University of Nevada, Reno NAVIGATING NOVEL HOSTILITIES

University of Nevada, Reno

NAVIGATING NOVEL HOSTILITIES A Story of Cooperation between Armed Political Groups and Their Perception of Threat

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Political Science

by Dilara B. Ozbek

Dr. Susanne N. Martin/ Thesis Advisor

May, 2018

THE GRADUATE SCHOOL

We recommend that the thesis prepared under our supervision by

DILARA B. OZBEK

Entitled

Navigating Novel Hostilities A Story Of Cooperation Between Armed Political Groups And Their Perception Of Threat

be accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

Dr. Susanne Martin, Ph.D, Advisor

Dr. Ian Hartshorn, Ph.D, Committee Member

Dr. Jessia Clark, Ph.D, Graduate School Representative

David W. Zeh, Ph.D., Dean, Graduate School

May, 2018

Abstract

This research engages the ongoing conflict in the Middle East. In 2011, the region fell under the influence of a revolutionary wave known as the Arab Spring. Almost a decade later, effects of pro-democracy uprisings, which have challenged some of the long standing authoritarian regimes in the region, are still experienced. While some states have established their respective stability, in others, such as Syria, the conflict still persists. The instability influencing the region for so long has also created new opportunities for some armed political groups and reinforced the post-Cold War perception of threat associated with the rise of non-state actors. While the relative power that these groups have gained has led nation-states within and outside of the region to rethink their perception of threat, this has also altered incentives for cooperation and competition between these armed political groups in the region. These groups and their changing incentives for cooperation are the main focus of this analysis.

This research offers a descriptive analysis of the changing incentives for cooperation between armed political groups faced by a new threat inflicted from another political actor(s). The study derives from the type of cooperation occurred between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and

Democratic Union Party in 2014. Before 2014, while a form of alliance limited to ideological support was present between the groups, why and how the groups’ strategies changed regarding cooperation, especially in the case of a new threat. It uses qualitative case study analysis to determine to what extent perceived threats play a role in changing the incentives for cooperation between previously independent armed political groups. It proposes a theoretical model derived from the cases. This research finds some support for the idea that incentives for cooperation are altered by the rise of a common threat when it provides new opportunities and benefits for the groups involved.

Dedicated to my mother and father, and my dearest grandmother, the strongest fighter that I have ever known…

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor Dr. Susanne

Martin for her continuous support and guidance to this project; for her patience for my language and grammar mistakes; for her kind motivation and immense knowledge. Without her, this research could not be done.

I would also like to thank the rest of my thesis committee: Dr. Ian Hartshorn for his support since the beginning of my journey in here; and Dr. Jessie Clark for her support and kindness since the day we have met, and for her immense knowledge and insightful comments about the subject.

My sincere thanks also go to the rest of the faculty of the Department of Political Science for letting me be a part of this crazy academic journey.

I would like to thank to the entire staff and faculty of the Office of International Students and Scholars for their endless support and for being my chocolate sponsor for two years, and for giving me my very first job. It has been a privilege to work with you…

I also want to thank Kaitlin, Ellie and Ani for their amazing friendship and support and for making me feel that I was never alone in here. I will never forget our Disney Fridays, “brainy quotes”, all the movies, musicals and bales we have watched and all the walks we have taken together. I will never forget all the road trips that we have planned although we never made it. I know we will, someday... I will also never forget our wine talks and struggle with statistics. I love you all.

Finally, to my parents for their endless support and love, and for always being there for me, no matter how hard distance can be …

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. Abstract ______i

2. Dedication ______ii

3. Acknowledgements ______iii

4. Table of Contents ______iv

5. Introduction ______1

5.1. The Gap and Research Question ______2

5.2. Defining Concepts ______3

5.2.1 Armed Political Groups ______3

5.2.2. Threat ______4

5.2.3. Incentives ______4

5.2.3 Cooperation ______5

6. Literature Review ______7

6.1. Perception of Threat ______7

6.2. Cooperation between Armed Political Groups ______13

6.2.1. Conditions ______13

6.2.2. Presumed Benefits ______17

6.2.3. Possible Drawbacks or Costs ______20

7. Theoretical Assumption and Model ______22

8. Methodology and Data ______33

7.1. Case Selection ______39

7.2. Limitations on Data and Methodology ______41

9. Historical Background ______43

10. Analysis______46

10.1. Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) between 1980 and 2011 ______48

10.2. Democratic Union Party (PYD) between 2003 and 2011 ______61

10.3. The PKK and the PYD between 2011 and 2017 ______68

11. Conclusion ______86

11.1.Limitations ______89

11.2. Implications and Future Research ______90

12. Bibliography ______93

13. Appendix ______143

INTRODUCTION

The perception of threat has long been an important theme in the literatures on international conflict and security. The end of the Cold War and the demise of the bipolar order brought forward a revised agenda for new security challenges. The post-Cold War period changed the perception of threat. Emerging threats come from the rise of non-state actors and their increased capacity for transnational operations as opposed to state-to-state conflicts. This has posed a challenge for state sovereignty and exposed states’ vulnerability to protect their territories against these new international actors. September 11 attacks have culminated this understanding. A new ‘War on

Terror’ drawing new form of alliances has begun between states and non-states. Any violent non- state actor(s), which has defined themselves outside of the state system and which has operated against states, has been mostly portrayed as the enemy. In this respect, armed political groups have been perceived as one of the most significant threats for national and international security.

Armed political groups have long been considered a separate and distinct threat to the nation-states they target. Thus, scholars have provided some explanation regarding why armed political groups cooperate. Consequently, cooperation between these groups has been seen as a bigger threat since the ability to inflict harm on some states is expected to increase through the pooling of resources and cooperation by groups. This perception has resulted perceived threats as an explanation for the incentive for cooperation among armed political groups to be neglected.

However, these groups may also face threats which can increase their incentives for cooperation.

If the new threat is common and more significant than the previous threats and if cooperation would be more beneficial, their cooperation may provide security to these groups. Moreover, their cooperation against this particular threat may even benefit broader populations, which would

2 potentially lead to additional pay-offs in terms of recognition, support and even legitimacy. Given new threats, perhaps more attention should be given to understand the role of shared threats in armed political groups’ changing incentives for cooperation.

The Gap and the Research Question

The end of the Cold War resulted in many shifts in international relations. With the disintegration of the bipolar system, the necessity of a new world order emerged in which cooperation and connectivity became more important than the ideological confrontations of the previous era. This new world order has been described as “unipolar moment” (Mastanduno 1997) with the rise of the United States as the only great power along with the rise of violent non-state actors, such as al-Qaeda, which have been evaluated as the source of new security challenges

(Fettweis 2017; Graebner 2001; Xuetong 2011; Zala 2013). Although unipolar system has been interpreted as more stable, changing dynamics of this new structure have also necessitated new alliances between states against the emerging non-state actors as the new threats, especially against those with transnational ties and those operating in stateless areas (or within weak states). While this has resulted in perceiving any group(s) out of the nation-state system as the enemy of the system, understanding that armed political groups could also be threatened in a similar way that states are has been neglected. This perception has ingenerated international relation theories to remain focus on the behaviors of states in terms of establishing alliances and cooperation under unipolarity while simultaneously reducing armed political groups to threat to the nation-state system (Gaddis 2014; Pastusiak 2004).

Theories of international relations have remained state-oriented while the non-state actors have been frequently treated as secondary actors. This has resulted in a gap in the literature

3 especially within the context of incentives for cooperation between non-state actors. Drawing from the gap in the literature, this research focuses on cooperation and conflict between non-state groups to understand how these groups perceive and react to threats. Then, the purpose of this research is to answer the following question:

Does the emergence of a new and significant threat alter the incentives for cooperation between previously independent armed political groups? If so, why?

Defining Concepts

Armed political groups, threat, incentives and cooperation are the key concepts used in this thesis. They are defined in accordance to the existing definitions in the literatures on conflict and security.

Armed Political Groups

Armed political groups- including separatist, nationalist non-state actors, terrorists, insurgents, militant and other type of violent groups- refer to actors operating outside of and often against the control of state and posing a threat to states using violence to achieve political goals

(Berti 2016; Chaudhry 2013; Englehart 2016; Hoffman & Schneckener 2011; Krause & Milliken

2009; Schlichte 2012). These groups are identified with their ability to use violence as a challenge to states and their territorial sovereignty (Berti 2016; Hoffman & Schneckener 2011; Krause &

Milliken 2009). The use of violence has often been treated as a rational choice and strategic decision for the ideologically motivated groups that wish to establish a political agenda and to garner attention for it (Crenshaw 1981; Freedman 2007; Hoffman 2006). Hence, it is the acquisition and coercive use of force to establish political change (Hoffman 2006). The use of

4 violence has also been evaluated as a useful tactic because of its effectiveness to gain attention of larger audiences (Hoffman 2006; Shapiro 2017). Proceeding from these definitions, cases that are used for this research are described as armed political groups.

Threat

The Oxford English Dictionary defines the concept of threat as something oppressive or dangerous, “a declaration of an intention to make some hostile action” (2002). Similarly, a threat is usually perceived by the international relations literature as a situation in which an actor(s) has either the capability or intent to inflict harm on another actor(s) (Buzan 1984; Garcia-Retamero &

Rousseau 2007). In that sense, threats have been referred to a perception of an actor’s capabilities or intentions (Perez 2016). Perception refers to “any possible danger that is experienced by a person subjectively and out of proportion to the real threat or physical danger” (“Defined Term”).

The concept itself, which has been mostly associated with military power, has most of the time referred to the national security and states’ vulnerabilities against internal and external forces

(Brauch 2011; Buzan 1984; Ullman 1983). Following these definitions, what I refer as threat is a perception of threat. Yet, unlike the academic emphasis on states’ perception of threats, the focus here is the perception of threats by non-state actors.

Incentives

The Oxford English Dictionary (2018) refers to incentives as something “that motivates or encourages someone to do something.” Here, references to incentives point at groups’ incentives as a whole. Thus, changes in incentives mean changes in groups’ incentives, not individuals’ incentives. Incentives refer to factors that determine armed political groups’ “behavior” (Crenshaw

1985; Phillips 2012). As Crenshaw (1985, p. 7) argues there is a psychological aspect to incentives.

However, to determine groups’ behavior it is also important to identify the “non-psychological/ instrumental” aspect of incentives, (i.e., strategic aspect) (Crenshaw 1985). In this respect, changes in groups’ incentives corresponding to changes in perceived threats involve both psychological and strategic aspects.

In addition, Clark and Wilson (1961, p. 129) also argues three types of incentives:

“material, solidary and purposive” (Phillips 2012, p. 18). While ‘material incentives’ imply physical benefits, such as resources, ‘solidary’ and ‘purposive incentives’ refer to nonphysical gains, including a sense of belonging or, for solidary, “bounding between members of group when group is threatened by another group” (Phillips 2012, p. 19). The types of incentives I address are both material and solidary incentives, which originate from a threat and the opportunities that the threat provides. In this respect, both psychological/solidary and non-psychological/material incentives would probably motivate groups to takes action.

Cooperation

The Oxford English Dictionary (2018) defines the concept of cooperation as the act of

“working together” or as an alliance to pursue a common goal or presumed mutual benefit.

Academic explanations refer to cooperation as logistical and operational coordination (Karmon

2005; Philips 2012). In the literature on conflict and security, cooperation is expected as a reaction to a conflict or challenge (Chadwick 1998). Therefore, the term also means direct interaction

(Phillips 2012).

There are several types of cooperation. As Moghadam (2015, p. 22) discusses, cooperation between armed political groups may vary from “high-end to low-end cooperative relationships.”

These relationships may also take different forms, such as “ideological, logistical and operational”

(Karmon 2005; Moghadam 2015). Furthermore, cooperative relationships can also differ in terms of “activities that groups engage in” (Moghadam 2015, p. 22). Those activities may be limited to a single form, such as an ideological support only (Moghadam 2015), or they may take multiple forms, such as ideological, logistical and operational support. Cooperation limited to an ideological support constitutes a low-end relationship (Moghadam 2015). Cooperation based on a strategic alliance originating from logistical and operational support, which may necessitate allocation of groups’ resources and information, and which may require combination of forces, including crossing borders, constitute a high-end relationship (Bacon 2013; Moghadam 2015).

The type of cooperation I specifically address here is what Moghadam (2015) defines as high-end relationship. I claim what happened in 2014 between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party

(PKK) and the Democratic Union Party (PYD) is an example of a high-end cooperation. I argue that before 2014, the type of relationship between the groups was closer to a low-end type of cooperation, which took the form of ideological support and it may have been limited to ideological support. Because the states’ borders where these groups operate are relatively porous and because the PKK and the PYD share ideological affinity (Ozcelik 2015), it may not have been difficult to find physical and ideological common ground. However, strategic alliances or “mergers”

(Moghadam 2015) may require more than common ground; they may require interdependence between the groups to achieve a mutual benefit or coexist together (Phillips 2012). A strategic alliance or merger is “the most complete type of cooperation because it entails the unification of the collaborating groups’ command and control structure, the integration of their fighting forces, and the pooling of their resources” (Moghadam 2015, p. 22). I argue that this form cooperation differs from an ideological alliance, which has almost always been present between the PKK and

7 the PYD (Ozcelik 2015). Therefore, in reference to cooperation, I refer specifically to strategic cooperation or high-end collaboration, as defined by Moghadam (2015).

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature leaves a gap on cooperation between armed political groups and the conditions that may be conducive to and the presumed benefits of cooperation, especially when these groups are faced with a new threat. Armed political groups have been treated mostly as the source of threats (Berti 2016; Enders & Sandler 2006; Englehart 2016; Freedman 2007; Goodwin,

Gains Jr. & Willson 2005; Hoffman 2006; Hoffman & Schneckener 2011; Karmon 2005; Krause

& Milliken 2009; Moghadam 2017; Stein 2013). This understanding has commonly resulted from the dominant perception of threat, as something posed by armed groups, in the conflict and security literature. These groups’ use of violence has been evaluated as a part of a strategy to coerce, provoke or intimidate their various adversaries or spoil the peace (Hoffman 2006; Kydd & Walter

2006; Shapiro 2017). Thus, when armed political groups cooperate, it has been framed as increasing threat (Moghadam 2017; Phillips 2012; Rollins 2010) since the idea of threat has been equated largely with capacity (Horowitz 2010; Stein 2013). It is believed that through cooperation, these groups could gain more power against their adversaries and pose a bigger threat or challenge

(Moghadam 2017). Much of literature on international conflict and security have on national security while missing incentives for cooperation between armed political groups.

Perception of Threat

Focus of threat in literature is not new. But, one reason it has been re-evaluated as a transnational threat has originated from the rise of new identities, mostly religious, in the post-

Cold War era (Frayman 2006; Reychler 1997). What distinguishes these groups from their

8 predecessors in the post-Cold War era is the emergence of a global jihadi ideology parallel to the emergence of new identities and their use of new tactics, which have unleashed a new form of armed conflict between nation states and violent non-state groups (Frayman 2006; Moghadam

2017). In some ways, this has resulted in nation-states facing a new type of threat, which has been poised against the state-system (Frayman 2006; Moghadam 2017; Reychler 1997).

Any internal or external activity that infringes upon states’ sovereign authority or which challenges its spatial borders has been perceived as a threat to a state’s security and as a threat to the nation state system (Chatterjee 2002; Daher 2005; Falah & Newman 1995; Stewart 2016). The aftermath of the First and Second World Wars has renewed attention to national sovereignty with regard to borders and re-defined national self-determination with respect to the rise of international organizations, such as the United Nations (Brahm 2004; Elden 2006). The First and Second World

Wars illustrated the unstable nature of multinational international system in terms of states’ capacity to challenge each other’s territorial sovereignty (Kelleh 2012; Schweller 1993). The emergence of international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and North Atlantic

Treaty Organization (NATO) after the Second World War and increase attention to international law have served as a guarantee to the idea of sovereignty and the nation-state system (Aleksovski,

Avramovska & Bakreski 2014; Dyke 1957; Ebegbulem 2011; Eke 2007; Korovin 1946;

Schwarzenberger 1964; Vaughan 2011). A continuation of the norm of territorial sovereignty and national security, from now on, has been supported by alliances and multinational treaties relying on international law and (Kelleh 2012).

The end of First and Second World Wars did not only necessitate that international organizations monitor the international system but also witnessed the creation of new nations, as

9 well as the resurgence of nations without states and the problem of displaced communities

(Gowlland-Debbas 1994; Mansbach & Rhodes 2007). The continued existence of stateless nations and displaced communities continue to raise questions to the traditional understanding of state formation and sovereignty has been perceived as another form of threat to the nation-state system

(Jackson 1990; Spruyt 2011). A traditional understanding of state formation, parallel to the notion of sovereignty, has been structured around the administrative functions of the state including the legitimate authority over the use of force (Tilly 1975; Weber 1978). In recognition of stateless nations, the absence of institutional state autonomy has been perceived as an ungoverned use of force, and so, as a threat to the system and the norm of territorial sovereignty (Singer 2003; Spruyt

2011). This has increased the attention to the necessity of “collective security” (Ebegbulem 2011) under the supervision of international institutions almost inevitable while prioritizing the states in their self-determination (Spruyt 2011).

During the Cold War, the conflict between the superpowers was shaped by ideology, specifically, the capitalist ideology of the West poised in opposition to the communist ideology of the Soviets (Huntington 1993). In other words, the traditional role of the Western states and its institutions was challenged by the communist ideology which proposed an eventual elimination of the state (Lopez & Stohl 1998). Unlike the challenges of the First and Second Worlds Wars to territorial sovereignty, ideological confrontation of the Cold War questioned the role of states and the system developed around it (Kent & Young 2013; Lopez & Stohl 1998). It has altered perception of threat by changing the emphasis from physical borders to ideological borders

(Brauch 2011). This ideological conflict has triggered other conflicts such as “nationalist” and

“religious” which were not given much attention before the Cold War (Reychler 1997). Western ideology has treated “national separatists” and “religious fundamentalists” as marginal groups by

10 mainly addressing them as threats to the existing international order, as well as the idea of collective security (Huntington 1993; Reychler 1997; Zarakol 2011). The end of ideological war between superpowers has not only lifted the “iron curtain” between the West and East, but also opened space for non-national and transnational forms of cultural identities (Juergensmeyer 2002).

The collapse of Soviet Bloc undermined the secular motives and led to religious identities gaining momentum. This led to new kind of conflicts while enabling new forms of cultural, ideological and religious forces to transgress spatial borders of the Westphalian order (Appadurai 1996; Billig

1995; Eriksen 2007; Huntington 1993; Juergensmeyer 2002). The explosion of nationalist, cultural, ethnic and religious identity conflicts has become the new evil that undermines territorial sovereignity of nation states in the post-Cold War era (Reychler 1997). Hence, the post-Cold War era has witnessed a new form of perception of threat shaped by different cultural and ideological struggles mostly between nation-states and new violent political actors (Huntington 1993;

Juergensmeyer 2002).

