18 Usc § 1961(1)

18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 Page 1

Effective: March 7, 2013

United States Code Annotated Currentness Title 18. Crimes and Criminal Procedure (Refs & Annos) Part I. Crimes (Refs & Annos) Chapter 96. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (Refs & Annos) § 1961. Definitions

As used in this chapter--

(1) “racketeering activity” means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a controlled substance or listed chemical (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act), which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section 201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery), sections 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1028 (relating to fraud and related activity in connection with identification documents), section 1029 (relating to fraud and related activity in connection with access devices), section 1084 (relating to the transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud), section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1344 (relating to financial institution fraud), section 1351 (relating to fraud in foreign labor contracting), section 1425 (relating to the procurement of citizenship or nationalization unlawfully), section 1426 (relating to the reproduction of naturalization or citizenship papers), section 1427 (relating to the sale of naturalization or citizenship papers), sections 1461-1465 (relating to obscene matter), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section 1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigations), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction of State or local law enforcement), section 1512 (relating to tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant), section 1513 (relating to retaliating against a witness, victim, or an informant), section 1542 (relating to false statement in application and use of passport), section 1543 (relating to forgery or false use of passport), section 1544 (relating to misuse of passport), section 1546 (relating to fraud and misuse of visas, permits, and other documents), sections 1581-1592 (relating to peonage, slavery, and trafficking in persons)., [FN1]section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund payments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), section 1956 (relating to the laundering of monetary instruments), section 1957 (relating to engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity), section 1958 (relating to use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire), section 1960 (relating to illegal money transmitters), sections 2251, 2251A, 2252, and 2260 (relating to sexual exploitation of children), sections 2312 and 2313 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles), sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate

transportation of stolen property), section 2318 (relating to trafficking in counterfeit labels for phonorecords, computer programs or computer program documentation or packaging and copies of motion pictures or other audiovisual works), section 2319 (relating to criminal infringement of a copyright), section 2319A (relating to unauthorized fixation of and trafficking in sound recordings and music videos of live musical performances), section 2320 (relating to trafficking in goods or services bearing counterfeit marks), section 2321 (relating to trafficking in certain motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts), sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), sections 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), sections 175-178 (relating to biological weapons), sections 229-229F (relating to chemical weapons), section 831 (relating to nuclear materials), (C) any act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds), (D) any offense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11 (except a case under section 157 of this title), fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in a controlled substance or listed chemical (as defined in section 102 of the Con- trolled Substances Act), punishable under any law of the United States, (E) any act which is indictable under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act, (F) any act which is indictable under the Immigration and Nationality Act, section 274 (relating to bringing in and harboring certain aliens), section 277 (relating to aiding or assisting certain aliens to enter the United States), or section 278 (relating to importation of alien for immoral purpose) if the act indictable under such section of such Act was committed for the purpose of financial gain, or (G) any act that is indictable under any provision listed in section 2332b(g)(5)(B);

(2) “State” means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, any territory or possession of the United States, any political subdivision, or any department, agency, or in- strumentality thereof;

(3) “person” includes any individual or entity capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property;

(4) “enterprise” includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity;

(5) “pattern of racketeering activity” requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity;

(6) “unlawful debt” means a debt (A) incurred or contracted in gambling activity which was in violation of the law of the United States, a State or political subdivision thereof, or which is unenforceable under State or Fed- eral law in whole or in part as to principal or interest because of the laws relating to usury, and (B) which was incurred in connection with the business of gambling in violation of the law of the United States, a State or political subdivision thereof, or the business of lending money or a thing of value at a rate usurious under State or Federal law, where the usurious rate is at least twice the enforceable rate;

(7) “racketeering investigator” means any attorney or investigator so designated by the Attorney General and charged with the duty of enforcing or carrying into effect this chapter;

(8) “racketeering investigation” means any inquiry conducted by any racketeering investigator for the purpose of ascertaining whether any person has been involved in any violation of this chapter or of any final order, judgment, or decree of any court of the United States, duly entered in any case or proceeding arising under this chapter;

(9) “documentary material” includes any book, paper, document, record, recording, or other material; and

(10) “Attorney General” includes the Attorney General of the United States, the Deputy Attorney General of the United States, the Associate Attorney General of the United States, any Assistant Attorney General of the United States, or any employee of the Department of Justice or any employee of any department or agency of the United States so designated by the Attorney General to carry out the powers conferred on the Attorney General by this chapter. Any department or agency so designated may use in investigations authorized by this chapter either the investigative provisions of this chapter or the investigative power of such department or agency otherwise conferred by law.

CREDIT(S)

(Added Pub.L. 91-452, Title IX, § 901(a), Oct. 15, 1970, 84 Stat. 941; amended Pub.L. 95-575, § 3(c), Nov. 2, 1978, 92 Stat. 2465; Pub.L. 95-598, Title III, § 314(g), Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2677; Pub.L. 98-473, Title II, §§ 901(g), 1020, Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2136, 2143; Pub.L. 98-547, Title II, § 205, Oct. 25, 1984, 98 Stat. 2770; Pub.L. 99-570, Title XIII, § 1365(b), Oct. 27, 1986, 100 Stat. 3207-35; Pub.L. 99-646, § 50(a), Nov. 10, 1986, 100 Stat. 3605; Pub.L. 100-690, Title VII, §§ 7013, 7020(c), 7032, 7054, 7514, Nov. 18, 1988, 102 Stat. 4395, 4396, 4398, 4402, 4489; Pub.L. 101-73, Title IX, § 968, Aug. 9, 1989, 103 Stat. 506; Pub.L. 101-647, Title XXXV, § 3560, Nov. 29, 1990, 104 Stat. 4927; Pub.L. 103-322, Title IX, § 90104, Title XVI, § 160001(f), Title XXXIII, § 330021(1), Sept. 13, 1994, 108 Stat. 1987, 2037, 2150; Pub.L. 103-394, Title III, § 312(b), Oct. 22, 1994, 108 Stat. 4140; Pub.L. 104-132, Title IV, § 433, Apr. 24, 1996, 110 Stat. 1274; Pub.L. 104-153, § 3, July 2, 1996, 110 Stat. 1386; Pub.L. 104-208, Div. C, Title II, § 202, Sept. 30, 1996, 110 Stat. 3009-565; Pub.L. 104-294, Title VI, §§ 601(b)(3), (i)(3), 604(b)(6), Oct. 11, 1996, 110 Stat. 3499, 3501, 3506; Pub.L. 107-56, Title VIII, § 813, Oct. 26, 2001, 115 Stat. 382; Pub.L. 107-273, Div. B, Title IV, § 4005(f)(1), Nov. 2, 2002, 116 Stat. 1813; Pub.L. 108-193, § 5(b), Dec. 19, 2003, 117 Stat. 2879; Pub.L. 108-458, Title VI, § 6802(e), Dec. 17, 2004, 118 Stat. 3767; Pub.L. 109-164, Title I, § 103(c), Jan. 10, 2006, 119 Stat. 3563; Pub.L. 109-177, Title IV, § 403(a), Mar. 9, 2006, 120 Stat. 243; Pub.L. 113-4, Title XII, § 1211(a), Mar. 7, 2013, 127 Stat. 142.)

[FN1] So in original.

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES

Revision Notes and Legislative Reports

1970 Acts. House Report No. 91-1549, see 1970 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 4007.

1978 Acts. Senate Report No. 95-962 and House Conference Report No. 95-1778, see 1978 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 5518.

1984 Acts. House Report No. 98-1030 and House Conference Report No. 98-1159, see 1984 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 3182.

House Report No. 98-1087, see 1984 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 4628.

1986 Acts. Statement by President, see 1986 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 5393.

House Report No. 99-797, see 1986 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 6138.

1988 Acts. For Related Reports, see 1988 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 5937.

1989 Acts. House Report No. 101-54(Parts I-VII) and House Conference Report No. 101-222, see 1989 Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 86.

1990 Acts. House Report Nos. 101-681(Parts I and II), 101-736, Senate Report No. 101-460, and Statement by President, see 1990 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 6472.

1994 Acts. House Report Nos. 103-324, 103-489, and House Conference Report No. 103-711, see 1994 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 1801.

House Report No. 103-835, see 1994 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 3340.

1996 Acts. Senate Report No. 104-179 and House Conference Report No. 104-518, see 1996 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 924.

House Report No. 104-556, see 1996 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 1074.

House Report No. 104-788, see 1996 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 4021.

2002 Acts. House Conference Report No. 107-685 and Statement by President, see 2002 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 1120.

2003 Acts. House Report No. 108-264(Parts I and II), see 2003 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 2408.

2004 Acts. House Conference Report No. 108-796, see 2004 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 3178.

Statement by President, see 2004 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. S51.

2006 Acts. House Report No. 109-317(Parts I and II), see 2005 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 1888.

Statement by President, see 2005 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. S56.

House Conference Report No. 109-333, see 2006 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. 184.

Statement by President, see 2006 U.S. Code Cong. and Adm. News, p. S7.

References in Text

Section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act, referred to in par. (1), is section 102 of Pub.L. 91-513, Title II, Oct. 27, 1970, 84 Stat. 1242, as amended, which is classified to section 802 of Title 21, Food and Drugs.

Sections 201, 224, 471, 472, 473, 659, 664, 891 to 894, 1028, 1029, 1084, 1341, 1343, 1344, 1461 to 1465, 1503 , 1510, 1511, 1512, 1513, 1542, 1543, 1544, 1546, 1581 to 1591, 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, 2251, 2252, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2321, 2341 to 2346, and 2421 to 2424 of title 18, United States Code , referred to in par. (1)(B), are sections 201, 224, 471, 472, 473, 659, 664, 891 to 894, 1028, 1029, 1084, 1341, 1343, 1344, 1461 to 1465, 1503, 1510, 1511, 1512, 1513, 1452, 1543, 1544, 1546, 1581 to 1591, 1951, 1952, 1953, 1954, 1955, 1956, 1957, 1958, 2251, 2252, 2312, 2313, 2314, 2315, 2321, 2341 to 2346, and 2421 to 2424 of this title, respectively.

The Currency and Foreign Transaction Reporting Act, as amended, referred to in par. (1)(E), was Pub.L. 91-508, Title II, Oct. 26, 1970, 84 Stat. 1118, which was classified generally to chapter 21 (section 1051 et seq.) of Title 31, Money and Finance prior to the revision of this title by Pub.L. 97-258, Sept. 12, 1982, 96 Stat. 995. For complete classification of this Act to the Code see section 5311 et seq. of revised Title 31 and Tables.

The Immigration and Nationality Act and such Act, referred to in par. (1)(F), is Act June 27, 1952, c. 477, 66 Stat. 163, as amended, which is classified principally to chapter 12 (section 1101 et seq.) of Title 8, Aliens and Nationality. Sections 274, 277 and 278 of such Act are classified to sections 1324, 1327 and 1328 of Title 8, respectively. For complete classification of this Act to the Code, see Tables.

The effective date of this chapter, referred to in par. (5), is Oct. 15, 1970.

Codifications

Section 5(b) of Pub.L. 108-193, which directed that paragraph (1)(A) of this section be amended by striking “sections 1581-1588 (relating to peonage and slavery)” and inserting “sections 1581-1591 (relating to peonage, slavery, and trafficking in persons)”, was executed to paragraph (1)(B) of this section as the probable intent of Congress.

Amendments

2013 Amendments. Par. (1)(B). Pub.L. 113-4, § 1211(a), inserted “section 1351 (relating to fraud in foreign labor contracting),” preceding “section 1425”.

2006 Amendments. Par. (1)(B). Pub.L. 109-177, § 403(a), inserted “section 1960 (relating to illegal money transmitters),” before “sections 2251”.

Pub.L. 109-164, § 103(c), in par. (1)(B), struck out “1581-1591” and inserted “1581-1592”.

2004 Amendments. Par. (1)(B). Pub.L. 108-458, § 6802(e), inserted “sections 175-178 (relating to biological weapons) , sections 229-229F (relating to chemical weapons), section 831 (relating to nuclear materials),” before “(C) any act which is indictable under title 29”.

2003 Amendments. Par. (1)(B). Pub.L. 108-193, § 5(b), struck out “sections 1581-1588 (relating to peonage and slavery)” and inserted “sections 1581-1591 (relating to peonage, slavery, and trafficking in persons)”.

2002 Amendments. Par. (1). Pub.L. 107-273, § 4005(f)(1), amended the directory language of section 813(2) of Pub.L. 107-56, and thus required no change in text.

2001 Amendments. Par. (1). Pub.L. 107-56, § 813, substituted “(F)” for “or (F)” and inserted “, or (G) any act that is indictable under any provision listed in section 2332b(g)(5)(B)” after “committed for the purpose of financial gain”.

1996 Amendments. Par. (1). Pub.L. 104-294, § 604(b)(6), amending Pub.L. 103-322, § 160001(f), substituted “sections 2251, 2251A, 2252, and 2258” for “sections 2251-2252”.

Par. (1)(B). Pub.L. 104-294, § 601(i)(3), substituted “2252, and 2260” for “2252, and 2258”.

Pub.L. 104-208, § 202, added provisions relating to sections 1425, 1426 and 1427 of this title, and struck out provisions relating to violations of sections 1028, 1542, 1543, 1544 and 1546 of this title committed for financial gain.

Pub.L. 104-153, § 3, inserted “, section 2318 (relating to trafficking in counterfeit labels for phonorecords, computer programs or computer program documentation or packaging and copies of motion pictures or other audiovisual works), section 2319 (relating to criminal infringement of a copyright), section 2319A (relating to unauthorized fixation of and trafficking in sound recordings and music videos of live musical performances), section 2320 (relating to trafficking in goods or services bearing counterfeit marks)” after “sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property)”.

Pub.L. 104-132, § 433, established certain alien smuggling-related crimes as Rico-predicate offenses.

Par. (1)(D). Pub.L. 104-294, § 601(b)(3), substituted “section 157 of this title” for “section 157 of that title”.

1994 Amendments. Par. (1). Pub.L. 103-322, § 330021(1), substituted “kidnapping” for “kidnaping”.

Pub.L. 103-322, § 90104, substituted “a controlled substance or listed chemical (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act)” for “narcotic or other dangerous drugs” wherever appearing.

Pub.L. 103-322, § 160001(f), as amended Pub.L. 104-294, § 604(b)(6), substituted “sections 2251, 2251A, 2252, and 2258” for “sections 2251-2252”.

Pub.L. 103-394, § 312(b), inserted “(except in cases under section 157 of that title)” after “offense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11”.

1990 Amendments. Par. (1)(B). Pub.L. 101-647, § 3560(1), (2), substituted “relating to” for “relative to” in the parenthetical provision following “section 1029” and struck out “sections 2251 through 2252 (relating to sexual exploitation of children),” before “, section 1958”.

1989 Amendments. Par. (1). Pub.L. 101-73 inserted “section 1344 (relating to financial institution fraud),” after “section 1343 (relating to wire fraud),”.

1988 Amendments. Par. (1)(B). Pub.L. 100-690, § 7514, inserted “sections 2251 through 2252 (relating to sexual exploitation of children),”.

Par. (1). Pub.L. 100-690, § 7032, substituted “section 2321” for “section 2320”.

Pub.L. 100-690, § 7054, inserted “, section 1029 (relative to fraud and related activity in connection with access devices)” and “, section 1958 (relating to use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder- for-hire), sections 2251-2252 (relating to sexual exploitation of children)”.

Pub.L. 100-690, § 7013, made technical amendment to directory language of Pub.L. 99-646.

Par. (10). Pub.L. 100-690, § 7020(c), added “the Associate Attorney General of the United States,” following “Deputy Attorney General of the United States,”.

1986 Amendments. Par. (1). Pub.L. 99-646, as amended by Pub.L. 100-690, § 7013, inserted “section 1512 (relating to tampering with a witness, victim, or an informant), section 1513 (relating to retaliating against a wit-

ness, victim, or an informant),” after “obstruction of State of local law enforcement),”.

Par. (1)(B). Pub.L. 99-570, § 1365(b), inserted “section 1956 (relating to the laundering of monetary instruments), section 1957 (relating to engaging in monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful activity),” after “section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses),”.

1984 Amendments. Par. (1). Pub.L. 98-473, § 901(g)(2), added “, or (E) any act which is indictable under the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act”.

Par. (1)(A). Pub.L. 98-473, § 1020(1), added “dealing in obscene matter,” after “extortion,”.

Par. (1)(B). Pub.L. 98-473, § 1020(2), added “sections 1461-1465 (relating to obscene matter),” after “section 1343 (relating to wire fraud),”.

Pub.L. 98-547, § 205(2), inserted reference to section 2320 (relating to trafficking in certain motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts).

Pub.L. 98-547, § 205(1), inserted reference to sections 2312 and 2313 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles).

1978 Amendments. Par. (1)(B). Pub.L. 95-575 inserted “sections 2341-2346 (relating to trafficking in contraband cigarettes),” following “sections 2314 and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property),”.

Par. (1) (D). Pub.L. 95-598 substituted “fraud connected with a case under title 11” for “bankruptcy fraud”.

Effective and Applicability Provisions

2002 Acts. Amendment by section 4005(f)(1) of Pub.L. 107-273, as therein provided, effective Oct. 26, 2001, which is the date of enactment of Pub.L. 107-56, to which such amendment relates.

1996 Acts. Amendment by section 604 of Pub.L. 104-294 effective Sept. 13, 1994, see section 604(d) of Pub.L. 104-294, set out as a note under section 13 of this title.

1994 Acts. Amendment by Pub.L. 103-394 effective on Oct. 22, 1994, and not to apply with respect to cases commenced under Title 11 of the United States Code before Oct. 22, 1994, see section 702 of Pub.L. 103-394, set out as a note under section 101 of Title 11, Bankruptcy.

1978 Acts. Amendment by Pub.L. 95-598 effective Oct. 1, 1979, see section 402(a) of Pub.L. 95-598, set out as

an Effective Date note preceding section 101 of Title 11, Bankruptcy.

Amendment by Pub.L. 95-575 effective Nov. 2, 1978, see section 4 of Pub.L. 95-575, set out as an Effective Date note under section 2341 of this title.

Severability of Provisions

If any provision of Division C of Pub.L. 104-208 or the application of such provision to any person or circumstances is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of Division C of Pub.L. 104-208 and the application of the provisions of Division C of Pub.L. 104-208 to any person or circumstance not to be affected thereby, see section 1(e) of Pub.L. 104-208, set out as a note under section 1101 of Title 8, Aliens and Nationality.

Amendment by section 314 of Pub.L. 95-598 not to affect the application of chapter 9 [section 151 et seq.], chapter 96 [section 1961 et seq.], or section 2516, 3057, or 3284 of this title to any act of any person (1) committed before Oct. 1, 1979, or (2) committed after Oct. 1, 1979, in connection with a case commenced before such date, see section 403(d) of Pub.L. 95-598, set out preceding section 151 of this title.

If any provision of or amendment made by Pub.L. 103-394 or the application of such provision or amendment to any person or circumstance is held to be unconstitutional, the remaining provisions of and amendments made by Pub.L. 103-394 and the application of such provisions and amendments to any person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby, see section 701 of Pub.L. 103-394, set out as a note under section 101 of Title 11, Bank- ruptcy.

If any provision of Pub.L. 101-73 or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of Pub.L. 101-73 and the application of the provision to other persons not similarly situated or to other circumstances not to be affected thereby, see section 1221 of Pub.L. 101-73, set out as a note under section 1811 of Title 12, Banks and Banking.

Section 1301 of Pub.L. 91-452 provided that: “If the provisions of any part of this Act [see Short Title note set out above] or the application thereof to any person or circumstances be held invalid, the provisions of the other parts and their application to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.”

Short Title

1984 Amendments. Pub.L. 98-473, Title II, § 301, Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2040, provided that: “This title [probably means chapter III of title II of Pub.L. 98-473 which enacted sections 853, 854, and 970 of Title 21, Food and Drugs, and sections 1589, 1600, 1613a, and 1616 of Title 19, Customs Duties, amended section 1963 of this title and sections 1602, 1605, 1606, 1607, 1608, 1609, 1610, 1611, 1612, 1613, 1614, 1615, 1618, 1619, and 1644 of Title 19, sections 824, 848, and 881 of Title 21, and section 524 of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, and repealed section 7607 of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code] may be cited as the ‘Comprehensive

Forfeiture Act of 1984’.”

1970 Acts. Section 1 of Pub.L. 91-452 provided in part that: “This Act [enacting sections 841 to 848, 1511, 1623, 1955, 1961 to 1968, 3331 to 3334, 3503, 3504, 3575 to 3578, and 6001 to 6005 of this title, and section 1826 of Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, amending sections 835, 1073, 1505, 1954, 2424, 2516, 2517, 3148, 3486, and 3500 of this title, sections 15, 87f, 135c, 499m, and 2115 of Title 7, Agriculture, section 25 of Title 11, Bankruptcy, section 1820 of Title 12, Banks and Banking, sections 49, 77v, 78u, 79r, 80a-41, 80b-9, 155, 717m, 1271, and 1714 of Title 15, Commerce and Trade, section 825f of Title 16, Conservation, section 1333 of Title 19, Customs Duties, section 373 of Title 21, Food and Drugs, section 161 of Title 29, Labor, section 506 of Title 33, Navigation and Navigable Waters, sections 405 and 2201 of Title 42, The Public Health and Welfare, sections 157 and 362 of Title 45, Railroads, section 1124 of Title 46, Shipping, section 409 of Title 47, Telegraphs, Telephones, and Radio telegraphs, sections 9, 43, 46, 916, 1017, and 1484 of former Title 49, Trans- portation, section 792 of Title 50, War and National Defense, and sections 643a, 1152, 2026, and former section 2155 of Title 50, Appendix, repealing sections 837, 895, 1406, and 2514 of this title, sections 32 and 33 of Title 15; sections 4874 and 7493 of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code, section 827 of Title 46, sections 47 and 48 of former Title 49, and sections 121 to 144 of Title 50, enacting provisions set out as notes under this section and sections 841, 1511, 1955, preceding 3331, preceding 3481, 3504, and 6001 of this title, and repealing provisions set out as a note under section 2510 of this title] may be cited as the ‘Organized Crime Control Act of 1970’.”

This chapter is commonly known as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act or RICO.

References to Coupons, Authorization Cards, or Access Devices under Food and Nutrition Act of 2008

References in any Federal, State, tribal, or local law to a “coupon”, “authorization card”, or other access device provided under the Food and Nutrition Act of 2008, 7 U.S.C.A. § 2011 et seq., considered to be a reference to a “benefit” provided under that Act, see Pub.L. 110-234, § 4115(d), and Pub.L. 110-246, § 4115(d), set out as a note under 7 U.S.C.A. § 2012.

President's Commission on Organized Crime; Taking of Testimony and Receipt of Evidence

Pub.L. 98-368, July 17, 1984, 98 Stat. 490, provided for the Commission established by Ex. Ord. No. 12435, formerly set out below, authority relating to taking of testimony, receipt of evidence, subpoena power, testimony of persons in custody, immunity, service of process, witness fees, access to other records and information, Fed- eral protection for members and staff, closure of meetings, rules, and procedures, for the period of July 17, 1984, until the earlier of 2 years or the expiration of the Commission.

Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose

Section 1 of Pub.L. 91-452 provided in part that: “The Congress finds that (1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corruption; (2) organized crime

derives a major portion of its power through money obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the theft and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social exploitation; (3) this money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions and to subvert and corrupt our democratic processes; (4) organized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation's economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threaten the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and its citizens; and (5) organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the evidence-gathering process of the law inhib- iting the development of the legally admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies to bear the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime and because the sanctions and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact.

“It is the purpose of this Act [see Short Title note above] to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime.”

Liberal Construction of Provisions; Supersedure of Federal or State Laws; Authority of Attorneys Representing United States

Section 904 of Pub.L. 91-452 provided that:

“(a) The provisions of this title [enacting this chapter and amending sections 1505, 2516, and 2517 of this title] shall be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.

“(b) Nothing in this title shall supersede any provision of Federal, State, or other law imposing criminal penalties or affording civil remedies in addition to those provided for in this title.

“(c) Nothing contained in this title shall impair the authority of any attorney representing the United States to--

“(1) lay before any grand jury impaneled by any district court of the United States any evidence concerning any alleged racketeering violation of law;

“(2) invoke the power of any such court to compel the production of any evidence before any such grand jury; or

“(3) institute any proceeding to enforce any order or process issued in execution of such power or to punish disobedience of any such order or process by any person.”

EXECUTIVE ORDERS

EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 12435

Ex. Ord. No. 12503, July 28, 1983, 48 F.R. 34723, as amended by Ex. Ord. No. 12507, March 22, 1985, 50 F.R. 11835, which related to the establishment, functions, administration and termination of the President's Commis- sion on Organized Crime, was revoked by Ex. Ord. No. 12610, Sept. 30, 1987, 52 F.R. 36901.

FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES

See Federal Sentencing Guidelines § 2S1.2, 18 USCA.

LAW REVIEW COMMENTARIES

Abortion protest: Lawless conspiracy or protected free speech? 72 Denv.U.L.Rev. 445 (1995).

Accountants' common law liability to third parties. Anna S. Rominger, 37 Res Gestae 508 (1994).

Adventures in racketeering. Keith J. Halleland, 45 Bench & B.Minn. 14 (March 1988).

Against forfeiture of attorney fees under RICO: Protecting the constitutional rights of criminal defendants. Note, 61 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 124 (1986).

Aiding and abetting under civil RICO. Jed S. Rakoff, 211 N.Y.L.J. 3 (May 12, 1994).

Alexander v. United States: RICO forfeitures, pornography, and the obscenity doctrine. 1994 Wis.L.Rev. 1549.

Fair labor fraud: The peculiar interplay of Civil Rico and the federal minimum wage act. James W. Crooks, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 2153 (2012).

Human trafficking and RICO: A new prosecutorial hammer in the war on modern day slavery. Comment, 18 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 759 (Spring 2011).

An irresistible force meets an immovable object: Reforming current standards as to the arbitration of statutory claims. Mark A. Cleaves, 8 J.L. & Com. 245 (1988).

Application of respondeat superior principles to securities fraud claims under RICO. Barbara Black (1984) 24 Santa Clara L.Rev. 825.

Application of RICO to international terrorism. Note, 58 Fordham L.Rev. 1071 (1990).

Arbitrating RICO: ten years after McMahon. Ronald J. Offenkrantz, 1997 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 45.

Arbitration and collateral estoppel: Using preclusion to shape procedural choices. Hiroshi Motomura, 63 Tul.L.Rev. 29 (1988).

Arbitration of federal domestic antitrust claims: How safe is the American safety doctrine? Bruce R. Braun, 16 Pepp.L.Rev. S201 (1989).

Attorneys' rights to fees under the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984: The “bona fide purchaser.” Ro- derick D. Vereen, 16 S.U.L.Rev. 407 (1989).

Bankruptcy fraud: Crime without punishment. Ralph C. McCullough, II, 96 Com.L.J. 257 (1991).

Civil RICO after Sedima: The new weapon against business fraud. John B. McArthur and William H. White, 23 Hous.L.Rev. 743 (1986).

Civil RICO and its application to “garden variety” fraud within the Sixth Circuit. Comment, 13 N.Ky.L.Rev. 463 (1987).

Civil RICO, foreign defendants, & “ET”. Michael Goldsmith and Vicki Rinne, 73 Minn.L.Rev. 1023 (1989).

Civil RICO--Limitations in limbo. Robert E. Wood, 21 Willamette L.Rev. 683 (1985).

Civil RICO: Overview on the eve of the 200th anniversary of the federal judiciary. Dan A. Naranjo and Edward L. Pina, 21 St.Mary's L.J. 23 (1989).

Civil RICO pattern requirement: Continuity and relationship, a fatal attraction? Patrick J. Ryan, 56 Ford- ham L.Rev. 955 (1988).

Civil RICO: Should private plaintiffs be granted equitable relief? Kristi Rae Culver, 18 Pac.L.J. 1199 (1987).

Civil RICO: The insurers fight back. Arnold D. Fielkow and Stephen P. Eisenberg, 21 Tort & Ins.L.J. 1 (1985).

Civil RICO--the scope of coverage after Sedima, John E. Grenier and Sally S. Reilly, 47 Ala.Law. 260 (1986).

Civil RICO--the Supreme Court opens the door to commercial litigation. William H. Rivoir, III, 90 Com.L.J. 621 (1985).

Civil RICO “treasure hunt”. Thomas K. Potter, III, 36 La.B.J. 421 (1989).

Clarifying a “pattern” of confusion: A multi-factor approach to civil RICO's pattern requirement. Note, 86 Mich.L.Rev. 1745 (1988).

Clarifying civil RICO: Sedima v. Imrex, Co., Inc. Comment (1986) 7 U.Bridgeport L.Rev. 189.

Class certification and common issues. Peter R. Schlan and Harvey M. Stone, 212 N.Y.L.J. 3 (Nov. 10, 1994).

Cocaine, demand, and addiction: A study of the possible convergence of rational theory and national policy. Morgan Cloud, III, 42 Vand.L.Rev. 725 (1989).

Commercial racketeering: What the civil practitioner needs to know and understand. David Berg and Joel Androphy, 22 Hous.Law. 13 (May 1984).

Complex settlement agreements (and what they mean). Barbara Radnofsky, 28 S.Tex.L.Rev. 435 (1987).

Consumer fraud and the elderly: Need for a uniform system of enforcement and increased civil and criminal penalties. 4 Elder L.J. 201 (1996).

Crimes by health care providers. Pamela H. Bucy, 1996 U.Ill.L.Rev. 589.

Criminal forfeiture and the attorney-client relationship: Are attorneys' fees up for grabs? Drew J. Fossum, 39 Sw.L.J. 1067 (1986).

Criminal RICO forfeitures and the Eighth Amendment: “Rough” justice is not enough. Vernon M. Win- ters, 14 Hastings Const.L.Q. 451 (1987).

Criminalization of employer fraud against alien employees? A national priority. Roshani M. Gune- wardene, 25 New Eng.L.Rev. 795 (1991).

Critical “patterns” in the RICO statute. Bruce H. Nagel and David W. Lentz, 122 N.J.L.J. 543 (1988).

Current guide to civil RICO in New York federal courts. Roger T. Creager, 66 N.Y.St.B.J. 18 (Nov. 1994) .

Defense attorney fees: A new tool for the prosecution. David F. DuMouchel and Cynthia J.H. Oberg, 1986 Det.C.L.Rev. 57 (1986).

DeJonghe v. E.F. Hutton: Innocent misrepresentation and securities fraud. John Rea and Michael S. Ru- bin, 29 Ariz.Att'y. 17 (Jan.1993).

Den of inequity: The case for equitable doctrines in Rule 10b-5 cases. Comment, 81 Cal.L.Rev. 1587 (1993).

Discrete and relational criminal representation: The changing vision of the right to counsel. Pamela S. Karlan, 105 Harv.L.Rev. 670 (1992).

Double jeopardy, conspiracy and continuing criminal enterprises (must the Section 846 conviction be vacated?). Jeffrey L. Nagel, 1994 Ann.Surv.Am.L. 125 (1994).

Drawing the appropriate statute of limitations in implied causes of action under Rule 10b-5: A general framework of familiar legal principles. Donald J. Polden, 40 Drake L.Rev. 221 (1991).

Elevated pleading in environmental litigation. Carl W. Tobias, 27 U.C.Davis L.Rev. 357 (1994).

Elusive Article 9 first-lien security interest: How your lien position can be eroded and how to prevent it. Lawrence F. Flick, II and Dennis Replansky, 20 UCC L.J. 211 (1988).

Emerging theories of lender liability in Texas. John O. Tyler, Jr., 24 Hous.L.Rev. 411 (1987).

Emerging trends in Texas DTPA liability. James H. Pearson, 24 Hous.Law. 22 (Nov.-Dec.1986).

Energy federalism, choice of forum, and state utility regulation. Clinton A. Vince and John S. Moot, 42 Admin.L.Rev. 323 (1990).

Equitable remedies in private civil RICO actions. 8 Geo.Mason U.L.Rev. 83 (1985).

Escaping the RICO dragnet in civil litigation: Why won't the lower courts listen to the Supreme Court? Michael P. Kenny, 30 Duq.L.Rev. 257 (1992).

“FACE”-ing RICO: Remedy for antiabortion violence? 18 Seattle U.L.Rev. 357 (1995).

Fair labor fraud: The peculiar interplay of Civil Rico and the Federal Minimum Wage Act. James W. Crooks, 112 Colum. L. Rev. 2153 (2012).

Federalization of organized crime: Advantages of federal prosecution. John C. Jeffries, Jr., and Honorable John Gleeson, 46 Hastings L.J. 1095 (1995).

Federalizing fires: The evolving Federal response to arson related crimes. John Panneton, 23 Am.Crim.L.Rev. 151 (1985).

Fighting corruption in the Philadelphia Police Department: The Death Knell of the “conspiracy of si- lence.” Howard B. Klein, 60 Temp.L.Q. 103 (1987).

Fighting insurance company fraud with RICO: The Supreme Court clears the way under the McCarran- Ferguson Act. Eugene R. Anderson, John A. MacDonald, and James J. Fournier, 22 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 267(1998).

Firestorm over Civil RICO. Marvin G. Fickholz, 71 A.B.A.J. 78 (March 1985).

Forfeitability of attorney's fees traceable as proceeds from RICO violation under Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. Calvin Sterk, 32 Wayne L.Rev. 1499 (1986).

Forfeiting defense attorneys' fees: Applying an institutional role theory to define individual constitutional rights. Morgan Cloud, 1987 Wis.L.Rev. 1 (1987).

Forfeiture and the Eighth Amendment. Steven L. Kessler, 210 N.Y.L.J. 1 (July 26, 1993).

Forfeiture of attorneys fees in RICO and CCE cases: A denial of due process and the right to choice of counsel. Note, 74 Iowa L.Rev. 249 (1988).

Forfeiture of attorneys' fees: The impact of RICO and CCE forfeitures on the right to counsel. Kathleen F. Brickey, 72 Va.L.Rev. 493 (1986).

Forfeiture of attorneys' fees under RICO and CCE and the right to counsel of choice: The constitutional dilemma and how to avoid it. Bruce J. Winick, 43 U.Miami L.Rev. 765 (1989).

Grand jury subpoena: Is it the prosecutor's “ultimate weapon” against defense attorneys and their clients? Tara A. Flanagan, 13 Pepp.L.Rev. 791 (1986).

Guarantee clause as a basis for federal prosecutions of state and local officials. Adam H. Kurland, 62 S.Cal.L.Rev. 367 (1989).

Hard law and bad cases: The Fourth Circuit limits civil RICO. Randall Bridwell and John Hughes Cooper, 22 Wake Forest L.Rev. 719 (1987).

Health care fraud. Stanley S. Arkin, 212 N.Y.L.J. 3 (Aug. 11, 1994).

Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp.: Standing to sue under Section 1464(c) of RICO for the se-

curities fraud plaintiff. Antonella M. Madonia, 18 Del.J.Corp.L. 923 (1993).

Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corporation: A warning to legitimate business. Casenote, 65 U.Colo.L.Rev. 659 (1994).

Hostages in the 'hood. Robert A. Destro, 36 Ariz.L.Rev. 785 (1994).

How the RICO monster mauled wall street. L. Gordon Crovitz, 65 Notre Dame L.Rev. 1050 (1990).

Illegal traffic in women: A civil RICO proposal. Lan Cao, 96 Yale L.J. 1297 (1987).

Impact of RICO forfeiture on legitimate business. Graeme W. Bush, 65 Notre Dame L.Rev. 1009 (1990).

In defense of sausage reform: Legislative changes to civil RICO. Geoffrey F. Aronow, 65 Notre Dame L.Rev. 964 (1990).

Injunctive relief and civil RICO: After Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., RICO's scope and remedies require reevaluation. Comment, 53 Cath. U. L. Rev. 1125 (2004).

Innocence by association: Entities and the person-enterprise rule under RICO. Note, 63 Notre Dame L.Rev. 179 (1988).

Interpreting RICO's “pattern of racketeering activity” requirement after Sedima: Separate schemes, episodes or related acts? Harold Selan, 24 Cal.W.L.Rev. 1 (1987-1988).

Introduction to lender liability. Gregory H. Hawley, 48 Ala.Law. 214 (July 1987).

Law enforcement against international terrorists: Use of the RICO statute. Irvin B. Nathan & Kenneth I. Juster, 60 U.Colo.L.Rev. 553 (1989).

Legal prevention of equine insurance fraud--How we can stop the killing game. 22 Ohio N.U.L.Rev. 845 (1996).

Legal shakedown of legitimate business people: The runaway provisions of private civil RICO. Phillip A. Lacovara and Geoffrey F. Aronow, 21 New Eng.L.Rev. 1 (1984-1985).

Losing faith in bad faith. Robert Egelko, 7 Cal.Law. 26 (Oct. 1987).

Making civil RICO “suave”: Congress must act to ensure consistent judicial interpretations of the Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Comment, 47 Santa Clara L. Rev. 123 (2007).

Making civil RICO work. Frederick D. Huebner & Richard E. Spoonemore, 46 Wash.St.B.News 11 (June 1992).

Managing securities disputes after McMahon: A call for consolidation and arbitration. Laura Ginger, 33 Vill.L.Rev. 515 (1988).

Meaning of pattern in RICO. Donald J. Moran, 62 Chi.-Kent L.Rev. 139 (1985).

Moving to dismiss a civil RICO action. Davis J. Howard, 35 Clev.St.L.Rev. 423 (1986-87).

Multimedia game software. Richard Raysman and Peter Brown, 211 N.Y.L.J. 3 (June 14, 1994).

National Organization for Women v. Scheidler: RICO and the Economic Motive Requirement. 26 Conn.L.Rev. 1533 (1994).

New proposal for limiting private civil RICO. Norman Abrams, 35 UCLA L.Rev. 1 (1989).

Obtaining uniformity for section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 causes of action. Comment, 22 Conn.L.Rev. 525 (1990).

An offer they couldn't refuse: Rolling back RICO through a direct interpretation of Hobbs Act Extortion. Andrew H. Nelson, 82 N.C.L.Rev. 1239 (2004).

On straddle crimes and the Ex Post Facto Clauses. J. Richard Broughton, 18 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 719 (Spring 2011).

Organized crime and white collar crime: Prosecution of organized crime infiltration of legitimate business. Donald H.J. Hermann, 16 Rutgers L.J. 589 (1985).

Overview of civil and criminal liability of clients and attorneys for federal and Arizona securities violations. Richard M. Weinroth, 26 Ariz.St.L.J. 1 (1994).

Pattern element of RICO before and after Sedima: A look at both federal and Florida RICO. Comment, 15 Fla.St.U.L.Rev. 321 (1987).

Permanent subcommittee on investigations report on hotel employees and restaurant employees international union: Will RICO take a walk on the boardwalk with local 54? Michael Vitiello, 16 Rutgers L.J. 671 (1986).

Personal jurisdiction and the appearance to challenge jurisdiction in Texas. W. Frank Newton and Jeremy C. Wicker, 38 Baylor L.Rev. 491 (1986).

Place of procedural control in determining who may sue or be sued: Lessons in statutory interpretation from civil RICO and Sedima. Douglas E. Abrams, 38 Vand.L.Rev. 1477 (1985).

Plea bargaining in the shadow of the guidelines. Jeffrey Standen, 81 Cal.L.Rev. 1471 (1993).

Private cause of action under Louisiana's unfair trade practices and consumer protection law. Anthony J. Rollo, Jr. and Roger A. Stetter, 34 La.B.J. 344 (April 1987).

Privatizing justice: A jurisprudential perspective on labor and employment arbitration from the Steelwork- ers Trilogy to Gilmer. Martin H. Malin and Robert F. Ladenson, 44 Hastings L.J. 1187 (1993).

Problem of proportionality in RICO forfeitures. William W. Taylor, III, 65 Notre Dame L.Rev. 885 (1990).

Proper application of civil RICO to patent fraud. Steven Fasman, 96 Yale L.J. 1323 (1987).

Proportionality and federalization. Stephen F. Smith, 91 Va. L. Rev. 879 (2005).

Punitive damages in securities arbitrations. Christopher F. Wilson, 17 L.A.Law. 34 (April 1994).

Quiet revolution: Securities arbitration confronts the hard questions. Joel Seligman, 33 Hous.L.Rev. 327 (1996).

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act: A peek into pandora's box. D. Jeffrey Hirschberg, Bruce G. Arnold and Lawrence Alan Towers, 57 Wis.B.Bull. 11 (Jan. 1984).

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO)--Securities and commercial fraud as racketeering crime after Sedima: What is a “pattern of racketeering activity”? Barbara Black, 6 Pace L.Rev. 365 (1986) .

Racketeering prosecution: The use and abuse of RICO. John Dombrink and James W. Meeker, 16 Rutgers L.J. 633 (1986).

Reaching a deep pocket under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Mark S. Poker, 72 Marq.L.Rev. 511 (1989).

RICO: A new weapon in intellectual property law? Ronald B. Coolley, 65 Chi.B.Rec. 370 (1984).

RICO and the due process “void for vagueness” test. George Clemon Freeman, Jr. and Kyle E. McSlar- row, 45 Bus.Law. 1003 (1990).

RICO and the professionals. Jeffrey M. Smith and Thomas B. Metzloff. 37 Mercer L.Rev. 627 (1986).

RICO battlegrounds: Standing and proximate causation. Roger T. Creager, 214 N.Y.L.J. 1 (Oct. 12, 1995).

RICO basics: A primer. Stephen D. Brown and Alan A. Lieberman, 35 Vill.L.Rev. 865 (1990).

RICO and the legislative supremacy approach to federal criminal lawmaking. Brian Slocum, 31 Loy. U. Chi. L.J. 639 (2000).

RICO: Associations in fact and legal entities. Patrick Tuite, 135 Chi.Daily L.Bull. 3 (April 5, 1989).

RICO forfeiture and the Eighth Amendment: When is everything too much? Craig W. Palm, 53 U.Pitt.L.Rev. 1 (1991).

RICO forfeitures as “excessive fines” or “cruel and unusual punishments.” Kathleen F. Brickey, 35 Vill.L.Rev. 905 (1990).

RICO lottery and the gains multiplication approach: An alternative measurement of damages under civil RICO. Jonathon Turley, 33 Vill.L.Rev. 239 (1988).

RICO post-indictment restraining orders: The process due defendants. Note, 60 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 1162 (1985).

RICO pretrial restraints and due process: The lessons of Princeton/Newport. Bruce A. Baird and Carolyn P. Vinson, 65 Notre Dame L.Rev. 1009 (1990).

RICO: The “pattern” limitation. R. Kymn Harp, 76 Ill.B.J. 312 (1988).

RICO's forfeiture provision: A First Amendment restraint on adult bookstores. Comment, 43 U.Miami L.Rev. 419 (1988).

RICO's murky wording is threatening its future. David Fassett, 125 N.J.L.J. 528 (1990).

RICO's “pattern” requirement: Void for vagueness question? Note, 90 Colum.L.Rev. 489 (1990).

Rule 10b-5 and RICO: Alternate remedies for environmental liabilities acquired by stock purchase of a closely-held corporation. Elizabeth Ann Glass Geltman, 26 Hous.L.Rev. 455 (1989).

Runaway RICO. William Rodarmor (1985) 5 Cal.Law. No. 4, p. 45.

Secondary liability under the federal securities laws--aiding and abetting, conspiracy, controlling person, and agency: Common-law principles and the statutory scheme. William H. Kuehnie, 14 J.Corp.L. 313 (1989).

Selection, analysis, and approval of federal Rico prosecutions. Paul E. Coffey, 65 Notre Dame L.Rev. 1035 (1990).

Seller beware: Computer buyers' theories of liability. Marc S. Friedman and Mary J. Hildebrand, 120 N.J.L.J. 389 (1987).

Seventh Circuit bestows immunity from RICO prosecutions upon anti-abortion protestors. Frans J. von Kaenel, 71 Wash.U.L.Q. 175 (1993).

Shifting the burden of losses in the securities markets: The role of civil RICO in securities litigation. Ar- thur F. Mathews, 65 Notre Dame L.Rev. 896 (1990).

Should third party payors of health care services disclose cost control mechanisms to potential beneficiaries? Edward B. Hirshfield, 14 Seton Hall Legis.J. 115 (1990).

“Something beyond”: The unconstitutional vagueness of RICO's pattern requirement. Michael S. Kelley, 40 Cath.U.L.Rev. 331 (1991).

Standing to sue in a civil RICO suit predicated on violation of SEC Rule 10b-5: The purchase or sale requirement. Note, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1793 (1991).

Standing to sue under RICO. Edward Brodsky, 212 N.Y.L.J. 3 (Nov. 9, 1994).

Statutes of limitations in civil RICO actions after Wilson v. Garcia. Note, 55 Fordham L.Rev. 529 (March 1987).

Stretching of civil RICO: Pro-life demonstrators are racketeers. Anne Melley, 56 UMKC L.Rev. 287 (1988).

Stretching RICO to the limit and beyond. Alexander M. Parker, 45 Duke L.J. 819 (1996).

Structural reform prosecution. Brandon L. Garrett, 93 Va. L. Rev. 853 (2007).

Tax fraud and civil RICO: Implications for business and governmental entities. Comment, 21 U.C.Davis L.Rev. 1233 (1988).

Tax planning for criminal forfeitures. Glen A. Stankee, 33 Prac.Law. 73 (1987).

Tightening the net of Florida's RICO Act. Jennifer Daley, 21 Fla.St.U.L.Rev. 381 (1993).

Trial lawyer's guide: Everything you always wanted to know about RICO before your case was dismissed. Mark E. DuVal, 1986, 12 Wm.Mitchell L.Rev. 291.

United States v. Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States: Settling the attorney's fee forfeiture issue. Note, 28 Hous.L.Rev. 429 (1991).

Using racketeering laws to control obscenity: Alexander v. United States and the perversion of RICO. 36 B.C.L.Rev. 553 (1995).

Using RICO to fight environmental crime: The case for listing violations of RCRA as predicate offenses for RICO. 70 Notre Dame L.Rev. 651 (1995).

Using the RICO Act in civil cases. Norman W. Black and Alan N. Magenheim, 22 Hous.Law. 20 (October 1984).

What have they done to civil RICO: The Supreme Court takes the racketeering requirement out of racketeering. Comment, 35 Am.U.L.Rev. 821 (1986).

When the database is wrong ... Do consumers have any effective remedies against credit reporting agencies or information providers? David Rameden, 100 Com.L.J. 390 (1995).

White collar crime's gray area: The anomaly of criminalizing conduct not civilly actionable. Wendy Ger- wick Couture, 72 Alb. L. Rev. 1 (2009).

Who should regulate lawyers? David B. Wilkins, 105 Harv.L.Rev. 799 (1992).

Wrongful discharge: Can RICO come to the rescue? Robert G. Gough, 61 Fla.B.J. 91 (June 1987).

LIBRARY REFERENCES

American Digest System

RICO 1-98.

Key Number System Topic No. 319H.

Corpus Juris Secundum

CJS Abatement and Revival § 172, Federal Statutes. CJS Aliens § 1677, Prohibited Acts. CJS Arbitration § 16, Nonsignatories.

CJS Bankruptcy § 10, Other U.S. Code Provisions. CJS Bankruptcy § 94, Criminal Liability. CJS Contribution § 26, Other Wrongs and Wrongdoers. CJS Courts § 280, State Courts; Cases Arising Under Federal Law--Particular Federal Statutes. CJS Federal Civil Procedure § 307, Pleading Particular Matters--Fraud, Mistake, and Condition of Mind. CJS Federal Civil Procedure § 911, Scheduling Order. CJS Federal Courts § 16, Discretion to Decline Exercise. CJS Federal Courts § 114, Actions Under Banking Laws. CJS Federal Courts § 637, Subsequent Appeals; Law-Of-The-Case Doctrine. CJS Limitations of Actions § 132, Continuing Wrongs. CJS Limitations of Actions § 176, Pendency of Other Legal Proceedings. CJS Limitations of Actions § 286, Rico Claims. CJS Postal Service & Offenses Against Postal Laws § 48, Mail Fraud Statute. CJS Products Liability § 120, Elevators, Silos and Other Agriculture Structures. CJS Release § 72, General Release--Release Encompassing Federally Guaranteed Constitutional Right. CJS RICO (Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Orgs.) § 12, State Law Felonies. CJS RICO (Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Orgs.) § 13, Federal Offenses. CJS RICO (Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Orgs.) § 17, Relation and Continuity. CJS RICO (Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Orgs.) § 29, Standing--Necessity that Injury Involve Business or Property. CJS RICO (Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Orgs.) § 32, “But-For” and Proximate Causation; Direct Injury. CJS RICO (Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Orgs.) § 35, Pleading. CJS Witnesses § 525, Effect of Refusal to Answer.

RESEARCH REFERENCES

ALR Library

65 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 21, Construction and Application of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) Nationwide Service of Process Provision, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1965.

4 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 279, Application of Common Law Revenue Rule by Federal Courts.

5 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 31, Bankruptcy Rule 9011 Sanctions in Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Proceedings.

6 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 351, Construction and Application of Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.

8 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 1, Validity, Construction, and Application of Federal Employees Health Benefits Act (FEHBA), 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 8901 to 8914.

8 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 611, Application of Local District Court Summary Judgment Rules to Nonmoving Party in Federal Courts--Statements of Facts.

9 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 193, Proper Procedure for Determining Whether Alleged Statement or Report of Gov- ernment Witness Should be Produced on Accused's Demand, Under Jencks Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 3500) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 26.2.

10 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 461, Application of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961 et Seq., to Terrorists and Acts of Terrorism.

15 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 315, Construction and Application of Whistleblower Provision of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1514a(A)(1).

18 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 185, When is Compliance With Hague Convention on Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial Matters, Art. 1 et Seq., Required.

21 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 559, To 2007 A.L.R. United States Supreme Court Review.

23 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 467, Construction and Application of Limitations Provision of Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C.A. § 25(C).

24 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 529, Liability of Civilian Contractors Engaged in Providing Security or Operational Support Services Under Contract to Department of Defense, Department of State, or Coalition Provisional Au- thority for Injuries to Their...

25 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 207, Propriety of Federal Court's Abstention, Under Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S. Ct. 1098, 87 L. Ed. 1424 (1943), as to Claim that State or Local Statute or Regulation, or Application Thereof, Violates...

28 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 563, Validity and Construction of Indian Reorganization Act.

30 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 1, Application of Indian Reorganization Act.

31 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 237, What Constitutes Plain, Speedy, and Efficient State Remedy Under Tax Injunc- tion Act (28 U.S.C.A. § 1341), Prohibiting Federal District Courts from Interfering With Assessment, Levy, or Collection of State Business...

33 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 269, Construction and Application of Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, Rule 9019(A), Concerning Judicial Approval of Compromise or Settlement in Bankruptcy Proceeding--Based on Likely Difficulties in Collecting...

34 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 613, Construction and Application of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019(A), Concerning Judicial

Approval of Compromise or Settlement in Bankruptcy Proceeding--Based on Complexity, Expense, Inconveni- ence, and Delay Of...

35 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 209, Construction and Application of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019(A), Concerning Judicial Approval of Compromise or Settlement in Bankruptcy Proceeding--Based on Paramount Interest of Creditors.

36 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 539, Construction and Application of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9019(A), Concerning Judicial Approval of Compromise or Settlement in Bankruptcy Proceeding--Based on Probability of Success In...

37 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 449, Construction and Application of U.S.S.G. § 2x1.1, Providing Sentencing Guideline for Conspiracy Not Covered by Specific Offense Guideline.

38 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 389, Construction and Application of 26 U.S.C.A. § 6501(E)(1), Providing Extended Six-Year Limitations Period for “Substantial Omission of Income” Respecting Federal Income Taxes.

39 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 17, Application of Equitable Estoppel by Nonsignatory to Compel Arbitration--Federal Cases.

43 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 659, Construction and Application of International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C.A. §§ 288 et seq. (Ioia).

44 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 387, Validity, Construction, and Application of Contraband Cigarette Trafficking Act (Ccta), 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 2341 et Seq.

48 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 83, Construction and Application of 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(M), Protecting Good Faith Pur- chaser Under Bankruptcy Code--Issues Other Than Status as “Good Faith Purchaser”.

55 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 345, Nature, Scope, and Necessity of Court's Compliance With Defendant's Right of Allocution Under Rule 32(i)(4)(A)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and Predecessor Rules.

60 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 331, Construction and Application of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(A)(1)(C), Proscribing Murder With Intent to Prevent Person from Communicating Information About Federal Offense to Federal Law Enforcement Officer or Judge of United...

63 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 327, Arbitration of Disputes in Bankruptcy Core Proceedings.

63 ALR, Fed. 2nd Series 443, Applicability of “Barton Doctrine,” Providing that Leave from Appointing Court Required Before Filing Suit Against Bankruptcy Trustee, and Effect or Cure of Violations Thereof.

1 ALR, Fed. 15, Questions as to Convenience and Justice of Transfer Under Forum Non Conveniens Provision of Judicial Code (28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(a)).

3 ALR, Fed. 29, Accused's Right to Inspection of Minutes of Federal Grand Jury.

3 ALR, Fed. 467, Construction and Application of Federal Statute (28 U.S.C.A. § 1406) Providing for Dismissal or Transfer of Cases for Improper Venue.

4 ALR, Fed. 123, Timeliness of Amendments to Pleadings Made by Leave of Court Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a).

4 ALR, Fed. 881, Elements of Offense Proscribed by the Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 1951) Against Racketeering in Interstate or Foreign Commerce.

6 ALR, Fed. 436, Determination of Corporation's Principal Place of Business for Purposes of Diversity Jurisdic- tion Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(C).

7 ALR, Fed. 9, Construction and Application of Change of Venue or Transfer Provision of Judicial Code (28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(A)), Apart from Questions of Convenience and Justice of Transfer.

8 ALR, Fed. 511, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Provisions of Federal Securities Acts for Extraterritorial Service of Process.

8 ALR, Fed. 784, Validity, Construction, and Effect of “100 Mile” Provision of Rule 4(F), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Permitting Service of Process Outside State in Which Court Sits.

9 ALR, Fed. 309, Withdrawal of Plea of Guilty or Nolo Contendere, After Sentence, Under Rule 32(D) of Fed- eral Rules of Criminal Procedure.

9 ALR, Fed. 893, What Constitutes “Causing” Mail to be Delivered for Purpose of Executing Scheme Prohibited by Mail Fraud Statute (18 U.S.C.A. § 1341).

10 ALR, Fed. 352, Application of Common-Law Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens in Federal Courts After Enactment of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1404(A) Authorizing Transfer to Another District.

15 ALR, Fed. 407, Propriety of Dismissal of Action With Prejudice, Under Rule 41(B) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Upon Ground of Plaintiff's Failure to Comply With Order of Court.

19 ALR, Fed. 709, State or Federal Law as Governing Applicability of Doctrine of Res Judicata or Collateral Estoppel in Federal Court Action.

19 ALR, Fed. 761, Construction and Application of Provision of Rule 60(B) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that Rule Does Not Limit Power of Federal District Court to Set Aside Judgment for “Fraud Upon the Court”.

20 ALR, Fed. 13, Propriety of Federal District Judge's Overruling or Reconsidering Decision or Order Previ- ously Made in Same Case by Another District Judge.

20 ALR, Fed. 125, Admissibility in Federal Conspiracy Prosecution of Evidence of Defendant's Similar Prior Criminal Act.

20 ALR, Fed. 488, Propriety of Dismissal for Failure of Prosecution Under Rule 41(B) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

22 ALR, Fed. 765, Who Must be Joined in Action as Person “Needed for Just Adjudication” Under Rule 19(A) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

27 ALR, Fed. 407, Construction and Application of Provision of Rule 9(B), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that Circumstances Constituting Fraud or Mistake be Stated With Particularity.

28 ALR, Fed. 26, Voir Dire Examination of Prospective Jurors Under Rule 24(A) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

29 ALR, Fed. 826, Validity, Construction, and Application of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962, Making Unlawful Certain Acts Involving “Pattern of Racketeering Activity” or “Collection of an Unlawful Debt”.

30 ALR, Fed. 421, Construction and Application of Federal Tort Claims Act Provision Excepting from Cover- age Claims Arising Out of Misrepresentation and Deceit (28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(H)).

31 ALR, Fed. 833, Award of Counsel Fees to Prevailing Party Based on Adversary's Bad Faith, Obduracy, or Other Misconduct.

36 ALR, Fed. 763, Appealability of Discovery Order as “Final Decision” Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291.

38 ALR, Fed. 617, Availability, Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1651, of Writ of Error Coram Nobis to Vacate Federal Conviction Where Sentence Has Been Served.

41 ALR, Fed. 497, Admissibility, Under Rule 404(B) of Federal Rules of Evidence, of Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts Not Similar to Offense Charged.

44 ALR, Fed. 627, Admissibility of Statement by Coconspirator Under Rule 801(D)(2)(E) of Federal Rules of Evidence.

45 ALR, Fed. 732, What Constitutes Such Discriminatory Prosecution or Enforcement of Laws as to Provide Valid Defense in Federal Criminal Proceedings.

46 ALR, Fed. 864, Timeliness of Application to Intervene Made Under Rule 24 of Federal Rules of Civil Pro- cedure After Denial of Class Certification for Intervenors.

47 ALR, Fed. 206, Sufficiency of Showing, Under Rule 56(F) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of Inability to Present by Affidavit Facts Justifying Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment.

48 ALR, Fed. 259, Situations in Which Federal Courts Are Governed by State Law of Privilege Under Rule 501 of Federal Rules of Evidence.

52 ALR, Fed. 679, Standards for Determining Whether Proceedings in Forma Pauperis Are Frivolous and Thus Subject to Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(D).

52 ALR, Fed. 818, What is an “Enterprise,” as Defined at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(4), for Purposes of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Statute (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961 et seq.).

53 ALR, Fed. 140, Circumstances Giving Rise to Prejudicial Conflict of Interests Between Criminal Defendant and Defense Counsel--Federal Cases.

53 ALR, Fed. 595, Requirement of Rule 58, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that Every Judgment Shall be Set Forth on a Separate Document.

53 ALR, Fed. 679, Sufficiency of Description of Business Records Under Fourth Amendment Requirement of Particularity in Federal Warrant Authorizing Search and Seizure.

54 ALR, Fed. 422, When is a Citizen of United States Who Resides in Foreign Country a Citizen of a Particular State for Purposes of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(A)(1), Granting Federal District Courts Jurisdiction of Certain Actions Between...

57 ALR, Fed. 150, Timeliness of Application for Intervention as of Right Under Rule 24(A) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

57 ALR, Fed. 824, When is Dismissal of Indictment Appropriate Remedy for Misconduct of Government Offi- cial.

59 ALR, Fed. 99, Exceptions to Jurisdictional Immunity of Foreign States and Their Property Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602 et seq.).

59 ALR, Fed. 320, What is the Judicial District “In Which the Claim Arose” for Venue Purposes Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1391(A) and (B).

61 ALR, Fed. 536, Modern Status of Jurisdiction of Federal Courts, Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(A), of Diversity Actions Affecting Probate or Other Matters Concerning Administration of Decedents' Estates.

61 ALR, Fed. 603, Propriety, Under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of Class Action for Viola- tion of Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601 et seq.).

62 ALR, Fed. 636, Delay in Sealing or Failure to Seal Tape or Wire Recording as Required by 18 U.S.C.A. § 2518(8)(A) as Ground for Suppression of Such Recording at Trial.

64 ALR, Fed. 292, District Court Jurisdiction Over Criminal Suspect Who was Abducted in Foreign Country and Returned to United States for Trial or Sentencing.

67 ALR, Fed. 319, Award of Damages or Costs Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1912 or Rule 38 of Federal Rules of Ap- pellate Procedure, Against Appellant Who Brings Frivolous Appeal.

67 ALR, Fed. 640, When is Prosecutor Entitled to Absolute Immunity from Civil Suit for Damages Under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983: Post-Imbler Cases.

72 ALR, Fed. 430, Application of Fraudulent Concealment Doctrine to Statute of Limitations in Antitrust Case ( 15 U.S.C.A. § 15b).

74 ALR, Fed. 199, When is Act of Extortion Performed “Under Color of Official Right” So as to be in Violation of Hobbs Act (18 U.S.C.A. § 1951).

75 ALR, Fed. 461, When Will Expert Testimony “Assist Trier of Fact” So as to be Admissible at Federal Trial Under Rule 702 of Federal Rules of Evidence.

75 ALR, Fed. 806, Propriety of Denial of Pretrial Bail Under Bail Reform Act (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3141 et seq.).

76 ALR, Fed. 46, Discretionary Exercise of Pendent Jurisdiction of Federal Court Over State Claim When Joined With Claim Arising Under Laws, Treaties, or Constitution of United States.

76 ALR, Fed. 700, Evidence Offered by Defendant at Federal Criminal Trial as Inadmissible, Under Rule 403 of Federal Rules of Evidence, on Ground that Probative Value is Substantially Outweighed by Danger of Unfair Prejudice, Confusion...

78 ALR, Fed. 23, Propriety, and Prejudicial Effect, of Comments by Counsel Vouching for Credibility of Wit- ness--Federal Cases.

80 ALR, Fed. 622, What Constitutes Assertion of Right to Counsel Following Miranda Warnings--Federal Cases.

82 ALR, Fed. 829, Proper Test to Determine Identity of Claims for Purposes of Claim Preclusion by Res Ju- dicata Under Federal Law.

83 ALR, Fed. 136, Determination of Citizenship of Partnership, for Purposes of Diversity Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1332(a).

83 ALR, Fed. 367, Propriety of Ordering Consolidation Under Rule 42(A) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Actions Involving Securities.

85 ALR, Fed. 803, Validity, Construction, and Application of § 501(C) of Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 501(C), Prohibiting Embezzlement of Union Assets.

89 ALR, Fed. 514, Modern Status of Federal Civil Procedure Rule 54(B) Governing Entry of Judgment on Mul- tiple Claims.

93 ALR, Fed. 135, Propriety Of, and Procedure For, Ordering Names and Identities of Jurors to be Withheld from Accused in Federal Criminal Trial--“Anonymous Juries”.

95 ALR, Fed. 82, Availability of Qualified Immunity Defense to Private Parties in Action Under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.

95 ALR, Fed. 107, Comment Note--General Principles Regarding Imposition of Sanctions Under Rule 11, Fed- eral Rules of Civil Procedure.

95 ALR, Fed. 793, Classification of Debt as Liquidated, Unsecured, or Contingent, for Purposes of Determining Debtor's Eligibility, Under § 109(E) of 1978 Bankruptcy Code (11 U.S.C.A. § 109(E)), for Chapter 13...

96 ALR, Fed. 881, Recovery of Damages for Personal Injuries in Civil Action for Damages Under Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) (18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(C)).

101 ALR, Fed. 308, Sufficiency of Federal Trial Court's Compliance With Requirements of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 32(A)(1)(A) and 32(C)(3)(D), that Defendant Has Had Opportunity to Read and Discuss Presentence Investigation...

106 ALR, Fed. 33, Construction and Application of Consumer Credit Protection Act Provisions (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 891-894) Prohibiting Extortionate Credit Transactions.

111 ALR, Fed. 503, Efforts of Plaintiff or Plaintiff's Agent for Service of Process as Constituting or Supporting Finding of “Good Cause,” Under Rule 4(J) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for Failure to Timely Serve Pro- cess Upon...

112 ALR, Fed. 141, Attorney's Liability for Nondisclosure or Misrepresentation to Third-Party Nonclients in Private Civil Actions Under Federal Securities Laws.

112 ALR, Fed. 473, Application of Doctrine of Specialty to Federal Criminal Prosecution of Accused Extradited from Foreign Country.

114 ALR, Fed. 355, What Constitutes Unusually “Vulnerable” Victim Under Sentencing Guideline § 3A1.1 Per- mitting Increase in Offense Level.

117 ALR, Fed. 263, Construction and Application of “Public Disclosure” and “Original Source” Jurisdictional Bars Under 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(E)(4) (Civil Actions for False Claims).

117 ALR, Fed. 419, Construction and Application of Rule 60(B)(5) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Author- izing Relief from Final Judgment Where Its Prospective Application is Inequitable.

121 ALR, Fed. 525, Validity, Construction, and Application of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1956, Which Criminalizes Money Laundering.

127 ALR, Fed. 67, Grounds for Disqualification of Criminal Defendant's Chosen and Preferred Attorney in Fed- eral Prosecution.

132 ALR, Fed. 525, Test of “Dual Criminality” Where Extradition to or from Foreign Nation is Sought.

136 ALR, Fed. 183, Construction and Application of § 10(A)(4) of Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C.A. § 10(A)(4)) Providing for Vacating of Arbitration Awards Where Arbitrators Exceed or Imperfectly Execute...

137 ALR, Fed. 227, Validity, Construction, and Application of § 274(A)(1)(A)(iv)), Making it Unlawful to In- duce or Encourage Alien to Come To, Enter, or Reside in United States.

137 ALR, Fed. 255, Validity, Construction, and Application of 274(A)(1)(A)(iii) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.A. § 1324(A)(1)(A)(iii)), Making it Unlawful to Harbor or Conceal Illegal Alien.

138 ALR, Fed. 393, What Matters Not Contained in Pleadings May be Considered in Ruling on a Motion to Dis- miss Under Rule 12(B)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings Un- der Rule 12(C) Without...

143 ALR, Fed. 455, Necessity and Sufficiency of Notice of Court's Decision to Convert Motion to Dismiss Un- der Rule 12(B)(6) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or Motion for Judgment on Pleadings Under Rule 12(C) to Motion for Summary...

148 ALR, Fed. 629, What Constitutes “Inquiry Notice” Sufficient to Commence Running of Statute of Limita- tions in Securities Fraud Action -- Post-Lampf Cases.

156 ALR, Fed. 311, Taxation of Costs Associated With Videotaped Depositions Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1920 and Rule 54(D) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

156 ALR, Fed. 361, Statute of Limitations in Civil Actions for Damages Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968.

157 ALR, Fed. 581, Comment Note: Sufficiency, in Federal Court, of Raising Issue Below to Preserve Matter for Appeal.

172 ALR, Fed. 109, Validity, Construction, and Application of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1346, Providing That, for Pur- poses of Some Federal Criminal Statutes, Term “Scheme or Artifice to Defraud” Includes Scheme or Artifice to Deprive Another Of...

173 ALR, Fed. 1, Admissibility of Statement Under Rule 807 of Federal Rules of Evidence, Providing for Ad- missibility of Hearsay Statement Not Covered by Specific Exception.

173 ALR, Fed. 465, Construction and Application of Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) Exception in 28 U.S.C.A. § 2680(C), Concerning Claims Arising in Respect of Assessment or Collection of Any Tax or Customs Duty, or Detention of Goods Or...

174 ALR, Fed. 289, Right to Award of Attorney's Fees Under §§ 101 et seq. of Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.A. § 505.

175 ALR, Fed. 243, Construction and Application of Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR), Re- quiring that Foreign Consulate be Notified When One of Its Nationals is Arrested.

183 ALR, Fed. 141, Liability of Officer, Director, Employee, or Other Individual Associated With Seller or Is- suer of Securities as “Control Person” Under § 15 of Securities Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 77) and § 20(A) of Securities Exchange Act...

186 ALR, Fed. 169, Liability of Brokerage Firm, Securities Underwriter, Investment Advisor, or Similar Entity, or Individual Affiliated With Such Entity, as “Control Person” Under § 15 of Securities Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 77o) and § 20(A) Of...

193 ALR, Fed. 291, Appropriateness of Federal Court Abstention Under Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 96 S. Ct. 1236, 47 L. Ed. 2d 483, Given the Existence of Concurrent Par- allel...

195 ALR, Fed. 349, Validity, Construction, and Application of Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA).

198 ALR, Fed. 631, Validity, Construction, and Application of Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act of 1994 (Hoepa), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1602(Aa), 1610, 1639, and 1640.

189 ALR, Fed. 147, Liability as “Control Persons” Under § 15 of Securities Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 77o) and § 78t(A) of Securities Exchange Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 78t(A)) of Accountants, Auditors, Attorneys, Lenders, and Other Persons or Entities...

188 ALR, Fed. 419, Civil Liability of Antiabortion Protesters Under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiz- ations Act (RICO) in Light of Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1057, R.I.C.O. Bus. Disp. Guide...

186 ALR, Fed. 71, Construction and Application of Federal Tribal Exhaustion Doctrine.

2003 ALR, Fed. 1, Construction and Application of Garmon Preemption Doctrine by Federal Courts.

171 ALR, Fed. 1, Validity, Construction, and Application of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et Seq.--Supreme Court Cases.

147 ALR, Fed. 613, Construction and Application of 28 U.S.C.A. § 2403 (And Similar Predecessor Provisions), Concerning Intervention by United States or by State in Certain Federal Court Cases Involving Constitutionality Of...

141 ALR, Fed. 311, Timeliness of Affidavit of Disqualification of Trial Judge Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 144.

