DIYALA GOVERNORATE,

INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT FACTSHEET D ISPLACEMENT OVERVIEW DATA COLLECTED: 8 – 15 SEPTEMBER 2014 The majority of IDPs in Diyala originate from elsewhere in the governorate, facilitating the reported return of many IDPs to their AoO. Displacement trends have historically been The worsening security situation in parts of northern and central Iraq has caused mass affected by sectarian violence, particularly from and within Sunni-populated areas such as internal displacement across much of the country. Information and humanitarian Ba’quba and Muqdadiya. on the other hand are more likely to relocate to response operations have and still are taking place in the accessible areas of the north where there is a large Kurdish population. where approximately half of the 1.8 million displaced people are currently residing. In other parts of the country where security issues have imposed access constraints, information is incomplete and assistance is limited, leaving the remaining half of the Map 1: Districts included in the Diyala governorate analysis displaced population without support.

In response to these information gaps, the REACH Initiative set up and is using a network of key informants originating from inaccessible or hard-to-reach areas to gain a better understanding of the current situation in order to inform a rapid, targeted humanitarian response in these areas, as soon as they become accessible. This factsheet provides an overview of displacement trends from and to IDPs’ areas of origin, as well as key issues related to shelter, food and livelihoods faced by IDPs and communities living in areas affected by the crisis, followed by priority needs as reported during the assessment. This factsheet should be read in conjunction with the Diyala governorate dashboard.

Data was collected between 8 – 16 September 2014, using a Key Informant (KI) network across all six districts in Diyala governorate. In this factsheet, primary data is complemented by a review of secondary information including the Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) maintained by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and other humanitarian reports. The factsheet contains district-level comparisons within Diyala, together with governorate-level comparisons between Anbar, Ninewa, Salah Al Din and Wassit, assessed by REACH during the same period.

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METHODOLOGY DISPLACEMENT TRENDS

For this assessment, REACH used its Area of Origin (AoO) methodology, which was DISPLACEMENT FROM AREA OF ORIGIN designed and is currently applied in other emergency settings as part of its overall support to the regional Syria crisis response. The AoO methodology was first piloted in The IOM DTM estimates the displaced population in Diyala at 9,834 families (59,004 Iraq in July 2014.1 By interviewing IDPs about their usual place of residence, REACH has individuals based on an average household size of six). The primary AoOs identified by been able to collect information about the situation in conflict-affected areas where there REACH community group discussions were the districts of Ba’quba, Khanaqin and is no or limited humanitarian access. Due to the dynamic context, REACH teams were Muqdadiyah in Diyala and Falluja and in Anbar governorate. According to the also able to collect information directly from key informants in newly accessible areas. IOM DTM from 14 September 2014, 88% of IDPs in Diyala were from elsewhere in the governorate and the remaining 12% were from Anbar. Using a pre-established network from prior assessment activities, REACH teams identified Key Informants (KIs) who were staying in targeted areas or who were in regular Despite the large population of IDPs, few group discussions reported seeing IDPs in their contact with persons in their place of origin since being relocated, and who indicated a communities. The indicates the specific congregation of IDPs in particular areas – likely willingness to provide information. Target locations for primary data collection were based located according to their religious or ethnic background, as family and tribal affiliations on figures provided by the IOM DTM, which indicated where large proportion of IDPs had often determine choice of location.2 Displacement trends are also often dictated by the arrived from since August 2014. dynamics of sectarian violence, which has plagued Diyala for over a decade.3 According to an IOM report in 2013, the districts of Ba’quba and Muqdadiya have a particularly KIs and recent arrivals were interviewed in groups of 3 – 5 participants based on their strong displacement history. These pre-dominantly Sunni districts have seen targeted city, town or village of origin. Community-based group discussions were used in order to attacks by the Iraqi government against Sunni Armed Opposition Groups (AoGs). Their ensure that the views of multiple KIs were taken into account, including a combination of populations have re-settled mostly in perceived safer areas within these districts, or to ages and sexes where possible. Findings from these discussions have been triangulated Baladrooz and Khalis.4 Kurds more often re-located to Kurdish areas such as the and supported with relevant and recent secondary data sources. disputed districts of Khanaqin and , or into the neighbouring KRI governorate of Sulaymaniyah.5 To provide indicative findings at governorate level, REACH teams collected 20 – 21 community group discussion samples per governorate. The stratification of these For more information on displacement routes please see ‘Reported movement of IDPs samples across the districts was weighted against the numbers of towns per district. For from Diyala to KRI’ in Annex I. certain districts a larger sample size was achieved due to the extensive presence of IDPs originating from these areas in the location of the assessment. During data cleaning, ETURN TO REA OF RIGIN additional samples were randomly deleted to achieve a baseline sample size required for R A O each governorate weighted by districts. Where 10 or more samples for an individual district were achieved, these are included in a district-level analysis. IDPs commonly return to their AoO in Diyala governorate – more so than in other governorates apart from Ninewa.