The emergence of transnational cultural and religious movements as a challenge to the nation-state system was not only related to the ideological motive of the Cold War but also coupled with the Western colonial ideas as a threat to other international actors (Bergesen & Lizardo 2004;

Linjakumpu 2003; Vaughan 2011). Colonialism (and imperialism) has been perceived as a threat by other states, nations or non-state groups (Bergesen & Lizardo 2004; Linjakumpu 2003;

Vaughan 2011). It has been used as a form of superiority and domination of the West over other cultures and identities (Bulhan 2015; Quijano 2000). The decline of state’s autonomy over the use of force in colonial terms has enabled the creation of new nations, as well as the re-appearance of new forms of cultural, ethnic and religious identities (Feinstein & Wimmer 2010; Pamir 1997). In this respect, many of the post-Cold War identities, including religious identities, have defined

11 themselves as anti-colonial (Rapoport 2002; Williams 2008). Hereby, especially among the non- state actors, a new anti-colonial movement as a form of identity conflict has started (Rapoport

2002). In many instances, their association with violence in their self- determination of identities against the nation-states has also contributed the post-Cold War, Western perception of threat

(Reychler 1997).

This perception has seeped more into the post-Cold War understanding of threat and national security when al-Qaeda attacked the United States in 2001 (Acharya 2015; Elden 2009;

Enders & Sandler 2004; Hoffman 2007; Kakihara 2003; Mythen & Walklate 2008; Shaw 2005).

Al-Qaeda is an Islamist group, a global movement, which has attracted religious extremists, has enabled a form of alliance between other radical groups who sharing a similar ideology, and has surpassed territorial borders (Gregory & Wilkinson 2005; Gunaratha 2003). Thus, al-Qaeda’s attacks on the United States’ soil have strengthened the fear of identity conflicts, especially of the religious fundamentalism, by challenging United States’ national sovereignty and territoriality

(Elden 2009; Scheerder 2012; Wilkinson 2003). Al-Qaeda’s attacks have resonated in the international arena and cultivated fear of new form conflict among identity groups and nation- states (Elden 2009; Scheerder 2012; Wilkinson 2003).

Since the Treaty of Westphalia, the perception of threat has developed alongside to the idea of territorial sovereignty (Cornelisse 2010; Donnan & Willson 1998; Eudaily & Smith 2008;

Hinsley 1966; Scudder 2010; Shaw 2003). Any groups that challenge territorial sovereignty of states has been evaluated as a threat (Chatterjee 2002; Daher 2005; Falah & Newman 1995;

Stewart 2016). In this respect, al-Qaeda’s association with the establishment of a caliphate state has been evaluated as the challenge to the Westphalian state order, particularly in terms of national

12 borders and homogeneity (Adraoui 2017; Moghadam 2017; Turner 2014). The fundamental objective of the idea of a caliphate state is to build a global caliphate system by redefining the idea of state and its sovereignty (Mendelsohn 2015; Sykiainen 2017; Zhongmin 2013). A caliphate state is a state governed by the Islamic rules as opposed to secular institutions and sovereignty is defined by the absolute authority of “the Caliph” unlike the Westphalian norm of sovereignty lying with the nation a within the state (Sykiainen 2017). Therefore, a caliphate state has been perceived as a threat to the Westphalian model of states’ monopoly over the given territory (Adraoui 2017;

Chaudhry 2013; Turner 2014).

The rise of al-Qaeda and groups sharing aspects of its violent version of Salafism have also contributed to the idea of an “invisible enemy” with an ability to operate transnationally (Coughlin

2009; Rapoport 2002; Rodeheaver & Zafirovski 2013). This transnational ability has further challenged spatial borders of states (Coughlin 2009; Rodeheaver & Zafirovski 2013). This operational ability has also allowed armed political groups to use new tactics and strategies, such as transnational use of suicide bombings, against the states that they target (Adraoui 2017; Lewis

2013; Moghadam 2017; Sandler 2015; Rodeheaver & Zafirovski 2013). Groups’ transnationality has increased states vulnerability when it comes to protecting their territory (Adraoui 2017;

Moghadam 2017; Sandler 2015; Rodeheaver & Zafirovski 2013). Furthermore, these groups have included diverse recruitment methods, which have allowed them to attract a wider audience and support their transnational operations (Rapoport 2002; Venhaus 2010). This has also posed further threat to the territorial integrity of states and nations (Coughlin 2009; Rodeheaver & Zafirovski

2013). An “Islamic other” has been defined as a threat by Western societies (Burke 2013; Boyd,

Chunn & Lessard 2011; Cafarella, Gambhir, Kagan, Kagan & Zimmerman 2016). This understanding has affected perceptions of threat (Bennis 2015).

Cooperation between Armed Political Groups

The literature offers several explanations regarding incentives for cooperation between armed political groups (Crenshaw 2010; Bridwell 2015; Bueno de Mesquita 2005; Desouza &

Hensgen 2006; Friman 2008; Horowitz &Potter 2011; Karmon 2005; Kruger & Maleckova 2003;

Moghadam 2017; Neumann 2007; Phillips 2012). Armed political groups usually have political goals, which affect the groups’ operational strategies (Moghadam 2017; Phillips 2012; Williams

2008). Cooperation, in this respect, has been defined as a strategy for these groups (Lichbach 1995;

Moghadam 2017; Phillips 2012; Williams 2008). It is believed that armed political groups cooperate if cooperation maximizes their strategic advantages or they avoid cooperation if it does not provide any benefit (Lichbach 1995; Moghadam 2017). Therefore, incentives for cooperation may change depending on the advantages or disadvantages of cooperation and perception of these

(Moghadam 2017; Phillips 2012; Williams 2008).

Conditions

There are some conditions and presumed benefits, which are believed to alter incentives for cooperation between political armed groups. Armed political groups are expected to be more likely cooperate under certain conditions. Drawing from the literature, I list these conditions as the existence of shared ideology, identity and political goals; geographic proximity; failed state; and a desire to gain territory. The presence of these conditions affects armed political groups’ incentives and provide them an opportunity for cooperation.

Ideology, Identity and Political Goal- Armed political groups have a certain ideology or identity in order to pursuit their political agendas, which define groups’ actions (Abubakar & Varin

2017; Grävingholt, Hoffman & Klingebiel 2007). When groups share a similar ideology or

14 identity, such as Islamic or Muslim, or political goals, such as national-separatism, it may contribute the groups’ cooperation (Frayman 2006; Grävingholt, Hoffman & Klingebiel 2007;

Karmon 2005; Moghadam 2017). For instance, many Islamist groups have alliances with one another, as have those tied by leftist ideologies (Horowitz & Potter 2011). Therefore, the existence of a similar ideology, identity or political goals may be expected to increase incentives for cooperation between groups.

Territoriality- Territoriality refers to the attachment to a particular space over a given a given entity (Vollaard 2009). The idea of territoriality is associated with a political entity where sovereign authority is maintained by a nation-state (Billig 1995; Chatterjee 1991; Croxton 1999;

Driver 2014; Herb 1999; Juergensmeyer 2002; Mostov 2014; Steunebrink 2008). Territoriality, in this respect, has usually been judged from the perspective of the nation-states (Adraoui 2017;

Donnan & Willson 1998; Hinsley 1966; Jackson 2003; Krasner 1996; Longo 2017).

Territoriality understood in that may disregard non-state actors. Despite this, many groups have established their own territorial entity as a part of their political agenda (Berti 2016; Krause

2013). Violent non-state groups, such as Hamas in Palestine, Hezbollah in Lebanon or even ISIS in Iraq and Syria share a similar struggle to achieve a type of sovereignty, which, however, is in conflict with the Westphalian understanding (Berti 2016; Krause 2013; Voller 2014).

Geographic Proximity- Geographic proximity may be another condition that facilitates cooperation between armed political groups (Moghadam 2017). The ease of travel between regions in which groups operate may facilitate cooperation (Menon & Paul 2017; Moghadam 2017).

Geographic proximity provides easy access to groups’ operational camps where they may train, arrange “face-to-face meetings” and share tactics and resources (Moghadam 2017). Geographical

15 proximity also means that they are more likely to share a cross-border context as well as people

(Blum 2014; Malji 2015). Therefore, geographic proximity may provide a ground for cooperation and this may be expected to increase incentives to cooperate.

Failed State- A state, which loses its ability to provide ‘economic’, ‘public’ and ‘territorial security’, as well as its autonomy over given territory has been perceived as a ‘failed’ or ‘weak state’ (Cecon 2014; Grävingholt, Hoffman & Klingebiel 2007; Newman 2009; Patrick 2006; Poku et al. 2007; Schneckener 2004; Yannis 2002). Similar to the threat and opportunity arguments, failed states have been seen by the Western societies as threats to other states (Cecon 2014;

Menkhaus 2004). This assumption originated from the common belief that failed states are most likely to provide place for violent non-state actors to operate, gain strength and pose a threat to the nation-states (Cecon 2014; Patrick 2007). A failed state is unable to perform the basic functions of a state, such as the legitimate of power (Holmes 2013; Rotberg 2011). This may lead to political openings, which may provide armed political groups to operate (Holmes 2013). In situations such as this, incentive for cooperation may be expected to increase (Grävingholt, Hoffman & Klingebiel

2007; Kilberg 2012; Schneckener 2004).

Increasing incentives to cooperate is clear in ethnically divided states (Grävingholt,

Hoffman & Klingebiel 2007; Jackson 1990). For instance, after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, instability in Iraq deepened sectarian war (Hamasaeed 2017). Iraq’s government replaced with weaker institutions that lacked capacity and legitimacy (Grimm & Merkel 2008; McAdam, Tarrow

& Tilly 2001; Mines 2013). As Holmes (2013) discusses “when the monopoly of force is lost, violent groups establish reciprocal relationships with the relevant marginalized populations, allowing these actors to not only exist in weak states, but to thrive.” This provided opportunity for

16 the political groups, such as the Kurds, Shias and some Sunnis in Iraq to cooperate (Hamasaeed

2017; Mansour 2017). Similarly, a state failure in Afghanistan contributed to the rise of al-Qaeda as a transnational threat (Cecon 2014; Patrick, 2007). The inability of the Afghan state to monitor al-Qaeda’s actions provided al-Qaeda resources for mobilization, such as human resources (Cecon

2014; Chaudhry 2013; Patrick 2006). Or, a failed state in Libya after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 opened a space for armed political groups to operate (Durac 2015). In a similar way, failure of Somalian state in 1969 enabled ethnic militia groups and clans to gain space to operate

(Makhubela 2016; Venugopalan 2017).

However, I believe that failed states do not pose a threat to armed political groups as long as the groups gain opportunities. Even though the opposite case has not been made, failed states have been mostly seen as threats to the international society because of their loss of legitimate use of force, which contributes to the groups achieve support for their activies (Cecon 2014; Holmes

2013; Menkhaus 2004; Patrick 2007). Armed political groups mostly benefit from the lack of state control over territory to gain political opportunity (Cecon 2014; Patrick 2007). It is expected that the presence of a failed state may increase incentives for cooperation between armed political groups.

One may still wonder why groups cooperate when they do not share objectives or when there is no failed state or when there is no territorial aspect and no geographic proximity. Presence of these or similar conditions help these groups to operate or make cooperation easier. However, they are not enough to increase incentives to cooperation alone. They may even lead to conflict or competition between armed political groups. Absent an expectation of benefit from cooperation

17 would likely result in conflict or competition. Therefore, conditions conducive to cooperation may not be enough unless groups expect benefits from cooperation.

Presumed Benefits

It is more likely that armed political groups will cooperate when they expect to benefit from cooperation. Drawing from the literature, I list these presumed benefits of cooperation as increasing probability of survival; increasing possibility of achieving more resources, support, recognition and even gaining legitimacy; increasing probability of bargaining leverage; and spreading political agenda.

Survival- From groups’ perspectives survival is one of the most important prerequisites for success because without survival, there would be less likely a success (Moghadam 2017). In order to survive, groups may need, for instance, to increase their resources, such as personnel and armament, with cooperation (Moghadam 2017). Groups determine their strengths and weaknesses, and their capabilities before taking action in a given situation (Crenshaw 1985; Crenshaw 2010;

Moghadam 2017; Phillips 2012). Cooperation, in this respect, may increase the chance of survival during the times of weakness (Crenshaw 2010; Moghadam 2017; Phillips 2012). Facing new threat, groups may seek survival first (Crenshaw 1985; Phillips 2012). Then, increase probability of survival would most likely motivate groups to cooperate.

Resources- Armed political groups require resources to operate and increase their capacity to achieve their goals (Bueno de Mesquita 2005). Armed groups have limited resources, yet they likely seek to maximize resources, including support and financing to operate and survive

(Moghadam 2017; Phillips 2012). Groups may pool resources in order to improve their odds

(Bacon 2013; Phillips 2012). Resource sharing may increase the existing materials, as well as the chance of success (Lichbach 1995; Phillips 2012). Cooperation may make this possible.

Support, Recognition & Legitimacy- Support, recognition and legitimacy are other potential benefits of cooperation (Grävingholt, Hoffman, & Klingebiel 2007). Armed political groups may gain support by joining forces (Bueno de Mesquita 2005; Kruger & Maleckova 2003;

Kis-Katos, Schulze & Turgut 2009). Increased support may lead to enjoy the enhanced recognition and legitimacy (Moghadam 2017). Recognition may take form of public attention and support

(Eskici, Akdogan & Ragab 2016; Omanga, 2016). In gaining recognition, groups aim to become a part of public discourse (Omanga 2016). Groups have been seen as illegitimate due to their use of violence and their operations outside and against states (Berti 2016; Bloom 2017; Englehart

2016; Hoffman & Schneckener 2011; Krause & Milliken 2009). However, legitimacy may also be gained through cooperation if cooperation benefits larger audience (Kausch 2017). It has been argued that, for instance, negotiating with these groups rewards them, leaving the government open to further attacks while giving these group more power (Bridwell 2015; Neumann 2007). However, it is also expected the more these groups gain support, the more they will be recognized as legitimate actors to negotiate, which will eventually add their political legitimacy (Bridwell 2015;

Neumann 2007). Therefore, when groups expect to gain support, recognition and legitimacy, cooperation will become more likely.

One may ask how armed political groups may be able to gain legitimacy. The illegitimacy of these groups mostly originates from their use of violence or intention to use violence against their adversaries, including civilians (Crenshaw 1981; Enders & Sandler 2006; Hoffman 2006) and the challenge they pose to state sovereignty (Berti 2016; Englehart 2016; Hoffman &

Schneckener 2011; Krause & Milliken 2009). The legitimate use of violence has been associated with states (Bassiouni 2004; Krause &Milliken 2009). In this respect, it has been argued that armed political groups cannot maintain the legitimacy since they pose a direct threat to the nation-state order (Krause &Milliken 2009; Zarakol, 2011). However, I argue that when a more significant threat appears, which also becomes a threat to states, cooperating against it may provide legitimacy for these groups. For instance, when ISIS emerged as the major challenge in 2014, Syrian Kurdish groups, including the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed wing, People’s Protection

Units (YPG), Iraqi Kurdish peshmergas and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) joined the international collation led by the United States against ISIS (“The Time of the Kurds” 2014). A partnership with violent non-state actors may not be as likely as a partnership between states

(Kausch 2017). However, ISIS’s threat was transnational, and it posed a threat not only to states but also non-state actors because the threat would most likely lead to changes in political space, which would affect the groups in the region (Abrams 2017; Coats 2018). From this point of view, cooperating against a transnational threat alongside state actors may provide legitimacy to the groups’, such as the PYD, YPG and PKK, use of violence, as well territorial claim (Associate

Press 2017). Therefore, when groups expect to gain support, recognition and legitimacy, they may become more willing to cooperate.

Bargaining Leverage- Bargaining leverage emphasizes the capabilities and vulnerabilities of each side in an ongoing struggle in which actors try to maximize their advantage and strength their position (Friman 2008). Armed political groups may seek to maximize their power against other state and non-state actors to realize their political agenda (Bapat & Bond 2012). Mutual cooperation may improve armed political groups’ bargaining leverage because through cooperation, groups can increase their capacity and the challenge that they pose against their

20 adversaries (Friman 2008; Moghadam 2017). This would also increase the groups’ power against state and non-state actors (Bapat & Bond 2012). Then, when groups expect to increase their bargaining leverages, they may be expected to cooperate.

Political Agenda- Armed political groups are believed to operate in accordance to a specific political agenda, such as national separatism, anarchism or secularism (Karmon 2005). Armed political groups’, such as terrorists and insurgents, agenda may be a challenge to states (Berti 2016;

Englehart 2016; Hoffman 2011; Krause & Milliken 2009). Cooperation is more likely to occur when these groups expect to benefit from a shared political agenda that they can better accomplish together (Moghadam 2017). In this respect, when armed political groups expect to benefit from an increase in their capacity to pursue their political agenda, incentives for cooperation between these groups are more likely to increase (Horowitz & Potter 2011).

Possible Drawbacks or Costs

There may be some drawbacks as a result of cooperation. Armed political groups aim to gain a desired outcome. However, those benefits may not always be realized. There may be some costs involve when groups cooperate (Moghadam 2017; Phillips 2012; Williams 2008). I list possible drawbacks as losing existing advantages and decreasing probability of survival; decreasing resources and information; decreasing organizational power and control, as well as support. When expected benefits outweigh these possible drawbacks, incentives for cooperation are expected to increase.

Survival- For armed political groups, cooperation may become a part of a strategy aimed to gain a desired outcome. However, cooperation may not always be beneficial, and groups may even lose their existing advantages (Moghadam 2017). One of the most important benefits that

21 groups can gain from cooperation is, for example, survival to operate (Moghadam 2017; Phillips

2012). Yet, the more they cooperate, it is expected that they will gain more attention from the public as well as their respective adversaries (Phillips 2012). Increased attention may most of the time be profitable for these groups’ political purposes (Phillips 2012). However, gaining attention may also decrease their chance of survival because they will become bigger challenges for states

(Moghadam 2017; Phillips 2012). In this respect, they become target by states and this may decrease their survival (Moghadam 2017; Phillips 2012; Williams 2008). Then, if groups expect a decrease in survival, this would more likely discourage cooperation.

Organizational control and power- Armed political groups generally cooperate to increase their knowledge and resources for survival and operational purposes (Moghadam 2017; Phillips

2012). However, cooperation may require groups to share their information and resources with each other to operate together (Moghadam 2017; Phillips 2012; Wiewel & Hunter 1985). This may result groups in losing their organizational control and power in consequence of “asymmetric information” (Lichbach 1995; Moghadam 2017; Phillips 2012). Asymmetric information refers to an uneven sharing regarding resources and information (Lichbach 1995; Moghadam 2017; Phillips

2012). In a situation similar to this, groups may expect to lose their organization control of power because cooperation would create an interdependency (Lichbach 1995; Moghadam 2017; Phillips

2012). Then, this may discourage cooperation.

