File No. 32931

SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (ON APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT OF THE QUÉBEC COURT OF APPEAL)

BETWEEN: FARÈS BOU MALHAB APPELLANT (Respondent / Incidental Appellant)

- and -

DIFFUSION MÉTROMÉDIA CMR INC.

and

ANDRÉ ARTHUR RESPONDENTS (Appellants / Incidental Respondents)

- and -

CONSEIL NATIONAL DES CITOYENS ET CITOYENNES D’ORIGINE HAÏTIENNE INTERVENER - and -

CANADIAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION INTERVENER

- and -

CANADIAN CIVIL LIBERTIES ASSOCIATION INTERVENER

- and -

CANADIAN NEWSPAPER ASSOCIATION, AD IDEM/CANADIAN MEDIA LAWYERS ASSOCIATION AND CANADIAN ASSOCIATION OF JOURNALISTS INTERVENERS

RESPONDENTS’ FACTUM

Henri A. Lafortune Inc. 2005 Limoges Street 450 442-4080 – Tel. Longueuil, Québec, J4G 1C4 450 442-2040 – Fax www.halafortune.ca [email protected] L-3160-08 - 2 -

Jean El Masri, Esq. Pierre Landry El Masri Dugal Noël et Associés Suite 750 111, Champlain Street 4, Notre-Dame Street East Gatineau, Québec Montréal, Québec J8X 3R1 H2Y 1B8

514 499-7575 – Tel. 819 771-7393 – Tel. 514 499-1050 – Fax 819 771-5397 – Fax [email protected] [email protected]

Counsel for Appellant Agent for Appellant

David Stolow, Esq. Nicholas Rodrigo, Esq. Brian A. Crane, Q.C. Louis-Martin O’Neill, Esq. Gowling Lafleur Henderson LLP Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg Suite 2600 26th Floor 160, Elgin Street 1501, McGill College Avenue Ottawa, Ontario Montréal, Québec H3A 3N9 K1P 1C3

514 841-6400 – Tel. 613 233-1781 – Tel. 514 841-6499 – Fax 613 563-9869 – Fax [email protected] [email protected] [email protected]

Counsel for Respondents Agent for Respondents

Stefan Martin, Esq. Thomas A. Houston Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP Suite 3900 Suite 1420 1, Place Ville-Marie 99 Bank Street Montréal, Québec Ottawa, Ontario H3B 4M7 K1P 1H4

514 878-5832– Tel. 613 783-9600 – Tel. 514 866-2241 – Fax 613 783-9690 – Fax [email protected] [email protected]

Counsel for Intervener Agent for Intervener Conseil National des citoyens et Conseil National des citoyens et citoyennes d’origine haïtienne citoyennes d’origine haïtienne

- 3 -

Guy J. Pratte, Esq. Nadia Effendi Borden Ladner Gervais LLP Borden Ladner Gervais LLP Suite 900 Suite 1100 1000 de la Gauchetière Street West World Exchange Plaza Montréal, Québec 100 Queen Street H3B 5H4 Ottawa, Ontario K1P 1J9

514 879-1212 – Tel. 613 237-5160 – Tel. 514 954-1905 – Fax 613 230-8842 – Fax [email protected] [email protected]

Counsel for Intervener Agent for Intervener Canadian Broadcasting Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Corporation

Paul B. Schabas, Esq. Nancy K. Brooks Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP Commerce Court West 45 O'Connor Street 2800 - 199 Bay St. 20th Floor Toronto, Ontario Ottawa, Ontario M5L 1A9 K1P 1A4

416 863-4274 – Tel. 613 788-2200 – Tel. 416 863-2653 – Fax 613 788-2247 – Fax [email protected] [email protected]

Counsel for Intervener Agent for Intervener Canadian Civil Liberties Canadian Civil Liberties Association Association

Ryder Gilliland, Esq. Nancy K. Brooks Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP Blake, Cassels & Graydon LLP Commerce Court West 45 O'Connor Street 2800 - 199 Bay Street 20th Floor Toronto, Ontario Ottawa, Ontario M5L 1A9 K1P 1A4

416 863-5849 – Tel. 613 788-2200 – Tel. 416 863-2653 – Fax 613 788-2247 – Fax [email protected] [email protected]

Counsel for Interveners Agent for Interveners Canadian Newspaper Canadian Newspaper Association, Ad IDEM/Canadian Association, Ad IDEM/Canadian Media lawyers Association and Media lawyers Association and Canadian Association of Canadian Association of Journalists Journalists

- i -

TABLE OF CONTENTS

RESPONDENTS’ FACTUM Page

INTRODUCTION ...... 1

PART I – STATEMENT OF FACTS ...... 2

A. The Motion for Authorization to Institute a Class Action ...... 2

B. The Authorization Judgment ...... 2

C. The Defamation Action ...... 3

D. The Judgment of the Q.S.C...... 4

E. The Judgment of the Q.C.A...... 5

PART II – STATEMENT OF THE QUESTIONS IN ISSUE ...... 6

PART III – STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT ...... 8

I. The Basic Principles ...... 8

A. Defamation Actions ...... 8

B. No Action for "Group Defamation" under Québec Law ...... 11

C. A Comparative Perspective of "Group Defamation" Actions ...... 15

i. The U.K...... 16

ii. Canadian Common Law ...... 17

iii. The U.S...... 20

iv. French Law ...... 21

D. Class Actions do not Create Substantive Rights ...... 23

- ii -

TABLE OF CONTENTS

RESPONDENTS’ FACTUM Page

II. This Case ...... 25

A. The Proper Dismissal of the Action by the Majority of the Q.C.A...... 25

i. No Member of the Group was "spécialement visé(e)" ...... 25

ii. No "atteinte illicite et intentionnelle" ...... 29

B. The Fundamental Error in the Judgments of the Q.S.C. and of Beauregard J.A...... 30

C. "Dénaturer le Recours Collectif" ...... 34

D. The Untenable Position ...... 37

PART IV – ORDER SOUGHT CONCERNING COSTS ...... 40

PART V – ORDER SOUGHT ...... 40

PART VI – TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ...... 41

PART VII – STATUTES, REGULATIONS, RULES

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982, R.S.C., 1985, App. II, No. 44, s. 2(b) ...... 45

Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C-12, s. 3, 4 and 49 ...... 48

- French version ...... 50

Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991. c. 64, art. 3, 35 and 1457 ...... 52

- French version ...... 58

- iii -

TABLE OF CONTENTS

RESPONDENTS’ FACTUM Page

Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. c. C-25, art. 59, 67, 1003(c), 1005, 1028, 1031, 1034 and 1045 ...... 65

- French version ...... 74

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C- 46, ss. 297, 318 and 319 ...... 82

Defamation Act of Manitoba, R.S.M. 1987, c. D20, s. 19 (1) ...... 90

Loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la presse, Bull. des Lois, 12 s., B.637, n. 10850, art. 29, 30, 31, 32 and 48 ...... 101

______

- 1 -

Respondents’ Factum Introduction

RESPONDENTS’ FACTUM

INTRODUCTION

1. In this appeal (the "Appeal"), the Appellant asks this Court to overturn a majority judgment of the Québec Court of Appeal (the "Q.C.A."), allowing the Respondents' appeal from a decision of the Québec Superior Court (the "Q.S.C."), and dismissing his class action in moral and punitive damages for defamation on behalf of a group of consisting of at least 1100 individuals.

2. With respect, the Appellant has failed to point to any error in the judgment which he impugns and he cannot dispute the fact that the majority of the Q.C.A. was correct to reverse the judgment of the Q.S.C., which had applied the incorrect legal standard for determining defamation, as it was not established on an objective standard that the individual reputation of the Appellant or any other member of the group was defamed. Accordingly, there was simply no basis to sustain the Appellant's action or that of any other member of the group.

3. To accept the position that an action for defamation lies, based on a general statement made about a group consisting of at least 1100 persons – where it was not established that any member of the group was targeted or singled out – would have profound and untenable ramifications on the right to freedom of expression and would open up new vistas of defamation litigation unconstrained by any principle recognizable in our law. To further contend that such an action – which could never be maintained if brought individually – should somehow be upheld because it is brought in the form of a class action, would effectively create an entirely new cause of action heretofore unknown to our law and would completely undermine this Court's holding that a class action is purely procedural and has no effect on substantive law.

------2 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Facts

PART I – STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. THE MOTION FOR AUTHORIZATION TO INSTITUTE A CLASS ACTION

4. On 17 November 1999, the Appellant sought leave of the Q.S.C. to institute a class action (the "Motion for Authorization")1 in moral and punitive damages for defamation against the Respondents based on comments made by the Respondent, André Arthur ("Arthur"), during his 17 November 1998 radio talk show on station CKVL (then owned by the Respondent, Diffusion Métromédia CMR Inc.).2 The Appellant sought to represent the following group (of which he was a member) which consisted of approximately 2000 individuals:

Les personnes physiques qui, le 17 novembre 1998 étaient soit titulaires de permis de taxi, soit chauffeurs de taxi, dans la région de l'île de Montréal qui est désservie par les agglomérations A-5, A-11 et A-12 au sens de la Loi sur le transport par taxi, qui sont d'origine arabe ou haïtienne. (our emphasis)

Judgment and Reasons for Judgment of Marcelin J. dated 22 June 2001 (now reported at J.E. 2001-1431 (C.S.)), A.R., vol. I, pp. 2, 4 and 13.

B. THE AUTHORIZATION JUDGMENT

5. By judgment of 22 June 2001, the Q.S.C. (Marcelin J.) dismissed the Motion for Authorization because, in its view, given the basic conditions for a defamation action, which includes that "pour qu'il y ait un lien entre la faute et le dommage que la personne qui se dit victime de diffamation soit identifiée ou à tout le moins

1 The Motion for Autorization was subsequently amended on 29 May 2003, Requête amendée pour autorisation d'exercer un recours collectif et pour être représentant, Appellant's Record ("A.R."), vol. I, p.128. 2 While much emphasis is placed by the Appellant on Arthur's history, as properly noted by the majority of the Q.C.A. in this case, "ce n'est pas un jugement sur l'à-propos de la radio de confrontation, mais sur l'incident particulier qui nous occupe." Reasons for judgment of the majority of the Q.C.A. dated 17 October 2008, A.R., vol. I, p. 118, para. 107. - 3 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Facts

identifiable" (p. 11), and considering that "[l]es propos s'adressent à une communauté composée d'un nombre important de membres" (p. 13), "il faut venir à la conclusion que, pris individuellement, ce recours n'a aucune chance de réussite." (p. 13).

Judgment and Reasons for Judgment of Marcelin J. dated 22 June 2001, A.R., vol. I, pp.12-14.

6. On 24 March 2003, the Q.C.A. (reasons for judgment of Rayle J.A. with which Gendreau and Dussault JJ.A. concurred) (“Métromédia C.A.”)3 allowed the appeal from the judgment of Marcelin J. and granted the Motion for Authorization. Pursuant to article 1005 of the Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C-25 (the "CCP"), the Q.C.A. redefined the group - which was then estimated to consist of 1100 individuals (the “Group”) - as follows:

toute personne qui, le 17 novembre 1998, était titulaire d’un permis de chauffeur de taxi, dans la région de l’île de Montréal, desservie par les agglomérations A-5, A-11 et A-12 au sens de la Loi sur le transport par taxi, L.R.Q. c. T-11.1, et dont la langue maternelle est l’arabe ou le créole. (our emphasis)

Judgment and Reasons for Judgment of the Q.C.A. dated 24 March 2003, A.R., vol. I, p. 21, para. 77.