141 ALR, Fed. 445, Sufficiency of “Designation” Under Federal Appellate Procedure Rule 3 of Judgment or Or- der Appealed from in Civil Cases by Notice of Appeal Not Specifically Designating Such Judgment or Order.

134 ALR, Fed. 289, What is “Investment Contract” Within Meaning of § 2(1) of Securities Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C.A. § 77b(1)) and § 3(A) (10) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.A. § 78c(A) (10), Both Defin- ing Term...

135 ALR, Fed. 533, Construction and Application of § 4(B) of Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) (29 U.S.C.A. § 1003(B)), Which Provides that Particular Employee Benefit Plans Are Not Covered By...

136 ALR, Fed. 593, Right of Mortgagee And/Or Lienor to Compensation When Property Subject to Mortgage And/Or Lien is Taken by Federal Governmental Forfeiture Based on Criminal Acts of Owner.

112 ALR, Fed. 647, Construction and Application of 12 U.S.C.A. § 503 Involving Civil Liability of Federal Re- serve Member Bank Officers and Directors for Certain Federal Reserve Act and Federal Criminal Code...

116 ALR, Fed. 525, Enforceability of Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Claims Arising Under Employee Re- tirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) (29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001 et seq.).

108 ALR, Fed. 380, Books, Papers, and Documents Subject to Discovery by Defendant Under Rule 16 of Feder- al Rules of Criminal Procedure.

108 ALR, Fed. 594, Double Jeopardy Defense to Separate or Successive Prosecutions Under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) (18 U.S.C.A. § 1962).

103 ALR, Fed. 422, Propriety, Under 18 U.S.C.A. § 2517(5), of Interception or Use of Communications Relat- ing to Federal Offenses Which Were Not Specified in Original Wiretap Order.

103 ALR, Fed. 648, Sufficiency of “Specificity” of Designation of Parties to Appeal in Notice of Appeal Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(C).

104 ALR, Fed. 548, Pre-Emption, by Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C.A. §§ 151 et seq.), of Employee's State-Law Action for Infliction of Emotional Distress.

97 ALR, Fed. 107, Imposition of Sanctions Under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Pertaining to Sign- ing and Verification of Pleadings, in Actions for Securities Fraud.

97 ALR, Fed. 273, What Conduct of Federal Law Enforcement Authorities in Inducing or Co-Operating in Criminal Offense Raises Due Process Defense Distinct from Entrapment.

100 ALR, Fed. 667, Liability, Under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968) for Retaliation Against Employee for Disclosing or Refusing to Commit Wrongful Act.

100 ALR, Fed. 880, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or State Law as Governing Relation Back of Amended Pleading.

89 ALR, Fed. 887, Commencement of Limitation Period for Criminal Prosecution Under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968.

81 ALR, Fed. 471, Restriction on Dissemination of Information Obtained Through Pretrial Discovery Proceed- ings as Violating Federal Constitution's First Amendment--Federal Cases.

83 ALR, Fed. 504, Constitutional Right to Counsel as Ground for Quashing or Modifying Federal Grand Jury Subpoena Directed to Attorney.

85 ALR, Fed. 13, Juror's Reading of Newspaper Account of Trial in Federal Criminal Case During Its Progress as Ground for Mistrial, New Trial, or Reversal.

76 ALR, Fed. 258, Seizure Under Rico Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984 (18 U.S.C.A. § 1963) of Funds Received by Attorney as Fees from Accused.

72 ALR, Fed. 191, Pendent Jurisdiction of Federal Court Over State Claim Against Party Not Otherwise Subject to Federal Jurisdiction Where State Claim is Sought to be Joined With Claim Arising Under Laws, Treaties, or Constitution Of...

74 ALR, Fed. 516, Tolling of Time for Filing Notice of Appeal in Civil Action in Federal Court Under Rule 4(A)(4) of Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

74 ALR, Fed. 797, Request for Attorney Fees as Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment Within Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(E).

75 ALR, Fed. 600, Existence of Pendent Jurisdiction of Federal Court Over State Claim When Joined With Claim Arising Under Laws, Treaties, or Constitution of United States.

70 ALR, Fed. 538, Civil Action for Damages Under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(C) of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (Rico, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961 et seq.) for Injuries Sustained by Reason of Racketeer-

ing...

61 ALR, Fed. 135, United States Parole Commission Guidelines for Federal Prisoners.

61 ALR, Fed. 879, Construction and Application of Provision of Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (18 U.S.C.A. § 1963(A)) that Whoever Violated 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962 Shall Forfeit to United States Any Interest in Unlawful...

62 ALR, Fed. 106, What Constitutes “Series of Acts or Transactions” for Purposes of Rule 8(B) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Providing for Joinder of Defendants Who Are Alleged to Have Participated in Same Series of Acts Or...

64 ALR, Fed. 874, Propriety and Prejudicial Effect, in Federal Criminal Cases, of Communications Between Judge and Jury Members Made in the Absence of Counsel, Regarding the Ability of Jury Members to Contin- ue...

65 ALR, Fed. 957, What Actions of United States Attorney Constitute Usurpation of Authority of Federal Grand Jury, Thus Warranting Exclusion of Evidence Obtained Thereby.

58 ALR, Fed. 458, What is “A Separate and Independent Claim or Cause of Action” Within 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(C) Which Permits Nonresident Codefendant to Remove Case from State to Federal Court.

51 ALR, Fed. 743, Financing of Insurance Premiums as Constituting “Business of Insurance” Within § 2 of Mc- carran-Ferguson Act (15 U.S.C.A. § 1012), Excluding Application of Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601 et seq.) To...

46 ALR, Fed. 342, Applicability of 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985(3) to Sex-Based Discrimination.

47 ALR, Fed. 639, Effect of Rule 801(D)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Evidence Upon the Admissibility of a Witness' Prior Consistent Statement.

47 ALR, Fed. 781, Admissibility, Under Rule 404(B) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, of Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts Similar to Offense Charged to Show Preparation or Plan.

49 ALR, Fed. 511, Admissibility of Evidence Discovered in Warrantless Search of Property or Premises Author- ized by One Having Ownership Interest in Property or Premises Other Than Relative.

50 ALR, Fed. 472, Propriety Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1920 and Rule 54(D) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure of Allowing Prevailing Party Costs for Copies of Depositions.

39 ALR, Fed. 479, Joinder of Offenses Under Rule 8(A), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

40 ALR, Fed. 937, Defendant's Right, Under Rule 14, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, to Severance in Federal Criminal Trial Because of Codefendant's Identification With an Unpopular Group.

31 ALR, Fed. 752, Necessity of Leave of Court to Add or Drop Parties by Amended Pleading Filed Before Re- sponsive Pleading is Served, Under Rules 15(A) and 21 of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

33 ALR, Fed. 403, Pretrial Discovery of Facts Known and Opinions Held by Opponent's Experts Under Rule 26(B)(4) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

30 ALR, Fed. 655, Dismissal of Indictment or Information as Reviewable on Appeal by United States Under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3731, as Amended by Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970.

20 ALR, Fed. 803, Construction and Application of Provision of Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 (18 U.S.C.A. § 1965(A)) that Civil Action or Proceeding Under Act Against Any Person May be Instituted in Feder- al District Court For...

21 ALR, Fed. 708, Validity, Construction, and Application of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1955 Prohibiting Illegal Gambling Businesses.

5 ALR, Fed. 10, Stay of Action in Federal Court Until Determination of Similar Action Pending in State Court.

1 ALR, Fed. 771, Relief from Judicial Error by Motion Under FRCP Rule 60(B)(1).

2 ALR 6th 195, Acceptance and Application of Reverse Veil-Piercing-Third-Party Claimant.

17 ALR 6th 1, Contribution Between Joint Tortfeasors as Affected by Settlement With Injured Party by One or More Tortfeasors.

23 ALR 6th 223, Products Liability: Pacemakers.

25 ALR 6th 435, Validity, Construction, Application, and Effect of Master Settlement Agreement (Msa) Between Tobacco Companies and Various States, and State Statutes Implementing Agreement; Use and Distri- bution of Msa...

26 ALR 6th 659, To 2007 A.L.R. United States Supreme Court Review.

27 ALR 6th 403, Construction and Application of Rule of Necessity in Judicial Actions, Providing that a Judge is Not Disqualified to Try a Case Because of Personal Interest If Case Cannot be Heard Otherwise.

32 ALR 6th 261, Construction and Application of “Municipal Cost Recovery Rule,” or “Free Public Services Doctrine”.

32 ALR 6th 419, Permissive or Mandatory Nature of Forum Selection Clauses Under State Law.

58 ALR 6th 385, Validity of Criminal State Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Acts and Similar Acts Related to Gang Activity and the Like.

60 ALR 6th 295, Propriety of Incentive Awards or Incentive Agreements in Class Actions.

66 ALR 6th 567, Effect of Uniform Commercial Code Article 4A on Attachment, Garnishment, Forfeiture or Other Third-Party Process Against Funds Transfers.

14 ALR 5th 695, Event Triggering Liability Insurance Coverage as Occurring Within Period of Time Covered by Liability Insurance Policy Where Injury or Damage is Delayed--Modern Cases.

57 ALR 5th 141, Admissibility of Evidence of Declarant's Then-Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condi- tion, Under Rule 803(3) of Uniform Rules of Evidence and Similar Formulations.

79 ALR 5th 587, Validity, Construction, and Application of “Fiduciary Shield” Doctrine--Modern Cases.

89 ALR 5th 629, Criminal Prosecutions Under State Rico Statutes for Engaging in Organized Criminal Activity.

105 ALR 5th 351, Common-Law Retaliatory Discharge of Employee for Disclosing Unlawful Acts or Other Misconduct of Employer or Fellow Employees.

97 ALR 5th 201, Conviction or Acquittal in Federal Court as Bar to Prosecution in State Court for State Offense Based on Same Facts--Modern View.

18 ALR 5th 474, Liability of Insurer to Insured for Settling Third-Party Claim Within Policy Limits Resulting in Detriment to Insured.

20 ALR 5th 677, Pre-Emption by Workers' Compensation Statute of Employee's Remedy Under State “Whistleblower” Statute.

23 ALR 5th 241, Excessiveness or Inadequacy of Attorney's Fees in Matters Involving Commercial and General Business Activities.

11 ALR 5th 630, Right of One Governmental Subdivision to Sue Another Such Subdivision for Damages.

10 ALR 4th 8, Adequacy of Defense Counsel's Representation of Criminal Client Regarding Guilty Pleas.

10 ALR 4th 552, Physician-Patient Privilege as Extending to Patient's Medical or Hospital Records.

57 ALR 4th 22, False Light Invasion of Privacy, Cognizability and Elements.

62 ALR 4th 654, Civil Action for Damages Under State Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Acts (RICO) for Losses from Racketeering Activity.

75 ALR 4th 13, Liability for Retaliation Against At-Will Employee for Public Complaints or Efforts Relating to Health or Safety.

85 ALR 4th 544, Bringing of Frivolous Civil Claim or Action as Ground for Discipline of Attorney.

69 ALR 4th 298, Discovery, in Civil Proceeding, of Records of Criminal Investigation by State Grand Jury.

55 ALR 4th 394, Commodities Broker's State-Law Duties to Customers.

36 ALR 4th 144, Validity and Effect of “Wraparound” Mortgages Whereby Purchaser Incorporates Into Agreed Payments to Grantor Latter's Obligation on Initial Mortgage.

40 ALR 4th 1062, Liability of Religious Association for Damages for Intentionally Tortious Conduct in Recruit- ment, Indoctrination, or Related Activity.

4 ALR 4th 955, Long-Arm Statutes: in Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Based on Ownership, Use, Pos- session, or Sale of Real Property.

8 ALR 4th 1181, Attorney's Conduct in Delaying or Obstructing Discovery as Basis for Contempt Proceeding.

9 ALR 3rd 203, Modern Status of Doctrine of Res Judicata in Criminal Cases.

18 ALR 3rd 259, Inconsistency of Criminal Verdict as Between Different Counts of Indictment or Information.

20 ALR 3rd 724, Plea of Guilty as Waiver of Claim of Unlawful Search and Seizure.

35 ALR 3rd 412, Development, Since Hickman v Taylor, of Attorney's “Work Product” Doctrine.

82 ALR 3rd 245, Antagonistic Defenses as Ground for Separate Trials of Codefendants in Criminal Case.

82 ALR 3rd 366, Right of Defendants in Prosecution for Criminal Conspiracy to Separate Trials.

92 ALR 3rd 1164, Admissibility, as Against Interest, in Criminal Case of Declaration of Commission of Crimin- al Act.

87 ALR 3rd 168, Legal Malpractice in Settling or Failing to Settle Client's Case.

36 ALR 3rd 405, Liability of Labor Union or Its Membership for Torts Committed by Officers, Members, Pick- ets, or Others, in Connection With Lawful Primary Labor Activities.

13 ALR 3rd 569, Of Labor Management Relations Act (29 U.S.C.A. § 186(A)-(D)) Concerning Payments Between an Employer and a Representative of His Employees.

5 ALR 3rd 819, Discovery and Inspection of Prosecution Evidence Under Federal Rule 16 of Criminal Proced- ure.

5 ALR 2nd 444, Right of Accused to Bill of Particulars.

12 ALR 2nd 695, May Federal Court, Acquiring Jurisdiction Because of Federal Question But Deciding Such Question Adversely to Party Invoking Jurisdiction, Decide Non-Federal Questions.

22 ALR 2nd 621, Failure to Assert Matter as Counterclaim as Precluding Assertion Thereof in Subsequent Ac- tion, Under Federal Rules or Similar State Rules or Statutes.

40 ALR 2nd 908, Coercion, Compulsion, or Duress as Defense to Criminal Prosecution.

50 ALR 2nd 458, Allegations in Third Person's Action Against Insured as Determining Liability Insurer's Duty to Defend.

62 ALR 2nd 1369, When Does Statute of Limitations Begin to Run Against Civil Action or Criminal Prosecu- tion for Conspiracy.

71 ALR 2nd 449, Admissibility of Evidence as to Extrajudicial or Pretrial Identification of Accused.

76 ALR 2nd 262, Accused's Right To, and Prosecution's Privilege Against, Disclosure of Identity of Informer.

90 ALR 2nd 265, Federal Court's Adoption of State Period of Limitation, in Action to Enforce Federally Created Right, as Including Related or Subsidiary State Laws or Rules as to Limitations.

90 ALR 2nd 1109, Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens: Assumption or Denial of Jurisdiction of Contract Action Involving Foreign Elements.

76 ALR 2nd 696, Sufficiency of Plaintiff's Allegations in Defamation Action as to Defendant's Malice.

69 ALR 2nd 1324, Validity of Contractual Provision Authorizing Venue of Action in Particular Place, Court, or County.

55 ALR 2nd 1137, Solicitation or Receipt of Funds by Public Officer or Employee for Political Campaign Ex- penses or Similar Purposes as Bribery.

38 ALR 2nd 225, Privilege Against Self-Incrimination as to Testimony Before Grand Jury.

15 ALR 2nd 500, Effect of Fraud to Toll the Period for Bringing Action Prescribed in Statute Creating the Right of Action.

4 ALR 44, He Who Comes Into Equity Must Come With Clean Hands.

58 ALR 1263, Scope or Extent, as Regards Books, Records, or Documents to be Produced or Examined, Per- missible in Order for Inspection.

59 ALR 1555, Evidence: Privilege of Communications Made to Public Officer.

63 ALR 602, Admissibility of Evidence of Other Offenses in Criminal Prosecution to Prove Identity of Defend- ant.

70 ALR 1511, When Sentences Imposed by Same Court Run Concurrently or Consecutively; and Definiteness of Direction With Respect Thereto.

73 ALR 1120, Fraud: Necessity for Knowledge of Falsity of Representation as to Value, Inducing Subscription to or Purchase of Corporate Stock, or Other Securities.

75 ALR 1411, Merger of Conspiracy in Completed Offense.

77 ALR 1044, Estoppel Against Defense of Limitation in Tort Actions.

79 ALR 592, Regulations, Rules, Custom, or Usage of Stock or Produce Exchange or of Stock or Produce Broker as Affecting Customers.

82 ALR 808, Conflict Between Federal and State Statutes of Limitations.

87 ALR 42, Blue Sky Laws.

91 ALR 587, Right to Control of Class Suit.

92 ALR 1137, Right of Prosecution to Review of Decision Quashing or Dismissing Indictment or Information, or Sustaining Demurrer Thereto.

94 ALR 711, Anticipation of Defense Involving Federal Constitution or Statute as Supporting Federal Jurisdic- tion Under Statute Conferring Such Jurisdiction Over Causes of Action Arising Under Federal Constitution Or...

104 ALR 931, Amount Paid by One Alleged Joint Tort-Feasor in Consideration of Covenant Not to Sue or a Re- lease Not Effective as a Full Release of the Other Joint Tort-Feasor, as Pro Tanto Satisfaction of Damages Re- coverable Against...

110 ALR 1178, Time When Limitation Commences to Run Against Action at Law or in Equity Based on Fraud Inducing Execution of Contract or Conveyance as Affected by Time When Actual Damages Resulted.

113 ALR 1179, What Amounts to Conviction or Satisfies Requirement as to Showing of Conviction, Within Statute Making Conviction a Ground for Refusing to Grant or for Canceling License or Special Privilege.

115 ALR 271, Market Manipulation of Securities.

118 ALR 1498, Meritorious Defense as Condition of Injunction Against or Direct Attack Upon Judgment for Want of Jurisdiction.

125 ALR 879, Promises and Statements as to Future Events as Fraud.

127 ALR 272, Duty of Secrecy on Part of Members Of, or Witness or Other Persons Present Before, Grand Jury.

130 ALR 327, Practice or Procedure for Testing Validity or Scope of the Command of Subpoena Duces Tecum.

131 ALR 917, Right to Severance Where Two or More Persons Are Jointly Accused.

132 ALR 738, Assumption of Jurisdiction by Court Before Completion of Administrative Procedure as Ground of Prohibition.

132 ALR 749, Comment Note.--Identity or Community of Interests Essential to Class or Representative Suit.

134 ALR 614, Admissibility of Evidence Obtained by Government or Other Public Officer by Intercepting Let- ter or Telegraph or Telephone Message.

134 ALR 882, Relation of Treaty to State and Federal Law.

135 ALR 104, What Are Games of Chance, Games of Skill, and Mixed Games of Chance and Skill.

136 ALR 364, Construction of Arbitration Provisions of Sales Contracts as Regards Questions to be Submitted to Arbitrators.

139 ALR 1017, Who May be Regarded as Injured in His Business or Property Within Provisions of Anti-Trust Acts as to Person Who May Recover Damages Resulting from Violation of the Acts.

139 ALR 1250, Evidence: Attorney-Client Privilege as Applicable to Communications Between Attorney and Client's Agent, Employee, Spouse, or Relative.

140 ALR 717, Duty of Federal Courts, Since Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, in Determining Ultimate Federal Ques- tion, to Follow State Laws or State Court Decisions of Substantive Character, Upon Questions Which Are Pre- liminary, Incidental...

141 ALR 1380, Grant of Injunction or Stay by Federal Court to Protect Discharge in Bankruptcy.

142 ALR 1490, Liability of Manufacturer of Packer of Defective Article for Injury to Person or Property of Ulti- mate Consumer Who Purchased from Middleman.

144 ALR 372, Constitutionality, Construction, and Application of Statutes or Rules of Court Which Permit Set- ting Aside a Plea and Giving Judgment by Default, or Dismissing Suit, Because of Disobedience of Order, Sum- mons, Or...

147 ALR 857, Duty of State Courts to Follow Decisions of Federal Courts, Other Than the Supreme Court, on Federal Questions.

148 ALR 183, Duty of Court When Appointing Counsel for Defendant to Name Attorney Other Than One Em- ployed By, or Appointed For, a Codefendant.

149 ALR 276, Claims Based on Provisions of Statutes Relating Specifically to Rights, Duties, and Obligations Between Employer and Employee as Subject to Arbitration Provisions of Contracts or Statutes.

152 ALR 1147, Failure to Prove Allegation of Conspiracy in Complaint in Civil Action as Affecting Right to Recover.

155 ALR 10, Duty and Discretion of District or Prosecuting Attorney as Regards Prosecution for Criminal Of- fenses.

157 ALR 247, Criminal Charge Under Mail Fraud Statute as Affected by Contention that Fraudulent Scheme Had Been Completed Before Use of Mail by Person Privy to the Fraud.

157 ALR 415, Criminal Offense Predicated Upon Mail Fraud Statute as Affected by Fact that Use of Mails was Not by Defendant, But by an Innocent Person.

159 ALR 1240, Use in Criminal Case of Testimony Given on Former Trial, or Preliminary Examination, by Wit- ness Not Available at Present Trial.

161 ALR 233, Right to Cross-Examine Accused as to Previous Prosecution For, or Conviction Of, Crime, for Purpose of Affecting His Credibility.

163 ALR 1050, What Constitutes Stock, Securities, or Investment Contracts Within Contemplation of State and Federal Statutes Regulating Sale of Securities.

167 ALR 279, Stockholder's Right to Maintain Personal Action Against Third Person as Affected by Corpora- tion's Right of Action for the Same Wrong.

169 ALR 315, Comment Note.--Duty in Instructing Jury in Criminal Prosecution to Explain and Define Offense Charged.

173 ALR 576, Comment Note.--What Constitutes Concealment Which Will Prevent Running of Statute of Lim- itations.

174 ALR 10, Scope and Character of Meritorious Defense as Condition of Relief from Judgment.

172 ALR 265, Pleading Avoidance of Delay in Discovery of Fraud in Order to Toll Statute of Limitations.

156 ALR 652, Specific Performance or Injunction as Proper Remedy for Breach of Collective Bargaining Agreement.

148 ALR 649, What Amounts to Conversion of Former Tenant's Goods by Landlord Not Entitled to Any Lien or Right in Respect Thereto.

152 ALR 168, Constitutionality of Statute or Practice Requiring or Authorizing Temporary Restraining Order or Injunction Without Notice.

137 ALR 268, Public Records as Notice of Facts Starting Running of Statute of Limitations Against Action Based on Fraud.

140 ALR 797, Doctrine of Res Judicata in Income Tax Cases.

131 ALR 810, Subjection of Party in Action in Federal Court to Physical Examination.

135 ALR 695, Allowance or Rejection of Claim in Bankruptcy Proceedings as Res Judicata in Independent Ac- tion or Proceeding Between the Claimant and Another Creditor.

121 ALR 1143, Workmen's Compensation Act as Exclusive of Remedy by Action Against Employer for Injury or Disease Not Compensable Under Act.

112 ALR 983, Identity, as Regards Former Jeopardy, of Offenses Charged in Different Indictments or Informa- tions for Conspiracy.

114 ALR 1500, Comment Note.--Duty of Federal Courts to Follow State Court Decisions on Questions of Gen- eral Law or Commercial Law.

115 ALR 1263, Criminal Offense of Bribery as Affected by Lack of Legal Qualification of Person Assuming or Alleged to be an Officer.

117 ALR 515, Employee's Right of Election After Injury or Disability as Between Benefits of Workmen's Com- pensation Act and Action at Law Against Employer.

107 ALR 300, Meaning, Effect, and Application of Word “Knowingly” as Employed in Statutes Relating to the Use of Mails for Improper Purposes.

108 ALR 167, Right to Cross-Examine Witness in Respect of Facts Not Included in His Direct Examination, But Which Negative a Prima Facie Case, Presumption, or Inference Otherwise Made by His Testimony on Direct...

109 ALR 954, Statute Providing that an Insane Person, Minor, or Other Person Under Disability May Bring Suit Within Specified Time After Removal of Disability as Affecting Right to Bring Action Before Disability...

111 ALR 787, Conflict of Laws as Regards Validity of Fraudulent and Preferential Transfers and Assignments.

111 ALR 879, Power and Duty of Court to Keep Its Files and Records Free from Scandalous Matter.

111 ALR 1317, Change of Law After Decision of Lower Court as Affecting Decision on Appeal or Error.

88 ALR 504, Right to Discovery as Regards Facts Relating to Amount of Damages.

82 ALR 484, Joinder in Same Indictment of Defendant Charged Singly With One Offense and Codefendant Charged Jointly With Him With Another Offense.

87 ALR 1258, Admissibility in Criminal Prosecution of Adjudication or Judgment in Civil Case or Procedure.

75 ALR 299, Misappropriation of Executor, Administrator, Guardian, or Trustee as Embezzlement.

64 ALR 333, Jurisdiction of State Courts of Actions in Relation to Interstate Shipments.

52 ALR 912, Parties Plaintiff to Actions Based on Libel or Slander of a Firm or Its Members.

50 ALR 1256, Disqualification of Judge or One Acting in Judicial Capacity to Preside in a Case in Which He Has a Pecuniary Interest in the Fine, Penalty, or Forfeiture Imposed Up on the Defendant.

26 ALR 369, Monopoly in Dramatic and Motion Pictures.

27 ALR 549, Civil Liability of Member of a Mob.

10 ALR 982, Sufficiency of Indictment as Affected by Bill of Particulars.

8 ALR 550, Effect of Bill of Particulars on Proof.

Encyclopedias

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Monopoly, Restr. of Trade, Unf. Trade § 116.50, Complaint in Federal Court--Fraudulent Ma- nipulation of Price Indexes by Gas Trader--Excessive Natural Gas Prices Charged to Oil Company--Sherman Act and Rico Violations--Breach of.

14 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 511, Racial Discrimination in Sale of Real Estate.

16 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 253, Forensic Economics--Valuation of Businesses and Business Losses.

18 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 149, Excessive Bail.

33 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 549, Criminal Law: Need for Disclosure of Identity of Informant.

34 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 509, Foundation for Offering Business Records in Evidence.

49 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 473, Civil Conspiracy to Deny First-Party Insurance Benefits.

50 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d 263, Damages for Copyright Infringement.

10 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 289, “Pattern of Racketeering Activity” Under the Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO).

12 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 505, Avoiding the “Intentional Injury” Exclusion--Insured Acting With Full Men- tal Capacity.

13 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 559, “Fraudulent or Dishonest Act” by Employee Covered by Fidelity Bond.

20 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 621, Misrepresentation in Sale or Lease of Computer.

22 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 411, Liability of Private Trade School to Student.

22 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 559, Legal Malpractice in a Securities Offering.

23 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 315, Foundation for Audio Recordings as Evidence.

25 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 591, Avoidance and Recovery of Fraudulent Transfers.

26 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 119, Lost Profits Resulting from Tortious Injury to Business.

27 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 213, Use of Statistical Evidence in Proving Churning of Securities Accounts.

28 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 87, Proof of Unsuitable and Unauthorized Trading by Securities Brokers.

29 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 1, Managed Care Organization Professional Malpractice.

29 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 189, Proof that a Fund Solicitor was Negligent in Promoting, Collecting, and Dis- bursing Funds for a Charitable Organization.

32 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 299, Proof that an International Union Ratified Wrongdoing by One of Its Local Affiliates.

33 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 359, Sports Memorabilia Dealer's Liability to Collector.

35 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 161, Proving Damages Caused by Securities Brokers' Excessive, Unsuitable, or Unauthorized Trading.

36 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 331, Introduction of Evidence Over Parol Evidence Rule Objection.

37 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 259, Liability for Airing False or Misleading Television Infomercials.

39 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 181, Cigarette Manufacturer's Liability for Mesothelioma Caused by Asbestos Fibers in Cigarette Filters.

41 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 253, Proving Securities Broker's Control Over Customer's Account in Churning and Unsuitable Trading Cases.

47 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 241, Proof of Violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and of Sanctions Thereunder.

50 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 543, Builder-Vendor's Liability to Purchaser of New Dwelling for Breach of Im- plied Warranty of Fitness or Habitability.

51 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 361, Liability of Real Estate Professional for Interstate Real Estate Fraud.

55 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 249, Proof that Motion Picture is Obscene or Harmful to Minors.

61 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 245, Liability of a Physician for Improper Referral of Patients to a Medical Care- Facility in Which the Physician Has a Financial Interest.

66 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 1, Liability of Health Maintenance Organizations.

71 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 193, Enforcement of Casino Gambling Debts.

74 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 63, Scams and Cons.

75 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 103, Proof of Violation of State Usury Consumer Loan Law.

79 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 199, Proof of a Claim Involving Alleged Violation of State Consumer Protection or Similar Statute Against Physician or Attorney.

88 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 395, Substantive and Procedural Issues in Refreshing Witness Recollection.

92 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 1, Arbitrability Disputes: Proving What Facts to Whom.

100 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 3d 1, Proof of a Claim Arising from Off-Label Use of Prescription Medications.

3 Am. Jur. Trials 611, Selecting the Forum--Defendant's Position.

9 Am. Jur. Trials 131, Actions on Health and Accident Insurance Policies.

18 Am. Jur. Trials 57, Actions for Interference With Contract Rights.

20 Am. Jur. Trials 351, Handling the Defense in a Conspiracy Prosecution.

21 Am. Jur. Trials 625, Preparation and Trial of Federal Class Actions.

36 Am. Jur. Trials 1, Broker-Dealer Fraud: Churning.

39 Am. Jur. Trials 527, Fraud in the Sale of a Show Horse.

40 Am. Jur. Trials 317, Cost Recovery Litigation: Abatement of Asbestos Contamination.

41 Am. Jur. Trials 1, Social Worker Malpractice for Failure to Protect Foster Children.

42 Am. Jur. Trials 419, Lender Liability Litigation: Undue Control.

44 Am. Jur. Trials 613, Defense of Lender Liability Litigation.

45 Am. Jur. Trials 113, Third-Party Accountant Liability--Prospective Financial Statements Used in Securities Offerings.

46 Am. Jur. Trials 687, Failure of Performance in Computer Sales and Leases.

47 Am. Jur. Trials 411, Handling Fidelity Bond Litigation.

47 Am. Jur. Trials 591, Taxation of Litigation Recoveries.

48 Am. Jur. Trials 1, Audio Recordings: Evidence, Experts and Technology.

51 Am. Jur. Trials 493, Structural Damage to Residential Buildings.

56 Am. Jur. Trials 293, A Guide to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

56 Am. Jur. Trials 369, Recovery of Damages for Property Devaluation Caused by Off-Site Environmental Haz- ards.

59 Am. Jur. Trials 155, The Business Appraiser as an Expert Witness.

64 Am. Jur. Trials 543, The Relevancy Rules.

70 Am. Jur. Trials 435, The Defense of a Computer Crime Case.

82 Am. Jur. Trials 1, Defending Against Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.

88 Am. Jur. Trials 1, Stockbroker Liability Litigation.

91 Am. Jur. Trials 151, When Clergy Fail Their Flock: Litigating the Clergy Sexual Abuse Case.

124 Am. Jur. Trials 487, Off-Label Use of Prescription Medications.

125 Am. Jur. Trials 1, Off-Label Use of Medical Devices.

Am. Jur. 2d Abortion and Birth Control § 113, Civil Remedies Against Protestors Under Rico--Use of an Enter- prise to Commit Illegal Acts.

Am. Jur. 2d Aliens and Citizens § 6, Enhanced Enforcement and Penalties Against Alien Smuggling.

Am. Jur. 2d Aliens and Citizens § 23, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.

Am. Jur. 2d Appellate Review § 620, Issues Considered by United States Supreme Court.

Am. Jur. 2d Bankruptcy § 227, Crimes.

Am. Jur. 2d Bankruptcy § 552, Title 18 Provisions.

Am. Jur. 2d Bankruptcy § 1381, Racketeering.

Am. Jur. 2d Bankruptcy § 2699, Expenses of Creditor in Connection With Criminal Prosecution.

Am. Jur. 2d Barbers and Cosmetologists § 8, Schools for Barbers and Cosmetologists.

Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 2207, Appraisal and Other Remedies.

Am. Jur. 2d Costs § 10, Presumption that Prevailing Party is Entitled to Costs.

Am. Jur. 2d Counterclaim, Recoupment, and Setoff § 26, Tendency to Defeat or Diminish Plaintiff's Demand; Counterclaim Exceeding Opposing Claim.

Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 93, Exclusive and Concurrent Jurisdiction.

Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 107, Generally; Purpose.

Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 109, Definitions.

Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 119, Predicate Acts, Generally.

Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 120, Checklist of Acts Which Constitute Racketeering Activity; Federal Law Violations.

Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 121, Checklist of Acts Which Constitute Racketeering Activity; Federal Law Violations--State Law Violations.

Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 124, Continuity.

Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 128, Composition.

Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 130, Private Entities.

Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 131, “Enterprise” as Distinct from “Person”.

Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 132, Illegitimate, Informal, and Foreign Organizations.

Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 144, As to Enterprise Element.

Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 191, Venue.

Am. Jur. 2d Extortion, Blackmail, and Threats § 193, Pleading.

Am. Jur. 2d Federal Courts § 887, Exhaustion of Other Remedies as Necessary--Effect of State Judgment.

Am. Jur. 2d Federal Courts § 1139, General Versus Special Venue Statutes.

Am. Jur. 2d Indictments and Informations § 196, Defendants Charged in Same Instrument; Generally.

Am. Jur. 2d Involuntary Servitude and Peonage § 12, Federal Statutes Outlawing Slave Trade; Actions on Ves- sels in Slave Trade.

Am. Jur. 2d Labor and Labor Relations § 1542, Organized Crime Control Act.

Am. Jur. 2d Pleading § 716, Amendments After Deadline Set by Scheduling Order.

Am. Jur. 2d Prostitution § 27, Construction and Application.

Am. Jur. 2d Searches and Seizures § 439, What Constitutes “Other Offense”.

Forms

Federal Procedural Forms § 4:3, Particular Claims as Within Coverage of FAA.

Federal Procedural Forms § 9:8, Other U.S.C.A. Provisions.

Federal Procedural Forms § 1:930, Motion to Dismiss--Failure to State Claim Under Rico [18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961 et Seq.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(B)(6)].

Federal Procedural Forms § 8:262, Complaint--Under Rico--For Damages--Conspiracy to Defraud Plaintiff of Proceeds Due Under Contracts [18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961, 1962, 1964(C); 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331, 1332, 1337].

Federal Procedural Forms § 20:213, Sealed Indictment [18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961 to 1963; 21 U.S.C.A. § 853(P); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2461(C)].

Federal Procedural Forms § 20:215, Information--Criminal Enterprise and Conspiracy [18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1959, 1961].

Federal Procedural Forms § 20:930, Criminal Forfeiture.

Federal Procedural Forms § 40:882, Complaint--Rico Conspiracy and Violations of Fair Labor Standards Act- -Harboring, Transporting and Encouraging Unauthorized Aliens [8 U.S.C.A. § 1324; 18 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 1584, 1956, 1961...

Federal Procedural Forms § 40:883, Complaint--Rico Conspiracy and Violations of Fair Labor Standards Act- -Recruiting Unauthorized Aliens to Work in Trucking Industry [8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1324, 1324a, B; 18 U.S.C.A. App. §§ 1546...

Federal Procedural Forms § 12:152, Allegation in Complaint--Treble Damages for Churning of Commodities Accounts--Proceeding Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) [18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961, 1962...

Federal Procedural Forms § 46:369, Plaintiffs' Response--In Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and Motion for More Definite Statement and Incorporated Memorandum of Law [Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(B)(6), (E)].

Securities Litigation: Forms and Analysis App 4, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et Seq.

Securities Litigation: Forms and Analysis § 3:36, Fraud in Sale of Securities.

3 West's Federal Forms § 2844, Civil Rico Case Statement Order.

5 West's Federal Forms § 7248, Conspiracy to Violate and Violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) (18 U.S.C. § 1962).

2B West's Federal Forms § 1774, Introduction.

2B West's Federal Forms § 1775, Scheme to Defraud and to Steal Jewels.

2B West's Federal Forms § 1776, Extortion, Assault, and Other Illegal Activities.

2B West's Federal Forms § 1777, Scheme to Defraud and Procure Secret Profits.

2C West's Federal Forms § 2234, Complaint for Fraud--Rico Allegations.

5A West's Federal Forms § 8416, Motion for Restraining Order.

26 West's Legal Forms § 3.370, Remedies.

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Adjoining Landowners § 117, Complaint, Petition, or Declaration--Pollution and Dam- ages Caused by Landfill--Class Action.

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Banks § 22, Complaint, Petition, or Declaration--By Bank Against Lending and Bank Officers--Wrongful Conduct in Origination of Mortgage Loans and Falsifying Data on Loan Applications.

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Conversion § 105, Complaint in Federal Court--Diversity of Citizenship--By Receiver of Subsidiary Corporation Against Controlling Shareholder and Director of Parent Corporation--Conversion of Check...

Am. Jur. Pl & Pr Forms Fidelity Bonds & Insurance § 8.50, Complaint in Federal Court--Diversity of Citizen- ship--By Surety--For Recovery of Amounts Paid on Bond Due to Employee Misconduct Including Theft, Fraud, and Rico...

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Gambling § 23.50, Complaint in Federal Court--Against On-Line Poker Provider- -Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Negligence, Fraud, and Other Claims--By On-Line Poker Players.

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Gambling § 23.70, Complaint in Federal Court--Class Action--To Recover Electronic Gaming Machine Losses--Illegal Gaming Operations at Dog Racing Establishment.

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Hospitals § 153, Complaint in Federal Court--Failure to Provide Medical Care- -Suspect Marketing, Billing, Accounting and Tax Practices--Rico--Pendent State Claims of Statutory Consumer Fraud, Common...

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Physicians Surgeons & Healers § 201, Complaint in Federal Court--Diversity of Cit- izenship--Negligent Spinal Surgeries and Post-Operation Physical Therapy--Conspiracy to Defraud- -Unnecessary Surgery and Care--Treble...

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Products Liability § 314, Complaint in Federal Court--Diversity of Citizenship--By Counties--Against Manufacturers of Cigarettes and Trade Associations--Fraud and Misrepresentation--Breach of Express...

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Securities Regulation § 60, Complaint in Federal District Court--Action by Investor Against Broker-Dealer Firm and Employee of Firm for Churning Customer's Account--Allegations--Violations of Racketeer...

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Securities Regulation § 86, Complaint in Federal Court--Action by Shareholders Against Directors--For Violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act...

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Securities Regulation § 117, Complaint in Federal Court--By Receiver- -Dischargeability of Debt Related to Securities Fraud and Rico Offenses.

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Stock & Commodity Exchanges § 62, Complaint in Federal Court--Allegation--Treble Damages for Churning of Commodities Accounts--Proceeding Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act...

Am. Jur. Pl. & Pr. Forms Telecommunications § 71, Complaint in Federal Court--By Television Cable Com- pany--Against Private Individual--For Injunctive Relief and Damages--For “Stealing” Cable Television Signals.

Treatises and Practice Aids

Bankruptcy Service Lawyers Edition § 11:7, Text of Statute.

Bankruptcy Service Lawyers Edition § 15:59, Rico Actions.

Bankruptcy Service Lawyers Edition § 29:115, Defenses.

Bankruptcy Service Lawyers Edition § 45:690, Relation to Independent Actions and Proceedings.

Bankruptcy Service Lawyers Edition § 45:696, Particular Applications--Request Time-Barred.

Callmann on Unfair Compet., TMs, & Monopolies § 2:40, Unlawful Conduct of Business.

Callmann on Unfair Compet., TMs, & Monopolies § 14:43, Remedies--Criminal Sanctions.

Callmann on Unfair Compet., TMs, & Monopolies § 22:33, Counterfeiting--Criminal Liability.

Callmann on Unfair Compet., TMs, & Monopolies § 22:34, Counterfeiting--Civil Liability.

Emp. Discrim. Coord. Analysis of Related Issues § 1:47, Federal Statutory Protection.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 4:8, Arbitration of Federal Statutory Claims.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 9:12, Other U.S. Code Provisions.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 22:74, Other Particular Offenses.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 51:95, Effect of Dismissal.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:132, Overview.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:136, Actions Involving Extraterritorial Conduct.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:162, was Plaintiff's Injury Proximately Caused by Defendant's Viola- tion?

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:170, Use or Investment Test for 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(A) Violation.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:172, Conspiracy to Violate Rico.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:183, Foreign Governments.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:215, Under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(A) or (B) “Person” May be Enterprise.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:216, Under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(C), Alleging Enterprise Distinct from “Person”.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:219, “Association-In-Fact”.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:223, Specificity Required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(B).

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:230, Relatedness and Continuity Requirements.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:236, Overt Act in Furtherance of Conspiracy.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:243, Burden of Proof.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:248, Pattern; Continuity.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:250, Conspiracy.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 10:261, Costs and Attorney's Fees.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 20:587, Contracts--For Arbitration.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 22:257, Contents of Application--Particular Facts and Circumstances Jus- tifying Order.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 22:305, Disclosure of Communications Not Related to Offenses Specified in Authorization--Communications Evidencing Rico Offenses.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 22:711, Performance in Presenting Appeal.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 22:877, What Constitutes Surplusage.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 47:143, Civil Remedies.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 51:250, Summary Judgment.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 63:435, Double Jeopardy.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 8:1542, Actions for Violations of Federal Statutes Governing Banks.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 8:1569, Numerosity.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 8:1575, Applicability of Actions of Party Opposing Class to All Class Members.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 8:1576, Predominance of Common Questions of Law or Fact.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 22:1058, Duplicity in Rico Charge.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 22:1061, Multiplicity--Rico Counts.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 22:1073, Rico Conspiracy.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 22:1088, Defendant's Burden of Showing Prejudice.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 22:1103, Rico Conspiracy.

Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 22:1630, Inclusion of an Order to Limit Criminal Association of Organ- ized Crime and Drug Offenders.

Handbook of Federal Evidence § 404:5, Rule 404(B)(2): Crimes, Wrongs or Other Acts.

Handbook of Federal Evidence § 702:6, Subjects of Expert Testimony.

Handbook of Federal Evidence § 803:22, Rule 803(22): Judgment of a Previous Conviction; Other Adjudica- tions.

Immigration Law Service 2d § 1:30, Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996--Title II: Additional Enforcement Issues.

Immigration Law Service 2d § 1:79, Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2003.

McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 30:116, Federal Criminal Counterfeiting Act: Overview of the Criminal Statute.

6 Newberg on Class Actions § 21:1, Consumer Class Actions: Introduction.

6 Newberg on Class Actions § 21:30, Consumer Fraud or Misrepresentation Class Actions.

Norton Creditor's Rights Handbook § 8:10, Theories of Lender Liability--Statutory Causes of Action.

Patent Law Fundamentals § 4:14, Unfair (Improper) Means--Tort.

Patent Law Fundamentals § 5:63, Rights Against Infringement--Remedies--Criminal Responsibility.

Patent Law Fundamentals § 6:87, Exploiting Copyrights--Recourse Against Infringement--Remedies--Criminal Responsibility.

Securities and Federal Corporate Law § 13:53, Rico Non-Alternative.

Securities and Federal Corporate Law § 13:56, Rico Non-Alternative--Rico and the Applicable Statute of Limit- ations.

Securities and Federal Corporate Law § 16:185, Rico and Other PSLRA Litigation-Related Provisions.

Securities Crimes § 2:1, Introduction.

Securities Crimes § 5:2, Applicability and Operation.

Securities Crimes § 5:3, Pattern of Racketeering Activity.

Securities Crimes § 5:4, The Rico Enterprise.

Securities Crimes § 1:37, Generally--Referrals for Criminal Prosecution--Informal.

Securities Crimes § 5:28, Introduction.

Securities Crimes App 14, U.S. Attorney's Application for Order Granting Use Immunity.

Securities Litigation: Damages § 22:1, Rico Securities Fraud.

Securities Litigation: Damages § 22:4, Rico Causation and Damages.

Securities Prac.: Fed. & State Enforcement, 2nd Ed § 7:34, Elements of Rico Violation.

Securities Prac.: Fed. & State Enforcement, 2nd Ed § 7:36, Civil Rico--Overview.

Securities Prac.: Fed. & State Enforcement, 2nd Ed App 7E, Order Regarding Rico Claim.

Securities: Public and Private Offerings § 12:19, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act.

Trade Secrets Law App M, U.S. Department of Justice Licensing Guidelines: 1995 Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property; 1988 Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations.

West's Federal Administrative Practice § 5459, FAA Authorization Act of 1994.

Wright & Miller: Federal Prac. & Proc. § 571, Background; History; Constitutionality.

Wright & Miller: Federal Prac. & Proc. § 3653, Actions Brought by the United States--Illustrative Cases.

Wright & Miller: Federal Prac. & Proc. § 3728, Removal of Particular Cases--Proceedings Under Other Statutes Providing for or Prohibiting Removal.

Wright & Miller: Federal Prac. & Proc. § 4511, The Erie Doctrine and Matters Not Directly Covered by the Civil Rules.

Wright & Miller: Federal Prac. & Proc. § 4518, Determining the Content of Federal Common Law--In General.

Wright & Miller: Federal Prac. & Proc. § 7063, Rule 803(22): Judgment of a Previous Conviction; Other Adju- dications.

Wright & Miller: Federal Prac. & Proc. § 1251.1, Statement of Particular Matters--Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).

NOTES OF DECISIONS

I. GENERALLY 1-40 II. RACKETEERING ACTIVITY 41-130 III. PATTERN OF RACKETEERING 131-220 IV. ENTERPRISE 221-290

I. GENERALLY

Abstention, generally 8a Bills of attainder, constitutionality 2 Constitutionality 1-5 Constitutionality - Generally 1 Constitutionality - Bills of attainder 2 Constitutionality - Double jeopardy 3 Constitutionality - Ex post facto laws 4 Constitutionality - Vague or overbroad legislation 5 Construction 6 Construction with other laws 7 Corporation, person 11 Doctor, person 10a Double jeopardy, constitutionality 3 Ex post facto laws, constitutionality 4 Extraterritoriality 16 Governmental entity, person 12 Juveniles 14 Offenses within section 18 Organized crime 15 Person 10-13 Person - Generally 10 Person - Corporation 11 Person - Doctor 10a Person - Governmental entity 12 Person - Realtor 10b Person - Reporter 10c Person - Unincorporated association 13 Predicate acts 17 Purpose 9 Realtor, person 10b Reporter, person 10c State regulation or control 8

Unincorporated association, person 13 Vague or overbroad legislation, constitutionality 5

1. Constitutionality--Generally

This chapter does not violate U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 9 and 10 by intruding upon state sovereignty, since this chapter proscribes furthering of the enterprise, not the predicate acts, and predicate acts are, in turn, proscribed by existing, enumerated state or federal laws. U. S. v. Martino, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1981, 648 F.2d 367, on reconsideration in part 650 F.2d 651, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 2006, 456 U.S. 943, 72 L.Ed.2d 465, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 2007, 456 U.S. 943, 72 L.Ed.2d 465, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 2020, 456 U.S. 949, 72 L.Ed.2d 474, on rehearing 681 F.2d 952, certiorari granted 103 S.Ct. 721, 459 U.S. 1101, 74 L.Ed.2d 948, affirmed 104 S.Ct. 296, 464 U.S. 16, 78 L.Ed.2d 17. Constitutional Law 1071; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 2; States 4.16(2)

This chapter is not repugnant to ban of U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 8 against cruel and unusual punishment because it may be applied to other than members of organized crime. U. S. v. Aleman, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1979, 609 F.2d 298, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 1345, 445 U.S. 946, 63 L.Ed.2d 780. Sentencing And Punishment 1453

Text of proposed preamble and corrective statements tobacco companies were required to issue to general public, following court's determination that they had violated, and were likely to continue to violate Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by deliberately deceiving public about the health effects of smoking and nicotine, were aimed at correcting misleading speech and preventing deception of consumers, as required for review of commercial speech under First Amendment pursuant to “reasonably related” standard set forth in Zauderer; although defendants claimed that statements were inappropriately motivated by government's desire to urge smokers to quit, statements contained nothing about choices of individual smokers to either quit or continue smoking. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., D.D.C.2012, 907 F.Supp.2d 1. Constitutional Law 1624

Lack of jury trial in United States' prior action against tobacco manufacturer alleging violations of Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) based on its marketing of light cigarettes counseled against application of offensive nonmutual issue preclusion to establish manufacturer's liability in consumer's state law action alleging that manufacturer falsely represented that its light cigarettes were lower in tar and nicotine than its regular cigarettes, where prior action only involved equitable relief and was tried only to court in bench trial, and consumer sought punitive damages. Shaffer v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., D.Ariz.2012, 860 F.Supp.2d 991. Judgment 644; Judgment 713(1)

Adjudication of claims of Iraqi nationals and estates of nineteen deceased Iraqi nationals against eleven business entities, and one individual who allegedly owned and operated one of entities, alleging that nationals were killed or seriously injured by defendants, in violation of Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO), while defendants provided security services for United States government would not require second-guessing the battlefield procedures, plans, or decisions of the United States Armed Forces, or of any government entity, and thus, claims were not barred by political question doctrine; plaintiffs' allegations did not indicate that claims depended in any way on any determinations made by federal government,

defendants were not acting as United States employees if they committed alleged conduct, and defendants were under direct supervision of entities' management when alleged conduct occurred. In re XE Services Alien Tort Litigation, E.D.Va.2009, 665 F.Supp.2d 569. Constitutional Law 2588

Eleventh Amendment immunity barred former California Highway Patrol (CHP) employee from holding CHP and former State Compensation Insurance Fund (SCIF) employee working as Staff Service Manager (SSM) of Disability and Retirement Section (DRS) at CHP, in his official capacity, liable under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Vierria v. California Highway Patrol, E.D.Cal.2009, 644 F.Supp.2d 1219. Federal Courts 269

Some inconvenience to speech is caused by all laws, including Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and inevitable inconvenience to free speech that law engenders cannot by itself be basis for avoiding liability. Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Intern. Union, E.D.Va.2008, 585 F.Supp.2d 789. Constitutional Law 1490; Constitutional Law 1545

Disgorgement of ill-gotten proceeds was not “punishment,” and thus United States' action under Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) seeking disgorgement of profits obtained by cigarette manufacturers as result of alleged conspiracy to deceive American public did not implicate Excessive Fines Clause. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA, D.D.C.2004, 310 F.Supp.2d 58. Fines 1.3; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 83

Tenth Amendment did not preclude federal government from regulating solid waste industry in New York through civil RICO statute; that application of RICO statute was not destructive of New York's state sovereignty on basis that it interfered with matter “traditionally” relegated to state police power. U.S. v. Private Sanitation Industry Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1992, 793 F.Supp. 1114. States 4.16(2)

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) is specifically targeted at organized crime and its infiltration of unions and it does not attempt to proscribe lawful speech and association. U.S. v. District Council of New York City and Vicinity of United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America, S.D.N.Y.1991, 778 F.Supp. 738. Constitutional Law 1449; Constitutional Law 1800; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Where Congress had power under commerce clause, U.S.C.A. Const. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, to regulate particular racketeering activities, power to do so was not one which was reserved to the states, or to the people, and thus exercise of power was not violative of U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 9 or 10. U.S. v. Vignola, E.D.Pa.1979, 464 F.Supp. 1091, affirmed 605 F.2d 1199, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 1015, 444 U.S. 1072, 62 L.Ed.2d 753. Commerce 82.6; States 4.4(3)

Congress is constitutionally entitled to make two crimes within a specified period of time and in course of a particular type of enterprise a “pattern” of prohibited racketeering activity an independent criminal offense punishable more severely than simply twice the penalty for each constituent offense. U. S. v. Field, S.D.N.Y.1977, 432

F.Supp. 55, affirmed 578 F.2d 1371, certiorari dismissed 99 S.Ct. 43, 439 U.S. 801, 58 L.Ed.2d 94. Sentencing And Punishment 559(1)

2. ---- Bills of attainder, constitutionality

This chapter relies upon acts which might have taken place prior to its effective date but, in view of definition requiring one act of racketeering activity after effective date, avoids prohibition against bills of attainder. U. S. v. Campanale, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1975, 518 F.2d 352, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 777, 423 U.S. 1050, 46 L.Ed.2d 638, rehearing denied 96 S.Ct. 1422, 424 U.S. 950, 47 L.Ed.2d 356. Constitutional Law 1100(1); Constitutional Law 2802; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

3. ---- Double jeopardy, constitutionality

Conviction of defendants for both unlawful debt collection under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) and operating illegal gambling business in violation of federal statute did not violate double jeopardy clause; elements of proof of offenses differed, even though collection of debts was necessary part of gambling operation. U.S. v. Aucoin, C.A.5 (La.) 1992, 964 F.2d 1492, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 661, 506 U.S. 1023, 121 L.Ed.2d 587. Double Jeopardy 151(4)

Fact that a defendant was acquitted in state court of a murder did not preclude federal authorities from charging that very same offense as a predicate act in a subsequent Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) action, absent any evidence supporting defendant's claim that state prosecutors were not acting independently when they indicted and prosecuted him. U.S. v. Coonan, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1991, 938 F.2d 1553, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 1486, 503 U.S. 941, 117 L.Ed.2d 628. Double Jeopardy 186

Government's reliance on defendant's prior conviction for conspiring to transport stolen property as predicate offense of indictment under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) did not violate double jeopardy clause, though indictment did not allege any post conviction unlawful conduct or accumulation of evidence establishing second predicate offense, especially where defendant was charged with numerous other racketeering acts in indictment. U.S. v. Bellomo, S.D.N.Y.1997, 954 F.Supp. 630. Double Jeopardy 151(4)

4. ---- Ex post facto laws, constitutionality

Defendant's conviction for conspiracy to violate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) arising from alleged scheme to defraud Mississippi casino did not violate ex post facto clause to extent that underlying offenses occurred prior to Mississippi's enactment of statutes that prohibited cheating at gambling games and marking or altering of gaming equipment or devices, given absence of showing that cheating at gambling was legal in Mississippi prior to statutes' enactment. U.S. v. Vaccaro, C.A.5 (Miss.) 1997, 115 F.3d 1211, certiorari denied 118 S.Ct. 689, 522 U.S. 1047, 139 L.Ed.2d 635. Conspiracy 23.5; Constitutional Law 2802

Where several acts of racketeering were alleged to have occurred after effective date of this chapter and where jury was specifically instructed that to convict under this chapter, jury had to have been shown that defendants

were involved in commitment of at least one act of racketeering after effective date of this chapter, racketeering convictions were not precluded by ex post facto clause of United States Constitution. U. S. v. Brown, C.A.5 (Ga.) 1977, 555 F.2d 407, rehearing denied 559 F.2d 29, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 1448, 435 U.S. 904, 55 L.Ed.2d 494. Constitutional Law 2802; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

This chapter relies upon acts which might have taken place prior to its effective date but, in view of definition requiring one act of racketeering activity after effective date, avoids prohibition against ex post facto laws. U. S. v. Campanale, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1975, 518 F.2d 352, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 777, 423 U.S. 1050, 46 L.Ed.2d 638, rehearing denied 96 S.Ct. 1422, 424 U.S. 950, 47 L.Ed.2d 356. Constitutional Law 1100(1); Constitutional Law 2802; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Disgorgement of profits sought by United States in action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) against cigarette manufacturers was not properly characterized as punishment, and thus Ex Post Facto Clause did not bar disgorgement of profits deriving from conduct that occurred before RICO's effective date, where RICO applied only if conduct in question was not completed until after statute's effective date. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA, D.D.C.2004, 310 F.Supp.2d 58. Constitutional Law 2802; Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 83

There was no ex post facto problem with using racketeering acts committed by defendant prior to amendment to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) that expanded number of acts which would satisfy definition of racketeering activity to support defendant's conviction for committing violent crime in aid of racketeering activity, if proof that defendant committed racketeering acts were requirement for conviction. U.S. v. Garfinkle, D.Nev.1993, 842 F.Supp. 1284, affirmed 67 F.3d 1421, denial of habeas corpus affirmed 125 F.3d 859. Constitutional Law 2812; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Par. (5) of this section defining a prohibited pattern of racketeering activity is not violative of constitutional ban on ex post facto laws as permitting a defendant to be charged with acts committed prior to its effective date, where one who has committed acts of racketeering activity prior to that date is on notice that commission of a further such act within prohibition of par. (5) will subject him to liability for a new offense and, thus, has notice necessary to conform his actions to requirements of par. (5). U. S. v. Field, S.D.N.Y.1977, 432 F.Supp. 55, affirmed 578 F.2d 1371, certiorari dismissed 99 S.Ct. 43, 439 U.S. 801, 58 L.Ed.2d 94. Constitutional Law 2802; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Where indictment made it clear that a number of acts alleged to be “racketeering activities” occurred after effective date of this chapter, operation of this chapter to entirety of defendant's scheme involving alleged racketeering activities did not constitute ex post facto operation of this chapter. U.S. v. Mandel, D.C.Md.1976, 415 F.Supp. 997, supplemented 415 F.Supp. 1025. Constitutional Law 2802; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

5. ---- Vague or overbroad legislation, constitutionality

Term “enterprise” as used in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act was not unconstitutionally

vague as applied to legislative aide's conduct in accepting payment for shepherding special legislation through California legislature; statute adequately warned aide and other government employees of their association with each other and legislature constituted RICO enterprise. U.S. v. Freeman, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1993, 6 F.3d 586, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 1661, 511 U.S. 1077, 128 L.Ed.2d 378, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 2177, 511 U.S. 1147, 128 L.Ed.2d 896. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

“Enterprise” requirement of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to conduct of defendant borough officials who solicited and accepted bribes in connection with public matters and received substantial kickbacks from companies for steering public works contracts in their direction; statute accurately warned defendants that their association with each other and office of mayor and Department of Public Works constituted a RICO enterprise. U.S. v. Dischner, C.A.9 (Alaska) 1992, 974 F.2d 1502, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 1290, 507 U.S. 923, 122 L.Ed.2d 682. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was not void for vagueness on ground that identical gambling offenses could be treated entirely different depending on whether government elected to prosecute individual under pattern of racketeering prong of RICO or unlawful debt collection prong of RICO; Congress decided that collection aspect warranted greater penalty, and fact that another federal statute was available for prosecution of collection aspect was irrelevant. U.S. v. Aucoin, C.A.5 (La.) 1992, 964 F.2d 1492, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 661, 506 U.S. 1023, 121 L.Ed.2d 587. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act's enterprise requirement was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to a defendant who had more than adequate notice that enterprise in which he participated was one covered by the statute; enterprise engaged in loansharking, extortion, murder and drug dealing activities. U.S. v. Coonan, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1991, 938 F.2d 1553, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 1486, 503 U.S. 941, 117 L.Ed.2d 628. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), as applied to conduct of first defendant, who was lawyer, and second and third defendants, who belonged to police departments, was not unconstitutionally vague; evidence indicated that informal consortium of law firm and police departments was organized for purpose of providing law business to firm and protecting firm's clients. U.S. v. Masters, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1991, 924 F.2d 1362, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 2019, 500 U.S. 919, 114 L.Ed.2d 105, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 86, 502 U.S. 823, 116 L.Ed.2d 58. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

RICO statute, by adopting laws of states in defining “racketeering activity,” [18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1)], is not void for vagueness. U.S. v. Tripp, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1986, 782 F.2d 38, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 1656, 475 U.S. 1128, 90 L.Ed.2d 199. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

This chapter is not unconstitutionally vague. U. S. v. Martino, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1981, 648 F.2d 367, on reconsideration in part 650 F.2d 651, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 2006, 456 U.S. 943, 72 L.Ed.2d 465, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 2007, 456 U.S. 943, 72 L.Ed.2d 465, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 2020, 456 U.S. 949, 72 L.Ed.2d 474, on rehearing 681 F.2d 952, certiorari granted 103 S.Ct. 721, 459 U.S. 1101, 74 L.Ed.2d 948, affirmed 104 S.Ct.

296, 464 U.S. 16, 78 L.Ed.2d 17.

