of its own strategy, including a regrouping of American forces now

in Europe. "This warning of a possible 'peripherie' defense strategy

was received with hostility in France.,,27 Likewise, when Adenauer said

that there cou Id be no alternative to EDC except the creation of a Ger

man army, the French resented this ultimatum-like statement. 28 Malen-

kov's diplomacy was quick to play upon this friction. France became

the target of a concerted Soviet campaign to convince her not only of

the grave risks involved in German rearmament but also of the fact that

her international authority and prestige as a great power were at

26Cited in "France's Problems after the Rejection of the EDC," World Today, X (October, 1954), 424. 27 "The European Defense Community: Problems of Ratification," World Today, X (August, 1954), 329.

28Ibid., 334-335. 102 stake.29

Soviet po1icy towards France appea1ed to the traditiona1 French fear of Germany and to the old French po1icy of cooperation with Ger- many's eastern neighbours to prevent German reviva1 and expansion.

Just before the final debate on EDC, Po1and offered France a treaty of alliance and mutua1 assistance. Later, in December, 1954, the 1egis-

1atures of Po1and, Czechos1ovakia and East Germany appea1ed to the

French Assemb1y not to ratify the Paris and London agreements on West

German rearmament. 30 In the measure that the Soviet mi1itary threat appeared to diminish since Acheson first disc10sed his plan to rearm

Germany in 1950, French opinion had been inc1ined to shy away from both German rearmament and the specific form of it in the EDC. 31 The

Soviet peace dip10macy was responsib1e for making many people fee1 the prospects for coexistence were good. The reappraisa1 of Soviet intentions contributed to the fai1ure of the EDC and the long de1ay in

German rearmament. This represented a noteworthy dip10matic victory for the Soviet b1oc. 32

In the final ana1ysis, however, Malenkov cou1d not bring about the neutra1ization of Germany in any forme A1though the necessity for dis engagement seemed to grow out of the nuc1ear balance between capita-

29See "France Faces the Choice," by Observer, Pravda, Aug. 28, 1954, CDSP, VI, 35, pp. 11-12, and "Franco-Soviet Relations and Euro pean Security," by Observer, pravda, Oct. 28, 1954, CDSP, VI, 43, pp. 16-17. --

30Byrnes, The Anna1s of the American Academy of Po1itica1 and Social Science, 174.

31"The European Defense Community," Wor1d Today, 326. 32 "Ma1enkov's Resignation," Wor1d Today, 101. 103 lfsm and socialism, America continued to press the cold war offensive.

One need only look at the vigour with which the campaign to arm Ger many was pursued. That Russia's approach was largely conciliatory, that the question of mutual security was uppermost, did not seem to matter. Obviously the Western nations were not ready for the radical redirection of energy and economy which peaceful coexistence seemed to demand. The U.S. was quite simply arming against Russia and in the halting of that process American leaders could see neither guarantees nor gain. Meanwhile, the only collective security the Russians needed was against the United States. Under the pressure of German rearma ment, therefore, the Soviet scheme to guarantee European security evolved into the Warsaw Pact.

E. Malenkov's Diplomacy Fails

Russia's mutual security venture was not so much rejected by the West as ignored; and the EDC rose from its own ashes, structurally altered but essentially the same, in the form of the London and Paris agreements (September and October, 1954). In courting France, the So viets had attempted to foster the rise of an alternate centre of power

in the West in opposition to American hegemony. But it was not pos

sible at this time to create a1ternate centres of power. The defeat of

the Axis had eliminated one of the major competing strains of capita

lism, and the cold war alliance of international capital, unified under

the banner of anti-communism, had not yet sufficiently broken down.

West European ruling elements were still too weak to stand on their own.

In these circumstances, the failure of the EDC treaty was but a

de1ay in America's plans. Diplomatie maneuvers and concessions finally 104 effected the rearmament of Germany. French rejection of the European

Defense Community was a victory for the conci1iators in Moscow. But the eventua1 fai1ure of his German po1icy toppled Malenkov, as we11 because it sea1ed the ruin of his economic p1ans. 33 It is interesting to note how between the French vote rejecting the EDC treaty and October

23 when the protoco1s arming the Bonn regime were signed, Soviet po1icy approached the position it had taken previous to the Berlin riots in

1953. This is a measure of how desperate the transitiona1 leadership was to prevent Germany's mi1itarization. Yet the ear1ier po1icy was on1y approached, not recreated, since the basis for unification had been undermined. The United States demanded the participation of Ger- many within the Western mi1itary system and wou1d not be appeased.