Support and Political Agenda- Armed political groups have long been considered as distinct groups because each of them may have a slightly different political agenda and audience

(Moghadam 2017; Phillips 2012). It is mostly believed that through cooperation, armed political groups can advance their networks, support, and political agenda (Grävingholt, Hoffman, &

Klingebiel 2007; Karmon 2005; Friman 2008; Moghadam 2017; Phillips 2012). Yet, in situations when groups do not share ideological similarities, or when their audiences are segmented, their cooperation may also lead to losses in their networks and support, as well as failure in furthering their political agendas (Phillips 2012). Therefore, when groups expect to lose support or a failure in political agenda, they may be discouraged from cooperating.

These drawbacks may decrease armed political groups’ incentives if their presumed drawbacks are greater than their expected benefits. However, if expected benefits of cooperation outweigh these possible drawbacks, incentives for cooperation are expected to remain.

THEORETICAL ASSUMPTION AND MODEL

Does the emergence of a new and significant threat alter the incentives for cooperation between previously independent armed political groups? If then, why do armed political groups need to cooperate? How do incentives for cooperation between armed political groups change?

What is the role of threat in altering strategies in regard to cooperation? Scholars have indicated different explanations for cooperation between armed political groups (Crenshaw 2010; Bridwell

2015; Bueno de Mesquita 2005; Desouza & Hensgen 2006; Friman 2008; Horowitz &Potter 2011;

Karmon 2005; Kruger & Maleckova 2003; Moghadam 2017; Neumann 2007; Lichbach 1995;

Phillips 2012; Williams 2008) but the literature demonstrates the extent to which it has yet to be adequately addressed, especially with regard to the role of threat in changing the incentives for cooperation.

State-centric approaches dominate the discussion of cooperation and perception of threat.

Threat, or the perception of threat, has primarily been associated with the territorial aspect of the norm of sovereignty (Donnan & Willson 1998; Eudaily & Smith 2008; Hinsley 1966; Scudder

2010; Shaw 2003). While the existing literature focuses on states’ perceptions of threats, armed political groups, which are outside of the state system, have usually been identified as a source of threat (Acharya 2015; Elden 2009; Enders & Sandler 2004; Hoffman 2007; Kakihara 2003;

Mythen & Walklate 2008; Shaw 2005). This has also led to discussions developing mostly around nation-states and their perceptions of threats (Korovin 1946; Schweller 1993; Wenger &

Zimmerman 2003) while leaving cooperation between armed political groups under-theorized.

In 2014, corresponding to the rise of ISIS, the cooperation between the Kurdistan Workers’

Party (PKK) and the Democratic Union Party (PYD) changed from ideological alliance to strategical alliance. In order to understand this particular case, I suggest an assumption that armed political groups’ incentives may change when their paths are interrupted by specific critical events, such as the rise of a new threat. This framework provides a way of understanding cooperation between the PKK and the PYD. Cooperation occurs along the lines of a sequence of events

(Lijphart 1971). As a result, changes in incentives to cooperate come from changes in perception of threat (see Figure 1).

Hypothesis: Incentives for cooperation increase as perceived threats increase.

I argue incentives are transformed as threat levels increase; in addition, opportunities arise as context and benefits change. Depending on the impact of threat on state and non-state actors, changes in perceived threat may lead to changes in opportunities and changes in cost and benefit calculations. These changes may be affected by contextual changes, including the Arab Spring and the Syrian civil war, which produced political openings and led to contextual transformation. These developments benefitted armed political groups, including ISIS, to not only operate but also thrive.

In addition, there may be additional factors, such as transformations in power distribution and

24 target. When these elements are combined or added each other, they will result in changes in groups’ incentives, which would likely lead to changes in groups’ strategy regarding cooperation

(see Figure 1). In this process, there may be factors that make cooperation easier, such as the presence of ideological and identity affinity, as well as geographic proximity. However, these factors are not necessary in strategical alliances even though their presence may help groups cooperate easier. Moreover, groups would expect to gain benefits from cooperation. Yet, benefits may not be always realized.

This is an interrelated process that is similar to a gun mechanism on which one needs to unlock the ‘safety catch’ to fire it. The process that I describe here refers to The Gun Model (see figure 1). The triggering mechanism is the process by which changes in perceived threats affect how strategic decisions are made. The groups’ security, or ‘safety catch’, is unlocked by ISIS. This triggers changes in perceived threat. However, unlocking the ‘safety catch’ is not enough to fire the gun or, in this instance, realize the cooperation. Groups need some other elements to hold on to fire the gun, or here, to operate and cooperate. These elements are changes in opportunities and cost and benefit calculations, which are contingent upon changes in perceived threat. When the security is unlocked and when there are changes in opportunities and benefits, groups would most likely aim to gain their expected benefits like a gun aiming to hit the target.

A threat implies conditions or situations in which an actor’s capabilities or intentions are perceived as intimidating by another actors (Buzan 1984; Cohen 1978; Garcia-Retamero &

Rousseau 2007; Perez 2016; Stein 2013). Threats refer not only to one’s capabilities or intentions but also to actors’ perceptions of those capabilities or intentions. From this point of view, as Gause

(2010, p. 273) argues, “identifying threats is the starting point of decision making on alliance.” In

25 this respect, changes in incentives to cooperate come from a group’s internalization of threats.

Threats posed by the Islamic State may be viewed as urgent by the PKK and the PYD perhaps even more so, than the struggles between the PKK and the Turkish state and the PYD and the

Syrian state.

Several factors distinguish ISIS’s threats from other threats. First, ISIS’s threat is territorial.

Although territory belongs to states and their sovereignties (Adraoui 2017; Donnan & Willson

1998; Hinsley 1966; Jackson 2003; Krasner 1996; Longo 2017), armed political groups like the

PKK and the PYD seek territory in which to operate. They also seek territory for the people they claim to represent as a part of their political agenda (Berti 2016; Krause 2013). ISIS, in this respect, threatens the operational and political spaces the PKK and the PYD seek to control. Second, ISIS poses an existential threat for the PKK and the PYD. As Stephens (2015, p. 233) argues, “the

Kurds have never faced quite as virulent and destructive a threat as the Islamic State (ISIS), which has sought to utterly destroy Kurdish political and cultural life in Iraq and Syria.” The PKK and the PYD are the groups representing separatist nationalism, and they are secular, which would make them ISIS’s target because there is no place separatist nationalism and secularism in Salafism

(Stephens 2015). Finally, ISIS poses a transnational threat, in part because the group seeks to establish an Islamic caliphate and seeks to do so through a global jihad. A caliphate state is a state governed by the Islamic rules as opposed to secular institutions and sovereignty is defined by the absolute authority of “the Caliph” unlike the Westphalian norm of sovereignty lying with the nation a within the state (Sykiainen 2017). As such, the rise of ISIS can be seen as “the decisive intervening variable between action and reaction …” (Cohen 1978, p. 93). Therefore, the threat posed by ISIS may be seen as factor affecting these groups’ incentives to cooperate (see Figure 1).

Figure 1: The ‘Gun Model’

Threat alone may not be enough to develop cooperation. There are other factors that contribute to cooperation. In addition to perceived threats, groups’ incentives may also be affected by changes in opportunities. As Williams (2008, p. 9) argues, cooperation between armed political groups “tend to fluctuate in response to both threats and opportunities.” We can, then, claim that changes in opportunities would also affect the changes in armed political groups’ incentives to cooperate (see Figure 1). However, it is also important to note that opportunities to cooperate may be present but without a catalyst, such as a new threat, they may not offer an explanation for a change in incentives for cooperation (see Figure 1). Bearing this in mind, there may be opportunities for these groups to operate, to gain support and resources, to take territory and to cooperate.

Armed political groups require a “strategic environment” (Cone 2012) to operate. Strategic environments refer to the certain conditions, which procure a ground for strategic action (Cone

2012; McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly 2001). While strategic environments, which provide armed political groups a room to operate, are not desirable, these groups would consider each opportunity to operate and prosper (Casebeer & Thomas 2004; Cone 2012; McAdam, Tarrow & Tilly 2001).

In this unique case, opportunity to operate can also be associated with political openings resulted from the post-Arab Spring instability, ongoing conflict in the region and the Syrian war, which can also be considered as contextual changes that may contribute to the changes in threat perception and groups’ incentives to cooperate (see Figure 1). These developments led to political instability, regime failure and changes that enabled political openings, which resulted from the absence of a strong or legitimate state, for groups to operate. While such opportunity may decrease threats from states, it may also lead to conflict and competition among armed political groups for the benefits the opportunity brings forward. It is important to note that ISIS, as the threat, is also one of the armed political groups benefitting from these political opportunities by gaining strength to operate. This, therefore, may also change the perception of threat between armed political groups, as well as their incentives to cooperate or compete.

Without controlling a territory, armed political groups would be unable to operate

(Gailiūnas 2010; Le Blanc 2013; McColl 1969; Moghadam 2015). They would consider any existing opportunity to claim or take territory. This also refers to what McColl (1969, p. 613) called

“territorial imperative”, which implies a control of part of a political space. Opportunity to claim or take territory usually appears in weak states, in which the legitimate use of force is lost (Holmes

2013). In situations similar to this, we can assume weak states cease to be a threat. They provide space for armed groups to not only exist, but also prosper where they can develop “reciprocal

28 relationships” (Holmes 2013). Then, in this unique argument we can associate the PYD’s changing incentives for cooperation with rebel groups in Syria and with the PKK. The PKK’s changing incentives to cooperate with the PYD, are influenced by the Kurdish groups who claim territory in the northern Syria.

Without support and resources, armed political groups would still be unable to operate

(Lichbach 1995; Phillips 2012). Any existing opportunity to increase resources and support would most likely be considered by the groups. In this suggested process, there are opportunities, which can be both explained by the rise of ISIS and changes in the context, such as the Arab Spring and the Syrian conflict, for the PKK and the PYD to gain and increase their support and resources

(Khal 2017; Unver 2016). Threat posed by ISIS is a transnational threat that concerns states and the state system (Aleksovski, Avramovska & Bakreski 2014; Ebegbulem 2011). This adds a foreign interest and element of international politics to the process. Resurfaced by the Syrian civil war and culminated by increasing ISIS challenge, it is also possible to observe competition among states, such as the United States, Russia, Syria and Turkey representing different interests

(Alaaldin 2018; Gilsinan 2015). It can be claimed that involvement of state actors to the process have provided opportunity for the groups’ seeking ways to increase local and international support and resources.

Corresponding to the opportunities to increase support and resources, foreign interests and international politics may also contribute to the opportunities for groups to cooperate. Groups seek alliances with states to operate and to gain more support and resources (Eggers & Tellis 2017;

Moravcsik 2010). Furthermore, in this suggested process we observe the presence of actors who do not have competing objective, which also provide opportunity to cooperate (Fehr & Gintis

2007). Providing, for instance, an explanation for why the PKK and the PYD began to cooperate but the PKK and the KRG did not because there has been a competing interest with the PKK and the KRG regarding territory.

In addition to the changes in perceived threats and opportunities, changes in groups’ cost and benefit calculations may also contribute to the decision regarding cooperation (Ataman 2003;

Bowen 2006; Thomas 2010). Yet, changes in cost and benefit calculations alone do not provide explanation for why there are changes in incentives to cooperate. There is another change needed, such as the rise of a new threat as a triggering element to also understand why there is a change in cost and benefits, as well as in incentives for cooperation (see Figure 1). Still, cost and benefit calculations can also be associated with armed political groups being strategic and rational actors

(Crenshaw 1981; Friman 2008; Kydd & Walter 2006; Moghadam 2017; Pape 2005; Phillips 2012;

Stohl 2003). Because these groups are pragmatists, we observe increase in the incentives when the expected benefits of cooperation outweigh the expected costs (Moghadam 2017; Phillips 2012;

Smith 2008; Thomas 2010; Williams 2008). In this process, presumed benefits that likely follow from changes in the context, such as the post-Arab Spring instability, ongoing conflict and the

Syrian war, based on observation and assessment of conditions, (i.e., increase) in ISIS threat (see

Figure 1).

There may be additional factors that also affect this process (see Figure 1). These additional factors may be listed as changes in power distribution and targets (Moghadam 2015). The post-

Arab Spring instability, ongoing conflict and the Syrian war have changed power distributions in the region in the context of state and non-state actors (Demir & Rijnoveanu 2013). While power was previously concentrated on the region’s long-term authoritarian states, in the post-Arab Spring

30 era those states have experienced a relative transition of power from the regimes to civil society, as well as to non-state actors (Alaoui 2016; Hamid 2011; Hinnebusch 2015; Scmitter & Sika 2016;

Seeberg 2016). This can also be evaluated as a decrease in threats from those regimes and increase in threats from non-state actors with newly maintained power. Such a change may also bring transformations in targets. In the aftermath of the Syrian war, Assad’s regime has become targeted by not only the Syrian protesters, rebel groups and non-state actors but also by the international society (Ferris & Kirisci 2016; Khaddour 2015), which also provided opportunities and benefits to other armed groups to gain a level of strength. Similarly, when international state actors began to target ISIS, groups, such as the PKK and the PYD, benefitted from the conflict, which also affected their incentives to cooperate not only with each other but also with international coalition established against ISIS.

Combination of these factors contribute to the process that develops cooperation between the groups. The impact of post-Arab Spring instability, ongoing conflict and the Syrian civil war, as factors establishing changes in the context, on this process is also undeniable (see Figure 1). In addition to these contextual changes, there may be other factors that make cooperation easier. For instance, sharing ideology, identity and political agenda and geographical proximity may also contribute to groups’ decision to cooperate (Frayman 2006; Grävingholt, Hoffman & Klingebiel

2007; Karmon 2005; Moghadam 2017). However, these additional factors are not as necessary as the changes in perceived threats or as the changes in the context to develop the momentum.

Incentives refer to rewards or motivations that mobilize actor(s) or group(s) to alter their behavior (Hoffman & Schneckener 2011; Phillips 2012). The process that is addressed implies a triggering element that affects groups to alter their behavior or strategies to cooperate or compete

(see Figure 1). Cooperation, as a concept, refers to Karmon’s (2005, p. 24-25) definition as “indepth collaboration.” Therefore, cooperation indicates not only a verbal support but rather an operational support, which is observable in action. Such decision is a strategic decision for these actors as they wish to achieve expected benefits as a result of the action (Lichbach 1995;

Moghadam 2017; Phillips 2012; Williams 2008). Strategies regarding cooperation aim to realize expected benefits as the PYD and the PKK aim to maintain their political goals. However, those presumed benefits may not be always realized.

This ongoing process in terms of the relation between perceived threats and incentives for cooperation suggests that in order to explain and understand the puzzle illustrated by the PKK, the

PYD and ISIS. It is important to evaluate each element that may or may not, directly or indirectly be involved in the process. From this point of view, there may be some alternative explanations that can offer different insights to understand the relationship between the PKK and the PYD, as well as cooperation between armed political groups in general.

Alternative explanations regarding groups’ strategic cooperation may be related to power relations between them, their ideological cooperation or survival. First, power relations between the groups may contribute to the groups’ decisions regarding cooperation. Power relations refer to coercive interactions between actors or groups (Edwards 2011). However, the type of power relation I refer to here is not based on subordination. A relationship in which power is not concentrated in one group and which provides free action (Sorensen 2014) may lead to increasing incentives for cooperation between the groups. This type of relationship may build trust between the groups so that they may act together. If, however, power is concentrated in one group, which may subordinate other actors’ actions and decisions, this would discourage groups from

32 cooperating even in cases which there is a significant threat, such as ISIS. This may be because subordination may also pose a threat to weaker groups, and in a situation similar to this, strategic cooperation may lead to a loss of autonomy. Second, ideological cooperation or support between groups may also play a role in groups’ decisions regarding cooperation. Moghadam (2015) argues that ideological affinity is a condition of establishing trust, which may lead to a long-term relationship between groups. A “shared world-view” (Moghadam 2015, p. 22) may trigger cooperation at first place because groups would be more likely trust each other. This may provide a type of assurance since armed political groups’ alliances are not secured by international law or multilateral agreements. Third, groups may simply cooperate to survive. In the simplest term, a threat may put these groups’ survival in danger. This may explain why there was not cooperation before and why there is now. Therefore, power relations, ideological cooperation and survival may also identify groups’ motives regarding cooperation.

A threat mentioned here, however, is not just any threat, it is the threat posed by ISIS, which is also the enemy of states. States’ involvement to the process provides different opportunities, in particular regarding the question of legitimacy. Cooperating against a threat that may provide an opportunity to use legitimate use of power may justify groups’ claims. This form of cooperation may help groups find a place for themselves and for the populations that they claim to represent in the international system. Therefore, what drives cooperation is not any perception of threat. It is the threat that provides opportunities and benefits for these groups, which may be bigger than power relations, survival and which may lead to a change from a simple ideological cooperation into a strategic one.

There may be other alternative explanations originating from, such as theories of balance of power and balance of threat that we can apply to identify these groups’ motivations to cooperate.

Yet, these theories are developed to understand states’ behavior when they encounter with a certain challenge. In other words, they refer to a cooperation between actors, which are already associated with the legitimate use of power. Thus, it is the question of legitimacy that distinguishes these groups from others and that is why we need a different assumption to understand these groups’ incentives for cooperation.

METHODOLOGY AND DATA

The purpose of this research is to understand cooperation and conflict between armed political groups, as well as to evaluate how these groups perceive and react to changes in threats.

More specifically, the goal of this study is to explain how and why the incentives for cooperation between armed political groups change when facing new threats. Here, I adopt a methodology for qualitative case study. Comparative case study analysis is used in order to understand and to provide explanation for the changes in incentives for cooperation between armed political groups when facing a new and more significant threat that results in interruptions in groups’ ongoing strategies. Case study focuses on changing incentives for cooperation among the Kurdistan

Workers’ Party (PKK) and the Democratic Union Party (PYD) between the years of 1980 and

2017. The rise of a new threat, (i.e. the Islamic State (ISIS)), provides a major critical juncture in this study. Within this context, comparative analysis centers upon the changes in the incentives for cooperation occurred with the appearance of the new threat. The first period corresponds to the incentives for cooperation between the PKK and the PYD between the years of 1980 and 2011.

2011 indicates the year that ISIS seizes power for territorial expansionism and becomes a

34 significant threat. In order to observe whether there are any changes in the incentives for cooperation between the PKK and the PYD in the context of ISIS’s rise, the second period sets sights on the incentives for cooperation between the years of 2011 and 2017.