Defendants lacked standing to challenge language “racketeering activity” of this chapter as unconstitutionally vague. U. S. v. Uni Oil, Inc., C.A.5 (Tex.) 1981, 646 F.2d 946, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1254, 455 U.S. 908, 71 L.Ed.2d 446. Constitutional Law 739

This chapter was not unconstitutionally vague; the requirement under this section that each defendant be guilty of two acts of racketeering activity rebutted the argument that a “status” crime was involved. U. S. v. Swiderski, C.A.D.C.1978, 593 F.2d 1246, 193 U.S.App.D.C. 92, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 2055, 441 U.S. 933, 60 L.Ed.2d 662, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 2056, 441 U.S. 933, 60 L.Ed.2d 662. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 2

This chapter is not unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous in view of this section's definitions; concept of affecting interstate or foreign commerce is so well imbedded in federal law as not to mislead anyone who desires to conform his conduct to requirements of law. U. S. v. Campanale, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1975, 518 F.2d 352, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 777, 423 U.S. 1050, 46 L.Ed.2d 638, rehearing denied 96 S.Ct. 1422, 424 U.S. 950, 47 L.Ed.2d 356. Constitutional Law 4509(6); Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Pattern of racketeering activity element, as incorporated by reference to provision in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), was not unconstitutionally vague, since element was not too broad to give reasonable person notice of prohibited conduct, RICO's substantive provisions described prohibited activity with sufficient particularity, and any ambiguity was cured by RICO provision defining pattern of racketeering activity with reference to definite number of acts of racketeering activity within specified time periods. Buchanan County, Virginia v. Blankenship, W.D.Va.2008, 545 F.Supp.2d 553. Constitutional Law 1133; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act's (RICO) prohibition against engaging in “pattern of racketeering activity” was not void for vagueness as applied to defendant accused of establishing large marijuana trafficking enterprise, providing front jobs to members of organization, and distributing marijuana on behalf of enterprise; indictment alleged numerous acts, all with purpose of making money from large-scale distribution of marijuana, and alleged that criminal acts were so numerous and so consistent over period of years as to constitute enterprise's regular way of doing business. U.S. v. Haworth, D.N.M.1996, 941 F.Supp. 1057. Constitutional Law 4509(6); Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Provision of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) defining racketeering activity as act “chargeable under state law” was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant charged with RICO violation based on state law murder, armed robbery, arson, and conspiracy offenses; such conduct was generically chargeable under state law. U.S. v. Wei, S.D.N.Y.1994, 862 F.Supp. 1129. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act's (RICO's) pattern requirement is not unconstitutionally

vague. American Credit Indem. Co. v. Legge, S.D.N.Y.1993, 829 F.Supp. 649. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 2

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) statute and its pattern of racketeering activity requirement were not unconstitutionally vague as applied to deceased singer's former legal and financial advisors in civil RICO action brought by singer's estate. Bingham v. Zolt, S.D.N.Y.1993, 823 F.Supp. 1126, affirmed 66 F.3d 553, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 1418, 517 U.S. 1134, 134 L.Ed.2d 543, rehearing denied 116 S.Ct. 1891, 517 U.S. 1240, 135 L.Ed.2d 185, rehearing denied 116 S.Ct. 1870, 517 U.S. 1230, 134 L.Ed.2d 967. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) pattern element is not unconstitutionally vague. U.S. v. Private Sanitation Industry Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1992, 793 F.Supp. 1114. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was not unconstitutionally vague, in violation of due process, as applied to defendant who was alleged, civil action, to have used the mails and wires to execute several schemes to defraud plaintiffs, in a commercial setting in which defendant was officer of a financial institution. Schrag v. Dinges, D.Kan.1992, 788 F.Supp. 1543. Constitutional Law 4509(6); Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to real estate association, officers of association, insurance consultant, and officers of consultant, which allegedly caused administrator of group health insurance plan to develop and administer program and then allegedly terminated administrator without reimbursing it for costs advanced or administrative fees, where violation of RICO was predicated on underlying mail fraud statute, and association, officers of association, consultant, and officers of consultant did not argue that underlying mail fraud statute was unconstitutionally vague. Patrick Carter Asso- ciates, Inc. v. Rent Stabilization Ass'n of N.Y.C., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1991, 781 F.Supp. 207. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act's (RICO's) pattern requirement was not unconstitutionally vague, where courts were not confounded in fruitless attempts to provide clarity and predictability with respect to this element of RICO. Farberware, Inc. v. Groben, S.D.N.Y.1991, 764 F.Supp. 296. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act's (RICO) pattern element was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendant who was executive director of nonprofit corporation who allegedly engaged in acts of mail and wire fraud and embezzlement; defendant allegedly used his position to defraud a company and city on several occasions, alleged fraudulent scheme contained similar participants, victims, method of commission, and results, and alleged predicate acts of mail and wire fraud and embezzlement occurred over substantial period of time. U.S. v. Quintanilla, N.D.Ill.1991, 760 F.Supp. 687, affirmed 2 F.3d 1469. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 2

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act's (RICO) “pattern” requirement, made up of continuity and relationship components, was not unconstitutionally vague as applied to defendants who allegedly were members of street gang involved in extensive drug conspiracy; alleged gang was wholly criminal organization, thus satisfying relationship requirement, and indictment alleged that street gang had in various forms been in existence for over 20 years, that each defendant was associated with organization for a number of years, and that each defendant was involved in at least one conspiracy to murder in order to protect drug activity, thus satisfying continuity requirement. U.S. v. Andrews, N.D.Ill.1990, 749 F.Supp. 1520. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 2

The “pattern of racketeering activity” requirement of a civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action was not unconstitutionally vague insofar as applied in an action for alleged fraudulent conduct in a business relationship; allegations, if proven, would satisfy pattern requirement regardless of narrow- ness of interpretation placed on the term “pattern” and involved a scenario likely to be among those typical situations envisioned as being within scope of RICO. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Mutual Trading Corp., N.D.Ill.1990, 749 F.Supp. 869. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was not void for vagueness as applied to defendant, a trustee of an employee welfare plan, who was being prosecuted for the plan's payment of legal fees of union president in criminal prosecution; there was no First Amendment concern where the charges did not implicate the defendant's ability to associate with other trustees for purpose of carrying out legitimate business, and defendant did not meet burden of establishing that RICO definition of “pattern” was vague as applied to him. U.S. v. Busacca, N.D.Ohio 1990, 739 F.Supp. 370, affirmed 936 F.2d 232, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 595, 502 U.S. 985, 116 L.Ed.2d 619. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute was not unconstitutionally vague as applied in case involving predicate offenses of mail and wire fraud, in use of terms “pattern of racketeering activity,” “enterprise,” and “association.” U.S. v. Paccione, S.D.N.Y.1990, 738 F.Supp. 691. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

That label “racketeering activity” within par. (5) of this section defining a prohibited pattern of racketeering activity did not come into existence until passage of this chapter in no way renders this chapter ambiguous on ground that no acts of a criminal nature could have possibly occurred before passage of this chapter because term “racketeering activity” was itself a construct of this chapter. U. S. v. Field, S.D.N.Y.1977, 432 F.Supp. 55, affirmed 578 F.2d 1371, certiorari dismissed 99 S.Ct. 43, 439 U.S. 801, 58 L.Ed.2d 94. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

6. Construction

This chapter is a remedial chapter which is to be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes. U. S. v. Mazzio, E.D.Pa.1980, 501 F.Supp. 340, affirmed 681 F.2d 810, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 2961, 457 U.S. 1134, 73 L.Ed.2d 1351. Commerce 82.6

Statutes which proscribe criminal activity should be strictly construed against ambiguity, and liberal construction clause, Pub.L. 91-452, Title IX, § 904(a), Oct. 15, 1970, 84 Stat. 941, set out as a note under this section, would have to be ignored when the statute to be interpreted proscribes activities or provides for forfeiture of interests acquired or maintained in violation of the proscribed activities, but since membership alone in an enterprise as defined in par. (4) of this section is not proscribed criminal activity, there is no due process requirement that the enterprise definition be strictly construed. U. S. v. Thevis, N.D.Ga.1979, 474 F.Supp. 134, affirmed 665 F.2d 616, rehearing denied 671 F.2d 1379, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 2300, 456 U.S. 1008, 73 L.Ed.2d 1303, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 3489, 458 U.S. 1109, 73 L.Ed.2d 1370, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 57, 459 U.S. 825, 74 L.Ed.2d 61. Constitutional Law 4509(6); Criminal Law 12.7(2); Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 2

This chapter is “plain on its face” and recourse to legislative history is unnecessary. U.S. v. Vignola, E.D.Pa.1979, 464 F.Supp. 1091, affirmed 605 F.2d 1199, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 1015, 444 U.S. 1072, 62 L.Ed.2d 753. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

7. Construction with other laws

Former restaurant employees' allegations that employers not only knowingly employed illegal aliens, but also that they provided the aliens with social security numbers and names, and paid them in cash in order to conceal, harbor, and shield the aliens from detection, stated a civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) predicate act for violation of statute criminalizing the concealing, harboring, or shielding of an alien from detection. Edwards v. Prime, Inc., C.A.11 (Ala.) 2010, 602 F.3d 1276. Aliens, Immigration, And Citizen- ship 778

Attorney's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against his former law partners, though lacking in merit, was not so utterly frivolous as to deprive the federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction; claim was weak mainly because only plausible allegations of predicate acts were barred by res judicata and all allegations were barred by Illinois's one-refiling rule, and these were affirmative defenses that could form the basis of a motion for judgment on the pleadings, which was a ruling on the merits. Carr v. Tillery, C.A.7 (Ill.) 2010, 591 F.3d 909, rehearing denied, on remand 2010 WL 1963398. Federal Courts 13

Claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), that insurer discontinued payment of long-term disability (LTD) benefits as part of racketeering scheme involving intentional and illegal policy of rejecting expensive payouts to disabled insureds, would not impair New Jersey's state insurance scheme, and thus McCarran-Ferguson Act reverse-preemption did not apply, since state's scheme was not intended to be exclusive in light of available state common law and statutory remedies, RICO would not disturb or interfere with state insurance regime, and RICO's provisions supplemented available state statutory and common-law claims for relief. Weiss v. First Unum Life Ins. Co., C.A.3 (N.J.) 2007, 482 F.3d 254, on remand 2008 WL 755958. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 55; States 18.41

Federal district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of 16 uncharged robberies in prosecution for racketeering, conspiracy and murder in aid of racketeering; evidence was relevant to central issues of trial, namely existence of criminal enterprise and conspiracy, uncharged conduct was less inflammatory than charged

conduct, and court delivered appropriate limiting instructions. U.S. v. Baez, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2003, 349 F.3d 90, post-conviction relief denied 533 F.Supp.2d 359. Criminal Law 368.77; Criminal Law 368.85

The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) confers subject-matter jurisdiction upon the district court over civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) claims against foreign states, their agencies, and instrumentalities, provided that the commercial activity exception, or another exception contained in the FSIA, applies. Southway v. Central Bank of Nigeria, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1999, 198 F.3d 1210, on remand 149 F.Supp.2d 1268. International Law 10.30; International Law 10.33; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 55

Indictments of employers and their owners for violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), predicated on alleged acts of mail fraud against unions and employees, were not preempted by federal labor law, even assuming that alleged acts underlying indictments constituted unfair labor practices; purpose of indictments was not to remedy labor dispute but to prosecute alleged criminal conduct, and the criminal prosecution did not impair labor policy. U.S. v. Palumbo Bros., Inc., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1998, 145 F.3d 850, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied, certiorari denied 119 S.Ct. 375, 525 U.S. 949, 142 L.Ed.2d 310, certiorari denied 119 S.Ct. 376, 525 U.S. 949, 142 L.Ed.2d 310. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 12 ; States 18.15

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against insurer and its employees, challenging activities surrounding sale and marketing of insurance plan, alleged “churning” trades, and management's alleged organized intimidation of sales agents, did not “invalidate, impair, or supersede” Pennsylvania's Unfair Insurance Practices Act (UIPA), and thus was not precluded by McCarran-Ferguson Act; RICO's grant of a liberal federal remedy to victims of organized crime was not inconsistent with the stated purpose of UIPA. Sabo v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., C.A.3 (Pa.) 1998, 137 F.3d 185, certiorari denied 119 S.Ct. 918, 525 U.S. 1129, 142 L.Ed.2d 915. Insurance 1104; States 18.41

Indian Major Crimes Act did not preclude court's exercise of jurisdiction over Indian juvenile charged with conspiracy to participate in racketeering enterprise, in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), even though offense was committed on reservation. U.S. v. Juvenile Male, C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1997, 118 F.3d 1344. Indians 274(4)

Government may prosecute under RICO for conduct that amounts to pattern of racketeering activity in connection with enterprise, and may also prosecute under statute prohibiting violent crimes in aid of racketeering activity for those crimes intended to permit defendant to maintain or increase his position within RICO enterprise. U.S. v. Concepcion, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1992, 983 F.2d 369, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 163, 510 U.S. 856, 126 L.Ed.2d 124, post-conviction relief dismissed 181 F.Supp.2d 206. Criminal Law 29(5.5)

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act complaint alleging underlying felonies of mail and wire fraud and extortion based upon termination of boat pilots' employment because of union activities, and upon actions threatening, coercing, and extorting pilots to accept working rules and wage agreements, were preempted by National Labor Relations Act; claims were clearly within National Labor Relations Board's jurisdiction, as

demonstrated by NLRB's determination in administrative action dealing with same claims. Brennan v. Chestnut, C.A.8 (Minn.) 1992, 973 F.2d 644. Labor And Employment 1676(1); Labor And Employment 1676(3)

This chapter was intended to augment other provisions of criminal law and not to limit or be limited by them. U. S. v. Angelilli, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1981, 660 F.2d 23, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1258, 455 U.S. 910, 71 L.Ed.2d 449, rehearing denied 102 S.Ct. 2024, 456 U.S. 951, 72 L.Ed.2d 476, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1442, 455 U.S. 945, 71 L.Ed.2d 657, rehearing denied 102 S.Ct. 1998, 456 U.S. 939, 72 L.Ed.2d 460, rehearing denied 102 S.Ct. 1999, 456 U.S. 939, 72 L.Ed.2d 460. Commerce 82.6; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Civilian government contractor employees and/or their survivors' claims that government contractors and their insurance carriers violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) were barred, where allegations that formed basis of the RICO claim, that defendants conspired to commit crimes under the Defense Base Act (DBA) by denying claims using fraud, were directly addressed by the comprehensive administrative procedures and remedies available under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), which was incorporated into the DBA. Brink v. XE Holding, LLC, D.D.C.2012, 910 F.Supp.2d 242. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 55; Workers' Compensation 2085

Merits of insurance subscribers' claims were intertwined with Article III standing issues presented by health insurer and its subsidiaries and affiliates, as required to survive factual attack on subscribers' standing, where subscribers asserted claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and Sherman Act, both of which provided for jurisdiction and for substantive claims themselves, and claims were not clearly frivolous or solely made for purpose of obtaining federal jurisdiction. In re WellPoint, Inc. Out-of-Network UCR Rates Litigation, C.D.Cal.2011, 865 F.Supp.2d 1002. Antitrust and Trade Regulation 960; Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 57

Employees' action against employers under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), alleging that employers did not pay employees overtime wages, was preempted by Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA); to recover under civil RICO for alleged substantive violations of FLSA would thwart Congress's care- ful, comprehensive scheme to remedy wage and hour violations falling within scope of FLSA. Gordon v. Kaleida Health, W.D.N.Y.2012, 847 F.Supp.2d 479. Labor and Employment 2362; Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 55

Court would not, under the primary jurisdiction doctrine, decline to exercise jurisdiction in a Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) suit brought by the United States against cigarette manufacturers and tobacco-related trade organizations, despite claim that any court-ordered relief would interfere with the implementation of the Food and Drug Administration's (FDA) expert regulatory judgment in implementing the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, and would potentially generate conflicting federal regulatory requirements; court had ample expertise to fashion a remedy that complied with RICO, and the FDA had no authority under Act to address RICO remedies. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., D.D.C.2011, 787 F.Supp.2d 68, affirmed 686 F.3d 832, 402 U.S.App.D.C. 34. Antitrust and Trade Regulation 283

Home purchasers' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against vendor, mortgage lender, and others, alleging that defendants obtained inflated appraisals for homes, in order to complete sales at above-market prices was not barred by Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), absent showing of in- consistencies between RICO and RESPA. Johnson v. KB Home, D.Ariz.2010, 720 F.Supp.2d 1109. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 55

Under Pennsylvania law, as predicted by district court, Title Insurance Companies Act (TICA) did not provide exclusive remedy for homeowners' claims against title insurer, and thus homeowners were not required to ex- haust administrative remedies prior to bringing action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), in which they alleged that insurer overcharged them by charging default “basic” rate for insurance rather than special discounted “reissue” or “refinance” rate that applied to kind of title insurance required as part of their mortgage transactions. Schwartz v. Lawyers Title Ins. Co., E.D.Pa.2010, 680 F.Supp.2d 690. Insurance 3545; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 55

It was inappropriate to dismiss claims, on forum non conveniens grounds, of Iraqi nationals and estates of 19 deceased Iraqi nationals in their actions against 11 business entities, and individual who allegedly owned and operated one of entities, alleging that nationals were killed or seriously injured by defendants in violation of Alien Tort Statute (ATS) and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) while defendants provided security services for United States government, since Iraqi courts would not hear claims arising out of conduct in actions; Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) order, which was incorporated into Iraqi law, immunized contractors from Iraqi legal process with respect to acts performed by them pursuant to terms and conditions of government contract, and Order protected defendants from civil liability in Iraqi courts. In re XE Services Alien Tort Litigation, E.D.Va.2009, 665 F.Supp.2d 569. Federal Courts 45

Only portion of tobacco vendor's proceeds that were attributable to sales of unstamped cigarettes that violated Contraband Cigarettes Trafficking Act (CCTA) were subject to forfeiture pursuant to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), despite government's contention that all of vendor's sales were subject to forfeiture, where racketeering activity that was part and parcel of RICO conspiracy conviction and lone predicate for RICO forfeiture was trafficking of contraband cigarettes. U.S. v. Morrison, E.D.N.Y.2009, 656 F.Supp.2d 338. Forfeitures 3

Automobile insurer's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against medical product retailers supplemented, rather than disturbed, New York's insurance regime, and thus were not preempted by New York's no-fault insurance law. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Grafman, E.D.N.Y.2009, 655 F.Supp.2d 212. Insurance 1103; States 18.41

Clear language of both Wire Act and Uruguay Round Agreements Act (URAA), under which Congress approved General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), entirely precluded application of either Charming Betsy canon or international comity, such that Wire Act would be narrowly construed to have neither extraterritorial reach nor application to online gambling, in prosecution for violations of Wire Act and Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); indictment alleged each of defendants' wire communications either originated or terminated within United States, and term “wire communications facility,” as used in Wire

Act provision, included online transmission instrumentalities. U.S. v. Lombardo, D.Utah 2007, 639 F.Supp.2d 1271. Gaming 63(2); International Law 7; International Law 10.1; Telecommunications 1348

The phrase “chargeable under State law” in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act's (RICO) definition of “racketeering” as offenses chargeable under state law does not require that the particular underlying conduct at issue could have been charged under state law, only that such conduct be chargeable as a general matter, i.e., that such conduct is criminal under state law; state offenses are included by generic designation, and references to state law serve merely a definitional purpose to identify generally the kind of activity made illegal by the federal statute. Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., N.D.Cal.2007, 481 F.Supp.2d 1010. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 6

Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) precluded securities fraud claims from serving as predicate acts under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and thus fraudulent advice provided by law firm to investors in connection with tax shelter strategy could not violate RICO, despite investors' contention that securities transactions they engaged in were wholly separate from allegedly fraudulent tax advice, where strategy required investors to acquire marketable securities, and investors presented strategy as single, unified product. Stechler v. Sidley, Austin Brown & Wood, L.L.P., S.D.N.Y.2005, 382 F.Supp.2d 580. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Defendants could be charged with money laundering, when they took money from legitimate businesses, placed funds in shell corporations, and then withdrew funds for purposes of paying undocumented aliens at substandard levels, achieving cost savings, despite claim that alleged laundering was integral part of criminal scheme, rather than simply mechanism for channeling of proceeds from illegal scheme. U.S. v. Maali, M.D.Fla.2005, 358 F.Supp.2d 1154, affirmed 502 F.3d 1281, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied 277 Fed.Appx. 977, 2008 WL 1991101, post-conviction relief denied 2009 WL 3055307. United States 34

General damages for injury to reputation under New York libel law were not independently recoverable under related Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, and thus were not subject to RICO trebling, where they did not reflect actual, out-of-pocket financial loss. Anglo-Iberia Underwriting Management Co. v. Lodderhose, S.D.N.Y.2003, 282 F.Supp.2d 126, as amended. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 85

Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) confers jurisdiction over civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations (RICO) actions against foreign sovereign, even though predicate acts for action are violations of federal criminal law. Southway v. Central Bank of Nigeria, D.Colo.1998, 994 F.Supp. 1299, affirmed and remanded 198 F.3d 1210, on remand 149 F.Supp.2d 1268. International Law 10.33

McCarran-Ferguson Act did not preempt claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) alleging fraudulent sales practices on part of life insurer. Dornberger v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., S.D.N.Y.1997, 961 F.Supp. 506. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Government was not required to comply with New York state statutory and constitutional requirements regarding corroboration of accomplice testimony in connection with Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) charges based on state law predicate crimes. U.S. v. Wei, S.D.N.Y.1994, 862 F.Supp. 1129. Crimin- al Law 510

Union member's racketeering claim against union was not preempted by NLRA, even though allegations could have been construed as alleging unfair labor practices in violation of NLRA; allegations could also have been construed as alleging violations of LMRDA, overlap did not necessitate finding of preemption, and allegations of LMRDA violations sufficed as predicate acts for RICO claim. O'Rourke v. Crosley, D.N.J.1994, 847 F.Supp. 1208. Labor And Employment 995

RICO claims alleging that insurer and its officers and directors engaged in pattern of making false and fraudulent representations to agents and general public was barred by McCarran-Ferguson Act; RICO is not specifically related to business of insurance, alleged fraudulent scheme to induce agents to continue to sell policies was within business of insurance, California has enacted laws governing unfair deceptive acts or practices, and application of federal RICO statute would impair state law. LeDuc v. Kentucky Cent. Life Ins. Co., N.D.Cal.1992, 814 F.Supp. 820. Insurance 1104

Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) and National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) did not preclude application of RICO against local union, where government sought direct equitable relief against union for its own alleged RICO violations. U.S. v. Private Sanitation Industry Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1992, 793 F.Supp. 1114. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 55

McCarran-Ferguson Act, a federal law regulating insurance industry, did not prevent insurer from bringing civil RICO action against his automobile insurer for allegedly conspiring with peer review organization to manipulate peer review process to deny benefit claims without regard to their merits, as such a scheme would have been outside scope of peer review process; McCarran-Ferguson Act barred insured from claiming only that parties' participation in peer review process was, in and of itself, a civil RICO violation. Elliott v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., E.D.Pa.1992, 786 F.Supp. 487. Conspiracy 8

McCarran-Ferguson Act did not bar Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and TILA claims arising out of alleged “insurance packing” which consisted of allegedly forcing borrowers to buy insurance on consumer loan; business of credit, not business of insurance, was at issue in borrowers' complaint. Elli- ott v. ITT Corp., N.D.Ill.1991, 764 F.Supp. 102. Consumer Credit 64.1; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 55

RICO should be read as limited by the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Act only when court would be forced to determine whether some portion of defendant's conduct violated labor law before RICO predicate act would be established. MHC, Inc. v. International Union, United Mine Workers of America, E.D.Ky.1988, 685 F.Supp. 1370. Labor And Employment 1671

Acts which were otherwise insufficient to constitute a viable cause of action for violation of statutory prohibition against fraudulent, manipulative and deceptive schemes in connection with sale or purchase of a security were also insufficient to establish predicate acts necessary to sustain a cause of action under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Cahill v. Arthur Andersen & Co., S.D.N.Y.1986, 659 F.Supp. 1115, affirmed 822 F.2d 14. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Par. (5) of this section providing that a proscribed “pattern of racketeering activity” requires at least two acts of racketeering activity within ten years of each other, one of which must have occurred after effective date of this chapter, is not violative of five-year federal statute of limitations for noncapital offenses, section 3282 of this title, as permitting prosecution for acts committed in 1968 and 1969 under an indictment returned on Dec. 10, 1976, where period of limitations, though clearly prohibiting government from charging defendant with separate violations occurring prior to date of indictment, did not bar prosecution for engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity when at least one of those acts took place within five-year period. U. S. v. Field, S.D.N.Y.1977, 432 F.Supp. 55, affirmed 578 F.2d 1371, certiorari dismissed 99 S.Ct. 43, 439 U.S. 801, 58 L.Ed.2d 94. Criminal Law 150

8. State regulation or control

Provision of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) declaring that RICO does not supersede any provision of state law affording additional civil remedies allows plaintiff to recover both treble damages under RICO and state law punitive damages for same course of conduct. Neibel v. Trans World Assur. Co., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1997, 108 F.3d 1123. Damages 15; Damages 87(1)

District court had authority, under Colorado Organized Crime Control Act (COCCA), to issue preliminary injunction freezing defendants' assets in advance of judgment on merits in purchaser of real property's action alleging defendants engaged in fraudulent financing scheme in violation of COCCA and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), even if injunction was not authorized under RICO and many COCCA provisions paralleled RICO, since language relating to pretrial injunctive relief had been broader in COCCA than it had been in RICO. Niemi v. Burgess, D.Colo.2012, 874 F.Supp.2d 1048, vacated 2013 WL 4767016. Injunction 1495

State, rather than federal law, controlled issue of vendors' entitlement to attorney fees pursuant to fee-shifting provision in real estate purchase agreement, even though vendors had removed purchasers' state court action against them to federal court on basis of purchasers' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims. Ozbakir v. Scotti, W.D.N.Y.2012, 906 F.Supp.2d 188. Federal Courts 415

Pennsylvania's Title Insurance Companies Act (TICA) did not create exclusive administrative remedy, and thus McCarran-Ferguson Act, which provided that no act of Congress was to be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any state law regulating business of insurance, did not preempt homeowners' action against title insurer under civil statute of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) arising from alleged overcharging for premiums. Schwartz v. Lawyers Title Ins. Co., E.D.Pa.2010, 680 F.Supp.2d 690. Insurance 1103; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 55; States 18.41

Construction of federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and Utah Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Enterprise Act and requirements for pleading are same. Bradford v. Moench, D.Utah 1987, 670 F.Supp. 920. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 100; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 102; Torts 436

Where state's complaint against drug manufacturer involved a federal question arising under the Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), case was not governed by Connecticut's statutory or common law privileges, including its physician-patient privilege; thus, medical records of Medicaid patients sought by manufacturer as relevant to its defense against state's claim for reimbursement of Medicaid payments were discoverable, with or without redaction, as there is no physician-patient privilege under federal law. In re Zyprexa Products Liability Litigation, E.D.N.Y.2008, 254 F.R.D. 50. Federal Courts 416; Privileged Communica- tions And Confidentiality 256

8a. Abstention, generally

Lawsuit filed by construction company in state court was not parallel to construction corporation's federal court action against former associates in construction, electrical subcontracting, and consulting industries, alleging violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and several other state law claims, as would warrant abstention under Colorado River doctrine; although federal action involved much of same factual material as state court suit, claims did not involve substantially the same legal issues, resolution of state court claims would not dispose of construction corporation's claims in federal court, and invocation of abstention doctrine would dismiss several federal defendants who were not parties to state action. DDR Const. Services, Inc. v. Siemens Industry, Inc., S.D.N.Y.2011, 770 F.Supp.2d 627, reconsideration denied 2012 WL 4711677. Federal Courts 47.1

Exceptional circumstances did not exist so as to justify the court's abstention of its jurisdiction over plaintiff's action alleging violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and North Carolina common law in favor of a state court proceeding that was brought against plaintiff by defendants, asserting various state law claims; mere potential for conflict in the results of the adjudications did not, without more, warrant staying exercise of federal jurisdiction, state court action was commenced only a few hours before the federal action, the federal RICO claim was at the heart of the federal action, and plaintiff's allegations of local biases in favor of defendants, and the fact that plaintiff's RICO claims were not included in the state proceeding, weighed against abstention. Barefoot v. Security Credit Corp., Inc., E.D.N.C.2008, 582 F.Supp.2d 738. Federal Courts 47.1

9. Purpose

In enacting Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Congress wanted to reach both “legitimate” and “illegitimate” enterprises, and the former enjoy neither an inherent incapacity for criminal activity nor immunity from its consequences; fact that private damages provision is used against respected businesses allegedly engaged in a pattern of specifically identified criminal conduct is hardly a sufficient reason for assuming that the provision is being misconstrued. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., U.S.N.Y.1985, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 473 U.S. 479, 87 L.Ed.2d 346, dissenting opinion 105 S.Ct. 3292, 473 U.S. 479, 87 L.Ed.2d 346. Racketeer Influenced

And Corrupt Organizations 37

Major purpose behind the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) is to curb the infiltration of legitimate business organizations by racketeers. Sinclair v. Hawke, C.A.8 (Ark.) 2003, 314 F.3d 934. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

State rule requiring corroboration of accomplice testimony to prove certain offenses was not incorporated into federal prosecution under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; Congress did not intend to incorporate various states' procedural and evidentiary rules into RICO statute, but merely meant to define, in more generic sense, wrongful conduct that constitutes predicates for federal racketeering charge. U.S. v. Paone, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1986, 782 F.2d 386, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 269, 479 U.S. 882, 93 L.Ed.2d 246, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 3261, 483 U.S. 1019, 97 L.Ed.2d 761, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 3262, 483 U.S. 1019, 97 L.Ed.2d 761, habeas corpus denied 735 F.Supp. 60. Criminal Law 510

This chapter is intended to eradicate organized crime rather than to subject ordinary criminals to this chapter's heightened punishment. U. S. v. Lemm, C.A.8 (Neb.) 1982, 680 F.2d 1193, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 739, 459 U.S. 1110, 74 L.Ed.2d 960. Commerce 82.6; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Purpose and history of this chapter and substance of its provisions demonstrate clear congressional intent that chapter be interpreted to apply to activities that corrupt public or governmental entities. U. S. v. Angelilli, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1981, 660 F.2d 23, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1258, 455 U.S. 910, 71 L.Ed.2d 449, rehearing denied 102 S.Ct. 2024, 456 U.S. 951, 72 L.Ed.2d 476, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1442, 455 U.S. 945, 71 L.Ed.2d 657, rehearing denied 102 S.Ct. 1998, 456 U.S. 939, 72 L.Ed.2d 460, rehearing denied 102 S.Ct. 1999, 456 U.S. 939, 72 L.Ed.2d 460. Commerce 82.6; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 1

Central aim of this chapter is to prevent and punish financial infiltration and corrupt operation, through patterns of racketeering activity, of legitimate business operations affecting interstate commerce. U. S. v. Sutton, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1979, 605 F.2d 260, rehearing granted and vacated 642 F.2d 1001, opinion after grant of rehearing 642 F.2d 1001, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 3143, 453 U.S. 912, 69 L.Ed.2d 995, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 3144, 453 U.S. 912, 69 L.Ed.2d 995.

In enacting this chapter, Congress was not so much concerned with limiting protective and remedial features of this chapter to business and labor organizations as it was with reducing invidious capabilities of persons in organized crime to infiltrate American economy. U. S. v. Frumento, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1977, 563 F.2d 1083, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 1256, 434 U.S. 1072, 55 L.Ed.2d 775, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 1258, 434 U.S. 1072, 55 L.Ed.2d 776. Commerce 82.10

This chapter was not designed to punish state law violations but was designed to punish impact on commerce clause by conduct which meets this chapter's definition of racketeering activity. U.S. v. Forsythe, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1977, 560 F.2d 1127. Commerce 82.10

Congress intended by enactment of this chapter to prohibit infiltration of legitimate organizations by organized crime and to prohibit any pattern of racketeering activity in or affecting commerce. U. S. v. Cappetto, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1974, 502 F.2d 1351, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 1121, 420 U.S. 925, 43 L.Ed.2d 395. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2; Torts 436

Congress made clear that it intended for application of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to encompass both current and future state extortion law through provision explicitly incorporating by reference any act or threat involving extortion which is chargeable under state law. Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Intern. Union, E.D.Va.2008, 585 F.Supp.2d 789. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 8

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) is to be used to stop acquisition of businesses, including unions, by force or threats of force and operation of businesses through a pattern of such activities. Buck Creek Coal, Inc. v. United Workers of America, S.D.Ind.1995, 917 F.Supp. 601. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 59

In enacting the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and its civil remedy provisions, Congress manifested an intent that these remedies be available only in relation to activities having some association with “racketeering” as that term is used in ordinary discourse. Exeter Towers Associates v. Bowditch, D.C.Mass.1985, 604 F.Supp. 1547. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 3

This chapter seeks to protect interstate and foreign commerce from activities that are characteristic of organized crime even when they are engaged in by a single individual. Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., E.D.Pa.1983, 581 F.Supp. 88. Commerce 82.6

Congress' primary intention in enacting this chapter was to prevent organized crime from infiltrating businesses and other economic entities. Guerrero v. Katzen, D.C.D.C.1983, 571 F.Supp. 714. Commerce 82.6

Intent of this chapter is to eradicate organized crime in United States and to provide remedies and penalties to deal with unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime. Noland v. Gurley, D.C.Colo.1983, 566 F.Supp. 210. Commerce 80; Commerce 82.6; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 1

This chapter does not seek to criminalize membership alone in enterprise, nor does it criminalize racketeering activity standing alone, but, rather, it is combination of such two separate and distinct elements which Congress intended to punish by enacting this chapter. U.S. v. Russotti, W.D.N.Y.1983, 555 F.Supp. 1236, affirmed 717 F.2d 27, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 1273, 465 U.S. 1022, 79 L.Ed.2d 678. Commerce 82.6; Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Congress intended this chapter to aid, if not accomplish, the elimination of organized crime in the United States; however, Congress did not intend to limit scope of this chapter to persons connected with organized crime or

even to those activities that are commonly thought of as racketeering. Crocker Nat. Bank v. Rockwell Intern. Corp., N.D.Cal.1982, 555 F.Supp. 47. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

This chapter was enacted principally to halt pattern of infiltration of business by organized crime. Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., N.D.Ill.1982, 548 F.Supp. 20. Commerce 82.6; Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 37

This chapter was never intended to transform violations of state law into federal crimes absent proof that defendant participated in the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Bays v. Hunter Sav. Ass'n, S.D.Ohio 1982, 539 F.Supp. 1020. Commerce 82.10

This chapter was enacted as part of Pub.L. 91-452, Oct. 15, 1970, 84 Stat. 922, overall purpose of which was to combat so-called “organized crime,” and major thrust of this chapter was to rid American economy and channels of interstate commerce from influences of organized crime, not by proscribing elusive status of organized crime but by prohibiting certain behavior, such as syndicated gambling and racketeering, which Congress concluded is commonly engaged in by members of “organized crime.” U.S. v. Vignola, E.D.Pa.1979, 464 F.Supp. 1091, affirmed 605 F.2d 1199, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 1015, 444 U.S. 1072, 62 L.Ed.2d 753. Commerce 82.6

10. Person--Generally

Employee who conducts the affairs of a corporation through illegal acts comes within the terms of Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) provision that forbids any “person” to unlawfully conduct an “enterprise”; statute explicitly defines “person” to include “any individual capable of holding a legal or beneficial interest in property,” and defines “enterprise” to include a “corporation.” Cedric Kushner Promotions, Ltd. v. King, U.S.2001, 121 S.Ct. 2087, 533 U.S. 158, 150 L.Ed.2d 198. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 47

Partner in joint farming venture was “person” within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO), for purpose of action by property owner who was other joint venturer, as partner was individual capable of holding legal or beneficial interest in property. Crowe v. Henry, C.A.5 (La.) 1995, 43 F.3d 198 , rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Law firm to which partner in joint venture belonged was not “person” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), for purpose of action by property owner who was other joint venturer, even if firm drew up court documents facilitating partner's alleged fraud and wrote unauthorized check for legal fees from funds of property owner, as actions were taken over four-year period and did not show continuous threat of racketeering activity. Crowe v. Henry, C.A.5 (La.) 1995, 43 F.3d 198, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Public utilities are subject to the strictures of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). County of Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1990, 907 F.2d 1295. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

RICO “person” must be one that either poses or has posed continuous threat of engaging in acts of racketeering; “continuous threat” requirement may not be satisfied if no more is pled than that person has engaged in limited number of predicate racketeering acts. Delta Truck & Tractor, Inc. v. J.I. Case Co., C.A.5 (La.) 1988, 855 F.2d 241, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 1531, 489 U.S. 1079, 103 L.Ed.2d 836. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 3

Sellers of oil and gas interests met Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act definition of “person”; sellers were capable of holding legal or beneficial interest in property, posed continuous threat, and allegedly engaged in act of racketeering with respect to their participation. George v. Blue Diamond Petroleum, Inc., W.D.La.1989, 718 F.Supp. 539, affirmed 922 F.2d 838. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Association in fact, which was composed of art merchants and retail outlets and which allegedly advertised, distributed, and sold counterfeit artworks, had separate existence from its individual members, for purposes of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Galerie Furstenberg v. Coffaro, S.D.N.Y.1988, 697 F.Supp. 1282, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1201. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Brokerage firm and its office could be person and enterprise, for purposes of action under section of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act prohibiting use or investment of income received from pattern of racketeering activity in acquisition or establishment of enterprise. De Muro v. E.F. Hutton, S.D.N.Y.1986, 643 F.Supp. 63. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 44

Shareholder, as such, was not “person injured” within subsec. (c) of this section by reason of alleged injury to corporation. Gallagher v. Canon U.S.A., Inc., N.D.Ill.1984, 588 F.Supp. 108. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 61

Cable television companies in which investors acquired investment interests were capable of being “persons” sufficient to meet this chapter's requirement of group of persons associated together for common purpose of engaging in course of conduct. Kirschner v. Cable/Tel Corp., E.D.Pa.1983, 576 F.Supp. 234. Commerce 82.6

An estate of an alleged wrongdoer is within plain meaning of par. (3) of this section of person encompassed within this chapter. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Caton's Estate, N.D.Ind.1982, 540 F.Supp. 673. Criminal Law 1220

10a. ---- Doctor, person

Physician, who owned commercial office space and who allegedly demanded that tenants refer patients to him, persuade a Medicare plan provider to contract with a hospital in which physician was a large shareholder, and pay for remodeling of their offices using one of physician's construction companies, was a “person” under Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), so as to support RICO claim by tenants; assuming physician still owned building, he could have continued to exert great influence over tenants. Trevino v. Pechero, S.D.Tex.2008, 592 F.Supp.2d 939. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

10b. ---- Realtor, person, generally

Real estate agent, who was allegedly involved in multiple acts of wrongdoing at the direction of a physician who owned commercial office space and who allegedly demanded that tenants refer patients to him, persuade a Medi- care plan provider to contract with a hospital in which physician was a large shareholder, and pay for remodeling of their offices using one of physician's construction companies, was a “person” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), so as to support RICO claim by tenants; agent could have continued to pose a threat to tenants. Trevino v. Pechero, S.D.Tex.2008, 592 F.Supp.2d 939. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 64

10c. ---- Reporter, person

Reporter and company which owned news organization, who published broadcast accusing physicians of illegal medical practices and who were invited to do the story at physicians' office building by real estate agent of landlord who had allegedly participated in scheme to extort money from the physicians, were not “persons” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, for purposes of RICO claim brought by physicians against reporter and the company; filming and subsequent publishing of news story was an isolated incident, and there was no indication that reporter and company could pose a continuous threat to physicians. Trevino v. Pechero, S.D.Tex.2008, 592 F.Supp.2d 939. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

11. ---- Corporation, person

Automobile manufacturer was “person” within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) provision prohibiting person associated with any enterprise from conducting such enterprise's affairs through pattern of racketeering activity; “person” did not have to be natural person. Fitzgerald v. Chrysler Corp., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1997, 116 F.3d 225. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Corporation may be a “person” under RICO. Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1987, 834 F.2d 1297, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 3241, 492 U.S. 917, 106 L.Ed.2d 588. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38

Corporation to which individual defendant made loans as shareholder, then causing the loans to be repaid to him as a priority, could not be both an “enterprise” and “person” for purposes of RICO. Garbade v. Great Divide Min. and Mill. Corp., C.A.10 (Colo.) 1987, 831 F.2d 212. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Lender and others met the definition of “person,” for purpose of debtors' civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, where debtors separately identified each defendant in the complaint and alleged how each defendant was integrally involved in establishing the real estate trust, which was the subject of the action. Williams v. Equity Holding Corp., E.D.Va.2007, 498 F.Supp.2d 831. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 64

Corporate defendant may be a “person” and, thus, liable under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

Act (RICO) section proscribing conduct of affairs of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity, but only if it, through pattern of racketeering, conducted affairs of an enterprise other than itself. Baglio v. Baska, W.D.Pa.1996, 940 F.Supp. 819, affirmed 116 F.3d 467. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

French corporation, which was 98% owned by French government, was “person” within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, where corporation was not acting pursuant to state directive or engaged in state action, but was acting independently as commercial corporation. American Bonded Warehouse Corp. v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, N.D.Ill.1987, 653 F.Supp. 861. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 112

Corporation was not an alleged “person,” i.e., defendant under this chapter but, rather, only individual defendants were alleged to be persons under this chapter, and thus claim was not stated under this chapter against corporation, which was an enterprise, not a person; furthermore, even if plaintiffs had alleged corporation to be a person under this chapter, claim was still subject to dismissal because an enterprise under this chapter may not simultaneously be a person defined under this chapter. Umstead v. Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc., M.D.N.C.1984, 592 F.Supp. 1269. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

12. ---- Governmental entity, person

There can be no Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations claim against federal government. Berger v. Pierce, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1991, 933 F.2d 393, on remand 771 F.Supp. 865. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 64

FBI was not a “person” within the meaning of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), as would support claims, by wife, sons, and estate of decedent, that FBI was liable for murder of decedent; RICO did not contain express or unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity of United States, and federal agency could not be subjected to state or federal criminal prosecution, and therefore could not satisfy the “racketeering activity” predicate for RICO liability. Donahue v. F.B.I., D.Mass.2002, 204 F.Supp.2d 169, reversed 634 F.3d 615, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied 660 F.3d 523, certiorari denied 132 S.Ct. 2375. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Village president, board of trustee members, and directors, against whom Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) claims were brought individually and in their individual capacities, were proper RICO persons, even though plaintiffs referred to wrongdoing by village in their complaint. Pelfresne v. Village of Rosemont, N.D.Ill.1998, 22 F.Supp.2d 756. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Although county board of commissioners and county solid waste management authority were “persons” under RICO, they were incapable of forming criminal intent necessary for commission of predicate offenses alleged, and therefore could not be held civilly liable under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Pine Ridge Recycling, Inc. v. Butts County, Ga., M.D.Ga.1994, 855 F.Supp. 1264. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Kentucky County, being quasi-municipal corporation, was not “person” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Smallwood v. Jefferson County Government, W.D.Ky.1990, 743 F.Supp. 502. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Municipal corporation is “person” within meaning of RICO statute. In re CitiSource, Inc. Securities Litigation, S.D.N.Y.1988, 694 F.Supp. 1069. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Federal Government lacked standing to sue for damages to its business or property under RICO. U.S. v. Bonan- no Organized Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra, E.D.N.Y.1988, 683 F.Supp. 1411, affirmed 879 F.2d 20. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 57

Term “person,” within Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, does not include a municipality which, being a corporation or an artificial person which can act only through its officers, is incapable of forming mens rea or criminal intent necessary to perform act of racketeering. Massey v. City of Oklahoma City, W.D.Okla.1986, 643 F.Supp. 81. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 112

13. ---- Unincorporated association, person

Unincorporated political associations were capable of holding property under New York law and, thus, fell within the definition of “person” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Jund v. Town of Hempstead, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1991, 941 F.2d 1271. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Unincorporated entity was not “person” subject to liability under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act, as it did not have capacity to hold either legal or beneficial title to property. Fleischhauer v. Feltner, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1989, 879 F.2d 1290, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 1122, 493 U.S. 1074, 107 L.Ed.2d 1029, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 1473, 494 U.S. 1027, 108 L.Ed.2d 611. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

14. Juveniles

Defendants could be convicted under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) provisions, and district court had subject matter jurisdiction over substantive RICO and RICO conspiracy counts against defendants, even though one committed predicate offenses before eighteenth birthday, except for conspiring to commit murder to maintain or increase position in RICO enterprise, and other defendant committed one predicate offense before eighteenth birthday, and even though government never certified case for prosecution in district court pursuant to the Juvenile Delinquency Act (JDA), or moved to have defendants transferred to adult status; as relevant ‘act’ for determining federal jurisdiction under the JDA, was the crime charged in the indictment, the substantive RICO offenses, rather than the discrete predicate acts underlying those charges, and RICO offenses were not committed by the defendants prior to their eighteenth birthdays because the offenses continued after their eighteenth birthdays; thus the JDA did not apply. U.S. v. Wong, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1994, 40 F.3d 1347, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 1968, 514 U.S. 1113, 131 L.Ed.2d 858, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 2568, 515 U.S. 1137,

132 L.Ed.2d 820, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 190, 516 U.S. 870, 133 L.Ed.2d 127. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

15. Organized crime

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act applied to activities of police officer assisting in drug trafficking in return for personal use cocaine, despite claim that RICO was limited to organized crime activities. U.S. v. Ruiz, C.A.1 (Mass.) 1990, 905 F.2d 499. Criminal Law 37(8)

This chapter does not premise violation on proof or allegations of any connection with organized crime. Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1983, 719 F.2d 5, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 1280, 465 U.S. 1025, 79 L.Ed.2d 684. Commerce 82.6

Involvement with organized crime, as that term is commonly understood, is not necessary element of claim under this chapter. Bennett v. Berg, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1983, 710 F.2d 1361, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 527, 464 U.S. 1008, 78 L.Ed.2d 710, on remand. Commerce 80

Membership in organized crime was not necessary element to establish conviction for violation of this chapter. U. S. v. Uni Oil, Inc., C.A.5 (Tex.) 1981, 646 F.2d 946, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1254, 455 U.S. 908, 71 L.Ed.2d 446. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

This chapter is not limited to those engaged in organized crime and makes unlawful the activities described no matter who engages therein and although only small business enterprise is involved. U. S. v. Campanale, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1975, 518 F.2d 352, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 777, 423 U.S. 1050, 46 L.Ed.2d 638, rehearing denied 96 S.Ct. 1422, 424 U.S. 950, 47 L.Ed.2d 356. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 4.1

Plaintiff was not required to establish that either brokerage firm was connected in some significant manner to the Mafia, or other organized crime syndicate, in order to establish claim under this chapter. Dakis on Behalf of Da- kis Pension Plan v. Chapman, N.D.Cal.1983, 574 F.Supp. 757. Commerce 80

Allegations of mail and wire securities fraud fell within ambit of this chapter, regardless whether actors were engaged in organized crime or activities within the penumbra of “organized crime,” and this chapter could be utilized as alternative or cumulative remedy for private plaintiffs alleging securities fraud. Eisenberg v. Gagnon, E.D.Pa.1983, 564 F.Supp. 1347. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

This chapter was not limited in its application to activities connected with organized crime. Hunt Intern. Re- sources Corp. v. Binstein, N.D.Tex.1982, 559 F.Supp. 601. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 37

Congress did not limit scope of this chapter to those persons involved in what traditionally has been thought of as “organized crime,” but, rather, any “person” as term is broadly defined in this chapter, whether associated

with organized crime or not, can commit violation, and any person injured in his business or property by such violation may then sue violator for damages in federal court. Lode v. Leonardo, N.D.Ill.1982, 557 F.Supp. 675. Commerce 82.6; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 37

In suit under this chapter seeking recovery of damages resulting from allegedly fraudulent transactions involving defendants, the acts complained of fell within the ambit of this chapter, even if defendants were not somehow linked to organized crime. D'Iorio v. Adonizio, M.D.Pa.1982, 554 F.Supp. 222. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 31

There was no requirement that defendants in civil action under this chapter be members of a group or society of criminals operating outside the law. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. O'Hearn, S.D.N.Y.1981, 523 F.Supp. 244. Criminal Law 1220

Defendants, who were charged with violation of section 2314 of this title, could not avoid prosecution on charge which alleged violation of this chapter because they claimed not to be members of organized crime. U.S. v. Sam Goody, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1981, 506 F.Supp. 380, 210 U.S.P.Q. 318. Receiving Stolen Goods 1

Purpose for passage of this chapter as stated in its legislative history, is to provide “enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime,” but language of this section and section 1964 of this title governing prohibited activities and civil remedies therefor requires neither proof nor allegation of any connection to organized crime for a violation to lie. Parnes v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., N.D.Ill.1980, 487 F.Supp. 645. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 37

This chapter can reach far beyond organized crime to encompass less serious offenses. U. S. v. Gibson, S.D.Ohio 1980, 486 F.Supp. 1230. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 6

This chapter was aimed at organized crime, but, in regard to said chapter, “organized crime” should be defined broadly. U. S. v. Chovanec, S.D.N.Y.1979, 467 F.Supp. 41. Commerce 82.6; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 1

Congress did not intend this chapter to apply exclusively to members of “organized crime,” and government need not prove that defendant prosecuted under this chapter is member of “organized crime.” U.S. v. Vignola, E.D.Pa.1979, 464 F.Supp. 1091, affirmed 605 F.2d 1199, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 1015, 444 U.S. 1072, 62 L.Ed.2d 753. Commerce 82.6

Congress' primary concern in enacting this chapter was to curb the threatening activities of members of organized crime; Congress did not intend to make a conviction under this chapter turn on a showing that the defendant was in some way a member of organized crime; Congress took pains to make conviction dependent upon behavi- or, not status. U.S. v. Mandel, D.C.Md.1976, 415 F.Supp. 997, supplemented 415 F.Supp. 1025. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

16. Extraterritoriality

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) did not have extraterritorial application to claim that defendants participated in widespread racketeering and money laundering scheme with the goal of seizing control over most of the Russian oil industry through the use of Russian oil companies, even if some domestic conduct occurred. Norex Petroleum Ltd. v. Access Industries, Inc., C.A.2 2010, 622 F.3d 148, withdrawn from bound volume , amended and superseded 631 F.3d 29, certiorari dismissed 180 L.Ed.2d 913, 2011 WL 1576936. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 23

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) had no extraterritorial application to oil companies' alleged involvement in attacks on Nigerian citizens on oil drilling platform and barge and in their villages; the citizens failed to present evidence that killing or otherwise suppressing protestors saved money or otherwise increased companies' profit margin and that oil companies gained a competitive advantage in the United States or impacted the American economy by engaging in the alleged racketeering activity, and American subsidiary engaged in merely prepatory, rather than material, conduct when designing and adjusting general security policies of Nigerian subsidiary, approving payments to Nigerian security forces, exercising control over Nigerian subsidiary, and engaging in media campaign to cover up Nigerian subsidiary's involvement. Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., N.D.Cal.2007, 481 F.Supp.2d 1010. Commerce 82.60; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 64

Provisions in remedial order prohibiting use of express or implied health messages or descriptors, in government's action alleging that cigarette manufacturers and tobacco-related trade organizations violated, and continued to violate, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by engaging in conspiracy to deceive American public about, inter alia, health risks of low-tar cigarettes and to manipulate design and composition of cigarettes in order to sustain nicotine addiction, applied to defendants' actions taken outside the United States; there was no reason to believe that Congress intended to exclude from a remedial injunctive order activities by defendants, over whom court had personal jurisdiction, merely because they occurred outside physical boundaries of the United States. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., D.D.C.2007, 477 F.Supp.2d 191. Injunction 1495

Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) could not be applied extraterritorially to action by Palestinian residents of West Bank against Israel arising from development of settlements, inasmuch as harms alleged were personal and only marginally impacted United States commerce, and applying RICO was not likely to affect way that Palestinians would be treated in future. Doe I v. State of Israel, D.D.C.2005, 400 F.Supp.2d 86 . Commerce 82.60; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

RICO does not apply extraterritorially. Jose v. M/V Fir Grove, D.Or.1991, 801 F.Supp. 349. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 1

Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) did not confer subject matter jurisdiction extraterritorially, in Brazilian investors' action alleging fraud by Swiss cooperative; complaint did not allege specific conduct in the U.S. material to completion of the fraud, allegations as to the effects of the alleged fraud in the U.S. were vague and conclusory, and use of U.S. judicial resources was inappropriate given the exclusively for-

eign nature of the transactions at issue. Nasser v. Andersen Worldwide Societe Co-op., S.D.N.Y.2003, 2003 WL 22179008, Unreported. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 55

17. Predicate acts

Vote buying, in violation of Kentucky's felony statute applicable to making or offering to make an expenditure to any person, either to vote or withhold his vote, or to vote for or against any candidate or public question at an election, constitutes “bribery” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act's (RICO) predicate-act definition of racketeering activity as any act or threat involving bribery which is chargeable under state law and punishable as felony, though the Kentucky statute does not use the word “bribery”; vote buying is the type of activity that is generally known or characterized as involving bribery. U.S. v. Adams, C.A.6 (Ky.) 2013, 722 F.3d 788. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 9

Electric utility customers adequately stated predicate act requirements of Ohio Corrupt-Practices Act by properly alleging money laundering and telecommunications fraud as predicate to their civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim. Williams v. Duke Energy Intern., Inc., C.A.6 (Ohio) 2012, 681 F.3d 788, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied , certiorari denied 133 S.Ct. 933, 184 L.Ed.2d 724. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 103

In order to establish a pattern of racketeering, for the purposes of securing a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conviction, the government was required to show that the predicate acts were related to one another and threatened continued criminal activity. U.S. v. Cain, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2012, 671 F.3d 271, certiorari denied 132 S.Ct. 1872, 182 L.Ed.2d 655, petition for certiorari filed 2013 WL 867471. Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations 28

Plaintiffs, former restaurant employees who brought action against franchisee that owned and operated restaurant, individual who owned and operated franchisee, and parent company-franchisor, failed to plead that defendants hired 10 or more illegal aliens with knowledge that they were unauthorized aliens who were illegally “brought into” the United States, as required for the alleged crime to constitute a Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) predicate act; plaintiffs never alleged that any of the defendants knew that the aliens who were hired had been illegally brought into the United States, and allegation that “[defendant] hired and allowed employees to remain employees despite the fact that . . . they were known by [defendant's] management as unauthorized or ineligible to work or even be in this Country,” though close to stating a claim, stopped short of line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief. Edwards v. Prime, Inc., C.A.11 (Ala.) 2010, 602 F.3d 1276. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Attorney's allegations that his former law partners committed fraud by misrepresenting to their bookkeeper what the attorney was owed under an agreement governing the division of legal fees did not allege a predicate act required for a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim; any failure to tell bookkeeper that payment was less than what the attorney was entitled to could not have harmed attorney any more than if the partners had cut and mailed a check to him themselves. Carr v. Tillery, C.A.7 (Ill.) 2010, 591 F.3d 909, rehearing denied, on remand 2010 WL 1963398. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Evidence was insufficient to establish that defendant violated or agreed to violation of Travel Act, as predicate act of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violation, and thus, since there was evidence that defendant committed and agreed to commission of only one other predicate act, evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for substantive RICO violation or RICO conspiracy; member of defendant's motorcycle club testified that he, defendant, and club leader traveled in van from Indiana to Ohio so leader could attend meeting, and there was other testimony that club members regularly distributed drugs and discussed it at meetings, but there was no evidence that defendant traveled to Ohio with intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate that illegal activity. U.S. v. Driver, C.A.6 (Ohio) 2008, 535 F.3d 424, certiorari denied 129 S.Ct. 662, 555 U.S. 1061, 172 L.Ed.2d 637. Commerce 82.10; Conspiracy 47(3.1)

County officials's enforcement of presumptively valid county zoning ordinances against landowners did not constitute a pattern of extortion under the Hobbs Act, and thus the officials's enforcement actions were not predicate acts, as would support landowners's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against officials; most of the officials's actions were simply the normal administrative duties required to enforce the zoning ordinances, including explaining to landowners either how the zoning scheme worked, or rejecting allegations of the scheme's invalidity. Gillmor v. Thomas, C.A.10 (Utah) 2007, 490 F.3d 791. Extortion 24(5)

Sufficient evidence established that each of defendant's three predicate acts were related to organized crime family's enterprise, as well as to each other, as required to satisfy the relatedness requirement in defendant's Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) prosecution; defendant was member of organized crime family, and as member, defendant orchestrated predicate acts of murdering two associates and participating in loansharking operations. U.S. v. Daidone, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2006, 471 F.3d 371, post-conviction relief denied 2009 WL 2611943, affirmed 422 Fed.Appx. 26, 2011 WL 1878679, certiorari denied 132 S.Ct. 598, 181 L.Ed.2d 424. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 49

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against meat processing facility by ex- employees did not fall within primary jurisdiction of National Labor Relations Board (NLRB); action was based on predicate offenses indictable under INA section relating to bringing in and harboring certain aliens, not underlying conduct that was wrongful only by virtue of labor laws. Baker v. IBP, Inc., C.A.7 (Ill.) 2004, 357 F.3d 685, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied , certiorari denied 125 S.Ct. 412, 543 U.S. 956, 160 L.Ed.2d 318. Labor And Employment 1666

City mayor's failure to disclose bribery funds received on statements of economic interest that he was required to file annually could not serve as predicate offense under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); it was questionable whether, as alleged, mayor's conduct violated Illinois statute proscribing public official's performance of act in excess of his lawful authority with intent to obtain personal advantage for himself or another, such offense did not set forth bribery offense for purposes of predicate offense under RICO, and penalty clause in statute requiring statements to be filed provided for only misdemeanor conviction, which could not qualify as “racketeering activity.” U.S. v. Genova, C.A.7 (Ill.) 2003, 333 F.3d 750, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 9

Bankers do not become racketeers by acting like bankers. Sinclair v. Hawke, C.A.8 (Ark.) 2003, 314 F.3d 934. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

Defendant's criminal acts committed before he reached age of eighteen constituted “racketeering activity” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), even though the government did not move to transfer defendant's case to adult status, and acts were acts of juvenile delinquency for which defendant would have avoided incarceration, where all of defendant's preeighteen predicate acts were felonies punishable under New York law by imprisonment for more than one year, except for extortion, which was charged under federal law. U.S. v. Wong, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1994, 40 F.3d 1347, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 1968, 514 U.S. 1113, 131 L.Ed.2d 858, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 2568, 515 U.S. 1137, 132 L.Ed.2d 820, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 190, 516 U.S. 870, 133 L.Ed.2d 127. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

Sellers of limited liability company's (LLC) assets failed to adequately allege Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) predicate acts of mail or wire fraud, as required for RICO claim against LLC and officers; sellers did not plead, state, or otherwise mention with any specificity how either mails or the wires were used in furtherance of a scheme to defraud, and failed to show that alleged predicate acts of damage to value of securities owned by LLC were both a but-for and proximate cause of their injuries. Derby City Capital, LLC v. Trinity HR Services, W.D.Ky.2013, 2013 WL 2470900. Federal Civil Procedure 636; Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 62

Employees failed to state mail fraud claim against employers with particularity, as required to support claim for violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where complaint alleged that employers engaged in predicate acts by mailing payroll checks that were false and deceptive because they misled employees about amount of wages to which they were entitled, as well as their status and rights under Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Gordon v. Kaleida Health, W.D.N.Y.2012, 2012 WL 125227. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Allegations by prospective adoptive parents that international adoption agency, its president, and other employees used e-mails, facsimiles, letters, and telecommunications to materially misrepresent the agency's legal authority to assist in adoptions in Uganda, the success rate of the agency's adoptions, a Ugandan child's status as an orphan, and the authenticity of documents related to that child's biological parents, that the defendant acted with the specific intent of obtaining plaintiffs' money or property, and that plaintiffs sent 15 monthly payments of $200 based on defendants' misrepresentations satisfied the pleading with particularity requirements for parents' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim with predicate wire and mail fraud offenses. Heslep v. Americans for African Adoption, Inc., N.D.W.Va.2012, 890 F.Supp.2d 671. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Employer failed to allege former employees' predicate acts of mail fraud with sufficient particularity, as required under federal rule for fraud, and thus complaint failed to state claims for violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) or Colorado Organized Crime Control Act (COCCA); employer alleged only that former employees had “orchestrated the purchase of over 500 parts and pieces of equipment” while working for employer, with intent to divert equipment to their newly formed company, and then submitted false bids on

contracts attempting to utilize equipment, but failed to specify details as to time, place, or contents of false representations or the identity of persons making them. L-3 Communications Corp. v. Jaxon Engineering & Main- tenance, Inc., D.Colo.2012, 863 F.Supp.2d 1066. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Investor's allegation that customer agreements mailed by foreign currency trading service included “deceptive information” and failed to disclose “actual risks” of trading with service was insufficient to satisfy particularity requirement applicable to averments of fraud, and thus failed to state claim against service for violation of Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) based on predicate acts of mail or wire fraud. Cruz v. FXDirectDealer, LLC, S.D.N.Y.2012, 855 F.Supp.2d 89, affirmed in part , vacated in part and remanded 720 F.3d 115. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Allegation of owner of service mark “Wecosign,” that “[competitors] devised a scheme or artifice to solicit payment from others for counterfeit services through [competitors'] infringing use of a counterfeit mark, which created confusion or mistake or deceived others regarding the source or origin of [competitors'] purported services,” was simply a restyling, if not purely a reiteration, of owner's trademark infringement and false designation of origin claims, which was insufficient to allege wire fraud as a predicate act supporting owner's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against competitors. Wecosign, Inc. v. IFG Holdings, Inc., C.D.Cal.2012, 845 F.Supp.2d 1072. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 70; Trademarks 1432

Purported class of foreign purchasers did not allege predicate acts of racketeering activity by automobile manufacturer and its subsidiaries, as required to state claim for violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act (RICO); complaint did not ascribe any predicate act to particular defendant rather than impermissibly ascribing conduct to manufacturer or all defendants generally. In re Toyota Motor Corp. Unintended Accel- eration Marketing, Sales Practices, and Products Liability Litigation, C.D.Cal.2011, 826 F.Supp.2d 1180. Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 7; Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 23

Facsimile transactions sent by rare coin seller from New York state and received in New York state could not constitute predicate acts of wire fraud, for purpose of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim brought by rare coin buyer against seller; intrastate communications fall outside the scope of RICO. Marini v. Adamo, E.D.N.Y.2011, 812 F.Supp.2d 243. Commerce 82.60; Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 3

Ex-wife's allegations that ex-husband told her the he had “lost the entire value” of a real estate investment made during their marriage which was valued at “almost nine million dollars,” and that a year later she learned that her ex-husband had instead been paid $5.5 million for the deal, failed to plead husband's predicate acts of fraud under civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim with requisite particularity under federal rule; ex-wife failed to allege that husband's statement was fraudulent, and the truth of his statement about the value of the asset could not reasonably turn on income he received from it a year later. Cohen v. Cohen, S.D.N.Y.2011, 773 F.Supp.2d 373, affirmed in part , vacated in part 711 F.3d 353. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Field review of one appraisal by plaintiff independent appraiser did not indicate fraud on basis that different appraiser had submitted same value later and was not subjected to such review, as required to support mail or wire fraud as predicate act to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against lender, where plaintiff did not describe when or where appraisals or field reviews had occurred, identities of other appraiser and reviewers, how those appraisals had been conducted, or how accepting same value on different appraisal report was fraudulent. Capitol West Appraisals, LLC v. Countrywide Financial Corp., W.D.Wash.2010, 759 F.Supp.2d 1267, affirmed 467 Fed.Appx. 738, 2012 WL 345903. Postal Service 35(10); Telecommu- nications 1014(12)

Former California Highway Patrol (CHP) employee alleged Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims based on predicate act of “witness tampering” regarding an “official proceeding”; employee alleged an institutionalized theft of state funds between CHP, a state agency and State Compensation Insurance Fund (SCIF), a business of insurance which affected interstate commerce, that CHP and SCIF engaged in criminal conspiracy to conceal nature and extent of their criminal activities, and that they acted with intent to intim- idate, threaten and corruptly dissuade plaintiff and other CHP employees from testifying or informing grand jury of identity of CHP high level officials who were fraudulently making workers' compensation claims and to protect SCIF from being linked to fraud as form of bribery for SCIF thefts. Vierria v. California Highway Patrol, E.D.Cal.2009, 644 F.Supp.2d 1219. Torts 302

Allegations by homeowner that homeowners' association and members of association's board of directors engaged in various fraudulent acts, including backdating a letter approving his application for permission to build a fence in his back yard, placing improperly addressed, unstamped correspondence in homeowner's mailbox, failing to prevent a board member from embezzling association funds, and filing a fraudulent insurance claim resulting in a check paid to the association, did not properly allege wire fraud or mail fraud, as required predicate acts to state claim for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, absent allegations as to how homeowner was injured by the alleged conduct, how he relied on the alleged fraud to his detriment, or how the defendants used the mail or interstate wires to commit the fraud. Durso v. Summer Brook Preserve Homeowners Ass'n, M.D.Fla.2008, 641 F.Supp.2d 1256. Fraud 41; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 75; Telecommunications 1014(12)

Company's allegations that outside vendors billed company for services which were never performed, and that vendors were retained in violation of company's standards of employee conduct, based on fact that outside vendors were owned and operated by former employee's wife and friends, alleged the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud, as required to support Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against vendors, vice president, and vendors' owners. Fuji Photo Film U.S.A., Inc. v. McNulty, S.D.N.Y.2009, 640 F.Supp.2d 300. Postal Service 35(11.1); Telecommunications 1014(12)

Medical equipment company's claim that its vice president of marketing and sales organized scheme in which company employees and competitors transported and received of property stolen from company adequately alleged claims for interstate transport and receipt of stolen property as predicate acts in civil action brought under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where company provided serial number and description of each piece of equipment at issue, ascribed specific quantity of stolen pieces of equipment to individual defendants, gave alleged aggregate value of stolen equipment, and gave general allegations that thefts oc-

curred in interstate commerce. Freedom Medical Inc. v. Gillespie, E.D.Pa.2007, 634 F.Supp.2d 490. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Minimum standards for fixed-base operators (FBO), as promulgated by Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), did not grant operator of private jet hangar, which leased space from municipal airport commission, uninhibited right to sell jet fuel, precluding operator's claim against commission under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO); standards granted commission power to regulate on-site sale of fuel, and no ambiguity existed as to the meaning of “grades” of fuel versus “types” of fuel. Rectrix Aerodome Centers, Inc. v. Barn- stable Municipal Airport Com'n, D.Mass.2009, 632 F.Supp.2d 120, affirmed 610 F.3d 8. Aviation 238; Aviation 240.1

Genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant's alleged predicate acts of wire fraud posed a threat of continued criminal activity precluded summary judgment in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action. Bloodstock Research Information Services, Inc. v. Edbain.com, LLC, E.D.Ky.2009, 622 F.Supp.2d 504. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Negative impact on sales representative's sales performance evaluation score as result of employers' preferential treatment of union agents, and improper maintenance of sales representative's account by union agent, violated Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA), and thus were predicate acts for purposes of sales representative's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against employers, union, and union agents; sales representative was injured by preferential treatment of union agents, and there was threat of repetition. Marceau v. International Broth. of Elec. Workers, D.Ariz.2009, 618 F.Supp.2d 1127. Labor And Employment 1445; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 12; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Allegations that landlord obtained money from commercial tenants for “phony construction” and for rent above their contracted amount by threatening tenants sufficiently alleged two occasions of attempted extortion and, thus, two predicate acts constituting a pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), as required for tenants' RICO claim. Trevino v. Pechero, S.D.Tex.2008, 592 F.Supp.2d 939. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

Website owner could not allege state law claims of theft and computer crime as predicate offenses to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims in action against non-profit internet archive organization that allegedly reproduced contents of website in archive in violation of website's copyright notice; claims were not included in RICO's list of predicate offenses. Internet Archive v. Shell, D.Colo.2007, 505 F.Supp.2d 755. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

Where all parties are residents of same state, all telephone calls are presumed to be intrastate and, absent any indication otherwise, predicate act of wire fraud is not stated for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim. DeFazio v. Wallis, E.D.N.Y.2007, 500 F.Supp.2d 197. Telecommunications 1014(12)

Debtors met particularity requirement for pleading mail fraud and wire fraud as predicate acts, in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against lender and others, where the complaint alleged that defendants used the mails and interstate telephone system in furtherance of a pattern of racketeering activity and collection of unlawful debt and to otherwise defraud plaintiffs, and the complaint outlined the alleged scheme to defraud them of their home and pled a time frame for the scheme, specific persons, entities, and times connected with the fraud, and the general contents of the alleged fraudulent communications between defendants and the debtors. Williams v. Equity Holding Corp., E.D.Va.2007, 498 F.Supp.2d 831. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Health spa manager failed to allege any facts that demonstrated that she suffered an injury to her business or property and that the injury was caused by employee, who had brought action against spa and manager under Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), as required for manager to establish standing to assert violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against employee; manager alleged only that telephone calls made by employee to other employees to solicit participation in her FLSA action and settlement solicitation letter sent by employee's attorney constituted extortion in violation of the Hobbs Act, and that these were the predicate acts that supported her RICO claim. Flores v. Osaka Health Spa, Inc., S.D.N.Y.2007, 474 F.Supp.2d 523. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Conclusory allegations that defendants' use of the mails and wires to perpetrate their fraud involved thousands of communications, and that they caused matter and things to be delivered in the mail, including “correspondence, policy materials, requests for proposals, invoices, and payments,” and the resulting transfers of funds were made by wire transfer were insufficient to plead Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) predicate acts of mail and wire fraud with sufficient particularity. In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Anti- trust Litigation, D.Me.2006, 456 F.Supp.2d 131, supplemented 2006 WL 2943308. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Immigrant workers stated a claim of money laundering, as a predicate act under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), by alleged employer and others that allegedly used the proceeds of mail fraud with the intent to promote the carrying on of mail fraud, the intent to violate Internal Revenue Code, and the intent to avoid a transaction reporting requirement under state and/or federal law. Choimbol v. Fairfield Re- sorts, Inc., E.D.Va.2006, 428 F.Supp.2d 437. United States 34

Alleged predicate acts of supervisors in Department of Justice (DOJ), in falsifying information to Congress, allegedly in violation of mail fraud statute, did not proximately cause DOJ employee's alleged injury, as required to support her claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), since employee was not intended target of the violation. Weaver v. Bratt, D.D.C.2006, 421 F.Supp.2d 25. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 62

Dinnerware and cookware seller's allegations that operators of website solicited or created defamatory consumer complaints about it, then agreed to remove or modify those complaints only if paid a fee of $50,000 and a monthly retainer of $1,500 were sufficient to allege threatened extortion, as predicate act under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); remedying publication of false and defamatory complaints, which

operators allegedly created and solicited, did not give them the right to collect fees. Hy Cite Corp. v. badbusi- nessbureau.com, L.L.C., D.Ariz.2005, 418 F.Supp.2d 1142. Extortion 19

Mail or wire fraud were unavailable as predicate acts, in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) suit by taxpayer against investment advisor offering tax avoidance scheme ultimately challenged successfully by Internal Revenue Service (IRS); taxpayer could not rely on scheme, as required in fraud action, due to advisor's caution that scheme might not work, and taxpayer's accountant's position that scheme would not work, which was held so firmly that accountant resigned. Swartz v. KPMG, LLC, W.D.Wash.2004, 401 F.Supp.2d 1146, affirmed in part , reversed in part 476 F.3d 756. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 10

Bidder for government contract did not commit mail or wire fraud, which were alleged as predicate acts supporting claim that bidder violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in connection with obtaining contract for satellite launch services; there were no allegations that bidder made any material misrepresentations or omissions, as required for mail or wire fraud. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Boeing Co., M.D.Fla.2005, 357 F.Supp.2d 1350. Postal Service 35(10); Telecommunications 1014(8)

Distributor of golf carts did not establish mail fraud, as predicate offense for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim brought against manufacturer, through allegations that manufacturer collected Quebec sales tax due on sales to distributor but failed to remit any funds to taxing authority for two years after collection began; there was no showing of fraudulent intent, as opposed to human error on part of manufacturer's accountant. Club Car, Inc. v. Club Car (Quebec) Import, Inc., S.D.Ga.2003, 276 F.Supp.2d 1276, affirmed 362 F.3d 775, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied 111 Fed.Appx. 1003, 2004 WL 1585294, certiorari denied 125 S.Ct. 618, 543 U.S. 1002, 160 L.Ed.2d 461. Postal Service 35(5)

Assignee of rights of rights of developer and declarant of planned community who brought suit against community association and individual members of association, alleging that association infringed on its rights by requiring it pay certain fees and assessments, failed to state a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, absent allegation that defendants committed two or more predicate acts amounting to racketeering; defendants' mere use of the mail to send the invoice requesting payment of the disputed fees was not mail fraud. Kalian at Poconos, LLC v. Saw Creek Estates Community Ass'n, Inc., M.D.Pa.2003, 275 F.Supp.2d 578. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Alleged acts in which defendants attempted through threats and property damage to obtain control over fishing

company's intangible property right to harvest crab during crab season could amount to attempted extortion, in violation of Hobbs Act, and predicate acts supporting Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim; defendants allegedly threatened injury to company's crew, damaged its boat and fishing equipment, and warned buyers and their customers that they would be blackballed if they bought crab from company. Dooley v. Crab Boat Owners Ass'n, N.D.Cal.2003, 271 F.Supp.2d 1207. Torts 436

Failure to plead predicate acts of mail fraud, wire fraud, and aiding and abetting securities fraud, precluded claim that three Korean banks violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) by entering into sham agreements with Korean subsidiary of Belgian parent, inflating subsidiary's earnings and those of parent, whose shares were acquired by American investor. Filler v. Hanvit Bank, S.D.N.Y.2003, 247 F.Supp.2d 425 , vacated 2003 WL 21729978, affirmed 378 F.3d 213, certiorari denied 125 S.Ct. 677, 543 U.S. 1022, 160 L.Ed.2d 499. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Manufacturer's alleged fraudulent concealment of discoverable data in prior products liability case could serve as predicate act in support of subsequent federal civil claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) to extent it involved actionable wire or mail fraud, obstruction of justice, or tampering with witnesses, even if manufacturer was absolutely immune from civil liability under state law. Florida Evergreen Foliage v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours, Co., S.D.Fla.2001, 135 F.Supp.2d 1271, affirmed 341 F.3d 1292, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied 87 Fed.Appx. 716, 2003 WL 22670882, certiorari denied 124 S.Ct. 2094, 541 U.S. 1037, 158 L.Ed.2d 723. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Copyright infringement is not a predicate act under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Damiano v. Sony Music Entertainment, Inc., D.N.J.1996, 975 F.Supp. 623, appeal dismissed 166 F.3d 1204, reconsideration denied 2000 WL 1689081. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

Pilot' conclusory statement that Retirement Systems of Alabama (RSA) committed bankruptcy fraud was insufficient to adequately state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) predicate act, absent facts to explain how RSA committed the alleged criminal act. Vaughn v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Intern., E.D.N.Y.2008, 395 B.R. 520, affirmed 377 Fed.Appx. 88, 2010 WL 1932388, affirmed 604 F.3d 703. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Virgin Islands dogfighting statute could be used as a predicate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) offense, despite defendant's claim that it was not an act involving gambling and was part of a health code; the dogfighting statute, under which a defendant could be punished for acting “for any bet, stake, or re- ward,” fell within the category of gambling offenses, RICO did not require gambling to be a necessary element of the predicate offense, and it was not relevant whether the statute was part of a health code. U.S. v. Mark, C.A.3 (Virgin Islands) 2012, 460 Fed.Appx. 103, 2012 WL 120092, Unreported, certiorari denied 132 S.Ct. 2705, 183 L.Ed.2d 61. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 7

Former prisoner who was wrongfully convicted of state offenses based upon false evidence failed to allege that police chief and various police officers obstructed justice in a federal proceeding, as would constitute a predicate act for purposes of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where prisoner alleged in

complaint that police chief and officers tampered with and retaliated against witnesses, victims, and informants in state court proceedings. Slade v. Gates, C.D.Cal.2003, 2003 WL 21149840, Unreported. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

18. Offenses within section

Bank regulators do not become racketeers by acting like aggressive regulators. Sinclair v. Hawke, C.A.8 (Ark.) 2003, 314 F.3d 934. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

Loss of rights to securities, stocks, and money, and damage to a person's professional reputation are not injuries cognizable under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Burrowes v. Combs, S.D.N.Y.2004, 312 F.Supp.2d 449, affirmed 124 Fed.Appx. 70, 2005 WL 670644. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Statutory list of offenses that may serve as predicate acts for civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) claim is exclusive. Harvey v. Harvey, D.Conn.1996, 931 F.Supp. 127, affirmed 108 F.3d 329. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 6

II. RACKETEERING ACTIVITY

Generally 41 Accessory after fact 43 Aiding and abetting 42 Aiding and abetting, mail and wire fraud 69 Antitrust law violations 44 Assault 45 Bail bond violations 46 Bribery 47-48, 103 Bribery - Generally 47 Bribery - Involving bribery 48 Bribery - State law violation 103 Burglary 49 Business competition, mail and wire fraud 70 Chargeable under state law, state law violation 102 Coercion 50 Common law, fraud 60 Concealment, mail and wire fraud 71 Conspiracy 51 Conspiracy, mail and wire fraud 72 Convictions, mail and wire fraud 73 Copyrights 90