On the day the protoco1s were signed the U.S.S.R. de1ivered a note which accepted the importance of free e1ections and, noting that agreement on this question had been prevented by the European Army, c1aimed that the French rejection of it created favourab1e conditions for bringing the four powers c10ser together on this crucial question. 34

Taking into account the "aforementioned new circumstances" the Soviet

goverrunent agreed to reconsider "the proposa1s for the holding of a11-

German e1ections made at the Berlin Conference by Britain and supported

by France and the U.S.A.,,35 They asked in return that corresponding

Soviet proposa1s be considered, viz. for a four power conference in

November (hopefu11y to nu11ify the unilateral Paris agreements and pre-

33Deutscher, Russia, China, and the West, 29-34, 46-47.

34Soviet Oct. 23, 1954 note, New York Times, Oct. 24, 1954, p. 46. See a1so Pravda, Oct. 25, 1954, CDSP, VI, 43, pp. 16-17. 35 Soviet Oct. 23, 1954, note. 105 vent their ratification), and for mutua1 withdrawa1 from Germany with out de1ay, thereby effecting the demi1itarization of that country.36

Indeed, if there were no more plans 1ike the EDC, the main So- viet objection to reunification wou1d have been removed. Having on1y postponed the rearmament of Germany, the Soviets p1ayed their dip10matic trump card of reunification and neutra1ization. The Russians further suggested an agreement on numbers, disposition and arms of a11 :types of

German police forces (the euphemism used for the parami1itary forces a1ready created), inc1uding a proposa1 for on the spot verification of actua1 positions at that time. 37 C1ear1y, the plans for rearming communist Germany had not yet been fina1ized. Moreover, this 1ast-stand effort to sett1e the German question was broadened, in the sense of

its connection to a total co1d war agreement, by significant compro- mises in the area of disarmament. The U.S.S.R. agreed to accept cer-

tain Ang10-French proposa1s current1y before the U.N. as the basis for

a future disarmament convention, on the understanding that the Paris

and London agreements which rep1aced EDC contradicted these proposa1s

and wou1d prec1ude their acceptance.

America dec1ined a negotiated sett1ement -- in fact, dec1ined

to negotiate. U.S. leaders, fo11owing the positions of strength po1icy,

wished to avoid serious negotiations unti1 they cou1d confront the

Russians with the fait accompli of German rearmament. The London con-

ference of Western countries, ca11ed in the wake of the EDC defeat,

reaffirmed the princip le of German rearmament. A commentary on these

ta1ks noted Dulles' p1edge to maintain the "necessary forces" in Europe

36Ibid•

37 Ibid. 106 and ca11ed it one of the most important deve10pments of the conference,38 presumab1y because the p1edge wou1d a11ay French fears of a German re surgence. But it did nothing to a11ay Soviet fears of U.S. purposes in

Europe. Even in 1954 there was imp1ied an ominous continuity of aims reaching through a decade from the very ear1iest moments of the co1d war. America remained vio1ent1y disp1eased with the resu1ts of Wor1d

War II, and rearming Germany within the Western alliance was the insti tutiona1ization of this displeasure. When the Western powers dec1ared the Federal Repub1ic to be "the only German government free1y and 1e gitimate1y constituted,,39 this was a c1ear threat to the communist sta tus quo of East Germany and by implication to a11 of Eastern Europe as we1l.

The pro cess of tieing the FRG to the Western alliance was grandi osely ca11ed "winning West Germany for the free wor1d, ,i on the assump tion that a neutra1 Germany wou1d move inevitab1y into the Soviet or bit.40 Po1itica11y this judgement was unfounded; but in another sense it he1d some truth. A Germany exempt from co1d war restrictions and

animosities might regain its peacetime potentia1 in close cooperation with the Soviet Union; that is, in a crucial stage of its deve1opment, might bui1d close links with growing Soviet economic power. In this

sense had Eastern Europe been 'lost' to communism before the iron cur

tain had ever fa11en. If the Western alliances were effective in any

measure it was in the institution of U.S. economic and po1itica1 domi-

38 New York Times, Oct. 4, 1954, p. 1.

39Ibid .