A case study approach is useful to answer the research question of this study, to identify relevant factors that contributed to the evolution of process and to derive the theory regarding changing incentives for cooperation between armed political groups. Case study provides “the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may be generalizable to other events” (Bennet & George 2005, p. 4). The purpose of this research is to procure a similar examination and understanding of an unexpected change and its outcome. The story told in this project emphasizes a “real- world” (Bennet & George 2005, p. 4) phenomenon. Thus, the goal of this study is to provide a descriptive analysis. The impact of threat on the incentives for cooperation may still draw a generalization to other forms of changing incentives for cooperation.

This thesis explains how and why armed political groups’ incentives change, which eventually results in changes in their strategies in terms of cooperation. Here, this kind of change in the incentives for cooperation is mainly associated with a variance in the perceived threats by armed political groups. In other words, changes in the incentives for cooperation between the PKK and the PYD mostly correlate with the increase in threat that ISIS poses to these groups. It is, however, not ISIS’ existence that leads to this form of change in the incentives that determine strategical alterations within the context of cooperation. It is a change in perceived threat posed by

ISIS that leads to increase in the incentives for cooperation. From this point of view, there are also other factors that contributed to the process. Contextual changes, such as increased instability in

35 the region after the Arab Spring, emergence of a weak state as a result of ongoing Syrian civil war and changes in the context of territory, also lead to changes in perceived threats associated with

ISIS, as well as in opportunities and presumed benefits. Therefore, the purpose is to understand and explain this interrelated process.

Data are gathered from multiple sources of evidence, including newspapers, government documents and reports, online secondary sources such as news, journals and articles, including

BBC Profiles and Council on Foreign Relations, and social media. In addition, data and reports are drawn from databases, including the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), Research and

Development Corporation (RAND) and Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) by the University of Maryland; written documents, such as interviews conducted with PKK and the PYD and news; and online resources and publications, including social media and websites belonging to the PKK and the PYD. However, I did not do the primary data collection for incentives, cooperation and changes in threats. I use and benefit from the existing material to provide some evidence of cooperation between the groups and to understand the groups’ stated goals in terms of what they may be seeking and how they may define costs and benefits. I use data from GTD, START and RAND, and news, journals and articles to analyze cooperation I refer remaining sources, including online resources and publications, social media and websites belonging to the PKK and the PYD, for theoretical assumption regarding the groups’ assessment of opportunities and cost and benefit calculations.

Data are mostly represented by qualitative, non-numeric data from written documents, including interviews, news and social media, as well as by quantitative, numeric data from the

Global Terrorism Database (see Table 1). The amount of information of data varies between the

PKK and the PYD. There is enough information for descriptive analysis and comparison between the years. For instance, The Global Terrorism Database and government reports are useful to capture how many attacks have been take place between the main players, which year has they taken, who are the targets and sources to interpret the level of intensity in the process of conflict.

Sources such as Human Rights Watch provides information regarding the actors who have been affected the most. The PYD’s website, “PYD Rojava” is useful to follow the daily events to also comment on the changing ideology, territory and alliances. Social media accounts, including “The

Lions of Rojava,” “PYD Rojava,” “Rojava Defense Units/YPG” and “PYD Foreign Office” provide information regarding these groups’ actions, as well as their supporters across the world.

Table 1: List of types of sources

Primary Secondary Sources of Data Sources of Data

Online Databases e.g. GTD, News, journals e.g. BBC and RAND, START and articles BBC Profiles, The Washington Post, Associate Press… etc. Government e.g. Government Research Papers e.g. Council on Reports of Turkey, The Foreign US Department Relations, of State Middle East Reports from International Crisis Group Research Reports e.g. Human Social Media e.g. The Lions of Rights Watch, (Facebook, Rojava, PYD RAND, START Twitter, Rojava, Rojava Instagram) Defense Units/ YPG, PYD Foreign Office

A majority of data collection and analysis is done by online information filtering to identify specific events, which interrupt the groups’ ongoing strategies over time (see Table 2). Because the purpose of this research is to describe a real-life phenomenon, one of the aims is to capture key moments or critical junctures in a given time period, which help develop comparison between cases. Information filtering options on the newspapers, government documents and reports, news, journals and articles, social media and databases is not only useful to narrow the research down to the key concepts but also convenient to take the snapshots in specific moments in order to identify the factors that may have contributed to the process. Information filtering refers to a system that eliminates unwanted or redundant information (Hanani, Shapira & Shoval 2001; Lerman 2007).

For instance, The Global Terrorism Database and the Turkish government reports involve a set of information regarding armed political groups and their activities. Filtering the information, such as to the PKK 1999, on the database allows us to trace the events specifically taking place in 1999, as well as the target type and other actors involved in order to have an insight regarding the PKK’s cooperation or conflict. Within this perspective, it is expected to find no cooperation with other

Kurdish groups and no cross-border conflict in order to evaluate the process during the time that represents the pre-ISIS era to compare to what extent perceived threat impacts the PKK’s decision/ incentives for cooperation. This process is repeated for the PKK and the PYD separately and for each time period that represent pre and post- ISIS era in order to provide a broader insight and comparison in regard to cooperation and whether perceived threat has an impact on it.

Social media accounts, such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram, provide similar set of information and allows us to evaluate these groups’ profiles, as well as the activities that they publish. I use social media, such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram, in order to identify the

PKK’s and the PYD’s interaction with each other and fight against ISIS. To collect such

38 information, I adopt a method similar to what Kristina Lerman (2007) calls as “social browsing and information filtering in social media” to remove redundant information and to only focus on these groups. Social media networks include “hashtag” feature that enables capturing the key concept when it is used. For instance, when “#PKK” or “#PYD” or similar features are used, search engine provides these specific highlights along with the users, as well as the dates they are published which allows us to collect the information regarding groups and their followers in order to evaluate support and recognition that the PKK and the PYD have gained in the process after the rise of ISIS. International support and recognition and legitimacy seem to be important factors in groups’ decision for cooperation. Along similar lines, social media networks also make the groups’ profiles visible. For instance, “The Lions of Rojava”, “PYD Rojava”, “Rojava Defense Units/

YPG” and “PYD Foreign Office” are public accounts that provide information regarding how many followers these groups have, which is used to evaluate international support and recognition by looking the number of the followers in the post-ISIS period, which allows us to make assumption in regard to expected benefits of a likely cooperation between the PKK and the PYD.

Table 2: List of key words, #tags

Sources Key Words #tags

GTD, RAND, e.g. PKK, PYD, START ISIS or PKK (Advanced 2016, PYD 2007, Search) ISIS 2014 … etc. Facebook, e.g. PKK and e.g. #PKK, #pkk, Twitter, PYD, PYD ISIS, #PYD, #YPG Instagram PYD and the #rojava, #ISIS, US… etc. #Syrianconflict, #Kurds, #Syriankurds … etc.

I historically analyzed the cases illustrated by the PKK and the PYD to capture specific points in the timeline of the two cases to identify changes in their incentives that impacts strategic decision regarding cooperation. In this context, the PKK and the PYD are compared by the changes in their incentives for cooperation parallel to the critical junctures appeared such as the Arab

Spring, the Syrian Civil War and the rise of ISIS, as well as the advantages and disadvantages that these junctures provide throughout the timeline in order to control the effect of perceived threat,

ISIS, on the incentives for cooperation. This comparison also provides a control in that this research holds accounts of the groups prior to and during cooperation, which also provides a control for the study. From this point of view, it is expected to show either no incentives or limited incentives for cooperation between the PKK and the PYD between the years of 1980 and 2011.

2011 indicates the year that ISIS emerges as a major threat in the region. Then, after 2011 data is expected to show increase in the PKK and the PYD’s incentives for cooperation. Therefore, conclusion of this research will be drawn when the comparative case analysis procures enough description for alterations on the incentives for cooperation found between the PKK and the PYD, and when the analysis identifies the impact of proposed explanatory variable, (i.e., threat). This will provide a support and insight for the relationship between the perceived threat and incentives for cooperation.

Case Selection

Alignment of armed political groups with each other, or with other state or non-state actors is not unusual. Cooperation between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and Democratic Union

Party (PYD), however, illustrates an exceptional process. Even though there can be observed

40 multiple characteristics that could have affected their reciprocal relationship earlier, questions of

‘why they did not cooperate before’ and ‘why they are cooperation now’ illustrate a more complex connection than it is expected. This change in the groups’ cooperative relationship deserves a deeper analysis.

The PKK and the PYD are similar in many ways. They share Kurdish ethnicity, language and religion. Their founding purpose originates from their Kurdish identity. They share similar political ideology and agenda regarding nationalist separatism. Each seeks an autonomous territory, a Kurdish region for their respective Kurdish populations. Both are secular political groups in their respective countries. They use of some form of violence in their respective struggles against states. In other words, they appeal violent tactics, including armed resistance, guerilla tactics or terrorism to achieve their political goals.

The PKK and the PYD also differ in terms of their adversaries and strategies. While the

PKK’s main adversary has been the Turkish state since the 1980s, the PYD’s main adversary has been the Syrian state since 2003. While the PKK has been defined as a terrorist group, the PYD was able to capture sits in the Syrian parliament as a legal representative. However, the PYD’s association with some violent tactics and its support and relation to the People’s Protection Units

(YPG), violent militia group, also illustrate the group as an insurgent group. Moreover, the relative political stability of the Turkish state and instability of the Syrian state also put the PKK and the

PYD in different positions in their respective struggles. Although both of the adversaries are states, the threat that they pose to their respective states is not the same especially given the ongoing conflict in Syria. Yet, this has respectively changed with the rise of ISIS as new and more significant and urgent threat in the region.

Neither the ideological and identity similarities, nor the strategical and adversarial differences have been sufficient enough to alter these groups’ incentives for cooperation before.

Even though ideological and identity affinities are part of why they could cooperate, the major reason the PKK and the PYD cooperate (strategically merge their resources and forces) has to do with the increase in the perceived threat, which led to a change in incentives for cooperation. Each group has become more prone to cooperation based on the emergence of a common, existential threat over their disputed territories. While the PKK has been claiming land within the territories of Turkish state, the PYD has been also demanding domain within the Syrian borders. From this perspective, culminated with the contextual changes experienced throughout the region, ISIS’s territorial expansionism seems to pose a more urgent threat to each group and their claims.

Therefore, cases demonstrated by the PKK and the PYD provide an understanding of how changes in threat affect the group’s incentives for cooperation.

Limitations on Data and Methodology

There are several limitations regarding this analysis that leave room for continued research.

The first limitation originates from the scope the research design. The scope of this project is limited to group level analysis. In other words, the PKK and the PYD are treated as homogenous entities in which group members’ incentives are excluded. Thus, incentives only refer to the groups’ incentives without including the variations, in incentives within groups, which could originate from individuals’ different motivations, which may also have had an impact on cooperation.

Second, this thesis only looks changes at strategic cooperation. This leads groups to be treated as if they have strict distinctions or organizational boundaries between them. However,

42 because these groups share some ideological foundations, their organizational boundaries may not be as tangible as this research anticipates. In other words, there may have been interactions between the members’ the PKK and the PYD long before ISIS became a threat to these groups.

Yet, such individual level interactions may not be observable. This also leads to the limitations on existing data.

The third limitation originates from the existing data. The PKK and the PYD gain popularity with their collaboration with the international coalition forces led by the United States against ISIS. Therefore, before 2014 existing data, particularly in international sources, was limited. Furthermore, finding individual level information is very difficult unless one is willing to collect primary data from the front lines of the conflict. Such data would likely provide a much richer analysis. Moreover, a majority of information comes from unclassified materials. It may also be possible that these materials exclude valuable information, which may influence this analysis. The use of social media may be also problematic for two reasons. First, because I am not a trained social media analysist, I used a very basic way of filtering and browsing online information. A more sophisticated analysis of social media may also provide useful information.

Second, because social media accounts, such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram, are used by these groups and their affiliates, information provided in these outlets may be biased.

A fourth limitation originates from the choice of methodology. Qualitative analyses rely on researchers’ understandings of actors and events and interpretations of what matters most in terms of explaining outcomes. An approach that adds a quantitative component pay provide a better understanding.

Finally, this thesis mainly focuses on the role of threat over the groups’ incentives for cooperation. Therefore, despite the stated goal of understanding the relationship between perceived threats, territoriality and legitimacy as a whole, any conclusions reached in this project may not necessarily represent all armed political groups and their incentives.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

“The Kurds are one of the world’s largest ethnic groups without a state of their own” (Abu-

Nasr 2018). Kurdish populations reside as minority groups in Armenia, Iran, Iraq, Syria and

Turkey (Abu-Nasr 2018; Aljazeera 2017; BBC News 2017). Kurdish societies were traditionally tribal, a form of small social organization, which refers to “temporary or permeant political integration” led by a tribal authority called “sheik or aga” (“Tribe” 2018). Although they historically share the same culture, language and religion, the Kurdish people are not united (Abu-

Nasr 2018; BBC News 2017; Spencer 2015). With the rise of nationalism after the First World

War, the various Kurdish groups demanded independence (BBC News 2017; Cameron 2014;

Eppel 2015; Hassanpour 2017). After the end of First World War, “the Treaty of Sevres was formally drafted to deal with the dissolution and partition of the Ottoman Empire” (“Kurdish

Political Parties” 2015). The Treaty anticipated the future of Kurdish lands but with the War of

Independence led by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, which resulted the establishment of the Republic of

Turkey, political space changed in the region (Azarian 2011; Coban 2013; “Kurdish Political

Parties” 2015; Yavuz 2001). This resulted in the Kurdish populations remaining in their minority status under the newly established states after the First World War (Abu-Nasr 2018; BBC News

2017; Roy 2011; “The Time of Kurds” 2014). A century later, Kurds still uphold their minority

44 status within these countries and still struggle for their independence (Abu-Nasr 2018; BBC News

2017).

Source: Bender, J. (2014). “Here's the New Kurdish Country That Could Emerge Out of The Iraq Crisis.”

From this desire for independence, various Kurdish nationalist groups have emerged across the region. The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) was one of these groups. The PKK was established in 1974 as a secular, Marxist-socialist, Kurdish nationalist group under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan (BBC News 2016; Bruno 2007; Davis, Haldeman, Larson, Oguz & Rana

2012). The group’s long-term adversary is the Turkish state (BCC News 2016; Hassanpour 2017).

Separatism has always been a part of the group’s political agenda (BBC News 2016; Cameron

2014). The groups adopted terrorism as a strategy, as well as a tactic to achieve their political goals

(BCC News 2016; Hassanpour 2017).

Another Kurdish nationalist group that emerged in the region is the Democratic Union

Party (PYD). The PYD was established in 2003 in response to the Syrian regime’s violent

45 treatment of minority groups (BBC News 2017; Dawood 2017; Halhalli 2018). The group also appeared as a secular, Marxist-socialist, Kurdish nationalist group in Syria (Dawood 2017;

Halhalli 2018; Spencer 2015). Unlike the PKK, separatism did not appear the PYD’s political agenda until the Syrian civil war in 2011 (Cemil 2016; “Group Denial” 2009). The group formed as a political party (Bongers 2017; Dawood 2017). The PKK and the PYD have been ideologically supportive with each other (Spencer 2015).

In addition to the PKK and the PYD, there are other important Kurdish groups that play active roles in the region. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) was established in 1946 in Iraq as a secular, Kurdish nationalist political party (Ashi & Dahan 2017; BBC News 2017; “KDP:

Kurdistan Democratic Party” 2015). The KDP’s Marxist-socialist orientation was not as strong as the PKK and the PYD (BBC News 2017; De Jong 2016; Spencer 2015). While the KDP’s long- term adversary was the Iraqi government, the group was also in competition with the PKK and the

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) for territory, resources, power and influence over the Kurds

(“KDP: Kurdistan Democratic Party” 2015). During the civil war in Iraq between 1994 and 1998, the group fought against the PUK (“KDP: Kurdistan Democratic Party” 2015). The KDP was supported by the Turkish government while the PUK was supported by the PKK (Alaaldin 2016;

BBC News 2017). Later, the KDP also developed economic relations with Turkey (Alaaldin 2016;

BBC News 2017).

The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) was established in 1975 as a secular, Marxist- socialist, Kurdish nationalist political party in Iraq (“PUK: Patriotic Union of Kurdistan” 2015;

Spencer 2015). Intellectuals who had stronger leanings on Marxist-socialism formed the party by separating themselves from the KDP (“PUK: Patriotic Union of Kurdistan” 2015). Although the

KDP and the PUK’s conflict started as an ideological dispute, their rivalry turned into territorial conflict during the civil war (“KDP: Kurdistan Democratic Party” 2015; Rimscha & Rogg 2007).

The civil war ended after the groups signed the Washington Agreement in 1998 (“PUK: Patriotic

Union of Kurdistan” 2015). As a result of the agreement, the KDP and the PUK agreed to share power and the revenues they gained (BBC News 2017; Makovksy 1998). They also agreed to

“deny the use of northern Iraq to the anti-Turkish PKK” (Makovsky 1998). The agreement led to the establishment of what is today called the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in 2005 (Jude

2017).

Despite their disagreements, conflict and competition for power, the Kurdish groups seek to have a homeland of their own (BBC News 2017; Gunter 2004; “The Time of Kurds 2014). After the establishment of the KRG in 2005, the PYD also gained an opportunity to claim territorial control during the Syrian civil war in 2011 (“Flight of Icarus” 2014; Gunes & Lowe 2015).

Although there is still no form of territorial unification between them, today their endeavors have become recognized by international powers (“Flight of Icarus” 2014; Gunes & Lowe 2015;

Spencer 2015). However, “whatever the future holds for an autonomous or even independent

Kurdistan, its greatest current threat is the jihad of Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant” (Spencer

2015). A majority of the Kurdish populations aspires to achieve a form of secular and democratic government (Mohammed 2013; Sheppard 2016; Spencer 2015). ISIS’s expansionism, therefore, does not only refer to a further change in political space but also implies another form of enslavement for these groups, which have been struggling for independence.

ANALYSIS

This analysis investigates how changes in perceived threats affect armed political groups’ incentives for cooperation. It starts with a historical evaluation of two groups, the PKK and the

PYD, and their relationship with other state and non-state actors in order to describe to what extent the evolution of threat alters their strategic decision with regard to cooperation. Historical analysis seems to show no form of strategic cooperation, which relatively requires a merger of fighters and resources, between the PKK and the PYD before ISIS. There is a change in threat due to ISIS, and that process contributed to the changes in their incentives to cooperate. However, there are also other factors, such as changes in opportunities and presumed benefits that fit in to this story parallel to the contextual changes which include both the post-Arab Spring instability and the Syrian war.

The first part of this analysis focuses on the PKK between the years of 1980 and 2011 in order to understand the group’s historical motives in developing cooperation with other Kurdish and non-Kurdish groups and states. An analysis of this time period suggests that the absence of a common threat, geographical proximity, similar identity, and ideological affinity most importantly, all have an impact on the PKK’s decision regarding cooperation. More importantly, the group’s territorial ambitions are likely to have a leading role in changing the PKK’s incentives to cooperate. In a similar vein, the socio-political climate of the time period, which refers to the presence of a strong state, also addresses conflictual interests regarding territory, which seems to incentivize competition, more than cooperation, between the PKK and Kurdish groups.