C. THE DEFAMATION ACTION

7. Further to the judgment in Métromédia C.A., on 22 January 2004, the Appellant filed an action for defamation seeking $750 in moral damages and $200 in punitive damages for each member of the Group (the "Action"). With respect to the alleged facts giving rise to an individual action on behalf of each Group member, the Action alleged, inter alia, as follows:

3 The judgment in Métromédia C.A. is now reported at [2003] R.J.Q. 1011 (C.A.). - 4 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Facts

13. […] b. Les propos de M. André Arthur […] sont diffamatoires et discriminatoires envers les personnes d’origine arabe et haïtienne œuvrant dans l’industrie du taxi dans la région de Montréal;

[…]

e. Les membres du groupe ont tous été lésés moralement par les propos haineux que [Arthur] a avancés […];

f. Les membres du groupe ont tous subi des dommages semblables à cause des propos haineux que [Arthur] a avancés […] (our emphasis)

Judgment and Reasons for Judgment of the Q.C.A. dated 17 October 2008, A.R., vol. I, p. 77, para. 12.

D. THE JUDGMENT OF THE Q.S.C.

8. The judgment on the merits of the Action was rendered by the Q.S.C. (Guibault J.) on 20 April 2006.

Judgment and Reasons for Judgment of the Q.S.C. dated 20 April 2006 (now reported at [2006] R.J.Q. 1145 (C.S.)), A.R., vol. I, p. 41.

9. As appears from the Q.S.C.'s reasons for judgment (A.R., vol. I, pp. 46-50, paras. 9 to 43), at trial, 11 Group members (including the Appellant) testified that they were "profondément blessés et choqués par les propos" (para. 122).4 No evidence was made at trial by any member of the Group or otherwise that:

4 The complete transcript of the testimony of the 11 Group members is found at A.R., vol. II, pp. 193 to 236 and vol. III, pp. 1 to 129. - 5 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Facts

(a) any member of the Group (let alone every member)5 was, on an objective standard, targeted or singled out, qua individual, by the comments in question; or that

(b) any member of the Group suffered a direct and personal damage distinct from the alleged damage suffered by the Group qua collectivity as a result of the impugned comments.

10. Despite the foregoing, and while the Q.S.C. expressly noted that "qu'il partage l'opinion émise par la Juge Marcelin" (who had dismissed the Motion for Authorization), because it erroneously considered that the authorization judgment in Métromédia C.A. bound its decision on the merits of the class action,6 it proceeded, on the purported basis of the collective recovery provisions in the CCP (articles 1028 et seq.), to grant the class action in part. The Q.S.C. awarded $200 in moral damages for defamation for each member of the Group7 and dismissed the claim for punitive damages based on its finding that there was no unlawful and intentional interference with the rights of any member of the Group.

E. THE JUDGMENT OF THE Q.C.A.

11. By a majority judgment dated 17 October 2008, the Q.C.A. (reasons for judgment of Bich J.A. with which Morissette J.A. concurred, Beauregard J.A. dissenting) allowed the Respondents' appeal, without costs, and dismissed the Action with costs.

5 The Q.S.C. noted that the evidence did not clearly establish the size of the Group, which consisted of between 1100 and 1200 individuals (paras. 108 and 120) and that, for the purposes of its judgment, the Group was established at 1100 persons (para. 155). 6 Judgment of the Q.S.C. dated 20 April 2006, A.R., vol. I, p. 66, para. 137. See also paras. 135 and 136. 7 Payment of the total amount of $220,000 was to be made to a non-profit organization to be subsequently determined. - 6 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Facts

Judgment and Reasons for Judgment of the Q.C.A. dated 17 October 2008 (now reported at [2008] R.J.Q. 2356 (C.A.)), A.R., vol. I, p. 74.

12. In summary and as will be detailed more fully in Part III, Section II below, the majority of the Q.C.A. dismissed the claim for moral damages because, inter alia, based on: (i) an objective standard which governs whether comments are defamatory; (ii) the criteria established under Québec law where an individual brings proceedings for "group defamation"; and (iii) the evidence in this case to the effect that "les propos de l'appelant Arthur ne visaient pas une personne, nommément identifiée ou identifiable, mais plutôt un groupe" (para. 43), "[on] ne pourrait raisonnablement conclure que la réputation individuelle et la dignité personnelle de chacun des chauffeurs de taxi appartenant au groupe visé sont entachées ou atteintes aux yeux de leurs concitoyens" (para. 76) (i.e. no individual member of the Group had been defamed).

13. The Q.C.A. (Beauregard J.A. concurring on this point) also dismissed, without costs, the Appellant's incidental appeal with respect to the claim for punitive damages. ------

PART II – STATEMENT OF THE QUESTIONS IN ISSUE

14. With respect, the questions framed by the Appellant (Appellant's Factum, para. 17) do not properly address the issue before this Court. As was properly recognized by the majority of the Q.C.A., the fundamental issue was whether it had been established that “chacun des membres visés par le recours collectif a-t-il été personnellement diffamé par le réquisitoire de l’appelant Arthur contre le groupe auquel il appartient?" (para. 26).8

8 Reasons for judgment of the majority of the Q.C.A. dated 17 October 2008, A.R., vol. I, pp. 86-87, para. 26. - 7 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of the Questions in Issue

15. In addition, it is necessary to correct the Appellant's mischaracterization of the Respondents' position before the Q.C.A. More particularly, his statements that the majority of the Q.C.A. would have "constaté que la faute n'était plus contestée", that "le caractère collectif de la réparation l'était pas non plus" (Appellant's Factum, para. 20) and that "[la preuve du préjudice individuel] n'est pas en litige" (Appellant's Factum, para. 51), are taken out of context and misconstrue the Respondents' position.

16. The Respondents' position was that, based on an objective standard and the evidence in this case, no individual member of the Group was defamed by the subject comments. Indeed, as appears from the reasons for judgment of the majority of the Q.C.A. (A.R., vol. I, p. 74):

(a) the Respondents "contestent le caractère diffamatoire, c'est-à-dire préjudiciable, des propos […]" (para. 22);

(b) the Respondents' position was that "la preuve ne révèle pas l'existence d'un préjudice de nature à appeler réparation" and that the prejudice alleged by the 11 Group members who testified "n'a rien du préjudice personnel et particulier qui seul permet réparation en matière de diffamation et qui doit pour cela se distinguer du préjudice commun subi par le groupe que visaient les propos litigieux." (para. 20);

(c) "[l]a faute n'est pas non plus contestée en ce sens que les appelants ne nient pas que les propos litigieux, que l'on ne cherche pas à excuser en invoquant une quelconque norme de conduite journalistique, ont été prononcés sans égard à leur impact potentiel sur autrui, alors que leur auteur aurait dû les savoir faux, indélicats ou exagérés" (para. 27); and

(d) under reserve of the Respondents' position that no member of the Group could sustain an individual action in damages for defamation, "n'est pas en cause le caractère collectif de la réparation accordée par le juge de - 8 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of the Questions in Issue

première instance ni son quantum : si la Cour devait confirmer le caractère diffamatoire des propos et conclure à l'existence d'un préjudice suffisant, il n'y aurait donc pas lieu de modifier le mode de réparation ainsi choisi ni le montant des dommages compensatoires." (para. 29).

17. Based on its recognition and proper application of the governing legal principles and the evidence in this case (or the lack thereof), the Q.C.A. held that no member of the Group had been defamed and dismissed the Action. The sole question raised by the Appeal is whether the Appellant has met his burden to "clearly satisf[y]" this Court that the impugned judgment is erroneous.9

------

PART III – STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT

I. THE BASIC PRINCIPLES

A. DEFAMATION ACTIONS

18. An action for defamation involves a balancing of "two fundamental values": freedom of expression and the protection of the reputation of an individual.10

19. The importance of the fundamental right to freedom of expression has long been recognized by this Court. Indeed, as Cory J. wrote in Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326,“[i]t is difficult to imagine a guaranteed

9 Beaudouin-Daigneault v. Richard, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 2 ("Beaudouin-Daigneault"), p. 8; St. Jean v. Mercier, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 491, 2002 SCC 15, paras. 37 to 40; and H.L. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 401, 2005 SCC 25, para. 69. 10 Prud’homme v. Prud’homme, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 663, 2002 SCC 85 ("Prud’homme"), para. 38 (Appellant's Book of Authorities ("A.B.A."), vol. I, tab 6). See also, in a defamation context, Hill v. Church of Scientology, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 ("Hill"), paras. 100 and 108 (Respondents' Book of Authorities ("R.B.A."), tab 5); and, most recently, WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 420, 2008 SCC 40 ("WIC Radio"), para. 1 (R.B.A., tab 9). - 9 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Argument

right more important to a democratic society than freedom of expression.” (p. 1356).11

20. The importance of freedom of expression is revealed by its elevation to constitutional status under section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982, R.S.C., 1985, App. II, No. 44 (the "Canadian Charter")12 and to quasi- constitutional status under section 3 of the Québec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C-12 (the “Québec Charter”).

21. The section 3 Québec Charter right to freedom of expression, as any other constitutional or quasi-constitutional right, is not, however, absolute and, as this Court wrote in Prud'homme, can be limited by "the requirements imposed by other people's right to the protection of their reputation" (para. 43).

22. In Prud’homme, this Court affirmed that Québec civil law "does not provide for a specific form of action for interference with reputation" and that the basis for such an action is article 1457 of the Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991. c. 64 (the "CCQ"), pursuant to which a plaintiff must establish, on a balance of probabilities, the three elements of civil liability, namely, "the existence of injury, of a wrongful act, and of a causal connection" (para. 32).13

23. To establish the first element of liability (injury), a complainant must establish – on an objective standard – that the subject comments were defamatory:

In other words, we must ask whether an ordinary person would believe that the remarks made, when viewed as a whole, brought

11 See also Gilles E. Néron Communication Marketing Inc. v. Chambre des Notaires du Québec, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 95, 2004 SCC 53 ("Néron"), paras. 48-49 (A.B.A., vol. I, tab 12). 12 Section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter is not at play in this Appeal. 13 This was reaffirmed by this Court in Néron (A.B.A., vol. I, tab 12), at para. 56. - 10 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Argument

discredit on the reputation of another person. (Prud'homme, para. 34) (our emphasis)

24. A person who makes defamatory comments is not, however, civilly liable for them unless he/she committed a "wrongful act" (i.e. a civil fault). This occurs where a person makes unpleasant remarks about another party knowing them to be false or where he/she should have known them to be false, or where a person makes unfavourable, but true comments about a party "without any valid reason for doing so." (Prud'homme, para. 36).

25. There can be no debate that the delict (or tort) of defamation, whose function is to vindicate interference with an individual's reputation, is a personal one. To put it differently, the right to the protection of reputation is undoubtedly an individual right, not a collective right and a group that has no legal status or persona does not have a reputation that can be defamed. The foregoing clearly appears from articles 3 and 35 CCQ and from section 4 of the Québec Charter, which provides that "[e]very person has a right to the safeguard of his dignity, honor and reputation."14

26. Indeed, in the oft-cited case of Jeunes Canadiens pour une civilisation chrétienne v. La Fondation du théâtre du Nouveau-Monde, [1979] C.A. 491 ("Jeunes Canadiens") (A.B.A., vol. III, tab 39), the Q.C.A., referring to section 49 of the Québec Charter, which provides for the right of the "victim" of an unlawful interference with his/her Québec Charter rights to obtain the cessation of and compensation for such interference, wrote that "[c]'est à la personne considérée individuellement qu'elle s'adresse" and that "ce n'est qu'en tant que personne lésée dans ses droits dont la Charte la déclare titulaire […] qu'une partie peut se prévaloir de ces recours." (p. 495).