40New York Times, Oct. 24, 1954, p. 1. 107 nance over its allies. The neutra1ization of Germany cou1d in no way benefit the American cause.

To keep our perspective on the peace party's fai1ure we must never 10se sight ofrow the United States was the prime mover behind a1l

these events. In its commentary upon the Paris conference which fina1ly

achieved the rearmament of Germany, the New York Times stated: "The

result may be described as a victory for U.S. policy, for the U.S. took

the initiative toward arming the Germans and has long been busy seeking

to insure by treaties that they shou1d be tied inseparably with the West

as a preliminary to any possible negotiations with Moscow on Germany.,,4l

Tied inseparably! Even neutra1ization would have been considered a de

feat. When one speaks of affixing preliminary conditions of this sort

to negotiations one has in hand the very causes of bitterness and ten

sion, the roots of the cold war.

Interesting1y enough, the policy of positions of strength 'was

effective up to a point. At the onset of the transitional period, the

unification of Germany, even to the point of eliminating the commu

nist bridgehead, was considered a reasonable alternative by the new

government. However, the Soviet policy of late 1954, which approxi

mated that position, was squeezed out of them under the relent1ess

pressure of German rearmament. Stalin's successors oversaw a po1icy

of retreat under the pressure of an unabated capitalist offensive.

Yet, once Germany joined Nato the worst had happened. Retrenchment

was the natural reaction in preparation for the next phase. It was

repeatedly demonstrated that the ultimate fai1ure of the positions of

41Ibid • 108 strength formula came precisely at the point when those carefully plotted positions had been successfully created. America never drew the proper conclusions from Soviet retreat and nullified that fa ct in pressing the attack.

In retreat, the Soviets had gone as far as agreeing to German elections under appropriate international supervision, something they had determinedly avoided since early in the cold war. In return, the future Germany would not be bound by prior, separate agreements concerning participation in military groupings. 42 But Western priorities were remilitarization first and reunification only second. At an

"alI-European" conference convened in Moscow on November 29, 1954 (the

Western nations were invited but did not attend), the framework for a socialist military alliance to become effective only should Germany join Nato was agreed upon. By February, 1955, it was left only to the

Germans to ratify the instruments of their own rearmament. What the

Soviet had warned numerous times, that Germany would remain divided and

that a counter alliance which included the GDR would be created, came

to pass. The peace party discovered that, in the final analysis, true

collective security had to face the real source of danger, which lay

across the geopolitical division that had created the cold war in the

first place.

F. Change in Leadership

The inclusion of West Germany in Nato coincided with a transfer

of power among Russia's leading group. The serious internaI argument

42"Soviet Government's Statement on the German Question," Pravda, Jan. 16, 1955, CDSP, VII, 3, p. 24. 109 was basic opposition to Malenkov's economic policies -- the New Look. 43

Signs of a retreat from the new course were already in evidence by Au-

gust, 1954, when a declaration on the continuation of the Virgin Lands

Programme was published. 44 Malenkov's fate was sealed when the French

parliament ratified the London and Paris agreements. 45 In this way,

Western policy helped put in power individuals would not compromise

over Germany as their predecessors seemed about to. The new alignment

included army men alarmed by Malenkov's consumptionist bias, which had

diverted investments away from heavy industry. This group was the one

which would significantly increase armament expenditures and would pro-

pose to Mao Tse-tung that he introduce conscription into China. The

latter, decreed the day after Malenkov resigned, was a counter-measure

to the hardening of the Western alliance, and it created special in-

dus trial demands since it could be guaranteed only if the Soviet Union

built China's armaments industry and supplied arms from its own re

serves. 46

If at first glance these men seemed harder than the Malenkov

43 Shenk and Lowenthal, The Observer, Nov. 9, 1958, pp. 6, 13. Also Leonhard, 85-92. 44 pravda, Aug. 17, 1954, CDSP, VI, 33, pp. 4-5. At that time, also, joint state-party declarations began to be signed "Central Com mittee and Council of Ministers" instead of vice versa as before. This indicated a shift of power from the state apparatus where Malenkov was strong to the party which had regrouped under Khrushchev. (Leonhard, 89-90.) 45 An important interview with Khrushchev which took place in September was finally published in December (Pravda, Dec. 24, 1954, CDSP, VI, 51, pp. 7-8) after the policy of appeasement had collapsed, putting the seal on the transfer of power. 46 Deutscher, Russia, China, and the West, 32-33. 110 faction, not so nearly convinced of the possibility of agreement,47 we must bear in mind what they were reacting to. The record of American