The second part of this analysis focuses on the PYD between the years of 2003 and 2011.

When compared to the PKK, in the absence of a common threat, the PYD seems to have less ambition for territory, which also appears to have less impact on the PYD’s decision regarding cooperation. The time period also illustrates that the PYD, in general, seems more open to

48 cooperation with the groups that have similar identity or ideology; however, their cooperation appears to be limited with local groups in Syria.

Finally, the third part of this analysis refers to the rise of ISIS as a threat after 2011. The time period also points to different contextual changes including the Arab Spring and following the Syrian civil war. It appears that while the outcome of the post-Arab Spring instability and

Syrian civil war had a different impact on these groups, there seems to be no immediate change in the groups’ incentives to cooperate with each other. However, the emergence of a weak state in

Syria after the Syrian civil war seemed to change the PYD and ISIS’s territorial ambitions. After

2011, the PYD’s incentives appeared to change parallel to the changes in the political atmosphere.

Yet, the major change in the groups’ incentives seems to coincide with ISIS emerging as a threat for the same territory. While the PYD’s territories in northern Syria are directly challenged by

ISIS, the PKK’s concern seems more focused on its future expectations regarding territory. This appears to increase the groups’ incentive to cooperate which resulted in the development of reciprocal relationships between the PKK and the PYD.

The PKK and the PYD illustrate that groups become more willing to cooperate with each other when their perceived threat increases. Opportunities and benefits, which the groups seem to obtain through their position against ISIS, also appear to be a contributing factor, which affects their decision regarding cooperation. The socio-political climate that emerged from the Arab

Spring and the Syrian conflict are also relevant to complete the story. Therefore, it seems more likely to observe changes in the incentives for cooperation between these groups when there is a perceived threat increase, parallel to the changes in their opportunities and benefits.

Kurdistan Workers’ Party between the years of 1980-2011

There is little evidence of cooperation between the two Kurdish groups between 1980 and

2011. Instead of cooperation among these groups, we see cooperation between the PKK and non-

Kurdish groups, such as the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). It is also observable that there were the PKK attempts to cooperate with Turkey more than other Kurdish groups. This appears likely because the PKK was in competition with other Kurdish groups for certain resources (Manyuan 2017; RAND 2012). Competition between the groups can be associated with the group’s territorial ambitions, power relations and Turkey’s socio-political environment, which presented itself as a form of oppression towards these groups. The presence of a strong state in Turkey that sustains “the legitimate use of physical force” (Holmes 2013) seems to restrict these groups’ operations by also leading to shortage in resources, including human resources, weapons and space, which seems to result in competition among the groups more than cooperation.

Surveys estimate that Kurds constitute almost 25% of the population in Turkey (Rose &

Ozcan 2007; “The Kurdish Population” 2017). Although they live in various provinces, a majority of the Kurdish population resides in the eastern and southeastern parts of the country (BBC News

2017; “The Kurdish Population” 2017). They establish the largest ethnic minority in the Turkish state (“Country Information and Guidance Turkey: Kurdish ethnicity” 2016). The Kurds’ struggle with their rights as a minority in Turkey. This struggle is worsened by the memory of their historical independence which precedes the establishment of the Republic of Turkey. In 1923, after the dissolution of the “multi-ethnic” Ottoman Empire, the Turkish Republic was established under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk (Azarian 2011; Yavuz 2001). As a part of the nation- building process, Mustafa Kemal adopted a centralization policy, which included the construction of a new national identity (Colak 2013; Menzies 2014; Schon 2013; Yavuz 2001). Even though

50 the ideology of the Republic of Turkey aimed to homogenize the country, the new Turkish identity

“denied the existence of the Kurds or reconstructed a political language to talk about the issue without pronouncing the word 'Kurds'” (Yavuz 2001, p. 2). This has resulted in the articulation of

Kurdish nationalism as a form of ethnic-separatism situated in opposition to those assimilation policies of the Republic of Turkey (Saylan 2011; Somer 2004; Yavuz 2001).

During the 1960s and 1970s the political climate of Turkey was unstable. Similar to the rest of the world, communist ideology and student movements were spreading in Turkey (Gorgas

2013; Salah 2013). Student movements and ideological conflicts between nationalist and leftist groups became more common (Akkaya & Jongerden 2012; Salah 2013; Sayari 2010). Besides the growing conflict, the Turkish state found itself in a relatively weak position as a result of coups d’état in 1960 and 1971 (Vacherot 2008). The coups further deepened the political and societal polarization across the country (Burak 2011; Eryilmaz 2014; Yavuz 2001). At the same time, the alienation between the Kurds and Turks increased (Salah 2013; Yavuz 2001). In this environment, some radical Kurdish students, including Abdullah Öcalan, were inspired by the ideals of

Marxism-Leninism to liberate the Kurds in Turkey, whom they believed had been enslaved by the

Turkish state (De Jong 2015; Huff 2018). Inspired by the Marxist theory of emancipation, equal rights, and a classless society, this new generation of Kurdish nationalists opposed the Turkish state (Al-Ali & Tas 2018; Yavuz 2001).

In light of these developments, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (Patriyaka Karkeren

Kurdistan- PKK) was established in 1974 under the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan and his followers in the eastern part of Turkey. The PKK aimed to emancipate the Kurdish population from the state and its institutions (Dirik & Souvlis, personal communication, March 16, 2017; Slee

2017). The PKK’s ideology originated from the combination of socialism and Kurdish nationalism to realize a Kurdish revolution in order to establish an independent Kurdistan (Hassanpour 2017;

Hooks 1996; “PKK: The Kurdistan Workers’ Party” 2015). They declared themselves as a party for all the Kurds inside and outside of the region while also claiming the leadership of the other

Kurdish groups (BBC News 2016; BBC News 2017).

Despite being newly-established in 1974, there is no evidence of cooperation between the

PKK and other Kurdish groups within and outside of Turkey. This appears likely because the PKK was in disagreement and competition with other Kurdish groups in terms of leadership, use of violence, and ideology (Eyrice 2013). In 1978, the PKK published a manifesto called “Path to

Revolution in Kurdistan” (RAND 2012) for Kurdish independence and self-determination that aimed to promote the group’s socialist ideology within and beyond Turkey’s borders (BBC News

2016; Leezenberg 2016; “PKK: The Kurdistan Workers’ Party” 2015; Schoon 2015). At same time, blaming other Kurdish groups with failure in realizing the necessity of a revolution, the manifesto addressed all the Kurds (De Jong 2015; “PKK: The Kurdistan Workers’ Party” 2015;

Saeed 2014; Schoon 2015). This seemed likely to prevent cooperation between the PKK and other

Kurds considering the group’s claim on leadership in fulfilling the Kurdish revolution (Davis,

Haldeman, Larson, Oguz & Rana 2012). The PKK’s strict socialist orientation and “their willingness to engage violence” (Schoon 2015, p. 273) distinguished the group from other Kurdish activist groups, which were sometimes portrayed as rivals or obstacles before the Kurdish revolution (Davis, Haldeman, Larson, Oguz & Rana 2012). From this point of view, I argue that the PKK’s attitude, in this context, to maintain leadership and spread Marxist ideology (Cagaptay

2007; Davis, Haldeman, Larson, Oguz & Rana 2012; Schoon 2015) has had an impact on other

52 groups’ motivations in regard to alliance formation and seem to affect the actors’ decision regarding cooperation, or in this case, competition.

There seems evidence that the PKK’s socialist orientation and discourse of revolution appealed to non-Kurdish groups (Holmes 2013; Marcus 2007; Schoon 2015). This follows from similarities that the groups share, which seems to make cooperation easier. In 1980s, the PKK established a reciprocal relationship with another Marxist- Leninist group, the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), as an extension of Palestinian Liberation Organization

(PLO) (Holmes 2013; Marcus 2007; Schoon 2015). The PKK and the DFLP had a similar political agenda and a Marxist discourse that referred to territorial liberation through a revolution (Akkaya

2015; Marcus 2007). An interview that Marcus (2007, p. 56) conducted with one of the members of the DLFP provides evidence for the role of a common ideology in developing cooperation.

Accordingly, the group’s willingness to train the PKK fighters likely originated from a common discourse for the Marxist revolution (Marcus 2007). The presence of such similarities likely provided opportunity for the PKK to join with the DFLP. The same aspect would be expected to affect the cooperation between the Kurdish groups. Yet, it seems like ideological affinities had little impact on the Kurdish groups’ cooperation since the groups were likely in competition for power and resources.

It is also relevant to underline the political climate in Turkey while describing the PKK’s relationship with the DFLP and other Kurdish groups. While the DFLP’s motivations in building alliance with the PKK was more ideological (Marcus 2007), I believe the PKK’s motivations were also affected by the presence of strong state in Turkey. In 1980, the Turkish state fell under another coup d’état (Akkaya 2015; Cetin 2010; Karacan 2015). The new junta government established a

53 more repressive state than ever before (Barkey & Kadioglu 2011). In the immediate aftermath of the coup, country wide martial law was initiated, and the new government banned the practices of radical Islam and leftist ideology (Aslan 2015; Candan 2016). The results of the coup were catastrophic for the Kurdish groups and Kurdish identity (Adolfson 2017; Meijer 2017; Unver

2016). The state not only destroyed the networks of those groups, but also banned the cultural expression of the Kurdish identity (Akkaya 2015; Meijer 2017). Consequently, the Kurdish language was officially banned in public and private life in Turkey (Aslan 2009; Haig 2003).

Moreover, surveys estimate that almost “11,500 people including leftists, nationalists, fundamentalist Muslim groups and the Kurds were arrested by the military junta in the first six weeks of the coup” (Candan 2016, p. 54). By the end of 1980, death sentences were added to the arrests, which were increasing every day (Candan 2016). The new junta government posed a threat to the PKK’s survival and restricted its “strategic environment” (Cone 2012) to operate inside

Turkey’s borders. As Holmes (2013) argues “when the monopoly of force is lost, violent groups establish reciprocal relationships with the relevant marginalized populations, allowing these actors to not only exist in weak states, but to thrive.” I claim that in Turkey’s case, however, the state maintained the monopoly of force, which resulted in destruction of human and arm resources, as well as political space that the PKK would likely be using for the group’s operations. Therefore, it would not be wrong to assume that the PKK’s decision to cooperate with the DFLP was likely affected by the PKK’s need of resources and territory to operate though the presence of a common ideology, which mostly likely made their cooperation easier (Holmes 2013). However, this need for resources seemed to lead itself to competition to gain resources and support between the

Kurdish groups (“The Time of Kurds” 2014).

Ironically, it also appears that the PKK benefitted from the presence of strong state in

Turkey. Even though the group had likely lost its human and armed resources, the Turkish state’s operations provided different opportunities for the PKK. As Ozcan (1999, p. 31-33) claims there were other Kurdish activist groups when the PKK was found in 1974. “Instead of cooperating with like-minded organizations, the PKK’s leader Öcalan dedicated much of his time and energies to purging his movement of those who dared to contest his authority” (Eyrice 2013, p. 36). The

Turkish government’s rigid practices towards marginal groups, including the Kurdish groups, likely eliminated the PKK’s rivals in Turkey. This provided an opportunity for the PKK to gain power and influence among the Kurds in Turkey (Davis, Haldeman, Larson, Oguz & Rana 2012;

Schoon 2015; Yavuz 2001). Furthermore, just before the 1980 coup, the PKK members, including

Abdullah Öcalan, fled to neighboring Syria (Dayton 2013; Orhan 2014). Although there was no clear evidence of PKK’s actions in Syria with respect to alliances, Syrian lands had likely served as a safe haven for the PKK to reside and operate. Moreover, during their time in the DFLP training camps, the PKK also fought alongside the PLO forces against Israel (Marcus 2007; Schoon 2015).

This provided the PKK benefits, such as the training that they needed, as well as “a training camp in the Bekaa Valley in Lebanon” to launch its operations against the Turkish state (Akkaya 2015;

Peterson 1991; Safire 1996).

There is evidence that the PKK’s motivation for cooperation was likely changed because of changes in the group’s need of resources in regard to armament and human capital, which, I argue, followed from changes in the conflict between the PKK and the Turkish state. After the

PKK’s first attack in 1984, simultaneous clashes between the Turkish armed forces and the PKK groups on the southeastern border of Turkey, where the population is predominantly Kurdish, continued (Dayton 2013; Marcus 2007; Schoon 2017). As a response to increasing PKK attacks,

55 the Turkish government closed the Syrian border with a wire-mesh fence to block PKK’s access to resources (BBC News 2016; Yildiz 2015). In return, the “PKK formed the Kurdistan Popular

Liberation Front (ERNK) to gain more support among the Kurdish populations in order to attain access to networks and resources, including humans and weapons” (Yildiz 2015). The ERNK was also responsible for propaganda and recruitment in Europe; however, there is no evidence whether the ERNK was supported by any other Kurdish armed groups in Iraq or Iran (Van Bruinessen

2007). On the contrary, the PKK established the ERNK without any outside support to endorse some if its operations, specifically into recruitment and the gathering of resources (Hamdan 2009;

Van Bruinessen 2007). Therefore, though the PKK likely became more prone to cooperate to gain resource for its operation, it would not be wrong to assume that the group’s formation of ERNK from the existing members of the PKK, and its initialization of diplomatic envoys to Europe for potential cooperational outreach to other organizations, are likely because of the persisting competition between the PKK and other Kurdish groups for power and influence.

There is also evidence that the PKK’s motivation for cooperation was changing because of an increase in the group’s need of resources with regards to armament, human capital, and other forms of support from Kurdish groups (Yildiz 2015). Despite the PKK’s efforts to gain support from Kurdish populations especially in terms of Kurdish nationalism, the group’s inception of

Marxist-Leninism did not attract a majority of Kurds (Eyrice 2013; Roth & Server 2013). In this respect, the PKK changed its policy and focused more on the propaganda and recruitment in both

Turkey and Europe for the benefit of Kurds and to get support from the Kurdish diaspora communities (Davis, Haldeman, Larson, Oguz & Rana 2012; Schoon 2015; Yavuz 2001). Thus, I claim that the PKK’s incentives for cooperation was affected by the lack of resources and the group’s need of support. The group was likely in need of support, resources, and recognition to

56 secure its position against the Turkish government. As a result, the PKK started cooperating with the European Kurdish diaspora communities (Baser 2013; Sozer & Yilmaz 2016). This is more likely because there seems to be more competition between the Kurdish groups in the region, such as the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), which followed because of their conflicting interests.

Diaspora communities, on the other hand, have greater influence in the international arena than the groups in the region (Celik 2015). This would likely provide the PKK resources, support, and international recognition that the group needed.

Instead of cooperation among the Kurdish groups, we continue observing competition between the PKK and other Kurdish groups not only in Turkey but also across the region. For instance, the KDP is an active group in northern Iraq since 1946 (TRAC 2018). Yet, there is no evidence of cooperation between the PKK and KDP; oppositely, there was a conflict between the groups regarding territory (“A Brief Guide to Understanding the Kurds” 2016). Unlike the Turkish state, the Iraqi government was relatively fragmented because of the Gulf Wars in 1990 and 1991

(Gause 2001; Holmes 2013). Because of the Gulf Wars, the Iraqi state lost its power over its sovereign territories (Gause 2001; Holmes 2013; Khan 1993), which provided an opportunity for the PKK and the KDP to claim and take territory to operate in northern Iraq (Holmes 2013). This likely led to conflicting interests between the groups, which seems to be an important factor in group’s decision to cooperate.

There is evidence of a change in the PKK’s strategies, which likely resulted from Abdullah

Öcalan’s arrest in 1999. Between 1991 and 1999, the PKK’s competition with the other Kurdish groups seems to continue in the region in terms of the conflicting interests regarding territorial expansion. The group seems to rely more on the diaspora communities to likely gain resources and

57 support to continue its operations against the Turkish government. However, 1999 seems to interrupt the PKK’s strategies. After he escaped from Turkey in 1980, Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of PKK, resided in Syria and Lebanon to plan the PKK’s operations (Orhan 2014; Varouhakis

2009). Turkey’s increasing military presence in the region alerted the Syrian regime (Aykan 1999).

In 1998 the Syrian government signed the Adana agreement with the Turkish state (Aykan 1999).

As result of the agreement, Syria recognized the PKK as a terrorist organization and initiated operations against the PKK and its members (Bechev 2013). In 1999, the Syrian regime, in cooperation with the Turkish government, forced Öcalan and other members of the PKK to leave the country (Van Bruinessen 2000). As a result, Öcalan and the other PKK members abandoned the group’s bases in Syria (Weiner 1999). On February 17, 1999 the Turkish forces captured

Öcalan who was seeking refuge in Kenya with the help of the CIA agents who were in Kenya at the time (Weiner 1999). The United States has a “close military and intelligence relationship with

Turkey, which lets American pilots fly missions against Iraq from a NATO base in Incirlik”

(Weiner 1999), in Turkey. Also, the United States was also seeing the PKK as a terrorist group

(“Foreing Terrorist Organizations”; Weiner). Thus, there was an international interest in Öcalan’s arrest.

It is likely that the PKK became keener to come to an agreement with the Turkish state after 1999 while the group was more hostile in its earlier operations against Turkey to realize its ambitions. I believe this is because there was a change in the group’s cost and benefit calculations.

Öcalan’s arrest would strengthen the Turkish government’s hand against the PKK while leaving the PKK vulnerable to its strategies. Then, it would not be wrong to assume that after Öcalan’s arrest in 1999, the PKK had entered a new phase. The historical period until 1999 demonstrates

58 that Abdullah Öcalan was the founder of the PKK’s ideology (“Kurdistan Workers’ Party” 2015).

It would not be wrong to assume that his absence would increase the challenges towards the PKK.

Ironically, there is no evidence of cooperation between the PKK and other Kurdish groups.

Instead of looking for an alliance, the PKK seems to change its strategies in its conflict with

Turkey. This was due to the group’s unwillingness to grant power to other groups. As Moghadam

(2017) discusses, this would likely undermine the PKK’s “imperative to maintain organizational control”. Instead, the PKK declared ceasefire in 2000 (BBC News 2013; Cagaptay & Kokner 2004;

Orhan 2014). During the time of ceasefire, the PKK changed its name to Kurdistan People’s

Congress (KONGRA-GEL), also known as the new PKK (Gunter 2004; Yildiz 2015). The

KONGRA-GEL relatively supported pro-Kurdish political parties than militant groups (TRAC

2018). The group also abandoned separatism by adopting a relatively peaceful political solution within the borders of the Turkish state (TRAC 2018). The group also aimed to form Kurdish political parties and organizations in Turkey (Tank 2006). The transformation was short-lived

(Tank 2006). There was also a conflict within the KONGRA-GEL (Dymond 2004; Tank 2006).