2 REACH Initiative, Vulnerability, Needs and Intentions of IDPs in Northern Iraq (August 2014), p.11. Available at: http://www.reach-initiative.org/reach-supports-response-to-displacement-crisis-in-iraq. 3 IOM, Diyala: governorate Profile.,(February 2010). 4 IOM, governorate Profile: Diyala, (2013) 1 REACH, Assessment of Area of Origin of Internally Displaced Persons in Northern Iraq, (12 July 2014). 5 Ibid.

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An IOM report from 2013 reported that Diyala governorate was hosting the second Urgent shelter related needs include access to basic services and winterization support. largest returnee population in the country at the time.6 As the majority of IDPs in Diyala Collective shelters and camps were the second and third most common shelter are from other areas within the governorate this may facilitate return. Nevertheless arrangements. ongoing military operations and the fear of persecution are preventing the return of many. Some group discussions cited only half of the IDPs from their community had returned. Conflict related damage to buildings is limiting the availability of adequate shelter in The large proportion Anbar IDPs settled in Diyala are also unable to return to their AoO – Diyala governorate, or forcing families out of their homes.

since the time of assessment military clashes and bombings in Anbar have escalated, with AOGs claiming to have taken more territory in the governorate.7 20% OF BUILDINGS AND INFRASTRUCTURE WERE COMPLETELY DESTROYED AS A DIRECT RESULT OF THE CONFLICT. Diyala governorate continues to be among the most unstable areas in Iraq as a result of its multi-sectarian composition.8 In 2010 the IOM found that 57% of IDPs assessed Figure 2: Reported damage levels among infrastructure and buildings reported they felt targeted because of their religious or sectarian beliefs.9 Renewed or continuous life-threatening risks associated with the conflict are the principal factors to No damage cause future displacement from or within Diyala governorate. A loss of income was also Slight damage mentioned by a small proprotion of groups (in turn, income-generating activities were 36% 13% 16% 16% 16% identified as a strong reason to stay). Many people are reportedly forced to remain in Moderate damage their AoO because they cannot afford transport and accommodation. This points to Heavy damage protection concerns for those living in conflict-affected areas, and reflects a significant 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Complete destruction proportion of the population that is financially constrained.

ACCESS TO SHELTER, FOOD AND LIVELIHOODS FOOD

Group discussions claimed that prices of all key food commodities have risen. If SHELTER households are unable to afford staple commodities their consumption patterns will deteriorate, negatively impacting health. A hike in the cost of chicken may limit protein- 36% OF IDPS WERE RENTING A HOUSE/APARTMENT OR HOSTED BY FAMILY intake.

The IOM DTM similarly found that 47% of IDPs were either renting or being hosted. Figure 1: Reported price inflation among key food items since the start of the crisis Sustainable support for rent and other related costs is necessary as the cost of rent burdens finite economic resources. Rented or hosted accommodation was less Tomato paste 12% commonly reported by group discussions than in other assessed governorates, whilst the Rice 14% presence of IDPs in open air spaces was the greatest in Diyala. This indicates that IDPs Private bread 7% in Diyala are especially vulnerable. Meat 9% Cooking oil 14% Chicken 22% 6 IOM, governorate Profile: Diyala, (2013). 7 Al Jazeera, Fighting rages in Iraq’s Anbar Province (5 October 2014); Al Jazeera, Iraq army pressured by ISIL in west: official (11 October 2014). 8 IOM, governorate Profile: Diyala, (April 2014). 9 Ibid.