actions over the preceeding few years had demonstrated a clear victory

for the ardent co Id warriors like Dulles. Massive increases in military

expenditure and the proliferation of American bases abroad, the South-

east Asia Treaty Organization in response to peace in Indochina, per

manent forces in South Korea, the Baghdad Pact, the first Taiwan cri-

sis, and finally the unilateral solution of the German question through

rearmament -- this is what the United States had accomplished.

These developments struck a blow at the basis of detente between

the camps: and within the socialist nations as weIl. The period of

greatest repression within the Soviet bloc coincided with the darkest

days of the cold war, and the era of reform, with the attempt to end

the international conflict. American pressure impeded the progress of

reform. Conservative and reform factions called upon contradictory

aspects of the world situation to justify their positions. 48 This is

particularly true of Eastern Europe where a German settlement, the

quid pro quo reduction of forces proposed by the Soviets on numerous

occasions, cultural exchanges and trade, aIl would have helped root out

the Stalinists who continued there after their mentors in the Kremlin

lost power. 49 But the only change acceptable to the United States was

470n the day Malenkov resigned, Molotov gave a report on foreign policy which presented a harder line and more pessimistic attitude than had been heard for a long time. (See Molotov's report before the Sup reme Soviet, Feb. 8, 1955, New York Times, Feb. 9, 1955, p. 6.)

48 Imre Nagy pointed out that a tense international atmosphere strengthened those who "aimed at the liquidation of democracy" and vice versa. (Imre Nagy, Imre Nagy on Communism [Thames & Hudson, 1957), 55-56. Cited in Horowitz, From Yalta to Vietnam, 284~

49 Horowitz, From Yalta to Vietnam, 286. 111

Soviet collapse and anti-communist revolution. Concerning German re armament, in an era of easing controls within the Soviet bloc it was dangerous to have a powerful anti-communist force next to East Europe, one that might strengthen the anti-Soviet opposition and foster insta bility. In this way the division of Germany perpetuated the division of Europe, by braking Soviet progress toward dismantling the iron cur

tain.

Malenkov's resignation came about at the low water mark of his

foreign policy. From the high point of the Geneva Conference and the

momentary jubilation surrounding France's rejection of the EDC, Soviet

policy had failed in its most important aims -- the structuring of a

detente and a German solution. With the Paris agreements, Soviet dip

lomacy temporarily lost initiative and its sense of direction. Un

doubtedly, the new ruling faction argued that the Soviet Union had

been in danger of being weakened relative to American power, that if

persuasion and protection are the complementary elements which combine

to maintain Soviet security, the latter had been abused.

Yet, this attitude would not last for long. The problem lay

not in the collapse of Russia's foreign position which, despite the

persistence of grave dangers, had not occurred, but in the inability

of the leadership during the transitional period to make full use of

the great strengths latent in that position. In the early cold war

period Stalinism, particularly its imposition in the zone of occupa

tion, drastically diminished the appeal of communism just as its ene

mies were moving in concerted fashion against it. The victory of re

forrn helped rectify this chief propaganda-ideological weakness of the 112

S ov i et pos i t1on.· 50 Growing Soviet prestige dovetailed with a worldwide search for viable alternatives as old political and social systems were breaking up. Under the transitional leadership there began to emerge a policy that more closely fitted Russia's needs and an international mood that was turning away from the certainties of the cold war.

Soviet strength lay in their own concept of historical development. When it was demanded, as it had been constantly since the cold war began, that settlements in Europe and Asia must take account of world historic changes, it was done with a sense of justification.

From the chaos of warring capitalism revolution had sprouted and spread,

to the point where historic rivalries were set aside in the common cam-

paign against communism. Thus was the cold war heightened struggle in

a new imperialist era. It fell to the Soviet Union, at this stage,

to lead in the struggle. And in his period Malenkov too made a con-

tribution. Who could deny that the thaw, despite provocations, held?