14 See also Hill (R.B.A., tab 5), para. 108. - 11 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Argument

B. NO ACTION FOR "GROUP DEFAMATION" UNDER QUÉBEC LAW

27. It is common ground that Québec law does not recognize that an unidentified individual can sustain a civil action in defamation on the sole basis that allegedly defamatory (or even allegedly racist or discriminatory) comments were directed towards a group of which he/she was a member. Indeed, the Appellant recognizes that "le critère est de savoir si les paroles (ou les écrits) déconsidèrent l'individu qui s'en plaint" (Appellant's Factum, para. 33) and that "l'individualisation des victimes est nécessaire pour la preuve d'une faute ou d'abus de la liberté d'expression" (Appellant's Factum, para. 36).

28. It is well established under Québec law that in order to sustain an individual cause of action for defamation where generalized comments are directed to a group, a plaintiff must establish that he/she was: (i) “spécialement visé(e)”: that the comments complained of identified or referred to him/her in particular; and (ii) "personnellement atteint(e)”: that he/she suffered a direct, personal and independent damage from that of the group of which he/she was a member. The latter criteria is commonly referred to as “l’individualisation du préjudice”.

29. These principles were recognized over 90 years ago by the Q.C.A. in Ortenberg v. Plamondon, (1915) 24 B.R. 69 and 385 (C.A.Q.) (“Ortenberg”) (A.B.A., vol. II, tab 29), which, as noted by the majority of the Q.C.A., is “à juste titre — l’incontournable de la jurisprudence en matière de diffamation dite collective.”15

30. In Ortenberg, Carroll J.A. articulated the following principle:

Sans doute, les attaques contre une race, quelques violentes soient- elles, ne peuvent donner ouverture à une action en dommages- intérêts; tous ceux qui écrivent peuvent écrire tout ce qu’ils pensent sur le compte d’une collectivité, avec cette restriction que si, l’un des

15 Reasons for judgment of the majority of the Q.C.A. dated 17 October 2008, A.R., vol. I, p. 99, para. 59. - 12 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Argument

individus de la collectivité est visé spécialement par la diffamation et subit un dommage, il a l’action en justice. Si la collectivité est nombreuse il n’y a pas droit d’action, car l’injure dans ce cas n’est pas censée viser une personne. (p. 73) (our emphasis)16

31. The foregoing principle has consistently been upheld by the Québec courts in numerous decisions since Ortenberg17 and has been acknowledged by the leading authors on group defamation.18

32. Thus, in Goyer v. Duquette, 61 B.R. (1936) 503 (C.A.) ("Goyer") (R.B.A., tab 4), a pharmacist brought an individual action for defamation based on an advertisement published by the defendant pharmacist (13 other pharmacists also brought separate actions on the same basis).19 St-Jacques J.A. described the basis for the claims in Goyer thusly:

Le champ du débat est donc bien défini en la déclaration même; on peut le déterminer comme suit : Vous avez publié une annonce injurieuse à tous les pharmaciens de la province. Or, je suis un pharmacien; donc, cette annonce me blesse dans mon honneur, ma

16 In Ortenberg, as was properly recognized by the majority of the Q.C.A. in this case (A.R., vol. I, pp. 99-100, paras. 59 to 66), the plaintiff succeeded in an individual action for defamation based on comments directed at persons of the Jewish faith in Québec City (at the time, there were 75 Jewish families out of 80,000 people in Québec City) because the evidence established that: (i) the defendant knew the plaintiff who lived across the street from him; (ii) the plaintiff's business address was specifically identified in the subject comments (see p. 72); (iii) the plaintiff was the target of harassment and vandalism following the comments (see decision of Cross J.A., p. 386); and (iv) the personal and distinct damages suffered by the plaintiff were foreseeable. 17 See, inter alia, Germain v. Ryan, (1918) 53 C.S. 543, p. 544; Sarrazin & AL v. Duquette, (1935) 41 R.P. 365, p. 373; and Raymond v. Abel, (1946) C.S. 251 ("Raymond") (R.B.A., tab 8). Raymond is summarized at para. 56 of the reasons for judgment of the majority of the Q.C.A. (A.R., vol. I, p. 99). 18 See Nicole Vallières, La Presse et la Diffamation, Montréal, Wilson & Lafleur, 1985, pp. 25 and 27 (R.B.A., tab 15); and Denis Buron, "Liberté d’expression et diffamation des collectivités : quand le droit à l’égalité s’exprime", (1988) 29 C. de D. 491, pp. 496 et 497 (R.B.A., tab 10). 19 The evidence established that, at the time, there were 545 pharmacists in Québec, of whom 425 were located in Montréal (see p. 512). - 13 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Argument

personne et mes biens, et, en conséquence, vous me devez une réparation. (p. 514) (our emphasis)

33. St. Jacques J.A. noted that the plaintiff in Goyer did not establish that the subject comments "[l'ont] visé en particulier" (p. 520) and dismissed the plaintiff's action for defamation on the following basis:

Comme on le voit, chacun de ces demandeurs, y compris le présent appelant, ne se croit lésé que parce qu’il fait partie du corps ou de l’Association des pharmaciens de la province de Québec. Chacun d’eux peut-il avoir une action en dommages en pareil cas? Je ne le crois pas. (p. 519)

[…]

Le demandeur appelant ne prétend pas que le défendeur l’a visé en particulier, en publiant cette annonce. De fait, tous les demandeurs, sans exception, reconnaissent avec l’appelant que ce n’est que par déduction qu’ils arrivent à se croire visés et atteints par l’annonce. (p. 520)

Je ne puis admettre qu’un droit d’action en dommages puisse découler en faveur du demandeur du seul fait que l’annonce pourrait être injurieuse à l’égard de la collectivité des pharmaciens de la province de Québec dont il fait partie. (p. 520) (our emphasis)20

34. Subsequently, in Jeunes Canadiens (A.B.A., vol. III, tab 39), the Q.C.A., applying the Ortenberg and Goyer principles, wrote that "[u]n acte fautif envers la collectivité n’en sera pas moins générateur de droits pour l’individu qui est alors personnellement lésé dans ses intérêts et droits propres, qui a subi un préjudice distinct du préjudice collectif" (p. 494). The Q.C.A. went on to reaffirm the following basic principle governing an action for defamation:

La règle, en droit commun, est la même en matière de diffamation. Une personne, uniquement à titre de membre d’une collectivité visée par les propos injurieux, n’a pas l’intérêt suffisant pour former

20 See also the comments of Rivard J.A. in Goyer (R.B.A., tab 4), p. 511. - 14 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Argument

une instance civile basée sur telle diffamation; il faudra qu’elle allègue qu’elle a été visée et atteinte personnellement. La diffamation doit être personnelle. (p. 494) (our emphasis)21

35. The principle articulated in Jeunes Canadiens was followed, in a class action context, in Cabay dite Chatel v. Fafard, J.E. 87-40 (C.S.) (appeal dismissed, C.A.M. 500-09-001473-867 and 500-09-001474-865, 14 June 1988) ("Chatel") (A.B.A. vol. III, tab 38), where the Q.S.C. dismissed, based on lack of interest, a motion for authorization to institute a class action for defamation brought by a member of the Church of Scientology on behalf of 22,250 members of the Church because the petitioner failed to demonstrate that the impugned comments "la visent personnellement autrement qu’en sa qualité d’adepte de cette religion" (p. 11):

Ainsi, quand la requérante allègue qu’une campagne de dénigrement contre la Scientologie menée par les intimés, humilie les adeptes de la Scientologie et elle-même, elle ne réfère toujours qu’aux attaques menées contre la Scientologie sans spécifier comment celles-ci la visent personnellement autrement qu’en sa qualité d’adepte de cette religion. C’est le même intérêt général qu’elle invoque comme étant celui de tous les membres du groupe qu’elle entend représenter. C’est là alléguer un intérêt général, commun à tous les adeptes de la Scientologie (pp. 11-12).

[…]

La requête n’allègue aucun fait précis qui permette d’inférer que la requérante est visée et atteinte personnellement par les agissements reprochés aux défendeurs. Elle n’allègue aucun préjudice distinct de celui de la collectivité que forment les adeptes de la Scientologie. (p. 12) (our emphasis)

36. Most recently, these principles were applied by the Q.C.A., following the impugned judgment, in its March 2008 decision in Zhang v. Chau, J.E. 2008-1176 (C.A.)

21 As noted by the majority of the Q.C.A. in this case, while Jeunes Canadiens was decided based on a lack of interest, "le principe avalisé par la Cour n'en est pas moins pertinent" (para. 54). - 15 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Argument

(leave to appeal to the SCC dismissed, 4 December 2008, #32747) (“Zhang”) (A.B.A., vol. III, tab 40). In Zhang, the Q.C.A. upheld a decision of the Q.S.C. dismissing an action for defamation brought on an individual basis by 232 members of Falun Gong because none of the complainants had established that the allegedly defamatory texts were about them in particular. The Q.C.A. reiterated that:

[18] Selon notre droit, celui qui prétend recouvrer des dommages- intérêts par suite d’un préjudice qu’il aurait subi par la faute du défendeur doit prouver que ce préjudice est réel et direct. Un individu, d’un race quelconque, adepte d’une religion particulière ou membre d’une association ne subit pas un préjudice qui peut être indemnisé si on attaque la race, la religion ou l’association à moins qu’on puisse dire qu’il subit un préjudice spécial et additionnel au préjudice causé à tous les autres individus qui sont dans la même position que la sienne. (para. 18) (our emphasis)

C. A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE OF "GROUP DEFAMATION" ACTIONS

37. Despite the differences between the civil law and common law systems with respect to defamation actions,22 common to both regimes is the fact that defamation is a personal delict (tort), determined according to an objective standard, committed against an identifiable individual based on injury to his/her reputation. Accordingly, it is of interest to consider the standards developed at common law, which mirror the Québec standards, and abroad, where a plaintiff sues for "group defamation".

22 For example, under civil law, damages are not presumed once defamation is established and must be proved. See, in this regard, Prud'homme, paras. 37, 56 and 57 and Aubry v. Éditions Vice-Versa, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 591, paras. 67 to 69. - 16 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Argument

i. The U.K.