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LIVELIHOODS FIRST PRIORITY NEEDS

Agricultural production was the most reported source of income for households in the 30 days prior to the assessment – more than in other governorates. Previously agriculture THE FIRST PRIORITY NEED WAS SHELTER accounted for up to 20% of Diyala’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP), as the creates fertile land.10 Now land has been destroyed, supply chains disrupted, and The overwhelming first priority need identified by community groups was shelter. The agricultural labourers forced to relocate due to the conflict. Agricultural production should type and urgency of other needs in turn depends on the kind of shelter arrangement. be supported as shortcomings in this industry will have dire consequences for both food Families living in collective shelters, open air spaces and unfinished buildings need and economic security.11 Other common sources of income included unskilled work, immediate shelter rehabilitation or improved forms of insulation from the cold. On the which can be irregular and often poorly paid, and privately-owned business. other hand, those living in rented/private accommodation are more likely to require rental support.

20-29% OF THE POPULATION THAT WAS EMPLOYED BEFORE THE CRISIS WAS STILL Cash, food and winter support were equally reported as second priority needs. Winter EMPLOYED support was a more prominent need in Diyala than in other governorates. No community groups mentioned the need for access to employment as in other governorates. This Group discussions agreed that the proportion of the population who were employed could suggest a particular concern with immediate relief in Diyala. before the crisis had decreased. A few cited that none of those who had been working Health assistance was included as a third priority need. The status of healthcare in Diyala prior to the conflict were still employed. The ability to find and continue work may be is fragile: many people were having trouble accessing health services though these especially challenging for IDP households living in camps. difficulties are not currently life-threatening. A small proportion of group discussions did

claim fatalities would start to occur unless access was improved. A growing number of families had their income reduced; some group discussions even estimated that this was true of 90-100% of the population. Those most affected will have to resort to living in free accommodation arrangements such as collective shelters, open LESS THAN 10% OF HEALTH FACILITIES WERE FUNCTIONING. air spaces and unfinished buildings. Commonly reported reasons for healthcare shortages were lack of medicines and a lack The most commonly reported coping mechanism adopted by families in response to of funding. The most common reason preventing healthcare facilities from functioning shrinking livelihoods was to reduce the portion size. Some group discussions even effectively was a lack of electricity. mentioned that families have spent days without eating. This can have severe health consequences and impede child growth and development. A few displaced families also Regular electricity shortages were already reported in 2010,12 and the influx of IDPs has borrowed from friends/relatives or sold assets, accruing debt and diminishing financial likely further burdened electric networks. Across the areas assessed many homes are reserves. without electricity at all. The majority of households (both the local community and IDPs) are reliant on the general electricity network – thus vulnerable to public power cuts. Most households accessed electricity for more than 10 hours a day, though some for only 2 – 6 hours. Electric heaters are often used as a source of heating, but these will be unreliable during winter.

10 Iraq American Chambers of Commerce and Industry (I-ACCI). Diyala governorate. Last accessed 21 September 2014. 11 JAU, Diyala Govenorate Profile, (November 2010). 12 JAU, Diyala Govenorate Profile, (November 2010).

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Kerosene is the most commonly reported source of fuel for heating – especially in Following shelter, electricity was identified as the second most urgent need in this district. collective shelters, open air spaces and unfinished buildings where there is no electricity. IDPs might feel safer relocating to other nearby Sunni-areas where they have According to group discussions fuel shortages are common on a daily basis or several connections, as group discussions cited the fear of prosecution as a leading trigger times per week. Conflict-related fuel shortages seemed worse in Diyala than other behind displacement. It is concerning that many economically vulnerable families could governorates, due to the isolation of oil-producing areas and its reliance on the disrupted also not afford to relocate further afield. oil refinery and other contested refineries in Salah Al Din.13 Households reliant on kerosene will be increasingly vulnerable in the winter, and find it difficult to prepare food Comparatively, food and cash were reported as second priority needs in Khanaqin. for themselves if reliant on fuel-generated cooking appliances. Food assistance Khanaqin has not suffered as much violence but is experiencing a growing IDP programmes should note this limitation. population: over 10,000 families in the last weeks of August 2014.16 This sudden influx is limiting the availability of food, spurring inflation, and creating competition for Surprisingly, water was not reported as a first, second or third priority need despite long- employment. Group discussions on Khanaqin estimated that only 20-29% of the standing shortages experienced in the governorate14 - indeed, group discussions population that was employed before the crisis in the district were still working at the time reported shortfalls in water on a weekly basis, and some even daily. A small proportion of of the assessment. group discussions reported IDPs rely on natural sources of water (e.g. private or communal well). IDP households living in collective shelters, open air spaces and camps Overall, respondents reported an immediate need for shelter improvement across Diyala, are more likely to access water through natural sources that present a health risk.15 particularly for IDPs living in open air spaces, collective shelters and unfinished buildings. The humanitarian response should prioritise winterization support for these families, such as facilitating relocation or providing insulation and heating systems. In turn, displaced families living in rented accommodation or being hosted by family/friends will require ONCLUSION support for covering the cost of rent if they are unable to find access to income- C generating activities.