And who could overlook the Soviet Union's growing influence, not only

amongst carefully cultivated neutrals, but in aIl parts of the third

world and sorne sectors of the West as weIl? This, largely created in

the transitional time, was a base which a more vigorous leadership

might weIl turn to gain.

50"The changes that have taken place in Soviet society since 1953 have . • • made the system more attractive to the non-communist left in Europe and Asia." (Martin C. Needler, Understanding Foreign Policy [New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966], Ill.) CONCLUSION

Soviet economic inferiority vis-à-vis the West was the main reason for the construction of an iron curtain bloc, and this coin cidedwith the ideological struggle both within Eastern Europe and on the international level. The construction and development of this bloc was tied to the conservatism of Russian foreign policy as weIl as to the internationalization of the class struggle. From the be

ginning, therefore, we are confronted Wl ~ the generally defensive na

ture of Russian cold war policy even when that policy was seemingly

offensive due to Soviet penetration of Eastern Europe and the nature

of the ideological struggle as seen from the West.

The constant factor in aIl Soviet cold war policy was the at

tempt to either reach an understanding with or build a situation of se

curity in respect to what every Russian leader believed to be a hos

tile West. Stalin's solution to the immediate postwar crisis was the

iron curtain bloc, the isolation of a Soviet sphere of influenc~and

rapid reconstruction. Yet, the rigid division of Europe, and the

world, heightened the co Id war, aggravated the crisis of. Soviet secu

rity and necessitated a rethinking of Soviet foreign policy.

With Stalin's death came the crucial stage in the development

of the idea of coexistence. His successors, freed to act, attempted

to dismantle the iron curtain and end the cold war through a de tente

with the West. But they inherited the basic contradiction which had

always hampered Soviet policy, that between national interest and re-

113 114 volutionary origins, and they faced the continued Western hostility which gave that contradiction meaning. Thus, they were unable to effect a change in the international patterns which cold war had assumed. Yet, on the other hand, they did create a potent new diplomacy.

And the record of their years did demonstrate the necessity of the peace policy; so that despite their failures the ide a of co-existence was reaffirmed.

"The chief feature of our epoch is the emergence of socialism from the confines of one country and its transformation into a world system."l So spoke Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress. The creation of a large socialist camp complicated the international situation and changed the nature of the dangers which the Soviet Union faced. The resolve of capitalism to stem or reverse what seemed to have become a historical trend increased with each communist success.

On the other hand, their ability to do so diminished as communism in

state form spread and stabilized.

The Twentieth Party Congress "enabled a changed international 2 setting to make its impact on the Party's outlook." This impact was

aIl the more far-reaching because it was caused not by a set-back but

by the success of the policy which was enunciated. 3 It is not incor-

rect to say that Khrushchev's pronouncements at the Congress gave ideo-

logical direction to measures initiated largely before. Malenkov's

lCurrent Soviet Policies II: The documentary record of the 20th Party Congress and its aftermath. From the translations of the Current Dillest et al., ed. Leo Gruliow (praeger, 1957), p. 29.

2Rudolf Schlesinger, "From the XIX to the XX Party Congress," Soviet Studies, 12.

3Ibid . 115 initiatives were a1most a11 pragmatic. Especia11y true as concerns domestic reforms, this observation is equa11y va1id in the foreign sec tor. It was in thp. context of Khrushchev's rise as the re-emergence of the party that coexistence was proc1aimed at the Twentieth Congress.

Under the Sta1inist concept of "socia1ism in one zone,"4 co existence became near1y synonomous with the se1f-imposed isolation of

communism within that zone. With the spread of revo1ution and the

capita1ist reaction, the U.S.S.R. was forced out of isolation. The

maintenance of peace demanded that the Soviet keep its thumb on the

dip10matic pulse of the who1e world. In a sense, the American co1d

war offensive sparked the expansion of Russian dip10macy in the same

way as the rise of fascism did in the thirties.

The transitional period was a beginning. That word comes to

mind more than any other. Malenkov began to give coexistence a dif

ferent meaning than it had had before. The Soviet Union fostered in

ternational cooperation and attempted to participate dip10matica11y in

the pro cess of ame1iorating capita1ist hosti1ity to the bloc of commu

nist countries. A1though Ma1enkov's foreign po1icy fai1ures hastened

his resignation and threw Soviet dip10macy into a momentary quandary,

the essentia1 dynamic of the peace po1icy was not thereby discredited.