38. The leading case in Anglo-Canadian jurisprudence on the subject of group defamation is, undoubtedly,23 the decision of the House of Lords in Knupffer v. London Express Newspaper, Limited, [1944] A.C. 116 ("Knupffer") (R.B.A., tab 7).24 In Knupffer, Viscount Simon L.C. summarized the basis for a defamation action as follows:

[…] it is an essential element of the cause of action for defamation that the words complained of should be published ‘of the plaintiff’. If the words are not so published, the plaintiff is not defamed and cannot have any right to ask that the defendant should be held responsible to him in respect of them (pp. 118-119) (our emphasis).25

39. Viscount Simon L.C. went on to affirm that in a case where an individual brings proceedings where allegedly defamatory comments were directed at a group, a two-part inquiry, "which decides whether the words referred to him/her are such as would lead persons acquainted with the plaintiff to believe that he was the person referred to" (p. 121) (i.e. to determine whether the plaintiff was the person defamed), was required:

The first question is a question of law – can the article, having regard to its language, be regarded as capable of referring to the

23 See, generally, Paul Mitchell, The Making of the Modern Law of Defamation, Oxford: Hart, 2005, p. 49; Gatley on Libel and Slander, 10th ed. by Patrick Milmo and M.V.H. Rogers. London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004, p.220; and Duncan and Neill on Defamation, 2nd ed. by Sir Brian Neill and Richard Rampton. London: Butterworths, 1983 ("Duncan and Neill"), pp. 26-27. 24 Knupffer was cited with approval by Kellock J. (in his separate majority opinion) in Arnott v. College of Physicians & Surgeons of Saskatchewan, [1954] S.C.R. 538, p. 544 and in the dissenting opinion in Sykes v. Fraser, [1974] S.C.R. 526, p. 559. Knupffer has been cited with approval in numerous Canadian common law cases governing group defamation and is also applied in, inter alia, Australia and New Zealand. See, generally, Michael Gillooly, The Law of Defamation in Australia and New Zealand, Sydney:The Federation Press, 1998, p. 59 et seq 25 See also the speeches of Lord Atkin (p. 121) and Lord Russell of Killowen (p. 123). - 17 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Argument

appellant? The second question is a question of fact – does the article, in fact, lead reasonable people, who know the appellant, to the conclusion that it does refer to him? Unless the first question can be answered in favour of the appellant, the second question does not arise […] (p. 121) (our emphasis)

40. In answering the second question raised by the two-party inquiry, Lord Porter wrote that the "size of the class, the generality of the charge and the extravagance of the accusation" (p. 124), none of which was conclusive, should be considered based on the circumstances of each case.26

41. In Knupffer, Lord Atkin and Lord Russell of Killowen indicated that courts should not adopt a general rule that group defamation cases are not actionable and then attempt to "qualify it with exception" (pp. 121 and 123) based on the particular facts at issue. Instead, courts should focus on whether the comments were "of and concerning" the complainant. Lord Atkin noted that group size was a relevant factor (although not conclusive) and summarized the rationale for why defamation of a large or indeterminate class generally fails to be actionable at the behest of an individual member of such class as follows:

The reason why a libel published of a large or indeterminate number of persons described by some general name generally fails to be actionable is the difficulty of establishing that the plaintiff was, in fact, included in the defamatory statement, for the habit of making unfounded generalizations is engrained in educated or vulgar minds, or the words are occasionally intended to be a facetious exaggeration. (p. 122) (our emphasis) ii. Canadian Common Law

42. The Canadian common-law approach to group defamation actions is fully consistent with Knupffer. Indeed, under Canadian common-law, it is well-settled

26 This approach, subsequently referred to as the "intensity of suspicion" test, was endorsed by Duncan and Neill, supra, note 23, p. 28. - 18 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Argument

that defamation is a personal tort committed against an identifiable individual based on injury to his/her own reputation and thus, a putative plaintiff must establish, on an objective standard and in light of all of the particular circumstances of each case, that the subject comments were reasonably understood to be published "of and concerning" him/her in particular.27

43. The "two key" applicable principles to a group defamation action were summarized by Abella J.A. (as she then was) in Elliott (A.B.A., vol. III, tab 32) as follows:

(a) An action for defamation is a personal one. The words complained of must tend to lower an individual's reputation "in the estimation of others" (S.I.U. v. Lawrence (1979), 24 O.R. (2d) 257 (C.A.) at 263, per MacKinnon A.C.J.O.).

(b) Where alleged defamatory remarks are directed at a group or class, individuals must be able to show that the defamatory words are about them in particular. (Knupffer v. London Express Newspaper Ltd., [1944] A.C. 116 (H.L.) at 118, per Viscount Simon L.C.) (p. 117) (our emphasis)

44. In Butler (R.B.A., tab 2), Cromwell J.A. (as he then was), writing for the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, noted that in Knupffer, Lord Atkin "stressed the fact that the group aspect of the defamatory statements should not distract the court from the real issue, namely whether the published words refer to the plaintiff." (Butler, para. 53). With respect to the factors that a court should consider in answering the

27 See, inter alia, Gauthier et. al. v. Toronto Star Daily Newspapers Ltd. et. al., (2004) 245 D.L.R. (4th) 169 (Ont. C.A.) (leave to appeal to the SCC denied, 27 January 2005, #30525) ("Gauthier") (R.B.A., tab 3), p. 170; Kenora (Town) Police Services Board v. Savino, (1997) 20 C.P.C. (4th) 13 (O.C.J. (Gen. Div.) (Div.Ct.)) ("Kenora") (R.B.A., tab 6), para. 3; Elliott v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, (1995), 38 C.P.C. (3d) 332 (Ont. C.A.) (leave to appeal to the SCC denied, 7 March 1996, #24895) ("Elliott") (A.B.A., vol. III, tab 32), p. 336; Bai v. Sing Tao Daily Ltd., 226 D.L.R. (4th) 477 (leave to appeal to the SCC denied, 22 January 2004, # 29897) ("Bai"), para. 10; Butler v. Southam Inc., (2001) 197 N.S.R. (2d) 97 ("Butler") (R.B.A., tab 2), paras. 18 and 53; Campbell et al. v. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. et al., (1990), 73 D.L.R. (4th) 190 (O.C. (Gen. Div.),(Div.Ct.)), p. 191; and Seafarers International Union of Canada et. al. v. Lawrence, (1979), 24 O.R. (2d) 257 (C.A.) (leave to appeal to the SCC denied, 10 February 1994, #23696), p.263. - 19 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Argument

"of and concerning" requirement, Cromwell J.A. (as he then was) also referred to Lord Porter's speech in Knupffer and endorsed what is now commonly referred to as the "intensity of suspicion" test, which "focuses the analysis of the strength of the link between the allegedly defamatory words and the individual plaintiff's reputation" (para. 59). Under this test, the Court should assess the "intensity of suspicion" that the publication/comments "could reasonably be thought to create in the mind of a sensible reader that the words referred to the plaintiff." (para. 56). 28

45. In Butler, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal held that "some immediate suspicion on the part of the reader that the article referred to the plaintiff is not enough" (para. 30)29 and it went on to list the following guiding factors that are relevant to the analysis of whether "reasonable persons would understand that the plaintiff himself had actually done the act alleged or (as the case may be) was reasonably suspected of having done it." (para. 56):

(a) the size of the group: generally, the larger the group, the more difficult it will be for a plaintiff to show the remarks were "of and concerning" him/her (Butler, para. 61);

(b) the identity of the group: for example, where the group has a clearly defined membership, organization or hierarchy, or where its members are highly visible in the community, or where membership is restricted in particular

28 Cromwell J.A. (as he then was) indicated in Butler that this test did not constitute a new and different test from the Knupffer inquiry. The "intensity of suspicion" approach in Butler was subsequently endorsed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Gauthier (R.B.A., tab 3), para. 2. 29 As an example, in Booth v. British Columbia Television Broadcasting System (1982), 139 D.L.R. (3d) 88 (B.C.C.A.), cited at para. 30 of Butler, the Court noted that "a neighbour who knows only one police officer and hears something about the police force would think immediately of that officer whether the subject words have any real link to that police officer or not" and this did not satisfy the "of and concerning" requirement. - 20 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Argument

ways,30 this may support an inference of individual defamation (Butler, paras. 61 to 67); and

(c) the nature of the allegedly defamatory statement: this would include: (i) the generality and extravagance of the remarks; (ii) whether they are understood to be taken literally or are "in the nature of "facetious exaggerations" or of broad generalizations which could not reasonably be taken literally." (para. 73); (iii) the way in which the allegations relate to the group; and (iv) the extent to which free speech interests are implicated (Butler, paras. 67 to 70). iii. The U.S.

46. Under U.S. law, the standards governing "group defamation" actions vary between states and under federal law. However, similar to the principles applied in the Commonwealth jurisdictions, an essential requirement of defamation is that the complainant establish that a reasonable person would understand that the subject statement was "of and concerning" him/her.31

47. The Restatement (Second) of Torts §564A (1977) (R.B.A., tab 16) articulates that: (i) a communication must "reasonably be understood as referring" to a plaintiff; (ii) where this is not the case, "there is no defamation"; and (iii) a person who publishes defamatory matter concerning a group or class of persons is subject to liability to an individual member of it, "if but only if”:

30 The example given by Lord Porter in Knupffer (R.B.A., tab 7, p. 124) is a statement that no one of the members of a community was elected unless he had committed a murder. 31 See, inter alia, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See also, generally, Nat S. Stern, "The Certainty Principle as Justification for the Group Defamation Rule", 40 ARIZ St. L.J. 951 (2008) (R.B.A., tab 14); Gary Chan Kok Yew, "A tort analysis of Group Defamation: Defining and refining Knupffer", 14 Torts LJ 176 (2006) (R.B.A., tab 12); Joseph H. King, "Reference to the Plaintiff Requirement in Defamatory Statements Directed at Group", 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 343 (2000) (R.B.A., tab 13); and Jeffrey S. Bromme, "Group Defamation: Five Guiding Factors", 64 Tex. L. Rev. 591 (1985) (R.B.A., tab 11). - 21 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Argument

a) the group or class is so small that the matter can reasonably be understood to refer to the member, or

b) the circumstances of publication reasonably give rise to the conclusion that there is particular reference to the member."

48. In the U.S., group size has, generally, served as the determining factor and U.S. courts have endorsed a strong presumption that in order to meet the criteria of "small", the group can consist of no more than 25 persons.32 A few states, Oklahoma and New York, for example, have, however, rejected an absolute limit on group size and have adopted the "intensity of suspicion" test (consistent with Lord Porter's speech in Knupffer) which takes into account the definitiveness in number and composition of the group, the degree of the group's organization, the group's prominence and the complainant's prominence within the group.33 iv. French Law

49. Under French law, defamation, which is determined objectively and which requires an "imputation de fait" (and is distinguished from an "injure"/insult), is specifically codified by penal legislation, the Loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la presse (the "Loi sur la presse"), as amended.34 Article 29 of the Loi sur la presse defines defamation as follows:

32 The most widely-cited case in support of this principle is Neiman-Marcus v. Lait, 13 F.R.D. 311 (S.D.N.Y), where, in the case of allegedly defamatory comments directed towards, inter alia, the plaintiff's salesmen (25) and saleswomen (382), the United States District Court, Southern District of New York held that only the former had a valid cause of action. 33 This standard gained visibility from its adoption by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Morris, 377 p. 2d 42 (Okla. 1962), where the Court did not accept the size of the group alone (a football team consisting of 60-70 members) as conclusive. See, also, Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 445 N.Y.S. 2d 786 (App. Div. 1981). 34 Bull. des Lois, 12 s., B.637, n. 10850. When the allegations complained of fall within the scope of this legislation, a recourse under the French Civil Code general provision of civil liability (article 1382) is ousted. See, inter alia, Cass. civ. 2e, 5 June 2008, unpublished; and Cass. civ. 3e, 1 October 2008, Bull. civ. 2008. II. No. 144. It should be noted that - 22 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Argument

Toute allégation ou imputation d’un fait qui porte atteinte à l’honneur ou à la considération de la personne ou du corps auquel le fait est imputé est une diffamation. La publication directe ou par voie de reproduction de cette allégation ou de cette imputation est punissable, même si elle est faite sous forme dubitative ou si elle vise une personne ou un corps non expressément nommés, mais dont l’identification est rendue possible par les termes des discours, cris, menaces, écrits ou imprimés, placards ou affiches incriminés (our emphasis)

50. The following points are worth noting under the Loi sur la presse:

(a) to sustain a defamation action, generally, the complainant must establish that he/she was, based on the subject comments and/or extrinsic evidence, sufficiently "identifiable" and "atteinte de manière directe et personnelle" by such comments;35

(b) generally, where comments are directed to a group which has no legal status, this group, subject to certain exceptions for specific groups (see articles 30 and 31 of the Loi sur la presse), does not have a cause of action for defamation;

(c) subject to the foregoing, where a group is "suffisamment restreint pour qu'un soupçon plane sur chacun de ses membres", each member of the group who is "aisément identifiable" by the subject comments or by extrinsic evidence that renders such identification apparent will have a civil cause of action for reparation for the prejudice he/she suffered. French law does not provide a definition or maximum size of a "groupe restreint";36 and

under the Loi sur la presse, in addition to penal proceedings, an individual may also join civil proceedings under that legislation to claim damages. 35 See, inter alia, Cass. crim., 11 May 1984, Bull. crim. 1984. No. 170 and Cass. civ. 2e, 3 February 2000, Bull. civ. 2000 II 16, No. 23. 36 See, inter alia, Cass. crim., 29 January 2008, Bull. crim. 2008. 89, No. 23. - 23 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Argument

(d) article 32 of the Loi sur la presse provides for penal sanctions (including imprisonment or fines) for defamatory comments addressed to a group or an individual based on ethnicity, nationality, race, religion, sex, sexual orientation or handicap. Penal proceedings can be instituted by the victim of the defamation or, in certain cases, by the Ministère Public (see article 48 of the Loi sur la Presse). 37

51. In summary, consistent with the principles under Québec law, the foregoing jurisdictions do not recognize a cause of action for "group defamation". In order for an individual to sustain an action for defamation where generalized comments are directed towards a group, he/she must demonstrate, on an objective standard and taking into account all of the circumstances, that the comments referred to him/her in particular.