Discharge of employee 52 Drug and narcotics violation 53 Economic motive 99 Elements, mail and wire fraud 68 Employment, mail and wire fraud 74 Endorsements 54 Extortion 55, 56 Extortion - Generally 55 Extortion - Hobbs Act violations 56 False pretenses 57 Falsification of records 58 Financial transactions, mail and wire fraud 75 Fraud 59, 60 Fraud - Generally 59 Fraud - Common law 60 Gambling 61 Grand larceny 62 Harboring fugitive 63 Hobbs Act violations, extortion 56 Injury, mail and wire fraud 76 Insurance, mail and wire fraud 77 Intimidation or threats 64 Involving bribery 48 Labor organizations 65 Land Sales Act violations 66 Mail and wire fraud 67-86 Mail and wire fraud - Generally 67 Mail and wire fraud - Aiding and abetting 69 Mail and wire fraud - Business competition 70 Mail and wire fraud - Concealment 71 Mail and wire fraud - Conspiracy 72 Mail and wire fraud - Convictions 73 Mail and wire fraud - Elements 68 Mail and wire fraud - Employment 74 Mail and wire fraud - Financial transactions 75 Mail and wire fraud - Injury 76 Mail and wire fraud - Insurance 77 Mail and wire fraud - Other offenses 78 Mail and wire fraud - Particular transactions as not racketeering 86 Mail and wire fraud - Particular transactions as racketeering 85 Mail and wire fraud - Pleading 84 Mail and wire fraud - Property 79 Mail and wire fraud - Scheme to defraud 80 Mail and wire fraud - Shareholder actions 81 Mail and wire fraud - Tax liability 82

Mail and wire fraud - Use of mail 83 Malicious prosecution 87 Miscellaneous racketeering activities 100 Murder 88 Obstruction of justice 89 Other offenses, mail and wire fraud 78 Particular transactions as not racketeering, mail and wire fraud 86 Particular transactions as racketeering, mail and wire fraud 85 Patents, copyrights and trademarks 90 Perjury 91 Pleading, mail and wire fraud 84 Property, mail and wire fraud 79 Repayment 92 Robbery 93 Scalping 94 Scheme to defraud, mail and wire fraud 80 Securities violations 95 Shareholder actions, mail and wire fraud 81 State law violation 101-103 State law violation - Generally 101 State law violation - Bribery 103 State law violation - Chargeable under state law 102 Tax liability, mail and wire fraud 82 Trademarks 90 Travel Act violations 96 Use of communication facility 97 Use of mail, mail and wire fraud 83 Usury 98

41. Generally, racketeering activity

Civil rights violations and injury to reputation do not fall within the statutory definition of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Willis v. Mullins, E.D.Cal.2007, 517 F.Supp.2d 1206, affirmed 314 Fed.Appx. 68, 2009 WL 453279, reconsideration denied 809 F.Supp.2d 1227. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

Violations of FLSA or purposely avoiding detection of Clean Water Act (CWA) violations do not amount to racketeering under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Vandermark v. City of New York, S.D.N.Y.2009, 615 F.Supp.2d 196, affirmed 391 Fed.Appx. 957, 2010 WL 3466981. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 12

“Racketeering activity” is any act that is chargeable and punishable under certain state law felony classifications or indictable under specific federal criminal provisions, and any act that does not fall within purview of RICO definition is not an act of “racketeering activity.” U.S. v. Private Sanitation Industry Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk,

Inc., E.D.N.Y.1992, 793 F.Supp. 1114. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 6

“Racketeering activity” within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, is that activity commonly associated with organized crime such as gambling, dealing in narcotics or dangerous drugs, and extortionate credit transactions. Alexander v. Thornburgh, D.Minn.1989, 713 F.Supp. 1278, appeal dismissed 881 F.2d 1081. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 6

42. Aiding and abetting, racketeering activity

Allegations of aiding and abetting securities fraud cannot constitute predicate acts under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Bowdoin Const. Corp. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat. Bank, N.A., D.Mass.1994, 869 F.Supp. 1004, affirmed 94 F.3d 721. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Defendant's aiding and abetting commission of a predicate act of racketeering activity that is indictable under enumerated federal criminal provision may constitute a predicate act itself for purposes of RICO. U.S. v. Private Sanitation Industry Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1992, 793 F.Supp. 1114. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 21

43. Accessory after fact, racketeering activity

Crime of accessory after fact to murder is Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) predicate. U.S. v. Patriarca, D.Mass.1995, 912 F.Supp. 596. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

44. Antitrust law violations, racketeering activity

Violation of antitrust laws is not a predicate act under RICO. Jennings v. Emry, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1990, 910 F.2d 1434. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

Landlord's request to gas utility to terminate service to leased premises after tenants refused to pay increased rent was not theft by extortion and was not predicate act for purposes of stating RICO claim. Jordan v. Berman, E.D.Pa.1991, 758 F.Supp. 269, reconsideration denied, affirmed in part , vacated in part on other grounds 20 F.3d 1250, on remand. Extortion And Threats 25.1

Automobile manufacturer's business dealings, which were determined to have not been per se violations of antitrust laws, could not form predicate acts of racketeering to support car dealer's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations suit. Cemar, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., D.Del.1988, 678 F.Supp. 1091. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

45. Assault, racketeering activity

Assault did not constitute “racketeering activity” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18

U.S.C.A. § 1961(1). Park South Associates v. Fischbein, S.D.N.Y.1986, 626 F.Supp. 1108, affirmed 800 F.2d 1128. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

46. Bail bond violations, racketeering activity

The Pennsylvania misdemeanor offense of accepting a fee or compensation for obtaining a bondsman or of deriving a profit from a bonding business is not included in the offense of conducting the affairs of a bail bond agency in violation of this chapter, since, if defendant is not guilty of a state law felony, he is guilty of no federal crime. U. S. v. Forsythe, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1979, 594 F.2d 947. Indictment And Information 191(.5)

Trustees of creditors trust lacked standing to sue, on behalf of estate and victims of asbestos exposure, third- party professionals for aiding and abetting Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations, arising from professionals' involvement in allegedly fraudulent transfer of Chapter 11 debtor's assets to affiliates, even though trustees alleged that debtor was victim of RICO violations; given that debtor was named as defendant and trustees alleged that debtor was aware of and participated in transactions, debtor could not also be a victim. Lippe v. Bairnco Corp., S.D.N.Y.1998, 218 B.R. 294. Bankruptcy 2154.1

47. Bribery, racketeering activity--Generally

Evidence that key individuals in alleged pension fund fraud/kickbacks scheme, which included prosecution witness, were members or associates of organized crime families was relevant to prove that defendants conducted Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, and that prosecution witness, having been arrested, had not simply invented scenarios that could be viewed as crimes so that he could cooperate with the government in order to earn a lighter sentence. U.S. v. Reifler, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2006, 446 F.3d 65. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 94

Lack of fiduciary relationship between holders of option to purchase real property and broker who attempted to assist them in obtaining financing precluded holders from establishing commercial bribery, as predicate act for claim against broker and others under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Marriott Bros. v. Gage, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1990, 911 F.2d 1105, rehearing denied. Bribery 1(1)

Each payment made to nonunion defendant's corporation, under plan pursuant to which union defendants were to receive kickbacks from various insurance or health care service provider representatives in exchange for exercising their influence with union to obtain union's health and insurance benefits contracts for companies paying kickbacks, constituted separate violation of statute prohibiting offer, acceptance or solicitation to influence operation of employee benefit plan, and thus, separate predicate act under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act. U.S. v. Caporale, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1986, 806 F.2d 1487, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 3191, 482 U.S. 917, 96 L.Ed.2d 679, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 3265, 483 U.S. 1021, 97 L.Ed.2d 763. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 12

Defendant's transfer of bribery money to undercover officer, together with his knowledge of gambling enterprise necessitating the bribe and his knowledge that the officer is one of those on the “take,” was sufficient evidence

of his participation in the bribe to establish a predicate offense necessary to support his conviction under this chapter. U. S. v. Colacurcio, C.A.5 (La.) 1981, 659 F.2d 684, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1635, 455 U.S. 1002, 71 L.Ed.2d 869. Bribery 11

For purposes of this section, generic description of “bribery” is conduct which is intended, at least by the alleged briber, as an assault on the integrity of a public office or an official action. U.S. v. Forsythe, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1977, 560 F.2d 1127. Bribery 1(1)

Violation of statute criminalizing bribery of public officials could serve as predicate act of racketeering, for purposes of stating claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act against health care provider, for operation of enterprise thorough pattern of racketeering activity, even though allegedly bribed parties were physicians in private practice; physicians were referring their patients who were federal employees to health care provider for in home infusion therapy, creating federal contracts in process and imposing federal responsibilities on physicians. Pharmacare v. Caremark, D.Hawai'i 1996, 965 F.Supp. 1411. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 9

First shareholder in automobile repair shop corporations failed to plead facts sufficient to establish bribery as predicate act in RICO suit against second and third shareholders and other individuals alleging concealment of corporations' profits; first shareholder's allegations that second and third shareholders agreed to confer benefit on insurance companies, with intent to cause them to mail payment for claims directly to second and third shareholders rather than corporations, did not contain any allegation of specific bribe paid. Zigman v. Giacobbe, E.D.N.Y.1996, 944 F.Supp. 147. Bribery 1(1)

Entertaining customers and prospective customers and giving Christmas gifts was not sufficient to support allegation of “bribery,” in violation of federal law, so as to support Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) action against competitors of plaintiff in trucking industry. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc. v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware, D.S.C.1992, 805 F.Supp. 1277, affirmed 998 F.2d 1009, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 553, 510 U.S. 993, 126 L.Ed.2d 454. Bribery 1(1)

Bank's claims to have incurred legal fees in excess of $100,000 in defending action before judge, as result of bribery of judge, stated injury that was distinct from injury to bankrupt corporation and its creditors and which did not involve fraudulent transfer of bankrupt corporation's assets, and therefore bank had standing to assert claim for damages under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act by alleging bribery of judge. Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, S.D.N.Y.1987, 676 F.Supp. 496, reversed on other grounds 859 F.2d 1096, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 1642, 490 U.S. 1007, 104 L.Ed.2d 158, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 1643, 490 U.S. 1007, 104 L.Ed.2d 158. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 58

Complaint adequately informed contractors of what they did to join RICO conspiracy to pay bribes to sewer inspectors by alleging that, for several years, the contractors agreed with corrupt sewer inspectors to commit multiple acts of mail fraud and bribery in order to evade sewer regulations. City of New York v. Joseph L. Balkan, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1987, 656 F.Supp. 536. Conspiracy 18

Allegation that defendants conferred numerous benefits on university's employees in exchange for receiving contracts from university sufficiently alleged predicate act of solicitation of bribery under state law to support federal action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Temple University v. Salla Bros., Inc., E.D.Pa.1986, 656 F.Supp. 97. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Alleged bribes and bribe offers, stretching over a period of time, involving various different members and non- members of enterprise, seeking to accomplish numerous illicit goals for enterprise, including inmate prison transfers, stopping federal tax prosecutions, preventing a state perjury prosecution, and attempting to get a high organized crime figure out of prison, set forth a “pattern of racketeering activity” falling within prohibitions of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. U.S. v. Persico, S.D.N.Y.1986, 646 F.Supp. 752, affirmed in part, reversed in part on other grounds 832 F.2d 705, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 1995, 486 U.S. 1022, 100 L.Ed.2d 227, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 1996, 486 U.S. 1022, 100 L.Ed.2d 227, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 532, 488 U.S. 982, 102 L.Ed.2d 564, post-conviction relief denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

A private citizen's taking of money for the ostensible purpose of using it to influence conduct of a public official is bribery within the ambit of RICO. U.S. v. Gonzales, N.D.Ill.1985, 620 F.Supp. 1143, reconsideration denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 9

Charges of commercial bribery and mail fraud adequately stated predicate acts under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1961]. Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Martin, S.D.Tex.1985, 616 F.Supp. 924. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 9

Finding of fraud resulting from bribery by majority shareholder of principal on whose behalf performance bonds and payment bonds had been issued for construction projects of surety's employees fell within Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act's definition of “racketeering” for purposes of treble damages action. All- state Ins. Co. v. A.M. Pugh Associates, Inc., M.D.Pa.1984, 604 F.Supp. 85. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Defendant's conviction for offering gratuities to public officials in consideration of services performed constituted predicate offenses for purposes of his liability under this chapter. U.S. v. Perkins, E.D.Pa.1984, 596 F.Supp. 528, affirmed 749 F.2d 28, affirmed 749 F.2d 29, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 2018, 471 U.S. 1015, 85 L.Ed.2d 300. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 9

In order to determine whether defendant's alleged acceptance of bribes, which supposedly constitute pattern of racketeering activity, places his conduct within class of activities properly within reach of this chapter, courts simply determine whether Congress had rational basis for finding that regulated activity affects commerce, and, if such basis exists, whether regulatory means selected by Congress are reasonable and appropriate. U. S. v. Joseph, E.D.Pa.1981, 510 F.Supp. 1001. Bribery 1(1)

Activities listed in indictment which charged that defendants had engaged in mail fraud and bribery relating to

two race tracks and other business ventures fell within definition of “racketeering activity.” U.S. v. Mandel, D.C.Md.1976, 415 F.Supp. 997, supplemented 415 F.Supp. 1025. Bribery 1(1); Postal Service 35(.5)

48. ---- Involving bribery, racketeering activity

Under this section relating to acts “involving” bribery, the word “involving” was broad enough to reach alleged conduct of owners and employees of bail bond agency who had allegedly made systematic payments of bribes to public officials and employees. U.S. v. Forsythe, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1977, 560 F.2d 1127. Bribery 1(1)

49. Burglary, racketeering activity

Series of burglaries committed in two states by defendants who were not shown to be members of “organized crime” fell within scope of this chapter. U. S. v. Aleman, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1979, 609 F.2d 298, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 1345, 445 U.S. 946, 63 L.Ed.2d 780. Burglary 2

Allegations in plaintiff's complaint, that defendant and one of plaintiff's employees had participated in scheme to remove merchandise from plaintiff's warehouse and sell it in interstate commerce, sufficiently pled RICO enterprise, consisting of defendant and plaintiff's employee. Executive Photo, Inc. v. Norrell, S.D.N.Y.1991, 756 F.Supp. 798. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

50. Coercion, racketeering activity

Crime of coercion, as defined by Alabama law, is not predicate act for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act (RICO) claim. General Cigar Co., Inc. v. CR Carriers, Inc., M.D.Ala.1996, 948 F.Supp. 1040. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 5

New York felony of coercion in the first-degree was not “racketeering activity” as defined in RICO, notwithstanding government's argument that coercion under New York law fell within “extortion” as used in RICO definition; distinction between coercion and larceny by extortion was not trivial. U.S. v. Private Sanitation In- dustry Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1992, 793 F.Supp. 1114. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 7

51. Conspiracy, racketeering activity

Evidence at trial could not be reasonably construed as supporting only a finding of multiple conspiracies, as purported basis for fatal variance from single conspiracy charged in indictment, in prosecution for conspiring to violate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), relating to defendants' alleged participation in vote-buying scheme in three election cycles in county; while evidence was presented at trial regarding competing factions within the conspiracy, with competing slates of candidates, this did not undermine the government's theory of the case, in light of defendants' common goal to exercise control county board of elections for their own benefit rather than a political party or a particular faction, the nature of their vote-buying scheme, which highlighted how individuals working for competing slates simultaneously could have agreed to a broader common goal of personal benefit, and the overlap of participants in each faction in all three election cycles. U.S.

v. Adams, C.A.6 (Ky.) 2013, 722 F.3d 788. Conspiracy 43(12)

Former restaurant employees' allegations of employers' conspiracy and aiding and abetting did not plead a civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) predicate act under statute making it a federal crime to engage in any conspiracy to commit violations of statute criminalizing the concealing, harboring, or shielding of an alien from detection or statute criminalizing encouraging and inducing an alien to enter the United States illegally; mere use of words “conspiracy” and “aiding and abetting,” without any more explanation of the grounds of employees' entitlement to relief, was insufficient. Edwards v. Prime, Inc., C.A.11 (Ala.) 2010, 602 F.3d 1276. Aliens, Immigration, And Citizenship 778; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 70

Any error in allowing jury to find that defendant committed a particular racketeering act under the vicarious coconspirator liability theory of Pinkerton was harmless where jury specifically found that defendant committed three other racketeering acts constituting pattern of racketeering activity. U.S. v. Tokars, C.A.11 (Ga.) 1996, 95 F.3d 1520, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 1282, 520 U.S. 1132, 137 L.Ed.2d 357, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 1328, 520 U.S. 1151, 137 L.Ed.2d 489. Criminal Law 1172.8

Alleged murder conspiracy by “captain” in organized crime enterprise could be charged as racketeering predicate along with gambling and attempted extortion predicates and counts for attempted extortion and illegal gambling, even if proof of murder conspiracy revealed unsavory aspects of “captain's” criminal past. U.S. v. Eu- frasio, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1991, 935 F.2d 553, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 340, 502 U.S. 925, 116 L.Ed.2d 280, denial of post-conviction relief affirmed 38 F.3d 693. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 15

Threat of continuing racketeering activity was present, in that defendant's activities took place as part of large cocaine smuggling operation that had smuggled drugs both before and after incident defendant was involved in, and thus fact that defendant's cocaine possession and Travel Act violation predicate acts were in close temporal proximity and related to single importation did not prevent acts from fulfilling pattern requirement of “continuity plus relationship” necessary to prove conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO). U.S. v. Gonzalez, C.A.11 (Ala.) 1991, 921 F.2d 1530, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 178, 502 U.S. 860, 116 L.Ed.2d 140, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 96, 502 U.S. 827, 116 L.Ed.2d 68. Conspiracy 28(3)

Conspiracy to murder could serve as predicate act for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy offense; statutory definition of racketeering activity encompasses predicate conspiracies, and problems in charging conspiracies to commit inchoate offenses did not arise in RICO context, as RICO conspiracy and predicate conspiracy were distinct offenses with different objectives. U.S. v. Pungitore, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1990, 910 F.2d 1084, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 2009, 500 U.S. 915, 114 L.Ed.2d 98, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 2010, 500 U.S. 915, 114 L.Ed.2d 98, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 2011, 500 U.S. 916, 114 L.Ed.2d 98, dismissal of habeas corpus vacated 68 F.3d 458, habeas corpus denied 945 F.Supp. 813, habeas corpus denied 947 F.Supp. 157, habeas corpus denied 965 F.Supp. 666, affirmed 172 F.3d 861, certiorari denied 119 S.Ct. 1483, 526 U.S. 1078, 143 L.Ed.2d 566, habeas corpus denied 970 F.Supp. 426, habeas corpus denied

993 F.Supp. 313, post-conviction relief denied 992 F.Supp. 766, post-conviction relief granted 2 F.Supp.2d 647, reconsideration denied , post-conviction relief denied 980 F.Supp. 803, post-conviction relief denied 15 F.Supp.2d 705, certification denied. Conspiracy 28(3)

Conspiracy may properly be alleged as a predicate act of racketeering under this chapter when it involves any of the substantive offenses included within the definition of racketeering activity. U. S. v. Phillips, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1981, 664 F.2d 971, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 2965, 457 U.S. 1136, 73 L.Ed.2d 1354, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 208, 459 U.S. 906, 74 L.Ed.2d 166. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 15

Claimed injuries of former clients of public interest law firm were proximately caused by fraud of purported attorney employed by firm, who claimed to be attorney when he was not one and failed to provide paid-for services to clients, and not by any cover-up by firm's director and its various officers, and thus clients lacked standing to bring conspiracy action against firm's director and officers under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO); clients claimed as injuries cash paid and services rendered to purported attorney in exchange for legal services that were never provided and lost wages and moving expenses resulting from purported attorney's advice, and cover-up did not prevent clients from filing lawsuits that purported attorney failed to file. Lopez v. Council on American-Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc., D.D.C.2009, 657 F.Supp.2d 104, affirmed 383 Fed.Appx. 1, 2010 WL 2689367. Conspiracy 8

Deferral of district court's consideration of issues of corrective action statements and advertisement placement in retail stores pending resolution of litigation challenging Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regulations concerning required warnings for cigarette packaging and advertisements was not warranted in United States' action alleging that cigarette manufacturers and tobacco-related trade organizations violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by engaging in conspiracy to deceive American public about health effects of smoking, where litigation would not end for extremely long period of time, defendants failed to establish any serious hardship they would face by proceeding with consideration of corrective action statements issue, and public had very substantial interest in having access to whatever corrective action statements might be adopted. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., D.D.C.2012, 841 F.Supp.2d 139. Action 68

In government's action alleging that cigarette manufacturers and tobacco-related trade organizations violated, and continued to violate, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by engaging in conspiracy to deceive American public about, inter alia, health risks of low-tar cigarettes, and to manipulate design and composition of cigarettes in order to sustain nicotine addiction, defendants were not entitled to clarification of order which permanently enjoined them from committing any act of racketeering relating in any way to the man- ufacturing, marketing, promotion, health consequences, or sale of cigarettes in the United States, where defendants had more than sufficient notice of the illegal conduct that was prohibited under the injunction. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., D.D.C.2007, 477 F.Supp.2d 191. Injunction 1611

Father failed to allege that employees of various child protection agencies, and State of Oregon Services to Chil- dren and Families (SOSCF) were part of a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise, that they agreed to violate substantive provisions of RICO, or that they agreed to participate in RICO conspiracy, as required to state RICO claim; former husband merely asserted his RICO claim was based on the

“false allegations and fraudulent statements” of the employees, and he provided no specifics of time, place, or nature of alleged RICO violations. Nielson v. Legacy Health Systems, D.Or.2001, 230 F.Supp.2d 1206. Conspir- acy 18; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 74

Alleged agreement between bank and principals of limited partnership to commit common-law fraud could not be basis for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy claim; common-law fraud was not “predicate act” under RICO. Attick v. Valeria Associates, L.P., S.D.N.Y.1992, 835 F.Supp. 103. Con- spiracy 28(3); Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Conspiracy needed to support convictions of former commissioner of city parks department for violating Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act in connection with use of city park department services and equipment for personal gain was established by evidence that defendant committed seven racketeering acts, knew of general nature of conspiracy, and knew that conspiracy extended beyond defendant's individual role. U.S. v. Delano, W.D.N.Y.1993, 825 F.Supp. 534, affirmed in part , reversed in part 55 F.3d 720. Conspiracy 47(3.1)

Operators of day care center who were acquitted of child sexual abuse charges could not bring Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against state and county officials based upon officials' investigation of abuse charges; day care operators' vague allegations that officials had conspired with parents and others to falsify sexual abuse claims could not fairly be construed as “racketeering activity” under RICO statutes. Simmerman v. Corino, D.N.J.1992, 804 F.Supp. 644, affirmed 16 F.3d 405. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Under principles of conspiracy law, officers of labor organization and alleged members of organized crime could be held liable for acts of other coconspirators even if acts occurred before defendants joined conspiracy alleged in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action. U.S. v. District Council of New York City and Vicinity of United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America, S.D.N.Y.1991, 778 F.Supp. 738. Conspiracy 41

Conspiracy to commit offenses of mail fraud, wire fraud, or interstate transportation of stolen property does not qualify as “predicate act” of racketeering for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). R.E. Davis Chemical Corp. v. Nalco Chemical Co., N.D.Ill.1990, 757 F.Supp. 1499. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 15

Government could allege multiple conspiracies as predicate acts of racketeering activity supporting RICO conspiracy; such allegations would not amount to misjoinder of multiple conspiracies under cover of single alleged conspiracy. U.S. v. Biaggi, S.D.N.Y.1987, 672 F.Supp. 112. Indictment And Information 125(5.5)

Inclusion of conspiratorial acts as predicate offenses in RICO counts was proper provided that all RICO enterprise defendants could be shown to have nexus signaling existence of truly unified agreement; if evidence at trial

showed unrelated multiple conspiracies, defendants would be entitled to acquittal on RICO conspiracy charges. U.S. v. Vastola, D.N.J.1987, 670 F.Supp. 1244. Conspiracy 30

Agreement to commit predicate acts of racketeering activity, standing alone, is not sufficient to support charge of conspiracy to violate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; plaintiff must also demonstrate defendant's consent to violation of substantive RICO provision. Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Barry, D.Minn.1987, 666 F.Supp. 1311. Conspiracy 28(3)

Conspiracy may properly be charged as predicate act for offenses listed in 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1)(A, D), defining “racketeering activity” as act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion or dealing in narcotic or dangerous drugs punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, or offenses involving fraud in connection with sales of security or drug offenses, respectively, but conspiracies can serve as racketeering activities under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1)(B), defining “racketeering activity” as act indictable under certain provisions of 18 U.S.C.A., only when enumerated statute includes conspiracy as indictable offense. Allington v. Carpenter, C.D.Cal.1985, 619 F.Supp. 474. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 15

Even in case where conspiracy forms basis of alleged illegal enterprise, plaintiff must still prove that one member of conspiracy committed at least two predicate acts as required in furtherance of conspiracy's purpose to state cause of action under this chapter. Rich-Taubman Associates v. Stamford Restaurant Operating Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1984, 587 F.Supp. 875. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Complaint which alleged that defendant chemical company conspired with its “employees, agents and others” to violate this chapter was sufficient to allege conspiracy cognizable under this chapter. Callan v. State Chemical Mfg. Co., E.D.Pa.1984, 584 F.Supp. 619. Conspiracy 18

A conspiracy can properly be charged as a predicate act of racketeering under this chapter. U.S. v. Napolitano, S.D.N.Y.1982, 564 F.Supp. 951. See, also, Zola v. Gordon, S.D.N.Y.1988, 685 F.Supp. 354, on reargument 701 F.Supp. 66. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 15

Government was not required to prove that defendant on trial for gang-related offenses was personally involved in two racketeering acts, but only the existence of an agreement on an overall objective. U.S. v. Sandoval, C.A.11 (Ga.) 2009, 325 Fed.Appx. 828, 2009 WL 1143506, Unreported, appeal after new sentencing hearing 369 Fed.Appx. 67, 2010 WL 780395, certiorari denied 131 S.Ct. 818, 178 L.Ed.2d 555, post-conviction relief denied 2012 WL 5398437, appeal after new sentencing hearing 375 Fed.Appx. 985, 2010 WL 1634638. Con- spiracy 24(1)

52. Discharge of employee, racketeering activity

Overt act of discharge of employee was not a RICO predicate act, so that his loss of employment did not confer standing to sue for RICO conspiracy violation. Hecht v. Commerce Clearing House, Inc., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1990, 897 F.2d 21, 100 A.L.R. Fed. 655. Conspiracy 6

53. Drug and narcotics violation, racketeering activity

Any alleged error in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) prosecution of street gang by instructing jury that illegal drug distribution satisfied the interstate commerce element of the crime was harmless, since numerous pieces of evidence tied gang's crimes to interstate commerce; gang was a national gang, two guns at issue were manufactured in Florida and transported to Georgia, and numerous gang members, with help of other gang members, fled to other states and countries to avoid arrest for their gang-related crimes. U.S. v. Flores, C.A.11 (Ga.) 2009, 572 F.3d 1254, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied 350 Fed.Appx. 435, 2009 WL 3246801, certiorari denied 130 S.Ct. 561, 558 U.S. 1015, 175 L.Ed.2d 389, certiorari denied 130 S.Ct. 562, 558 U.S. 1015, 175 L.Ed.2d 389, certiorari denied 130 S.Ct. 568, 558 U.S. 1015, 175 L.Ed.2d 389, certiorari denied 130 S.Ct. 1108, 558 U.S. 1133, 175 L.Ed.2d 921, post-conviction relief denied 2011 WL 3273622, affirmed 506 Fed.Appx. 945, 2013 WL 452412, post-conviction relief denied 2011 WL 5554391. Criminal Law 1172.3

Evidence was sufficient to permit jury to conclude beyond reasonable doubt, under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), that defendant and other persons were associated in fact and functioned as continuing unit in narcotics trafficking in housing complex, where, among other things, defendant and his relatives provided drugs to “lieutenants,” lieutenants used street-level dealers to sell narcotics, and defendant and his relatives collaborated in enforcing enterprise's exclusive control over complex. U.S. v. Jones, C.A.2 (Conn.) 2006, 482 F.3d 60, certiorari denied 127 S.Ct. 1306, 549 U.S. 1231, 167 L.Ed.2d 119, on remand 2007 WL 1670141. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

Evidence was sufficient to support finding that gang was actively engaged in racketeering activity of drug trafficking during the time period relevant to defendants' indictment for violations of the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering (VCAR) statute; although certain evidence showed that the gang had a purported policy prohibiting the use and sale of narcotics, that evidence was countered by gang member testimony that several gang members used and sold narcotics, that the leadership of the gang did not make substantial efforts to stop these activities, and the gang responded as a group to threats from other gangs over drug spots and territory. U.S. v. Pimentel, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2003, 346 F.3d 285, certiorari denied 125 S.Ct. 451, 543 U.S. 955, 160 L.Ed.2d 316, post-conviction relief dismissed 2005 WL 820513. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 95

Predicate act of defendant's conspiracy with another to distribute cocaine hydrochloride and heroin hydrochloride had adequate nexus to charged narcotics enterprise to serve as a predicate act for a conviction on Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) charge, based on drug dealer's testimony linking dealer's sales of cocaine to group conducting criminal enterprise, notwithstanding inability of dealer who sold cocaine and heroin to specify the source of narcotics he purchased from two members of enterprise. U.S. v. Scarpa, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1990, 913 F.2d 993, post-conviction relief denied 848 F.Supp. 354, post-conviction relief dismissed. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 15

Predicate crimes of police officer who assisted drug traffickers in return for personal use cocaine were sufficiently related to sustain conviction under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; officer repeatedly peddled information, furnished bullets and escorted dealers. U.S. v. Ruiz, C.A.1 (Mass.) 1990, 905 F.2d 499. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 13

Predicate acts used in charge of supervising continuing criminal enterprise engaged in narcotics distribution were not factually identical with those used to charge conspiring to engage in illegal racketeering enterprise in violation of RICO by participating in affairs of illegal enterprise that trafficked in controlled substances, for purposes of double jeopardy claim, although nonnarcotics predicate acts alleged in RICO conspiracy count were incorporated by reference into CCE count; only narcotics felony offenses can serve as predicate acts under CCE statutes, and nonnarcotics charges were thus at best surplusage and could not have supported CCE conviction. U.S. v. Muhammad, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1987, 824 F.2d 214, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 716, 484 U.S. 1013, 98 L.Ed.2d 666. Double Jeopardy 151(5)

Marijuana is Schedule I controlled substance and therefore falls within ambit of Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act language referring to “narcotic or other dangerous drugs.” U.S. v. Williams, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1987, 809 F.2d 1072, rehearing denied 817 F.2d 1136, on rehearing 828 F.2d 1, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 228, 484 U.S. 896, 98 L.Ed.2d 187, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 229, 484 U.S. 896, 98 L.Ed.2d 187, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 259, 484 U.S. 913, 98 L.Ed.2d 216, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 506, 484 U.S. 987, 98 L.Ed.2d 504, opinion after remand 859 F.2d 327. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 13

Marijuana trafficking was “predicate act” under RICO statute, so that the defendant's alleged involvement in conspiracy to import and distribute marijuana was sufficient to support RICO prosecution. U.S. v. Ryland, C.A.9 (Ariz.) 1986, 806 F.2d 941, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 2199, 481 U.S. 1057, 95 L.Ed.2d 854. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 13

Acquittal of defendant on charge of facilitating distribution of methamphetamine by use of communication facility did not invalidate RICO convictions in which telephone facilitation acted as predicate offense. U.S. v. Tins- ley, C.A.4 (Va.) 1986, 800 F.2d 448. Criminal Law 878(4)

Acts of dealing in marijuana could constitute predicate acts of racketeering activity proscribed by the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization statutes; marijuana is classified as controlled substance and dealing therein is a federal offense, within ambit of RICO. U.S. v. Tillett, C.A.4 (Va.) 1985, 763 F.2d 628. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 13

Marijuana may be the subject of a charge under this chapter as marijuana has been classified as a Schedule I controlled substance. U. S. v. Phillips, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1981, 664 F.2d 971, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 2965, 457 U.S. 1136, 73 L.Ed.2d 1354, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 208, 459 U.S. 906, 74 L.Ed.2d 166. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 13

For purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) counterclaim by manufacturer and seller of gold jewelry against competitor, allegations that competitor engaged in unspecified number of narcotics violations over imprecise period of as many as 12 years were too vague to survive even requirements of notice pleading and therefore could not serve as adequate predicate. Michael Anthony Jewelers, Inc. v. Peacock Jew- elry, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1992, 795 F.Supp. 639. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Marijuana is a “dangerous drug” within provision of RICO defining racketeering activity to include the manufacture, etc., of narcotic or other dangerous drugs. U.S. v. Castellano, S.D.N.Y.1985, 610 F.Supp. 1359. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 13

Marijuana related drug offenses may be predicate to racketeering acts under this chapter. U.S. v. Harvey, S.D.Fla.1982, 560 F.Supp. 1040, affirmed 789 F.2d 1492, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 190, 479 U.S. 854, 93 L.Ed.2d 123, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 192, 479 U.S. 855, 93 L.Ed.2d 124, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 279, 479 U.S. 886, 93 L.Ed.2d 255. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 13

54. Endorsements, racketeering activity

Agricultural equipment suppliers' endorsements of computer system supplier and computer supplier's payment of royalties to agricultural suppliers for computer systems leased to agricultural equipment dealers did not constitute “racketeering activities” within statutory definition, so as to support Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) civil claim. American Computer Trust Leasing v. Jack Farrell Implement Co., D.Minn.1991, 763 F.Supp. 1473, affirmed and remanded 967 F.2d 1208, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 414, 506 U.S. 956, 121 L.Ed.2d 338. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

55. Extortion, racketeering activity--Generally

Alleged violations of Wyoming's blackmail statute by employees of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in their efforts to obtain an easement against ranch owner's property did not qualify as a predicate offense for a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) suit, given that the alleged conduct did not fit the traditional definition of extortion. Wilkie v. Robbins, U.S.2007, 127 S.Ct. 2588, 551 U.S. 537, 168 L.Ed.2d 389, on remand 497 F.3d 1122. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 8

Allegations that financing officer threatened to lose successful bidder's requisition forms unless bidder entered joint venture on Housing and Urban Development project, was use of fear of economic loss needed for extortion claim under Hobbs Act and predicate act of attempted extortion for purposes of civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim. McLaughlin v. Anderson, C.A.2 (Conn.) 1992, 962 F.2d 187. Torts 436

There was sufficient evidence that defendant fire inspector and his supervisor agreed to commit two separate and distinct predicate acts to support defendant's conviction of conspiracy to violate the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), based upon evidence that defendant and supervisor agreed to split bribes given during course of inspection of restaurant, that liquor license applicant paid supervisor during task force inspection of roller skating rink, and that consultation took place between supervisor and defendant before amount of bribe from liquor license applicant was established. U.S. v. Balzano, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1990, 916 F.2d 1273. Con- spiracy 47(3.1)

Defendant attorney's alleged act of extortion in diverting from plaintiff attorney checks from settlements of case in which plaintiff acted as defendant's cocounsel, and then withholding fund of attorney fees from plaintiff,

could not be counted as “predicate act” for purposes of RICO statute; there was no evidence that defendant attorney ever intended to put plaintiff attorney in fear or that her fear was reasonable. Sutherland v. O'Malley, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1989, 882 F.2d 1196, rehearing denied. Extortion 20; Extortion 22

Farmers' RICO action against bank, insurer, federal land bank and others was clearly without merit where farm owners did not show that any of the defendants conspired to create unlawful debts, attempted to collect those debts by extortionate means, or committed mail fraud in attempting to collect farmers' agricultural loans, under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1); thus appeal of dismissal was frivolous under U.S.Ct. of App. 8th Cir. Rule 12(a), 28 U.S.C.A. Wagner v. Farmers & Merchants State Bank of Bloomfield, Neb., C.A.8 (Neb.) 1986, 787 F.2d 444. Federal Courts 726

Activities of Croation terrorist group, which perpetrated an international extortion scheme against “moderate Croations” and persons they believed to be supporters of government of Yugoslavia, came within purview of this chapter, because core of enterprise was commission of more than 50 acts of classic economic crime or extortion, and many violent crimes perpetrated were in aid of extortion scheme, and were carried on either to compel payment of or in retaliation for refusal to meet defendants' extortion demands. U.S. v. Bagaric, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1983, 706 F.2d 42, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 133, 464 U.S. 840, 78 L.Ed.2d 128, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 134, 464 U.S. 840, 78 L.Ed.2d 128, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 283, 464 U.S. 917, 78 L.Ed.2d 261. Commerce 82.6; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 8

Each payment by undercover business operated by Federal Bureau of Investigation agents resulted from defendants' initial threats in ongoing extortion scheme and thus each payment was separate act of racketeering under this chapter. U. S. v. Brooklier, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1982, 685 F.2d 1208, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 1194, 459 U.S. 1206, 75 L.Ed.2d 439, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 1195, 459 U.S. 1206, 75 L.Ed.2d 439. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 8

Fund trustees' ERISA collection action was not, as alleged in employer's subsequent Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action, brought as part of criminal extortion conspiracy or sham to retaliate against employer or put it out of business; trustees' objective of collecting delinquent fund contributions was not only rightful one but their fiduciary duty, and filing of lawsuit did not involve threat of force, violence or fear. Andrea Doreen Ltd. v. Building Material Local Union 282, E.D.N.Y.2004, 299 F.Supp.2d 129. Conspiracy 28(3); Labor And Employment 665

Alleged extortionate acts taken by union against employer in pursuit of legitimate union ends did not constitute a Hobbs Act violation or a predicate act for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Buck Creek Coal, Inc. v. United Workers of America, S.D.Ind.1995, 917 F.Supp. 601. Extortion 22; Extortion 23; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 12

Wife's sending letter to husband in which she claimed to have third-party financier who was going to assure husband would be totally wiped out forever upon divorce if he did not agree to divulge his secret holdings did not constitute Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) predicate act of extortion or attempted extortion under either federal or state law; husband neither alleged nor supplied any evidence that wife obtained

or exerted control over any of his property as a result of letter and wife believed she had a right to property she was seeking to obtain. Streck v. Peters, D.Hawai'i 1994, 855 F.Supp. 1156. Extortion 10; Extortion 22; Extortion 26; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 8

Union member stated claim against union business agent for extortion under Hobbs Act, and thus satisfied “racketeering activity” element of Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, where union member alleged that business agent harassed and intimated him, urged superintendent to lay him off, and caused him to resign his position, based on his performance of work at construction site where another company was being picketed. O'Rourke v. Crosley, D.N.J.1994, 847 F.Supp. 1208. Torts 436

Threats by bakery franchisor, to terminate franchises if licensing fees were not paid, was not extortion and could not be predicate act for claim by franchisees under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Zaro Licensing, Inc. v. Cinmar, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1991, 779 F.Supp. 276. Extortion 22; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 8

Complaint adequately alleged that officers of labor organization participated in extortion of union members' rights to free speech, participation in union affairs and loyal and responsible representation in violation of Hobbs Act, and alleged acts of extortion qualified as predicate acts for purposes of civil Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) liability. U.S. v. District Council of New York City and Vicinity of United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America, S.D.N.Y.1991, 778 F.Supp. 738. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 8

Union's general president and its communications director aided and abetted extortion of union members' LM- RDA rights in awarding printing contract to printing firm of president's son-in-law, providing court-appointed administrator with ground to reasonably believe that awarding of contract furthered act of racketeering under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), as required for administrator to veto union expenditures to printing firm pursuant to consent decree; contract was awarded by means of rigged bidding process, and firm lacked its own equipment, credit, contacts or track record of competence and efficiency. U.S. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, S.D.N.Y.1991, 765 F.Supp. 1206, appeal dismissed, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 975, 502 U.S. 1075, 117 L.Ed.2d 139. Federal Civil Procedure 2397.5

Corporation, its officer, and claimant to shares made out claim for extortion as predicate act to racketeering charge by specifying instances where defendant tax exempt corporation, its officers and shareholders threatened plaintiffs with information gained from wiretapping to deprive him of their property, including attempts to keep them from selling their business, thus depriving them of cash, and attempts to eliminate claimant's interest in plaintiff corporation. Federal Information Systems, Corp. v. Boyd, D.D.C.1990, 753 F.Supp. 971. Torts 436

Putative finders suing for fee in connection with corporate acquisition pleaded facts sufficient to establish racketeering activity involving extortion and thus state cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO); finders had alleged that vice-president and general counsel of acquiring corporation had

contacted law partner of officer of finder, whose firm did legal work for acquiring corporation, demanding that either finder must drop its claim or attorney be discharged from firm and precluded from working on any of acquiring corporations' legal work, or otherwise acquiring corporation would take its legal business elsewhere. Deem v. Lockheed Corp., S.D.N.Y.1989, 749 F.Supp. 1230, reargument denied. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 70

Government made sufficient showing of nexus between sheriff's extortion (a predicate act) and operation of sheriff's department (the RICO enterprise) to defeat motion to strike extortion count from RICO indictment, where sheriff received phone calls and held meetings pertaining to extortion at office in sheriff's department, and where sheriff mailed out communications pertaining to extortion on stationery with office address; Govern- ment's proffer provided sufficient showing to meet relatedness and continuity tests. U.S. v. Thomas, M.D.Tenn.1990, 749 F.Supp. 847. Indictment And Information 137(1)

Evidence that abortion protestors made unauthorized entrances into clinic and that patients and employees present during those entries were placed in fear by the nature and manner of the incidents was sufficient to show extortion as predicate act for RICO claims of clinic. Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, E.D.Pa.1987, 670 F.Supp. 1300. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Though sufficient proof of extortion of interest payment on loan could support convictions for extortionate extension of credit and collection and extortionate interference with commerce, in that unit of prosecution under each statute is different, proof could not support conviction of RICO pattern, which required “sufficiently differentiated” acts. U.S. v. Vastola, D.N.J.1987, 670 F.Supp. 1244. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Actions of organization in conducting demonstrations and picketing of television station and its advertisers, and in mailing letters in order to coerce station to provide free air time for organization's messages, constituted extortion under federal law, as predicate offense under federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO). Burnham Broadcasting Co. v. Williams, La.App. 4 Cir.1993, 629 So.2d 1335, writ denied 632 So.2d 770, 1994-0150 (La. 2/25/94), certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 69, 513 U.S. 814, 130 L.Ed.2d 25. Extortion 19

56. ---- Hobbs Act violations, extortion, racketeering activity

Alleged violations of the Hobbs Act by employees of the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) in their efforts to obtain an easement over landowner's property for the exclusive benefit of the Government did not qualify as a predicate offense for a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against individual employees. Wilkie v. Robbins, U.S.2007, 127 S.Ct. 2588, 551 U.S. 537, 168 L.Ed.2d 389, on remand 497 F.3d 1122. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 8

Although conduct proscribed under state law must be generically classified as extortionate to qualify as a predicate act under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), Bureau of Land Management (BLM) employees' alleged lawful authority to require reciprocal right-of-way from ranch owner who held various BLM preference rights did not give them authority to use any means necessary to extort right-of-way under the Hobbs

Act, and such lawful authority did not provide defense to blackmail under Wyoming law, for purposes of owner's claim that acts of blackmail were predicate acts under RICO. Robbins v. Wilkie, C.A.10 (Wyo.) 2006, 433 F.3d 755, certiorari granted 127 S.Ct. 722, 549 U.S. 1075, 166 L.Ed.2d 559, reversed and remanded 127 S.Ct. 2588, 551 U.S. 537, 168 L.Ed.2d 389, on remand 497 F.3d 1122. Extortion 28

Racketeering convictions under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act were supported by evidence of Hobbs Act violations where lobbyists met with state legislator to discuss specific legislative action, legislator refused to discuss legislation and reviewed record of campaign contributions, and legislator ended each meeting without giving lobbyist a chance to discuss legislative matter. U.S. v. Carpenter, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1992, 961 F.2d 824, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 332, 506 U.S. 919, 121 L.Ed.2d 250. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 8

Hobbs Act's definition of “wrongful” didnot apply to state law extortion predicates of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against union; extortion under RICO did not require the existence of an “unlawful objective.” Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Intern. Union, E.D.Va.2008, 585 F.Supp.2d 789. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 8; Torts 436

Distributor of golf carts did not establish extortion, in violation of Hobbs Act, as predicate offense for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim brought against manufacturer, in connection with termination of oral agreement to act as distributor for manufacturer's utility vehicle line; if there was oral agreement, it was unenforceable under Georgia statute of frauds provision requiring writing when contract would not be performed within one year. Club Car, Inc. v. Club Car (Quebec) Import, Inc., S.D.Ga.2003, 276 F.Supp.2d 1276, affirmed 362 F.3d 775, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied 111 Fed.Appx. 1003, 2004 WL 1585294, certiorari denied 125 S.Ct. 618, 543 U.S. 1002, 160 L.Ed.2d 461. Extortion 19

Allegations of subornation of perjury by union's regional organizing director and violation of the Hobbs Act by union and director were not sufficient to plead continuity, as required to establish pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where complaint asserted only that acts took place over four-month period, did not specify when alleged obstruction of justice arising from perjury took place, and did not demonstrate a threat of continuing racketeering activity. Mariah Boat, Inc. v. Laborers Intern. Union of North America, S.D.Ill.1998, 19 F.Supp.2d 893. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Rights of labor organization members to free speech, democratic participation in union affairs, and loyal and responsible representation by union officers were “property” under Hobbs Act, and therefore, defendants' alleged extortion of labor union officers and employees to obtain such rights was legally sufficient predicate act under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). U.S. v. Bellomo, S.D.N.Y.1997, 954 F.Supp. 630. Extortion 23

Defendant's guilty plea in state court to coercion in the first degree established that he had committed predicate racketeering act in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) action; guilty plea in state action precluded defendant from litigating facts underlying that plea, defendant was fully aware of consequences of

guilty plea, and conviction established elements of Hobbs Act violation. U.S. v. Private Sanitation Industry Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1994, 899 F.Supp. 974, appeal granted 44 F.3d 1082, affirmed 47 F.3d 1158, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 50, 516 U.S. 806, 133 L.Ed.2d 15. Judgment 828.8

To extent RICO defendants were charged with conspiring to commit certain acts indictable under enumerated federal criminal provisions, they were alleged to have committed acts that were “indictable” under Hobbs Act and, as such, were alleged to have committed acts cognizable as “racketeering activity.” U.S. v. Private Sanita- tion Industry Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1992, 793 F.Supp. 1114. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 70

General allegations of violence at local unions were appropriate as to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act (RICO) claims predicated on Hobbs Act violations, where it may have been impossible for Govern- ment to pinpoint who committed acts of violence; Government was entitled to prove atmosphere at union and its contribution to Hobbs Act extortion. U.S. v. District Council of New York City and Vicinity of United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America, S.D.N.Y.1991, 778 F.Supp. 738. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 70

Union rank and file's rights to democracy and self-governance under LMRDA are extortable property under Hobbs Act, and extortion of those rights may constitute act of “racketeering” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) statute. U.S. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehouse- men and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, S.D.N.Y.1991, 765 F.Supp. 1206, appeal dismissed, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 975, 502 U.S. 1075, 117 L.Ed.2d 139. Extortion 23; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 8

Alleged violation of Hobbs Act by securities firm and stock exchange could not serve as predicate racketeering activity to support RICO cause of action by market trader who alleged that defendants conspired to obtain millions of dollars from him under threat, by refusing him admission to stock exchange unless he paid outstanding debts owed securities firm by corporation of which he had been officer; application of stock exchange's membership procedures to trader's application and securities firm's attachment and arbitration actions involving debts were legal proceedings and were not “wrongful” within meaning of Hobbs Act. Peterson v. Philadelphia Stock Exchange, E.D.Pa.1989, 717 F.Supp. 332, on reconsideration. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 8

57. False pretenses, racketeering activity

Obtaining money under false pretenses is not a “racketeering activity” within meaning of Racketeer Influence Corrupt Organizations Act. Disandro-Smith & Associates, P.C., Inc. v. Edron Copier Service, Inc., D.R.I.1989, 722 F.Supp. 912. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

58. Falsification of records, racketeering activity

Neither larceny by embezzlement nor larceny by false promise falls within the Racketeering Influenced and Cor-

rupt Organization Act (RICO) statutory definition of “racketeering activity,” nor does “false procurement” of documents constitute a RICO predicate act. Weizmann Institute of Science v. Neschis, S.D.N.Y.2002, 229 F.Supp.2d 234. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

One defendant's attempt to falsify records subpoenaed by federal grand jury in order to cover up completed predicate crimes alleged in indictment under this chapter and to prolong illegal activities allegedly engaged in was properly included as a predicate act in counts charging conspiracy under this chapter and substantive violations of this chapter regardless of whether any of the other defendants participated in or were aware of the actual preparation of the false records. U. S. v. Boffa, D.C.Del.1980, 513 F.Supp. 444. Conspiracy 40.1

59. Fraud, racketeering activity--Generally

As predicate acts under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), mail fraud and wire fraud require, inter alia, evidence of intent to defraud, that is, evidence of scheme to defraud by false or fraudulent pretenses, representation, or promises; circumstantial evidence can be sufficient. Crowe v. Henry, C.A.5 (La.) 1997, 115 F.3d 294. Postal Service 49(11); Telecommunications 1018(4)

As owner of corporation had no fiduciary duty to another corporation with which his company did business, his alleged omissions were not fraudulent, as required to support Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim based on fraud. C & B Sales & Service, Inc. v. McDonald, C.A.5 (La.) 1996, 95 F.3d 1308, modified on denial of rehearing 111 F.3d 27. Corporations And Business Organizations 1524

Intentional filing of false insurance claims or false completed work forms in order to obtain payments from insurer constituted “scheme to defraud” the insurer as a predicate act for RICO claim. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co. v. P & B Autobody, C.A.1 (Mass.) 1994, 43 F.3d 1546. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Competitor's statement in trade magazine regarding “rip-offs,” although perhaps disparaging to other manufacturer, did not rise to level of fraud which would support Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim. Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Corp., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1994, 34 F.3d 1321. Fraud 68.5

Minority shareholder's failure to establish oral contract with majority shareholder to purchase his stock was fatal to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) predicate act as a matter of law; premise of RICO fraud claim was that majority shareholder entered into oral agreement to purchase stock at end of minority owner's employment and therefore minority owner had to establish oral contract to purchase or sell to sustain fraud claim under federal securities laws. Conkling v. Turner, C.A.5 (La.) 1994, 18 F.3d 1285, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Mortgagors did not justifiably or reasonably rely on representation of mortgagee to their detriment, as required for mortgagors' claims challenging mortgagee's presentation of payment option adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) to mortgagors under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); mortgagors had held several ARMs in the past, mortgagors were active and continuous shoppers of mortgage financing and possessed obvious and extensive experience with fixed-rate and ARM loans, mortgagors received substantial benefits in con-

nection with ARMs complained of, and there was no evidence that mortgagee misrepresented interest payments due under ARM. Biggs v. Eaglewood Mortg., LLC, D.Md.2008, 582 F.Supp.2d 707, motion to amend denied 636 F.Supp.2d 477, affirmed 353 Fed.Appx. 864, 2009 WL 4250577, certiorari denied 130 S.Ct. 3360, 176 L.Ed.2d 1247. Mortgages 216

Residential mortgage lender and broker established claims against one of its branch managers, competing brokerage and abstract businesses and their owners and operators alleging violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act arising from fraudulent scheme to divert brokerage business to defendants, as required for entry of default judgment; defendants formed and were members of association-in-fact enterprise which had an organizational structure in which defendants and others carried out distinct responsibilities and which functioned as continuing unit, one of defendants conducted business with lenders in interstate commerce, and, over course of two and a half year period, broker's branch manager and other defendants committed predicate acts of racketeering. Fairfield Financial Mortg. Group, Inc. v. Luca, E.D.N.Y.2013, 925 F.Supp.2d 344 . Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 10; Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 29; Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 44

Allegations of mail fraud, replete with examples of fraudulent statements, explanations for why the statements were fraudulent and the identity of the particular fraudulent statements provided, and each defendant's role in those statements, alleged fraud under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) with sufficient particularity. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Grafman, E.D.N.Y.2009, 655 F.Supp.2d 212. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint failed to specify any act within RICO's definition of racketeering activity; complaint only alleged that defendants in general defrauded plaintiffs. Syn- ergy Financial, L.L.C. v. Zarro, W.D.N.C.2004, 329 F.Supp.2d 701. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 10

Alleged fraudulent transfers in violation of Iowa Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA) were not criminal offenses identified as “racketeering activity” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Webster Industries, Inc. v. Northwood Doors, Inc., N.D.Iowa 2004, 320 F.Supp.2d 821. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

Automobile dealers were not injured as result of distributor's alleged fraudulent scheme to conceal alleged options-packing scheme, as required to support their civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim based on such scheme; any added costs that dealers may have incurred to purchase unwanted accessories or to pay floor plan interest on vehicles that took longer than expected to sell because they were equipped with unwanted accessories would have been directly caused by the option-packing scheme rather than the fraud scheme. George Lussier Enterprises, Inc. v. Subaru of New England, Inc., D.N.H.2003, 286 F.Supp.2d 86, affirmed 393 F.3d 36, certiorari denied 126 S.Ct. 395, 546 U.S. 926, 163 L.Ed.2d 274. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint failed to plead predicate wire and mail

fraud act with requisite particularity; although complaint alleged specific instances of mail and wire use, no use was attributed to any specific defendant. Tate v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., N.D.Cal.2002, 230 F.Supp.2d 1072. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Amendment to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) removing securities fraud claims as RICO predicate acts barred investors' claim that hedge fund manager and broker-dealers participated in fraudulent RICO scheme to induce them to purchase securities issued by hedge funds. ABF Capital Management v. Askin Capital Management, L.P., S.D.N.Y.1997, 957 F.Supp. 1308. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 11

By admitting that she created false teller transfer tickets on regular basis to cover up nonexistent transactions by which money was removed from employer bank, employee admitted defrauding financial institution in violation of federal financial institution fraud statute, which was included in definition of “racketeering activity” under RICO statute. LaSalle Bank Lake View v. Seguban, N.D.Ill.1996, 937 F.Supp. 1309. Banks And Banking 509.10; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Alleged actions of credit life and disability insurer in intentionally failing to institute mechanisms to provide automatic refunds or premium credits upon repayment of underlying loan prior to expiration of term did not rise to level of “scheme to defraud” so as to support Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim where insurer lacked any notice that borrowers had paid off loan and apparently lacked knowledge of identity of final assignee of loans. Sousa v. North Cent. Life Ins. Co., D.R.I.1995, 910 F.Supp. 53. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Receiver for investment trusts failed to allege willful conduct on part of trustees, as required to state claim for RICO violation in connection with securities fraud which trustees allegedly committed; there were no allegations, supported by fact, showing that trustees had acted deliberately or intentionally, as required to satisfy RICO requirement that racketeering activity require indictable criminal conduct, as opposed to mere reckless- ness. Friedlob v. Trustees of Alpine Mut. Fund Trust, D.Colo.1995, 905 F.Supp. 843. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Claim by professional massage therapy association that defendant association mailed libelous statements concerning plaintiff to state legislatures in seeking enactment of message therapy regulations failed to state a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) on theory that mailings constituted mail fraud, in light of First Amendment protection afforded petitioning legislatures; allegations of nonviolent state law transgressions will not inject RICO implications into protected speech. Associated Bodywork and Massage Professionals v. American Massage Therapy Ass'n, N.D.Ill.1995, 897 F.Supp. 1116. Postal Service 35(11.1)

Under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) definition of racketeering as including offense involving “fraud in the sale of securities,” fraud in the sale of securities did not extend only to actual seller, but also applied to nonsellers who willfully violated federal securities fraud laws. In re Colonial Ltd. Part- nership Litigation, D.Conn.1994, 854 F.Supp. 64. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Accounting firm that lacked any knowledge of offeror's alleged fraud, as of time it performed its review services in connection with offering of limited partnership interest, could not be charged with predicate acts of fraud required to state RICO claim against it for allegedly participating in conduct of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity. Abrams & Wofsy v. Renaissance Inv. Corp., N.D.Ga.1993, 820 F.Supp. 1519. Accountants 9

As a predicate RICO act, fraud in the sale of securities does not require that the defendant have participated in the actual sale. In re American Continental Corporation/Lincoln Sav. and Loan Securities Litigation, D.Ariz.1992, 794 F.Supp. 1424. Securities Regulation 60.40

Evidence did not support Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) fraud claims against bank alleged to have lent money based upon announced prime rate that was higher than its actual prime rate; only 1.03% of bank's 90-day unsecured commercial loans were claimed to have been below announced prime rate, bank offered explanation in some cases of clerical errors or rate change intervening between preparation of note and its inception date, some of loans in question were participation loans, others were secured, and London In- terbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) loans were peculiar financial arrangements. Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, N.D.Ill.1992, 793 F.Supp. 783, reconsideration granted 814 F.Supp. 655, on reconsideration 814 F.Supp. 656, affirmed 38 F.3d 1429. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Complaint which alleged that defendants failed to disclose that Regulation A offering was in progress under which stock was being offered at one dollar per share while they were aggressively promoting the stock and that neither defendant stated that the corporation had suffered severe financial difficulty subsequent to the publication of its last 10-K report alleged fraud in the sale of securities and thus predicate acts within the definition of racketeering activity for purposes of RICO. Koulouris v. Estate of Chalmers, N.D.Ill.1992, 790 F.Supp. 1372. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Borrower failed to present evidence, such as scheme to defraud, to support claim that lender and other entities conspired to engage in pattern of racketeering activity for purpose of effectuating takeover of borrower and to defraud borrower's guarantors of their personal assets; borrower failed to establish predicate acts necessary to support RICO claim, or any competent evidence of damages it allegedly suffered as proximate result of allegedly wrongful conduct. Okura & Co. (America), Inc. v. Careau Group, C.D.Cal.1991, 783 F.Supp. 482. Con- spiracy 19

Fact that bank officers have made mistakes, approved bad loans, obtained less than adequate security, committed errors of business judgment, misapplied the law, or acted on poor or mistaken legal advice cannot be equated with fraud or, in turn, racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Blue Line Coal Co., Inc. v. Equibank, E.D.Pa.1991, 769 F.Supp. 891. Banks And Banking 54(1); Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Racketeering conspiracy count stated offense with respect to commodities traders, although traders contended that trading at Chicago Board of Trade was not a racketeering activity and that no pattern of such activity could thus be established; traders were not charged with simply trading at Chicago Board of Trade but were charged

with doing so in manner which allegedly defrauded customers and threatened integrity of soybean futures market. U.S. v. Dempsey, N.D.Ill.1990, 768 F.Supp. 1256. Conspiracy 43(9)

Newspaper advertiser failed to state claim against newspaper under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) where newspaper's use of computer line count method to calculate charges was not actionable fraud. Orenstein Advertising, Inc. v. New York Times, E.D.Pa.1991, 768 F.Supp. 1133. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Alleged breach of former husband's statutory duty to answer truthfully at trial, and to fulfill disclosure requirements under New York Domestic Relations Law, did not constitute violation of a fiduciary obligation between husband and wife, as necessary to sustain fraud as a predicate offense for purposes of suit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Capasso v. CIGNA Ins. Co., S.D.N.Y.1991, 765 F.Supp. 839. Hus- band And Wife 205(2)

Allegations made by limited partnership formed to fund development and marketing of computer software program, concerning misrepresentations made by corporation that was to develop and market program, sounded in fraud rather than contract for purposes of partnership's civil claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO), notwithstanding corporation's contention that allegations concerning underreporting of royalties amounted to only breach of parties' contract; partnership alleged that underreporting was result of series of intentional misrepresentations as to status of program and marketing efforts, and conditions in computer industry. Com-Tech Associates v. Computer Associates Intern., Inc., E.D.N.Y.1990, 753 F.Supp. 1078, affirmed 938 F.2d 1574. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Theory presented by borrower and guarantors of alleged fraudulent scheme by lenders defied economic reason and, thus, did not yield inference of fraudulent intent to support claims under Racketeering Influenced and Cor- rupt Organization Act (RICO); complaint alleged that lenders advanced substantial sum of money to new venture, then intentionally prevented successful completion of construction. Atlantic Gypsum Co., Inc. v. Lloyds In- tern. Corp., S.D.N.Y.1990, 753 F.Supp. 505. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 22

Erroneous belief that flexible annuity to fund defined benefit pension plan would pay capital gains did not amount to fraudulent misrepresentation, mail or wire fraud, or predicate act of racketeering; rate of return was declared and agreed to in advance. Associates in Adolescent Psychiatry, S.C. v. Home Life Ins. Co. of New York, N.D.Ill.1990, 751 F.Supp. 727, affirmed 941 F.2d 561, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 1182, 502 U.S. 1099, 117 L.Ed.2d 426. Postal Service 35(13); Telecommunications 1014(9)

Putative finders seeking fee in connection with corporate acquisition sufficiently pleaded detrimental reliance, so as to allege predicate activities, as necessary to state cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) based on fraud; finders alleged that they lost opportunity to present acquisition candidates to other potential acquiring companies as a result of alleged promise to pay finders fees. Deem v. Lock- heed Corp., S.D.N.Y.1989, 749 F.Supp. 1230, reargument denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza-

tions 72

Tenants of condominium units could not recover in RICO action for alleged fraud against purchasers and owners; economic injury was element of liability and was not alleged by tenants. Beauford v. Helmsley, S.D.N.Y.1990, 740 F.Supp. 201. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Allegations that two persons were defrauded by bank president and bank employee when value of equipment and cattle was misstated to cover amount of loan being assumed by those persons did not sufficiently allege fraud required for plaintiffs' racketeering claim where alleged change in value was made in the presence of those persons with their awareness and was not concealed from them. Langley v. American Bank of Wisconsin, E.D.Wis.1990, 738 F.Supp. 1232. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Allegations by securities brokerage house that customers induced brokerage house to enter into transactions for sale of securities through multiple misrepresentations which were intended to defraud brokerage house satisfied “racketeering activity” pleading element necessary to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. Smith, D.Ariz.1989, 736 F.Supp. 1030. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Assuming that fraud is racketeering activity within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, plaintiff could not base claim against attorney who associated with her in prosecution of personal injury case upon statements allegedly made by that attorney to client to effect that plaintiff was out of case, where plaintiff presented no evidence that client was damaged or that statements were made to or intended to be relied upon by plaintiff. Sutherland v. O'Malley, N.D.Ill.1988, 687 F.Supp. 392. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 10

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act fraud claim arising from corporation's failure to inform investors of its ongoing participation in medicaid fraud scheme, failed to satisfy particularity requirements for allegations of fraud, insofar as it purported to rest upon unidentified instances of “other indictable” offenses. Greenfield v. Professional Care, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1987, 677 F.Supp. 110. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Complaint alleging that bank and vice-president in trust department contrived scheme to defraud bank customers, whose funds were used by bank without their consent to purchase a company's notes, including making misrepresentations concerning company and hiding vice-president's association with company, stated cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act section making it unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in interstate activities to conduct or participate in conduct of enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering. Bachmeier v. Bank of Ravenswood, N.D.Ill.1987, 663 F.Supp. 1207. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Allegations of multiple fraudulent acts with respect to each of several investments, together with allegations that each defendant was agent of every other defendant, might adequately establish continuity plus relationship needed to allege pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, but

plaintiff would have to specify which subsections under which he was proceeding. Washington v. Baenziger, N.D.Cal.1987, 656 F.Supp. 1176. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Allegation that contractors on hazardous waste cleanup site contract conducted or participated directly or indirectly in the affairs of the enterprise by defrauding government in contract negotiations and performance sufficiently alleged contractors' participation under RICO to avoid dismissal. State of N.Y. v. O'Hara, W.D.N.Y.1987, 652 F.Supp. 1049. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

Allegations of mail fraud, wire fraud and extortion on part of bank and others fell within definition of racketeering activity contained in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Millonzi v. Bank of Hillside, N.D.Ill.1985, 605 F.Supp. 140. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Common questions of insurer's misrepresentations and of causation predominated, in putative class action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) alleging that insurer engaged in scheme to defraud senior citizens into purchasing inappropriate deferred annuities products; all members were allegedly provided with uniform written sales material containing insurer's representations about annuities' premium bonus and up- front sales charges, the truth of which did not vary by member, and all members allegedly relied on representations, which were directly related to their alleged losses, because although members made money from annuities, it was allegedly less than they would have made had insurer's representations about bonus and sales charges been true. In re National Western Life Ins. Deferred Annuities Litigation, S.D.Cal.2010, 268 F.R.D. 652. Federal Civil Procedure 182.5

Omission of material fact can constitute “fraud” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act if either there exists duty to disclose information or defendant makes statements of half-truths or affirmative misrepresentations. Katzman v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, S.D.N.Y.1996, 167 F.R.D. 649, reargument denied 939 F.Supp. 274, affirmed 113 F.3d 1229. Fraud 16

For purposes of estimating and temporarily allowing for voting purposes creditors' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against Chapter 11 debtor-corporation, required predicate acts were established by debtor's chief executive officer's alleged continuous writing of bad checks to cover debts that were never intended to be repaid and draining debtor's estate at expense of creditors for personal gain, activities which involved use of mails and telephones for asserted purpose of defrauding creditors. In re Hydrox Chemical Co., Bkrtcy.N.D.Ill.1996, 194 B.R. 617. Postal Service 35(10); Telecommunications 1014(8)

Bankruptcy debtor failed to show existence of predicate acts of racketeering activity necessary to bring action against creditor under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, where debtor's fraud claims were without merit, and creditor lacked intent necessary to establish bankruptcy fraud. In re Rubin Bros. Footwear, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1990, 119 B.R. 416. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

In absence of allegation of existence of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act enterprise distinct from creditor, allegations that creditor violated Act by falsely representing to debtor's principals that interest on

loans would be based upon rate for prime commercial loans and by repeatedly mailing to principal fraudulent statements of interest and fees due failed to state RICO claim. In re Rubin Bros. Footwear, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1987, 73 B.R. 346. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

60. ---- Common law, fraud, racketeering activity

Existence of common-law fraud is not enough to establish breach of federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Zolfaghari v. Sheikholeslami, C.A.4 (Md.) 1991, 943 F.2d 451. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Acts of common-law fraud which do not implicate the mails or the wires do not constitute “racketeering activity” for purposes of RICO. Fleet Credit Corp. v. Sion, C.A.1 (R.I.) 1990, 893 F.2d 441. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Where fraudulent scheme underlying mail and wire fraud allegations is premised upon inadequate common-law fraud claim, allegations of mail and wire fraud fail as predicate acts for civil liability under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Compania Sud-Americana de Vapores, S.A. v. IBJ Schroder Bank & Trust Co., S.D.N.Y.1992, 785 F.Supp. 411. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Alleged fraudulent scheme to purchase property from credit union at less than fair market value and then obtain loans from credit union secured by that property, even if true, did not fall within parameters of Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); allegations raised only issues of breach of contract and common- law fraud. National Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. Regine, D.R.I.1990, 749 F.Supp. 401. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Corporate venture capitalist's common law fraud claim against franchisor, and derivatively its claim under this chapter, had to be dismissed, since plaintiff was a sophisticated investor which could not merely close its eyes and expect the court to compensate it for any lost expenses and time, since defendants' alleged misrepresentation was simply an opinion of future profitability, and since plaintiff failed to show material misrepresentations or omissions inasmuch as plaintiff, even now, wanted to go through with some version of the deal. North American Financial Group, Ltd. v. S.M.R. Enterprises, Inc., N.D.Ill.1984, 583 F.Supp. 691. Fraud 21; Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

A “fraud” claim under this chapter is not identical to a state common law fraud claim; there must be an enterprise, there must be an effect upon interstate commerce before its provisions can come into effect, and there must also be two predicate offenses. Ralston v. Capper, E.D.Mich.1983, 569 F.Supp. 1575. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Sweep of this chapter does not embrace ordinary violators charged in common law fraud actions or with federal securities law violations as predicate offenses for relief under this chapter, although use thereof to accomplish one of enumerated felonies in section 1961 of this title may be element of and lead to liability under this chapter if organized criminals engage in prohibited activity. Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc., S.D.N.Y.1983, 553 F.Supp.