On the contrary, there was no other way to go. Russia cou1d not re

turn to isolation nor adopt an uncompromising attitude towards the

West. This period saw the crisis of coexistence because the peace po-

1icy was being tried inthe face of continuing pressure, which cou1d have

strang1ed this po1icy in its beginnings. But one cou1d not compare the

Soviet Union's wor1d position in 1950 to the gains made by 1955: inter-

4Deutscher's phrase. See Sta1in, 537-538. 116 national negotiations re-established and a summit approaching, commu-

nist isolation broken by growing third world resistance to imperia-

lism, a thaw definitely established. This went hand in hand with Rus-

sia's bolstered economic and strategie position. When the configura-

tions of Khrushchev's foreign policy began to appear, it was a reaffir-

mation, an intensification in fact, of the peace line, based now upon

the continued existence of a divided Germany and Europe.

Already in the fall of 1954, before Malenkov resigned, a high-

level delegation had gone to China to negotiate. These negotiations

ended with a joint new approach to the problem of Japan, with the U. 5 S.S.R. and China calling for a complete detente in the Far East. The

communists indicated their desire to normalize the situation even on

the basis of America's provocative military presence in Japan. Thus,

the concept of coexistence developed in the Far East despite the per-

sistence of the cold war, and it would survive that situation in

Europe.

To see this one need only look ahead to June, 1955, just four

months after Malenkov resigned, by which time Khrushchev had moved

decisively for the immediate establishment of coexistence with the

West. Khrushchev's peace policy erupted in the spring of 1955 with

a flurry of activity. A Soviet-Austrian communique on April 16 an-

nounced the success of negotiations toward an Austrian state treaty

(signed May 15).6 On May 10 new Soviet disarmament proposaIs were sub-

mitted before the U.N. 7 A Soviet note on June 7 proposed the normali-

5See the Soviet-Chinese communique, New York Times, Oct. 12, 1954, p. 8.

6Text of communique, New York Times, April 16, 1955, p. 2.

7Soviet disarmament proposaIs, New York Times, May Il, 1955, p. 8. 117 zation of relations with West Germany.8 Then there was the Geneva summit.

Each one of these moves involved significant Soviet concessions. On the question of the Austrian treaty, they gave better terms than those which the West had offered at the Berlin Conference.9 The disarmament proposaIs, substantially the same as ones put before the

U.N. by France and Britain,lO constituted a retreat because the Soviets had previously made acceptance of those fu1glo-French proposaIs condi- tional upon the scrapping of the London and Paris agreements. Il And over Germany, diplomatic ties with the FRG would mean acceptance of the cold war status quo which Soviet diplomacy had struggled so in- tensely to alter. Even in the matter of the summit there was back- tracking from a more rigid position previous1y he1d. When asked if he would welcome a summit, Malenkov had replied that three-power policy over Germany seemed to preclude such a meeting. 12 Yet, Germany rearmed, the heads of state still met.

These initiatives grew out of an approach that had its impor-

tant development in the preceeding transitional period. The unifying

factor in aIl of them was the attempt to secure a rapprochement with

the West on the basis of the cold war division of Germany which had

been finalized by rearmament. The issues, by the solution of which

8Text of Soviet June 7, note, New York Times, June 8, 1955, p. 4.

9New York Times, April 16, 1955, p. 1.

10Joseph P. Morray, From Yalta to Disarmament: Cold War Debate (New York: MR Press, 1961), 226-238.

llAbove p. 105.

12New York Times, Jan. 1, 1955, p. 2. 118 the U.S.S.R. hoped to establish a detente, had changed.13 The ultimate aim of establishing coexistence had not.