D. CLASS ACTIONS DO NOT CREATE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS

52. This Court has made clear that "the class action is only a procedural vehicle whose use neither modifies nor creates substantive rights." (Bisaillon v. Concordia University, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 666, 2006 SCC 19 ("Bisaillon")) (para. 17).38 This Court further enunciated in Bisaillon that a class action "cannot serve as a basis for legal proceedings if the various claims it covers, taken individually, would not do so" (para. 17) and that "unless otherwise provided, the substantive law continues to apply as it would in a traditional individual proceeding." (para. 18).

37 None of the French cases relied on by the Appellant in his Factum (paras. 42 and 43) supports his position in this Appeal. Indeed, two of the cases (Le Pen and Société Benneton) involved a question of the admissibility of an action by an association and were resolved based on specific statutory requirements under French law which determined whether an association had a right of action and which depended on the purpose and object for which such association was constituted, while the third, (Ouaps), did not involve an action for defamation. 38 Cited with approval in the reasons for judgment of the majority of the Q.C.A., A.R., vol. I, p. 87, para. 26. This principle was reaffirmed in Dell Computer Corporation v. Union des Consommateurs, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801, 2007 SCC 34 ("Dell"), para. 105. - 24 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Argument

53. With respect to the rules of evidence in a class action, in Bisaillon (para. 18), this Court endorsed the principles affirmed in (Québec) Curateur Public v. Syndicat National des Employés de l’Hôpital St-Ferdinand, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 211 (“St. Ferdinand”) (A.B.A., vol. I, tab 5), where L'Heureux-Dubé J., on behalf of this Court, wrote that the “general rules of evidence are applicable to any civil action in Québec […]” including "in the context of an action in civil liability brought in the form of a class action" (para. 32) and that:

(a) "the elements of fault, prejudice and causal connection must be established in respect of the members of the group by the normal evidentiary rules […]" (para. 33);

(b) "there is no doubt that these rules of proof by presumptions apply to class actions in the same way as they do to any other civil action, just as any other rule of civil evidence also applies to class actions." (para. 39); and

(c) the provisions of the CCP that govern “collective recovery” in the context of a class action (i.e. article 1028 CCP et seq.) "allows a court in a class action to prescribe measures designed to hasten the proceedings and to simplify the proof, if they do not prejudice a party or the members of the group", that they “merely adapt the applicable rules of evidence to class actions”, and that they "do not change the ordinary rules of evidence so as to exempt class actions.” (para. 39).39

54. Finally, it is worth noting that, to date, no "group defamation" class action has been certified, let alone maintained on the merits, under Canadian common-law.

39 In St. Ferdinand, the class action, brought by the Public Curator on behalf of patients in a hospital, was granted, in part, based on the evidence, including witnesses who replaced the striking workers and expert evidence, that patients in certain care units (who, as a result of their disabilities, were unable to testify) suffered a prejudice due to the illegal strikes and the resulting deprivation of care and services that they normally received (p. 223). No damages were awarded to patients in two (2) units of the hospital with respect to whom no damages were established (pp. 224 and 233). - 25 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Argument

II. THIS CASE

A. THE PROPER DISMISSAL OF THE ACTION BY THE MAJORITY OF THE Q.C.A. i. No Member of the Group was "spécialement visé(e)"

55. In its detailed and extensive reasons for judgment, the majority of the Q.C.A. carefully reviewed this Court's case-law and that of the courts in Québec - which establishes that defamation is determined according to an objective standard -40 and all of the Québec case-law governing "group defamation" actions.41 It is clear that its decision properly recognized and applied the principles established by these cases.

56. To begin with, contrary to the Appellant's repeated suggestion that the Action was dismissed by the majority of the Q.C.A. on the sole basis of its finding that no reasonable person would have taken the subject comments seriously (Appellant's Factum, paras. 4, 33 and 48), it is apparent on any fair reading of its reasons for judgment that that position cannot be sustained. The majority of the Q.C.A. dismissed the Action because, on an objective standard and taking into account all of the circumstances, it was not established that the individual reputation of any member of the Group, let alone every member, was defamed.

57. Indeed, the majority of the Q.C.A. correctly expressed the following standards which govern an action for defamation:

(a) defamation is evaluated according to a "norme objective qui est celle de la perception du citoyen ordinaire" (para. 32), who will take into account the "contexte dans lequel les propos sont prononcés." (para. 37);

40 Reasons for judgment of the majority of the Q.C.A. dated 17 October 2008, A.R., vol. I, pp. 88 to 92, paras. 31 to 40. 41 Reasons for judgment of the majority of the Q.C.A. dated 17 October 2008, A.R., vol. I, pp. 95 to 103, paras. 45, 49 to 54 and 56 to 66. - 26 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Argument

(b) where "les propos litigieux visent ostensiblement un groupe, il ne suffit pas que l’individu appartenant à ce groupe allègue le préjudice général résultant de cette appartenance." (para. 44) and the “syllogisme”: “le groupe a été attaqué, je fais partie du groupe, donc j’ai été attaqué personnellement” (para. 47), is insufficient to ground an action for defamation by a member of the Group; and

(c) "[c]'est la réputation et la dignité personnelles qui sont protégées […] dans la mesure où l'attaque est particularisée et vise spécialement un individu précis, identifié ou identifiable." (para. 96) (italics in original)

58. Secondly, as properly recognized by the majority of the Q.C.A., defamation is not determined based on "l'émotion ou du sentiment purement subjectif de la personne qui s'estime diffamée", which would "faire dépendre l'idée même de diffamation, entièrement, de l'affectivité particulière de chaque individu" (para. 40), and that " [a]vec beaucoup d'égards pour le juge de première instance […] on ne peut conclure au préjudice du seul fait que les chauffeurs qui ont témoigné se sont sentis choqués, blessés et insultés par les propos de l'appelant Arthur [footnote omitted]: ce n'est pas là la norme applicable" (para. 81).42

59. Thirdly, the evidence in this case makes plain that the comments in question did not target the Appellant nor any other member of the Group in particular and that, as in Goyer, "ce n'est que par déduction qu'ils arrivent à se croire visés et atteints par l'annonce." (p. 520):

● Testimony of Mr. Farès Bou Malhab (A.R., vol. II, p. 224)

A- […] c’est que je vois une personne qui utilise ou qui voit peut-être qu’il y a un problème quelque part, et utilise ce problème pour insulter tout un groupe de gens qui sont les Arabes et Haïtiens […]

42 See also para. 85, A.R., vol. I, p.109. - 27 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Argument

● Testimony of Mr. Chawki El-Helou (A.R., vol. III, pp. 94-95)

[...] C’est quoi l’expérience qu’il [Arthur] a eue? Qu’est-ce qu’il a eu ce monsieur pour nous insulter en spécifiant et en utilisant les ondes pour nous ... pour nous massacrer?

[...]

Le monsieur [Arthur] est en train d’insulter tout le monde, d’insulter les Arabes […]

● Testimony of Mr. Rodolphe Azouri (A.R., vol. III, p. 109)

R- […] je dirais c’est de la méchanceté gratuite qui vient chercher tout le monde, puis c’est inacceptable, c’est vraiment frustrant.

● Testimony of Mr. Edgar El-Kalaani (A.R., vol. III, p. 134)

R- Les chauffeurs qui parlent l’arabe ont des voitures sales.

Q- C’est ce que vous...

R- Ça m’inclut là-dedans.

Q- C’est ce que vous vous souvenez, là, de ce qui a été dit, que les chauffeurs de taxis arabes conduisent des véhicules sales?

R- Ça m’inclut là-dedans dans ce groupe-là.

● Testimony of Mr. Simon Beaudin (A.R., vol. III, p. 145)

R- […] C’est que la façon dont il l’a dit, c’est comme si d’une manière abjecte, une sorte de rejet de la part de nous dans la communauté, qui parlent créole ou bien les Arabes qui parlent arabe dans le taxi.

● Testimony of Mr. Milad Saba (A.R., vol. IV, pp. 108-109)

R- […] il nous fait arroser ou nous fait qualifier comme nous, les chauffeurs, incompétents, ignorants, grossiers, sales. On sait pas parler le français […]

60. The nature of the testimony by the 11 Group members in this case is similar to the testimony of the complainants in Goyer and Chatel. In both of those cases, the Q.C.A. dismissed the defamation actions because no individual complainant - 28 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Argument

established that the comments were directed at them in particular and that they had suffered a personal and direct damage as a result thereof. That was precisely the case here.

61. In the circumstances of this case, the majority of the Q.C.A. properly held that:

(a) "les propos de [Arthur] ne visaient pas une personne nommément identifiée ou identifiable, mais plûtot un groupe […]" (para. 43) and that [a]ucun chauffeur, en effet, n'est identifié, directement ou indirectement, ou nommé, aucun ne peut être individuellement reconnu." (para. 75);

(b) "[on] ne pourrait raisonnablement conclure que la réputation individuelle et la dignité personnelle de chacun des chauffeurs de taxi appartenant au groupe visé sont entachées ou atteintes aux yeux de leurs concitoyens, et ce, d'autant moins que les chauffeurs en question, selon le calcul que fait le juge de première instance, sont au nombre de 1 100 [footnote omitted], sur un total d'environ 4 500 [footnote omitted]." (para. 76) (italics in original);

(c) this was not a case, as in Raymond, of "diffamation individuelle camouflée sous des propos généraux ou faussement anonymes […]" (para. 77);

(d) this was not a case like Ortenberg "où l'on parlait de 75 familles et surtout — ce qui demeure un élément capital — où le préjudice particulier du demandeur avait été établi de façon directe et l'aurait été même en fonction de la norme objective utilisée aujourd'hui […]" (para. 77); and

(e) "l'imputation injurieuse s'est perdu dans la foule — on parle ici, en effet, de plus de mille personnes —, l'attaque se diluant, en raison de l'importance du groupe mais aussi en raison de la généralité du propos, jusqu'à s'estomper avant de rejoindre l'individu." (para. 80).