1347, affirmed 719 F.2d 5, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 1280, 465 U.S. 1025, 79 L.Ed.2d 684. Commerce 80 ; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

61. Gambling, racketeering activity

Long-distance telephone service provider was involved in “business of gambling” within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act and thus collected unlawful debts when it included in its long-distance bills the fees charged by company that conducted telephone gambling game, which provider had agreed to bill and collect for company; provider collected approximately $287,000 from state residents who called game, indicating that billing was regular part of provider's business operations. Kemp v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., C.A.11 (Ga.) 2004, 393 F.3d 1354. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 14

Collection by defendants of illegal gambling debts arising out of bookmaking business which was admittedly operating in violation of Louisiana law constituted violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). U.S. v. Aucoin, C.A.5 (La.) 1992, 964 F.2d 1492, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 661, 506 U.S. 1023, 121 L.Ed.2d 587. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 14

There was sufficient evidence of a “pattern” of racketeering activity to support defendant's RICO conspiracy conviction, where defendant was “associated with” a series of rigged card games, his agreement to participate in which could be inferred from his acts in bringing potential victims into scheme to play in rigged games, and defendant conspired to commit two acts of conspiracy in violation of Michigan's gambling laws. U.S. v. Joseph, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1987, 835 F.2d 1149. Conspiracy 47(7)

Operation of “rigged” poker games violated both Ohio and Michigan gambling statutes, thus constituting predicate acts required for RICO conviction, since operation of poker game for profit violated Ohio statute without regard to degree of chance involved and games ran afoul of Michigan statute, even if “rigged” from the start, where defendant was engaged in “putting up money on cards” to win or obtain money or goods. U.S. v. Tripp, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1986, 782 F.2d 38, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 1656, 475 U.S. 1128, 90 L.Ed.2d 199. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

Conspiracy to gamble cannot serve as a predicate act to support a RICO conspiracy conviction; on its face, conspiracy to gamble falls within RICO's definition of racketeering activity. U.S. v. Joseph, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1986, 781 F.2d 549. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 15

Evidence was sufficient to support finding that enterprise alleged, an illegal gambling operation, had sufficient effect on interstate commerce to fall within ambit of this chapter. U. S. v. Griffin, C.A.4 (Md.) 1981, 660 F.2d 996, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1029, 454 U.S. 1156, 71 L.Ed.2d 313. Gaming 62

In state where gambling is illegal, business of gambling is also illegal, and therefore no specific statutory ban of business of gambling is necessary for prosecution under this chapter. U. S. v. Salinas, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1977, 564 F.2d 688, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 1577, 435 U.S. 951, 55 L.Ed.2d 800. Gaming 62

Civil cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act was alleged against trading card manufacturer by allegation that a portion of the purchase price was consideration for the chance of winning an extra-value “chase” card; the alleged conduct violates the gambling laws of both New York and New Jersey, as it was alleged that people bought packages of cards in hope of obtaining “chase” card, which could immediately be exchanged for cash in secondary market. Schwartz v. Upper Deck Co., S.D.Cal.1997, 967 F.Supp. 405, vacated 104 F.Supp.2d 1228, affirmed 300 F.3d 1083. Lotteries 3

Evidence created jury question whether defendants conducted gambling business in violation of New York law and did so as predicate act of racketeering. U.S. v. Giovanelli, S.D.N.Y.1989, 747 F.Supp. 897. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 96

An illegal gambling business is included in categories of “racketeering activity” and “enterprise” within this chapter. U. S. v. Moeller, D.C.Conn.1975, 402 F.Supp. 49.

62. Grand larceny, racketeering activity

Issues of whether criminal defense attorney attempted to garner unearned payments from client by unjustifiably threatening to withdraw from case, and whether attorney engaged in interstate commerce involved fact questions that could not be resolved on motion to dismiss client's claim that attorney violated Hobbs Act as predicate act in his action against attorney under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Wade v. Gaither, D.Utah 2009, 623 F.Supp.2d 1277. Federal Civil Procedure 1831

Neither larceny by embezzlement nor larceny by false promise falls within the Racketeering Influenced and Cor- rupt Organization Act (RICO) statutory definition of “racketeering activity,” nor does “false procurement” of documents constitute a RICO predicate act. Weizmann Institute of Science v. Neschis, S.D.N.Y.2002, 229 F.Supp.2d 234. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

Acts of racketeering activity that were predicated on offense of “grand larceny * * * involving bribery” under New York law were insufficient as matter of law. U.S. v. Private Sanitation Industry Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1992, 793 F.Supp. 1114. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 9

63. Harboring fugitive, racketeering activity

Crime of harboring fugitive is not Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) predicate act. U.S. v. Patriarca, D.Mass.1995, 912 F.Supp. 596. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

64. Intimidation or threats, racketeering activity

Alleged intimidation of president of aircraft charterer by plaintiff's wife and her attorney, allegedly resulting in interference with plaintiff's interstate air transportation activities, did not qualify as predicate acts that could support civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim. Harvey v. Harvey, D.Conn.1996, 931 F.Supp. 127, affirmed 108 F.3d 329. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

65. Labor organizations, racketeering activity

Racketeering activity includes violations of the provision of the Labor Management Relations Act which re- stricts payments which a union representative can seek and which his employer can give. Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie, C.A.11 (Ala.) 1994, 17 F.3d 1386, modified on rehearing 30 F.3d 1347, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 900, 513 U.S. 1110, 130 L.Ed.2d 784. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 12

Under express terms of consent decree entered in civil RICO action against union, election official lacked authority to determine union official's election protest, after election official had certified results of union election; since union official won election, alleged impropriety could not have affected election's outcome which precluded election official from retaining authority to consider protest postelection. U.S. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, AFL-CIO, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1993, 3 F.3d 634. Fed- eral Civil Procedure 2397.5

Conduct of union officials in receiving what was illegal for management to pay constituted a violation of prescription in the Taft-Hartley Act against receiving or accepting “any money or other thing of value” and, as such, formed predicate act required to establish a “pattern of racketeering activity” under statute making it unlawful to conduct or to conspire to conduct an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. U.S. v. Pec- ora, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1986, 798 F.2d 614, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 949, 479 U.S. 1064, 93 L.Ed.2d 998. Labor And Employment 3271; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 12

A violation of either Landrum-Griffin Act, section 501 of Title 29, or Taft-Hartley Act, section 186 of Title 29, by a union official constitutes an act of “racketeering” for purposes of this chapter. U.S. v. LeRoy, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1982, 687 F.2d 610, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 823, 459 U.S. 1174, 74 L.Ed.2d 1019. Commerce 82.6; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 12

Violation of section 186 of Title 29 is predicate offense of this chapter. U.S. v. Scotto, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1980, 641 F.2d 47, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 3109, 452 U.S. 961, 69 L.Ed.2d 971.

Misdemeanor, including receiving of money by an employee of a labor organization from an employer, is an “indictable” offense for purposes of this chapter prohibiting interstate racketeering. U.S. v. Kaye, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1977, 556 F.2d 855, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 395, 434 U.S. 921, 54 L.Ed.2d 277. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 12

Allegations in employer's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint against local union president and second local union officer were sufficient to allege commission of two or more predicate acts so as to state claims for relief under RICO, where complaint alleged, inter alia, that president engaged in acts of receipt or agreement to receive or solicitation of things of value because of or with intent to be influenced regarding duties relating to pension benefit plans. National Elec. Ben. Fund v. Heary Bros. Lightning Pro- tection Co., Inc., W.D.N.Y.1995, 931 F.Supp. 169. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Union member's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against union business

manager failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, where union member failed to allege that business manager did anything to union member, or that business manager ordered or otherwise induced any acts committed against union member by others. O'Rourke v. Crosley, D.N.J.1994, 847 F.Supp. 1208. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

Allegations of misconduct by officer of labor organization in relation to organization's benefit trust funds were sufficient to support “pattern of racketeering activity” within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) in relation to benefit trust funds; officer allegedly took payoffs in connection with funds, local union and labor organization represented unions, and allegedly committed same types of racketeering as other officer defendants. U.S. v. District Council of New York City and Vicinity of United Broth. of Car- penters and Joiners of America, S.D.N.Y.1991, 778 F.Supp. 738. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 25

Evidence that union convention was wholly unnecessary, that no business meeting convened before 4 p.m. and that the longest meeting was over before 6 p.m., that the convention was attended only by officers and a sprink- ling of elected delegates and that LM-2 reports filed did not indicate the amount of the convention expense or state that it was convention expense sufficiently established that expenditures in which defendant union officials directly or indirectly participated were made in violation of section 501 of Title 29, and, therefore, constituted a single “racketeering activity” within meaning of this chapter. U.S. v. Ladmer, E.D.N.Y.1977, 429 F.Supp. 1231. Labor And Employment 2112

66. Land Sales Act violations, racketeering activity

Alleged violations of Land Sales Act could not support Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim; Land Sales Act is not included in list of statutory violations which may constitute RICO predicate acts, and, in any event, Land Sales Act claims were dismissed. Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, D.N.J.1993, 845 F.Supp. 182, affirmed 43 F.3d 1462, vacated on rehearing 66 F.3d 312, on remand 897 F.Supp. 826. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

67. Mail and wire fraud, racketeering activity--Generally

Wire and mail fraud may be considered predicate acts under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). District 65 Retirement Trust for Members of Bureau of Wholesale Sales Representatives v. Pruden- tial Securities, Inc., N.D.Ga.1996, 925 F.Supp. 1551. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Mail fraud can constitute “racketeering activity.” Corporacion Insular de Seguros v. Reyes-Munoz, D.Puerto Rico 1994, 849 F.Supp. 126. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

RICO plaintiff need not rely on predicate acts of mail or wire fraud. In re American Continental Corporation/Lin- coln Sav. and Loan Securities Litigation, D.Ariz.1992, 794 F.Supp. 1424. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 10

Although plaintiff could allege mail fraud as predicate act for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim, mail fraud allegations themselves did not state a separate cause of action. Delta Educ., Inc. v. Lan- glois, D.N.H.1989, 719 F.Supp. 42. Action 5

68. ---- Elements, mail and wire fraud, racketeering activity

“Mail fraud,” such as will constitute predicate act for purposes of asserting civil claim under the Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), consists of scheme or artifice to defraud and a mailing for purpose of executing scheme. Kenty v. Bank One, Columbus, N.A., C.A.6 (Ohio) 1996, 92 F.3d 384, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied. Postal Service 35(2)

Elements of mail fraud as predicate act for purposes of civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims are scheme to defraud by means of false or fraudulent representation, interstate or intrastate use of mails to execute scheme, use of mails by defendant connected with scheme, and actual injury to plaintiff. In re Burzynski, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1993, 989 F.2d 733. Postal Service 35(2)

Plaintiff's complaint failed to allege defendant's acts of mail and wire fraud with requisite specificity under federal rules, where complaint contained no detailed allegations as to time, place, or content of defendant's alleged acts, but instead only generally stated that defendant used the “facilities provided by wire communications and the U.S. Postal Service.” Trinidad v. IDI Holdings PR, Inc., D.Puerto Rico 2005, 708 F.Supp.2d 137. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Mortgagors were required to prove that they justifiably or reasonably relied on representation of mortgagee to their detriment, to prevail in their claims challenging mortgagee's presentation of payment option adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) to mortgagors under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Biggs v. Eaglewood Mortg. LLC, D.Md.2009, 636 F.Supp.2d 477, affirmed 353 Fed.Appx. 864, 2009 WL 4250577, certiorari denied 130 S.Ct. 3360, 176 L.Ed.2d 1247. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Offenses of mail and wire fraud, alleged as predicate acts supporting civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) claims, require proof that defendant knowingly participated in scheme to defraud and knowingly used mails or wires to further that scheme. Laro, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank (Nat. Ass'n), S.D.N.Y.1994, 866 F.Supp. 132, affirmed 60 F.3d 810. Postal Service 35(5); Telecommunications 1014(3)

To be guilty of mail fraud, defendants must have used mail as means to obtain money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises for purposes of executing scheme to defraud; interference with mail is not “mail fraud.” Berry v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Services, S.D.N.Y.1992, 808 F.Supp. 1106. Postal Service 35(2)

Allegation that corporation engaged in mail and wire fraud, that controlling persons received some fraudulently obtained funds and that fraudulent representations were part of scheme by controlling persons to defraud plaintiff, were sufficient to state predicate act mail and wire fraud claims in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act (RICO) suit against controlling persons. Todaro v. Orbit Intern. Travel, Ltd., S.D.N.Y.1991, 755 F.Supp. 1229. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

To prove mail or wire fraud, RICO plaintiff must show that scheme was devised with specific intent to defraud, that any nondisclosures or affirmative misrepresentations were material, and that some actual harm or injury was at least contemplated, even though the scheme's victims may not in fact have been defrauded. Beck v. Manufac- turers Hanover Trust Co., S.D.N.Y.1986, 645 F.Supp. 675, on reargument 650 F.Supp. 48, affirmed 820 F.2d 46, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 698, 484 U.S. 1005, 98 L.Ed.2d 650, rehearing denied 108 S.Ct. 1588, 485 U.S. 1030, 99 L.Ed.2d 903. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

General allegations that defendant benefitted from racketeering activity, which includes mail fraud and wire fraud, are insufficient to state a claim under this chapter. Lopez v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., N.D.Cal.1984, 591 F.Supp. 581. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

69. ---- Aiding and abetting, mail and wire fraud, racketeering activity

Since aiding and abetting mail fraud would be indictable under mail fraud statute, it is a predicate act under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Plaza Oldsmobile Ltd., E.D.N.Y.1985, 600 F.Supp. 1452. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

70. ---- Business competition, mail and wire fraud, racketeering activity

Labels like “poor quality,” “cheap,” and “look-alike” may be offensive to companies whose products are being described, but they are ill-suited as basis for mail and wire fraud claims used to support alleged Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations. Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Corp., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1994, 34 F.3d 1321. Postal Service 35(12); Telecommunications 1014(9)

Beer distributor failed to state RICO claim against competitor which allegedly violated distributor's exclusive rights with beer manufacturer; competitor never made any misrepresentations or omissions of material fact to distributor, as required to support claim of mail fraud or wire fraud as RICO claim predicate act. Central Distrib- utors of Beer, Inc. v. Conn, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1993, 5 F.3d 181, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 2678, 512 U.S. 1207, 129 L.Ed.2d 812. Postal Service 35(11.1); Telecommunications 1014(9)

Automobile parts seller stated claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act against competitor to which it had agreed to sell its assets in exchange for management of its daily operations, where it alleged that competitor committed multiple acts of mail or wire fraud over eight-month period, varying from simple customer mailings to electronic wire transfers of funds, and that separate schemes existed which led to loss of customer base and of various assets. Horwitz v. Alloy Automotive Co., N.D.Ill.1987, 656 F.Supp. 1039. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

71. ---- Concealment, mail and wire fraud, racketeering activity

Genuine issue of material fact, as to whether former business coowner could establish bribery under Illinois official misconduct statute, precluded summary judgment for village on his Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) claim based on failure to establish a predicate act. LaFlamboy v. Landek, N.D.Ill.2008, 587 F.Supp.2d 914. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Possibility that defendants in civil action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) may have in future perpetrated additional acts of mail and wire fraud in concealing fraudulent scheme from state and federal authorities could not serve as predicate acts of fraud. Turkish v. Kasenetz, E.D.N.Y.1993, 832 F.Supp. 565, reversed 27 F.3d 23, on remand 964 F.Supp. 689. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

72. ---- Conspiracy, mail and wire fraud, racketeering activity

Conspiracy to violate wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343, cannot serve as predicate act for Racketeering In- fluenced and Corrupt Organization claim, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c, d). Allington v. Carpenter, C.D.Cal.1985, 619 F.Supp. 474. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 15

73. ---- Convictions, mail and wire fraud, racketeering activity

Where none of the underlying mail fraud convictions remained viable because they were improperly based upon theory that former governor and others had deprived the citizens of the state of their right to honest government, racketeering convictions under RICO could not stand. U.S. v. Mandel, C.A.4 (Md.) 1988, 862 F.2d 1067, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 3190, 491 U.S. 906, 105 L.Ed.2d 699. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 19

74. ---- Employment, mail and wire fraud, racketeering activity

Former insurance company employee failed to show that insurance company committed mail fraud by inducing him to work for company through the mail or that inducement was causally connected to scheme to defraud company's policyholders and, thus, employee's allegations of mail fraud did not provide sufficient predicate for employee's civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against company. Vitone v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., D.R.I.1997, 954 F.Supp. 37. Postal Service 35(10)

Real estate corporation did not engage in mail fraud or wire fraud, so as to violate RICO, in connection with its plan to change status of real estate salespersons from employees to independent contractors, allegedly in effort to deprive her of benefits; salesperson admitted that she was not deceived or misled as to loss of benefits. Sea- man v. Arvida Realty Sales, Inc., M.D.Fla.1995, 910 F.Supp. 581. Postal Service 35(10); Telecommunica- tions 1014(8)

75. ---- Financial transactions, mail and wire fraud, racketeering activity

Creditors sufficiently alleged that family member of debtor, who was denied discharge for bankruptcy fraud, participated in conduct of affairs of Chapter 7 bankruptcy estate, as enterprise under Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), by predicate acts of making $5,000 wire transfers to debtor on monthly basis from money that debtor had previously transferred to that member, receiving assets from debtor pre-petition, falsely stating to Bankruptcy Court that she did not have those assets in her possession, and making false declar- ations by her attorney. First Capital Asset Management, Inc. v. Satinwood, Inc., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2004, 385 F.3d 159. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Financier's decision to charge rate of interest based on bank's advertised prime rate rather than rate bank charged its best customers as required under contract could not have been reasonably calculated to deceive business entity such as consumer loan company inasmuch as financier was separate and distinct entity from bank and was therefore in no better position than consumer loan company to obtain information about the bank's prime rate, and thus financier's action could not be a mail fraud under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Blount Financial Services, Inc. v. Walter E. Heller and Co., C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1987, 819 F.2d 151. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Allegations that bank was not authorized by loan documents to procure or charge borrowers for insurance against default of borrowers on loan contracts, that bank used mails in furtherance of fraudulent scheme to collect payment for unauthorized coverage and to effect repossession and transfer of title to vehicles from those who declined to pay, and that bank engaged in these practices over period of at least five years and with respect to numerous consumers was sufficient to state claim against bank under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) for scheme to defraud by use of the mails. Bermudez v. First of America Bank Champi- on, N.A., N.D.Ill.1994, 860 F.Supp. 580, withdrawn pursuant to settlement 886 F.Supp. 643. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Allegations that lenders mailed bank statements and letters demanding payment, which were at least incidental to essential part of scheme, were sufficient to state use of mails element of mail fraud as predicate act under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); borrowers alleged that at least some mailings actually misrepresented rate of interest being charged by lenders, which presumably induced borrowers to continue making payments on loans. Center Cadillac, Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. of New York, S.D.N.Y.1992, 808 F.Supp. 213, affirmed 99 F.3d 401. Postal Service 35(8)

Mailings between would-be borrower and bank consisting of bank's request for would-be borrower's supplemental reports on business project and bank's mailing of request for payment on equipment allegedly sold to would-be borrower had sufficient connection to bank's alleged scheme to defraud borrower to establish predicate mail fraud acts underlying RICO claim. Dunham v. Independence Bank of Chicago, N.D.Ill.1986, 629 F.Supp. 983. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 49

76. ---- Injury, mail and wire fraud, racketeering activity

Alleged illegal kickbacks, rebates and rent payments did not amount to scheme to deceive plaintiff travel agency, as required to establish mail and wire fraud as predicate acts of racketeering, absent allegations that alleged illegal payments were somehow used to induce plaintiff to give up its position as corporate customer's exclusive agent; alleged illegal payments all occurred after customer had terminated plaintiff's contract. McEvoy Travel Bureau, Inc. v. Heritage Travel, Inc., C.A.1 (Mass.) 1990, 904 F.2d 786, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 536,

498 U.S. 992, 112 L.Ed.2d 546. Postal Service 35(10); Telecommunications 1014(8)

77. ---- Insurance, mail and wire fraud, racketeering activity

Evidence established predicate offenses of mail and wire fraud by enterprise existing among liability insurance purchase group and its affiliated service companies operating as continuing business unit, for purposes of parent corporation's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against individual connected with many of the companies for failing to properly forward premiums that had been paid to insure health maintenance organizations (HMOs) owned or managed by parent's subsidiary. United HealthCare Corp. v. American Trade Ins. Co., Ltd., C.A.8 (Minn.) 1996, 88 F.3d 563. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

It could reasonably be foreseen by each insured, claimant, appraiser, or body shop that one of them would use the mails in connection with each of the fraudulent claims submitted to insurer or that insurer would use the mails to send payments to the recipients, so that those uses of the mails were in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme and could establish predicate act of mail fraud for RICO claim. Aetna Cas. Sur. Co. v. P & B Autobody, C.A.1 (Mass.) 1994, 43 F.3d 1546. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Insurer's alleged representations that policyholders were required to take polygraph test before receiving payment and that policyholders would be obligated to make sworn statement regarding loss if they refused to take test did not amount to mail or wire fraud sufficient to support racketeering claim; insurer did not tell policyholders that Illinois law or policy required polygraph examination; and representations did not compel policyholders to take test and did not misstate terms of policy. Marcial v. Coronet Ins. Co., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1989, 880 F.2d 954. Postal Service 35(11.1)

Insureds' allegations that automobile insurer and state insurance investigator wrongfully conspired to deny coverage did not constitute “racketeering activity” necessary to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) or Delaware Organized Crime and Racketeering statute. McDuffy v. Koval, D.Del.2002, 226 F.Supp.2d 541. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 15; Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 103

Liability insurer's business letters could not serve as predicate acts of mail fraud in action brought by insured under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), but, rather, letters merely contained innocuous business communications; insurer's counsel in one letter refused to produce documents unless in course of discovery in civil litigation, insurer's claim account executive notified insured by another letter that he was unable to ascertain that insured had been issued general liability policy years earlier, and account executive acknowledged in third letter the receipt of summons and complaint in three pending lawsuits against insured. Asbeka In- dustries v. Travelers Indem. Co., E.D.N.Y.1993, 831 F.Supp. 74. Postal Service 35(5)

Administrator of group health insurance plan pled facts adequate to show that real estate association and its officers engaged in enterprise within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where administrator alleged that association, its officers, consultant, and its officers formed ongoing association,

goal of which was to cause administrator to develop insurance program at no cost to association or consultant, and thereafter to divide administrative fees among themselves. Patrick Carter Associates, Inc. v. Rent Stabiliza- tion Ass'n of N.Y.C., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1991, 781 F.Supp. 207. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Single-premium life policyholders did not establish mail or wire fraud as predicate act for purposes of RICO; policyholders failed to allege specific times, places and content of communications deemed to be fraudulent. Berent v. Kemper Corp., E.D.Mich.1991, 780 F.Supp. 431, affirmed 973 F.2d 1291. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Field underwriter for insurer did not commit mail or wire fraud or predicate act of racketeering when underwriter allegedly represented himself as expert in planning of pension plans and allegedly failed to disclose lack of corporate status for his organization; underwriter had working relationship with insurance company, which specialized in designing pension products and pension plans, and had working relationship with professional ac- tuarial firm. Associates in Adolescent Psychiatry, S.C. v. Home Life Ins. Co. of New York, N.D.Ill.1990, 751 F.Supp. 727, affirmed 941 F.2d 561, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 1182, 502 U.S. 1099, 117 L.Ed.2d 426. Postal Service 35(11.1); Postal Service 35(14); Telecommunications 1014(9)

Insureds' complaint was insufficient to state RICO claim against insurers for allegedly knowingly participating in scheme to defraud insureds out of unearned premiums on credit life and disability policies issued in conjunction with insureds' second mortgage loans, where claim was predicated solely on insurance certificates issued by the insurers which themselves contained no misstatements of fact. Hoban v. USLIFE Credit Life Ins. Co., N.D.Ill.1995, 163 F.R.D. 509. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Representations that automobile insurer allegedly made to policyholders who had submitted theft or vandalism claims, that claims would be denied if policyholders refused to submit to polygraph examination, were not acts of mail or wire fraud sufficient to support policyholders RICO claims, where insurer did not represent that Illinois law required that policyholders submit to polygraph examination, but at most made statement as to its own practices, regardless of whether those practices were legal under Illinois insurance law. Marcial v. Coronet Ins. Co., N.D.Ill.1988, 122 F.R.D. 529, affirmed 880 F.2d 954. Postal Service 35(5); Telecommunications 1014(9)

78. ---- Other offenses, mail and wire fraud, racketeering activity

Where fraudulent scheme falls within scope of mail fraud statute and other elements of RICO are established, use of mail fraud offense as RICO predicate act cannot be suspended simply because perjury is part of means for perpetrating the fraud. U.S. v. Eisen, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1992, 974 F.2d 246, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 1619, 507 U.S. 998, 123 L.Ed.2d 178, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 1840, 507 U.S. 1029, 123 L.Ed.2d 467, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 1841, 507 U.S. 1029, 123 L.Ed.2d 467, denial of habeas corpus affirmed 32 F.3d 31, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 900, 513 U.S. 1110, 130 L.Ed.2d 784, on rehearing 45 F.3d 680, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 1796, 514 U.S. 1084, 131 L.Ed.2d 724, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 2015, 514 U.S. 1134, 131 L.Ed.2d 1014. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Allegations of mail and wire fraud were not invalidated as predicate acts in RICO prosecution on ground that the alleged enterprise was accused of violations of environmental laws as well; existence of environmental regulatory schemes, including criminal penalties, did not preempt use of properly stated allegations of mail fraud as racketeering activity in charging RICO violation. U.S. v. Paccione, S.D.N.Y.1990, 738 F.Supp. 691. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

79. ---- Property, mail and wire fraud, racketeering activity

Lost business opportunities of travel agency that lost customers due to competitor's fraudulent activities were “properties” within meaning of mail fraud statute, and so were not intangible rights, the loss of which could be used as basis for maintaining Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action. Israel Travel Advisory Service, Inc. v. Israel Identity Tours, Inc., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1995, 61 F.3d 1250, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 1847, 517 U.S. 1220, 134 L.Ed.2d 948. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 60

RICO claim could not be based on alleged mail fraud involving defending of false reports to the Immigration and Naturalization Service; in relying on predicate acts of mail fraud, proof of loss of tangible property resulting from defendant's conduct must be shown and mailing of false reports deprived government of merely intangible rights. O'Malley v. O'Neill, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1989, 887 F.2d 1557, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 2620, 496 U.S. 926, 110 L.Ed.2d 641. Postal Service 35(9)

Rate bureaus' and Interstate Commerce Commission's (ICC) intangible interest, as regulators, in properly regulating trucking industry was not sufficient deprivation of property under wire and mail fraud statutes so as to establish claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) based upon motor carriers' defrauding of rate bureaus and ICC. Lifschultz Fast Freight, Inc. v. Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Delaware, D.S.C.1992, 805 F.Supp. 1277, affirmed 998 F.2d 1009, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 553, 510 U.S. 993, 126 L.Ed.2d 454. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval of abbreviated new drug applications was not property in hands of the government, within purview of mail or wire fraud statutes, as required to support claims under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., D.Md.1991, 770 F.Supp. 1053. Postal Service 35(9); Telecommunications 1014(7)

There was sufficient evidence that individual defendants and defendant affiliated corporation unlawfully, wil- fully, and knowingly engaged in scheme to defraud state of New York of property by depriving its Department of Environmental Conservation of control over process of awarding waste transporter permit to corporation and that they used mails in so doing to support finding of mail fraud as predicate act for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) charge. U.S. v. Paccione, S.D.N.Y.1990, 749 F.Supp. 478. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 95

80. ---- Scheme to defraud, mail and wire fraud, racketeering activity

Tenants of mobile home park who brought suit alleging that landlord violated the Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) failed to allege predicate acts of mail fraud sufficient to support a RICO claim; tenants did not demonstrate that lease and letter which accompanied lease supported allegation that landlord formed a scheme to defraud park tenants. Rothman v. Vedder Park Management, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1990, 912 F.2d 315. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Insurers sufficiently alleged that professional corporations formed by various doctors and health care providers were fraudulently incorporated under New York law, thus supporting insurers' allegation of mail fraud in their Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims regarding alleged schemes to fraudulently obtain insurance proceeds intended to pay for medical services for people injured in automobile accidents, by alleging that professional corporations, which defendants represented to be eligible for reimbursement, were in part owned by non-physicians in contravention of state requirements. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lyons, E.D.N.Y.2012, 843 F.Supp.2d 358. Fraud 44

Company alleged sufficient facts to support strong inference of fraud, as required to meet heightened pleading requirements for mail and wire fraud Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against former employee and outside vendors; company alleged a fictitious billing scheme and provided dates, amounts, invoice numbers, and descriptions of all invoices that it claimed pertained to unperformed services, provided detailed descriptions of schemes, and that former employee was only employee with direct knowledge of invoices at issue. Fuji Photo Film U.S.A., Inc. v. McNulty, S.D.N.Y.2009, 640 F.Supp.2d 300. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Corporation failed to plead with sufficient particularity its claim that bank violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) as result of bank's wire transfers out of account owned by corporation, absent indication of purpose of transfers in bank's alleged scheme. In re Parmalat, S.D.N.Y.2005, 383 F.Supp.2d 587. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Not every common-law breach of fiduciary duty which requires mailings or the use of the telephone constitutes a violation of federal mail and wire fraud statute so as to support a RICO claim; scheme to defraud element of those crimes must be satisfied. Disher v. Information Resources, Inc., N.D.Ill.1988, 691 F.Supp. 75, affirmed 873 F.2d 136. Postal Service 35(2); Telecommunications 1014(2)

Single fraud merely furthered by mails would not be enough to make out Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganization Act violation predicated on mail fraud; but, fraudulent scheme committed by sending series of materials that are themselves fraudulent, with each causing independent harm to plaintiff, would be. Louisiana Power and Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., E.D.La.1986, 642 F.Supp. 781. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

81. ---- Shareholder actions, mail and wire fraud, racketeering activity

Investor asserting Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against corporation failed to establish predicate acts of mail and wire fraud, arising out of corporation's allegedly fraudulent issuance of

stock warrants to major officers in return for past consideration and without providing inducement for continued service, allegedly in violation of state law; state law allowed past services to be consideration for warrants, and as they were issued at exercise prices above market price of underlying shares at time of issuance, or at market price but with requirement that they be held for nine months, economic incentives were provided for officers to remain with corporation and to expend “full effort” on its behalf. Pinnacle Consultants, Ltd. v. Leucadia Nat. Corp., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1996, 101 F.3d 900. Telecommunications 1014(8)

Alleged shareholder failed to establish that former attorney for corporation and former president participated in scheme to defraud alleged shareholder and, thus, failed to establish predicate acts of mail and wire fraud as necessary prerequisite to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim; alleged shareholder failed to produce any evidence that would have suggested that former president devised scheme to induce alleged shareholder to buy another shareholder's stock. Pelletier v. Zweifel, C.A.11 (Ga.) 1991, 921 F.2d 1465, rehearing denied 931 F.2d 901, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 167, 502 U.S. 855, 116 L.Ed.2d 131. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 79

First shareholder in automobile repair shop corporations pled facts sufficient to establish only a single instance of use of mails in furtherance of scheme to defraud, as predicate act in RICO suit against second and third shareholders and other individuals alleging concealment of corporations' profits; although alleged mailing of monthly bank statements was not essential to plead fraudulent scheme, and although first shareholder failed to please relationship between alleged mailing of checks and alleged scheme, alleged mailing of insurance check to entity other than repair corporation was consistent with allegations of fraudulent scheme. Zigman v. Giacobbe, E.D.N.Y.1996, 944 F.Supp. 147. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Allegations that sponsors used mail and wire communications in furtherance of alleged scheme to defraud in connection with investments in real estate limited partnerships were insufficient to allege mail and wire fraud as predicate acts of racketeering. Adler v. Berg Harmon Associates, S.D.N.Y.1992, 790 F.Supp. 1222. Postal Ser- vice 48(4.2); Telecommunications 1014(12)

Shareholders could not rely on wire fraud as predicate act, for purposes of civil RICO claim involving other shareholders' scheme to seize control of corporation, where allegation rested on single intrastate telephone call, and no reasonably foreseeable interstate communication would follow that call. Eisenberger v. Spectex Indus- tries, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1986, 644 F.Supp. 48. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

82. ---- Tax liability, mail and wire fraud, racketeering activity

For purposes of provision of RICO statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(1), under which mail fraud qualifies as racketeering activity, mailing fraudulent state sales tax returns qualifies as “mail fraud.” Illinois Dept. of Revenue v. Phillips, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1985, 771 F.2d 312. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

RICO defendants' involvement in property tax dispute was not a predicate act in case alleging that their racketeering activity consisted of “fraudulently forcing individuals to sell their property for below its true market value” by means of the mail and the telephone, and thus could not be used to bring the defendants' conduct with-

in the four-year limitations period applicable to RICO claims. Anderson v. Consol-Pennsylvania Coal Co., W.D.Pa.1990, 740 F.Supp. 1126, affirmed 945 F.2d 394, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 975, 502 U.S. 1075, 117 L.Ed.2d 139, affirmed 945 F.2d 395, affirmed 945 F.2d 396. Limitation Of Actions 58(1); Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 7

83. ---- Use of mail, mail and wire fraud, racketeering activity

Allegation that Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) defendant used mails only in order to collect proceeds of fraud through routine sales invoices did not defeat claim for mail fraud, as predicate offense; mailings did not have to be essential element of scheme, and could instead be merely incident to essential part of scheme. American Eagle Credit Corp. v. Gaskins, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1990, 920 F.2d 352. Postal Service 35(8)

Investor was not required to show evidence of personal use of the mails by corporation's attorney to establish use of mails in furtherance of fraudulent scheme, as element of investor's civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against attorney; use of mails was only required to be reasonably foreseeable. Ikuno v. Yip, C.A.9 (Wash.) 1990, 912 F.2d 306. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

For purposes of this chapter, a scheme to defraud is not an act indictable under section 1341 et seq. of this title for though offense of mail fraud has its genesis in scheme to defraud, gist of crime is use of mails in executing the scheme. U. S. v. Weatherspoon, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1978, 581 F.2d 595. Postal Service 35(2)

Pleading of predicate RICO crime of mail fraud must specify the use of mail or wire. Morin v. Trupin, S.D.N.Y.1993, 809 F.Supp. 1081, on reargument 823 F.Supp. 201. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Accountant's alleged check-writing on client's accounts to pay for services from telephone company not incurred by clients satisfied mailing requirement for purposes of establishing predicate act of mail fraud in action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); scheme did not reach fruition until accountant mailed checks to company and client's account was subsequently credited, thereby satisfying debt, and were mails not used, scheme would not have been completed. Zee-Bar, Inc. N.H. v. Kaplan, D.N.H.1992, 792 F.Supp. 895. Postal Service 35(8)

Allegation that “outlines were delivered to plaintiff through the use and means of interstate commerce” and that defendant “sent plaintiff a subscription agreement” for each investment lacked detail necessary for determination that United States mails were employed; absent allegation of use of mails, there was no predicate act of mail fraud to support Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim. McCoy v. Goldberg, S.D.N.Y.1990, 748 F.Supp. 146. Postal Service 48(4.7)

Allegations of conduct which would only constitute theft or receipt of stolen mail matter and would not constitute use of the mails to defraud did not allege RICO violation as they did not set forth a predicate act. Haskin v. Corporacion Insular de Seguros, D.Puerto Rico 1987, 666 F.Supp. 349. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 7

Use of mails to collect proceeds of fraudulent scheme is sufficient to meet in furtherance requirement to find predicate act of mail fraud under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. U.S. v. Weinberg, E.D.N.Y.1987, 656 F.Supp. 1020. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 49

Allegations that defendant used mail depository of United States Postal Service to transmit false and fraudulent invoices sufficiently set out violation of Travel Act as predicate offense to action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, since defendants effectuated bribery transactions in violation of state commercial bribery statute. Temple University v. Salla Bros., Inc., E.D.Pa.1986, 656 F.Supp. 97. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Mailings relied on by plaintiffs to establish predicate acts of mail fraud under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act were not in furtherance of alleged scheme but, rather, could only have served to make it likely that plaintiffs would have uncovered any scheme; therefore, plaintiffs failed to state a RICO cause of action. Garrick-Aug Associates Store Leasing, Inc. v. Hirschfeld, S.D.N.Y.1986, 652 F.Supp. 905. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 49

84. ---- Pleading, mail and wire fraud, racketeering activity

Client had not sufficiently pleaded that her attorney had committed mail fraud, so as to be able to use such fraud as predicate act for purposes of pleading violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); client had not alleged that attorney had failed to credit her with advance payments made toward fee with fraudulent intent in doing so. McDonald v. Schencker, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1994, 18 F.3d 491. Postal Service 48(4.2)

Insurer's complaint failed to allege pattern of racketeering activity, as required to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against employee insurance agent, his girlfriend, and other unnamed individuals for allegedly fraudulently diverting business from insurer to competing insurance company that agent helped establish to steal insurer's clients, since insurer failed to allege either open-ended continuity of predicate acts of mail and wire fraud involving distinct threat of long-term racketeering activity, or closed-ended continuity from two predicate acts of mail fraud in less than two months or from wire fraud that had not extended over substantial period of time. Sebrite Agency, Inc. v. Platt, D.Minn.2012, 884 F.Supp.2d 912. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 31

Insurers sufficiently alleged open-ended continuity of defendants' acts of mail fraud to support their Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against various doctors and health care providers, stemming from alleged schemes to fraudulently obtain insurance proceeds intended to pay for medical services for people injured in automobile accidents, by alleging fraudulent incorporation of professional corporations formed by various clusters of defendants and numerous and regular inflated billings. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lyons, E.D.N.Y.2012, 843 F.Supp.2d 358. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 28

Plaintiff independent appraiser, who did not establish how emails were fraudulent or furthered alleged fraudulent scheme to blacklist those independent appraisers who did not inflate property values, did not state fraud

with particularity, as required to support mail or wire fraud as predicate act to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against lender. Capitol West Appraisals, LLC v. Countrywide Financial Corp., W.D.Wash.2010, 759 F.Supp.2d 1267, affirmed 467 Fed.Appx. 738, 2012 WL 345903. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Alleged fraudulent scheme to blacklist those independent appraisers who did not inflate property values was not stated with particularity, as required to support mail or wire fraud as predicate act to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against lender, where complaint simply stated that lender's conduct of placing appraiser on list that required second appraisal was fraudulent without explaining how or why. Capitol West Appraisals, LLC v. Countrywide Financial Corp., W.D.Wash.2010, 759 F.Supp.2d 1267, affirmed 467 Fed.Appx. 738, 2012 WL 345903. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Company failed to allege that president of outside vendor was aware of the alleged fraudulent invoices submitted to company or actions of other outside vendors, as required to allege predicate act of mail and wire fraud, as required to support Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim. Fuji Photo Film U.S.A., Inc. v. McNulty, S.D.N.Y.2009, 640 F.Supp.2d 300. Postal Service 35(11.1); Telecommunications 1014(12)

Immigrant workers sufficiently pled mail and wire fraud by alleged employer as predicate acts for claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); workers alleged failure to pay overtime wages and miscalculation of payroll checks based on straight time rates alone without any necessary withholdings, the workers clearly pled that the payroll checks were false and deceptive, the employer allegedly utilized the mails and fixed-line telephone transmissions in interstate commerce in furtherance of the scheme, and the fact that paychecks were mailed or timecards were transmitted in the ordinary course of business was irrelevant. Choim- bol v. Fairfield Resorts, Inc., E.D.Va.2006, 428 F.Supp.2d 437. Fraud 41; Telecommunications 1014(12)

To satisfy requirements for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim where predicate acts alleged are mail fraud, alleged fraudulent mailings must be linked to particular defendants and may not be attributed vaguely to “defendants.” Tribune Co. v. Purcigliotti, S.D.N.Y.1994, 869 F.Supp. 1076, affirmed 66 F.3d 12. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Allegations adequately stated mail and wire fraud as predicate acts to support claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against union and successful candidate for union office, even though allegations involved injury to union members rather than to plaintiffs who were not union members; complaint alleged that union and candidate fraudulently misused union's power to force transfer of certain rights from plaintiffs to nonunion entities. Volmar Distributors, Inc. v. New York Post Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1993, 825 F.Supp. 1153. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

To establish that defendant has committed indictable offense under federal mail and wire fraud statutes, for purposes of establishing predicate offense in RICO case, plaintiff must allege and prove existence of scheme to defraud and use of mails or interstate wires in furtherance of fraudulent scheme, and fraud must be pleaded in con-

formity with Rule 9(b). Morin v. Trupin, S.D.N.Y.1991, 778 F.Supp. 711, on reconsideration 809 F.Supp. 1081, on reargument 823 F.Supp. 201. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Predicate acts of wire fraud were not alleged with sufficient particularity to support plaintiff's Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint, where plaintiff failed to allege actual number of telephone calls that were made in furtherance of alleged racketeering scheme, the precise dates on which phone calls occurred, the content of telephone conversations, and how conversations furthered allegedly fraudulent scheme. Qantel Corp. v. Niemuller, S.D.N.Y.1991, 771 F.Supp. 1361. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Taxpayer failed to allege that employer used mails to comply with Internal Revenue Service (IRS) summons for purpose of obtaining money or property by false pretenses and, thus, taxpayer failed to allege mail fraud as predicate act of racketeering; taxpayer claimed that employer wanted to cooperate with IRS, but that it also wanted to avoid bad employer/employee relations. Ungaro v. Desert Palace, Inc., D.Nev.1989, 732 F.Supp. 1522. Postal Service 48(1)

RICO plaintiff failed to plead predicate acts of mail and wire fraud with sufficient particularity by failing to specify time, place and contents of alleged mail and wire fraud, identity of person making representations, and consequences of such misrepresentation. Coronet Ins. Co. v. Seyfarth, N.D.Ill.1987, 665 F.Supp. 661. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Debtor's RICO complaint, which alleged that creditor used mails on at least two specific and named occasions within ten years of furtherance of fraudulent scheme, pled mail fraud with sufficient particularity. In re Bennett, Bkrtcy.N.D.N.Y.1992, 142 B.R. 616. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Tenant's failure to allege any predicate acts based on mail fraud precluded her from stating RICO claim; although tenant alleged that defendants committed numerous predicate acts of mail fraud by mailing her bills for attorney fees that she alleged were illegal, tenant alleged nothing fraudulent about the billed amounts. Chambers v. Habitat Co., C.A.7 (Ill.) 2003, 68 Fed.Appx. 711, 2003 WL 21377492, Unreported, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied , certiorari denied 124 S.Ct. 1064, 540 U.S. 1119, 157 L.Ed.2d 913. Federal Civil Procedure 636

85. ---- Particular transactions as racketeering, mail and wire fraud, racketeering activity

City sufficiently pled a scheme or artifice to defraud that was furthered by mail or wires against out-of-state cigarette retailers and affiliated individuals, as required to establish standing on a civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint, by alleging that named Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act (RICO) persons directed alleged enterprises to conceal cigarette sales from state tax authorities by failing to file Jenkins Act reports or to effect sales by means of misrepresentations, while using mails or wires to effect a sale of cigarettes to city residents, and alleging that this amounted to a scheme to defraud the city of its use taxes because defendants deprived the city of information needed to charge and collect those taxes. City of New York v. Smokes-Spirits.com, Inc., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2008, 541 F.3d 425, certified question accepted 897 N.E.2d 1061, 868 N.Y.S.2d 580, 11 N.Y.3d 800, certiorari granted 129 S.Ct. 2159, 173 L.Ed.2d 1155, certified

question answered 911 N.E.2d 834, 883 N.Y.S.2d 772, 12 N.Y.3d 616, reversed and remanded 130 S.Ct. 983, 559 U.S. 1, 175 L.Ed.2d 943. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 57

Allegation that defendants used interstate mails and wire communications to fraudulently obtain settlement of lawsuit brought by plaintiffs was sufficient to state mail and wire fraud, as predicate acts in plaintiffs' subsequent Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) suit; although settlement contained limitation of liability clause in case of inaccurate representations by defendants, fraud claim alleged more than mere inaccuracies to which clause applied. Turkish v. Kasenetz, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1994, 27 F.3d 23, on remand 964 F.Supp. 689. Postal Service 35(10); Telecommunications 1014(8)

Evidence supported district court's finding that defendant intended to defraud when he placed advertisements in newspapers representing that he was able to provide immediate commercial financing, for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) predicate acts of wire and mail fraud; advertisements represented that defendant was able to provide immediate commercial financing, but defendant had no prior experience in providing financing of any kind, had no sources for such financing at time he placed ad, and was never able to provide financing to any of the people responding to his ads, notwithstanding defendant's contention that he had good faith belief he could obtain financing. Diamonds Plus, Inc. v. Kolber, C.A.8 (Ark.) 1992, 960 F.2d 765. Postal Service 35(14); Telecommunications 1014(9)

Family that perpetrated criminal scheme to obtain forced labor and to harbor alien fugitive for private financial gain engaged in racketeering activity by committing mail and wire fraud, thus supporting victim's civil Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim; family engaged in scheme to defraud by not fulfilling promise to properly compensate victim and to treat her well, confining her to their home, confiscating her passport, allowing her visa to lapse, not fulfilling promise to send money to victim's parents, and using mail and wire communications to facilitate trafficking victim into United States, to open and close bank account in victim's name, to divert victim's letters from United States mail, and to force victim to send financial information to her parents. Martinez v. Calimlim, E.D.Wis.2009, 651 F.Supp.2d 852. Postal Service 35(10); Telecommu- nications 1014(8)

Vocational students' complaint against vocational school sufficiently pleaded cause of action for mail and wire fraud under civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); complaint specified nature and operation of scheme to defraud the government and students out of loan monies and the use of the mail system to further their scheme, despite failure to describe particular telephone calls or identify exact speaker, complaint revealed harm and injury to students was contemplated by defendants' plan, students provided ample detail as to purpose mailing served within scheme, and complaint detailed total amount of loan money received by vocational school through mail system. Moy v. Adelphi Institute, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1994, 866 F.Supp. 696. Postal Service 48(4.2); Telecommunications 1014(12)

Assuming that complaint adequately alleged that Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) defendants acted jointly with intent to defraud plaintiff of trade secret, and adequately identified particulars of multiple mailings and telephone calls made in connection with alleged scheme to defraud, such mailings and wire communications satisfied requirement of two predicate acts for all defendants; each of communications

could be deemed separate predicate act of racketeering “committed” by each of defendants. R.E. Davis Chemic- al Corp. v. Nalco Chemical Co., N.D.Ill.1990, 757 F.Supp. 1499. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 31

Employer's allegations that union and its local affiliates induced employer to make pension fund contributions on behalf of supervisory, nonbargaining unit employees through fraudulent scheme whereby defendants represented that supervisory employees were entitled to participate in pension plan stated claim for mail fraud as predicate act in RICO case. Domestic Linen Supply & Laundry Co. v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, E.D.Mich.1989, 722 F.Supp. 1472. Postal Service 35(2)

Silver trader's injury resulting from manipulation of market for silver futures and silver occurred by reason of predicate acts of mail and wire fraud; defendants used mail and wires to plan and execute conspiracy to manipulate market which caused injury; and predicate acts were directed at investors like silver trader. Minpeco, S.A. v. Hunt, S.D.N.Y.1989, 718 F.Supp. 168, reconsideration denied 724 F.Supp. 259. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 62

For purposes of their summary judgment motion in civil RICO action, bank defendants committed at least three predicate acts in connection with airline ticket scam; issuance of letter by bank president confirming account balance of travel agency involved in airline ticket scam, along with incorporation of that confirmation in travel agency's application for accreditation of travel office and mailing of accreditation notice for that office, constituted mail fraud. Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Barry, D.Minn.1987, 666 F.Supp. 1311. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act counts were sustained by sufficient allegations of mail and wire fraud, framing a picture of falsely positive factual representations about merits and track record of gas reclamation program, which, when communicated in context of packaged investment offering complete with ready financing, induced investors to purchase. In re Gas Reclamation, Inc. Securities Litigation, S.D.N.Y.1987, 659 F.Supp. 493. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Complaint for violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.], which alleged that partnership should have known that financial information in its statements was materially false and misleading, and would be provided to and relied upon by plaintiff, and which accused partnership of violating 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962 by the use of means and instrumentalities of interstate commerce and the mails, pled violation of federal mail statute. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S. v. Alexander Grant & Co., S.D.N.Y.1985, 627 F.Supp. 1023. Postal Service 48(4.7)

Necessary predicate acts for violation of this chapter were stated in complaint alleging that defendants, in order to defraud plaintiff in connection with offer and sale of coal leases, disseminated false information to him by mail and by wire, and that such acts constituted indictable offenses under section 1341 of this title, relating to mail fraud and section 1343 of this title, relating to wire fraud, and alleging that defendants circulated offering materials containing false information in violation of Securities Exchange Act of 1934, section 78 et seq. of Title 15. Freschi v. Grand Coal Venture, S.D.N.Y.1984, 583 F.Supp. 780. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or-

ganizations 11

Evidence that a defendant was owner of business involved in sale of plaintiff's computer components, rather than destruction of such components as required under Certificate of Destruction, that an associate was observed using interstate telephone wires in the sale of the plaintiff's computer component, and that it was reasonably likely that the defendant foresaw the associate's interstate use of the wires was sufficient to show that the defendant was engaged in “racketeering activity,” for purposes of claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Digital Equipment Corp. v. Currie Enterprises, D.Mass.1992, 142 F.R.D. 16. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

86. ---- Particular transactions as not racketeering, mail and wire fraud, racketeering activity

Letters that corporate trustee's attorney sent to beneficiary's counsel did not constitute acts of mail fraud and, thus, provided no basis for civil RICO action against corporate trustee by beneficiary, where beneficiary's counsel had full knowledge of all facts which corporate trustee allegedly failed to disclose in one of the letters, two letters fully advised beneficiary's counsel of corporate trustee's deduction of funds from trust and clearly set forth its reasoning for deducting such funds, and letters were mailed after such funds had been deducted as attorney fees. Spiegel v. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1986, 790 F.2d 638, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 579, 479 U.S. 987, 93 L.Ed.2d 582. Postal Service 35(5)

Inasmuch as mailing of allegedly fraudulent invoice was not cause of injuries suffered by clients as result of attorney's allegedly negligent handling of their case, alleged mail fraud resulting from sending of invoices was not predicate act of racketeering that could support civil claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) claim. Kirk v. Heppt, S.D.N.Y.2006, 423 F.Supp.2d 147. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Corporations and individuals who purchased advertising from two newspapers with bloated circulation figures failed to provide any specifics in counts alleging mail fraud as predicate acts, as required to plead violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) with sufficient particularity, where they did not articulate contents of the letters, where they were mailed, to whom they were mailed, or which representations were false. Crab House of Douglaston, Inc. v. Newsday, Inc., E.D.N.Y.2006, 418 F.Supp.2d 193. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Investors' allegations that attorney used their money to acquire residential property for benefit of his daughter and son-in-law, that daughter and son-in-law mailed intermittent mortgage payments to investors' broker while concealing that mortgage was in default, and that they eventually stopped payments and converted money for their own use, were insufficient to state predicate offense of mail fraud required to support claim against daughter and son-in-law under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); investors alleged no facts demonstrating that daughter and son-in-law knowingly participated in attorney's fraudulent scheme, daughter and son-in-law had no obligation to disclose default to investors, and alleged incident of fraud was isolated. Congregacion de la Mision Provincia de Venezuela v. Curi, E.D.N.Y.1997, 978 F.Supp. 435. Postal Service 35(20)

While automobile finance company might be liable for breach of contract, to the extent that force placed insurance which it obtained when car buyer failed to obtain his own insurance exceeded that allowed by parties' contract, or to the extent that, as result of alleged kickbacks from insurer, automobile finance company overcharged car buyer for this insurance, finance company's alleged misconduct in connection with purchase of insurance did not constitute predicate acts of mail fraud, of kind sufficient to support civil RICO claim on car buyer's behalf, where car buyer failed to identify any false of misleading statement by finance company upon which he relied in entering into financing agreement. Moore v. Fidelity Financial Services, Inc., N.D.Ill.1997, 949 F.Supp. 673. Postal Service 35(11.1)

Individuals prominent in atheist movement had not committed mail or wire fraud, as predicate act to RICO claim, when they arranged to have mail destined for atheist publication rerouted to post office box which they controlled, as part of their lawsuit seeking an accounting of publication's funds and their general efforts to wrest control of publication from its publisher. Jackson v. Truth Seeker Co., Inc., S.D.Cal.1994, 884 F.Supp. 370, affirmed 105 F.3d 665, certiorari denied 118 S.Ct. 557, 522 U.S. 995, 139 L.Ed.2d 399. Postal Service 35(10); Telecommunications 1014(8)

Credit card holder who claimed that issuing company followed secret marketing strategy of waiving annual fees in whole or in part when card holders complained about fee or threatened to cancel cards failed to state violation of mail and wire fraud statutes so as to establish violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) because there was no potential or actual harm; fact that card holders might get issuing company's service without paying annual fee or by paying lesser fee did not mean that they suffered cognizable damage. Litwin v. American Exp. Co., S.D.N.Y.1993, 838 F.Supp. 855. Postal Service 35(9); Telecommunications 1014(7)

Securities brokerage firm did not commit Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations (RICO) predicate act of mail fraud by sending client statements which allegedly led clients to believe that current market value of their investments equaled original purchase price, despite omission of true value of investments; statements contained legends which disclosed that prices listed were for informational purposes only and represented original purchase price. Caraluzzi v. Prudential Securities, Inc., N.D.Ill.1993, 824 F.Supp. 1206. Postal Service 35(12)

Village's maintenance of record of arrestee's conviction for driving while impaired, and transmission of that information to Department of Motor Vehicles and FBI, did not violate RICO; transmission of information was not mail or wire fraud, and there was but single occurrence and not continuous criminal activity required by RICO. Malone v. McHugh, E.D.N.Y.1991, 797 F.Supp. 154, affirmed 968 F.2d 1480. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 10; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Allegation that “materially inaccurate, incomplete and misleading information audited by accountant defendants was communicated to plaintiffs by means of the United States mails and telephonic communications” failed to allege indictable act of mail or wire fraud, as required to support Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions act (RICO) claim. Pell v. Weinstein, M.D.Pa.1991, 759 F.Supp. 1107, affirmed 961 F.2d 1568. Postal Ser- vice 48(4.2); Telecommunications 1014(12)

Second payment made by commercial lessee for additional “costs of operation” under lease could not serve as mail fraud racketeering predicate act in lessee's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act action, and thus lessee had no standing to assert such claim; on second payment, lessee began challenging invoice by demanding backup documentation and making payments accompanied by express reservation of rights, thus there was no connection between payment and any injury lessee suffered. Ferndale Corp. v. Schulman Urban Development Associates, S.D.N.Y.1990, 758 F.Supp. 861. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Efforts to avoid payment of fully justified and legitimate obligations under asset purchase agreement did not establish mail fraud as predicate offense under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. CNC Service Center, Inc. v. CNC Service Center, Inc., N.D.Ill.1991, 753 F.Supp. 1427. Postal Service 35(10)

Routine business communications that show only dispute between parties do not lead to reasonable inference of fraudulent intent so as to constitute predicate acts under civil Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO). Atlantic Gypsum Co., Inc. v. Lloyds Intern. Corp., S.D.N.Y.1990, 753 F.Supp. 505. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Evidence did not establish mail fraud on part of boat builder's president by allegedly requesting that buyer send money for purchase of engines for boat, and, thus, finding of racketeering activity was foreclosed; even if request had been made, proof that engines were never purchased was not equivalent of proof that president made fraudulent statement relating to payment. Hilton Sea, Inc. v. DMR Yachts, Inc., D.Me.1990, 750 F.Supp. 35. Postal Service 49(11)

Communications between lighting ballast manufacturer and supplier of component parts after date upon which supplier admitted that it had altered its specifications pertaining to parts did not fall under mail and wire fraud statutes and thus, could not constitute predicate offenses under RICO statute, where even if scheme was of continuing nature, such scheme reached fruition on date when manufacturer discovered fraud. Radionic Industries, Inc. v. GTE Products Corp., N.D.Ill.1987, 665 F.Supp. 622. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Plaintiff failed to establish that defendants' telephone solicitations and sales with respect to counterfeit parts and spurious packaging amounted to wire or mail fraud and thus plaintiff failed to establish “racketeering” activity on the part of defendants for the purpose of establishing cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Ford Motor Co. v. B & H Supply, Inc., D.Minn.1986, 646 F.Supp. 975, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1094, supplemented 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1870. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Letter sent by attorney to prospective purchasers of financial planning businesses, stating position that any files on clients of registered securities broker and registered investment adviser which businesses had maintained were property of broker and adviser and demanding that such files be turned over to them, was not mail fraud, and thus, not racketeering activity for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act. Paul S. Mullin & Associates, Inc. v. Bassett, D.Del.1986, 632 F.Supp. 532. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 10

Simple transfer of stock did not in itself constitute conduct of business through pattern of racketeering activity that would support racketeering cause of action against seller, certain banks and their directors, and others for purportedly participating in scheme to defraud purchaser by inducing it to purchase stock at inflated price, even if transfer was part of an alleged mail fraud scheme. Lipin Enterprises, Inc. v. Lee, N.D.Ill.1985, 625 F.Supp. 1098, affirmed 803 F.2d 322. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Allegations by recipient of mail order catalog from women's clothing manufacturer that manufacturer had unlawfully discriminated in its pricing structures by sending catalogs which contained different discount offers to different groups of customers were insufficient to allege predicate act of mail fraud, as would support civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action; no fraudulent misrepresentations or material omissions constituting mail fraud were identified, and no basis for finding of fraudulent intent was made apart from conclusory allegations. Katzman v. Victoria's Secret Catalogue, S.D.N.Y.1996, 167 F.R.D. 649, reargument denied 939 F.Supp. 274, affirmed 113 F.3d 1229. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

87. Malicious prosecution, racketeering activity

A malicious prosecution could not constitute a predicate act for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act liability. von Bulow by Auersperg v. von Bulow, S.D.N.Y.1987, 657 F.Supp. 1134. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

88. Murder, racketeering activity

Evidence was sufficient to support finding that gang was actively engaged in racketeering activity of murder during the time period relevant to defendants' indictment for violations of the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racket- eering (VCAR) statute; FBI agent testified that following defendant's arrest, when asked if she was aware of the violence connected with the gang, defendant claimed that they used to beat up members and were responsible for the murder of four individuals, and a fellow gang member testified that, during the relevant time period, the gang's punishment for the commission of rape or for being a snitch was execution. U.S. v. Pimentel, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2003, 346 F.3d 285, certiorari denied 125 S.Ct. 451, 543 U.S. 955, 160 L.Ed.2d 316, post-conviction relief dismissed 2005 WL 820513. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 95

Evidence supported finding that defendant's participation in murder of victim was related to defendant's Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise, which engaged in drug and gun trafficking, so that participation could be deemed predicate act in support of RICO conviction, where, to further defendant's own enterprise, defendant sold guns to gang leader who committed murder, and murder could be seen as necessary precedent to consummating particular gun sale. U.S. v. Polanco, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1998, 145 F.3d 536, certiorari denied 119 S.Ct. 803, 525 U.S. 1071, 142 L.Ed.2d 664, post-conviction relief denied 2005 WL 1229255. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 95

Defendant's actions on behalf of murder for hire scheme qualified as predicate acts under RICO even though in criminal prosecution defendant was charged with federal offenses of conspiracy and murder for hire, which are not listed as RICO predicate acts; under state law, defendant's federal crimes would also have been chargeable

as criminal solicitation of murder and criminal conspiracy to commit murder, and thus qualified as predicate state offenses. Pohlot v. Pohlot, S.D.N.Y.1987, 664 F.Supp. 112. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 7

89. Obstruction of justice, racketeering activity

Charged conspiracies to obstruct enforcement of criminal laws of state of Texas with intent to facilitate illegal gambling business were properly listed as predicate acts of substantive count under this chapter charging that defendants conducted affairs of enterprise affecting interstate commerce through pattern of racketeering activity. U. S. v. Welch, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1981, 656 F.2d 1039, rehearing denied 663 F.2d 101, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1767, 456 U.S. 915, 72 L.Ed.2d 173, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1768, 456 U.S. 915, 72 L.Ed.2d 173. Conspir- acy 28(3)

Failed attempt of wife's attorneys to serve subpoena on husband's client to testify in California divorce proceeding did not constitute grounds for charge of obstruction of justice and did not establish Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) predicate act. Streck v. Peters, D.Hawai'i 1994, 855 F.Supp. 1156. Obstruct- ing Justice 118; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

Defendants did not commit RICO predicate acts by allegedly agreeing to predicate acts of witness tampering or obstruction of justice committed by other defendants. Dooley v. United Technologies Corp., D.D.C.1992, 803 F.Supp. 428. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

RICO defendants' continuous pattern of obstructionous conduct was sufficiently related to other alleged RICO predicates so that statute of limitations did not bar prosecution; obstruction of justice predicates were part of continuing pattern to conceal securities and mail predicates. U.S. v. Cannistraro, D.N.J.1992, 800 F.Supp. 30. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

Ample state involvement was shown in antiabortion protestors' alleged civil rights conspiracy to frustrate ability of local law enforcement to provide equal access to abortion, even if result of protestors' actions was not state's intention. Town of West Hartford v. Operation Rescue, D.Conn.1992, 792 F.Supp. 161, vacated in part 991 F.2d 1039, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 185, 510 U.S. 865, 126 L.Ed.2d 144. Conspiracy 7.5(3)

Indictment for alleged violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act was sufficiently specific in its obstruction of justice predicate, which did more than track statutory language by stating that obstruction was aimed at preventing witness from responding to grand jury subpoena and providing general time and place of alleged obstruction, despite absence of detail about means by which alleged obstruction was accomplished and absence of any precision as to the criminal investigation being obstructed. U.S. v. Vitale, S.D.N.Y.1986, 635 F.Supp. 194, cause dismissed 795 F.2d 1006. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 91

Inaction of police officers, or their fear to take action with respect to participants in gambling operation, was relevant to the issues of whether the racketeering operation of the gambling operation was being protected by the

police as result of payments to the mayor, some of which were delivered by the defendant who was charged with conspiracy to participate in the conduct of the affairs of the department through a pattern of racketeering activity and with conspiracy to obstruct law enforcement with the intent to facilitate an illegal gambling business. U. S. v. Feliziani, E.D.Pa.1979, 472 F.Supp. 1037, affirmed 622 F.2d 580. Conspiracy 45

90. Patents, copyrights and trademarks, racketeering activity

Concrete sealer manufacturer's alleged scheme to market products using competitor's trademark amounted to claim of willful trademark infringement, not racketeering, and thus was not actionable under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where there was no allegation of criminal trafficking in counterfeit marks. Evercrete Corp. v. H-Cap Ltd., S.D.N.Y.2006, 429 F.Supp.2d 612. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 7

Patent infringement is not “racketeering activity” for purposes of RICO. Michod v. Walker Magnetics Group, Inc., N.D.Ill.1987, 115 F.R.D. 345, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1815, reconsideration denied. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 7

91. Perjury, racketeering activity

Alleged perjury and misleading testimony of testator's aides did not fraudulently conceal purported heir's Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against personal representatives of estate, as required to equitably toll statute of limitations on such grounds, where heir had enough information concerning the perjury to begin the limitations period at the time of the probate trial. Dummar v. Lummis, C.A.10 (Utah) 2008, 543 F.3d 614. Limitation Of Actions 104(2)

Alleged perjury which took place in state court, not federal court, could not qualify as Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) predicate act; only perjury in federal court falls under obstruction of justice which is a predicate act under RICO. Streck v. Peters, D.Hawai'i 1994, 855 F.Supp. 1156. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

Perjury can be a predicate act for purposes of a RICO action, through obstruction of justice statute, where plaintiffs allege the perjury was part of the pattern of racketeering activity. C & W Const. Co. v. Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 745, AFL-CIO, D.Hawai'i 1988, 687 F.Supp. 1453. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 7

Inconsistency between verdict in criminal case and witness' testimony in civil case did not establish that witness gave false testimony in civil case and did not establish predicate act of obstruction of justice for purposes of civil RICO action. Scutieri v. Estate of Revitz, S.D.Fla.1988, 683 F.Supp. 795. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 7

Perjury is not a predicate act to permit civil RICO liability. Rand v. Anaconda-Ericsson, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1985, 623 F.Supp. 176, affirmed 794 F.2d 843, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 579, 479 U.S. 987, 93 L.Ed.2d 582. Racket-

eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

92. Repayment, racketeering activity

Diversion of monies requested by accountant from client for payment of income taxes failed as predicate act for purposes of civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) action, where money was repaid with interest. Zee-Bar, Inc. N.H. v. Kaplan, D.N.H.1992, 792 F.Supp. 895. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 58

93. Robbery, racketeering activity

Conduct of defendant police officer or his coconspirators in restraining drug dealer victims with handcuffs and placing them in back of police cars while taking their money and drugs amounted to robbery under Florida law, rather than larceny, and therefore conduct qualified as racketeering activity chargeable as predicate act under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). U.S. v. Gonzalez, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1994, 21 F.3d 1045. Larceny 1; Robbery 1

Racketeering activity as defined in this section includes state crime of robbery. U. S. v. Aleman, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1979, 609 F.2d 298, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 1345, 445 U.S. 946, 63 L.Ed.2d 780. Robbery 1

Radio station owner operator which alleged defendants were engaged in business of illegally modifying radio units, for a fee, to allow unauthorized listeners to obtain and enjoy programming on subcarrier frequencies that could not be received by general public had not stated RICO claim for racketeering activity; alleged predicate act was state law crime of robbery, but alleged conduct did not constitute robbery under Pennsylvania law, as use of or threat of force was not involved, so no predicate offenses were pled. Greek Radio Network of America, Inc. v. Vlasopoulos, E.D.Pa.1990, 731 F.Supp. 1227. Robbery 6

94. Scalping, racketeering activity

Alleged “scalping” schemes were racketeering predicate act of securities fraud whereby brokerage firm owner, research analyst, and former president of another firm allegedly bought securities through use of nominee brokerage accounts with advance knowledge of coming public dissemination of favorable reports by analyst, sold securities once dissemination of reports caused price to rise, and did not disclose financial interest in the securities; fact that owner, analyst, and former president were financially interested in the securities would cer- tainly be viewed as material by investors. U.S. v. Eisenberg, D.N.J.1991, 773 F.Supp. 662. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

95. Securities violations, racketeering activity

That indictment charging violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) alleged predicate acts of “purchase and sale” or “offer and sale” of securities, rather than simple “sale” did not render indictment defective as to brokerage firm's owner; it was doubtful that jury would have misconstrued indictment to mean that defendant engaged in fraud in purchase or offer of securities, exclusive of sale, and extensive factu-

al allegations of superseding indictment made clear that fraud in question was securities fraud and that transaction in question was defendant's sale of stock to unknowing customers. U.S. v. Blinder, C.A.9 (Nev.) 1993, 10 F.3d 1468. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 91

In context of corporation's RICO action against shareholder and his associates, in which predicate acts were alleged to be extortion and securities fraud arising out of shareholder's “green mail,” evidence did not establish that corporation was damaged by transaction which resulted in shareholder receiving almost $80 per share, notwithstanding that stock was trading at only $62 per share on open exchange; despite market price, shareholder had offered to buy all corporation's stock at $75 per share only several days before greenmail transaction, and corporation at that time reviewed reports valuing corporation's stock at $88 to $100 per share. Viacom Intern. Inc. v. Icahn, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1991, 946 F.2d 998, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 1244, 502 U.S. 1122, 117 L.Ed.2d 477. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Alleged shareholder's evidence failed to establish that former attorney for corporation and former president intended to deceive alleged shareholder or that alleged shareholder relied on alleged misstatements or omissions in connection with alleged shareholder's attempt to buy stock from another shareholder and, thus, failed to establish securities fraud as a predicate act for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim. Pelletier v. Zweifel, C.A.11 (Ga.) 1991, 921 F.2d 1465, rehearing denied 931 F.2d 901, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 167, 502 U.S. 855, 116 L.Ed.2d 131. Securities Regulation 60.63(2); Securities Regulation 60.63(4)

“Churning,” a type of rule 10(b)-5 violation, is a predicate act under RICO. Laird v. Integrated Resources, Inc., C.A.5 (Tex.) 1990, 897 F.2d 826, rehearing denied.