While some members demanded an end to armed struggle, and some were dissatisfied with the ceasefire (Morris 1999; Uzun 2014), others were more willing to work within the system rather than against it (Morris 1999; Uzun 2014).

However, there is also evidence of a change in the PKK’s strategies corresponding to the opportunities brought by the United States invasion of Iraq in 2003. Though it seems that those strategic changes did not affect the PKK’s decision regarding cooperation. During the United

States’ invasion of Iraq in 2003, the territorial balances of power changed within the context of states and non-state actors (Hinnebusch 2007). This culminated with the United States’ invasion

59 of Iraq, the region entered into a period of long-term regional instability (Black 2016; Hinnebusch

2007). Clearly, the Iraqi regime’s loss of control over its territories provided opportunities for the

PKK and other Kurdish groups, such as the KDP, to claim and take territory, which seems to correspond in the PKK’s strategies towards the Turkish government (Holmes 2013). The collapse in the Iraqi government refers to a weak state, which is usually associated with the “loss of legitimate use of force” (Holmes 2013). In the absence of a strong and legitimate state, the marginal groups locating in Iraq, such as the KDP and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) were able to establish an autonomous region (Jude 2017). During the civil war between 1994 and 1998 in Iraq, the KDP and the PUK were rivals because of the groups’ conflicting interest in territory, resources and ideological clashes (“Country Policy and Information Note” 2017; Jude 2017; Rogg &

Rimscha 2007). However, in 1998 they ended their conflict to realize Kurdish nationalism in Iraq

(“Country Policy and Information Note” 2017; Rogg & Rimscha 2007). Though not cooperation in the form of a strategic and operational support, the PKK and the PUK had positive relations during the civil war. In the absence of a legitimate government in Iraq, and with its good relations with the PUK, the PKK was able to recover and even expand its bases in northern Iraq in order to reconstitute its armed struggle against Turkey (Chorev 2007; Rogg & Rimscha 2007).

However, there is no evidence of cooperation between the KRG and the PKK, which is likely because of the group’s differences regarding their respective struggles, ideological approaches, as well as the perception of threat. While the KRG was struggling to consolidate power in northern Iraq in 2005, the PKK’s struggle was only towards the Turkish state (“Capitalizing on the Kurds” 2016; Tank 2006). There is also evidence that the KRG and Turkey had positive relations, especially in economic terms. “Turkish companies are heavily involved in construction and trade, as well as in the oil sector” (Rogg & Rimscha 2007). From this point of view, the Turkish

60 state was less likely a threat for the KRG. This seems highly affected the groups in their decision regarding cooperation.

In the meantime, the PYD, established in 2003, was operating in Syria. However, there is no sign of strategic cooperation between the PKK and the PYD between 2003 and 2011 even though groups were ideologically supporting each other (Jenkins 2016). This may be associated with the presence of legitimate and strong states in Turkey and Syria, which likely limited the groups’ operations. The Syrian government was a threat to the PKK because of the Adana agreement signed in 1998 with the Turkish state (Aykan 1999). This would likely increase the

PKK’s perception of threat in the case of cooperation with the PYD.

The period between the years of 1984 and 2011 illustrates no evidence of strategic cooperation between the PKK and other Kurdish groups, including the PYD (Eyrice 2013; Roth

& Server 2013). Despite the changes in the PKK’s incentives, the group did cooperate with other groups in its respective struggle with the Turkish state or in other struggles (Eyrice 2013; GTD

2017; Roth & Server 2013; Ozcan 1999). The only observable support that the PKK demonstrates seems to be with the PUK during the 1994-1998 civil war though there is no evidence of strategical cooperation between the groups. However, Öcalan’s arrest and the collapse of the Iraqi government resulted in interruptions in the group’s strategies (BBC News 2016; van Bruinessen

2007). Öcalan’s arrest led to changes in the PKK’s territorial ambitions (Bacik & Coskun 2010).

In a short period of time, the group gave up on separatism and adopted political solutions in the conflict with the Turkish state (Morris 1999; TRAC 2018; Uzun 2014). However, with the collapse in the Iraqi state, the PKK returned its territorial claims to operate and even thrive (Holmes 2013).

This territorial aspect lead to competition among the Kurdish groups, which are “the ethnic groups

61 without a territory for their own” (Abu-Nasr 2018). From a similar point of view, I claim that the differences in the groups’ territorial expectations, as well as the struggles to realize those expectations, resulted in differences in their perceived threats. However, with the spread of the ideals of the Arab Spring and the outburst of the Syrian civil war in 2010, as well as the rise of

ISIS in 2011, the balance of power was further changed in the region with regards to the role of state and non-state actors, as well as political spaces, perception of threat, and cooperation

(Cordesman 2017; Wiersema 2013).

Democratic Union Party between the years of 2003-2011

There is evidence of cooperation between the two Kurdish groups in between 2003 and

2011. We can observe a cooperation between the PYD and other Kurdish groups, such as the

Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party (KDPP), as well as other non-state actors in Syria. Unlike the PKK’s case, this appeared to happen because any form of cooperation between the PYD and other groups in Syria took place in the political, rather than militant, arena since the PYD is a political party. This cooperation is also due to the Syrian state and its policies towards these groups which likely impacted their ability to cooperate (Hevian 2013). Contextual changes with regards to perceived threat by the PYD from the Syrian government and the Turkish state appear to contribute to the PYD’s decision to cooperate between 2003 and 2011. This seems more relevant in the PYD and PKK’s changing relationship.

Surveys estimate that the Kurds constitute the largest minority group in Syria by comprising approximately 10% of the Syrian population (“Kurds” 2015). Human Rights Watch

(2009) reports that the Kurdish population in Syria was regularly suppressed by the government’s policies in regard to the practice of Kurdish culture and self-determination. According to the report

(2009), the intensity of repression towards the Kurds increased in 2004 after the large-scale protests. However, the Kurdish struggle in Syria was not new. Similar to the struggle in Turkey, the Kurds in Syria have also suffered under the Syrian nation building process which originated from a monistic understanding of central identity (BBC News 2017; McLeary 2018). This “one nation, one state” understanding frequently denies minorities rights within their state (Ganguly

2013; Vizi 2009). Therefore, as in the case of Turkey, the Syrian regime’s assimilative policies resulted in the national awareness among the Kurdish communities in Syria since 1956 when the

Arab nationalist regime came to power (Donabed 2012; Hawramy 2012).

As a response, Kurdish groups called for political unity and formed the Kurdish

Democratic Party in Syria (KDPS) in 1957 (Schott 2017; Sinclair & Kajjo 2011). However, in

1961 the government issued a special act that led approximately 160,000 Syrian Kurds to lose their citizenship status (Albarazi 2013; Radpey 2016). This act resulted in a majority of Kurdish population losing their citizenship rights, including political and economic rights (Albarazi 2013;

Radpey 2013). After 1963 Ba’athist coup d’état, the conditions of Kurds further worsened

(Kreitner & The Almanac 2015; Ziadeh 209). The new regime was frequently suspicious of any actions perpetrated by the Kurdish communities (“Syria’s Kurds” 2013). It considered the Kurdish separatist movements in Iraq to be connected despite the fact that there was no recorded record of their cooperation (“Syria’s Kurds” 2013). By the end of the 1960s and through the 1970s, the

Ba’athist government aimed to weaken political activities of Kurdish groups by further denying the Kurdish culture, including replacing the Kurdish names with Arab names, which later created more polarization among the Syrian society, as well as among the Kurdish groups (Albarazi 2013;

“Syria’s Kurds” 2013). By the end of 1970s, the Kurdish groups became keener about leftist, socialist ideologies (Balanche 2017).

Ironically, during the 1980s and 1990s, the Syrian regime started supporting the PKK’s separatism in Turkey (Gunter 1991; Olsen 1997). The Syrian regime even encouraged the Syrian

Kurds to join the PKK in order to replace the Kurdish populations in Syria (Brandon 2007; Ziadeh

2009). In return, the PKK’s leader Abdullah Öcalan publicly supported the Syrian regime

(Brandon 2007). This can likely be associated with the PKK’s superior-subordinate relationship with other Kurds, as well as its intention to recruit Syrian Kurds (“The PKK’s Fateful Choice in

Northern Syria” 2017). Even so, a majority of the Kurdish activists in Syria were often perceived as a threat to the PKK’s operations to the extent of their unrest for the Kurdish rights in Syria

(Paasche 2015). Though cooperation between the PKK and the Syrian regime seems rather unlikely, I claim that it still can be associated with the perception of threat with regards to the

PKK’s inability to fight at the same time in the Turkish and Syrian fronts. In this context, ironically, the PKK constituted a repression apparatus using the Syrian regime to push the activities of the

Syrian Kurds down.

However, by the end of the 1990s, the regime stopped supporting the PKK because of the developments in Iraq, which subsequently reactivated the Kurdish national struggle. Additionally, the Turkish state started posing a threat to Syria with cross-border operations (BBC News 2017;

Natali 2012). In 2000, Bashar Assad succeeded his father and promised reforms for the Kurdish rights (“A Wasted Decade” 2010). This resulted in the formation of various Kurdish political parties in Syria, including the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat-PYD), which was established in 2003 (“The Kurdish Democratic Union Party” 2012).

From this point of view, there is no evidence of cooperation between the PKK and the PYD prior to the PYD’s formation. It is also relevant to refer to the operational differences between the

PKK and the PYD. The purpose of Syrian Kurds and political parties, as well as the PYD, was to recognize the Kurdish culture in the Syrian society (BBC News 2017; Paasche 2015). Unlike the

PKK, separatism was not on the PYD’s political agenda (BBC News 2017; “Democratic Union

Party”, Paasche 2015). When it was formed in 2003 as an opposition party, the PYD demanded a democratic political solution for Kurdish struggle in Syria (Hevian 2013). The PYD referred to justice for inequality and political pluralism as a response to the Syrian regime’s denial of Kurds from political and economic activities without any reference to the separatism (“Group Denial”

2009). Although the PYD was formed by the former members of the PKK, they were different organizations with different origins (Caves 2012; Khalil 2017). On the one hand, there was a considerable deal of ideological differences between the PKK and the PYD because of likely differences in their discourses regarding separatism and the role of state. While the PKK’s earlier ideology focused more on the formation of a nation, in which the state is eventually withered away, the motivation that led to the establishment of the PYD was the struggle for the recognition of the

Kurdish rights in Syria, which recognizes the state system (BBC News 2017; Khalil 2017). The

PYD, in that sense, appeared as an opposition political party while the PKK has always been considered a terrorist group (BBC News 2017; Caves 2012). On the other hand, Öcalan and PKK members were banished from Syria long before the PYD was established (BBC News 2017;

Bechev 2013). In 1998 the Syrian government signed the Adana agreement with the Turkish state

(Aykan 1999). As result of the agreement, Syria recognized the PKK as a terrorist organization and initiated operations against the PKK and its members (Bechev 2013). Furthermore, during time of the PYD’ formation, Öcalan was in prison and the PKK was mostly operating in its bases in northern Iraq and Turkey (BBC News 2017; De Jong 2016). Thereby, there is no clear evidence of a strategic or operational relation between the PKK and the PYD in the context of cooperation.

There is, however, evidence of cooperation between the PYD and other Kurdish groups, such as the KDPP, in Syria (Hevian 2013). The PYD’s political efforts in recognizing the Kurdish culture in Syria likely affected the group’s motivations to cooperate. In 2004, Syria fell under the influence of large-scale protests, known as “Qamishli riots”, which resulted in a major catastrophe in relations between the Kurds and the Syrian regime (Aji 2004; Little 2012; “The Al-Qamishli

Uprisings” 2009). The Syrian government’s hostile treatment and discrimination against the

Kurdish communities in Syria triggered large-scale Kurdish uprisings across the country (“The Al-

Qamishli Uprisings” 2009). While Assad’s regime promised for reform in the Kurdish political and national rights, the government continued denying the Kurds any form of socio-economic and political platforms (“Group Denial” 2009). On the eve of the riots, a bloody clash occurred between the Kurdish groups and Arabs during a football match (Aji 2004; Little 2012; “The Al-Qamishli

Uprisings” 2009). The Kurds, who became restive by the usage of Saddam’s posters by the Arab groups, reacted to the Arabs (Wong 2007). The regime forces brutally interfered to the conflict

(“Group Denial” 2009; “The Al-Qamishli Uprisings” 2009). In the aftermath of the protests,

Assad’s regime, which was already suspicious about Kurdish activities because of the developments that took place in Iraq in the context of separatism, perceived the Kurdish political parties, including the PYD as a threat (“Group Denial” 2009; “Syria’s Kurds” 2013). According to the Human Rights Watch 2005 report regarding the events took place in 2004, Assad’s regime, further increased its suppression against the Kurdish minorities, and it started arresting the members of Kurdish political parties, including the PYD members and activists. Therefore, it would not be wrong to assume that the threat that the Syrian government posed towards the

Kurdish identity was likely the reason that the PYD cooperated or deepened its cooperation with other grassroots Kurdish groups to gain recognition for minority rights and to political operations.

An increasing challenge from the government can likely be associated with the PYD’s relationship with other Kurdish groups not only in Syria but outside of the country as well. There is evidence of verbal support that the PYD demonstrated towards the PKK. However, the cooperation that I indicate here is more than ideological or verbal support. Still, it would not be wrong to assume that the change in hostilities affected the PYD’s motivation in regard to cooperation. Between the years of 2005 and 2009, the government continued its rigid practices and violence towards the Kurds and Kurdish political organizations (“Group Denial” 2009; “Syria”

2009). The regime had particularly focused on arresting PYD activist because of the Adana agreement signed between the Syrian and Turkish governments (“Group Denial 2009”; “Syria’s

Kurds” 2013). The Turkish state was already perceiving PYD as the Syrian wing of PKK even though the PYD did not demonstrate any violent association against the Turkish territories

(Cagaptay & Tabler 2015; Tekdemir 2016). The Global Terrorism Database (2017) captures no violent attack conducted by the PYD against Turkey. Furthermore, the database (2017) also shows that the PKK ploughed a lone furrow in an attempt to carry out the group’s attacks toward Turkey.

Yet, it seems the agreement between the Syrian and Turkish regimes likely affected the PYD’s position in Syria. The regime forces launched mass arrests against the PYD activists (“Group

Denial 2009”; “Syria’s Kurds” 2013). The Syrian government’s treatment resulted in a further increase in the polarization among the Kurdish parties, especially among the PYD members

(“Syria” 2009). As a result, the PYD has continued calling for gatherings and protests despite the state’s violent practices and brutal suppression (“Group Denial” 2009). This illustrates that the group likely became more open to cooperate with other groups against the Syrian regime’s brutality. I argue that the more the Syrian government became a threat to the PYD’s survival, and the more the Turkish state increased its pressure, the keener the PYD seems to cooperate with other

Kurdish groups inside and outside of Syria. For instance, the PYD called for a mass gathering on

November 2, 2007 to protest Turkey’s interference in northern Iraq and Syria’s support for the

Turkish operations (“Group Denial” 2009). The group was also carrying Öcalan flags to show its support of the PKK (“Syria’s Kurds” 2013). This can be associated with the increase in pressure from the Syrian and Turkish government that the PYD felt, which also reacted to the group’s motivations to cooperate with the PKK though there is still no evidence of strategic cooperation in terms of observable reciprocal operations.

In the meantime, there is also no evidence of the PKK’s actions regarding the cooperation with the PYD. I claim that while changes the PYD’s incentives was more likely associated with an increased pressure from both Syria and Turkey, there is no evidence of such a change in the

PKK’s incentives, as well as the level of challenge. It would not be wrong to assume that the

PKK’s cooperation with the PYD would likely increase the pressure from the Syrian state, as well as from Turkey. However, it appears likely that the PKK was more interested in negotiating with the Turkish state to survive (Aydin & Emrence 2016; Jawed 2015; Taspinar & Tol 2014). Within this context, change in the PYD’s threat perception likely affected the PYD more than the PKK in the context of alliance. Starting from 2010, the PYD and the PKK started developing relationships.

In 2010, Salih Muslim, co-leader of the PYD, went to northern Iraq to seek refuge with the PKK in order to escape from the Syrian regime’s forces (Acun & Kesin 2017; “Syria’s Kurds” 2013).

He remained in northern Iraq until his return in Syria in 2011 (Acun & Kesin 2017; “Syria’s Kurds”

2013), which could likely be associated with the increasing instability spread by the Arab Spring in the region. The extent of his visit is still unknown; but, it seems that it was likely a start of some form of relationship. From another point of view, choosing the PKK, not the KDP, to cooperate can likely be associated with the group’s perception of shared threat and ideological affinities. As

Moghadam (2015) argues presence of an ideological affinity is one of the conditions to establish trust between armed political groups. Turkey’s indirect effect on the increased arrestments of the

PYD members can also be seen as an increase in the threat, which the PKK seems to share. I believe this refers to a shared challenge that could create enough impact to change the groups’ incentives to strategically cooperate.

Between the years of 2003 and 2011, there is evidence of a cooperation between the PYD and other Kurdish political groups in Syria. Additionally, there is also no proof of a strategic cooperation between the Kurdish groups and the PKK. I argue that the increased government pressure, corresponding with the indirect involvement of the Turkish state, in 2007 seemed to interrupt the PYD’s strategies regarding cooperation with the PKK. The group became more willing to cooperate with the PKK, although that form of cooperation was limited with verbal and ideological support until 2010 (“Group Denial” 20090. However, with the spread of the ideals of the Arab Spring and the outburst of the Syrian civil war in 2010, as well as the rise of ISIS in 2011, there was a further impact on the balance of power in the region in regard to the role of state and non-state actors, as well as the Kurdish struggle, perception of threat and alliances (Gilsinan 2015;

Wittes 2015; Zorthian 2015).

The PKK and the PYD After 2011

There is evidence of a strategic cooperation between the PKK and the PYD between the years of 2011 and 2017. However, there is proof that the groups only took action against ISIS.

There is still no evidence of cooperation against their respective states. I claim that although the groups started to develop positive relationships beforehand, the cooperation between them coincides with the rise of ISIS as a direct territorial threat. I also argue that other contextual

69 changes, such as the post-Arab Spring instability, the Syrian conflict, and other foreign interests had an impact on the groups’ decision regarding cooperation (Abramowitz & Edelman 2013;

Gunes & Lowe 2015). This is because these contextual changes provided opportunities and benefits for the PKK and the PYD, which would make the cooperation more desirable for the groups (Abramowitz & Edelman 2013; Cagaptay 2012). However, there is also evidence of connection between the opportunities and benefits in addition to ISIS’s threat, which seems to have greater impact on not only the PKK and the PYD, but also other state and non-state actors within and beyond the region (Gunter 2015; Spencer 2015). It also appears more relevant considering the

PKK and the PYD’s immediate reaction to ISIS’s expansionism in 2014 when compared to the post-Arab Spring instability, as well as the Syrian conflict and other foreign interests.