62. In the final analysis, the judgment of the majority of the Q.C.A. is well founded in all respects and there was simply no basis to sustain an individual action for - 29 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Argument

defamation by the Appellant nor any member of the Group and the Appellant has failed to point to any error, let alone a palpable and overriding error,43 in the majority of the Q.C.A.'s finding that no member of the Group was defamed. ii. No "atteinte illicite et intentionnelle"

63. With respect to the claim for punitive damages, which was dismissed by the Q.S.C. and all of the judges of the Q.C.A., the Appellant does not dispute that the Q.S.C. applied the correct legal test enunciated by this Court in St. Ferdinand (A.B.A., vol. I, tab 5, p. 262) under section 49 of the Québec Charter for determining whether punitive damages should be awarded.44

64. The Appellant's suggestion that the issue of punitive damages involved a "qualification des faits prouvés" and that the Q.S.C.'s dismissal of this claim is reviewable on a standard of correctness (Appellant's Factum, para. 53) is incorrect. As noted by this Court in St. Ferdinand, this issue, which requires a determination of the "desire" and "intent" of the alleged wrongdoer, depends on the "assessment of the evidence in each case" (p. 263) and, even in cases where an unlawful and intentional interference exists, punitive damages are not automatic and remain subject to the discretion of the trial judge (p. 263). Accordingly, this is clearly a finding subject to review on a standard of palpable and overriding error.45

65. The Q.S.C.'s dismissal of the claim for punitive damages was based on its appreciation of the evidence as a whole and Arthur's "state of mind" (St. Ferdinand, p. 262), including that Arthur "n'avait probablement pas à l'esprit des chauffeurs de taxi de la qualité de ceux qui ont été entendus comme témoins lors de l'enquête" (para. 77). The Q.S.C. found that Arthur did not desire or intend

43 See Beaudouin-Daigneault, p. 8; and WIC Radio, para. 56. 44 The Q.S.C. also referred (A.R., vol. I, p. 71, para. 158) to article 1621 CCQ which sets out the criteria to be considered when awarding punitive damages. 45 See, inter alia, Housen v. Nikolaisen, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235 ("Housen"), paras. 10 to 18; and Fillion v. Chiasson, [2007] R.J.Q. 867 (C.A.), para. 111. - 30 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Argument

to harm any individual member of the Group.46 Indeed, the majority of the Q.C.A. correctly noted that the Q.S.C. dismissed this claim "estimant que la preuve ne permet pas de conclure qu'il y a eu atteinte intentionnelle." (para. 17).

66. Moreover, consistent with this Court's decision in Béliveau St. Jacques v. F.E.E.S.P., [1996] 2 S.C.R. 345 (R.B.A., tab 1) and its progeny,47 punitive damages are not awarded in the absence of other damages (p. 409). Accordingly, in the absence of any evidence that any member of the Group was defamed, there was neither a basis to award moral damages or punitive damages to any member of the Group.

67. The Appellant has not established that the Q.S.C. committed a palpable and overriding error in its dismissal of the claim for punitive damages. Indeed, as Beauregard J.A. noted, the Appellant “ne fait pas voir que la Cour devrait intervenir dans l’appréciation du juge selon lequel l’appelant Arthur n’a pas agi de telle façon qu’il doit être condamné à des dommages punitifs et exemplaires.”48

B. THE FUNDAMENTAL ERROR IN THE JUDGMENTS OF THE Q.S.C. AND OF BEAUREGARD J.A.

68. Based on the principles recognized by this Court which govern an action for defamation, with respect, the Q.S.C. (and Beauregard J.A.) applied the wrong legal standard for determining whether a member of the Group was defamed. Accordingly, the Q.S.C.'s decision to award moral damages for defamation for

46 Reasons for judgment of the Q.S.C. dated 20 April 2006, A.R., vol. I, p. 56, para. 77. 47 See Labarre v. Spiro Méga Inc., J.E. 2001-1275 (C.S.), AZ-50087271 (appeal dismissed, C.A. 500-09-011223-013, 2 October 2003), para. 86; and Banque Canadienne Impériale de Commerce v. Garantie-Québec, J.E. 2002-761 (C.S.), AZ-50115762, para. 123. 48 Reasons for judgment of Beauregard J.A. dated 17 October 2008, A.R., vol. I, p. 122, para. 126. - 31 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Argument

each member of the Group was reviewable by the majority of the Q.C.A. on a standard of correctness.49

69. To begin with, while properly noting that defamation was "essentiellement un recours individuel" (para. 106), the Q.S.C. nowhere addressed, let alone answered, the fundamental question of whether the Appellant or any member of the Group was "spécialement visé(e)" by the subject comments and could thereby sustain an individual action for defamation.

70. Indeed, the Q.S.C. erred in treating the Group, which had no persona or legal status and thus could not suffer a defamation, as the plaintiff in this case,50 when the plaintiffs were the 1100 individual members of the Group, each of whom had to individually satisfy the criteria under article 1457 CCQ in order to sustain an action in moral damages for defamation. In other words, the Q.S.C. erred in considering whether the Group was defamed as opposed to whether, on an objective standard, any individual member of such Group was defamed.

71. Secondly, contrary to the rule prescribed in Prud'homme, the Q.S.C. erred in applying a purely subjective standard for determining defamation. As appears from the Q.S.C.'s reasons for judgment, the extent of the evidence made by the Appellant and the other 10 members of the Group who testified at trial was that they were "profondément humilié et choqué par les propos tenus."51 Based on an objective standard and the evidence in this case, the subject comments did not target any member of the Group in particular and the subjective offensiveness of the comments was not relevant to the question of whether an individual member of the Group was defamed.

49 See Housen, paras. 8 and 33; and Néron (A.B.A., vol. I, tab 12), para. 74. 50 See reasons for judgment of the Q.S.C. dated 20 April 2006, A.R., vol. I, p. 58, paras. 91, 99 and 105. 51 Reasons for judgment of the Q.S.C. dated 20 April 2006, A.R., vol. I, p. 48, para. 28. - 32 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Argument

72. The Appellant continues to perpetuate the error made by the Q.S.C. by questioning whether it was necessary that "tous les chauffeurs de taxi se sentant diffamés témoignent au procès" (Appellant's Factum, para. 17). With respect, this is the wrong question for determining whether a member of the Group was defamed.

73. The indisputable fact is that there was no evidence that any member of the Group was, on an objective standard, "spécialement visé(e)" by the subject comments. Indeed, the Appellant concedes that no member of the Group was "identifié(e)" by the subject comments (Appellant's Factum, para. 17) and to quote Viscount Simon L.C. in Knupffer, there was "nothing in the words which refers to one member of the group rather than another" (p. 120) and "no facts were proved in evidence which could identify the appellant as the person individually referred to." (p. 121).

74. Moreover, in addition to the lack of evidence that any member of the Group was targeted, with respect to the approximately 1089 members of the Group who were allegedly "lésés moralement"52 and who did not testify at trial, the Q.S.C. found that:

(a) "il n’y a pas la moindre preuve qu’ils sont même au courant du contenu de l’émission […]" (para. 132);

(b) there was an “absence totale de preuve de dommages” (para. 140), let alone that any member was personally targeted by the comments; and

(c) "le tribunal ne pouvant établir de lien entre la faute et des dommages individuels pour les chauffeurs de taxi concernés par le recours présenté par M. Bou Malhab […]" (para. 146).

75. Thirdly, Beauregard J.A.'s statement that "[l']appel ne remet pas en cause cette détermination [whether the comments were defamatory to the individual members

52 Requête Introductive d'Instance dated 22 January 2004, A.R., vol. I, p. 136, para. 13. - 33 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Argument

of the Group]" (para. 117) is, with respect, difficult to understand as that was precisely the issue before the Q.C.A.

76. In addition, and with respect, it is difficult to accept Beauregard J.A.'s dissenting judgment for a number of reasons, including that:

(a) his statement that he agreed with the findings of the Q.S.C. that the comments were defamatory "à l'égard des chauffeurs de taxi de langue arabe et des chauffeurs haïtiens" (para. 116) and that “selon les éléments de preuve qui ont été mis devant nous, il a été prouvé que les chauffeurs ont subi un préjudice individuel"53 does not address the fact that the Q.S.C. applied the wrong legal standard for determining whether an individual member of the Group was defamed and is irreconcilable with the fact that no evidence was made at trial that any individual "chauffeur de taxi" was “visé(e) spécialement” and “atteint(e) personnellement” by the subject comments, let alone the 1089 members with respect to whom absolutely no evidence was made either with respect to identification or alleged moral damages sustained;

(b) he relied on criteria which do not address the question of whether an individual was "spécialement visé(e)" by the subject comments, including whether members of the Group were "au départ l'objet de préjugés" (para. 124). Moreover, Beauregard J.A. indicated that "[o]n sera porté à nier l'existence d'un préjudice individuel" where, inter alia, the defamation "n'est pas de nature à inciter l'auditoire à participer au mépris exprimé par les paroles diffamatoires" and "si le préjudice n'est pas de nature à affecter le membre dans son gagne-pain" (para. 124). Neither of these factors were established in this case; and

(c) the statement that the subject comments were directed to individuals based on "ce qu'ils sont" and not "ce qu'ils font", which, in Beauregard J.A.'s view,

53 Reasons for judgment of Beauregard J.A., A.R., vol. I, p. 120, para. 120. - 34 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Argument

would support a finding of a "préjudice individuel" (whereas the latter would not) is contradicted by the fact that a condition of membership in the Group was the profession (i.e. taxi driver) of an individual (i.e. ce qu'ils "font").

77. In sum, there was simply no legal or factual basis upon which the Q.S.C. could have allowed a civil action for defamation for any member of the Group and the judgments of the Q.S.C. and of Beauregard J.A. to the contrary cannot be sustained.

C. "DÉNATURER LE RECOURS COLLECTIF"

78. In addition to the foregoing fundamental errors, which alone demonstrate why the majority of the Q.C.A. was correct in allowing the appeal and dismissing the Action, the Q.S.C. committed a number of other serious errors with respect to the nature of class actions which had a significant impact on its analysis. With respect, while the Q.S.C. stated that it was concerned with avoiding an approach that would "dénaturer le recours collectif" (para. 145), that was, paradoxically, precisely the effect of its judgment.

79. Firstly, the Q.S.C. erred in considering that it was "lié" by the authorization judgment in Métromédia C.A. and, as noted by the majority of the Q.C.A., this holding "a pesé lourd" (para. 15) in the conclusions reached by the Q.S.C. The Q.S.C. clearly was not bound by that decision and had to decide the issues before it based on: (i) the applicable legal standards, which are undoubtedly different at the authorization stage and on the merits of the action once authorized; and (ii) the evidence before it.54

54 See Comité régional des usagers des transports en commun du Québec v. La commission des transports de la Communauté urbaine de Québec, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 424, p. 427; and Guimond v. Québec (Procureur Général), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 347, para. 11. See comments of the majority of the Q.C.A. dated 17 October 2008 in this regard, A.R., vol. I, p. 109, paras. 84 and 85. - 35 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Argument

80. Secondly, the Q.S.C. misconstrued the object and scope of the class action provisions governing collective recovery (articles 1028 CCP et seq.) and erred in law in holding that these provisions served as basis for awarding moral damages. As recognized by this Court in St. Ferdinand, these rules "merely adapt the applicable rules of evidence to class actions, because of the unique nature of such actions" and they "do not change the ordinary rules of evidence so as to exempt class action." (para. 39).55

81. There was no evidence that any member of the Group was defamed by the subject comments and had suffered a personal and direct damage to his/her reputation as a result thereof distinct from the alleged damage suffered by the Group. None of the provisions governing collective recovery – which are purely procedural and apply only once evidence of damages has been established – nor any other provision in the CCP for that matter, provides that a Court can award damages for defamation in the absence of evidence that an individual was defamed. Indeed, article 1031 CCP makes clear that "the court orders collective recovery if the evidence produced enables the establishment with sufficient accuracy of the total amount of the claims of the members."