Consequential damages to investors arising from accountant's material misstatements and omissions in connection with sale of stock were sufficient to meet “injury” requirement of Rule 10b-5 claim, and thus, investors, who purchased stock on accountant's recommendation, established necessary two predicate acts of securities fraud to support finding of civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act violation on part of accountant, even though neither investor suffered “out-of-pocket” damages as determined from value of securities at time of purchase. James v. Meinke, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1985, 778 F.2d 200. Securities Regulation 60.47

Viewing all evidence in light most favorable to plaintiff customer in his suit against broker stemming from a dispute over balance owed on margin account, it was obvious that customer would be unable to prove any predicate acts amounting to “racketeering activity” or “collection of an unlawful debt” as defined in the Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act and as necessary to sustain a RICO claim. Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., C.A.11 (Ga.) 1985, 763 F.2d 1352. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Conspiracies involving securities fraud may serve as predicate acts for RICO claims, even though there is some authority that no private rights of action for conspiracy exist for violations of Rule 10b-5. Borden, Inc. v. Spoor Behrins Campbell & Young, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1993, 828 F.Supp. 216. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza-

tions 15

Any violation of securities fraud provision in Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that is sufficiently willful to trig- ger criminal penalties constitutes “fraud in the sale of securities” for purposes of a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim. In re Crazy Eddie Securities Litigation, E.D.N.Y.1993, 812 F.Supp. 338. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Sufficient evidence from which jury could find scienter for securities fraud can also establish scienter for predicate acts of securities fraud under RICO. Kline v. First Western Government Securities, E.D.Pa.1992, 794 F.Supp. 542, affirmed in part , reversed in part 24 F.3d 480, rehearing and rehearing in banc denied, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 613, 513 U.S. 1032, 130 L.Ed.2d 522, on remand. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 79

Any willful misrepresentation or omission of material fact made in connection with sale of stock falls within statutory definition of “racketeering activity.” Koulouris v. Estate of Chalmers, N.D.Ill.1992, 790 F.Supp. 1372. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Investors in real estate venture stated cause of action against certain promoters for securities fraud, so as to provide predicate act for RICO charge; investors had alleged that tax opinions provided to induce investment contained misrepresentation that intermediary entities had been involved in sale of property in question so as to inflate its price and allow for larger tax deductions, even though property records indicated presence of no such entities. Morin v. Trupin, S.D.N.Y.1991, 778 F.Supp. 711, on reconsideration 809 F.Supp. 1081, on reargument 823 F.Supp. 201. Securities Regulation 60.40

Securities fraud is predicate act under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Gilmore v. Berg, D.N.J.1991, 761 F.Supp. 358. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Sale of securities by means of false oral communication, in violation of Securities Act § 12(2), was fraud in sale of securities that could serve as predicate act of racketeering. Metromedia Co. v. Fugazy, S.D.N.Y.1990, 753 F.Supp. 93, affirmed as amended on other grounds 983 F.2d 350, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 2445, 508 U.S. 952, 124 L.Ed.2d 662. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11; Securities Regulation 25.56

Minority shareholder, as alleged victim of securities fraud and mail fraud violations occurring in connection with her sale of stock to corporation, was required to show that her injury stemmed from corporate officials' acquisition or maintenance of control of corporation through pattern of racketeering activity to recover under section of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) making it unlawful to acquire or maintain control of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity. Helman v. Murry's Steaks, Inc., D.Del.1990, 742 F.Supp. 860, reargument denied 743 F.Supp. 289. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Directors of corporation did not violate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act in connection with certain representations made regarding a corporation which allegedly resulted in certain shareholders making

loan guarantee commitment to corporation; as activities of defendants had been held not to constitute fraud in the sale of securities, there was no wrongful conduct to provide predicate acts of racketeering. VT Investors v. R & D Funding Corp., D.N.J.1990, 733 F.Supp. 823. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 22

Securities fraud is predicate offense under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act only if fraud oc- curs in actual sale of security. In re Par Pharmaceutical, Inc. Securities Litigation, S.D.N.Y.1990, 733 F.Supp. 668. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Where investment banker took corporation's confidential information in violation of their contract and passed it along to securities arbitrager for purposes of insider trading, value of confidential information was destroyed and destruction entitled corporation to damages under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. FMC Corp. v. Boesky, N.D.Ill.1989, 727 F.Supp. 1182, affirmed 36 F.3d 255. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 11

Trust beneficiary's claims against trustee alleging that trustee violated RICO in his handling of trust was not barred by res judicata, despite claim that beneficiary could have brought RICO claims in prior suit, in which beneficiary alleged that trustee engaged in three fraudulent stock transactions that took place in 1967-1968, since these same three transactions were the alleged predicate acts in beneficiary's RICO claims; even if beneficiary knew about three transactions in 1980, beneficiary could not have brought RICO claims, since RICO statute requires at least one predicate act after 1970, and there was reason to believe that beneficiary did not know of any post-1970 predicate acts in 1980 when she filed prior action. Norris v. Wirtz, N.D.Ill.1989, 703 F.Supp. 1322. Judgment 739

Complaint which did not allege actionable fraud on the part of bank which transferred customer's securities to the trust company without informing trust company that customer had been double hypothecating the securities and which did not allege that the trust company had been injured in its property or business by reason of the fraud did not state a cause of action under RICO. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. v. Fidata Corp., S.D.N.Y.1988, 700 F.Supp. 1252. Fraud 25

Allegations of securities fraud violations in connection with the issuance and marketing of manufactured home loan bonds and multiple use of mail, telephone and other instrumentalities of interstate commerce in connection with those violations sufficiently alleged predicate acts required to state a civil RICO claim. First Financial Sav. Bank, Inc. v. American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida, Inc., E.D.N.C.1988, 699 F.Supp. 1167. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Stockbroker's repeated acts of misrepresentations to investor, to induce investor to either sell his then current investments and then buy other investments over two and one-half year period were sufficiently continuing to constitute continuing predicate violations and support a RICO claim, even though transactions were distinguishable. Filloramo v. Johnston, Lemon & Co., Inc., D.D.C.1988, 697 F.Supp. 517. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 29

Under section of RICO statute defining “racketeering activity” as meaning any offense involving bankruptcy fraud, securities fraud, or “dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of the United States,” phrase “punishable under any law of the United States” modifies clauses concerning bankruptcy and securities fraud as well as clause concerning narcotics offenses, so that claim thereunder could not be predicated solely on alleged violation of state securities laws. Gatti v. National Bank of the Com., W.D.Pa.1988, 696 F.Supp. 153. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Violation of federal securities laws can serve as predicate act or acts for federal racketeering violation. Ohman v. Kahn, S.D.N.Y.1988, 685 F.Supp. 1302. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Allegations of churning and unsuitable trading on part of broker were adequate to allege “pattern of racketeering” within meaning of RICO statute. Cruse v. Equitable Securities of New York, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1987, 678 F.Supp. 1023. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Sales of condominium units were not investment contracts so as to qualify as sales of securities within definition of “racketeering activity” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, even though some purchasers bought units for investment purposes in reliance on developer's representations, absent showing that developer promised to market, develop, sell or lease properties on behalf of passive investors and in exchange for their investment; sales of condominium units did not involve collateral agreements. Dumbarton Condominium Ass'n v. 3120 R Street Associates Ltd. Partnership, D.D.C.1987, 657 F.Supp. 226. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act applied to alleged fraud in connection with sale of commodity futures contracts. Davis v. Smith, N.D.Ill.1985, 635 F.Supp. 459. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 11

Horse breeding syndication agreement which did not involve a “security” could not, therefore, have been an offense falling within the definition of “racketeering activities” relating to sales of securities so as to permit civil RICO action. Kefalas v. Bonnie Brae Farms, Inc., E.D.Ky.1985, 630 F.Supp. 6. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 11

Cause of action based on fraudulent use of interstate facilities and violations of security laws stated claim under Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act. Fondren v. Schmidt, D.Nev.1986, 626 F.Supp. 892. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Fraud in sale of securities qualifies as “racketeering activity” within meaning of this chapter. Yancoski v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., E.D.Pa.1983, 581 F.Supp. 88. Commerce 82.6

Plaintiff could maintain securities fraud action under this chapter based on theory that registered broker-dealer conspired with one of its registered representatives. Mauriber v. Shearson/American Exp., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1983, 567 F.Supp. 1231. Conspiracy 30

Active trading by securities companies in plaintiff's stock did not constitute violation of this chapter, where such activities did not violate market manipulation provisions of section 78i of Title 15. Trane Co. v. O'Connor Se- curities, S.D.N.Y.1983, 561 F.Supp. 301, appeal dismissed 718 F.2d 26. Commerce 82.6; Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 11

In prosecution for engaging in pattern of racketeering activities centering on corporate theatre enterprise, alleged securities fraud and bankruptcy fraud were sufficient predicate offenses despite contention that securities fraud was committed prior to formation of theatre and therefore not in conduct of its affairs and that bankruptcy fraud was not part of day-to-day activities of enterprise. U. S. v. DePalma, S.D.N.Y.1978, 461 F.Supp. 778. Bank- ruptcy 3861; Securities Regulation 193

96. Travel Act violations, racketeering activity

In order for defendants' convictions as accomplices under the Travel Act to serve as predicate RICO violations, the Government was required to prove the defendants' knowing participation in the conspiracy, the object of which was to operate a prostitution enterprise, affecting interstate commerce, through two predicate acts, but not that defendants knowingly used an interstate facility to further the enterprise. U.S. v. Stern, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1988, 858 F.2d 1241. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 3

Predicate act alleging that defendant used extortionate means to collect an extension of credit at meeting in New York City and count alleging violation of Travel Act, section 1952 of this title, by traveling in interstate commerce with intent to carry out unlawful means of extortionate collection were not identical so as to constitute one act, thereby being fatal to the two predicate acts of racketeering activity necessary for violation of this chapter. U.S. v. Pepe, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1984, 747 F.2d 632. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Where evidence was insufficient to sustain convictions under the Travel Act, section 1952 of this title, and those offenses were the predicate offenses of substantive count under this chapter, substantive conviction could not stand under this chapter. U.S. v. Truglio, C.A.4 (W.Va.) 1984, 731 F.2d 1123, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 197, 469 U.S. 862, 83 L.Ed.2d 130. Commerce 82.6

Violation of the Travel Act could be predicate act for purposes of RICO violation, even though Travel Act violation was itself based on violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act which is not a listed RICO predicate; Congress has not restricted the Travel Act as a RICO predicate to cases where the underlying offense is also a listed RICO predicate. U.S. v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., D.Conn.1990, 741 F.Supp. 334. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

97. Use of communication facility, racketeering activity

Racketeering charge against defendant could not use as a predicate act a telephone call which was neither placed by or answered by defendant, in which defendant was merely mentioned, as the statute on which the predicate act was based, use of a communication facility in furtherance of commission of a felony, required at a minimum

that the defendant utilize a communication facility. U.S. v. Jennings, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1988, 842 F.2d 159. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

98. Usury, racketeering activity

Cable service provider did not collect “unlawful debts” within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) by collecting late fees from cable subscribers; fixed administrative or late fee charged under a rental or service agreement was not regarded as interest under Texas law, and therefore was not usurious. Nolen v. Nucentrix Broadband Networks Inc., C.A.5 (Tex.) 2002, 293 F.3d 926, certiorari denied 123 S.Ct. 600, 537 U.S. 1047, 154 L.Ed.2d 520. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

Neither Federal Home Loan Bank Board regulations nor Home Owners' Loan Act can be fairly characterized as “laws relating to usury” for purposes of RICO. Sundance Land Corp. v. Community First Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n, C.A.9 (Wash.) 1988, 840 F.2d 653. Commerce 82.20

Loans made to person for business or investment purposes were not subject to state usury law or federal Truth in Lending Act and, therefore, attempts to collect allegedly usurious loans could not have been attempts to collect unlawful debt as predicate acts under RICO. Nelson v. Nationwide Mortg. Corp., D.D.C.1991, 758 F.Supp. 747. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 14

Bank's mistaken reductions in principal on consolidated mortgage agreement could not be considered “interest” in support of borrower's RICO claim that loan carried twice the enforceable interest rate and was incurred in connection with business of lending money at usurious rate; because bank “mistakenly” reduced principal at greater rate than that required under agreement, it charged borrower less interest on monthly basis than that due under agreement. Durante Bros. & Sons, Inc. v. Flushing Nat. Bank, E.D.N.Y.1986, 652 F.Supp. 101. Usury 42

Complaint, which alleged that interest rate on note effectively exceeded twice the legal rate of interest in New York, was sufficient to state claim that creditor collected unlawful debt in violation of RICO, even though annual interest rate on note was 27% and only note calling for at least 32% interest would constitute twice the enforceable rate under state law as required for RICO violation; complaint alleged that due to compounding of monthly interest at 2%, effective annual interest rate would exceed 32% per annum over time. In re Bennett, Bkrtcy.N.D.N.Y.1992, 142 B.R. 616. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

99. Economic motive, racketeering activity

Economic motive of predicate acts of racketeering is sufficient to uphold Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) conviction; economic motive is not required for both enterprise and predicate acts of racketeering. U.S. v. Freeman, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1993, 6 F.3d 586, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 1661, 511 U.S. 1077, 128 L.Ed.2d 378, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 2177, 511 U.S. 1147, 128 L.Ed.2d 896. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 34

100. Miscellaneous racketeering activities, racketeering activity

Former restaurant employees' allegations that employers knowingly supplied aliens with jobs and with social security numbers to facilitate their employment amounted to allegations of “encouraging or inducing” within meaning of statute criminalizing encouraging and inducing an alien to enter the United States illegally, and stated a predicate act of racketeering under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Edwards v. Prime, Inc., C.A.11 (Ala.) 2010, 602 F.3d 1276. Aliens, Immigration, And Citizenship 776

Although Cayman Islands judgment creditor's action, under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), for alleged scheme of state-run Congolese oil company to use straw men transactions by prepayment agreements with French bank to thwart legitimate creditors by diverting oil revenue to Congolese officials, was “based upon” execution of prepayment agreements, constituting act outside United States in connection with commercial activity of foreign state elsewhere, as required for exception to oil company's immunity from suit as foreign state, under Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), creditor's financial losses from prepayment agreements did not cause “direct effect” or immediate consequence in United States, under FSIA requirements, since prepayment agreements did not require performance in United States, and creditor as foreign corporation did not suffer harm felt in United States. Kensington Intern. Ltd. v. Itoua, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2007, 505 F.3d 147. In- ternational Law 10.33

Employer's alleged recruitment of hundreds of illegal aliens at border, hiring of those aliens in order to cut costs and drive down wages of its legal workers, and shielding of illegal aliens from federal inspectors constituted “pattern of racketeering activity” within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Williams v. Mohawk Industries, Inc., C.A.11 (Ga.) 2005, 411 F.3d 1252, certiorari granted in part 126 S.Ct. 830, 546 U.S. 1075, 163 L.Ed.2d 705, certiorari dismissed as improvidently granted 126 S.Ct. 2016, 547 U.S. 516, 164 L.Ed.2d 776, on remand 465 F.3d 1277. Aliens, Immigration, And Citizenship 776; Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

Lawsuits by persons dissatisfied with their portrayal in investigative news programs did not demonstrate continued threat of illegal activity required for televangelist and church to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) claims against television network which broadcasted investigative report that was critical of church's fund-raising techniques; existence of lawsuits did not demonstrate illegal acts as defendant's regular way of doing business. Word of Faith World Outreach Center Church, Inc. v. Sawyer, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1996, 90 F.3d 118, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 1248, 520 U.S. 1117, 137 L.Ed.2d 329. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Alleged illegal interception of telephone conversations is not one of the criminal acts that constitutes “racketeering activity” for purposes of RICO. Bast v. Cohen, Dunn & Sinclair, PC, C.A.4 (Va.) 1995, 59 F.3d 492. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

Arrestee failed to allege a pattern of racketeering activity against law enforcement officers as required to state a claim of violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), even if the one racketeering activity alleged, an illegal arrest, could be termed a kidnapping. Willis v. Mullins, E.D.Cal.2007, 517 F.Supp.2d 1206, affirmed 314 Fed.Appx. 68, 2009 WL 453279, reconsideration denied 809 F.Supp.2d 1227. Racketeer In-

fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Allegations that defendants sold or purchased interests in accounts receivables did not constitute “racketeering activity” as required to state a claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). McGee v. Moon, N.D.Ohio 2010, 685 F.Supp.2d 737. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

Employer's allegedly improper withholding of federal taxes from his wages did not constitute attempt to collect “unlawful debt,” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); amounts withheld were in no way related to illegal gambling activity or usurious lending. Giles v. Volvo Trucks North Amer- ica, M.D.Pa.2008, 551 F.Supp.2d 359. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 14

United States congregation's alleged act of raising funds for development of settlements on West Bank in Israel, if proven, was not “racketeering activity” within meaning of Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), even if entities for whom they raised funds engaged in racketeering activity, inasmuch as there was no evidence that congregation knew Israelis would engage in activity contemplated by RICO. Doe I v. State of Is- rael, D.D.C.2005, 400 F.Supp.2d 86. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

Independent contractor's allegations that hiring corporation's employees committed theft through their unauthorized use of corporation's equipment for their own purposes did not establish predicate act for purposes of Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim; simple theft was not one of the crimes constituting a predicate act, and alleged theft did not harm independent contractor. Toms v. Pizzo, W.D.N.Y.1998, 4 F.Supp.2d 178, affirmed 172 F.3d 38. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

Alleged criminal violations of Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), and alleged commission of financial institution bribery could not serve as predicate acts for purposes of establishing violation of RICO; offenses were not included in list of indictable offenses constituting predicate acts, set forth in RICO. Kerby v. Mortgage Funding Corp., D.Md.1998, 992 F.Supp. 787. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 9

Actions of lamp manufacturer in allegedly sending letter to parts supplier threatening to cancel its orders with supplier if supplier sent parts to competitor did not constitute predicate acts on part of manufacturer which could serve as basis of civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) claim; actions did not violate Massachusetts commercial bribery statute, and attempted to create legal vertical restraint which did not violate antitrust laws. Holmes Products Corp. v. Dana Lighting, Inc., D.Mass.1997, 958 F.Supp. 27. Antitrust And Trade Regulation 592; Bribery 1(1)

Former European distributors of product used to treat wastewater and aquarium water were liable under RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) and Ohio Corrupt Activities Act to seller for compensat- ory damages in excess of $3.9 million, representing treble the amount of sum of unpaid product, lost profits on product itself and on on-site activation system, and consequential damages in form of travel and employee time, based on their theft of trade secrets and use of those secrets for their own profit. General Environmental Science

Corp. v. Horsfall, N.D.Ohio 1992, 800 F.Supp. 1497, affirmed in part , vacated in part 25 F.3d 1048, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 358, 513 U.S. 947, 130 L.Ed.2d 312, on subsequent appeal 53 F.3d 331. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 85; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 118

Violation of statute providing penalties for transmission in interstate commerce of threats to kidnap or injure is not racketeering activity listed under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) statutory definition, so violation of that statute could not support RICO civil claims. American Computer Trust Leasing v. Jack Farrell Implement Co., D.Minn.1991, 763 F.Supp. 1473, affirmed and remanded 967 F.2d 1208, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 414, 506 U.S. 956, 121 L.Ed.2d 338. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 8

Allegation that funds fraudulently converted by meeting planning organization were “transported” and “received” by organization's controlling persons was sufficient to allege violation of transportation and receipt statutes as predicate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) acts. Todaro v. Orbit Intern. Travel, Ltd., S.D.N.Y.1991, 755 F.Supp. 1229. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

Violation of Texas misapplication of fiduciary property statute is not ground for liability under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Marriott Bros. v. Gage, N.D.Tex.1988, 704 F.Supp. 731, opinion supplemented on denial of reconsideration 717 F.Supp. 458, affirmed 911 F.2d 1105, rehearing denied. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Chief deputy sheriff's allegation, that county political party chairman and county commission chairman pressured sheriff's department to work on party's behalf, did not establish racketeering activity under RICO, absent any allegation that money or property was withheld threatening harm or that chairmen threatened unlawful harm to department personnel with intent to influence discretion for violation of legal duties. Rose v. Bartle, E.D.Pa.1988, 692 F.Supp. 521, affirmed in part , vacated in part and reversed in part 871 F.2d 331, on remand. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 8

Promoter's disagreement with another general contractor in another shopping mall project was not predicate act that gave rise to pattern of racketeering activity with respect to general contractor's RICO claim against same promoter with regard to shopping mall project; other general contractor did not claim he was defrauded by promoter and did not claim any intentional misrepresentation on part of promoter, but merely disagreed regarding contract interpretation. J.A. Moore Const. Co. v. Sussex Associates Ltd. Partnership, D.Del.1988, 688 F.Supp. 982. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

Defendant, the clerk of courts of Lehigh County, was properly convicted under this chapter, despite contention that laws which require estreatments to be forwarded to solicitor's office are so confusing that defendant could not be expected to know and understand the duties which they impose, in that testimony at trial revealed a number of breaches of known legal duties, namely, estreatments and bail conditions were established by court order, failure to estreat in timely manner was in violation of such an order, and accepting a bond without court-ordered collateral constituted a breach of legal duty. U.S. v. Joseph, E.D.Pa.1981, 526 F.Supp. 504. Bribery 1(2)

Breach of attorney fiduciary obligations or conversion of client's property during course of professional engagement does not ordinarily rise to level of claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Niccum v. Meyer, N.D.Ill.1994, 171 B.R. 828. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

101. State law violation, racketeering activity--Generally

Wyoming statute prohibiting blackmail clearly established that it was unlawful to accuse or threaten to accuse a person of a crime with intent to obtain that person's property or compel some other action or inaction, and thus ranch owner who claimed that Bureau of Land Management (BLM) employees accused owner of various crimes to obtain right-of-way across owner's property stated violation of clearly established statutory rights under Wyoming law, as required to defeat employees' defense of qualified immunity to owner's claim that employees' violations of statute constituted predicate acts supporting owner's claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Robbins v. Wilkie, C.A.10 (Wyo.) 2006, 433 F.3d 755, certiorari granted 127 S.Ct. 722, 549 U.S. 1075, 166 L.Ed.2d 559, reversed and remanded 127 S.Ct. 2588, 551 U.S. 537, 168 L.Ed.2d 389, on remand 497 F.3d 1122. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Breach of fiduciary duty was not one of the specified state crimes listed in the definition of “racketeering activity,” for purposes of establishing civil RICO action. Manion v. Freund, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1992, 967 F.2d 1183, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

State preclusion law must be examined to determine collateral estoppel effect of previous state court judgments on claims made under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt and Organizations Act even if jurisdiction under that Act is exclusively federal. Cook County v. MidCon Corp., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1985, 773 F.2d 892. Federal Courts 420

Although state offenses are incorporated into this chapter, violation of state law is not sole element of charged federal offenses; this chapter serves independent federal purposes and is not merely an attempt to enforce state law. U. S. v. Zemek, C.A.9 (Wash.) 1980, 634 F.2d 1159, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 1359, 450 U.S. 916, 67 L.Ed.2d 341, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 1525, 450 U.S. 985, 67 L.Ed.2d 821, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 3031, 452 U.S. 905, 69 L.Ed.2d 406. Commerce 82.10

There is no requirement that a state conviction be obtained where a state offense is part of racketeering activity charged under this chapter. U. S. v. Malatesta, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1978, 583 F.2d 748, on rehearing 590 F.2d 1379, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 1508, 440 U.S. 962, 59 L.Ed.2d 777, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 91, 444 U.S. 846, 62 L.Ed.2d 59. Commerce 82.10

This chapter forbids “racketeering,” not state offenses per se; the state offenses referred to are definitional only, and racketeering, the federal crime, is defined as matter of legislative draftsmanship by reference to state law crimes. U. S. v. Frumento, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1977, 563 F.2d 1083, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 1256, 434 U.S. 1072, 55 L.Ed.2d 775, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 1258, 434 U.S. 1072, 55 L.Ed.2d 776. Commerce 82.10

Under this chapter, state offenses are included by generic designation, and test for determining whether charged

acts fit into generic category of predicate offense is whether indictment charges type of activity generally known or characterized in the proscribed category. U.S. v. Forsythe, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1977, 560 F.2d 1127. Commerce 82.10

Reference to state law in par. (1)(A) of this section is for purpose of defining conduct prohibited and is not meant to incorporate state statute of limitations or procedural rules. U. S. v. Brown, C.A.5 (Ga.) 1977, 555 F.2d 407, rehearing denied 559 F.2d 29, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 1448, 435 U.S. 904, 55 L.Ed.2d 494. Criminal Law 147; Gaming 63(2)

District Court lacked jurisdiction pursuant to Rooker-Feldman doctrine, to consider plaintiff's action alleging violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), and claims under §§ 1983, and his request as relief that multiple state judgments be declared void and their execution enjoined, where all of plaintiff's allegations concerned specific grievances that the state court in- correctly applied the law in underlying debt collection actions, and were clearly predicated on his belief that the state court was mistaken in rendering its decisions against him. McGee v. Moon, N.D.Ohio 2010, 685 F.Supp.2d 737. Courts 509

Alleged “scheme to defraud” in violation of state law did not fall within definition of racketeering activity for purposes of civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violation. Kirk v. Heppt, S.D.N.Y.2006, 423 F.Supp.2d 147. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) did not require government to plead state law crimes in accordance with specific pleading requirements of state law. U.S. v. Galasso, E.D.N.Y.2000, 118 F.Supp.2d 322. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

New York's “coercion” statute does not provide basis for liability under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO). Center Cadillac, Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. of New York, S.D.N.Y.1992, 808 F.Supp. 213, affirmed 99 F.3d 401. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 8

“Racketeering activity” within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) includes state law crimes such as murder, bribery and extortion, and federal crimes such as mail fraud, wire fraud and securities fraud. Wiley v. Hughes Capital Corp., D.N.J.1990, 746 F.Supp. 1264. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

Suit by operators of shopping mall project against general contractor's bonding company based on allegation that bonding company had exercised bad faith in investigating claims for payment made by general contractor and its subcontractors was not an extortionate act under Maryland law on ground that it caused, or threatened to cause, economic injury to general contractor, and could not serve as predicate act for general contractor's civil RICO claim against operators. J.A. Moore Const. Co. v. Sussex Associates Ltd. Partnership, D.Del.1988, 688 F.Supp. 982. Extortion 8

State offenses referred to in subsec. (1) (A) of this section are “definitional only” and racketeering, the federal crime, is defined as a matter of legislative draftsmanship by reference to state law crimes; thus, state procedural defenses are not available in this chapter's prosecution. U.S. v. Joseph, E.D.Pa.1981, 526 F.Supp. 504. Com- merce 82.10

An offense which, when committed, would have been indictable under state law is within definition of “racketeering activity” as used in this section. U. S. v. Fineman, E.D.Pa.1977, 434 F.Supp. 189. Commerce 82.10

102. ---- Chargeable under state law, state law violation, racketeering activity

Defendant's acquittal on state court murder charge did not mean that the murder was no longer “chargeable under state law” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and thus that murder could not serve as a predicate act of racketeering; definitional section merely described the type of generic conduct which would serve as RICO predicate and satisfy RICO's pattern requirement, regardless of whether further state prosecution would be barred by double jeopardy clause. U.S. v. Coonan, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1991, 938 F.2d 1553, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 1486, 503 U.S. 941, 117 L.Ed.2d 628. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 19

Under this chapter, Congress intended to permit federal indictment within time specified in federal statute of limitation, section 3282 of this title, for offenses which, when committed, were chargeable under state law and punishable for more than one year; words “chargeable under state law” in this section mean “chargeable under state law at the time the offense was committed.” U. S. v. Davis, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1978, 576 F.2d 1065, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 119, 439 U.S. 836, 58 L.Ed.2d 132. Criminal Law 147

Manufacturer's design, manufacture, and export of military bulldozers used by Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) to destroy homes of Palestinians was not “chargeable under state law,” and, thus, was not “racketeering activity” under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), for purposes of RICO claim brought by family of peace activist who was run over and killed by a military bulldozer in the Gaza Strip, and a number of Palestinians who lived in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., W.D.Wash.2005, 403 F.Supp.2d 1019, affirmed 503 F.3d 974. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

103. ---- Bribery, state law violation, racketeering activity

Conduct of city's public works commissioner in granting “comp time” and overtime pay to employees to perform political activities could not serve as predicate offense supporting conviction under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), under theory that using public funds to pay municipal employees for political labor was bribery under Illinois law; no state-court decision supported such a view, and putting bribery statute to such a novel use to secure RICO conviction would deprive commissioner of fair warning. U.S. v. Gen- ova, C.A.7 (Ill.) 2003, 333 F.3d 750, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 9

As defendant acted in good faith, he was not guilty of commercial bribery under Texas law, as required to sup-

port Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim based on bribery. C & B Sales & Ser- vice, Inc. v. McDonald, C.A.5 (La.) 1996, 95 F.3d 1308, modified on denial of rehearing 111 F.3d 27. Bribery 1(1)

Under Indiana law, former deputy sheriff accepted “bribes” in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganization Act, despite contention that payments from illegal poker machine vendors were political contributions, given that vendors expected and deputy agreed that vendors would receive police protection and other favors in exchange for payment. U.S. v. Mokol, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1992, 957 F.2d 1410, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 284, 506 U.S. 899, 121 L.Ed.2d 210. Bribery 1(1)

Violation of Florida unauthorized compensation statute may constitute “bribery” within federal Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute and thus form predicate act. U.S. v. Kotvas, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1991, 941 F.2d 1141, rehearing denied 966 F.2d 1463, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 982, 506 U.S. 1055, 122 L.Ed.2d 135. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 9

The labels placed on a state statute do not determine whether that statute proscribes bribery for purposes of the RICO statute and thus any statute prohibiting conduct which can be generically defined as bribery could be the basis for a RICO predicate act. U.S. v. Garner, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1987, 837 F.2d 1404, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 2022, 486 U.S. 1035, 100 L.Ed.2d 608, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 2914, 487 U.S. 1240, 101 L.Ed.2d 945, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 244, 488 U.S. 898, 102 L.Ed.2d 232. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 9

Violations of state antibribery statute, Code Ann. § 97-11-53, constituted predicate offense needed to establish pattern of racketeering activity under this chapter. Alcorn County, Miss. v. U.S. Interstate Supplies, Inc., C.A.5 (Miss.) 1984, 731 F.2d 1160. Commerce 82.6

Defendants who sought help of licensed groom in drugging horses that were competing with those under his care did not ask groom to refrain from giving his best efforts, and therefore defendants did not violate McKinney's N.Y. Penal Law §§ 180.40, 180.50 providing, that a person is guilty of sports bribing when he confers, offers or agrees to confer any benefit upon a sports participant with intent to influence him not to give his best efforts in a sports contest; therefore, defendants' conviction under this chapter, could not be based on that offense. U.S. v. Malizia, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1983, 720 F.2d 744. Bribery 1(1)

Since government had not shown that defendant, while a special bailiff for county circuit court, conferred any pecuniary benefit upon or directed any communication to a judge, government failed to prove that defendant violated Kentucky bribery statute, KRS 521.020, and therefore, those alleged acts of bribery could not serve as predicate offenses for defendant's conviction under this chapter. U.S. v. Cissell, C.A.6 (Ky.) 1983, 700 F.2d 338. Commerce 82.10

Defendant's action in furnishing services of prostitute free of charge to peace officers constituted predicate crime of bribery under Texas law, for purposes of prosecution under this chapter, as evidence established economic

value of services of prostitute, so that such services constituted “benefit” within meaning of Texas law. U.S. v. Tunnell, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1982, 667 F.2d 1182. Bribery 1(2)

Although proof of defendant's involvement in alleged acts of bribery was not necessary in order to affirm his racketeering conviction, acts charged in indictment against defendant, who alleged that charged acts actually were acts of official misconduct and that such acts, since misdemeanors, could not serve as predicate crimes for his racketeering conviction, did appear to fall within provisions of V.T.C.A. Penal Code §§ 36.02(a), 39.01 and 39.01(a) (1-4), even if offenses were acts of official misconduct, inclusion of such charges in indictment and the evidence produced at trial to support these charges was not so prejudicial as to require reversal of defendant's racketeering conviction. U. S. v. Welch, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1981, 656 F.2d 1039, rehearing denied 663 F.2d 101, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1767, 456 U.S. 915, 72 L.Ed.2d 173, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1768, 456 U.S. 915, 72 L.Ed.2d 173. Bribery 1(1); Criminal Law 1165(1)

Practice of entertaining public officials and favoring them with gifts in order that business expectations might be enhanced could constitute violation of LSA-R.S. 14:118; bribery was not restricted to those acts made in anticipation of specific official action. U. S. v. L'Hoste, C.A.5 (La.) 1980, 609 F.2d 796, rehearing denied 615 F.2d 383 , certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 104, 449 U.S. 833, 66 L.Ed.2d 39. Bribery 1(1)

Action of South Carolina policeman in accepting money and services of prostitutes in return for protecting illegally operated clubs and gambling establishments constituted violation of state statute making it a felony for an executive officer to corruptly accept a gift or gratuity under an agreement that his judgment in a particular manner should be made in a particular way and thus permitted conviction for interstate racketeering despite contention that the only South Carolina statute violated was statute imposing a fine of not more than $300 on sheriffs and other officers who accept a bribe for delaying or failing to arrest a person. U. S. v. Burnsed, C.A.4 (S.C.) 1977, 566 F.2d 882, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 1270, 434 U.S. 1077, 55 L.Ed.2d 784. Bribery 1(1)

Whether Connecticut bribery statutes required specific intent to influence official conduct was irrelevant in determining sufficiency of indictment charging defendants with violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute in connection with bribery scheme, where indictment alleged that campaign contributions were offered and received in exchange for official state acts. U.S. v. Triumph Capital Group, Inc., D.Conn.2002, 260 F.Supp.2d 444. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 91

Defendant's repeated commission of acts constituting New York crime of second-degree bribery established predicate act under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO); defendant asserted privilege against self-incrimination in response to questions about bribe payments to town officials, and United States produced independent corroborative evidence that defendant made payments to officials to have his company's waste disposal fees reduced. U.S. v. Private Sanitation Industry Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1994, 899 F.Supp. 974, appeal granted 44 F.3d 1082, affirmed 47 F.3d 1158, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 50, 516 U.S. 806, 133 L.Ed.2d 15. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 9

Predicate acts of racketeering, concerning alleged bribery of New York state officials in order to influence votes on proposed rate increase for carting, were acts involving bribery that were chargeable under New York law and

were punishable by more than one year of imprisonment and thus were properly pleaded as racketeering acts. U.S. v. Private Sanitation Industry Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1992, 793 F.Supp. 1114. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 9

Alleged violations of New York commercial bribery statute could not serve as requisite predicate acts to RICO claims of purchasers of title insurance; as title insurance premium was nonnegotiable, purchasers did not allege that insurer caused each of them economic harm in excess of $250. Moll v. US Life Title Ins. Co. of New York, S.D.N.Y.1989, 710 F.Supp. 476. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 9

Alleged commercial bribery offense under Illinois law was not punishable by imprisonment and thus, could not serve as predicate act under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Barkman v. Wabash, Inc., N.D.Ill.1987, 674 F.Supp. 623. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 9

State law offense in which bribery is alleged to have played major role, and which is punishable by more than one year's imprisonment, is “act * * * involving * * * bribery” which may serve as one of predicate acts required to establish pattern of racketeering activity under this chapter. Beth Israel Medical Center v. Smith, S.D.N.Y.1983, 576 F.Supp. 1061. Commerce 82.6

Violation of 18 P.S. § 4701(a) in effect prior to bribery statute which took effect on June 1, 1973, cannot constitute “racketeering activity” for purposes of this chapter if the Pennsylvania statute of limitations applicable to such offenses has run before the date of the federal indictments. U.S. v. Forsythe, W.D.Pa.1977, 429 F.Supp. 715, reversed 560 F.2d 1127. Criminal Law 157

III. PATTERN OF RACKETEERING

Generally 131 Abortion protest 135 Advancement of pattern 133 Arson 134 Bankruptcy fraud 136 Battery 137 Bribery 138 Bribery, number of acts 168 Business competition 139 Campaign fraud 140 Closed end continuity 142 Conspiracy, number of acts 169 ContinuityContinuity - Generally 141 Continuity - Mail and wire fraud 161 Continuity - Miscellaneous patterns of racketeering 144

Continuity - Open or closed ended continuity 142 Continuity - Threat of continuity 143 Continuity - Time of acts 192 Convictions 145 Copyrights 177 Criminal conduct 146 Denial of offense 147 Dismissed claims 148 Elements 132 Embezzlement 149 Employment 150 Extortion 151 Fiduciary duty 152 Financial transactions 153 Forgery 154 Fraud 155 Fraud, number of acts 170 Gambling 156 Harassment 157 Illegal activity 158 Insurance 159 Limitations, time of acts 193 Mail and wire fraud 160-162, 171 Mail and wire fraud - Generally 160 Mail and wire fraud - Continuity 161 Mail and wire fraud - Number of acts 171 Mail and wire fraud - Related or separate acts 162 Merger of offenses 163 Mergers 164 Miscellaneous patterns of racketeering 194 Miscellaneous patterns of racketeering, continuity 144 Miscellaneous patterns of racketeering, related or separate acts 181 Murder 165 Narcotics offenses 166 Necessary but not sufficient, number of acts 172 Number of acts 167-174 Number of acts - Generally 167 Number of acts - Bribery 168 Number of acts - Conspiracy 169 Number of acts - Fraud 170 Number of acts - Mail and wire fraud 171 Number of acts - Necessary but not sufficient 172 Number of acts - Securities violations 173 Number of acts - Unlawful debt 174 Number of victims 175

Open or closed ended continuity 142 Organized criminal activity 176 Patents, copyrights and trademarks 177 Pensions 178 Pleading 179 Related or separate acts 162, 180-181 Related or separate acts - Generally 180 Related or separate acts - Mail and wire fraud 162 Related or separate acts - Miscellaneous patterns of racketeering 181 Robbery 182 Sales 183 Securities violations 184 Securities violations, number of acts 173 Shareholder actions 185 Single act 186 Single objective 187 Single scheme 188 Single transaction 189 Social threat 190 Threat of continuity 143 Time of acts 191-193 Time of acts - Generally 191 Time of acts - Continuity 192 Time of acts - Limitations 193 Trademarks 177 Unlawful debt, number of acts 174

131. Generally, pattern of racketeering

To state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), pattern of racketeering activity must be established. Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v. Matkari, C.A.4 (Md.) 1993, 7 F.3d 1130, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1533, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 1307, 510 U.S. 1197, 127 L.Ed.2d 658. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 25

Determination of what activity constitutes a “pattern of racketeering activity” within meaning of RICO is a matter of criminal dimension and degree for which no mechanical test is available. International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, C.A.4 (Va.) 1987, 812 F.2d 149. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

This chapter does not criminalize engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity standing alone; gravamen of an offense under this chapter is the conduct of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. U. S. v. Phil- lips, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1981, 664 F.2d 971, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 2965, 457 U.S. 1136, 73 L.Ed.2d 1354, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 208, 459 U.S. 906, 74 L.Ed.2d 166. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 34

Defendants' alleged conspiracy to commit extortion was “act,” for purposes of determining whether defendants engaged in pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). U.S. v. Bellomo, E.D.N.Y.2003, 263 F.Supp.2d 561. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 15

“Pattern” is established for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act where predicate acts themselves amount to, or otherwise constitute threat of, continuing racketeering activity; factors including number and variety of predicate acts, length of time during which they were committed, number of victims, and occurrence of distinct injuries are considered in determining whether such continuity exists. SMS Mar- keting & Telecommunications, Inc. v. H.G. Telecom, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1996, 949 F.Supp. 134. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Liability under federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) requires conduct of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity. Pedrina v. Chun, D.Hawai'i 1995, 906 F.Supp. 1377, affirmed 97 F.3d 1296, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 2441, 520 U.S. 1268, 138 L.Ed.2d 201. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 34

Injury from single predicate act does not evolve into Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) injury until pattern of racketeering activity has developed; thus, injured party must know, or have reason to know, that his injury is part of pattern before he can be expected to file civil RICO cause of action. Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Value Rent-A-Car Inc., S.D.Fla.1992, 814 F.Supp. 1084. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

Before Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) plaintiff can allege “pattern of racketeering activity” he must plead particular instances of “racketeering activity” or “predicate acts.” Grove Holding Corp. v. First Wisconsin Nat. Bank of Sheboygan, E.D.Wis.1992, 803 F.Supp. 1486. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 72

Pattern of racketeering activity is sine qua non of any Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, and lack of that element mandates dismissal of claim. Qantel Corp. v. Niemuller, S.D.N.Y.1991, 771 F.Supp. 1361. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Demonstrating a “pattern of racketeering activity” is a prerequisite to bringing actions under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) subsections making it unlawful for any person to use money derived from a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire, establish or operate an enterprise that affects interstate commerce; to acquire, maintain or control an enterprise for a pattern of racketeering activity; or to conduct or participate in affairs of enterprise affecting interstate commerce through a pattern of racketeering activity. Eureka Paper Box Co. v. WBMA, Inc., Voluntary Employee Ben. Trust, M.D.Pa.1991, 767 F.Supp. 642. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

To state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim, plaintiff must plead basis from which to in- fer that alleged acts of racketeering activity were neither isolated nor sporadic. Dooner v. NMI Ltd., S.D.N.Y.1989, 725 F.Supp. 153. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 3

Case-by-case analysis of fact is appropriate to determination of whether RICO “pattern” requirement has been satisfactorily pleaded. Four Star Corp. v. Clink, E.D.Mich.1987, 702 F.Supp. 617. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

“Pattern of racketeering activity” for purposes of RICO requires more than multiple acts of racketeering committed to further single criminal transaction, episode, or scheme. McMullen v. Christenson, E.D.Mich.1987, 678 F.Supp. 1277. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

The “pattern” requirement of a substantive RICO violation, i.e., pattern of racketeering activity, should be read as indicating only the form and extent of participation which a defendant's activities must take for him to be convicted of a substantive RICO violation. U.S. v. Castellano, S.D.N.Y.1985, 610 F.Supp. 1359. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Pattern of racketeering is a distinct element of a RICO claim which must be proven and is not synonymous with enterprise, which also must be proven. Ross v. Omnibusch, Inc., W.D.Mich.1984, 607 F.Supp. 835. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Under plain words of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, “pattern of racketeering activity” is required, and same requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, the word “pattern” including requirement that the racketeering acts must have been connected with each other by some common scheme, plan or motive so as to constitute a pattern and not simply series of disconnected acts. Berg v. First American Bankshares, Inc., D.C.D.C.1984, 599 F.Supp. 500, affirmed 796 F.2d 489, 254 U.S.App.D.C. 198. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 28

A plaintiff under this chapter must prove existence of both an “enterprise” and a “pattern of racketeering activity.” Kimmel v. Peterson, E.D.Pa.1983, 565 F.Supp. 476. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 3

Term “racketeering activity,” within par. (5) of this section providing that a proscribed pattern of racketeering activity requires at least two acts of racketeering activity within ten years of each other, one of which must have occurred after effective date of this chapter, specifically incorporates any acts indictable under a number of specified previously existing statutes. U. S. v. Field, S.D.N.Y.1977, 432 F.Supp. 55, affirmed 578 F.2d 1371, certiorari dismissed 99 S.Ct. 43, 439 U.S. 801, 58 L.Ed.2d 94. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

For purposes of this section, a “pattern” can apparently be established by two acts occurring on the same day in the same place and forming a part of the same criminal episode. U. S. v. Moeller, D.C.Conn.1975, 402 F.Supp. 49. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

132. Elements, pattern of racketeering

In order to prove a pattern of racketeering activity under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act a plaintiff or prosecutor must show at least two racketeering predicates that are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., U.S.Minn.1989, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 492 U.S. 229, 106 L.Ed.2d 195, on remand 734 F.Supp. 879. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Determination as to whether pattern of racketeering activity exists under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) is fact-specific question hinging on variety of factors, including: number and variety of predicate acts and length of time over which they were committed, number of victims, presence of separate scheme, and occurrence of distinct injuries. Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., C.A.7 (Ind.) 1996, 77 F.3d 951, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

To prove pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) against leasing company and owner, financing company had to prove at least two acts of racketeering activity, the last of which occurred within ten years after commission of the prior act of racketeering activity. Heller Financial, Inc. v. Grammco Computer Sales, Inc., C.A.5 (Tex.) 1996, 71 F.3d 518. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 26; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

To prove a “pattern of racketeering activity,” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act claim, plaintiff must show at least two predicate acts of racketeering that are related and amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity. Tel-Phonic Services, Inc. v. TBS Intern., Inc., C.A.5 (Tex.) 1992, 975 F.2d 1134. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

To prove “pattern of racketeering activities” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, plaintiff must show that defendant engaged in at least two predicate acts of racketeering and that acts are related and amount to or pose threat of continued criminal activity. Schroeder v. Acceleration Life Ins. Co. of Pennsylvania, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1992, 972 F.2d 41. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26; Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

In order to establish pattern of racketeering activity within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act, plaintiff must show that racketeering acts were related and that they amounted to or posed threat of continued criminal activity. Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., C.A.3 (Pa.) 1991, 926 F.2d 1406, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 2839, 501 U.S. 1222, 115 L.Ed.2d 1007. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Demonstrating Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations “pattern” requires proof of multiple racketeering predicates, which can be part of single scheme, that are related and that amount to, or threaten likelihood of, continued criminal activity. U.S. v. Coiro, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1991, 922 F.2d 1008, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 2826, 501 U.S. 1217, 115 L.Ed.2d 996. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26; Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 27; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

In order to establish violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) Government must prove two racketeering acts related to each other (horizontal relatedness) as well as related to the criminal enterprise (vertical relatedness) and that they resulted in or posed a threat of continuity of criminal activity. U.S. v. Long, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1990, 917 F.2d 691. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

To establish “pattern of racketeering activity” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), plaintiff must show at least two predicate acts of racketeering activity and must establish that predicates are related and that they amount to or pose threat of continued criminal activity. Lincoln House, Inc. v. Dupre, C.A.1 (N.H.) 1990, 903 F.2d 845. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26; Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Something more than proof of two predicate acts is needed to prove a RICO “pattern”; continuity plus relationship combines to produce a “pattern.” U.S. v. Boylan, C.A.1 (Mass.) 1990, 898 F.2d 230, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 139, 498 U.S. 849, 112 L.Ed.2d 106. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Predicate acts which combine to produce pattern of illegal activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act must be marked by factors of continuity plus relationship. Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, C.A.D.C.1989, 883 F.2d 132, 280 U.S.App.D.C. 60, rehearing granted , on rehearing in part 913 F.2d 948, 286 U.S.App.D.C. 182, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 2839, 501 U.S. 1222, 115 L.Ed.2d 1007. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

To state claim for violation of RICO § 1962(c), prohibiting conduct of an enterprise's affairs through pattern of racketeering activity, claimant must satisfy “continuity plus relationship” test by showing two or more predicate acts that are related to one another and pose threat of continued criminal activity. Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Kapoor, N.D.Ill.1996, 936 F.Supp. 455, affirmed in part , reversed in part 115 F.3d 1332, on remand 16 F.Supp.2d 941. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

In order to prove pattern of racketeering under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), plaintiff must show that racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity. Pobel v. Hans Christian Yachts, Inc., D.Md.1996, 933 F.Supp. 494. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

In determining whether “pattern” requirement for liability under RICO is satisfied, by showing that fraud is likely to recur even though allegedly fraudulent predicate acts constituting wrongful conduct ceased, court must consider duration of time over which predicate acts were committed, number and variety of predicate acts, num-

ber of victims, presence of separate schemes, and occurrence of distinct injuries. Kleban v. S.Y.S. Restaurant Management, Inc., N.D.Ill.1996, 929 F.Supp. 294. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

For racketeering activity to constitute pattern under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), activity must have relatedness and continuity; predicate acts are related if they have same or similar purposes, result, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events, and continuity requires proof of related predicates extending over substantial period of time, or involving specific threat of repetition extending indefinitely into future. Reynolds v. Condon, N.D.Iowa 1995, 908 F.Supp. 1494, modified on denial of reargument, reconsideration denied. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

If alleged racketeering activities either are unrelated or do not exhibit continuity, there is no Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act “pattern.” Lycan v. Walters, S.D.Ind.1995, 904 F.Supp. 884. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

To prove “pattern” of racketeering activity, in violation of RICO, plaintiff must satisfy requirement that there have been “continuity plus relationship” by showing two or more predicate acts committed within ten year period that are related to one another and pose threat of continued criminal activity. Wobble Light, Inc. v. McLain/ Smigiel Partnership, N.D.Ill.1995, 890 F.Supp. 721. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

In proving pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), plaintiff must demonstrate that racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose threat of continued criminal activity. Pemberton Sales & Service, Inc. v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, D.Virgin Islands 1994, 877 F.Supp. 961. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

In determining whether group of predicate acts constitutes “pattern of racketeering activity” within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), court considers: number of predicate acts; variety of predicate acts; length of time over which they were committed, number of victims; presence of separate schemes; and occurrence of distinct injuries. Bowdoin Const. Corp. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat. Bank, N.A., D.Mass.1994, 869 F.Supp. 1004, affirmed 94 F.3d 721. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Group of predicate acts constitute pattern of racketeering activity within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), when they are related and they amount to or pose threat of continued criminal activity. Bowdoin Const. Corp. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat. Bank, N.A., D.Mass.1994, 869 F.Supp. 1004 , affirmed 94 F.3d 721. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Factors analyzed to determine existence pattern of racketeering activity in closed-ended period as will establish violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) are number and variety of predicate acts, length of time over which acts were committed, number of victims, presence of separate schemes, and oc-

currence of direct injuries; of factors, duration is single most important factor in analysis. Resolution Trust Corp. v. S & K Chevrolet, C.D.Ill.1994, 868 F.Supp. 1047. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

In order for predicate act to be part of the same pattern of racketeering activity for limitations purposes, it must be “related to” and there must be a “continuity within” the pattern of racketeering activity. Fineberg v. Credit In- tern. Bancshares, Ltd., D.Del.1994, 857 F.Supp. 338. Limitation Of Actions 58(1)

In addition to alleging at least two predicate acts of racketeering committed within ten-year period, RICO plaintiff must show that predicate acts are related, and that they amount to or pose threat of continued criminal activity. Levine v. Prudential Bache Properties, Inc., N.D.Ill.1994, 855 F.Supp. 924. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Party attempting to establish civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim must prove pattern of racketeering activity that shows both continuity plus relationship among predicate acts. Select Creations, Inc. v. Paliafito America, Inc., E.D.Wis.1992, 828 F.Supp. 1301. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

In order to demonstrate pattern of racketeering activity, plaintiffs must prove that defendants committed at least two predicate offenses, along with showing that racketeering acts are related and that they pose threat of continued criminal activity. Grand Cent. Sanitation, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Palmerton, M.D.Pa.1992, 816 F.Supp. 299. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 28

Where multiple predicate acts relating to single scheme inflict repeated economic injury on alleged victim over course of several years, both relatedness and continuity prongs of test for existence of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) “pattern” are present. Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Kapoor, N.D.Ill.1993, 814 F.Supp. 720. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

In assessing whether sufficient showing of continuity and relatedness has been made for purposes of establishing pattern of racketeering activity, court may consider number of unlawful acts, length of time over which acts were committed, similarity of acts, number of victims, number of perpetrators, and character of unlawful activity. Marrazzo v. Bucks County Bank and Trust Co., E.D.Pa.1993, 814 F.Supp. 437. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) requires at least two predicate acts of racketeering activity which are related and pose threat of continued criminal activity. Broyles v. Wilson, M.D.La.1993, 812 F.Supp. 651, affirmed 3 F.3d 439. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 26; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Pattern of racketeering activity, for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), will not be found without some showing that racketeering acts are interrelated and that there is continuity or

threat of continuity. Purgess v. Sharrock, S.D.N.Y.1992, 806 F.Supp. 1102, supplemented. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Pattern requirement for damages claim under RICO statute requires plaintiff to show that racketeering predicates are related and that they amount to or pose threat of continued criminal activity. Barrett v. U.S. Banknote Corp., S.D.N.Y.1992, 806 F.Supp. 1094. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

“Requisite pattern” needed to establish civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization claims is satisfied with continuity plus relationship, not acts in isolation. Newman v. Comprehensive Care Corp., D.Or.1992, 794 F.Supp. 1513. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

To prove pattern of racketeering activity, plaintiff must show that racketeering predicates are related and that they amount to or pose threat of continued criminal activity; this “continuity plus relationship” requirement is as essential to establishment of “pattern” element as is demonstration of predicate acts themselves. U.S. v. Private Sanitation Industry Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1992, 793 F.Supp. 1114. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

“Pattern of racketeering activity” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) requires combination of predicate acts related to each other and continuity of conduct. Polycast Technology Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1992, 792 F.Supp. 244. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

To satisfy “pattern” element of RICO claim under section prohibiting use of pattern of racketeering activity in conduct of RICO enterprise's affairs, plaintiffs must plead commission of at least two predicate acts that were related and amounted to, or threatened likelihood of, continued criminal activity. Adler v. Berg Harmon Asso- ciates, S.D.N.Y.1992, 790 F.Supp. 1222. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

In order for predicate act to be part of same pattern, it must be related to and there must be continuity with rest of the predicate acts in the pattern. Owens v. Wade, E.D.Pa.1992, 789 F.Supp. 168. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) plaintiff must prove that predicate acts amount to or otherwise constitute threat of continued criminal activity and that predicate acts are related. Delta Pride Catfish, Inc. v. Marine Midland Business Loans, Inc., E.D.Ark.1991, 767 F.Supp. 951. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 28

To prove pattern of racketeering activity under RICO, plaintiff must set forth at least two predicate acts and must show that racketeering predicates are related and they amount to or pose threat of continued activity. Jordan v. Berman, E.D.Pa.1991, 758 F.Supp. 269, reconsideration denied, affirmed in part , vacated in part on other grounds 20 F.3d 1250, on remand. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Test for assessing whether defendants' alleged conduct rises to level of “pattern of racketeering activity” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) requires weighing of five factors: number and variety of predicate acts of racketeering, length of time over which predicate acts occurred, whether defendants' conduct amounted to single scheme or several separate schemes, number of victims, and whether defendants inflicted single injury or multiple, distinct injuries; no single factor is dispositive. R.E. Davis Chemical Corp. v. Nalco Chemical Co., N.D.Ill.1990, 757 F.Supp. 1499. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Pattern of racketeering activity necessary to establish RICO violation requires commission of at least two predicate acts in manner that shows both relationship and continuity. American Trade Partners, L.P. v. A-1 Intern. Importing Enterprises, Ltd., E.D.Pa.1990, 755 F.Supp. 1292. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

To prove pattern of racketeering activity, for purposes of civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, plaintiff must show that racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose threat of continued criminal activity. Hoffman Elec., Inc. v. Emerson Elec. Co., W.D.Pa.1991, 754 F.Supp. 1070 . Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Relatedness of racketeering activities is not alone enough to satisfy “pattern” element of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); to establish pattern, plaintiff must show that predicates themselves amount to, or that they otherwise constitute threat of, continuing racketeering activity. Certilman v. Hardcastle, Ltd., E.D.N.Y.1991, 754 F.Supp. 974. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

“Pattern of racketeering activity” for purposes of Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) requires commission within ten-year period of at least two predicate acts that violate listed laws; acts must be related and must amount to, or threaten continued likelihood of, continued criminal activity. Atlantic Gypsum Co., Inc. v. Lloyds Intern. Corp., S.D.N.Y.1990, 753 F.Supp. 505. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Factors including the number and variety of predicate acts, length of time during which they were committed, number of victims, and occurrence of distinct injuries are considered in determining whether there is a sufficient continuity of racketeering activity to establish a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violation. Passini v. Falke-Gruppe, S.D.N.Y.1990, 745 F.Supp. 991. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 28

To sufficiently allege pattern of racketeering activity, plaintiffs must describe two or more predicate acts demonstrating continuity and relatedness. Langley v. American Bank of Wisconsin, E.D.Wis.1990, 738 F.Supp. 1232. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

To form a pattern of racketeering, predicate acts must be related and amount to, or threaten the likelihood of, continued criminal activity. Bigay v. Taco Maker, Inc., D.Puerto Rico 1990, 730 F.Supp. 463. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 28

In order to establish pattern of racketeering activity under RICO, plaintiffs must allege and prove relationship and continuity. Johnson v. Schopf, D.Minn.1987, 669 F.Supp. 291. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 28

To show the existence of a pattern of racketeering activity for purpose of civil action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, there must be a showing of “relationship,” requiring the predicate acts to be committed somewhat closely in time to one another, involving the same victim or the same type of misconduct, and “continuity,” requiring predicate acts to occur at different points in time or involving different victims. Plant Process Equipment, Inc. v. Continental Carbonic Products, Inc., N.D.Ill.1987, 668 F.Supp. 1191. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

“Pattern of racketeering activity” required under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act may be established by showing existence of either more than one lawful scheme or open-ended continuous scheme which contains multiplicity of predicate acts; disagreeing with Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir.); Allington v. Carpenter, 619 F.Supp. 474 (C.D.Cal.); Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare, N.A. v. Inryco, Inc., 615 F.Supp. 828 (N.D.Ill.). Environmental Tectonics Corp., Intern. v. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., Inc., D.N.J.1987, 659 F.Supp. 1381, affirmed in part , reversed in part 847 F.2d 1052, certiorari granted in part 109 S.Ct. 3213, 492 U.S. 905, 106 L.Ed.2d 563, affirmed 110 S.Ct. 701, 493 U.S. 400, 107 L.Ed.2d 816. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Relevant factors in determining whether there has been a pattern of racketeering include the number and variety of predicate acts and the length of time over which they were committed, number of victims, presence of separate schemes, and occurrence of distinct injuries. United Airlines, Inc. v. CEI Industries, Inc., N.D.Ill.1987, 654 F.Supp. 1209, reconsideration denied 664 F.Supp. 1216. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

“Pattern of racketeering activity” for purposes of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act is a design or arrangement of predicate acts which manifest both relatedness and continuity, for which there must be separation in time and place of acts related to each other and/or the affairs of the enterprise and an ongoing or repetitive characteristic of such acts. Thompson v. Wyoming Alaska, Inc., D.Utah 1987, 652 F.Supp. 1222. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Engaging in numerous acts of “racketeering activity” which were continuous over an identified period of time and which were related to one another under furtherance of alleged fraudulent scheme would satisfy continuity plus relationship standard to constitute a “pattern of racketeering activity” in RICO. Trak Microcomputer Corp. v. Wearne Bros., N.D.Ill.1985, 628 F.Supp. 1089. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

At least four factors are relevant to pattern requirement under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO): presence of separate schemes; number of victims; number and variety of predicate acts and length of time over which they were committed; and occurrence of distinct injuries. Niccum v. Meyer, N.D.Ill.1994, 171 B.R. 828. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

For purposes of federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), criminal conduct forms pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events. Elliott v. First Sec. Bank, Neb.1996, 544 N.W.2d 823, 249 Neb. 597. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

133. Advancement of pattern, pattern of racketeering

“Pattern of racketeering” requirement under this chapter was met by actions of county sheriff in running political war chest fund and by illegal escort service provided by traffic division sergeant and thus, since conduct of both parties advanced pattern through their actions, indictment properly joined sheriff and sergeant on charges of conspiracy under this chapter. U.S. v. Davis, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1983, 707 F.2d 880. Conspiracy 28(1)

Series of conspiracies and failed attempts constitutes pattern of racketeering activity within meaning of this chapter even if no racketeering offense is completed; in any event, defendants failed to show that so-called ambiguity in indictment, which charged them with conspiracy allegedly based on racketeering activities that included conspiracy charges, prejudiced them on theory that a “conspiracy to conspire” to commit acts of extortion was illogical and ambiguous. U. S. v. Brooklier, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1982, 685 F.2d 1208, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 1194, 459 U.S. 1206, 75 L.Ed.2d 439, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 1195, 459 U.S. 1206, 75 L.Ed.2d 439. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

A takeover target satisfied “pattern” requirement for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations claim by its assertion that during the course of an attempted acquisition, the general counsel and chief executive officer of prospective acquirer used the mails, interstate telephone wires and wire transmission to transmit a letter of intent and other information and to conduct negotiations in furtherance of an alleged fraudulent scheme to drive target corporation into bankruptcy and acquire its assets at a lower price. Westmont Industries, Inc. v. Weinstein, M.D.Pa.1989, 762 F.Supp. 646. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

Plaintiff's allegations that future commission merchant, its wholly owned subsidiary and its employees engages in acts of mail and wire fraud were insufficient to support essential element of pattern under Racketeering Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act in view of the fact that all the predicate acts were in the furtherance of single scheme to defraud plaintiff through his trading account. Richardson Greenshields of Canada Ltd. v. Patel, S.D.N.Y.1986, 643 F.Supp. 672. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Statements made in multiple wire or telephone communications by auditors preparing report, even if sequential representations in furtherance of alleged “scheme,” did not constitute a “pattern” of racketeering to support a civil RICO action based on alleged “scheme” to disseminate false and misleading information about firm being audited. Professional Assets Management, Inc. v. Penn Square Bank, N.A., W.D.Okla.1985, 616 F.Supp. 1418. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

134. Arson, pattern of racketeering

Although two arsons relied on to establish a pattern of racketeering activity for purpose of RICO conviction had no direct financial benefit to defendant or his white supremacist organization, such acts of racketeering activity “affected” the enterprise in that they bolstered members' morale and commitment to the enterprise and, in instance of burning of church, furthered enterprise's intentions to punish nonconforming groups and arson of leader's sister's house enabled sister, former member, to gain financially and demonstrated association's contempt of property rights of others; arsons were part of a series of arsons, theft and other crimes and constituted a “pattern” because they stemmed from the same or similar purposes, involved the same group of participants and had similar methods of commission and were likely to continue indefinitely. U.S. v. Ellison, C.A.8 (Ark.) 1986, 793 F.2d 942, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 415, 479 U.S. 937, 93 L.Ed.2d 366. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 49

An arson and two acts of mail fraud in collection on insurance policy were evidence of predicate crimes related to affairs of enterprise engaged in business of burning with intent to defraud insurance companies, thus meeting requirement of this chapter of proof of pattern of racketeering activity. U. S. v. Martino, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1981, 648 F.2d 367, on reconsideration in part 650 F.2d 651, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 2006, 456 U.S. 943, 72 L.Ed.2d 465, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 2007, 456 U.S. 943, 72 L.Ed.2d 465, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 2020, 456 U.S. 949, 72 L.Ed.2d 474, on rehearing 681 F.2d 952, certiorari granted 103 S.Ct. 721, 459 U.S. 1101, 74 L.Ed.2d 948, affirmed 104 S.Ct. 296, 464 U.S. 16, 78 L.Ed.2d 17. Arson 37(1); Postal Service 49(11)

Traveling by defendant who organized arson scheme with others from Indiana to Illinois so they could set fire in order to defraud insurer, actual setting of fire in order to defraud insurer, and then using mails to complete the fraudulent scheme were separate acts of racketeering, and thus there was a “pattern” of racketeering activity as required for conviction under this chapter. U. S. v. Starnes, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1981, 644 F.2d 673, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 116, 454 U.S. 826, 70 L.Ed.2d 101. Arson 2; Postal Service 35(2)

135. Abortion protest, pattern of racketeering

Health clinic which provided abortions stated prima facie case for pattern of racketeering activity against abortion opponents by presenting evidence that they unlawfully entered the health center and that, following the unlawful entries, certain medical tubes, bottles, and knobs were missing. Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. Mc- Monagle, E.D.Pa.1987, 670 F.Supp. 1300. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Complaint by corporation providing abortions sufficiently alleged a “pattern of racketeering activity” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(5)] against “pro-life activists,” where it alleged 13 acts of robbery were committed by defendants and a conspiracy to destroy a business engaged in interstate commerce by means of robbery, theft, physical violence and threats of physical violence. Northeast Women's Center, Inc. v. McMonagle, E.D.Pa.1985, 624 F.Supp. 736. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 26

136. Bankruptcy fraud, pattern of racketeering

Allegations that stock owned by debtor was fraudulently conveyed to shareholder of debtor who concealed it in contemplation of debtor's bankruptcy and that shareholder concealed stock from debtor's trustee and bankruptcy

court during bankruptcy by making false statements were sufficient to allege two separate violations of bankruptcy fraud statute, and hence, two separate acts of racketeering activity, for purposes of civil RICO action by creditor. Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman, S.D.N.Y.1986, 648 F.Supp. 17, on reargument 676 F.Supp. 496, reversed on other grounds 859 F.2d 1096, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 1642, 490 U.S. 1007, 104 L.Ed.2d 158, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 1643, 490 U.S. 1007, 104 L.Ed.2d 158. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Shareholder objections to asset sales procedures used to dispose of corporate debtor's assets concerned activities taken by assets buyer and related individual defendants in bankruptcy proceeding, whereas claims under Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and state law that debtor's bankruptcy estate asserted against buyer and related defendants largely concerned acts that preceded debtor's bankruptcy filing and so stemmed from different core of operative facts, and therefore claim preclusion did not apply, under federal law, to bar estate's claims to the extent that estate could prove all elements of claim without relying on facts related to debtor's bankruptcy proceedings. Estate of KDC, Inc. ex rel. McNeilly v. Kraklow, W.D.Wis.2007, 368 B.R. 769. Judgment 585(3)

Creditors who asserted Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against Chapter 11 debtor-corporation failed to establish, for purposes of estimation and temporary allowance of their claims for voting purposes, sufficient period of repeated conduct to establish pattern of criminal activity under closed- ended standard of continuity when they alleged and offered proof showing debtor's chief executive officer engaged in alleged predicate acts for approximately six months before involuntary bankruptcy petition was filed. In re Hydrox Chemical Co., Bkrtcy.N.D.Ill.1996, 194 B.R. 617. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 29

137. Battery, pattern of racketeering

Single incident in which deputy sheriff committed battery and false imprisonment during attempt to collect debt on behalf of private creditor did not amount to “pattern” of racketeering activity. Wright v. Sheppard, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1990, 919 F.2d 665. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

138. Bribery, pattern of racketeering

Allegations that telephone company and some of its employees gave members of the Minnesota Public Utilities Commission numerous bribes at different times over the course of at least a six-year period, with the objective of causing the commissioners to approve unfair and unreasonable rates for the company were sufficient to plead a pattern of racketeering activity under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., U.S.Minn.1989, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 492 U.S. 229, 106 L.Ed.2d 195, on remand 734 F.Supp. 879. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that predicate state law bribery crimes were both related and amounted to or posed threat of continued criminal activity sufficient to support government's proof of “pattern” of racketeering activity under RICO with respect to legislative aide who accepted payment for his assistance in shepherding special interest bills through California legislature where aide accepted series of improper payments over

two-year period, consistent with closed-end concept of continuity. U.S. v. Freeman, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1993, 6 F.3d 586, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 1661, 511 U.S. 1077, 128 L.Ed.2d 378, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 2177, 511 U.S. 1147, 128 L.Ed.2d 896. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 95

Evidence that defendants repeatedly solicited and accepted bribes in connection with public matters and received substantial kickbacks from companies for steering public works contracts in their direction satisfied Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act's (RICO) requirement of “pattern of racketeering activity”; given con- sistency of methods, purposes, results, and participants involved, predicate acts were sufficiently related, acts were committed over substantial period of time and demonstrated threat of continued racketeering, and because of what defendants said and did, various contractors were led to believe that they had to keep paying kickbacks to continue to receive borough's business. U.S. v. Dischner, C.A.9 (Alaska) 1992, 974 F.2d 1502, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 1290, 507 U.S. 923, 122 L.Ed.2d 682. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

County commissioner's receipt of 17 bribes over closed-ended period of approximately 20 months established continuity prong of racketeering pattern requirement. U.S. v. Stodola, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1992, 953 F.2d 266, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 104, 506 U.S. 834, 121 L.Ed.2d 63. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Racketeering acts of clerk employed in district office of New York Department of Motor Vehicles were sufficiently related to establish pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act, where Government proved one act of possession of motor vehicle and nine acts of mail fraud, all but one of such acts involved clerk's processing of fraudulent applications for motor vehicle registration in exchange for cash payment, and acts had common goal and methods used to perpetrate them were similar. U.S. v. Alkins, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1991, 925 F.2d 541. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Evidence of defendant's activities involving bribery and money laundering on behalf of organized crime was sufficient to establish a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act “pattern,” including requisite relatedness and continuity; evidence indicated that criminal organization was long-term criminal enterprise engaged in narcotics trafficking, that defendant was active participant, and that instances of defendant's bribery and money laundering were calculated, connected activities in furtherance of enterprise. U.S. v. Coiro, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1991, 922 F.2d 1008, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 2826, 501 U.S. 1217, 115 L.Ed.2d 996. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 95

Bribes given by real estate developers to town officials were part of related pattern of municipal corruption for benefit of common participants, and thus constituted pattern of racketeering activity, where parties participated in at least two bribery schemes which victimized taxpayers and residents of town. Town of Kearny v. Hudson Meadows Urban Renewal Corp., C.A.3 (N.J.) 1987, 829 F.2d 1263. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 30

Mayor and city prosecutor's attorney fees kickback scheme, under which prosecutor bribed mayor to ensure continued selection of prosecutor as city's prosecutor and as attorney who received payment for non-existent legal

work purportedly done on city's behalf, constituted “pattern of racketeering activity” sufficient to support their convictions under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where defendants engaged in multiple and varied predicate racketeering acts of mail fraud, bribery and official misconduct over course of at least three years, and scheme perpetrated fraud upon and caused multiple and distinct injuries to public good and financial well-being of city. U.S. v. Genova, N.D.Ill.2002, 187 F.Supp.2d 1015, reversed in part 333 F.3d 750, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Electric utility's payment of cash incentives to developers, builders or contractors who installed heat pumps in residential construction did not violate Pennsylvania Commercial Bribery statute so as to establish pattern of racketeering activity for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where developers, builders or contractors were not employees, agents or fiduciaries of anyone from whom they were required to obtain consent for accepting payments. Yeager's Fuel, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., E.D.Pa.1992, 804 F.Supp. 700, reconsideration denied 146 F.R.D. 110, affirmed in part , reversed in part 22 F.3d 1260, rehearing denied , on remand. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 9

Law firm's alleged offer of bribe to partners in another firm to breach their partnership agreement and transfer client accounts from their former firm to law firm was not “pattern” of racketeering activity, even if law firm continued to pay compensation; there was no showing of any threat of continuity or that law firm had practice of subverting client accounts away from other firms as means of increasing its own profitability. Clapp v. Greene, S.D.N.Y.1990, 743 F.Supp. 273, affirmed 930 F.2d 912, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 197, 502 U.S. 868, 116 L.Ed.2d 157. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Count which alleged that defendants engaged in bribery to influence officials of the Jamaica Tourist Board to obtain and retain particular advertising agency properly pleaded a pattern of racketeering activity in the form of a series of related predicate acts over a substantial period of time, so as to satisfy RICO pattern requirement, notwithstanding defendants' claim that indictment pleaded nothing more than single bribe to obtain a single contract; alleged kickback payments were not installments of a single fixed bribe, but separate payments, in amounts related to amount spent by Board on advertising, and kickbacks were allegedly paid over period of approximately five years to secure and retain contract. U.S. v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., D.Conn.1990, 741 F.Supp. 334. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 91

Two alleged bribes received by state governor did not satisfy “pattern” requirement for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act conviction, where both alleged bribes were within less than two-month period. U.S. v. Mandel, D.Md.1987, 672 F.Supp. 864, affirmed 862 F.2d 1067, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 3190, 491 U.S. 906, 105 L.Ed.2d 699, modification denied 853 F.Supp. 177. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Complaint alleging scheme by telephone company to illegally influence various members of state public utilities commission failed to allege a pattern of racketeering activity within the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act even though plaintiffs alleged criminal activity of long duration and multiple victims and various methods of commission, where the complaint did not allege separate transactions but merely separate pre-

dicate acts committed in furtherance of a single scheme and it could not be said that the alleged “pattern” of predicate acts was a regular part of the way defendants conducted their business; calling into doubt Ghouth v. Con- ticommodity Services, Inc., 642 F.Supp. 1325 (N.D.Ill.). H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., D.Minn.1987, 653 F.Supp. 908. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

RICO indictment was sufficient which alleged that defendant made two bribe payments to others involved in conspiracy involving New York City Parking Violations Bureau, that defendant knowingly conducted and participated in the affairs of the enterprise through pattern of racketeering, and that he committed perjury under circumstances suggesting knowledge of the existence of the enterprise. U.S. v. Friedman, S.D.N.Y.1986, 635 F.Supp. 782. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 91

139. Business competition, pattern of racketeering

Even to extent that one or two of statements competitor allegedly disseminated through mails and wires regarding manufacturer's alleged inferior products and acts of unfair competition may have contained misrepresentations, they were not sufficient to establish pattern of “racketeering” that Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) requires. Jepson, Inc. v. Makita Corp., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1994, 34 F.3d 1321. Postal Service 35(12); Telecommunications 1014(9)

Manufacturer of evaporative coolers failed to establish existence of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) “pattern” of racketeering activity in connection with competitor's alleged mail and phone communications with sales representatives that manufacturer's cooler was fire hazard and with manufacturer to effect that competitor would discontinue showing videotape comparing products' fire safety; manufacturer did not adequately state claim for predicate act of fraud, and there was evidence suggesting that competitor distributed information about fire safety to deceive; moreover, as to videotape, competitor indicated in letter that other tests may have been conducted over which competitor had no control. Bacchus Industries, Inc. v. Arvin Industries, Inc., C.A.10 (N.M.) 1991, 939 F.2d 887, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Competitor challenging mobile catering company's anticompetitive activities failed to establish Racketeer Influ- ence and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) jurisdiction merely by showing that company's equipment and supplies were drawn generally from stream of interstate commerce. Musick v. Burke, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1990, 913 F.2d 1390. Commerce 82.6; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 49

Allegations of wholesale appliance distributor were insufficient to allege pattern of racketeering activity necessary to support civil RICO claim; plaintiff alleged that competitors fraudulently obtained appliance shipment which they sold in plaintiff's exclusive territory, but did not allege facts establishing threat of continuing racketeering activity. Schreiber Distributing Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., Inc., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1986, 806 F.2d 1393. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Competitors' instigation of district court and International Trade Commission (ITC) proceedings against de-

veloper of chest equalization radiography technology within one day of each other, and commencement of interference proceeding in Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) within four months, did not constitute “pattern” based on closed-period continuity for purpose of developer's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim; date of interference proceeding was determined by PTO and proceedings initiated within one day of each other could not satisfy continuity requirement. B.V. Optische Industrie De Oude Delft v. Hologic, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1995, 909 F.Supp. 162, reconsideration denied 925 F.Supp. 162. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 28

Clothing manufacturer's allegations that defendants defamed and defrauded it in order to misappropriate its assets and to compete unlawfully with it did not establish open-ended continuity, which would have supported claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); manufacturer did not allege threat that predicate acts would be repeated, and manufacturer alleged no facts showing that defendants committed anything other than a single fraudulent scheme. Pier Connection, Inc. v. Lakhani, S.D.N.Y.1995, 907 F.Supp. 72 . Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Chemical corporation failed to allege “pattern of racketeering activity” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); alleged acts occurred over relatively short period of time and related to single alleged scheme to misappropriate corporation's trade secret and, moreover, corporation was only party injured by scheme. R.E. Davis Chemical Corp. v. Nalco Chemical Co., N.D.Ill.1990, 757 F.Supp. 1499. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

An alleged scheme involving the theft, destruction and secretion of a company's documents and trade secrets and an alleged scheme to use the trade secrets to develop, market and finance a competing heart valve, constituted a single illegal scheme to misappropriate trade secrets and did not satisfy requirement of pattern of racketeering activity for civil RICO claim. Medical Inc. v. Angicor Ltd., D.Minn.1988, 677 F.Supp. 1000. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Plaintiff had not alleged “pattern” of racketeering activity that was essential to claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, where it had alleged only one scheme to steal and sell customer list which purportedly contained trade secrets. McIntyre's Mini Computer Sales Group, Inc. v. Creative Synergy Corp., E.D.Mich.1986, 644 F.Supp. 580. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

140. Campaign fraud, pattern of racketeering

Defendant judge's racketeering predicate acts in campaign fraud schemes were related and threat of continued criminal activity existed so as to establish “pattern of racketeering activity,” for purposes of RICO violation, where purpose in each case was to elect candidates supported by judge, aided by illegal campaign contributions, and result in each case was election by means of illegal plan. U.S. v. Grubb, C.A.4 (W.Va.) 1993, 11 F.3d 426, habeas corpus denied 859 F.Supp. 227, affirmed as modified 65 F.3d 167.