The regime led by Khrushchev and Bulganin maintained the prin ciple lines of Soviet foreign policy.14 They saw for themselves the force and potential of detente diplomacy.15 The new regime extended the pattern of the preceeding period to its logical conclusion. Cer- tain potential partners in the struggle for peace believed they were building socialism by their own means and resented the old attitude of one road to socialism which underlay Comintern practice. The recognition of a third camp which would unite with the communist countries to

form the wider peace camp, implied a redefinition of this concept. 16

Khrushchev drove this ide a into the ideological consciousness of the

Soviet party by his penitive trip to Yugoslavia in May, 1955, and his

l3Speaking in Berlin on Oct. 6, 1955, to celebrate the formation of the GDR, Suslov declared: "The question of disarmament, the banning of atomic and other weapons of mass destruction, and the creation of a system of collective security in Europe should be ranked as the inter national problems principly agitating the minds of the people of aIl countries." (Cited in "The Four Powers and Germany -- The Reunification Issue," World Today, XI (November, 1955), 475.)

14Byrnes, The AunaIs of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 166.

l5Western reaction to the initiatives of spring, 1955, was uni formly surprise and often dismay. Although the three powers had de manded conclusion of an Austrian treaty as a test of Soviet good will, they were stunned by the Russian concessions and worried about the ef fect it would have in Germany. The tendency represented by Austrian neutrality was reported to be causing concern in Washington and London. (New York Times, April 16, 1955, p. 1.) The June 7 note to West Ger many was called the latest in a series of "unexpected moves" and Bri tish sources were reportedly disturbed. (New York Times, June 8, 1955, p. 1.) 16 Rudolf Schlesinger, "From the XIX to the XX Party Congress," Soviet Studies, 12. In June, 1955, for example, Pravda declared the Soviet and the Indian peoples to be peace-loving. (Vucinich, Current History, 42.) 119 postulation of the different roads to socia1ism at the Twentieth Con-

gress. 17

Ma1enkov's fai1ures may be attributed in part to the pragmatic nature of his approach. If there was ever an argument against the

theory that international relations are merely based upon political and

state power and the structures derived therefrom, the cold war is such

an argument. The cold war was a contest between ideologies. In terms

of the international balance of power, it was perfectly reasonable that

a German solution should be found on the basis of neutrality. In terms

of the international balance of power, it is perfectly reasonable that,

the communist bloc having achieved a certain level of power in the nuc

lear age, detente should follow. In terms of the international class

struggle either of these is wholly unreasonable, because world capita

lism would not tolerate the advance of socialism unless absolutely

forced to do so. Their opposition stemmed from the deepest and most

pervasive of prejudices, the very roots of their social being.

The foreign policy in the transitiona1 period was pragmatic in

a way similar to Stalin's, and the policy of retreat grew directly out

of the zig-zagging of the Stalin period as Malenkov tried to dispense

with some of the liabilities which the Soviet Union had aequired. The

iron curtain was a liability, but Germany, at the centre of that issue,

could not be dealt away because of the intensity of the international

class conflict. The transitional leadership could not effect a German

solution for the simple reason that pragmatism cannot do away with ide

ology. But, on the other hand, because the concept of detente was de

rived from an unavoidab1e appraisal of the world situation, it survived

l7Current Soviet Policies II, 37-38. 120

Ma1enkov's fa11. And because dip10macy is a pragmatic art (which ac-

counts for its limitations), we can readi1y understand the effective-

ness of Soviet foreign po1icy in a wor1d becoming more responsive to

socia1ist and anti-imperia1ist ideo1ogies. In many ways the new Rus-

sian dip10macy of detente and coexistence was better able to adapt to

the changing co1d war than that of the West.

"The requirements of the international situation . he1ped

to free the forces which had matured in the 1ast years of the Sta1in 18 period and in the transition years since the XIX Congress." Whi1e

America had stood a100f from and resisted the process of loosening

international relations, Sta1in's successors active1y fostered it.

Peace was the necessary e1ement for Soviet prosperity. On1y after

Sta1in's death were those who rea1ized the full implications of this

fact given their opportunity to act. Un1ess Russia cou1d coexist with

the West she wou1d never fu11y reap the benefits of peace. This, the

peace party understood. Ma1enkov's government worked in furtherance of

a wor1d situation where the relations between capita1ism and socia1ism,

that is, the national relations between East and West, wou1d be some- .

thing more than hostile uncertainty. The po1icy of de tente was not an

end in itse1f. It set the groundwork for a further stage when rea1

solutions to outstanding issues wou1d have brought norma1cy into inter-

national affairs. This end was peacefu1 coexistence.

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