82. Given the foregoing, there was simply no legal basis for the Q.S.C. to award moral damages to these Group members and, in so doing, the Q.S.C. erred in law in failing to apply the basic rules of evidence that apply in all cases of civil liability, including in class actions (see St. Ferdinand, paras. 33 and 39).

83. Indeed, the questions raised by the Appellant of whether "un chauffeur d'origine arabe ou haïtienne aurait pu poursuivre les intimés en dommages-intérêts pour diffamation dans une action régulière" and whether the "contexte procédural dans lequel cette cause se présente change quelque chose?" (Appellant's Factum,

55 See also article 1045 CCP (cited at para. 39 of St. Ferdinand) which "allows a court in a class action to prescribe measures designed to hasten the proceedings and to simplify the proof, if they do not prejudice a party or the members of the group." - 36 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Argument

para. 26) must both be answered in the negative. The Action for defamation by the Appellant and every member of the Group was, in the absence of evidence that any member of the Group was defamed, equally unsustainable whether brought in the form of an individual action or a class action.

84. Thirdly, the Appellant indicates, relying inter alia, on this Court's decision in Ciment du Saint-Laurent Inc. v. Barrette, 2008 SCC 64 ("Ciment St-Laurent") (A.B.A., vol. III, tab 42), that it would have been possible to establish a "procédure d'établissement des réclamations individuelles, de fixer une indemnité moyenne ou même une indemnisation collective" (Appellant's Factum, para. 30). The Appellant is, with respect, confusing the existence of injury to a member of the class based on the evidence made at trial and the procedure chosen for recovery where that injury has been established.56

85. Neither Ciment St-Laurent, nor any other case provides that a member of a group in the context of a class action for defamation is entitled to recover damages in the absence of evidence that he/she was defamed. There is equally no support for the proposition that the total absence of such evidence at trial can somehow be remedied after trial at the stage of the individual liquidation of claims.

86. Finally, in the absence of any evidence that the subject comments targeted any member of the Group, it is apparent that the Q.S.C. awarded damages to these members on the sole basis that the proceedings were brought in the form of a class action. In so holding, the Q.S.C. conferred substantive rights upon the members of the Group where none existed in direct contradiction with the principle

56 In Ciment St-Laurent, this Court noted that the trial judge found evidence of "detailed injury" that was common to all sub-members of the group, but that varied in intensity based on territoriality, and thus ensured that there was a common injury in each subgroup (paras. 109-110). This Court further held that the use of average amounts in assessing damages for each residential zone was appropriate in that case, based on the evidence from which the trial judge could draw a presumption of fact and that this did not increase the liability of the defendant (para. 116). - 37 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Argument

affirmed by this Court in Bisaillon and Dell to the effect that a class action is a procedural vehicle "whose use does not create substantive rights." (Bisaillon, para. 17).

D. THE UNTENABLE POSITION

87. Quite apart from the fact that the Appellant has not cited any authority or legal principle under Québec law that would support sustaining his action for defamation nor that of any member of the Group, the Appellant's position is untenable in a number of fundamental respects.

88. To begin with, the Appellant attempts to create a distinction between allegedly defamatory comments that are "blasphématoires ou sacrilèges envers une religion ou ethnie" (Appellant's Factum, para. 23), which, in his view, are not civilly actionable, and "racist" comments, which, in his view, are. This distinction is nowhere supported and is not made in any of the case-law governing group defamation actions. To the contrary, this case-law specifically refers to comments directed indiscriminately towards members of a race57 and the common ground in all of the cases that have dismissed defamation actions directed to members of a group, whether based on religion, ethnicity, race, profession etc.58 is that the comments were not about any member of such group in particular.

89. Secondly, in response to the oft-repeated characterization in the Appellant's Factum that the subject comments were "racistes" and "discriminatoires", with respect, and as was properly recognized by the majority of the Q.C.A., the issue is not whether such comments were racist and discriminatory, nor is the issue whether such comments were "désobligeants", "désagréables", "déplaisants", "excessifs", "outranciers", or "répugnants", or whether, as was bluntly expressed

57 See Ortenberg, A.B.A., vol. II, tab 29, p. 73; and Zhang, A.B.A., vol. III, tab 40, para 18. 58 See Reasons for judgment of the majority of the Q.C.A. dated 17 October 2008, A.R., vol. I, p. 96, para. 47. - 38 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Argument

by the majority of the Q.C.A., the Court may have an "aversion irrépressible pour les propos" or whether they "répugne personnellement à celui qui doit en juger." (para. 95). The issue is whether the Appellant or any member of the Group was "spécialement visé(e)" by the comments and whether there was any basis for the Appellant or any other member of the Group to sustain a civil action in defamation.

90. Moreover, this characterization of the comments ought not to obscure the fact that the civil law simply does not recognize a right of action based on a delict of "racism" and that the criminal law specifically provides sanctions for defamatory libel and hate propaganda (i.e. the use of threatening language that incites hatred),59 which, as noted in the reasons for judgment of the majority of the Q.C.A. (paras. 78 and 106), did not characterize the comments in this case. 60

91. In this regard, the comments of Backhouse J. (Ontario S.C.J.) in Bai are apposite:

I can understand the plaintiffs' concern about an article which they view as untrue and unfair, and liable to cause them problems in their community. However, society provides means of redress through the criminal law process and human rights legislation. In my respectful submission, the path chosen by the plaintiffs is not open to them (para. 14).

92. Finally, the Appellant’s contention that the comments in issue give rise to moral and punitive damages for each member of the Group by mere fact that an individual is a member of the Group to whom the comments were directed would completely stifle the fundamental right and scope of freedom of expression which "requires that criticism of unspecified members of a public body in a general way not be proscribed by use of a class action defamation suit."61

59 See ss. 297, 318 and 319 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C- 46. 60 See also the Defamation Act of Manitoba, R.S.M. 1987, c. D20, s. 19 (1), which provides sanctions for the publication of libel against a race or religious creed. 61 Kenora, Ont. C.J. (Gen. Div) (R.B.A., tab 6), p. 14. - 39 -

Respondents’ Factum Statement of Argument

93. Indeed, as noted by the majority of the Q.C.A., "le remède ne réside pas dans la dilatation du concept de diffamation, mais bien dans le débat public, et même le débat public vigoureux" (para. 106) and that:

[96] […] il y a justement dans la prudence — on peut même dire la réticence — du droit à l'égard de la diffamation dite collective l'affirmation du point d'équilibre entre le droit à la réputation, à l'honneur et à la dignité, d'un côté, et les libertés de pensée, de croyance, d'opinion et d'expression, de l'autre. C'est la réputation et la dignité personnelles qui sont protégées contre les propos excessifs, injurieux ou même mensongers ou malicieux, dans la mesure où l'attaque est particularisée et vise spécialement un individu précis, identifié ou identifiable. (para. 96) (italics in original)

94. With respect to the scope of the right to freedom of expression, as Binnie J. put it most recently in WIC Radio (R.B.A., tab 9), "we live in a free country where people have as much a right to express outrageous and ridiculous opinions as moderate ones." (para. 4). Similarly, the Q.C.A. has held that this right "applies not only to journalists who we consider thoughtful, professional and courteous" and that "vulgarity, sloppy journalism and bad taste are not, in themselves" sufficient to limit such freedom.62

95. The untenable consequence of the position advocated by the Appellant was aptly described by the majority of the Q.C.A. as follows:

[97] [s]’il faut en effet que tout propos désagréable ou offensant à l’endroit d’une collectivité […] soit considéré comme diffamatoire, c’est-à-dire attentatoire à la réputation, à l’honneur et à la dignité de chacun des individus faisant partie de ce groupe, et leur confère un droit d’action personnel [footnote omitted], c’est tout un pan des libertés d’opinion et d’expression qui disparaît. (para. 97)63

62 See Champagne v. Collège D'enseignement Général et Professionnel de Jonquière, [1997] R.J.Q. 2395 (C.A.), p. 2401 and Société Saint Jean-Baptise de Montréal v. Hervieux Payette, [2002] R.J.Q. 1669 (C.A.), p. 1675, cited at paras. 102 and 103 of the reasons for judgment of the majority of the Q.C.A. dated 17 October 2008, A.R., vol. I, p. 116. 63 Reasons for judgment of the majority of the Q.C.A. dated 17 October 2008, A.R., vol. I, p. 113, para. 97. - 40 -

Respondents’ Factum Order Sought

PART IV – ORDER SOUGHT CONCERNING COSTS

96. Costs should be allowed to the Respondents in this Court and in all Courts below.

------

PART V – ORDER SOUGHT

FOR THESE REASONS, the Respondents pray this Court to:

♦ DISMISS the appeal;

♦ GRANT any further order or relief that this Court deems appropriate under the circumstances.

♦ ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.

DATED AT MONTRÉAL, this 17th day of September 2009.

______David Stolow, Esq Nicholas Rodrigo, Esq. Louis-Martin O’Neill, Esq. DAVIES WARD PHILLIPS & VINEBERG, LLP Of counsel for the Respondents

- 41 -

Respondents’ Factum Table of Authorities

PART VI – TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

JURISPRUDENCE Paragraph(s)

Arnott v. College of Physicians & Surgeons of Saskatchewan, [1954] S.C.R. 538 ...... 38

Aubry v. Éditions Vice-Versa, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 591 ...... 37

Bai v. Sing Tao Daily Ltd., 226 D.L.R. (4th) 477 (leave to appeal to the SCC denied, 22 January 2004, # 29897) ...... 42,91

Banque Canadienne Impériale de Commerce v. Garantie- Québec, J.E. 2002-761 (C.S.), AZ-50115762 ...... 66

Beaudouin-Daigneault v. Richard, [1984] 1 S.C.R. 2 ...... 17,62

Béliveau St. Jacques v. F.E.E.S.P., [1996] 2 S.C.R. 345 ...... 66

Bisaillon v. Concordia University, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 666, 2006 SCC 19 ...... 52,53,86

Booth v. British Columbia Television Broadcasting System (1982), 139 D.L.R. (3d) 88 (B.C.C.A.) ...... 45

Brady v. Ottaway Newspapers, Inc., 445 N.Y.S. 2d 786 (App. Div. 1981) ...... 48

Butler v. Southam Inc., (2001) 197 N.S.R. (2d) 97 ...... 42,44,45

Cabay dite Chatel c. Fafard, J.E. 87-40 (C.S.) (appeal dismissed, C.A.M. 500-09-001473-867 and 500-09-001474-865, 14 June 1988) ...... 35,60

Campbell et al. v. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. et al., (1990), 73 D.L.R. (4th) 190 (O.C. (Gen. Div.),(Div.Ct.)) ...... 42

Cass. civ. 2e, 3 February 2000, Bull. civ. 2000 II 16, No. 23 ...... 50(a)

Cass. civ. 2e, 5 June 2008, unpublished ...... 49

Cass. civ. 3e, 1 October 2008, Bull. civ. 2008. II. No. 144 ...... 49

Cass. crim., 11 May 1984, Bull. crim. 1984. No. 170 ...... 50(a) - 42 -

Respondents’ Factum Table of Authorities

Cass. crim., 29 January 2008, Bull. crim. 2008. 89, No. 23 ...... 50(c)