141. Continuity, pattern of racketeering--Generally

Continuity requirement of a RICO pattern is satisfied where it is shown that predicates are regular way of conducting defendant's ongoing legitimate business, or of conducting or participating in an ongoing and legitimate RICO “enterprise.” H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., U.S.Minn.1989, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 492 U.S. 229, 106 L.Ed.2d 195, on remand 734 F.Supp. 879. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Unspecified Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) predicate acts spanning a period of no more than sixteen months were of insufficient length to demonstrate closed-ended continuity. Spool v. World Child Intern. Adoption Agency, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2008, 520 F.3d 178. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 29

Predicate acts extending over a few weeks or months and threatening no future criminal conduct cannot establish continuity needed for pattern of racketeering. McDonald v. Schencker, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1994, 18 F.3d 491. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Even if two predicate acts alleged by buyers and marketers could establish the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) pattern relationship element, alleged acts lacked “continuity element” required to establish a RICO pattern, where there was no continuity alleged, no specific threat of repetition, nor any suggestion that predicate acts or offenses were part of the regular way of doing business of the defendants. Tel-Phonic Services, Inc. v. TBS Intern., Inc., C.A.5 (Tex.) 1992, 975 F.2d 1134. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 28

Assuming that predicate acts of commercial bribery, mail fraud, and wire fraud constituted “racketeering activity,” no “pattern” of racketeering activity was established as required under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); although alleged predicate acts established relationship element of pattern, they lacked requisite continuity. Calcasieu Marine Nat. Bank v. Grant, C.A.5 (La.) 1991, 943 F.2d 1453, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Although single-fraudulent scheme can give rise to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act liability, if that scheme is short-lived and directed at limited number of people, further indication that defendant's fraudulent activities are likely to continue is required. Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., C.A.3 (Pa.) 1991, 926 F.2d 1406, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 2839, 501 U.S. 1222, 115 L.Ed.2d 1007. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Plaintiff who alleges a high number of related predicate acts committed over a substantial period of time estab- lishes that those acts amount to continued criminal activity for purposes of establishing a pattern of racketeering activity. Fleet Credit Corp. v. Sion, C.A.1 (R.I.) 1990, 893 F.2d 441. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 28

The requirement of “continuity” in a civil RICO case does not require that there be a finding of some continuing threat of racketeering activity. Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1987, 834 F.2d 1297, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 3241, 492 U.S. 917, 106 L.Ed.2d 588. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Alleged scheme of husband and others to frustrate wife's right to recover marital property in underlying divorce action had single goal of hiding marital property from wife, involved only one victim, and would have only minimal effect on society, and thus did not constitute closed-ended pattern of racketeering under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), even if scheme spanned approximately three years. Rosner v. Rosner, E.D.N.Y.2011, 766 F.Supp.2d 422. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27; Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Allegedly fraudulent letters sent by representative of insolvent manufacturer promising repayment scheme to venders who supplied goods and services to manufacturer did not establish pattern of racketeering activity, as required to support claim for violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); all letters were mailed on same day, and there was no threat of repetition, since manufacturer had ceased operations and representative who sent letters had disappeared. Webster Industries, Inc. v. Northwood Doors, Inc., N.D.Iowa 2004, 320 F.Supp.2d 821. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

“Continuity” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim involving closed period may be shown by alleging series of related predicates extending over substantial period of time. Tribune Co. v. Purcigliotti, S.D.N.Y.1994, 869 F.Supp. 1076, affirmed 66 F.3d 12. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Continuity required to show pattern necessary to state claim of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violation exists where there has been repeated conduct over close period of time or where racketeering activity by its nature projects into future with threat of repetition based on considerations of number and variety of acts and length of time over which they are committed, number of victims, presence of separate schemes, and occurrence of distinct injuries. Dudley Enterprises, Inc. v. Palmer Corp., N.D.Ill.1993, 832 F.Supp. 221. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 30

Whether sufficient continuity exists for existence of “pattern” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), is fact-specific question encompassing many relevant factors including: number and variety of predicate acts and length of time over which they were committed; number of victims; presence of several schemes; and occurrence of distinct injuries. Fujisawa Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. v. Kapoor, N.D.Ill.1993, 814 F.Supp. 720. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

“Continuity” of alleged pattern of racketeering activity exists if predicate acts constitute or threaten continued criminal activity or if series of related predicate acts extends over substantial period of time; however, proof of multiple criminal schemes is not necessary to show “pattern.” Center Cadillac, Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. of New York, S.D.N.Y.1992, 808 F.Supp. 213, affirmed 99 F.3d 401. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 29

Continuity requirement of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) may be met by either showing series of related predicate acts extending over substantial period of time or establishing threat of continued racketeering activity. U.S. v. Quintanilla, N.D.Ill.1991, 760 F.Supp. 687, affirmed 2 F.3d 1469. Racketeer

Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Continuity requirement of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim is satisfied where it is shown that predicate acts are a regular way of conducting defendant's ongoing legitimate business. Langley v. American Bank of Wisconsin, E.D.Wis.1990, 738 F.Supp. 1232. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 28

It is necessary for district court to examine overall context in which acts took place in order to ascertain whether sufficient continuity exists to show a pattern of racketeering. Landy v. Mitchell Petroleum Technology Corp., S.D.N.Y.1990, 734 F.Supp. 608. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

While Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act plaintiff need not allege more than one RICO “episode” to establish that a pattern of racketeering activity exists, a series of predicate acts, even in furtherance of common unlawful scheme, does not necessarily state RICO cause of action if scheme is not a continuing one or does not threaten to continue into the future. Lowenbraun v. L.F. Rothschild, Unterberg, Towbin, S.D.N.Y.1988, 685 F.Supp. 336. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

To be sufficiently continuous to constitute a “pattern” of racketeering activity, for purposes of civil action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, the predicate acts must be ongoing over an identified period of time, so that they can fairly be viewed as constituting separate transactions. Plant Process Equipment, Inc. v. Continental Carbonic Products, Inc., N.D.Ill.1987, 668 F.Supp. 1191. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 28

Whether racketeering activities are sufficiently continuous to constitute pattern under RICO depends on such factors number of predicate acts, their duration, nature of scheme they are designed to promote, actual or potential number of victims, nature of scheme's objectives, number of participants in scheme, potential for continued criminal activity, and whether particular scheme is part of broader set of criminal objectives. NL Industries, Inc. v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc., D.Kan.1986, 650 F.Supp. 1115. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 28

“Continuity requirement” in order to establish violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act means there must be racketeering acts over a substantial period of time, which, when combined with relatedness requirement, form group indistinguishable in composition, i.e., “design or configuration,” and “pattern” does not require different criminal episodes. U.S. v. Freshie Co., E.D.Pa.1986, 639 F.Supp. 442. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Issue in determining the “continuity” of alleged pattern of racketeering activity in civil action alleging violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act is not the “continuity” of a single activity, but whether defendants had a practice of engaging in the same or similar types of activity. Richter v. Sudman, S.D.N.Y.1986, 634 F.Supp. 234. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), an enterprise need not necessarily have a continuity extending beyond the performance of the pattern of racketeering acts alleged, or a structural hierarchy, so long as it is in fact an enterprise as defined in the statute. Feinberg v. Katz, S.D.N.Y.2002, 2002 WL 1751135, Unreported. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 34

142. ---- Open or closed ended continuity, pattern of racketeering

Indictment adequately alleged both closed-ended and open-ended continuity in charging defendants with violating and conspiring to violate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); with regard to former, predicate offenses were alleged to have occurred over six-year period during which six criminal schemes were executed, including several that occurred over number of years and involved repeated conduct, and, as to the latter, alleged number of schemes and purported enterprise's apparent willingness to engage in criminal acts to aid clients of one member, who was defense attorney, suggested threat of continuing criminal activity in the future. U.S. v. Bergrin, C.A.3 (N.J.) 2011, 650 F.3d 257. Conspiracy 28(3); Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Allegations of scheme to defraud debtor's creditors through bankruptcy fraud was not sufficient to plead open- ended pattern of racketeering activity for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims; alleged scheme was inherently terminable because scheme essentially came to its conclusion once debtor fraudulently conveyed his assets, which he allegedly accomplished when he filed for bankruptcy. First Capital Asset Management, Inc. v. Satinwood, Inc., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2004, 385 F.3d 159. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 28

Where long-term criminal conduct cannot be established for continuity necessary to show “pattern of criminal activity,” and prevail under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), “open-ended” continuity may be proved; this is the threat that criminal conduct will continue into the future, and it is established by showing either that predicate acts include specific threat of repetition extending indefinitely into the future, or that the predicate acts were part of an ongoing entity's regular way of doing business. Allwaste, Inc. v. Hecht, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1995, 65 F.3d 1523. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

“Closed-ended” continuity, to show continuity required to establish a “pattern of criminal activity” for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), is established by showing that related predicate acts occurred over a substantial period of time. Allwaste, Inc. v. Hecht, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1995, 65 F.3d 1523. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Allegations that defendants, as regular way of doing business, fraudulently misrepresented expenditures to benefit themselves and to deprive plaintiffs of their legitimate share of partnership's profits satisfied “continuity” prong of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act's (RICO) “pattern” requirement; conduct lasting three and one-half years was sufficient to establish closed-ended continuity, but even if it was not, plaintiffs established threat of continuing fraudulent conduct as required under “open-ended” continuity analysis (per Roth, Circuit Judge, with two Judges concurring and four Judges concurring in judgment). Tabas v. Tabas, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1995, 47 F.3d 1280, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 2269, 515 U.S. 1118, 132 L.Ed.2d 275. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Plaintiff bringing suit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) can satisfy continuity prong of pattern test by either demonstrating a closed-ended conspiracy that existed for such an extended period of time that a threat of future harm is implicit, or an open-ended conspiracy that, while short-lived, shows clear signs of threatening to continue into the future. Midwest Grinding Co., Inc. v. Spitz, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1992, 976 F.2d 1016. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

“Continuity” of criminal activity for a closed period of time, as required to establish pattern of racketeering activity, may be demonstrated by proving series of related predicates extending over substantial period of time. Hindes v. Castle, C.A.3 (Del.) 1991, 937 F.2d 868. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Mortgagor's allegation that mortgage servicer operated a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise to extract money and property from him was insufficient to show open-ended continuity to establish a pattern of racketeering activity, as an element of his RICO claim; the alleged scheme to extract money and property from mortgagor was inherently terminable and therefore did not imply a threat of continued racketeering activity, as at some point, mortgagor's funds would be exhausted and his home lost. Dolan v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., E.D.N.Y.2013, 2013 WL 991002. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 28

Public interest law firm, its director, and its officers did not engage in pattern of racketeering activity in conducting alleged cover-up of former employee's fraudulent claim that he was attorney when he was not one and failure to perform paid-for legal services, and thus former clients failed to satisfy closed-ended continuity requirement to establish standing to bring conspiracy action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO); alleged scheme spanned only about two years and involved only four identified victims. Lopez v. Council on American-Islamic Relations Action Network, Inc., D.D.C.2009, 657 F.Supp.2d 104, affirmed 383 Fed.Appx. 1, 2010 WL 2689367. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29; Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Shipper plausibly alleged open-ended continuity, as required to establish a pattern of racketeering activity within meaning of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where it alleged approximately 150 instances each of upweighting packages and overcharging for Canadian customs by carrier, its parent corporation, and its sister subsidiary, and it alleged threat of continuing criminal activity in that it continued to be improperly charged for Canadian customs after it complained of overcharges and was notified that the overcharges were due to a software problem that had been corrected. U1IT4less, Inc. v. FedEx Corp., S.D.N.Y.2012, 896 F.Supp.2d 275. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 28

Circus owner sufficiently pled closed-ended continuity element of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) pattern in its suit against non-profit animal rights organizations, even though organizations' underlying suit against circus owner was, overwhelmingly, basis for its RICO suit, by alleging that, in relation to organizations' fundraising activity, donors lost money, and thus were also victims of organizations' fraudulent statements, that organizations engaged in over 1,000 predicate acts, including bribery, illegal gratuity, mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and obstruction of justice, that those acts occurred over eight years, and that those acts were committed by 13 perpetrators. Feld Entertainment Inc. v. American Society for the Preven- tion of Cruelty to Animals, D.D.C.2012, 873 F.Supp.2d 288. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

Allegations of Filipino workers, that regular way of doing business of company that allegedly recruited them to come from the Philippines to work in the United States was to recruit groups of Filipino employees in both the United States and the Philippines through mail, wire, and immigration document fraud and then force those workers into forced labor and involuntary servitude, alleged facts sufficient to meet the open-ended continuity requirement for civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against company, its officers, and employees. Magnifico v. Villanueva, S.D.Fla.2011, 783 F.Supp.2d 1217. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 28; Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 31

Alleged scheme of husband and others to frustrate wife's right to recover marital property in underlying divorce action had natural ending point, namely, resolution of parties' divorce proceedings, and thus did not constitute open-ended pattern of racketeering under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Rosner v. Rosner, E.D.N.Y.2011, 766 F.Supp.2d 422. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28; Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Health care provider's allegations that purported enterprise between preferred provider organization (PPO) network administrator, claims processor, and processor's third party payor clients had legitimate business purpose of administering workers' compensation claims, that processor was part of deceptive scheme to reprice medical claims with PPO discounts that processor and its clients had no right to take, and that processor routinely and repeatedly delivered deceptive bills through mail or private carriers were sufficient to allege open-ended pattern of racketeering required to state claim against processor under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Walsh Chiropractic, Ltd. v. StrataCare, Inc., S.D.Ill.2010, 752 F.Supp.2d 896. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Alleged scheme by borrower, borrower's agent, and real estate appraiser to fraudulently induce lender to accept overvalued property as collateral for loan did not evince pattern of racketeering activity, by showing either closed-ended or open-ended continuity, required to establish claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO), where only predicate acts that applied to all defendants were acts of alleged wire fraud in connection with loan, complaint set forth eleven acts, ten of which occurred over eleven day period, and one of which occurred six months later, and there was no indication of ongoing scheme. Ferri v. Berkowitz, E.D.N.Y.2009, 678 F.Supp.2d 66. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28; Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Former client's allegation that criminal defense attorney engaged in at least two to three instances of extortion over period of nearly twelve months was sufficient to demonstrate closed-ended pattern of racketeering activity required to establish claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Wade v. Gaither, D.Utah 2009, 623 F.Supp.2d 1277. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Alleged scheme between mortgagee bank, various town officials, and state Executive Office of Environmental Affairs, to acquire pro se mortgagor's property by increasing assessed value on the property thereby causing financial burden and ruin on mortgagor, did not establish open-ended continuity pattern under Racketeer Influ-

enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where the only scheme alleged in the complaint involved the one- time expropriation of mortgagor's land, and complaint did not allege a threat of continued activity extending over a period of time yet to come, nor did it allege that the racketeering acts were part of defendants' regular way of doing business. Mani v. United Bank, D.Mass.2007, 498 F.Supp.2d 406. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 28

Even if father, whose federal and state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against rape crisis center and county arose from mother's unlawful removal of children from county's custody after having been allowed visitation of the children, had probable cause for each of the predicate acts alleged, father failed to meet continuity requirement to establish a pattern of racketeering activity; five-and-a-half month time period in which defendants were associated with mother did not satisfy the “substantial period of time” requirement for closed-ended continuity, and there was a not a sufficient threat of future repetition so as to satisfy requirement for open-ended continuity. Geraci v. Women's Alliance, Inc., D.N.D.2006, 436 F.Supp.2d 1022. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 104

Contractors' allegations that property owners engaged in a single scheme over period of 17 months by pursing false or fraudulent claims and a sham arbitration to garner a large sum of money from contractors were insufficient to establish open-ended continuity, for purposes of proving a pattern under Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) provision prohibiting conduct of enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity; complaint alleged a single scheme to accomplish a discrete goal, alleged scheme only extended to contractors, and contractors did not allege that scheme was owners' regular way of conducting business. Got- fredson v. Larsen LP, D.Colo.2006, 432 F.Supp.2d 1163, motion to amend denied 2006 WL 2943008. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Alleged scheme by corporate officers and employees and outside accountant to defraud shareholder of his fair share of corporate profits did not present open-ended threat of continuing criminal activity necessary to establish “pattern of racketeering activity” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), even if defendants continued to plunder shareholder's share of corporations, where sole purpose of alleged scheme was to deprive single shareholder of his rightful portion of profits of closed set of closely-held corporate entities. Leung v. Law, E.D.N.Y.2005, 387 F.Supp.2d 105. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Factual allegations of international union's amended Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint were insufficient to demonstrate open-ended continuity of alleged racketeering activities, through showing that defendants' predicate acts were inherently unlawful or in pursuit of inherently unlawful goals; unlawful activity, which allegedly occurred in context of general union president's reelection campaign, was undertaken for mostly lawful purposes of self enrichment, protection of ongoing relationships with union, and depriving union and members of money, honest services of officers and employees, and right to have elections conducted fairly, and fraud was not inherently unlawful in RICO continuity context. International Broth. of Teamsters v. Carey, S.D.N.Y.2004, 297 F.Supp.2d 706, affirmed 124 Fed.Appx. 41, 2005 WL 481573. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Closed-end continuity requirement for establishing pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was not satisfied by claim that officer of financial institution falsely represented to financier that third party was successful company, inducing financier to guaranty performance bond, and that fee was later sought from another company for providing false information; predicate acts occurred within few months, and in cases involving closed end continuity, acts were separated by periods of years. Gian- nacopolous v. Credit Suisse, S.D.N.Y.1997, 965 F.Supp. 549. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Continuity element of the pattern of racketeering activity that is needed to state cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was adequately alleged by complaint asserting scheme to defraud plaintiff promoter by fixing boxing matches, under either “closed-ended” or “open-ended” continuity theory, where alleged predicate acts of wire fraud and bribery were committed over 18-month period; were significant in number and variety, especially considering number of spectators that allegedly paid to watch fake fights; and were claimed to be one defendant's regular way of conducting business. Venzor v. Gonzalez, N.D.Ill.1996, 936 F.Supp. 445. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Party alleging Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violation may demonstrate closed- ended continuity by proving series of related predicates extending over substantial period of time, which is determined on case-by-case basis considering number and variety of predicate acts, length of time over which they were committed, number of putative victims, presence of separate schemes, and potential of multiple distinct injuries. Pobel v. Hans Christian Yachts, Inc., D.Md.1996, 933 F.Supp. 494. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Continuity element, of requirement that there be pattern of racketeering activity before Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violation will be found, was satisfied by complaint alleging fraud in solicitation of investments in limited partnership involving rental video business; complaining investors had alleged five-year period in which alleged false representations were made, showing “close-ended” pattern of racketeering activity, and nature of activities, comprising an ongoing fraudulent scheme, satisfied requirement as an “open-ended” pattern of racketeering activity. Pahmer v. Greenberg, E.D.N.Y.1996, 926 F.Supp. 287, affirmed 123 F.3d 717. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

In order to satisfy continuity element, of requirement that there be a pattern of criminal activity before violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) will be found, plaintiff may allege either an “open-ended” pattern of activity, i.e., past criminal conduct with threat of future criminal conduct or “close-ended” pattern of racketeering activity, i.e., past criminal activity extending over substantial period of time. Pahmer v. Greenberg, E.D.N.Y.1996, 926 F.Supp. 287, affirmed 123 F.3d 717. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Where predicate acts extend over only few weeks or months, plaintiff must also demonstrate threat of future criminal activity in order to demonstrate threat of continued criminal activity required to establish violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); in other words, if period of time is insufficient to establish “closed-ended” continuity, past conduct must be of type that threatens future repetition, or

“open-ended” continuity. Pedrina v. Chun, D.Hawai'i 1995, 906 F.Supp. 1377, affirmed 97 F.3d 1296, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 2441, 520 U.S. 1268, 138 L.Ed.2d 201. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Alleged fraud-based predicate acts of aircraft lessor consisting of two acts of wire fraud and one violation of foreign transport of converted money failed to satisfy continuity requirement necessary to form pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); few criminal acts and short- lived scheme alleged by airline to have been accomplished when airline's security deposit was transmitted and then commingled with general funds of lessor failed to satisfy “substantial period” requirement for establishing closed-ended continuity, and did not justify inference that lessor's acts carried threat of continuing into future or represented their ordinary way of doing business as required to demonstrate open-ended continuity. Thai Air- ways Intern. Ltd. v. United Aviation Leasing B.V., S.D.N.Y.1994, 891 F.Supp. 113, affirmed 59 F.3d 20. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Allegation that program on television network used hidden cameras and microphones as part of regular business activity did not constitute allegation that network regularly engaged in mail or wire fraud as required to establish open-ended continuity in pattern of racketeering which would violate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act (RICO). Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., M.D.N.C.1995, 887 F.Supp. 811. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

In determining whether pattern of criminal activity has been established for RICO purposes “continuity” is both closed and open-ended concept, referring either to closed period of repeated conduct, or to past conduct that by its nature projects into future with threat of repetition. Barsam v. Pure Tech Intern., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1994, 864 F.Supp. 1440, vacated pursuant to settlement 907 F.Supp. 79. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Open-ended continuity for RICO claim is not adequately pleaded merely because of the involvement of member of organized crime. McCormack Intern. Corp. v. Vohra, S.D.N.Y.1994, 858 F.Supp. 415. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

“Continuity” requirement of state and federal racketeering claims involves examination of temporal aspect of alleged predicate acts; RICO claim can either consist of close-ended pattern of activity or open-ended pattern; “close-ended pattern” of racketeering refers to series of related predicate acts extending over substantial period of time, concluded by time suit is brought, and predicate acts extending over a few weeks or months and threatening no future conduct do not satisfy continuity requirement, while “open-ended pattern” involves series of predicate acts which by their nature indicate likelihood of continuing criminal activity, and predicate acts may extend over only a short period of time so long as they indicate threat of future criminal activity. Alter v. DBLKM, Inc., D.Colo.1993, 840 F.Supp. 799. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28; Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 104

Party alleging Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violation may demonstrate continuity over closed period by proving series of related predicates extending over substantial period of time. Standard Chlorine of Delaware, Inc. v. Sinibaldi, D.Del.1992, 821 F.Supp. 232. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Continuity for purposes of RICO is both closed and open-ended concept, referring either to closed period of repeated conduct, or to past conduct that by its nature projects into future with threat of repetition. Grand Cent. Sanitation, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Palmerton, M.D.Pa.1992, 816 F.Supp. 299. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 28

Determination of whether predicate act satisfies continuity requirement of Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) is based on two-step analysis: first, whether predicate acts are open-ended or closed- ended and second, if predicate acts are open-ended, do they indicate threat of long-term, or continued criminal activity, and if they are close-ended, what was, or will be, their duration. Southmark Prime Plus, L.P. v. Falzone, D.Del.1991, 776 F.Supp. 888. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

“Continuity” needed to establish “pattern of racketeering activity” requires more than allegation of sporadic or isolated activity, requires different criminal episodes or transactions somewhat related in time and place, but does not require more than single scheme, and may be satisfied by open-ended scheme with sufficient number of independent criminal episodes. Papai v. Cremosnik, N.D.Ill.1986, 635 F.Supp. 1402. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Insurance underwriter, its parent, and subsidiary who brought action against underwriter's former corporate parent and former common directors of its former and current parent corporations, failed to establish continuity element of pattern of racketeering activity under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); while plaintiffs alleged a closed-ended series of predicate acts, they constituted a single scheme to accomplish one discrete goal, directed solely at plaintiffs, with no credible potential to extend to other persons or entities. Waddell & Reed Financial, Inc. v. Torchmark Corp., D.Kan.2004, 223 F.R.D. 566. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

143. ---- Threat of continuity, pattern of racketeering

When alleged Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise primarily conducts a legitimate business, no presumption of a continued threat of criminal activity beyond the period during which the predicate acts were performed arises for purposes of establishing open-ended continuity; in such cases, there must be some evidence from which it may be inferred that the predicate acts were the regular way of operating that business, or that the nature of the predicate acts themselves implies a threat of continued criminal activity. Spool v. World Child Intern. Adoption Agency, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2008, 520 F.3d 178. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 77; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

“Threat of continuity” from conspiracy to kidnap successful narcotics dealers, as needed to establish pattern of

racketeering activity in support convictions for violating Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), was established, despite evidence that kidnappings and attempted kidnappings were conducted over 3 1/2 -month period, given that kidnapping attempts were made every two weeks for 14 weeks, repeated extortion attempts were made when kidnappings failed to extract ransoms, and list of kidnapping targets had not been exhausted. U.S. v. Aulicino, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1995, 44 F.3d 1102. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Where continuity required to establish pattern of racketeering activity cannot be established by showing series of related predicates extending over substantial period of time, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violation may be shown when threat of continuity is demonstrated. Lange v. Hocker, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1991, 940 F.2d 359, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) “pattern” of racketeering activity is not established merely by proving two predicate acts; it also must be shown that acts themselves amounted to, or otherwise constituted threat of, continuing racketeering activity. Bacchus Industries, Inc. v. Arvin Industries, Inc., C.A.10 (N.M.) 1991, 939 F.2d 887, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Short term scheme threatening no future criminal activities is not sufficient to show pattern of racketeering activity within meaning of RICO. Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., C.A.3 (Pa.) 1991, 926 F.2d 1406, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 2839, 501 U.S. 1222, 115 L.Ed.2d 1007. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Evidence showed that threat of continuity, within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, was posed by racketeering acts of owner of automobile dealership and clerks in district office of New York Department of Motor Vehicles, where testimony indicated that their conduct was not limited to acts charged as predicates in indictment, and fact that clerks processed many motor vehicle applications that did not result in fraudulent licenses and registrations did not negate inference that clerks made themselves available to process applications for those people who could not legally obtain licenses and vehicle registrations. U.S. v. Alkins, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1991, 925 F.2d 541. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 95

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) defendants' alleged acts of mail fraud, which took place over six-month period without threat of continuing criminal activity, did not constitute pattern of racketeering activity. American Eagle Credit Corp. v. Gaskins, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1990, 920 F.2d 352. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 29

“Continuity,” for purposes of showing a RICO pattern can be defined as a showing that the racketeering predicates amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity, and may be established by proving a series of related predicates extending over a substantial period of time, or by proving that the predicates are a regular way of conducting or participating in an ongoing and legitimate RICO “enterprise,” or by proving that the predicates form a closed period of repeated conduct. U.S. v. Boylan, C.A.1 (Mass.) 1990, 898 F.2d 230, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 139, 498 U.S. 849, 112 L.Ed.2d 106. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

For purposes of establishing “pattern of racketeering activity” under RICO, necessary continuity does not require showing that defendants engaged in more than one scheme or criminal episode, but circumstances of case must suggest that predicate acts are indicative of threat of continuing activity. Medallion Television Enterprises, Inc. v. SelecTV of California, Inc., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1987, 833 F.2d 1360, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 3241, 492 U.S. 917, 106 L.Ed.2d 588. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Alleged actions of Delaware state court judge, court reporters, and law firm did not pose threat of future criminal activity, as required to constitute pattern of racketeering within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); allegations of depriving plaintiff of fair trials in three underlying state court civil actions covered three distinct time frames involving three different cases, and alleged racketeering activity ended at termination of each civil case. Shahin v. Darling, D.Del.2009, 606 F.Supp.2d 525, affirmed 350 Fed.Appx. 605, 2009 WL 3471297. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Plaintiff failed to establish threat of continuity and thus failed to show pattern of racketeering activity for purposes of RICO claim where alleged predicate acts occurred over five-month period and plaintiff identified only three similar alleged predicate acts committed by single defendant against single victim as part of single criminal scheme that resulted in single injury. D'Orange v. Feely, S.D.N.Y.1995, 877 F.Supp. 152. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 27; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

In order to establish requisite “pattern” of racketeering activity, for RICO purposes, plaintiff must show that predicate acts amounted to or otherwise constituted threat of continuing racketeering activity. Barsam v. Pure Tech Intern., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1994, 864 F.Supp. 1440, vacated pursuant to settlement 907 F.Supp. 79. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Claim under civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) requires showing of pattern of racketeering activity which is more than sporadic and which indicates threat of continuing illegal activity. In re Cedar Hill Cemetery Litigation, S.D.N.Y.1994, 853 F.Supp. 706. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 28

Threat of continuity can satisfy element of pattern “racketeering activity” required for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim. O'Rourke v. Crosley, D.N.J.1994, 847 F.Supp. 1208. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Threat of long-term racketeering activity can be inferred from nature of enterprise if it existed for criminal purposes or if predicate acts were part of defendant's regular way of doing business. Three Crown Ltd. Partnership v. Caxton Corp., S.D.N.Y.1993, 817 F.Supp. 1033. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Threatened criminal conduct, for purposes of proving pattern of racketeering activity, can be established by showing that predicate acts or offenses are part of ongoing entity's regular way of doing business. Marrazzo v. Bucks County Bank and Trust Co., E.D.Pa.1993, 814 F.Supp. 437. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza-

tions 25

Alleged mail fraud by transmitting purchase order for the work and alleged misrepresentation approximately two months later to pay contractor did not involve type of continuing activity or threat of continuing activity necessary to establish RICO pattern; any threat of obtaining goods and services ended when plant owner ceased operations. W.E. Darin Const. Enterprises, Inc. v. Detroit Coke Co., W.D.N.Y.1993, 814 F.Supp. 325. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Isolated incidents of wrongdoing intended to secure separate and discrete goals pose no threat of continued criminal activity, and thus cannot constitute “pattern of racketeering activity” in violation of RICO. Jackson v. Radcliffe, S.D.Tex.1992, 795 F.Supp. 197. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Government might be able to demonstrate that alleged acts of racketeering which allegedly occurred only a few days apart from each other involved a threat of continuing activity by showing, e.g., that acts were a “regular way of conducting a defendant's ongoing legitimate business;” thus, pattern element was adequately pleaded as to that defendant. U.S. v. Private Sanitation Industry Ass'n of Nassau/Suffolk, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1992, 793 F.Supp. 1114. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Even if alleged acts of misrepresentation concerning investments were related, predicate acts extending over relatively short period of time without the threat of future criminal activity were insufficient to satisfy the continuity prong for a RICO claim. Davidson v. Wilson, D.Minn.1991, 763 F.Supp. 1470, affirmed 973 F.2d 1391. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

144. ---- Miscellaneous patterns of racketeering, continuity, pattern of racketeering

Allegations that Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise consisting of adoption agency and affiliated not-for-profit entity committed a serious, but discrete scheme to defraud a handful of adoption clients and former joint venturer partner over a period of no more than sixteen months was insufficient to establish open-ended continuity; enterprise, which primarily conducted a legitimate business, did not pose a threat of continuing conduct since the scheme was “inherently terminable” because once enterprise concluded the fraudulent “processing” of adoptions, they would have no more of former partner's files with which to work. Spool v. World Child Intern. Adoption Agency, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2008, 520 F.3d 178. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Repeated refusal of taxicab insurer over one-month period to issue “tort letter” necessary to sell insured's New York City taxi medallion, because of premiums allegedly owed on past policies, was not “pattern” of racketeering activity within Racketeer and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); continuity requirement was not satisfied. Saglioccolo v. Eagle Ins. Co., C.A.6 (Ohio) 1997, 112 F.3d 226. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 29

Production of television investigative news report concerning televangelist's fund-raising techniques was not “continuity of racketeering activity” required to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-

tions Act (RICO); alleged predicate acts occurred during production and airing of news reports were part of single, lawful endeavor. Word of Faith World Outreach Center Church, Inc. v. Sawyer, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1996, 90 F.3d 118, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 1248, 520 U.S. 1117, 137 L.Ed.2d 329. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Requirement of continuity to show a pattern of racketeering activity was not met by evidence that railroad and coal company made misrepresentations to landowners over a period of ten months in order to acquire land for railroad right-of-way. Hughes v. Consol-Pennsylvania Coal Co., C.A.3 (Pa.) 1991, 945 F.2d 594, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 2300, 504 U.S. 955, 119 L.Ed.2d 224. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 29

Investor failed to demonstrate closed period of repeated conduct sufficient to satisfy “continuity” requirement of civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against bank for conduct allegedly performed by its subsidiary, while performing bookkeeping and clearinghouse functions for investor, in relation to broker's “churning” of investor's account, in that charged securities fraud lasted only three months; subsidiary's alleged concealment of its knowledge of, and of its alleged participation in, churning did not extend duration of conspiracy or racketeering pattern, and charged instances of mail fraud and obstruction of justice were not sufficiently supported. Pyramid Securities Ltd. v. IB Resolution, Inc., C.A.D.C.1991, 924 F.2d 1114, 288 U.S.App.D.C. 157, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 85, 502 U.S. 822, 116 L.Ed.2d 57. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Activity of father and son, pursuant to which they set up second company in order to market first corporation's cookies, so that father, who had advanced substantial sums of money to first corporation, would obtain payment on his loan, was closed-ended over short period of time with no threat of ongoing activity, and thus, did not satisfy pattern of racketeering activity requirement for action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act. Olive Can Co., Inc. v. Martin, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1990, 906 F.2d 1147. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Shipper plausibly alleged closed-ended continuity, as required to establish a pattern of racketeering activity within meaning of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where it alleged that carrier, its parent corporation, and its sister subsidiary engaged in practice of upweighting packages for more than two years, identifying date and nature of numerous particular instances of upweighting. U1IT4less, Inc. v. Fed- Ex Corp., S.D.N.Y.2012, 896 F.Supp.2d 275. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 29

Idaho Fish and Game conservation officers did not engage in a pattern of racketeering activity, as would support claim for violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) brought against them by limited liability company (LLC) that operated a hunting club, and its member, where officers' alleged conduct in telling member's relative that he was a fraud and that he was selling relative's property on an on-line auction site, and in causing defamatory articles to be published in a newspaper, were sporadic and not continuous. Cocker- ham v. Sellers, D.Idaho 2011, 781 F.Supp.2d 1056. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Family that perpetrated criminal scheme to obtain forced labor and to harbor alien fugitive for private financial

gain engaged in pattern of racketeering activity under continuity plus relationship test, which required showing that predicate acts were related to one another and posed threat of continued criminal activity, thus supporting victim's civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim; family committed numerous related predicate acts over nineteen year period, which caused series of distinct injuries throughout victim's time with perpetrators. Martinez v. Calimlim, E.D.Wis.2009, 651 F.Supp.2d 852. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Foreign workers' allegations that defendants used the mails and telephone and fax to advertise for and hire foreign workers for construction jobs in the United States, with an alleged promise that workers could obtain legal permanent residence, were sufficient to plead claim that defendants were enterprise engaged in continuing pattern of racketeering activity, under Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). David v. Signal Intern., LLC, E.D.La.2008, 588 F.Supp.2d 718. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31 ; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Plaintiff failed to allege a pattern of racketeering activity and failed to state the facts of the fraud with particularity, as required to state claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) founded on a theory of mail fraud. Uland v. City of Winsted, D.Minn.2008, 570 F.Supp.2d 1114. Federal Civil Procedure 636; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Indictment charging defendant with violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) based upon her alleged interstate travel in aid of racketeering satisfied the showing of continuity plus relationship required to adequately allege a pattern of racketeering activity; indictment alleged 14 specific acts of racketeering over eight-year period, nine of which alleged activity in the District of Columbia, and it alleged that all of the racketeering acts had the related purpose or result of enriching the members and associates through the operation of a prostitution business. U.S. v. Palfrey, D.D.C.2007, 499 F.Supp.2d 34. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 91

“Pattern” requirement for activity within ambit of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was not shown with respect to Mexican bank's alleged scheme focused on dispute over rights to property located in Mexico, absent indication that activity would not terminate upon final disposition of the subject property. Dtex, LLC v. BBVA Bancomer, S.A., D.S.C.2005, 405 F.Supp.2d 639, affirmed 214 Fed.Appx. 286, 2007 WL 173711. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Union's amended complaint in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action failed to demonstrate open-ended continuity of alleged racketeering activities, through showing that predicate acts or offenses were part of ongoing entity's regular way of doing business; even assuming that allegations were sufficient to define association in fact enterprise, they were inadequate to support inference that enterprise was ongoing one that would, absent discovery of election-related fraud, have continued to engage in criminal activity, and mere risk of recurrence of criminal activity in connection with future election was insufficient. International Broth. of Teamsters v. Carey, S.D.N.Y.2004, 297 F.Supp.2d 706, affirmed 124 Fed.Appx. 41, 2005 WL 481573. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Complaint sufficiently alleged closed-ended continuity in pattern of racketeering activity, in support of creditors' claims that debtor and others violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), when it asserted that several persons, including debtor's friends, family members, and various legal entities purportedly created by debtor schemed together to defraud various financial institutions, and that predicate acts supporting scheme took place over several years, but within 10-year period. Cadle, Co. v. Flanagan, D.Conn.2003, 271 F.Supp.2d 379. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Investor in limited partnership organized to operate fast food restaurant failed to satisfy continuity requirement for stating RICO claim based on fraud; alleged fraudulent activity had come to end when limited partnership filed for bankruptcy, and possibility of continuing fraud in connection with transfer of assets and other facets of bankruptcy did not establish ongoing enterprise and continued prospects of future fraud. Kleban v. S.Y.S. Res- taurant Management, Inc., N.D.Ill.1996, 929 F.Supp. 294. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Automobile manufacturer's claims against dealership and related alter-ego parties under state racketeering and federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims based on predicate acts of mail fraud, wire fraud, and conversion related to defendants' failure to pay for cars delivered did not establish requisite continuity of criminal activity by alleging single scheme to obtain 13 cars over three month period. Rolls- Royce Motor Cars, Inc. v. Schudroff, S.D.N.Y.1996, 929 F.Supp. 117. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 72

Majority shareholder failed to allege facts sufficient to satisfy continuity requirement for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim arising out of struggle for control of corporation; alleged scheme did not commence with execution of shareholders' agreement, but rather at time of shareholders' meeting, and even if scheme extended to time when shareholders' position was further diluted by issuance of other bonus shares, scheme lasted no more than seven to eight months. Bardsley v. Powell, Trachtman, Logan, Carrle & Bowman, P.C., E.D.Pa.1996, 916 F.Supp. 458, affirmed 106 F.3d 384. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 72

Restaurant franchisor's alleged removal of equipment from restaurant shortly before franchisee was to take possession was not “long-term criminal conduct” necessary to establish threat of continued racketeering activity, for purposes of civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim. Hall v. Burger King Corp., S.D.Fla.1995, 912 F.Supp. 1509. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Limited partnership investors asserting Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violation in connection with offering of securities did not satisfy continuity requirement for pattern of racketeering activity; sale of limited partnerships occurred over period of at most eight months and ceased once offering closed, and fact there were multiple victims was not dispositive. Wegbreit v. Marley Orchards Corp., E.D.Wash.1991, 793 F.Supp. 957, reinstatement granted 793 F.Supp. 965. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Mailing of invoices for preparation of tax returns which were, in fact, not filed, lacked requisite continuity so as to establish pattern of racketeering activity for purpose of civil RICO claim. Zee-Bar, Inc. N.H. v. Kaplan,

D.N.H.1992, 792 F.Supp. 895. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Allegations of fraudulent letters, facsimile transmissions, and telephone calls over course of several months in renegotiating purchase contract did not “amount to continued criminal activity” and could not satisfy continuity requirement of RICO pattern. Charles River Data Systems, Inc. v. Oracle Complex Systems Corp., D.Mass.1991, 788 F.Supp. 54. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Closed-ended scheme involving transfers of funds over period of nine months to defraud depositors of savings and loan association failed to satisfy continuity element required to establish pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). U.S. v. Crysopt Corp., D.Md.1991, 781 F.Supp. 375. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Allegations in corporation's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint against former senior officer in corporation and corporate subsidiary, that officer had caused falsified records of his un- used vacation time to be mailed to corporate officers to obtain compensation to which he was not entitled and to otherwise defraud corporation, failed to demonstrate requisite continuity or threat of continuity to satisfy RICO “pattern” requirement; predicate acts occurred within at most a few months of each other, at time when defendant was senior corporate officer, a position which he no longer held. Qantel Corp. v. Niemuller, S.D.N.Y.1991, 771 F.Supp. 1361. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Investor failed to make sufficient allegations of continuity to establish pattern of racketeering activity necessary for liability of broker's employee under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), though some 226 acts of racketeering were alleged to have occurred, where those acts were all identical or similar in nature and gave rise to same type of injury, they occurred over closed term, they involved at most two perpetrators and one victim, and there was no showing that same or similar acts were committed before or after those alleged in complaint, or that broker and employee otherwise posed threat of similar misconduct in future. Nundy v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., W.D.N.Y.1991, 762 F.Supp. 40. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 28

Claim that management consultant had been induced to become first an employee and then a partner of a partnership involved in management consulting work, did not allege RICO violations, as continuing pattern of activity had not been involved; consultant had asserted that purpose of misrepresentations and other racketeering conduct had been to appropriate consultant's client base, and any illegal conduct ceased once that objective had been reached. Mead v. Schaub, S.D.N.Y.1991, 757 F.Supp. 319. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Allegations by National Credit Union Administration Board, acting as conservator of credit union, of scheme to defraud union through four transactions occurring over less than two-year period did not establish required continuity or threat of continuing criminal activity. National Credit Union Admin. Bd. v. Regine, D.R.I.1990, 749 F.Supp. 401. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

RICO plaintiffs' allegation of other schemes besides defendants' land acquisition scheme did not establish threat of continuing criminal conduct; defendants' nonpayment of real estate transfer taxes and their misrepresentations to plaintiffs concerning federal government's tax treatment of property sales, did not amount to separate scheme to defraud, and would not establish RICO violation absent showing of continuity or threat of continuity. Lough- man v. Consol-Pennsylvania Coal Co., W.D.Pa.1990, 740 F.Supp. 1114, affirmed in part , vacated in part on other grounds 945 F.2d 594, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 2300, 504 U.S. 955, 119 L.Ed.2d 224. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

There was sufficient evidence of continuity to establish a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) pattern, even though embezzlements defendants were charged with, arising out of an employee welfare plan's payment of legal fees of a union president, occurred over a short time period; defendants had exhibited control over the plan, and board of trustees of plan had adopted policy to pay legal fees indefinitely into future. U.S. v. Busacca, N.D.Ohio 1990, 739 F.Supp. 370, affirmed 936 F.2d 232, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 595, 502 U.S. 985, 116 L.Ed.2d 619. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 95

Alleged predicate acts of securities, mail and wire fraud committed by defendants over period of less than three weeks in connection with tender offer were not sufficiently “continuous” to satisfy RICO “pattern” requirement. In re Phillips Petroleum Securities Litigation, D.Del.1990, 738 F.Supp. 825. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Short-term, closed-end scheme spread over period of seven months in which defendants allegedly committed various acts of mail and securities fraud to manipulate price of stock, which resulted in injury to stockholders when they sold their stock at artificially low price, did not show continuity sufficient to support claim under section of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, absent allegations that defendants had committed same or similar acts before or that they committed them again after period in question; fact that defendants continued to hold stock in target corporation and to control that corporation, and that they were in business of investing in corporations, did not show threat of continuity sufficient to support claim. Azurite Corp. Ltd. v. Am- ster & Co., S.D.N.Y.1990, 730 F.Supp. 571. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31; Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

Allegations regarding successful and completed scheme by manufacturer of ice cream to defraud another manufacturer of ice cream of its funds and keep profits of joint venture did not satisfy “pattern” requirement for civil RICO action; although numerous racketeering acts were alleged, there was no statement from which a threat of continuing crime could be inferred or that the defendant's fraud was precursor to other and repeated crimes. La Delite, Ltd. v. Chipwich, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1988, 691 F.Supp. 613. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 28

Builder of single-family homes which purchased two lots in subdivision failed to fulfill “pattern of racketeering” requirement for civil RICO claim by failing to allege any indication of a threat of continuing activity in addition to requisite predicate acts occurring over four-month period, which were not targeted at a small group of potential buyers, but to the mass market, and where there were no other allegations of similar conduct toward other potential buyers in the past showing required continuity of actions. J.G. Williams, Inc. v. Regency Properties,

Ltd., N.D.Ga.1987, 672 F.Supp. 1436. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Although residence for aged did not cease to exist upon eviction of resident, its function as “criminal enterprise” ended upon occurrence of that discrete, definite event, so that enterprise, with its discrete short-term object, was not sufficiently “continuing” for purpose of stating RICO claim. Khaimi v. Schonberger, E.D.N.Y.1987, 664 F.Supp. 54, affirmed 838 F.2d 1203. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Manufacturer's allegation of supplier's commercial bribery and fraudulent use of mails or wires or airlines in attempt to obtain purchase contracts was not sufficiently continuous to constitute pattern for purposes of RICO violation. NL Industries, Inc. v. Gulf & Western Industries, Inc., D.Kan.1986, 650 F.Supp. 1115. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Complaint resulting from advertising contract failed to sufficiently allege pattern of racketeering activity, by failing to allege threat of continuing activity with regard to multiple acts of mail fraud, to state civil claim under Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act, based on alleged overcharging for advertisements, though numerous mailings were made in connection with contract, where mailings related to single contract and did not result in separate injuries. Frankart Distributors, Inc. v. RMR Advertising, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1986, 632 F.Supp. 1198. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Allegations that corporation's directors secretly purchased real property and resold it at a substantial profit to corporation did not allege pattern of racketeering required to state a claim under racketeering statute [18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c)]; there was only one purpose, one result, one set of participants, one victim, and one method of commission, and, thus, no continuity and no pattern of racketeering activity. Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, D.Colo.1986, 628 F.Supp. 163, affirmed 810 F.2d 925. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Pilots who asserted Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against union, airline, and lender that provided airline with debtor-in-possession (DIP) loan, in connection with defendants' activities concerning pilots' pension plans, failed to allege pattern of racketeering activity through open-ended continuity; pilots had not alleged that union's primary business was unlawful, so they had to provide some strong evidence of continued criminal activity, but pilots' only claim that there was still a risk of future criminal conduct by union was the fact that union continued to be their exclusive bargaining representative, and pilots did not indicate that this allegation was premised upon future predicate acts or the threat of any criminal activity but, rather, it appeared that pilots were relying on bald speculation as to the future acts of union and the alleged “enterprise,” which was insufficient. Vaughn v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Intern., E.D.N.Y.2008, 395 B.R. 520, affirmed 377 Fed.Appx. 88, 2010 WL 1932388, affirmed 604 F.3d 703. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Even if, as alleged, prepetition principals for Chapter 7 debtor, principals for buyer of debtor's assets, and principals of debtor's customer engaged in scheme to gain control of debtor, drive it into the ground, and buy its assets for reduced price, their alleged acts did not demonstrate continuity of predicate acts required to establish pattern of racketeering activity for closed-ended scheme under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

Act (RICO), in that alleged acts occurred over only seven-month period, number of predicate acts was limited, and purported scheme was directed toward single, specific outcome and harmed single group of victims consisting of debtor's creditors. Estate of KDC, Inc. ex rel. McNeilly v. Kraklow, W.D.Wis.2007, 368 B.R. 769. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

145. Convictions, pattern of racketeering

Defendant's RICO conviction was not supported by two predicate acts of fraud upon reversal of his mail fraud convictions where he was convicted only for mail fraud and conspiracy to violate Hobbs Act. U.S. v. Alexander, C.A.11 (Ala.) 1988, 850 F.2d 1500, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 1346, 489 U.S. 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 814, vacated 109 S.Ct. 3236, 492 U.S. 915, 106 L.Ed.2d 584, on remand 888 F.2d 777. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 19

Prior criminal conviction for either predicate offenses supporting RICO claim or for RICO violation itself has not been necessary for recovery in RICO action; all that is required in this regard is evidence establishing that defendant participated in affairs of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity by committing at least two predicate offenses. James v. Meinke, N.D.Tex.1984, 606 F.Supp. 125, affirmed 778 F.2d 200. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 19

146. Criminal conduct, pattern of racketeering

Municipalities could not have criminal intent necessary to establish a “pattern of racketeering activity” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), nor could such intent be imputed to the municipalities through their police officers. Interstate Flagging, Inc. v. Town of Darien, D.Conn.2003, 283 F.Supp.2d 641. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Finding of pattern of racketeering activity requires indictable criminal conduct, as defined in federal statutes. Scheiner v. Wallace, S.D.N.Y.1993, 832 F.Supp. 687. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

No prior conviction is required for predicate act required to establish a racketeering claim but racketeering activity consists not of acts for which defendant has been convicted but for acts which he could be. Broyles v. Wilson, M.D.La.1993, 812 F.Supp. 651, affirmed 3 F.3d 439. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 6

Repeated criminal activity, not merely repeated acts to carry out same criminal activity, is required to state a civil cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; declining to follow United States v. Moeller, 402 F.Supp. 49 (D.Conn.); United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir.); R.A.G.S. Cou- ture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir.); Illinois Dept. of Revenue v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312 (7th Cir.); and Soper v. Simmons International, Ltd., 582 F.Supp. 987 (N.D.N.Y.). Kovian v. Fulton County Nat. Bank and Trust Co., N.D.N.Y.1986, 647 F.Supp. 830, reconsideration denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 27

147. Denial of offense, pattern of racketeering

Defendant who both made bribe and made false denial of same bribe could not be convicted of engaging in pattern of racketeering activity in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, in absence of its additional predicate acts of racketeering activity. U.S. v. Biaggi, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1990, 909 F.2d 662, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 1102, 499 U.S. 904, 113 L.Ed.2d 213. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

148. Dismissed claims, pattern of racketeering

Where federal securities law claim had been dismissed, it could not be considered a predicate act for purposes of RICO allegations. LaRoe v. Elms Securities Corp., S.D.N.Y.1988, 700 F.Supp. 688. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 17

149. Embezzlement, pattern of racketeering

For RICO purposes, fraud activities against employer bank were “pattern,” where bank employer admitted executing fraudulent teller tickets every three days for 12-year period to cover up embezzlement of bank funds, and each ticket increased total amount of money taken; each teller ticket represented discrete attempt to deprive bank of money. LaSalle Bank Lake View v. Seguban, N.D.Ill.1996, 937 F.Supp. 1309. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Allegations that attorney embezzled funds entrusted to him under power of attorney and as executor, and that attorney covered up acts of misappropriation by mailing periodic checks over two and one-half year period without disclosing actual distribution of funds, pled pattern of racketeering activity needed to state civil RICO claim for damages. D'Orange v. Feely, S.D.N.Y.1995, 894 F.Supp. 159, affirmed 101 F.3d 1393, certiorari denied 118 S.Ct. 309, 522 U.S. 919, 139 L.Ed.2d 238. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

150. Employment, pattern of racketeering

Former employees' allegations failed to establish sufficient “pattern” of racketeering activity to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; allegations involved multiple acts of mail fraud in furtherance of single scheme, to deprive employees of their employment, and resulted in nondistinct injuries. Talbot v. Robert Matthews Distributing Co., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1992, 961 F.2d 654. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 31

Employer's alleged illegal activity in terminating certain vacation benefits did not qualify as a pattern of racketeering activity where it was accomplished in a period of approximately six months to one year. Aldridge v. Lily- Tulip, Inc. Salary Retirement Plan Benefits Committee, C.A.11 (Ga.) 1992, 953 F.2d 587, rehearing denied 961 F.2d 224. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Continuing criminal activity, required to state claim under section of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiz- ations Act (RICO) proscribing conduct of affairs of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity, was lack-

ing from complaint alleging discharge of bank employee to obstruct federal money-laundering probe; once employee was discharged, the scheme, by definition, was at an end. Miranda v. Ponce Federal Bank, C.A.1 (Puerto Rico) 1991, 948 F.2d 41. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Acts leading to single basic injury of unilateral implementation of new terms and conditions into existing bargaining agreement was not “pattern of RICO activity,” even if employers' conduct could have amounted to mail fraud and wire fraud; alleged scheme was 11 to 14-month closed-ended period of activity aimed at single goal. Young v. West Coast Indus. Relations Ass'n, Inc., D.Del.1991, 763 F.Supp. 64, affirmed 961 F.2d 1570. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Former employee who brought claim against his former employer under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act failed to demonstrate that former employer engaged in pattern of racketeering activity, inasmuch as former employer's alleged acts were all in furtherance of one transaction and single finite scheme: hiring of employee. Flannery v. IFA Inc., N.D.Ill.1989, 722 F.Supp. 498. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 27

“Pattern” was sufficiently alleged for RICO purposes, though defendant employer's acts related only to a single alleged scheme to deprive plaintiff employee of her commissions, where the acts were themselves separate oc- currences and the alleged scheme was open-ended, which would continue for as long as employee was employed. Smith v. MCI Telecommunications Corp., D.Kan.1987, 678 F.Supp. 823, reconsideration denied 124 F.R.D. 665. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Discharge of employee constituted single transaction, not pattern of racketeering activity required for RICO claim. Penry v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., E.D.Tex.1987, 662 F.Supp. 792. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 27

Employee who alleged that employer and supervisors fraudulently promised employee participation in a profit sharing plan but who did not allege that supervisors concocted similar scheme in any other year did not show the continuity required for RICO claim. Simon v. Fribourg, D.Minn.1986, 650 F.Supp. 319. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

151. Extortion, pattern of racketeering

Evidence concerning defendant's participation in bookmaking operating and extortion of victim was sufficient to demonstrate pattern of racketeering activity required to support Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) convictions; enterprise was pervasively involved in local bookmaking activities and was aware of defendant's bookmaking operation, and extortion was in furtherance of enterprise's affairs. U.S. v. Minicone, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1992, 960 F.2d 1099, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 1511, 503 U.S. 950, 117 L.Ed.2d 648, amended on rehearing in part, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 199, 506 U.S. 869, 121 L.Ed.2d 142, post-conviction relief denied , affirmed 40 F.3d 1237. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 95

T-shirt buyer's alleged extortion forcing manufacturer to make up $2.55 million inventory deficit through series

of discounted t-shirt transactions and buyer's alleged mail and wire fraud lacked sufficient continuity and were not “pattern of racketeering activity,” even though there were several instances of alleged mail and wire fraud; alleged economic injury stemmed from manufacturer's assumption of inventory shortage; allegedly extortionate scheme was the only dishonest undertaking; and each injury at time of shipment of discounted t-shirts did not signal threat of continuing criminal activity and was not distinct. U.S. Textiles, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch Com- panies, Inc., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1990, 911 F.2d 1261. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Employer's allegation, that union official made four separate threats to damage its property or injure employees, if union was not recognized as labor bargaining unit, was sufficient to satisfy racketeering pattern element under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, C.A.D.C.1988, 839 F.2d 782, 268 U.S.App.D.C. 103, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 309, 488 U.S. 926, 102 L.Ed.2d 328, vacated on other grounds 109 S.Ct. 3235, 492 U.S. 914, 106 L.Ed.2d 583, on remand 883 F.2d 132, 280 U.S.App.D.C. 60, rehearing granted. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 26

Corporation's allegations in its complaint that predicate acts of extortion committed by unions, which had been trying unsuccessfully to become bargaining representatives of its employees, had same or similar purpose, that acts were participated in generally by same people, that alleged method of commission was same or similar, that acts were not isolated events, and that unions' alleged conduct had continued for over 18 months established pattern of racketeering activity sufficient for recovery under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Intern. Union, E.D.Va.2008, 633 F.Supp.2d 214. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

“Pattern of racketeering activity” needed to support convictions under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act was established by evidence that defendant, who was former commissioner of city parks department, committed numerous extortions within five-year period by providing city parks department services and equipment for personal gain. U.S. v. Delano, W.D.N.Y.1993, 825 F.Supp. 534, affirmed in part , reversed in part 55 F.3d 720. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Union's violation of Hobbs Act, in organizing secondary strike by suppliers of contractor who was targeted for coercion to acquire union contract through threats, formed predicate acts sufficient to allow contractor to assert RICO claim. C & W Const. Co. v. Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 745, AFL-CIO, D.Hawai'i 1988, 687 F.Supp. 1453. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 8

Allegations that patentee had extorted millions of dollars in settlement monies through pattern of litigation involving infringement claims based on fraudulently obtained patents, and that predicate acts were enterprise's repeated and continued use of United States mails and use of telephone wires to further that extortionate scheme were sufficient to allege pattern of racketeering activity necessary to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) claim. Lemelson v. Wang Laboratories, Inc., D.Mass.1994, 874 F.Supp. 430, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

152. Fiduciary duty, pattern of racketeering

Breach of fiduciary duty does not satisfy pattern of racketeering activity requirement under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act. LaVay Corp. v. Dominion Federal Sav. & Loan Ass'n, C.A.4 (Va.) 1987, 830 F.2d 522, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 1027, 484 U.S. 1065, 98 L.Ed.2d 991. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 10

153. Financial transactions, pattern of racketeering

Evidence supported finding that defendant engaged in “pattern” of racketeering activity, for purposes of Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act by meeting with between 125 and 350 people after they saw the defendant's advertisement stating that he could provide financing services, yet none of those people were provided with financing after they each paid $1,000 for the defendant's services. Diamonds Plus, Inc. v. Kolber, C.A.8 (Ark.) 1992, 960 F.2d 765. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Allegations showing only one general scheme, which concerned one major transaction, a Small Business Ad- ministration loan, had four potential victims, one distinct injury, wrongful conversion of loan proceeds, and threatened no repeated harm did not constitute “pattern of racketeering activity” as required by Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Jones v. Lampe, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1988, 845 F.2d 755. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Bank president's predicate acts in mailing four letters to third parties met continuity requirement for RICO liability, though only single scheme was involved, where predicate acts constituting racketeering activity, through which bank president allegedly received numerous kickbacks, and through which he concealed practice from his employer, were not isolated or sporadic events, but were continuous. Sun Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1987, 825 F.2d 187. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Bank customer failed to establish that his financial situation, relative to having committed to purchase property on basis of promised loan and to later having been required to pay allegedly excessive interest as condition for the loan, arose out of any pattern of racketeering activity, where only “pattern” alleged was bank's sending monthly account statements; furthermore, defendants were not shown to have been convicted of the underlying predicate acts. Durante Bros. and Sons, Inc. v. Flushing Nat. Bank, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1985, 755 F.2d 239, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 3530, 473 U.S. 906, 87 L.Ed.2d 654, on remand 652 F.Supp. 101. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

District court lacked federal question subject matter jurisdiction over borrower's action against credit union that held a security interest in his automobile, corporation that repossessed his automobile, and others, alleging a claim for violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where the repossession did not amount to a pattern of racketeering activity. Anderson v. Wiggins, D.D.C.2006, 460 F.Supp.2d 1. Feder- al Courts 197

Alleged fraudulent procurement of loans by loan broker and its officer constituted single “scheme,” for purpose of determining whether lenders adequately alleged pattern of racketeering activity with respect to conspiracy claim against loan broker and its officer under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),

even though financial statements utilized in obtaining some loans were not employed in obtaining one loan, and in some cases broker sold loan to lenders whereas in other cases lenders made loan directly to enterprise. A.I. Credit Corp. v. Hartford Computer Group, Inc., N.D.Ill.1994, 847 F.Supp. 588. Conspiracy 18

Continuity requirement for finding pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) was not satisfied with respect to borrowers' claim that bank's vice-president had fraudulently misrepresented that workout agreement was in default, where allegedly fraudulent acts occurred, at most, within a matter of months, even though related but otherwise innocent mailings continued long after deceptive practices ceased, and bank continued to control borrowers' coal contracts by declaring default. Blue Line Coal Co., Inc. v. Equibank, E.D.Pa.1991, 769 F.Supp. 891. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Helping various persons not connected with loan transaction to obtain loans in exchange for ownership interest in, or shares of profits of, their operations, did not constitute “pattern of racketeering activity” necessary to state civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claims arising from plaintiffs' unsuccessful attempt to purchase real property because of their inability to secure financing, where there was no pattern among loans arranged by defendant, nor was there pattern between those loans and proposed sale. Marriott Bros. v. Gage, N.D.Tex.1988, 704 F.Supp. 731, opinion supplemented on denial of reconsideration 717 F.Supp. 458, affirmed 911 F.2d 1105, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Partner failed to sufficiently allege pattern of racketeering activity to state RICO claim against bank after partner was found personally liable on note made by partnership; partner alleged bank engaged in scheme to defraud him by inducing him to sign note, then obtained deficiency judgment against him, but alleged only single fraudulent loan scheme. Petrie v. United Bank of Skyline, Nat. Ass'n, D.Colo.1987, 676 F.Supp. 217. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Complaint by borrowers against mortgage broker satisfied “pattern” requirement to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim; although borrowers alleged that they were only defrauded in single loan transaction, they also alleged that broker defrauded other loan applicants in same kind of transactions. Ferleger v. First American Mortg. Co., N.D.Ill.1987, 662 F.Supp. 584. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Defendants, who allegedly engaged in single “buyer credit scheme” to defraud, at the same time could have participated in a pattern of racketeering activity and, thus, could be charged with both RICO violations and conspiracy fraudulently to secure Federal Housing Administration financing; predicate acts arose out of 23 distinct real estates transactions, each involving same or substantially similar predicate acts as others and occurring over span of about five years, there were allegedly many victims of defendants' acts, and each transaction caused infliction of new injuries on the particular victim. U.S. v. Madeoy, D.D.C.1987, 652 F.Supp. 371. Conspiracy 37

Savings and loan association, which asserted that bank made several independent decisions to deceitfully conceal different material existing facts from it in order to lull it into advancing funds in reliance on collateral that bank was claiming for itself, failed to sufficiently allege a pattern of racketeering activity where all acts com-

plained of arose from single financing arrangement for single construction project. Jackson County Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Maduff Mortg. Corp., D.Colo.1986, 649 F.Supp. 6. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 27

Corporation's allegations that bank fraudulently induced corporation into financing one of bank's failing debtors constituted a single isolated scheme lacking required continuity and thus was insufficient to establish a pattern of racketeering activity under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Temporaries, Inc. v. Maryland Nat. Bank, D.Md.1986, 638 F.Supp. 118. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Multiple mail and wire communications in furtherance of single allegedly fraudulent loan by bank to lender were insufficient to show a pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968. Grant v. Union Bank, D.Utah 1986, 629 F.Supp. 570. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Physician's allegations of mail fraud, wire fraud, and use of interstate commerce to commit fraud, arising out of two discrete loan transactions with bank, failed to establish a “pattern of racketeering activity” sufficient to support civil RICO claim against bank. Rojas v. First Bank Nat. Ass'n, E.D.N.Y.1985, 613 F.Supp. 968. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Fraud, if any, by bank in allegedly inducing debtors to expend additional sums in reliance on its prior forbear- ance in not collecting interest payments on construction loan was fraud relating to only a single, short, narrow scheme with few victims and one goal and did not evidence requisite “pattern” of racketeering activity to support RICO claim. Southern Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n of Georgia v. 21-26 East 105th Street Associates, S.D.N.Y.1991, 145 B.R. 375, reargument denied , affirmed 978 F.2d 706. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 27