Much of the violence in Diyala governorate has occurred in the pre-dominantly Sunni It is important to focus on connectors / dividers between the host community and IDPs as district of Muqdadiya. REACH findings confirm the humanitarian situation is worse here an already volatile sectarian dynamic in the governorate may be worsened by IDPs using than in other areas. Group discussions highlighted an urgent priority need for food and local services and resources. In response to the concern over food insecurity, an healthcare services compared to a prioritisation of shelter as reported in Ba'quba and assessment of agricultural production in Diyala should be conducted. With the planting Khanaqin. Some respondents from Muqdadiya reported that severe malnutrition was season beginning in mid-October, agricultural initiatives may benefit both the IDP and already occurring in the district, whilst less than 50% of healthcare facilities are local population in providing income-generating opportunities. functioning. Respondents feared that mortality rates would increase if available health services were not rapidly supported. Nonetheless, group discussions observed that most IDPs have relocated within Muqdadiya district as well as to the conflict-ridden Ba’quba About REACH Initiative district. In Ba’quba healthcare facilities are also severely undermined as a result of REACH facilitates the development of information tools and products that enhance the capacity of aid electricity shortages. actors to make evidence-based decisions in emergency, recovery and development contexts. All REACH activities are conducted through inter-agency aid coordination mechanisms. For more information, you can write to our in-country office: [email protected] or to our global office: [email protected]. Visit www.reach-intiative.org and follow us @REACH_info.

13 J. Motlagh, “If Iraq is Full of Oil, Why Is It Running Out of Gas?”, Bloomberg Business Week, 15 July 2014. 14 JAU, Diyala Govenorate Profile, (November 2010). 15 USAID, Iraq Complex Emergency Factsheet #4, (5 September 2014). 16 Ibid.

5 For humanitarian purpose only IRAQ - IDP Crisis Production date : 22 September 2014 Reported movement of IDPs from Diyala to KRI

Shaqlawa

Erbil

Gwer NINEWA ERBIL

Makhmour

Sulaymaniyah

Hawiga

SULAYMANIYAH

KIRKUK

Baiji Tuz Khormato

IRAN

Kifri Kalar

SALAH AL-DIN Khanaqin

Jalawla Samara

Balad

Muqdadiya

Khalis DIYALA

Baquba

Baladruz ANBAR

Ramadi

Falluja

BAGHDAD WASSIT

Kms 0 30 60 90

TURKEY Data sources: Reported Area Reported Location Main routes taken Displacement Routes: of Origin IDPs in Diyala IDPs from Diyala by IDPs from Diyala REACH participatory mapping sessions (# of families (# of families) on the way to KRI SYRIA IPD Location and AOO: IOM DTM by governorate) Admin level: OCHA COD Alternative routes taken File: IRQ_MAP_IDP_DiyalaOrigin_ 0 - 500 by IDPs from Diyala Diyala 0 - 100 on the way to KRI RoutesToKRI_22Sep2014 501 - 1,000 Contact: [email protected] 101 - 1,000 1,001 - 2,000 Governorate capital 2,001 - 4,000 Note: Data, designations and boundaries 1,001 - 5,000 contained on this map are not warranted 4,001 - 8,000 Other cities to error-free and do not imply acceptance 5,001 - 10,000 SAUDI by the REACH partners, associated, 8,001 - 12,000 ARABIA donors mentioned on this map. For Humanitarian purposes only. More than 10,000