By the end of 2010, the Arab Spring was sweeping the region with the revolutionary uprisings aiming to build democratic governments against the region’s long-survived authoritarian regimes (Ahmed 2014; Bhardwaj 2012; Botelho 2015; Heydemann 2013; Phillips 2012; Rozsa

2012). Although the purpose of the riots was the eventual establishment of functioning stable societies across the region, in many places the struggle turned into violence and instability (Ahmed

2014; Heydemann 2013). However, mass protests also led to the question of self-determination especially in societies suffering from long-term ethno-sectarian divisions which reemerged as the authoritarian regimes lost their influence on subjugating religious fundamentalists and ethnic separatists (Babbitt, Bell, Lempereur, Mandell & Wolf 2017; BBC News 2013). Neither the religious fundamentalism nor the ethnic nationalism was new in the region (Mellon 2000;

Roshwald 2013). The collapse of the authoritarian regimes, in that sense, resulted in violence and instability but also resulted in religious or ethnic non-state actors benefitting from the opportunities brought by the collapse (Alaoui 2016; Babbitt, Bell, Lempereur, Mandell & Wolf 2017; BBC

News 2013; Grote & Roder 2016; Phillips 2012). In other words, the diminishment of threat posed by the regime forces towards these groups’ activities opened channels for these groups to rise for their self-determinations.

The collapse of the regime meant a relative decrease in the state’s power, which can also be evaluated as a form of holding force over the rise of non-state actors (Holmes 2013). That holding force, which the states have, can likely be perceived as a threat from the perspective of non-state actors. The case of a decrease in the force relates to the decrease in the threat posed by the state against those actors. This situation has played out as the weak and failed states lose their power, there is an eventual increase in conflict which develops opportunities for the suppressed groups to operate (Cecon 2014; Holmes 2013; Patrick 2007). One of the most intense examples of such form of conflict occurred in Syria in 2011 (BBC News 2016; Dalacoura 2012; Saouli 2015).

After the subversions in Tunisia and Egypt, Syrian pro-democracy activists mobilized against

Assad’s regime in order to overthrow the government (BBC News 2016; Wimmen 2016). Yet instead, they were met with the regime’s brutal reaction, which evoked the bloodstained civil war

(BBC News 2016; Wimmen 2016). Surveys estimated that approximately 465,000 activists have been killed by the regime forces since the conflict started in Syria while the number of displaced people has been measured by millions (“Syria Population at Risk” 2017).

There is evidence of cooperation between the PYD and other groups, such as the National

Coordination Body for Democratic Change (NCC) (“Syria in Crises” 2012). I argue that this followed from the collapse of Assad’s regime, which likely resulted in opportunities for the groups to claim and take territory to operate. There is, however, no evidence of cooperation between the

PKK and the PYD against Assad’s regime in 2011 (GTD 2017). I claim that this is because there

71 was no perception of a common enemy between the PKK and the PYD, or any other situation that would likely provide mutual benefits to the groups. But, there is proof of cooperation between the

PYD and other groups in Syria, which followed from those opportunities, including territory to operate, that the PYD gained during the civil war (“Syria in Crises” 2012). As a response to

Assad’s brutality, opposition groups formed the Free Syrian Army in 2011 (BBC News 2013;

White 2011). Although the Free Syrian Army has been supported by various Kurdish groups, ironically, the data are contradicting regarding the PYD’s role during the civil war in 2011 (“Flight of Icarus” 2014). As claimed by the Turkish SETA foundation’s 2016 report, the PYD was in cooperation with the Assad regime (Acun & Keskin 2016). Accordingly, the group and the regime have been agreed to cooperate against the opposition forces (Acun & Keskin 2016). In return,

Assad’s regime has warranted the PYD’s de-facto authority in the northern Syria, also known as

Rojava (or today as the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria) (Acun & Keskin 2016; Pusane

2017). Yet, there is neither clear proof regarding the PYD’s direct cooperation with Assad’s regime, nor its agreement for the northern Syrian territories though the group operated in northern

Syria (Arafat 2017; Cagaptay 2012). Nevertheless, considering the changing opportunities to take territory, the PYD’s cooperation with the regime seems likely, even though the form of cooperation is restricted by verbal support and remains uncertain in the future. The PYD joined the formation of National Coordination Body for Democratic Change (NCC) in 2011 along with “the National

Democratic Rally, the Democratic Arab Socialist Union, the Arab Revolutionary Workers’ Party, the Communist Labor Party, the Arab Socialist Movement, the Democratic People’s Party, the

Together for a Free Democratic Syria, the Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria” (“Syria in Crises”

2012). The NCC was established as an opposition council by the secular nationalist, leftist and non-armed political groups. NCC adopted a political dialogue in order to solve the conflict instead

72 of directly aiming to replace Assad’s regime (“Syria in Crises” 2012). The group suggested a peaceful transition from authoritarianism to democracy (“Syria in Crises” 2012. Thus, the PYD’s participation in the NCC likely supports that claim of cooperation, although their actions are not enough to assume a direct cooperation with the regime.

There is also no evidence of action taken by the PKK to cooperate with the PYD in Syria.

The Global Terrorism Database (2017) anticipated no action taken by the PKK against the Syrian regime in 2011. This is likely because of the political climate in the Turkish state. When the civil war erupted in 2011, the PKK was also fighting its own struggle with Turkey (BBC News 2017;

Pidd 2011). The Turkish government report (“Government of Turkey-PKK”) shows that in 2011, compared to the other years since the struggle had started, was the most intense during 2011. The

Turkish pressure on the PKK was interrupted in 2011 because of the general elections, which more or less constituted a retardation in the decision-making process for the operations (“Government of Turkey-PKK). Furthermore, on October 23, a massive earthquake, which ended up with the deaths of more than 272 people, took place in Turkey (“Government of Turkey-PKK). In the aftermath of the earthquake, the government stopped its cross-border operations, which provided ground for PKK to recover in its bases at northern Iraq (“Government of Turkey-PKK). Therefore, instead of interfering with another conflict, the PKK to focus on its conflict in Turkey, especially when the Turkish state seems at its most vulnerable, which, from my understanding, would provide more benefits for the PKK for its own struggle.

There is also evidence of changes in the context regarding ISIS’s expansionism, which seems to benefit from the collapse of the Syrian state. The absence of legitimate use of power in

Syria resulted in marginalized, non-state actors having the ability to bloom. As a result of failure

73 in the state structure, a fragmented state more likely leads to political openings for the actors

(Holmes 2013; Rotberg 2011). From this point of view, it would not be wrong to assume that the collapse in Syrian state not only benefited the PYD or similar groups but also likely resulted in providing an opening for ISIS to claim and take the territory. In addition to the failed state, the ongoing conflict likely contributed to ISIS seizing power in Syria. While the civil war between the opposition forces, including the Free Syrian Army and Assad’s regime, was continuing, in 2012 the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI) found ground for its territorial expansion in the soils of eastern and northern Syria, on which Assad’s regime was withdrawn and left the territories to the hands of

Kurds and rebel fighters (Al-Ubaydi, Lahoud, Milton & Price 2014; BBC News 2014; Hamid &

McCans 2017; Lister 2016). The absence of a strong resistance from the rebel groups seems to provide an opportunity for ISIS to take territory.

There is, however, no evidence of cooperation between the PKK and the PYD as an immediate reaction to ISIS in 2012 (GTD 2017). On the contrary, it seems the PYD’s immediate reaction was to deploy its armed wing, People’s Protection Units (YPG) against ISIS (“YPG”

2015). Such reaction refers to a change in the PYD’s tactics more than the group’s decision to cooperate. This is because ISIS became a direct threat to the PYD and the group’s territorial claims in northern Syria (Barfi 2015; Parlar Dal 2017). It is no longer Assad’s regime but ISIS posing as a threat to the possible Kurdish territories in Syria after the regime emptied the majority of the northern lands (Balanche 2018; BBC News 2015). While the conflict between ISIS and the PYD can be explained by the presence of conflicting interests regarding territory, the PKK’s inaction regarding ISIS seems to be related to the group’s renascent conflict with the Turkish state. The

PKK was increasing its impact with the consecutive attacks on the Turkish armed forces and villages in eastern Turkey (“Government of Turkey-PKK). The long-term conflict between the

PKK and Turkey reached into a new level in 2012 (“Government of Turkey-PKK). The PKK’s attacks started on July 23, 2012 and the intensity continued until September 23, 2012

(“Government of Turkey-PKK). Increased casualties from both side revived the PKK’s and the

Turkish government's agenda for a peaceful solution to the Kurdish conflict (“Government of

Turkey-PKK”; Pusane 2014). The PKK re-established a lateral ceasefire by the end of 2012

(“Government of Turkey-PKK). In this regard, the PKK and the PYD seem to have distinctions in the perceived threats, which would likely lead to different strategies, as well as different expectations in terms of cost and benefits. For the moment, Turkish government was likely a more urgent threat for the PKK while the conflict with the rebel factions and ISIS were likely the actual threats for the PYD. This likely led to no cooperation between the PKK and the PYD. The Global

Terrorism Database (2017) shows that neither the PKK nor the PYD forces crossed the border to join each other in action though the database captures one suspected action was taken by the PYD against Turkey in 2012. On August 1, 2012, the PYD kidnapped two Turkish journalists (Cihat

Arpacik and Kemal Gumus) in Afrin, in Syria, though the journalists were released the next day

(GTD 2017). Yet, the incident also notes that “no group claimed responsibility for the attack, but sources attributed it to the PYD” (GTD 2017). Thereby, the findings support our claim that there was no sign of a strategic or operational cooperation between the PKK and the PYD in 2012.

There is, however, evidence of a changing relationship between the PYD and the KRG in

2013 against ISIS (Arafat 2013; Michek & Misztal 2014). It is likely that ISIS’s expansionism and brutal tactics had a greater impact on the state and non-state actors within and beyond the region

(Spencer 2015). I argue that realization of ISIS as the real and more urgent threat affected the groups’ decisions to cooperate as a strategy that best fits the groups’ interests. With ISIS’s expansion in 2013, the regional balance of power changed between the state and non-state actors

(Cordesman 2017; Ignatius 2015). The PYD was already deploying its forces under its armed wing, the YPG, to continue its struggle to take the northern Syrian territories following the regime’s forces retreat (Alaaldin 2018; “Flight of Icarus” 2014). After ISIS seized power in Syria, however, fighting against ISIS became more important than overthrowing the regime (Spencer

2015). Throughout 2013, the PYD and the SYPG engaged ongoing attacks against ISIS’s forces

(Gunes & Lowe 2015; Martin & Kozak 2016; “Syria” 2016). Surveys estimated that approximately

450 Kurds have been killed in the Islamist-Kurdish conflict while approximately 35,000 Syrians and Kurds escaped to Iraq (Cafiero & Wagner 2013). Increasing conflict and brutality led even the

KRG to interfere in Syria (Ferris 2013; Filkins 2014). Masoud Barzani, the leader of Kurdistan

Regional Government in Iraq, declared that the KRG forces, the peshmerga, would be ready to support the PYD in action against ISIS (Filkins 2014; Phillips 2015). The change in the KRG’s decision to cooperate with the PYD/ YPG is more likely ISIS’s increasing threat in Iraq that would also likely limit the KRG operations or be threat to the group’s survival.

There is still no evidence of cooperation between the PKK and the PYD in 2013 (GTD

2017). It seems that the PKK was more interested in cooperating with the Turkish state to survive considering the increased casualties (Mandiraci 2016). This can be associated with the PKK’s perception of threat. The Turkish state’s ability to sustain the “monopoly of force” (Holmes 2013) seems to challenge the PKK more than ISIS in 2013, which- I would claim- prevented the PKK any ability to cooperate with other groups that would lead to more challenges for the PKK’s survival. From this point of view, Abdullah Ocalan’s declaration for a ceasefire to solve the everlasting conflict (Euronews 2013) was likely to secure the group’s future. In the aftermath of

Ocalan’s call, the PKK forces began to retrieve from its bases in the northern Iraq and Turkish border in 2013 (Pusane 2016).

There is evidence of a change in the PKK’s actions regarding cooperation with the PYD in

2014, which likely followed from the change in political space as ISIS was increasing its pressure.

The intensity of ISIS threat was increasing between 2012 and 2016 (see Figure 2). This resulted in

ISIS gaining more attention from state and non-state actors inside and outside of the region (Byman

2017; Ignatius 2015). With the changes in ISIS’s threat, it is possible to observe a change in the

PKK’s strategies. In 2014, ISIS marched into Kobane to expand its territories in Syria after they subjugated Mosul in Iraq (see Appendix for Map 1 showing Kobane) (Hassan 2017; Stack 2015).

After the Kobane blockade, the Turkish government estimated that over 130,000 people tried cross the Turkish borders to escape from ISIS’s forces (“Kurds” 2015). While the Kurdish forces, especially the YPG, were fighting against ISIS, refugees reportedly clashed with the Turkish security forces in the border (Chulov, Letsch & Hawramy 2014; Fahim & Shoumali 2014). This resulted in escalation from the PKK’s side and interrupted the peace negotiations with Turkey started in 2013 (Fahim & Shoumali 2014). The increase in ISIS’s threat likely resulted in interruptions in the PKK’s strategies. The PKK accused the Turkish government of not allowing people to send aid to the Kurds in Kobane (BBC News 2016; Fahim & Shoumali 2014). Turkey’s hesitation in the process and prevention of Kurds to send support to PYD/ YPG re-inflamed the

PKK conflict. “Ankara’s hostility to Kobane’s defenders is at odds with a two-year-old peace process it has pioneered in an effort to end the PKK’s 30-year-long insurgency in Turkey, which has claimed 40,000 lives” (Christie-Miller 2014). The Global Terrorism Database (2017) also recorded 14 attacks carried by the PKK in the south east Turkey between April 2014 to September

2014 (see Figure 3). Kurds in Turkey also reacted against the Turkish government’s unwillingness to send aid to the Syrian Kurds with mass protests in Ankara and Istanbul (ABC News 2014; BBC

News 2014). This was a major event that likely led to increase in the PKK’s recruitment and support in the fight against ISIS.

Figure 2: ISIS’s Attacks between the years of 2012 and 2016 (GTD 2017)

Figure 3: The PKK’s attacks in Turkey (GTD 2017)

There is evidence of cooperation between the PKK and the PYD, which seems to follow form ISIS’s threat but also seems to be realized after the Turkish threat is relative decreased. In

September, Turkey was invited to NATO meeting by the United States to discuss anti-ISIS war in

Kobane (Khal 2017; Svendsen 2016). After the meeting, Turkey agreed to support the anti- ISIS

78 war even though the Turkish government was not pleased the PKK’s involvement to the conflict

(Almukhtar & Wallace 2015; MacAskill & Letsch 2015). Kobane was one of the Rojava cantons that PYD holds (see Appendix for Map 1 showing Rojava cantons), which have been perceived as one of the future Kurdish autonomous regions in Syria (Jayamaha 2014). In this respect, the loss of Kobane, for the Kurds, meant the loss of connection with other cantons and loss of autonomy while for Turkey, it meant a free Kurdistan next to its borders (Salih & Stein 2015; Stein & Foley

2016). Therefore, Kobane had a strategic importance for the PYD, the PKK and even for Turkey

(Gunes & Lowe 2015; Salih & Stein 2015). In October 2014, a month after ISIS’s further advancement in Kobane, Öcalan called the Kurds to rise up against ISIS forces (“The Rojava

Report” 2014). Within this context, the change in the PKK’s strategies regarding cooperation with the PYD seems to be affected by the territorial challenge that ISIS posed to the groups. However, it is important to note that even though ISIS seems to trigger the cooperation between the groups, it seems that the realization of the cooperation was only possible after the Turkish state agreed to support the war against ISIS, which likely provided relative safety to the PKK to operate alongside the PYD.

Another factor that contributed to cooperation between the PKK and the PYD was the increasing international interest in the region, which likely affected the role of the Turkish state during the war against ISIS. ISIS threat not only affected the PKK and the PYD, but also posed a greater challenge to the state and non-state actors within and beyond the region (see Figure 4 showing ISIS’s operations by region) (Adolfson 2017; Gunter 2015; Yihdeo 2015). ISIS’s transnational ability to operate, as well as the group’s international support is far greater than other actors (Wood 2016) (see Figure 4). Within this context, the United States became the potential ally for the Kurds fighting against ISIS (Beauchamp 2016; Bradley & Parkinson 2015; Sly 2018). The

United States involvement to the region goes back to invasion of Iraq in 2003 and since then, it was targeting the jihadists (Byman 2007). Yet, by 2011, a majority of the United States forces were withdrawn from Iraq (DeYoung & Wilson 2011; Ryan 2016). With the United States retreating, the jihadists likely found the ground to seize power in the region. After the fall of Mosul in Iraq and Raqqa in Syria to the hands of ISIS, the Islamic State started to extend its impact as well as the threat that it was posing (Jones 2017; Schmitt 2018). It particularly became a challenge for Iraqi Kurds, the Peshmerga, when it turned towards Mosul Dam and Kirkuk in Iraq

(Beauchamp 2017; Filkins 2014). In the following months of 2014, ISIS also began to execute hostages, which included civilians from the United States, Europe, and Japan, and they broadcast those executions (Bixler, Hogenmiller, Lister, O’Key, Sanchez & Tawfeeq 2018; Dearden 2016).

The United States already reflected its concerns after the fall of Mosul to ISIS in 2014 (Laub 2016).

In the aftermath of these events, the United States Secretary of State John Kerry described ISIS

“as a threat to Iraq, the entire region, and the international community” (Kerry, 2014) and invited ministers of Turkey, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Australia, and

Denmark to NATO Summit in September 2014 to build a coalition to support the Kurdish and

Iraqi forces in Syria and Iraq to fight against ISIS (“The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS” 2014).

In the following days, the United States expanded its call and announced the formation of a global coalition to defeat ISIS (The Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS” 2014). Immediately after, the United

States started sending military supplies to the Kurds to stop ISIS’ advances in Kobane (Filkins

2014; Letsche 2014). The PKK and the PYD have been out of the nation-state order with their intention to form a stateless nation (Organ 2015; “The Associated Press” 2017). Under normal circumstances, the international support would be less likely. However, ISIS was a bigger threat than the Kurds. Therefore, it seems the PKK and the PYD benefitted from an unforeseeable

80 opportunity led by ISIS threat. The United States and the global coalition forces provided the strategic environment for the PKK and the PYD to cooperate by, in a way, limiting the Turkish state’s operations towards the PKK and by providing human and weapon resources (Abbas 2016).

It would not be wrong to assume that this provided an environment for the PKK and the PYD to cooperate.

There is evidence of a high degree of cooperation between the PKK and the PYD.