Champagne v. Collège D'enseignement Général et Professionnel de Jonquière, [1997] R.J.Q. 2395 (C.A.) ...... 94

Ciment du Saint-Laurent Inc. v. Barrette, 2008 SCC 64 ...... 84,85

Comité régional des usagers des transports en commun du Québec v. La commission des transports de la Communauté urbaine de Québec, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 424 ...... 79

(Québec) Curateur Public v. Syndicat National des Employés de l’Hôpital St-Ferdinand, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 211 ...... 53,63-65,80,82

Dell Computer Corporation v. Union des Consommateurs, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 801, 2007 SCC 34 ...... 52,86

Edmonton Journal v. Alberta (Attorney General), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1326 ...... 19

Elliott v. Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, (1995), 38 C.P.C. (3d) 332 (Ont. C.A.) (leave to appeal to the SCC denied, 7 March 1996, #24895) ...... 42,43

Fawcett Publications, Inc. v. Morris, 377 p. 2d 42 (Okla. 1962) ...... 48

Fillion v. Chiasson, [2007] R.J.Q. 867 (C.A.) ...... 64

Gauthier et. al. v. Toronto Star Daily Newspapers Ltd. et. al., (2004) 245 D.L.R. (4th) 169 (Ont. C.A.) (leave to appeal to the SCC denied, 27 January 2005, #30525) ...... 42,44

Germain v. Ryan, (1918) 53 C.S. 543 ...... 31

Gilles E. Néron Communication Marketing Inc. v. Chambre des Notaires du Québec, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 95, 2004 SCC 53 ...... 19,22,68

Goyer v. Duquette, 61 B.R. (1936) 503 (C.A.) ...... 32-34,59,60

Guimond v. Québec (Procureur Général), [1996] 3 S.C.R. 347 ...... 79

Hill v. Church of Scientology, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 ...... 18,25 - 43 -

Respondents’ Factum Table of Authorities

H.L. v. Canada (Attorney General), [2005] 1 S.C.R. 401, 2005 SCC 25 ...... 17

Housen v. Nikolaisen, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 235 ...... 64,68

Jeunes Canadiens pour une civilisation chrétienne v. La Fondation du théâtre du Nouveau-Monde, [1979] C.A. 491 ...... 26,34,35

Kenora (Town) Police Services Board v. Savino, (1997) 20 C.P.C. (4th) 13 (O.C.J. (Gen. Div.) (Div.Ct.)) ...... 42,92

Knupffer v. London Express Newspaper, Limited, [1944] A.C. 116 .....38-42,44,45(b),73

Labarre v. Spiro Méga Inc., J.E. 2001-1275 (C.S.), AZ- 50087271 (appeal dismissed, C.A. 500-09-011223-013, 2 October 2003) ...... 66

Neiman-Marcus v. Lait, 13 F.R.D. 311 (S.D.N.Y) ...... 48

New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) ...... 46

Ortenberg v. Plamondon, (1915) 24 B.R. 69 and 385 (C.A.Q.) .....29-31,34,61(d),88

Prud’homme v. Prud’homme, [2002] 4 S.C.R. 663, 2002 SCC 85 ...... 18,21-24,37,71

Raymond v. Abel, (1946) C.S. 251 ...... 31,61(c)

Sarrazin & AL v. Duquette, (1935) 41 R.P. 365 ...... 31

Seafarers International Union of Canada et. al. v. Lawrence, (1979), 24 O.R. (2d) 257 (C.A.), (leave to appeal to the SCC denied, 10 February 1994, #23696) ...... 42

Société Saint Jean-Baptise de Montréal v. Hervieux Payette, [2002] R.J.Q. 1669 (C.A.) ...... 94

St. Jean v. Mercier, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 491, 2002 SCC 15 ...... 17

Sykes v. Fraser, [1974] S.C.R. 526 ...... 38

WIC Radio Ltd. v. Simpson, 2008 SCC 40 ...... 18,62,94

Zhang v. Chau, J.E. 2008-1176 (C.A.) (leave to appeal to the SCC dismissed, 4 December 2008, S.C.C. #32747) ...... 36,88 - 44 -

Respondents’ Factum Table of Authorities

DOCTRINE

Denis Buron, "Liberté d’expression et diffamation des collectivités : quand le droit à l’égalité s’exprime", (1988) 29 C. de D. 491 ...... 31

Jeffrey S. Bromme, "Group Defamation: Five Guiding Factors", 64 Tex. L. Rev. 591 (1985) ...... 46

Gary Chan Kok Yew, "A tort analysis of Group Defamation: Defining and refining Knupffer", 14 Torts LJ 176 (2006) ...... 46

Michael Gillooly, The Law of Defamation in Australia and New Zealand, Sydney:The Federation Press, 1998 ...... 38

Joseph H. King, "Reference to the Plaintiff Requirement in Defamatory Statements Directed at Group", 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 343 (2000) ...... 46

Patrick Milmo and M.V.H. Rogers, Gatley on Libel and Slander, 10th ed., London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2004 ...... 38

Paul Mitchell, The Making of the Modern Law of Defamation. Oxford: Hart, 2005 ...... 38

Brian (Sir) Neill and Richard Rampton Duncan and Neill on Defamation, 2nd ed. London: Butterworths, 1983 ...... 38,40

Nat S. Stern, "The Certainty Principal as Justification for the Group Defamation Rule", 40 ARIZ St. L.J. 951 (2008) ...... 46

Nicole Vallières, La Presse et la Diffamation, Montréal, Wilson & Lafleur, 1985 ...... 31

OTHER SOURCES

The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 564A (1977) ...... 47 PART VII

STATUTES - 45 - Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982, R.S.C., 1985, App. II, No. 44, s. 2(b) - 46 - Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982, R.S.C., 1985, App. II, No. 44, s. 2(b) - 47 - Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act 1982, being Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982, R.S.C., 1985, App. II, No. 44, s. 2(b) - 48 -

Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C-12, s. 3, 4 and 49 - 49 -

Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C-12, s. 3, 4 and 49 - 50 -

Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C-12, s. 3, 4 and 49 - 51 -

Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, R.S.Q., c. C-12, s. 3, 4 and 49 - 52 -

Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991. c. 64, art. 3, 35 and 1457 - 53 -

Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991. c. 64, art. 3, 35 and 1457 - 54 -

Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991. c. 64, art. 3, 35 and 1457 - 55 -

Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991. c. 64, art. 3, 35 and 1457 - 56 -

Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991. c. 64, art. 3, 35 and 1457 - 57 -

Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991. c. 64, art. 3, 35 and 1457 - 58 -

Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991. c. 64, art. 3, 35 and 1457 - 59 -

Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991. c. 64, art. 3, 35 and 1457 - 60 -

Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991. c. 64, art. 3, 35 and 1457 - 61 -

Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991. c. 64, art. 3, 35 and 1457 - 62 -

Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991. c. 64, art. 3, 35 and 1457 - 63 -

Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991. c. 64, art. 3, 35 and 1457 - 64 -

Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991. c. 64, art. 3, 35 and 1457 - 65 -

Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. c. C-25, art. 59, 67, 1003(c), 1005, 1028, 1031, 1034 and 1045 - 66 -

Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. c. C-25, art. 59, 67, 1003(c), 1005, 1028, 1031, 1034 and 1045 - 67 -

Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. c. C-25, art. 59, 67, 1003(c), 1005, 1028, 1031, 1034 and 1045 - 68 -

Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. c. C-25, art. 59, 67, 1003(c), 1005, 1028, 1031, 1034 and 1045 - 69 -

Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. c. C-25, art. 59, 67, 1003(c), 1005, 1028, 1031, 1034 and 1045 - 70 -

Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. c. C-25, art. 59, 67, 1003(c), 1005, 1028, 1031, 1034 and 1045 - 71 -

Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. c. C-25, art. 59, 67, 1003(c), 1005, 1028, 1031, 1034 and 1045 - 72 -

Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. c. C-25, art. 59, 67, 1003(c), 1005, 1028, 1031, 1034 and 1045 - 73 -

Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. c. C-25, art. 59, 67, 1003(c), 1005, 1028, 1031, 1034 and 1045 - 74 -

Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. c. C-25, art. 59, 67, 1003(c), 1005, 1028, 1031, 1034 and 1045 - 75 -

Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. c. C-25, art. 59, 67, 1003(c), 1005, 1028, 1031, 1034 and 1045 - 76 -

Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. c. C-25, art. 59, 67, 1003(c), 1005, 1028, 1031, 1034 and 1045 - 77 -

Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. c. C-25, art. 59, 67, 1003(c), 1005, 1028, 1031, 1034 and 1045 - 78 -

Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. c. C-25, art. 59, 67, 1003(c), 1005, 1028, 1031, 1034 and 1045 - 79 -

Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. c. C-25, art. 59, 67, 1003(c), 1005, 1028, 1031, 1034 and 1045 - 80 -

Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. c. C-25, art. 59, 67, 1003(c), 1005, 1028, 1031, 1034 and 1045 - 81 -

Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q. c. C-25, art. 59, 67, 1003(c), 1005, 1028, 1031, 1034 and 1045 - 82 -

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C- 46, ss. 297, 318 and 319 - 83 -

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C- 46, ss. 297, 318 and 319 - 84 -

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C- 46, ss. 297, 318 and 319 - 85 -

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C- 46, ss. 297, 318 and 319 - 86 -

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C- 46, ss. 297, 318 and 319 - 87 -

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C- 46, ss. 297, 318 and 319 - 88 -

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C- 46, ss. 297, 318 and 319 - 89 -

Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C- 46, ss. 297, 318 and 319 - 90 -

Defamation Act of Manitoba, R.S.M. 1987, c. D20, s. 19 (1) - 91 -

Defamation Act of Manitoba, R.S.M. 1987, c. D20, s. 19 (1) - 92 -

Defamation Act of Manitoba, R.S.M. 1987, c. D20, s. 19 (1) - 93 -

Defamation Act of Manitoba, R.S.M. 1987, c. D20, s. 19 (1) - 94 -

Defamation Act of Manitoba, R.S.M. 1987, c. D20, s. 19 (1) - 95 -

Defamation Act of Manitoba, R.S.M. 1987, c. D20, s. 19 (1) - 96 -

Defamation Act of Manitoba, R.S.M. 1987, c. D20, s. 19 (1) - 97 -

Defamation Act of Manitoba, R.S.M. 1987, c. D20, s. 19 (1) - 98 -

Defamation Act of Manitoba, R.S.M. 1987, c. D20, s. 19 (1) - 99 -

Defamation Act of Manitoba, R.S.M. 1987, c. D20, s. 19 (1) - 100 -

Defamation Act of Manitoba, R.S.M. 1987, c. D20, s. 19 (1) - 101 -

Loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la presse, Bull. des Lois, 12 s., B.637, n. 10850, art. 29, 30, 31, 32 and 48 - 102 -

Loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la presse, Bull. des Lois, 12 s., B.637, n. 10850, art. 29, 30, 31, 32 and 48 - 103 -

Loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la presse, Bull. des Lois, 12 s., B.637, n. 10850, art. 29, 30, 31, 32 and 48 - 104 -

Loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la presse, Bull. des Lois, 12 s., B.637, n. 10850, art. 29, 30, 31, 32 and 48 - 105 -

Loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la presse, Bull. des Lois, 12 s., B.637, n. 10850, art. 29, 30, 31, 32 and 48 - 106 -

Loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la presse, Bull. des Lois, 12 s., B.637, n. 10850, art. 29, 30, 31, 32 and 48 - 107 -

Loi du 29 juillet 1881 sur la liberté de la presse, Bull. des Lois, 12 s., B.637, n. 10850, art. 29, 30, 31, 32 and 48