Following Ocalan’s call, Murat Karayılan, the PKK’s senior leader, also called Turkish Kurds to join YPG forces in Kobane to fight against ISIS (Michek & Misztal 2014; Rudaw 2014). This illustrates that the first time in history that the PKK openly supported the PYD and sent human resources and armament (Michek & Misztal 2014). The PKK fighters cross the border to fight against another force alongside with another Kurdish group since the PKK’s cooperation with the

DFLP in 1982 (“Kurdish People’s Protection Unit YPG” 2018). Therefore, 2014 was a turning point for the PKK and the PYD regarding cooperation in terms of joint action.

It is also possible to anticipate that the PKK and the PYD likely gained more support and recognition, which seems to deepen the group’s cooperation. The more ISIS increased its threat

(see Figure 2 and Figure 4), it appears that the more likely the PKK and the PYD/YPG gained support and resources from the international coalition (Orton 2017). This procured an opportunity for the PKK and the PYD to make a propaganda of their own goal, which also affected the group’s decision to cooperate (Orton 2017; Stein & Foley 2016). Although the purpose of the international coalition is to support the Kurds only to defeat ISIS, the PKK and particularly the PYD seem surprisingly able to find international attraction and support for their own political agenda and struggle.

Figure 4: Attacks carried by ISIS or groups inspired by ISIS between 2012- 2016, (GTD 2017)

Social media platforms, such as the Facebook, Twitter and Instagram and their websites, were establish an ability for the Kurds to make propaganda for their anti-ISIS fight and their political struggle in the region. For instance, ‘PYD Foreign Office’ opened an account on Twitter and Facebook in December 2015 and since then, it has 6,270 followers, including from

Scandinavia, Europe and the United States. They all have different backgrounds, including human rights activists and college students on Twitter and 2,783 followers on Facebook. The account is in English and publishes the news from the region on a daily basis, and promulgates the deaths of fighters, especially foreign fighters who joined the PYD and PKK forces, by declaring them as martyrs. ‘PYD Rojava’ also has an account on Twitter since 2012 with approximately 72 thousand followers and an officially active website since 2014. These accounts, publish in English and

Arabic, make anti-ISIS and “free Kurdistan” propaganda. Similarly, ‘Rojava Defense Units/ YPG’ has a Twitter account with approximately 62 thousand followers from different countries and backgrounds. The Lions of Rojava is the Facebook account active since 2015 to franchise the

82 support for what Öcalan called “Rojava Revolution” with approximately 46 thousand followers among which majority supporters are from the United Kingdom and Australia. The account shares information regarding anti-ISIS operations and Rojava region for the formation of autonomous

Kurdish region on the Turkish and Syrian border. There are many accounts similar to these with thousands of supports across the world though they are run by the PYD and the YPG more than the PKK. Social media platforms frequently forbid accounts belonging to terrorist groups. Since the PKK is listed as a terrorist group, it would not be wrong to assume it is the reason that the PKK does not have a social media account. However, the PYD and the YPG seem simultaneously refer to the PKK and Ocalan’s ideology. A majority of social platforms already attributes these groups as the freedom fighters. Then, it is likely the cooperation against ISIS provided the PYD and the

PKK a ground to spread their political cause and gain some level of support to their territorial claims.

The cooperation between the PKK and the PYD was deepening while it is also evident that the Turkish state’s position in the conflict was changing, which would affect the PKK’s alliance with the PYD. Although there is no evidence that the PKK withdrew from Rojava, there is proof of conflict between the PKK and Turkey in 2015. However, there is also proof of changes in targets that provided the PKK and the PYD to cooperate in their operation. I argue that Turkey’s concern can be associated with the state’s perception of threat, which seems different than the coalition forces. While ISIS seems to be the most important threat to be destroyed, Turkey was concerned with the relative power that the PKK achieved through the conflict (Gunes & Lowe 2015; Salih

2015). That means, when ISIS threat is defeated, Turkey’s territories may become the next target for the PKK forces (see Appendix for Map II referring possible change in the political space).

Furthermore, when ISIS retreats from the northern Syria, Turkey will share direct border with the

Syrian Kurds, which would likely further strengthen the PKK’s hand against the Turkish state (see

Appendix for Map I, referring Rojava cantons) (Taspinar 2016). In the first months of 2015, the

YPG forces managed to capture the majority of territories in Kobane with the support that they have gained (BBC News 2015; Hawramy & Letsch 2015). In the following days, Kurdish resistance groups defeated ISIS in Kobane and the YPG reclaimed its territorial control (Lund

2015). As a response, the Turkish government insisted on a “no-fly zone” to protect its borders from a possible Kurdish rise in the region (BBC News 2015; Kandermir & Tattersall 2016).

Although ISIS retreated from Kobane, In July 2015, the war against ISIS was still continuing

(Boghani & Tsui 2016). The Turkish state started initiating more active role in targeting ISIS by airstrikes (Boghani & Tsui 2016). However, Turkish airstrikes also hit the PKK bases in northern

Iraq during the cross-border operation for the first time since 2011 (Almukhtar & Wallace 2015;

Coles & Davison 2017). This likely followed from the Turkish state’s attempt to protect borders against a possible PKK attack. Yet, Turkey’s attempt seems to result in the PKK arming against the Turkish government once more. The Global Terrorism Database (2017) recorded 6 attacks from July 2015 to October 2015. In the aftermath of these events, Turkish state was pressured by the coalition forces to not to take action against the Kurdish forces fighting against ISIS (BBC

News 2016). I claim that interference of the coalition forces maintained the persistence of cooperation between the PKK and the PYD by providing them a relative security to operate. This followed by a change in target from the PKK to ISIS and even to other actors that would likely interrupt the war against ISIS. This seems to benefit these groups by procuring them a secure and strategic environment to continue their operations against ISIS.

There is evidence that cooperation between the PKK and the PYD further deepened in

2016. The PYD further changed its ideological aspects more similar to the PKK’s (De Jong 2016),

84 especially Ocalan’s ideology in regard to “democratic confederalism” (Öcalan 2011). In 2016,

ISIS was defeated in Tal-Abyad with the help of the United States airstrikes (Associated Press

2016). Tal-Abyad was the last city for the PYD to secure its Rojava territories (see Appendix for

Map I, referring Rojava cantons) (Associated Press 2016). After Tal- Abyad victory, the PYD gained its entire control back in all Rojava cantons (Kobane, Afrin and Jazira) and declared that they will adopt Ocalan’s democratic confederalism (also known as Apoism) (Acun & Keskin 2017;

De Jong 2016). In March 2016, the PYD released a constitutional draft referring to a federal system to govern northern Syria (or Western Kurdistan) (De Jong 2016; Said 2016; Perry 2016; Al-

Jabassini 2017). Democratic confederalism addresses a “non-state social paradigm” (Ocalan,

2011). The system that democratic confederalism perceives the Western nation-state system is as an oppressive, ineffective instrument (Öcalan 2011). It portrays states as the obstacles before any form of development (Öcalan 2011). It purely and simply implies a nation, a democratic nation based on representation of gross-root organizations instead of any form of state institutions (Öcalan

2011). In my understanding, the PYD’s adaptation of the democratic confederalism illustrates the group’s further willingness to cooperate with the PKK. In this case, throughout their alliance against ISIS, the PKK and the PYD benefitted from increase resources, recognition and even territorial expansion in regard to the formation of Rojava federation, which would likely sustain further reciprocal relationships that would be related to the groups’ expected benefits for the future based on their assessments of the current process. It can be discussed that after ISIS’s threat is relatively dealt with, cooperation between the PKK and the PYD turned back to shared ideology.

As Moghdadam (2015) discusses ideological affinity is one of the necessities to develop a long- term relationship between these groups. However, the type of cooperation that is observed during

85 fight against ISIS was a strategic one and it seems it was a short-term operational support based on the contextual changes, including a change in threat.

From the PKK’s side, the PYD’s increasing autonomy in the eastern border of Turkey (see

Appendix for Map I, referring Rojava cantons) would be an opportunity to push the Turkish state even further to establish their own autonomous region inside the Turkish borders in the future. Or, and more realistically, it would likely provide the PKK bases to operate against Turkey. That is why defeating ISIS became more crucial for the PKK. Long-term ideological relationships with the PYD also made this possible but it seems groups’ strategic cooperation is not entirely based on shared ideology considering the opportunities and benefits that they gain in this process.

Therefore, it can be said that there is even a strategic perception regarding threat, which, in my understanding, is more than ideology.

Ironically, starting from 2017, cooperation between the PKK and the PYD began decreasing (Khalil 2017). With ISIS losing a majority of its power and influence, the groups’ strategies regarding cooperation changed, especially from the PYD’s side:

We can share a founding philosophical father without being the same organization. Having different leadership, different members, and publicly stating we are different… Simply put, we are our own organization, and we are proud of that… We have said publicly and will say again that our territory and resources are not going to be used by the PKK or any other groups fighting Turkey. We don’t interfere in the domestic affairs of neighboring countries, and we expect other countries to do the same (Khalil, personal communication, May 15, 2017).

This may also be because of the decrease in international support towards the groups. In

2017, with ISIS substantially weakened after the defeat in Raqqa, the United States and the international coalition began to reduce their support towards the PYD and other groups (Ayboga

2017; McCowen 2017). The PYD’s close ties with the PKK during the conflict and the PYD’s declaration of a federation, which is in opposition with the nation-state system, have not been supported by the ally forces (Calamur 2017). Furthermore, Turkey, as the member of NATO, was already urging the United States and the coalition to not to cooperate with the PKK (Emmott &

Tattersall 2015; Jones 2015; Spencer 2015). The PKK has been listed as a terrorist organization by the United States and the Europe (“Foreign Terrorist Organizations”). Although the United

States still needed the Kurdish groups to entirely defeat ISIS, the PKK as a terror group complicated the process (Beauchamp 2016; Shepp 2018). I believe that the decrease in the perceived threat, as well as the opportunities and benefits that the groups’ gained throughout the conflict would affect the PYD’s strategic decision regarding cooperation with the PKK. This seems to lead the PYD to a certain extent reduce its ties with the PKK. The PYD began to deny its formal ties with the PKK though the PYD did not give up on democratic confederalism (Khalil 2017). In the meantime, The Global Terrorism Database (2017) captured no attack in 2017 neither from the

PKK not from the PYD towards Turkey. It is, however, also important to note that throughout the conflict or even before, The Global Terrorism Database (2017) captured no attack carried together by the PKK and the PYD neither towards to Turkish state nor to the Syrian government.

Nevertheless, the cooperation between the PKK and the PYD seem to be drag into an unknown future with the decrease in international support and increase in Turkey’s position.

CONCLUSION

I proposed a theory connecting threats and cooperation in order to understand and identify armed political groups’ motives in their decisions for cooperation. The theoretical model that I suggest also addresses and- in a sense- challenges the notions of territoriality and perception of

87 threat, which have been associated with the nation-state system. The type of cooperation, which is a strategic, “high-end cooperation” (Moghadam 2015), between armed political groups is related to the changes in perceived threats, threats that would likely lead to changes in political spaces.

ISIS is a group seeking to establish an Islamic caliphate and seeking to do so through a global jihad, which more or less require a territorial expansionism. Realization of this ambition would likely lead to changes in physical borders, which Kurdish groups, such as the PKK and the PYD, have also had claim on. From this point of view, the Kurds presented a strategic challenge to ISIS’s expansionism, which resulted in ISIS threatening these groups not only territorial claims but also existence. In my understanding, territoriality and existentialism are related especially when we talk about nation-states. The norm of sovereignty, which led to the creation of modern nation-state system, has commonly been expressed by “geographical expression of authority … as invariably and inevitably territorial” (Agnew 2005, p. 437). Such form of authority brings forward the legitimate use of power with regards to protection sovereign territories, which has been attributed to states (Agnew 2005; Alvarez 2012; Holmes 2013; Osborne 2013). In a situation when there is a change in threat to states’ territories, we may expect them to establish a strategic, high-end cooperation as theories of balance of power and balance of threat would suggest. This form of cooperation in the face of a territorial threat is something unlikely for armed political groups because they are not associated with the norm of territoriality and the legitimate use of power.

However, what I claim is, such threat may trigger a type of cooperation, which requires a merge between groups’ forces and resources, and may even result in groups acting almost in a state-like manner to protect their territorial claims, as well as existences.

As such, I conducted a comparative case study analysis of cooperation between the PKK and the PYD, and their perceptions of threats associating with the rise of ISIS. The outcomes

88 allowed for a comparison between the groups between 1980 and 2017. The analysis produced an insight regarding the evolution of a strategic, high-end cooperation between the PKK and the PYD.

It is true that before 2014 an ideological form of cooperation existed between the PKK and the PYD. However, with the rise of ISIS that poses an existential and a territorial threat to these groups, the type of cooperation these groups’ share changes based on changes in their perceptions of threats, which lead to changes in their incentives. Thus, evolution of cooperation between the

PKK and the PYD may be similar to the mechanism firing a gun. Arguably, one may use a gun for protection purposes when there is a significant threat. From this point of view, cooperation between the PKK and the PYD is tool for protection against ISIS. Yet, what fires it cannot simply be explained by the groups’ survival instincts. I suggest that increasing ISIS threat unlocking the

PKK and the PYD’s security was a triggering mechanism to fire the gun, strategical cooperation between the groups. However, to pull the trigger, these groups need more than changes in threats.

Unlike states, cooperation between armed political groups are nor based on international law or multilateral agreements. Armed political groups need different assurances, such as opportunities and benefits. That is also why their cooperation is more than survival. Those opportunities and benefits are brought forward by ISIS threat, which has provided these groups a strategic environment to operate and cooperate, as well support from the United States and international society. When these groups fire their gun, they not only aim the threat but also aim their expected benefits. This form of collaboration requires more than an ideological cooperation because the benefits that the groups gain may not be as tangible as they gain from strategic cooperation, such as increasing resources, support and even legitimacy. Then, combined with the changes in threat, groups would more likely fire their guns together to achieve expected benefits. Therefore, a strategic cooperation merging the groups’ forces and arms provides a ground for this model.

There may be further steps to be taken to test this theory and assumption or find more evidence regarding it. The analysis focuses only on the changes in groups’ strategic cooperation based on changes in perceives threats. However, ideological cooperation between the PKK and the

PYD deserves a consideration to also understand groups’ strategic cooperation. “Strategic alliances and mergers, on the other hand, may be dependent upon a shared world view”

(Moghadam 2015). I suggested that ideological affinity may not be required to build a strategic alliance. However, it may still have an impact on furthering and deepening the cooperation because it may lead to a common purpose. Furthermore, presence of ideological affinity may overcome trust issues between the groups (Moghadam 2015). Cooperation between armed political groups are not regulated by international law or multilateral agreements. There is usually no assurance that would guarantee the partnership. This may lead to trust problems between the groups. Yet, presence of an ideological affinity may lead to a strategic cooperation characterized by a “relatively high degree of trust” (Moghadam 2015) between the actors. This may also react in groups’ perception of threats and cost and benefit calculations.

Strategic cooperation between the PKK and the PYD are groups that inspired the theoretical model of this research. These groups are nationalist groups that seek territory in which to operate. They also seek territory for the people they claim to represent as a part of their political agenda. Any threat that directs their territorial claims and existence would trigger a strategic cooperation between them. Therefore, groups that claim and seek territory for themselves to operate and for the people, which they claim to represent, may also be affected by a similar threat and illustrate a similar form of cooperation.

Limitations

There are several limitations of this research that should be considered for future studies.

First, the PKK and the PYD’s cooperation is part of an ongoing process. The groups’ relationship was only analyzed between 1980 and 2017. Although by the end of 2017 ISIS’s threat had decreased, the group is still operating (Burke 2017; Turak 2017). Thus, balances in the region regarding power distribution may still change. Further analysis is needed to identify new challenges and their impacts on these groups. Second, the threat mentioned here represents a specific threat posed by an armed political group to another. ISIS is a threat to state and non-state actors because of its ideology. Cooperating against a threat that is also the enemy of states would probably provide more benefit to these groups than cooperating against a state actor. Furthermore, cooperating against ISIS may have justified these groups’ use of force and, in the case of the PYD, legitimized their political claims. However, not every form of threat may lead the same outcome.

For instance, in the early months of 2018, the Turkish state initiated cross-border operations to

Afrin, one of the cantons of Rojava (Bilginsoy 2018). The Turkish government called this the

“olive branch” operations, which were aimed at maintaining “peace” by targeting the PYD and the

YPG forces in order to stop the possible Kurdish territorial expansionism (Kasapoglu & Ulgen

2018). This can also be viewed as a threat to the PKK and the PYD, as well as their territorial ambitions. However, cooperation by the PKK and the PYD against the Turkish state would be less beneficial than cooperation against ISIS. Third, I treated the PKK and the PYD as they though they are comparable in terms of resources and support. In other words, capacities, resources, networks and support that the groups had before and during the cooperation are not distinguished.

Different capacities, for instance, may also affect groups’ incentives to cooperate.

Implications and Future Research

There are also some implications from this work, which may benefit future research. First, as a part of the assumption, I claim that through their cooperation against ISIS, which is also the enemy of states, these groups’ use of violence was in some sense legitimized, especially for the

PYD. This was mostly because of the involvement of international forces and their support of

Kurdish groups fighting ISIS. Particularly in the PYD’s case, the group was able to establish a de- facto state in northern Syria, which seems to be accepted by the international community.

Therefore, I recommend that future researchers evaluate whether the legitimacy persists even after

ISIS is gone. This would also help us understand groups’ objectives in their decisions for cooperation. More importantly, this would provide a new insight regarding the legitimacy of these groups and the legitimate use of force in general. Second, I encourage future researchers to focus on the limitations regarding methodology and data. I recommend that future researchers identify or collect new sources of data to test the conclusions reached here. There may be other sources of information regarding the groups and their incentives for cooperation. Finally, I suggest that future researchers give more attention to theories, such as the theories of balance of power by Kenneth

Waltz (1979) and the balance of threat by Stephen Walt (1987). These theories are developed to understand states’ reactions to increasing power or threat. Because the scope of this research is limited to the non-state actors, I exclude assumptions of these theories. However, for future studies these theories may be taken into account not only to compare state and non-state actors’ incentives for cooperation but also to extend the concept of balancing into armed political groups.

The more insight we develop into how armed political groups cooperate and how they perceive threats, including threats from non-state and state actors, the better we may understand these groups’ motivations not only regarding their cooperation but also their strategies, including

92 their use of violence. This may expand discussions within the literature on international conflict.

Considerations of the legitimate use of force may not only be related to sovereignty.

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APPENDIX

Map I: Borders of Democratic Federation of Norther Syria

Retrieved from Wikimedia Commons, the free media repository

Map II: Iraq-Syrian Battlespace (also represent possible change in the political space)

Bokhari &Friedman 2017, retrieved from Mouldin Economics.