154. Forgery, pattern of racketeering

Alleged forgery committed by attorney in sending allegedly forged attorney lien releases to settling defendants in personal injury suit could not be considered as predicate act under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiz- ations Act, where same underlying facts were used to allege predicate act of mail fraud and forgery had not been pled as predicate act. Sutherland v. O'Malley, N.D.Ill.1988, 687 F.Supp. 392. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

Corporation's allegation that its employee took and forged corporate checks on many occasions over a 16-month period satisfied pattern element of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act cause of action. P.M.F. Services, Inc. v. Grady, N.D.Ill.1988, 681 F.Supp. 549. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

Under episode test, complaint under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act adequately set forth pattern of racketeering activity, where it was based on four separate related forgeries and conversions of different sums belonging to one victim over one year; forgeries had independent harmful significance, and recurrence

of forgeries reasonably implied threat of ongoing criminal activity. Ghouth v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., N.D.Ill.1986, 642 F.Supp. 1325. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

155. Fraud, pattern of racketeering

Seventeen alleged predicate acts of wire and mail fraud over 21 months did not pose threat of continued criminal activity, as required to satisfy “pattern” element of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim alleging scheme to diminish value of project, pressing plaintiff and two others to yield up their interests so that schemers could own and control whole project; victims' injury resulted from single set of alleged misdeeds and occurred at same time, and there was nothing to suggest that defendants would seek to repeat their fraud in other partnerships or similar business settings, or to employ mail and wire fraud indefinitely in the partnership. Efron v. Embassy Suites (Puerto Rico), Inc., C.A.1 (Puerto Rico) 2000, 223 F.3d 12, certiorari denied 121 S.Ct. 1228, 532 U.S. 905, 149 L.Ed.2d 138. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28; Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Alleged schemes to defraud estate of pop artist and transport artwork out of state and to fraudulently deny receipt of payment for use of artist's works to try to escape liability to pay co-owner of copyright were not sufficiently related to allegedly fraudulent manipulation of licensing agreement by estate to comprise part of pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Warhol, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1997, 119 F.3d 91. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Allegedly fraudulent acts of pop artist's estate, in effort to manipulate agreement to license artist's works and im- age, were not sufficiently continuous to constitute pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), as there was no threat that fraudulent acts would continue in future, and acts were actually subparts of singular act of fraud, namely, negotiation of licensing agreement. Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Warhol, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1997, 119 F.3d 91. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Complaint charging fraud under vendor agreement for purchase and lease of electronic credit card processing equipment failed to allege open-ended continuity sufficient to satisfy pattern requirement for stating claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), in that scheme alleged had natural ending point, so there was no specific threat of continued racketeering activity, and there was no allegation that predicate acts of mail and wire fraud were part of regular way of conducting business. Vicom, Inc. v. Harbridge Merchant Ser- vices, Inc., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1994, 20 F.3d 771. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Investors' allegations that principals in religious enterprise sold over 55,000 “lifetime partnerships” through misrepresentation sufficiently alleged pattern of racketeering activity to support civil RICO claim. Combs v. Bak- ker, C.A.4 (N.C.) 1989, 886 F.2d 673. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Regional pay-TV service supplier's claim that national pay-TV service supplier made fraudulent representations

leading up to single agreement between national and regional supplier and transfer of negotiations for purchase of third supplier from regional supplier to national supplier did not constitute “pattern” of racketeering within meaning of RICO. Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., C.A.7 (Wis.) 1987, 813 F.2d 810. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Allegation that accountant and partner acted to defraud former partner on one occasion by mailing false K-1 tax schedules to him on two occasions, by filing false partnership tax returns, and by denying him access to information or discussions did not adequately allege a “pattern” of racketeering activity for purpose of RICO. Marks v. Pannell Kerr Forster, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1987, 811 F.2d 1108. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Complex investment scheme operated by network of individuals and companies, which purportedly allowed high income individuals to initially lease thoroughbred mares, breed those mares for a season and then keep the resulting foal, and also later provided alternative mineral investment opportunities, constituted pattern of racketeering activity for purposes of claim under Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act; individuals promoted program with knowledge of lack of horses to support commitments to investors, were keenly aware of finances and undercapitalization of marketing and financing company given its obligations, and reviewed and approved marketing materials, including attorney opinion letters, and there were no fewer than 37 predicate acts comprised of fraudulent communications by mail and wire between investors and operators of scheme during relevant time period. In re ClassicStar Mare Lease Litigation, E.D.Ky.2011, 823 F.Supp.2d 599, opinion supplemented on reconsideration , amended in part 2012 WL 1080569, affirmed 2013 WL 3746220. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 31

Teachers and Filipino nationals who had come from the Philippines to work in the United States failed to allege specific mailings or wire usage by teacher recruiting service which had brought them into the country, as required for either wire fraud or mail fraud to serve as predicate act under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) claim against service; plaintiffs only generally alleged that service “utilized the telephone, facsimile, postal system, and/or email of the United States to organize, plan, and coordinate the RICO Enterprise” but failed to allege that service or its officers specifically used mail or wires, when they used them, or how any such use concerned a scheme to defraud, as required to state fraud with specificity under federal rule. Nunag-Tanedo v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., C.D.Cal.2011, 790 F.Supp.2d 1134. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Independent appraisers, who had allegedly been blacklisted by defendant lender for not inflating property values, failed to adequately allege common purpose in association-in-fact Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act (RICO) enterprise between lender and thousands of independent mortgage brokers which directed borrowers into loans issued by lender; allegations did not explain why brokers had any incentive to place loans with defendant lender rather than its competitors. Capitol West Appraisals, LLC v. Countrywide Financial Corp., W.D.Wash.2010, 759 F.Supp.2d 1267, affirmed 467 Fed.Appx. 738, 2012 WL 345903. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 44

Investors who sued ambulance services, affiliates and officers, alleging that they were induced to invest through

series of misrepresentations, failed to aver that defendants received any income derived from pattern of racketeering activity to use or invest, as required to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); although complaint averred that defendants used and invested income derived from pattern of racketeering activity in one or more interstate enterprises, it did not identify entity in which defendants invested racketeering income separate and apart from purported racketeering enterprise. DeFazio v. Wallis, E.D.N.Y.2007, 500 F.Supp.2d 197. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Immigrant workers claiming that payroll checks did not include overtime pay adequately alleged relationship and continuity necessary for pattern of racketeering activity; workers alleged that thousands of false and misleading paychecks were sent through the mail over a three-year period, alleged employer had a similar purpose of denying overtime compensation, and the fraudulent scheme involved over forty individuals, including at least five active perpetrators. Choimbol v. Fairfield Resorts, Inc., E.D.Va.2006, 428 F.Supp.2d 437. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Advertising agency's allegations that clients retained it to perform advertising and media placement services, knowing they could not pay for those services, and fraudulently induced agency to accept worthless promissory note and guaranty in satisfaction of their debts, were insufficient to establish pattern of racketeering activity necessary to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); allegations amounted to single scheme with single victim involving predicate acts that spanned at most eight months. Greenstone Roberts Advertising/Florida, Inc. v. Gold Star Cruises of Galveston, L.C., E.D.N.Y.1997, 951 F.Supp. 402. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

RICO requirement that pattern of racketeering activity continue over substantial period of time was satisfied by Latvian corporation alleging fraud against American corporation retained to help Latvian corporation to do business in United States, even though it was claimed that predicate acts were only separated by insufficient period of one year; there was evidence that American corporation intended long campaign of fraud against Latvian corporation. Nafta v. Feniks Intern. House of Trade (U.S.A.) Inc., E.D.N.Y.1996, 932 F.Supp. 422. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Travel agency's conduct in misrepresenting sales to airlines to increase its commissions under incentive agreement with airline did not have “continuity” required to establish Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) violation; airline did not allege threat to “social” well-being, where agency's conduct was directed towards single fraudulent goal, involved only one set of perpetrators and one victim, and took place over 18-month period. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Berger, E.D.Mo.1994, 864 F.Supp. 106. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Buyers and assignees of 1986 bonds, who alleged actions in 1986 and 1987 amounting to a breach of 1986 bond covenants, but who did not allege any other predicate acts prior to 1989 claims of fraudulent scheme, did not sufficiently plead any close-ended RICO or Colorado Organized Crime Control Act (COCCA) violations; pattern lasted only for six or seven months. Alter v. DBLKM, Inc., D.Colo.1993, 840 F.Supp. 799. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 29; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 104

Accountant's improper telephone bill payments using client's funds constituted scheme to defraud client and qualified as pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where checks were written by accountant in satisfaction of debts that client did not incur for services they did not receive and 25 checks were written over 23-month period. Zee-Bar, Inc. N.H. v. Kaplan, D.N.H.1992, 792 F.Supp. 895. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

In order to show threat of continuity, to establish pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), plaintiffs must demonstrate that the predicate acts were a regular way of conducting the ongoing business, and it is not enough to show that a defendant's acts of common-law fraud were a regular way of conducting the ongoing business. Gott v. Simpson, D.Me.1990, 745 F.Supp. 765. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Three transactions arising from a common scheme to defraud bank through excess financing in the form of direct loans and participation agreements satisfied requirement of a related and continuous pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. First City Nat. Bank and Trust Co. v. Feder- al Deposit Ins. Co., E.D.N.Y.1990, 730 F.Supp. 501. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Corporation which purchased subsidiary had adequately alleged “pattern” of racketeering activity within meaning of RICO with respect to alleged scheme to induce purchase of subsidiary at inflated price through conduct which took place over eight and one-half months, although separate fraudulent acts were aimed at single goal of subsidiary's sale; complaint alleged 23 acts of mail and wire fraud, three securities law violations, issuance of fraudulent $13.3 million earnings forecast, misrepresentation of future earnings forecasts, and failure to disclose cancellation of significant contract. Polycast Technology Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1989, 728 F.Supp. 926. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

To establish violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act on basis of fraud, there may be only one design or plan (scheme) to engage in fraud, but there must be at least two racketeering activities to carry out plan to engage in fraud. Combs v. Bakker, W.D.N.C.1988, 692 F.Supp. 596, vacated 886 F.2d 673. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Criminal acts which were repetitive and in furtherance of overarching scheme of use of fraudulent certificates of authenticity of stamps and other philatelic items, did not satisfy requirement of allegations of “pattern of racketeering activities” under RICO, even though criminal convictions had been obtained against three of the alleged conspirators and predicate violations alleged in complaint included 328 acts occurring over period of approximately two years, where conduct involved same participants and employed same procedures for altering certificates and defrauding stamp purchasers. Philatelic Foundation v. Kaplan, S.D.N.Y.1986, 647 F.Supp. 1344. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Series of acts in which majority shareholder of corporation allegedly improperly withdrew funds from corporation were directed toward a single fraudulent scheme and did not constitute a “pattern of racketeering activity.” Garbade v. Great Divide Min. and Mill. Corp., D.Colo.1986, 645 F.Supp. 808, affirmed 831 F.2d 212. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

For purposes of treble damages action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, pattern of racketeering activity element was satisfied by at least two acts of fraud committed upon sureties which issued performance and payment bonds to contractor within ten years. Allstate Ins. Co. v. A.M. Pugh Associates, Inc., M.D.Pa.1984, 604 F.Supp. 85. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

Occurrence of at least two instances of fraud in the sale of securities would be sufficient to establish a pattern of racketeering activity within purview of this section. Mazza v. Kozel, N.D.Ohio 1984, 591 F.Supp. 432. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

Automobile insurer, which sought approval of attachment, demonstrated reasonable likelihood of success on merits of establishing existence of pattern of racketeering activity in civil action for fraudulent insurance claims brought under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), based on numerous claims for property damage which were submitted, where defendants were unable to produce receipts and documentation of repairs allegedly performed for which numerous insurance claims were submitted and paid. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co. v. Rodco Autobody, D.Mass.1991, 138 F.R.D. 328. Attachment 249

Investors' receipt of notices from Internal Revenue Service (IRS) disallowing tax losses generated by partnerships should have informed investors of tax manager's fraud, and thus precluded investors from invoking doctrine of fraudulent concealment to equitably toll limitations period for bringing civil action under Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against tax shelter manager; reports concluded that “partnerships had failed to show their transactions were genuine.” 131 Maine Street Associates v. Manko, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2002, 54 Fed.Appx. 507, 2002 WL 31868146, Unreported. Limitation Of Actions 104(1)

Under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), an association in fact enterprise exists if the plaintiff can show that its various associates function as a continuing unit; for an association of individuals to constitute an enterprise, the individuals must share a common purpose to engage in a particular fraudulent course of conduct and work together to achieve such purposes. Feinberg v. Katz, S.D.N.Y.2002, 2002 WL 1751135, Unreported. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

156. Gambling, pattern of racketeering

Evidence that defendant engaged in several card games over a 19-month period and followed an easily recogniz- able pattern, including junkets to Nevada, private card games in his hotel suite, the presence of shills, and the use of a “cold deck” and other sleight-of-hand cheating techniques was sufficient to show a “pattern of racketeering activity.” U. S. v. Morris, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1976, 532 F.2d 436. Gaming 98(1)

157. Harassment, pattern of racketeering

Employee who sued her employer under RICO for allegedly trying to extort sexual favors from employee by threatening her financial prospects could establish “pattern” of racketeering activity, even if she alleged only one predicate act; while employer's acts of harassment all shared one common purpose, i.e., sex, his conduct would have been capable of endless repetition, at least in theory. Sharpe v. Kelley, D.Mass.1993, 835 F.Supp. 33.

Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

158. Illegal activity, pattern of racketeering

Mere fact that operation is illegal does not render it a pattern of racketeering activity. McEvoy Travel Bureau, Inc. v. Heritage Travel, Inc., C.A.1 (Mass.) 1990, 904 F.2d 786, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 536, 498 U.S. 992, 112 L.Ed.2d 546. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

RICO plaintiff must establish that defendant violated statute, which includes that defendant participated in pattern of racketeering activity, and that plaintiff sustained injury to business or property. Jacobsohn v. Marks, N.D.Ill.1993, 818 F.Supp. 1187. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25; Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 59

“Illegal acts” within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, can be civil or criminal. Ferdinand Drexel Inv. Co., Inc. v. Alibert, E.D.Pa.1989, 723 F.Supp. 313, affirmed 904 F.2d 694, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 154, 498 U.S. 856, 112 L.Ed.2d 120. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 6

159. Insurance, pattern of racketeering

Evidence established “pattern” of racketeering activity manifesting relatedness and continuity by individual defendant associated with enterprise existing among liability insurance purchase group and its affiliated service companies operating as continuing business unit, for purposes of parent corporation's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against the individual for failing to properly forward premiums that had been paid to insure health maintenance organizations (HMOs) owned or managed by parent's subsidiary. United HealthCare Corp. v. American Trade Ins. Co., Ltd., C.A.8 (Minn.) 1996, 88 F.3d 563. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Insurance agent's sale of millions of dollars worth of insurance policies to scores of individual clients throughout the country by means of a fraudulent promotion whereby the defendants falsely represented that the potential investors could completely avoid payment of any future income taxes, which activities were carried out over the course of several years, was sufficient evidence of a “pattern of racketeering activity,” to allow finding of violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) conviction. Hofstetter v. Fletcher, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1988, 905 F.2d 897. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Insurance company and agent did not engage in any “pattern of racketeering activity” actionable under RICO when, in order to induce partnership into purchasing life insurance policies on partners, agent allegedly made three distinct fraudulent representations through use of mails and wires. Creative Bath Products, Inc. v. Con- necticut General Life Ins. Co., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1988, 837 F.2d 561, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 3241, 492 U.S. 918, 106 L.Ed.2d 588. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Insured's scheme which involved mailing of false statements of value of insured goods and false proof of loss did not amount to a pattern of racketeering for RICO purposes where there was nothing to indicate a threat of

continuing criminal activity beyond the goal of inducing insurer to pay false insurance claim. Albany Ins. Co. v. Esses, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1987, 831 F.2d 41. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Plaintiffs asserting that insurer and sales agents violated federal mail and wire fraud statutes in connection with their alleged scheme to defraud senior citizens into purchasing deferred annuities that were inappropriate for them failed to state claim under provision of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) proscribing use or investment of income from pattern of racketeering activity to acquire interest in, establish, or operate enterprise, despite plaintiffs' contention that allegation that defendants used proceeds from fraudulent scheme to establish and/or operate enterprise, absent allegation of separate investment injury. In re National Western Life Ins. Deferred Annuities Litigation, S.D.Cal.2006, 467 F.Supp.2d 1071. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Closed-ended scheme lasting only a few months did not satisfy RICO's continuity requirement; president and vice president of business alleged that individuals developed plan to cancel unprofitable small welfare benefit plans and in so doing mailed cancellation notice, mailed final insurance bill, placed one interstate telephone call to discuss cancellation and later affected one mailing and one additional interstate telephone call to deny allegations of wrongdoing. Robinson v. Hawkins, E.D.Mo.1996, 942 F.Supp. 1234. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Insurer failed to satisfy continuity requirement for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) claim against insured and brokers for participation in scheme to induce it to issue insurance based on inaccurate or false information where predicate acts of mail or wire fraud all occurred within discrete seven-month period and defendants' alleged machinations did not support inference of continued criminal conduct or inference of possible repetition. Ocaso, S.A., Compania De Seguros Y Reaseguros v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Author- ity, D.Puerto Rico 1996, 915 F.Supp. 1244. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Insurers' complaint alleged sufficient facts that, if proven, would establish “open-ended” continuity of predicate acts of misrepresentation by trucking company, its officers and its insurance agent in obtaining and maintaining two successive property and casualty policies issued to company by the insurers, so as to show pattern of racketeering activity necessary to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); insurers alleged not just that defendants fraudulently obtained first policy, but that they continued making misrepresentations during life of that policy and repeated same misrepresentations in connection with second policy. Seneca Ins. Co. v. Commercial Transp., Inc., M.D.Pa.1995, 906 F.Supp. 239. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Insured suing insurer satisfied Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) requirement of participation in a “pattern” of criminal activity, for purposes of stating a cause of action; insured claimed that insurer knowingly misrepresented availability of benefits for “soft tissue” injuries arising out of automobile accidents while intending to limit or decline payment for benefits, and that insurer collaborated with an insurance claim auditor to reduce or refuse payments for such injuries. Brownell v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., E.D.Pa.1991, 757 F.Supp. 526. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) plaintiffs claiming that defendants participated and conspired in fraudulent scheme instituted by insurance company to deny coverage, delay settlement and force litigation of personal injury claim failed to allege requisite “pattern”; complaint basically described single transaction, i.e., settlement of particular personal injury claim, even though transaction was accomplished in series of steps. Curtis v. Duffy, D.Mass.1990, 742 F.Supp. 34. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Clinic's RICO claim against its former physician employee and his new health care organization, for allegedly advising clinic's former obstetric patients that clinic had billed them for amounts in excess of amount reasonable for services provided and advising them not to pay full amounts charged, satisfied “pattern” requirement by alleging that patients made reduced payments to clinic over period of at least seven months; each time former clinic patient paid only portion of amount billed plaintiff suffered new injury. Hinsdale Women's Clinic, S.C. v. Women's Health Care of Hinsdale, N.D.Ill.1988, 690 F.Supp. 658. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 29

Connotations of “pattern of racketeering activity,” as that phrase is used in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, were not satisfied by proof that two or more predicate acts of fraud were committed in effectuating purchase of single insurance policy. UST Capital Corp. v. Charter Nat. Life Ins. Co., D.Mass.1986, 684 F.Supp. 757. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Two letters mailed by insurer denying insured's claim were not sufficiently differentiated to establish “pattern of racketeering activity” necessary to insured's civil action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act where second letter was distinguishable from first only in name of addressee and supplemental information given, but basic substance of letter did not change and where letters were mailed within six weeks of one another. Grabowski v. Agricultural Ins. Co., E.D.Pa.1986, 646 F.Supp. 841. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 31

Because insured failed to establish any other past or present criminal activities of fire insurer, it failed to show pattern of racketeering activities, and single isolated event of policy dispute, even though allegedly consisting of more than one fraudulent act, was not sufficient to show pattern of racketeering. Rich Maid Kitchens, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., E.D.Pa.1986, 641 F.Supp. 297, affirmed 833 F.2d 307. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Annual mailing of billing statements and policy renewals, for policy on garage, which insurer did not cover based on business purposes exclusion in policy, constituted ministerial acts performed in execution of single unified transaction in which insured obtained coverage, amounted to single fraudulent transaction, and, therefore, did not constitute “pattern of racketeering activity” required to establish violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Wright v. Everett Cash Mut. Ins. Co., W.D.Pa.1986, 637 F.Supp. 155. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Two instances in which insurer refused to pay proceeds of life insurance policy was insufficient to establish pattern of fraudulent conduct to constitute violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). McLaughlin v. American Intern. Life Assur. Co. of New York, N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.1992, 580 N.Y.S.2d

763, 181 A.D.2d 444. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

160. Mail and wire fraud, pattern of racketeering--Generally

Plaintiff could not establish pattern of civil racketeering activity essential to civil Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim absent showing of predicate act of mail fraud. Demerath Land Co. v. Sparr, C.A.8 (Neb.) 1995, 48 F.3d 353, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

Owner of cable TV operations failed to establish pattern of racketeering activity by investors so as to support civil RICO claim based upon mail and wire fraud; although cable TV owner identified numerous communications by mail or telephone, he failed to allege scheme to defraud and did not specify in what respect communications were fraudulent or how they were used in furtherance of scheme to defraud. Manion v. Freund, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1992, 967 F.2d 1183, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Defendant's mail fraud violations and fact that they were strung together by objective of making money at expense of bondholders were sufficient to satisfy continuity and relatedness requirements of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) pattern. Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co. of Illinois, C.A.5 (La.) 1991, 946 F.2d 1160, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 1944, 504 U.S. 911, 118 L.Ed.2d 549. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Evidence supported verdict against founder of telemarketing venture in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) cause of action; there was evidence that founder directly or indirectly participated in submission of hundreds of fraudulent credit card charges by telemarketing venture, each constituting a separate act of wire or mail fraud, many of charges originated from other telemarketing ventures which were associated with founder in some capacity, and evidence established that the activities extended over lengthy period of time and presented threat of continuing illegal activity. First Nat. Bank and Trust Co. v. Hollingsworth, C.A.8 (Ark.) 1991, 931 F.2d 1295. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Two or more acts of mail fraud that are related and continuous or pose threat of continuity can support conviction under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. U.S. v. Alkins, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1991, 925 F.2d 541. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 28

Alleged predicate acts of wire and mail fraud committed by attorneys in course of representing clients in personal injury and medical malpractice action, which allegedly prevented clients from discovering facts which would have led them to dismiss attorneys, did not have sufficient “continuity” or “relationship” to constitute RICO “pattern,” where predicate acts occurred over short period of time and did not injure any parties other than attorneys' clients in personal injury and malpractice action. Hartz v. Friedman, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1990, 919 F.2d 469. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Dealers of ceramic tile sufficiently alleged “pattern” of racketeering activity to support RICO claim against tile manufacturers, although alleged acts of mail and wire fraud pertained to single criminal episode. California Ar- chitectural Bldg. Products, Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1987, 818 F.2d 1466, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 698, 484 U.S. 1006, 98 L.Ed.2d 650, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 699, 484 U.S. 1006, 98 L.Ed.2d 650. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Defendant's convictions of mail fraud predicate acts which were based on deceptive liquor license renewal applications in successive years for same establishment were sufficient to establish pattern of racketeering activity within meaning of § 1962(c) of RICO where common purpose of criminal enterprise was to skim profits and had no obvious terminating goal or date. U.S. v. Ianniello, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1986, 808 F.2d 184, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 3229, 483 U.S. 1006, 97 L.Ed.2d 736, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 3230, 483 U.S. 1006, 97 L.Ed.2d 736, post-conviction relief dismissed , affirmed 10 F.3d 59. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Licensed chiropractor and his medical practice's allegations that insurer sent five letters in furtherance of its alleged scheme to defraud under the mail fraud statute, in a discrete seven week time period, related to only one purported deceitful act on the part of insurer, consisting of insurer's attempt to avoid paying chiropractor for treatment rendered to a patient by obtaining a sham peer review report, were insufficient to allege a threat of continuing conduct, for purposes of establishing a pattern of racketeering activity against insurer under Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Schatzberg v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., E.D.Pa.2012, 877 F.Supp.2d 232, entered 2012 WL 2864481. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Allegations by prospective adoptive parents that international adoption agency, its president, and other employees engaged in acts of mail and wire fraud to defraud them and five other prospective adoptive families by misrepresenting that they could facilitate their legal adoption of Ugandan child stated pattern of racketeering element, as required for parents to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim. Heslep v. Americans for African Adoption, Inc., N.D.W.Va.2012, 890 F.Supp.2d 671. Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations 31

Allegations by borrower that the servicer of a home loan secured by a deed of trust and an attorney engaged in a fraudulent scheme, involving mail fraud, wire fraud, and witness tampering, to misappropriate the borrower's interests and unjustifiably force the foreclosure sale of her property did not state claim for civil Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations, absent factual allegations indicating an ongoing pattern of racketeering activity against other homeowners. Busby v. Capital One, N.A., D.D.C.2011, 772 F.Supp.2d 268 . Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Plaintiffs' allegations against various real estate and mortgage companies and law firms, as well as certain officers, agents, and attorneys, arising from real estate mortgage investment scheme were insufficient to state viable Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim; plaintiffs made no indication as to who were proper RICO defendants or what exactly was RICO enterprise, and predicate acts alleged were generic violations of mail and wire fraud statutes. Smith v. Jenkins, D.Mass.2009, 626 F.Supp.2d 155. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Reliance is not a requirement in order to demonstrate mail fraud or wire fraud under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). American Medical Ass'n v. United Healthcare Corp., S.D.N.Y.2008, 588 F.Supp.2d 432. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10

Disappointed bidder for satellite launch services contract with government adequately pleaded pattern of racketeering activity by employee of successful bidder, by adequately stating claims for at least two predicate acts including wire and mail fraud, witness tampering, and obstruction of justice in connection with successful bidder's alleged use of confidential information of disappointed bidder. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Boeing Co., M.D.Fla.2005, 357 F.Supp.2d 1350. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

“Pattern of racketeering activity,” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, must consist of at least two acts of racketeering activity within ten-year period and may include any act of mail fraud indictable under federal mail fraud statute. Tribune Co. v. Purcigliotti, S.D.N.Y.1994, 869 F.Supp. 1076, affirmed 66 F.3d 12. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Subject of report that had erroneously stated that he had been convicted of felony failed to show pattern of racketeering activity, as required for Racketeer influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) conviction of reporting agency; only allegation of criminal activity, mail fraud, had involved sending of erroneous report, a single incident, and there was no indication that there would be further activity. Wiggins v. Equifax Services, Inc., D.D.C.1993, 848 F.Supp. 213. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

General partners' use of mails and interstate wires and fraud in connection with sale of securities consisting of limited partnerships were multiple predicate acts over period of four years in furtherance of fraud and constituted “pattern of racketeering activity”; relatedness was present since predicate acts had similar purposes, results, participants, or methods of commission, continuity was present since acts were committed over closed period of repeated conduct with aim of defrauding limited partners, and predicate acts were regular way of conducting business. Miltland Raleigh-Durham v. Myers, S.D.N.Y.1992, 807 F.Supp. 1025. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Independent sales representative's allegations that repeated acts of mail and wire fraud by long distance carrier and its officers “had continuity,” as demonstrated by their “repetitive and continuous false statements * * * and other fraudulent conduct” and “the fact that (carrier) has engaged in parallel conduct with its other sales representatives” did not sufficiently allege “pattern” of racketeering activity. Comwest, Inc. v. American Operator Ser- vices, Inc., C.D.Cal.1991, 765 F.Supp. 1467. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Alleged predicate acts of mail and wire fraud in connection with single bond issue over period of approximately three months did not amount to “pattern of racketeering activity”; bond issue was, at most, isolated instance of legitimate business engaging in alleged racketeering activity. Dalton v. Alston & Bird, S.D.Ill.1990, 741 F.Supp. 1322. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Alleged acts of mail and wire fraud occurring in less than one-year period did not provide continuing threat required to show pattern under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and, thus, contractor failed to allege sufficient pattern of racketeering activity to state civil RICO claim against property owner in relation to failed construction project. Newport Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., E.D.La.1990, 739 F.Supp. 1078, vacated on other grounds 941 F.2d 302, rehearing denied 946 F.2d 893, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 1175, 502 U.S. 1096, 117 L.Ed.2d 420, on remand. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Alleged mail and wire fraud committed by subsidiary bank and its president to conceal involvement in scheme to churn investor's brokerage account would not satisfy pattern element of RICO and RICO conspiracy claims as constituting concealment of racketeering fraud; investor had discovered churning, so the only possible concealment was of subsidiary bank and its president's involvement in churning scheme, and investor could not have been lulled into false sense of security once churning was discovered. Pyramid Securities, Ltd. v. International Bank, D.D.C.1989, 726 F.Supp. 1377, affirmed 924 F.2d 1114, 288 U.S.App.D.C. 157, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 85, 502 U.S. 822, 116 L.Ed.2d 57. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

Students sufficiently alleged pattern of racketeering activity in connection with school's alleged procurement of funds through allegations of numerous acts of mail fraud over two-year period, including mailing of applications for student monies on behalf of students and receipt of money intended to pay for students' educational needs. Gonzalez v. North American College of Louisiana, Inc., S.D.Tex.1988, 700 F.Supp. 362. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Where mail and/or wire fraud violations are treated by plaintiff as “predicate acts” constituting pattern of racketeering activity within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, fraud violations must be pleaded with specificity and particularity required by federal rules. Anitora Travel, Inc. v. Lapian, S.D.N.Y.1988, 677 F.Supp. 209. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Truck driver established “pattern” of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act by his employer trucking company in recruiting drivers; each mailing or wire communication in furtherance of company's recruiting of drivers, if unlawful, would have constituted an indictable offense, even if undertaken pursuant to single-fraudulent scheme. Waldo v. North American Van Lines, Inc., W.D.Pa.1987, 669 F.Supp. 722. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Single allegedly fraudulent advertising scheme implemented by numerous ministerial acts of mail and wire fraud did not constitute pattern of “racketeering activity” for purposes of civil RICO action. Franklin & Joseph, Inc. v. Continental Health Industries, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1987, 664 F.Supp. 719. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 31

Allegation of complaint under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, that series of mail and wire frauds were directed at consummating single fraud in connection with investment in oil and gas drilling prospects, did not sufficiently allege pattern of racketeering activity. Terra Resources I v. Burgin, S.D.N.Y.1987, 664 F.Supp. 82. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Allegations by seller corporation of buyer's mail and wire fraud violations in furtherance of alleged scheme to obtain confidential information from seller sufficiently established “pattern of racketeering” to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Metropolitan Intern., Inc. v. Alco Standard Corp., M.D.Pa.1986, 657 F.Supp. 627. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

General contractor's alleged predicate acts of demanding kickbacks from subcontractors working on property owners' residence and using mail and wire to communicate those demands revolved entirely around a single contract to construct a single residence over a period of less than five months; thus, property owners failed to show a pattern of racketeering and failed to state a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act cause of action. Maussner v. McCormick, W.D.N.Y.1986, 653 F.Supp. 131. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 31

Retirement trust and trustee adequately alleged sufficient acts to constitute pattern of racketeering activity where asserted acts of mail and wire fraud occurred over substantial period of time, alleged acts were in furtherance of single scheme and retirement trust was sole victim of scheme, alleged acts of mail fraud occurred when bank mailed trustee's deed and released assignment of rents and all real estate forming res of trust, which may have contributed to loss sustained because of collateral assignment of beneficial interest securing debts of beneficiaries of trust and two distinct injuries were alleged by trust. Hatherley v. Palos Bank and Trust Co., N.D.Ill.1986, 650 F.Supp. 832. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

RICO complaint failed to sufficiently allege pattern of racketeering activity, though complaint alleged numerous acts of wire, mail and securities fraud intended to induce plaintiff to invest in equity securities of two bank holding companies, where acts were all directed toward single fraudulent scheme. Kamin v. Colorado Nat. Bank of Denver, D.Colo.1986, 648 F.Supp. 52. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Shareholders in corporation failed to sufficiently allege existence of pattern of racketeering activity, for purposes of civil RICO action against other shareholders involved in scheme to seize control of corporation, where predicate acts being relied upon arose from alleged single unlawful scheme, mailing of false and misleading financial and proxy statements; multiple mailings that were part of same criminal activity did not constitute pattern of racketeering activity. Eisenberger v. Spectex Industries, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1986, 644 F.Supp. 48. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 31

“RICO pattern” was not stated by allegations that defendant induced plaintiff to give her consent to sale of seven vessels held jointly by plaintiff and defendant, with full intention of taking proceeds of sale for himself, and that defendant then did so, making multiple use of United States mails or of interstate wires in the process; plaintiff did not allege that conjunction of individual sales of each of the seven vessels formed pattern for purposes of RICO, but rather, alleged that separate activities leading up to and including the sales, which occurred simultaneously, constituted the RICO pattern. Emmanouilides v. Buckthorn, Ltd., S.D.N.Y.1986, 642 F.Supp. 964. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Alleged predicate acts of mail and wire fraud in alleged check kiting scheme constituted subdivisions of one fraudulent scheme and would not constitute “pattern of racketeering activity” required to assert private cause of

action under RICO; there were no allegations that defendants had done these activities in the past or that they were engaged in other criminal activities elsewhere. Madden v. Gluck, E.D.Mo.1986, 636 F.Supp. 463, affirmed 815 F.2d 1163, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 86, 484 U.S. 823, 98 L.Ed.2d 48. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Evidentiary submissions by buyer of money certificates revealing frequent use of mail and telephone by issuer and its president and indicating that issuer and its president operated scheme whereby they accepted money for putative investment and failed to repay money established a scheme to defraud and the mailing or transmission by wire of document or communication for purpose of executing scheme so as to satisfy requirements of mail and wife fraud statutes, thus, constituting a pattern of racketeering activity within the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Al-Kazemi v. General Acceptance & Inv. Corp., D.D.C.1986, 633 F.Supp. 540. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Alleged numerous mailings related to physicians' working with emergency medical corporation and creating or joining competing corporation to render emergency room medical services to particular hospital could not each constitute separate criminal episode due to their relation to single wrongful transaction and single injury and, therefore, they were insufficient to allege pattern of racketeering activity to support civil action under Racket- eering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Medical Emergency Service Associates (MESA) S.C. v. Foulke, N.D.Ill.1986, 633 F.Supp. 156, affirmed 844 F.2d 391. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Alleged use on several occasions of false invoices involving named customers, alleged direction that debts be written off plaintiff's books as bad-debt losses, and alleged creation of bank accounts for purposes of receiving fraudulently induced payments from customers, all involving mail and telephone transactions, demonstrated continuity and relationship sufficient to allege a pattern of racketeering activity; allegations related to more than sporadic criminal acts. United Fish Co. v. Barnes, D.Me.1986, 627 F.Supp. 732. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 31

Complaint, alleging that conspiracy existed between one construction corporation and another in unreasonable restraint of interstate trade and commerce, that mailing of bills and receipt of payments through the mails was in furtherance of that conspiracy, and that such acts of alleged mail fraud represented a “pattern of racketeering,” sufficiently alleged a “pattern of racketeering activity” by construction corporation under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(a, b). Com. of Pennsylvania v. Derry Const. Co., Inc., W.D.Pa.1985, 617 F.Supp. 940. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Even if three added kickback payments alleged in complaint involved use of mails, they still implemented same fraudulent scheme as first two mailings and that single scheme did not represent necessary “pattern of racketeering activity.” Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare, N.A. v. Inryco, Inc., N.D.Ill.1985, 615 F.Supp. 828. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Although dairy farm vendors' allegations of mail and wire fraud in connection with sale sufficiently indicated patterns of racketeering activity, in absence of specific allegation of injury or allegations which would allow

finding of injury, vendors failed to state RICO claim. Boeck v. Logan 480 Dairy Farm, S.D.Iowa 1985, 606 F.Supp. 868. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Complaint alleging that defendants committed mail fraud by mailing fraudulent investment information and investment contract itself, respectively, and that one defendant engaged in wire fraud by causing plaintiff's $100,000 investment to be wired to Mississippi from Bermuda sufficiently described a “pattern” of racketeering activity within meaning of this section. Lopez v. Richards, S.D.Miss.1984, 594 F.Supp. 488. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 31

161. ---- Continuity, mail and wire fraud, pattern of racketeering

Predicate acts of mail fraud by office of state legislator satisfied continuity requirement for pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, in light of facts that fraud took place over period of six years and threatened to repeat in future due to legislator's belief in absence of wrongdoing concerning personal use of campaign funds and acceptance of large payments from lobbyists. U.S. v. Bland- ford, C.A.6 (Ky.) 1994, 33 F.3d 685, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 1821, 514 U.S. 1095, 131 L.Ed.2d 743. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Alleged “close-ended” scheme to defraud did not demonstrate requisite continuity or threat of continuity, either by its intrinsic nature or sheer duration, to amount to “pattern” of “racketeering activity” within meaning of civil RICO statute, where activities relied upon as establishing pattern lasted and were brought to fruition with accomplishment of their limited purpose over period of only three months, during which all predicate acts of mail and wire fraud allegedly occurred and end purpose of activities was allegedly accomplished. Eastern Pub. and Advertising Inc. v. Chesapeake Pub. and Advertising, Inc., C.A.4 1990, 895 F.2d 971, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 3274, 497 U.S. 1025, 111 L.Ed.2d 784, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 65, 498 U.S. 819, 112 L.Ed.2d 39. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Bottled water distributor's allegations of one act of mail fraud by sending “dual documents” through the United States Mail and six acts of wire fraud by “verbally reiterat[ing]” the terms of the exclusive distributorship agreement and by “fraudulently” sending a wire transfer, without specifying which of the defendants was involved in the allegedly fraudulent activities, and instead with allegations that the mail fraud or wire fraud was committed by “some defendants, through” a named defendant who was distributor's agent, failed to plead fraud with particularity, with respect to wire fraud and mail fraud as predicate acts in action alleging violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Ho Myung Moolsan Co., Ltd. v. Manitou Mineral Water, Inc., S.D.N.Y.2009, 665 F.Supp.2d 239. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Debtors failed to allege a pattern of racketeering activity in connection with real estate trust set up by lender, as required to establish civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim; although debtors asserted specific fraudulent acts directed towards themselves, including three acts of mail fraud and one act of wire fraud over a period of one year, there was no assertion of ongoing fraudulent acts toward debtors or others, or that a sufficient threat of continued criminal activity or multiple schemes existed. Williams v. Equity Holding Corp., E.D.Va.2007, 498 F.Supp.2d 831. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Allegation that predicate acts, i.e., mail and wire fraud, constituted a threat of continued racketeering activity in the future because insured's attorneys and accountants, who participated in enterprise in which insured borrowed money, made loans, and obtained insurance while they provided necessary legal and financial advice, guidance, and information, continued in the same or similar lines of business established pattern of racketeering activity element, supporting credit risk insurer's claims that attorneys and accountants violated and conspired to violate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Royal Indemnity Co. v. Pepper Hamilton LLP, D.Del.2007, 479 F.Supp.2d 419. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

“Pattern of racketeering” element of civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim was established by contractor's acts in violation of mail fraud statute by regularly mailing invoices to client in furtherance of fraudulent scheme, each of which falsely attested to his compliance with the prevailing wage laws, and by receiving checks from client via the mail that represented the fruits of his fraudulent acts. System Management, Inc. v. Loiselle, D.Mass.2001, 138 F.Supp.2d 78, reversed 303 F.3d 100. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Two predicate acts of mail fraud over eight-month period, involving only one scheme to divest plaintiffs of their investment capital or profits, were not of sufficient continuity over closed period to support claim under Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), even though number of victims weighed in favor of finding continuity. Bajorat v. Columbia-Breckenridge Development Corp., N.D.Ill.1996, 944 F.Supp. 1371. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Alleged acts of mail fraud committed by alleged infringer when it filed applications for two patents without revealing material prior art and sent amendment to prior application without disclosing patentee's patent was not pattern of racketeering activity necessary to support patentee's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim; alleged predicate acts did not amount to long-term criminal activity occurring in closed time period and did not pose threat of continuing into future. Fototec Intern. Corp. v. Polaroid Corp., N.D.Ga.1995, 889 F.Supp. 1518, reconsideration denied 1996 WL 263651. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Series of predicate acts of mail and wire fraud by television network conducting undercover investigation of retail food supermarket chain that occurred over six month span was not long-term criminal conduct as would have constituted closed continuity in pattern of racketeering activity as required to establish violation of Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., M.D.N.C.1995, 887 F.Supp. 811. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Master franchisee asserting Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) claim against franchisor and certain of its officers or directors failed to allege continuity required to satisfy the RICO pattern requirement where franchisee alleged isolated acts of alleged wire or mail fraud which occurred, at the longest, over 18-month period and acts complained of had “run their course” in that they ended with franchisor's purported failure to cure breach of agreement before it filed for bankruptcy protection. Gotham Print, Inc. v. American Speedy Printing Centers, Inc., E.D.Mich.1994, 863 F.Supp. 447. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 29

Alleged mail fraud on four occasions over less than three months in connection with termination of sales representatives' contracts and conversion to in-house sales staff involved no threat of continued criminal activity and did not satisfy continuity element of pattern requirement. VSA v. Von Weise Gear Co., E.D.Mo.1991, 769 F.Supp. 1080. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Employer did not engage in pattern of racketeering activity within meaning of RICO by selling one of its divi- sions to purchaser, depriving employees of more favorable severance benefits; predicate acts of mail fraud alleged by plaintiffs did not suggest continuing criminal activity. Cefali v. Buffalo Brass Co., Inc., W.D.N.Y.1986, 653 F.Supp. 263. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Alleged scheme involving single real estate transaction with evidence of mail and wire fraud, all allegedly relating to goal of depriving plaintiff of opportunity to buy building, did not satisfy “continuity” requirement for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act action. Sammon v. Watchung Hills Bank for Sav., N.J.Super.L.1992, 611 A.2d 674, 259 N.J.Super. 124. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 104

162. ---- Related or separate acts, mail and wire fraud, pattern of racketeering

Complaint alleging numerous acts of mail fraud related to common purpose of causing default on loans satisfied relatedness requirement for alleging pattern of racketeering activity under RICO. Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidel- cor, Inc., C.A.3 (Pa.) 1991, 926 F.2d 1406, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 2839, 501 U.S. 1222, 115 L.Ed.2d 1007. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Alleged fraudulent mailings which numbered at least 95 and which were part of same fraudulent scheme to obtain loans were sufficiently related to constitute racketeering activity for purposes of RICO. Fleet Credit Corp. v. Sion, C.A.1 (R.I.) 1990, 893 F.2d 441. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

For purposes of “relationship” requirement for federal RICO liability, former savings and loan president's alleged predicate acts of mail fraud met definition of relationship; all letters which he wrote were part of scheme that victimized savings and loan and enriched president. Sun Sav. and Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1987, 825 F.2d 187. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Predicate acts of mail and wire fraud which concerned fraudulent miscertification of crude oil tiers were sufficiently related to the defendant's enterprise of selling crude oil to support a conviction under this chapter. U. S. v. Zang, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1982, 703 F.2d 1186, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 103, 464 U.S. 828, 78 L.Ed.2d 107. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 49

Shipper plausibly alleged predicate acts of mail and/or wire fraud with sufficient particularity to state a claim for violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against carrier, its parent corporation, and its sister subsidiary, where it specified numerous instances of fraudulent upweighting and improper assessment of Canadian Customs charges, specifying their date and nature, and it alleged facts giving rise to a strong inference of intent, including that defendants had both motive, profit, and opportunity, control of billing

technology, to perpetrate the alleged frauds. U1IT4less, Inc. v. FedEx Corp., S.D.N.Y.2012, 896 F.Supp.2d 275. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) did not take Palestinian property to create “buffer zones,” as would support Hobbs Act extortion claim brought by family of peace activist who was run over and killed by a military bulldozer in the Gaza Strip, and a number of Palestinians who lived in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, against manufacturer of bulldozers used by the IDF to destroy homes of Palestinians. Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., W.D.Wash.2005, 403 F.Supp.2d 1019, affirmed 503 F.3d 974. Torts 436

Relationship prong for finding pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiz- ations Act (RICO) was established by allegations in lenders' complaint against loan broker and its officer; lenders alleged mail fraud consisting of transmission of false and misleading financial statements in order to induce four lenders to grant four loans to same borrowers. A.I. Credit Corp. v. Hartford Computer Group, Inc., N.D.Ill.1994, 847 F.Supp. 588. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Alleged acts of mail and wire fraud committed by insureds for purpose of communicating fraudulent underreporting of gross receipts interstate, thereby defrauding insurer of earned premiums due under policies, satisfied requisite relatedness requirement so as to establish pattern of racketeering activity; each act was alleged as separate violation of mail and wire fraud statutes and therefore, they were considered distinct predicate acts, and they were related, as they shared common purpose, which was to defraud insurer of earned premiums due under policies, and same participants and same victim. Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Value Rent-A-Car Inc., S.D.Fla.1992, 814 F.Supp. 1084. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Relatedness of predicate acts for indictment for violations of Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute [18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c, d)], existed where participants were the same, three wire-fraud acts had single victim, and acts had same purpose. Allington v. Carpenter, C.D.Cal.1985, 619 F.Supp. 474. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 28

163. Merger of offenses, pattern of racketeering

Defendant committed two predicate acts, for purposes of conspiracy to violate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) case, by participating in a particular drug importation transaction, and by piloting aircraft in interstate flight to bring other participants to transaction site, even though defendant claimed that his act of introducing the participants to ring leader did “double duty” in both establishing his connection to transaction and in constituting the overt act necessary to cause a Travel Act violation, and that the offenses were con- sequently merged. U.S. v. Gonzalez, C.A.11 (Ala.) 1991, 921 F.2d 1530, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 178, 502 U.S. 860, 116 L.Ed.2d 140, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 96, 502 U.S. 827, 116 L.Ed.2d 68. Conspiracy 28(3)

Claims that defendant Mexican bank engaged in multiple acts of extortion and attempted extortion in connection with dispute over property located in Mexico were improper attempts to separate multiple acts in furtherance of the same alleged scheme into pattern of multiple predicate acts for purposes of alleging claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Dtex, LLC v. BBVA Bancomer, S.A., D.S.C.2005, 405

F.Supp.2d 639, affirmed 214 Fed.Appx. 286, 2007 WL 173711. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 27

164. Mergers, pattern of racketeering

Failed merger transaction was single act which did not satisfy pattern requirement for civil claim under Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, even if defendants engaged in number of acts within context of failed merger. Newman v. Comprehensive Care Corp., D.Or.1992, 794 F.Supp. 1513. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

165. Murder, pattern of racketeering

Acts of racketeering activity allegedly involving murders and murder conspiracy satisfied pattern requirement of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where many of same defendants were charged with murders and conspiracy to murder as well as several other racketeering acts alleged in indictment, and evidence indicated that murders were intended to maintain discipline within narcotics trafficking network so as to constitute threat of continuing racketeering activity. U.S. v. Simmons, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1991, 923 F.2d 934, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 2018, 500 U.S. 919, 114 L.Ed.2d 104, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 383, 502 U.S. 943, 116 L.Ed.2d 334, post-conviction relief denied , habeas corpus denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 28

Nearly simultaneous murders of three individuals to facilitate change in leadership of organized crime family satisfied RICO's “pattern” requirement, where nature of RICO enterprise made it clear beyond peradventure that there was threat of continuing racketeering activity. U.S. v. Indelicato, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1989, 865 F.2d 1370, on remand 868 F.2d 524, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 56, 493 U.S. 811, 107 L.Ed.2d 24. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Murders of government's principal witness and of a bystander had sufficient nexus with pornography enterprise to be properly charged under this chapter. U. S. v. Thevis, C.A.5 (Ga.) 1982, 665 F.2d 616, rehearing denied 671 F.2d 1379, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 2300, 456 U.S. 1008, 73 L.Ed.2d 1303, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 3489, 458 U.S. 1109, 73 L.Ed.2d 1370, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 57, 459 U.S. 825, 74 L.Ed.2d 61. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 49

“Pattern of racketeering activity,” within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, included two alleged acts of attempted murder by husband of incompetent, where husband's alleged motive was to get incompetent's money and marry another woman. von Bulow by Auersperg v. von Bulow, S.D.N.Y.1986, 634 F.Supp. 1284, on reargument. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

166. Narcotics offenses, pattern of racketeering

Defendant's furnishing of cocaine on two occasions over three-month period were predicate acts showing relationship and indicating continuity for purposes of establishing RICO “pattern of racketeering activity”; cocaine distributing operation to which sales were made had been in existence for some time, and buyer from operation

had promised to return and purchase more cocaine from defendant. U.S. v. Church, C.A.11 (Ga.) 1992, 955 F.2d 688, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 233, 506 U.S. 881, 121 L.Ed.2d 169. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Evidence that defendant possessed diazepam with intent to distribute on two separate occasions and obtained the drug from the same distributors each time was sufficient to establish “pattern of racketeering activity” pursuant to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); defendant's acts were part of long-term relationship with organization that existed for criminal purpose. U.S. v. Link, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1991, 921 F.2d 1523, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 2273, 500 U.S. 958, 114 L.Ed.2d 724, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 106, 502 U.S. 831, 116 L.Ed.2d 76, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 157, 502 U.S. 851, 116 L.Ed.2d 122. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 95

Defendant's acts of conspiracy to distribute narcotic and of interstate travel in aid of conspiracy to distribute were sufficiently distinct to constitute the two predicate acts needed to support RICO charge, where interstate travel charge related to defendant's November heroin distribution, and conspiracy to distribute charge covered a much broader time frame and encompassed another sale, as well as other conspiratorial activities. U.S. v. John- son, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1990, 911 F.2d 1394, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 761, 498 U.S. 1050, 112 L.Ed.2d 781. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 15; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 21

Purchasers of controlled substances engaged in pattern of activity as required for prosecution under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, despite claim that defendants only committed single act of paying for one shipment of marijuana; payment was one of series of acts, including demand for repayment of money or delivery of marijuana to replace lost shipment which by nature “projected into the future with a threat of repetition.” U.S. v. Hobson, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1990, 893 F.2d 1267, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 384, 498 U.S. 957, 112 L.Ed.2d 395. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Predicate acts of racketeering charged in indictment and proven at trial satisfied requirements of RICO statute as to “pattern” requirement, where acts in question were two important aspects of large scale, continuous drug enterprise wherein defendants had planned additional narcotics ventures and even taken steps toward an additional venture. U.S. v. Benevento, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1987, 836 F.2d 60, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 2035, 486 U.S. 1043, 100 L.Ed.2d 620, denial of post-conviction relief affirmed 963 F.2d 1522. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

167. Number of acts, pattern of racketeering--Generally

A pattern of racketeering activity under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act is not established merely by proving two predicate acts. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., U.S.Minn.1989, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 492 U.S. 229, 106 L.Ed.2d 195, on remand 734 F.Supp. 879. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 25

Six instances of chairman of board of trustees of health and welfare and pension funds misappropriating fund

money over period of approximately two and one-half months to pay for legal defense implicitly involved threat of continuity sufficient to establish pattern of racketeering activity under RICO, even though chairman was removed from board when jury returned verdict of guilty; chairman was willing to disregard established board procedures for disbursement of checks, had control over funds and union as its president, made misrepresentations to board regarding advanced monies, and shopped for legal opinion consistent with objectives of misappropriating the money. U.S. v. Busacca, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1991, 936 F.2d 232, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 595, 502 U.S. 985, 116 L.Ed.2d 619. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

No defendant can be liable under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) unless he participated in two or more predicate offenses sufficient to constitute pattern of racketeering activity, although this participation need not be direct. Banks v. Wolk, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1990, 918 F.2d 418, on remand. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 26

Under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, pattern of racketeering activity did not require multiple episodes; two related predicate acts could suffice to establish pattern; clarifying Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S.Ct. 3275, 473 U.S. 479, 87 L.Ed.2d 346; rejecting Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir.). Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1987, 820 F.2d 46, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 698, 484 U.S. 1005, 98 L.Ed.2d 650, rehearing denied 108 S.Ct. 1588, 485 U.S. 1030, 99 L.Ed.2d 903. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

To be convicted of having conducted affairs of enterprise affecting interstate commerce through pattern of racketeering activity, evidence must show that defendant participated in affairs of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity, which requires commission of at least two predicate crimes. U. S. v. Welch, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1981, 656 F.2d 1039, rehearing denied 663 F.2d 101, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1767, 456 U.S. 915, 72 L.Ed.2d 173, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1768, 456 U.S. 915, 72 L.Ed.2d 173. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 50

A pattern of racketeering within this chapter may be established by showing only two acts of racketeering activity. U. S. v. Aleman, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1979, 609 F.2d 298, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 1345, 445 U.S. 946, 63 L.Ed.2d 780. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

“Pattern of racketeering activity” is at least two acts of racketeering activity committed within ten-year time period that are related and amount to or pose threat of continued criminal activity. LaFlamboy v. Landek, N.D.Ill.2008, 587 F.Supp.2d 914. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Although only two predicate acts must be present to constitute a pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), a showing of more than two acts will not always suffice to form a pattern; moreover, plaintiffs must show that the predicate acts are related, and that they amount to, or pose a threat of, continuing criminal activity. Moore v. Guesno, W.D.N.Y.2007, 485 F.Supp.2d 300, affirmed 301 Fed.Appx. 17, 2008 WL 5082982. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26; Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Former client's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim failed to demonstrate his alleged injuries derived from acts by attorney that sufficiently established a pattern of racketeering activity; only claim of unlawful conduct by attorney related to his alleged failure to disclose a conflict of interest in having represented client as well as client's sisters in connection with somewhat related criminal proceedings, while inducing client to plead guilty to allegedly false accusations by sisters, and client's complaint contained nothing more than conclusory assertion that attorney on two occasions communicated with government agents by mail and facsimile about matters pertaining to client. Tenamee v. Schmukler, S.D.N.Y.2006, 438 F.Supp.2d 438. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Because single racketeering act cannot, by definition, constitute “pattern,” that single racketeering act may not be tried alone under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). U.S. v. Urso, E.D.N.Y.2005, 369 F.Supp.2d 254. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

Although at least two racketeering acts are necessary to make pattern as will establish violation of Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), nominal showing of only two acts will rarely suffice, and plaintiff to establish pattern must show that predicate acts are related and continuous. Resolution Trust Corp. v. S & K Chevrolet, C.D.Ill.1994, 868 F.Supp. 1047. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Plaintiff must demonstrate conduct of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity that must include at least two racketeering acts to establish violation of statute prohibiting person employed by enterprise engaged in interstate or foreign commerce from participating in conduct of such enterprise's affairs through pattern of racketeering activity. Wiselman v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., M.D.Fla.1993, 835 F.Supp. 1398. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

Since focus of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) provision prohibiting person from conducting enterprise's affairs through pattern of racketeering activity is on individual pattern of racketeering engaged in by defendant rather than collective activities of enterprise, RICO claim under that provision must allege that each defendant committed two or more predicate acts. Moeller v. Zaccaria, S.D.N.Y.1993, 831 F.Supp. 1046. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

Pattern of racketeering activity requires more than merely two predicate acts for purposes of Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Select Creations, Inc. v. Paliafito America, Inc., E.D.Wis.1992, 828 F.Supp. 1301. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

Where multiple predicate acts exist only because transaction is a complicated one requiring many separate statements, the number and variety of predicate acts factor for determining whether there is pattern of racketeering is not satisfied. Pucci v. Litwin, N.D.Ill.1993, 828 F.Supp. 1285. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

To satisfy “pattern of racketeering activity” requirement for assertion of federal RICO claim, plaintiff must show that defendant engaged in at least two predicate acts of racketeering activity. Abrams & Wofsy v. Renais- sance Inv. Corp., N.D.Ga.1993, 820 F.Supp. 1519. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

In order to sufficiently plead relationship prong of pattern requirement, RICO plaintiff must first allege that at least two acts of racketeering were committed. W.E. Darin Const. Enterprises, Inc. v. Detroit Coke Co., W.D.N.Y.1993, 814 F.Supp. 325. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

In order to make out a RICO claim based on conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, the government must prove that each defendant committed at least two acts in furtherance of the RICO enterprise, and those are known as the “predicate acts.” U.S. v. Local 1804-1, Intern. Longshoremen's Ass'n, S.D.N.Y.1993, 812 F.Supp. 1303, modified 831 F.Supp. 167, affirmed 52 F.3d 1173, on remand 1996 WL 22377, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 934, 516 U.S. 1122, 133 L.Ed.2d 861. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 26

Plaintiff must allege that defendant agreed to commit at least two predicate acts of racketeering to sustain civil RICO claim. Trautz v. Weisman, S.D.N.Y.1992, 809 F.Supp. 239. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 26

Minimum requirement under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) for establishing a pattern is the existence of at least two acts of racketeering within a ten-year period. Koal Industries Corp. v. Asland, S.A., S.D.N.Y.1992, 808 F.Supp. 1143. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

“Pattern of racketeering activity” as element of RICO claim requires plaintiffs to show that defendants committed at least two predicate acts that were among enumerated offenses such as mail and wire fraud, extortion, extortionate credit transactions, or Travel Act violations. Center Cadillac, Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. of New York, S.D.N.Y.1992, 808 F.Supp. 213, affirmed 99 F.3d 401. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

To establish liability under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), plaintiff must show that defendant, through commission of two or more acts constituting pattern of racketeering activity, directly or indirectly invested in, or maintained interest in, or participated in enterprise activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce. Purgess v. Sharrock, S.D.N.Y.1992, 806 F.Supp. 1102, supplemented. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 3

“Pattern of racketeering activity” which RICO plaintiff must establish requires commission of at least two specific predicate acts. Jackson v. Radcliffe, S.D.Tex.1992, 795 F.Supp. 197. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

Putative finders seeking fee in connection with corporate acquisition did not state cause of action against of-

ficers of acquired company who lived and worked in England, under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiz- ations Act (RICO); officers had not performed necessary two predicate acts and predicate acts of fraud committed by other parties were not properly attributed to officers. Deem v. Lockheed Corp., S.D.N.Y.1989, 749 F.Supp. 1230, reargument denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

Attorneys' alleged involvement in interstate transportation and/or receipt of stolen deed, even if deed was type of property covered by federal statutes proscribing that conduct, was only one predicate act and, therefore, grandchildren failed to allege pattern of racketeering activity as element of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act (RICO) claim. Firestone v. Galbreath, S.D.Ohio 1990, 747 F.Supp. 1556, affirmed in part 976 F.2d 279, rehearing denied , certified question answered 616 N.E.2d 202, 67 Ohio St.3d 87, answer to certified question conformed to 25 F.3d 323, on remand 895 F.Supp. 917. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

“Pattern of racketeering activity” requires commission of at least two predicate acts in manner that shows both relationship and continuity. Steco, Inc. v. S & T Mfg., Inc., E.D.Pa.1990, 745 F.Supp. 305. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

In order for a plaintiff to validly plead a Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) cause of action, plaintiff must allege more than one racketeering activity and the threat of continuing activity. Mery v. Uni- versal Sav. Ass'n, S.D.Tex.1990, 737 F.Supp. 1000. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 70

RICO complaint which alleged involvement of defendants in three separate predicate acts adequately stated cause of action. Babst v. Morgan Keegan & Co., E.D.La.1988, 687 F.Supp. 255. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 26

Two or more related acts which arise out of same transaction may establish pattern of racketeering for purposes of RICO. Sheridan v. Weinberger, M.D.Pa.1987, 687 F.Supp. 152. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 25

Defendants have engaged in “pattern” of racketeering activity, within meaning of civil RICO statute, where they have engaged in multiple episodes of such activity evincing a regular, ongoing course of conduct. MHC, Inc. v. International Union, United Mine Workers of America, E.D.Ky.1988, 685 F.Supp. 1370. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

For “pattern of racketeering” to exist under RICO, all that is required is that defendant commit at least two acts of racketeering, or “predicate acts,” related to common purpose of enterprise. U.S. v. Bonanno Organized Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra, E.D.N.Y.1988, 683 F.Supp. 1411, affirmed 879 F.2d 20. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

To properly allege Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act violation, plaintiff must allege at least two acts of racketeering activity with enough specificity to show there is probable cause that defendant commit-

ted crimes charged. Joyner v. Abbott Laboratories, E.D.N.C.1987, 674 F.Supp. 185. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Pattern of racketeering activities sufficient for private civil RICO action to lie is established by showing that party has committed two indictable acts. Banco de Desarrollo Agropecuario, S.A. v. Gibbs, S.D.Fla.1986, 640 F.Supp. 1168. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

As long as more than one racketeering activity is sufficiently alleged, a “pattern” may exist for RICO even if the racketeering activities contemplate a single scheme. Tryco Trucking Co., Inc. v. Belk Stores Services, Inc., W.D.N.C.1986, 634 F.Supp. 1327. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Defendant must participate in affairs of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity in order to be liable in civil matter under Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute, which requires at least two acts which are indictable under certain federal criminal statutes. Frankart Distributors, Inc. v. RMR Advertising, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1986, 632 F.Supp. 1198. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, pattern of racketeering activity requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, last of which occurred within ten years of a prior act of racketeering. U.S. v. Bren- nan, E.D.N.Y.1986, 629 F.Supp. 283, affirmed 798 F.2d 581, habeas corpus granted 685 F.Supp. 883, affirmed 867 F.2d 111, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 1750, 490 U.S. 1022, 104 L.Ed.2d 187. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 29

“Pattern of racketeering activity” requisite to showing of violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act required at least two acts of racketeering activity; thus, where one of two alleged criminal offenses relied upon by plaintiff claiming securities fraud was found to have no basis in fact, RICO count of his complaint was subject to dismissal. Etshokin v. Texasgulf, Inc., N.D.Ill.1984, 612 F.Supp. 1212. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 32

In civil RICO action, pattern of racketeering activity has been sufficiently established for purposes of motion to dismiss if plaintiff has alleged that defendants are guilty of two acts of racketeering activity. Nunes v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., D.C.Md.1985, 609 F.Supp. 1055. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 26

Term “pattern of racketeering activity” as used in this chapter requiring proof of such pattern as element of offense means that showing of at least two separate instances of racketeering activity is required. U. S. v. Fru- mento, E.D.Pa.1976, 409 F.Supp. 136, affirmed 563 F.2d 1083, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 1256, 434 U.S. 1072, 55 L.Ed.2d 775, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 1258, 434 U.S. 1072, 55 L.Ed.2d 776. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 26

Former employee failed to plead more than one predicate act in support of her Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against physician and medical group, arising from employer's denial of long-

term disability insurance benefits, and thus failed to show a pattern of racketeering activity; plaintiff alleged only one act, physician's transmission of letter indicating that employee was not disabled, in terms of time, parties, and method. Morrison v. Steiman, S.D.Ohio 2002, 2002 WL 31409860, Unreported. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 26

168. ---- Bribery, number of acts, pattern of racketeering

Defendant engaged in two distinct acts of bribery which could be separately counted for purpose of proving Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act pattern, even though bribes were offered by defendant simultaneously, where each bribe sought particular service from particular party. U.S. v. Kaplan, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1989, 886 F.2d 536, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 1127, 493 U.S. 1076, 107 L.Ed.2d 1033. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

Three acts of bribery make pattern of racketeering activity within scope of this chapter. U. S. v. Davis, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1978, 576 F.2d 1065, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 119, 439 U.S. 836, 58 L.Ed.2d 132. Bribery 1(1)

Single, ongoing scheme by city official to defraud by obtaining bribes or kickbacks, which involved series of unlawful acts, was “pattern of racketeering activity,” within scope of this chapter and it was not necessary to establish two or more totally independent criminal acts. U. S. v. Salvitti, E.D.Pa.1978, 451 F.Supp. 195, affirmed 588 F.2d 822, affirmed 588 F.2d 824. Bribery 1(1)

169. ---- Conspiracy, number of acts, pattern of racketeering

Single conviction for conspiracy to distribute heroin was insufficient to support conviction for conspiracy to commit racketeering. U.S. v. Sanders, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1991, 929 F.2d 1466, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 143, 502 U.S. 846, 116 L.Ed.2d 109, denial of post-conviction relief affirmed 91 F.3d 160. Conspiracy 47(3.1)

To sustain charges under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Government was required to prove that defendant agreed to participate in racketeering acts through at least two predicate crimes, but was not required to prove that defendant conspired directly with other conspirators. U.S. v. Alkins, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1991, 925 F.2d 541. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 26

Charges under this chapter against defendant against whom only one predicate act was properly charged would be dismissed for failure to satisfy requirement of par. (5) of this section that a “pattern of racketeering” consist of at least two acts of racketeering, notwithstanding government's argument that it was sufficient that defendant be found to have conspired with others to engage through an enterprise in a pattern of racketeering consisting of predicate acts committed by others. U.S. v. Ruggiero, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1984, 726 F.2d 913, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 118, 469 U.S. 831, 83 L.Ed.2d 60. Commerce 82.6

Former federal employee alleging he was terminated in retaliation for his whistle-blowing activities failed to allege pattern of racketeering activity arising out of commission of two or more specified predicate acts, as re-

quired to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy claim against United States. Gibbs v. U.S., M.D.Fla.2012, 865 F.Supp.2d 1127, affirmed 517 Fed.Appx. 664, 2013 WL 1668244. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 26

Property owner's claim that city officials conspired to impose arbitrary and bogus requirements on parcels of land adjacent to property owned by mayor as part of scheme to make them amenable to selling their land so that all parcels could be assembled and sold for development failed to plead pattern of racketeering activity required to establish claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where complaint alleged only one scheme, and there was no potential to extend it to other person or entities. Ferluga v. Eickhoff, D.Kan.2006, 408 F.Supp.2d 1153. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27; Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 28

To determine whether there is pattern of racketeering activity for purposes of federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, court must examine all predicate acts, regardless of which defendants actually committed, or agreed to commit, alleged acts; with respect to individual defendants, it is only necessary that they commit, or conspire to commit, two predicate acts in order to establish pattern. Pedrina v. Chun, D.Hawai'i 1995, 906 F.Supp. 1377, affirmed 97 F.3d 1296, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 2441, 520 U.S. 1268, 138 L.Ed.2d 201. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

Under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) conspiracy, government must show, inter alia, that defendants agreed to commit two offenses which would in turn constitute two predicate acts. U.S. v. Shen- berg, S.D.Fla.1993, 828 F.Supp. 968. Conspiracy 24(1)

170. ---- Fraud, number of acts, pattern of racketeering

Complaint alleging mispayment of interest under Mexican railroad bonds and mishandling of sale of collateral securing the bonds did not assert a pattern of racketeering as it did not assert two separate acts but, rather, only ongoing or open-ended fraudulent conduct. Beck v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., S.D.N.Y.1986, 645 F.Supp. 675, on reargument 650 F.Supp. 48, affirmed 820 F.2d 46, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 698, 484 U.S. 1005, 98 L.Ed.2d 650, rehearing denied 108 S.Ct. 1588, 485 U.S. 1030, 99 L.Ed.2d 903. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

171. ---- Mail and wire fraud, number of acts, pattern of racketeering

Sheer number of predicate acts committed is never enough to establish requisite RICO “pattern,” at least not where only predicate acts alleged are mail and wire fraud. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1989, 875 F.2d 1271. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 31

Allegations of numerous uses of the mails and telephone in furtherance of allegedly fraudulent scheme to induce modification of stock purchase agreement adequately stated a “pattern of racketeering activity” sufficient to state a cause of action under RICO under the Fifth Circuit rule that two related predicate acts were enough to

constitute a pattern under RICO. Smith v. Cooper/T. Smith Corp., C.A.5 (La.) 1988, 846 F.2d 325, rehearing granted 850 F.2d 1086, remanded 883 F.2d 357, on remand 886 F.2d 755, on rehearing. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Evidence presented at trial to support defendant's convictions of four separate counts of mail fraud committed over a two-year period was sufficient to establish “pattern of racketeering” for purposes of RICO convictions, resulting from scheme to bribe tax authorities to lower tax assessments on certain properties. U.S. v. Garver, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1987, 809 F.2d 1291, grant of post-conviction relief affirmed 861 F.2d 166. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Banks which provided financing for corporation which subsequently filed for bankruptcy satisfied “pattern” of racketeering activity requirement under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(5), by alleging nine separate acts of wire and mail fraud, involving same parties over period of three years, for purpose of inducing banks to extend credit to corporation. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav. Ass'n v. Touche Ross & Co., C.A.11 (Ga.) 1986, 782 F.2d 966. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 49

Defendant engaged in five acts of racketeering activity by virtue of fact that she committed five separate acts of mail fraud and as a consequence she engaged in pattern of racketeering activity in that she committed two or more acts of racketeering activity. U. S. v. Weatherspoon, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1978, 581 F.2d 595. Postal Service 35(2)

Multiple predicate acts of mail and wire fraud were sufficiently alleged to satisfy pattern element of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action by consumer debtors in putative class action against provider of consumer debt arbitrations, debt collection law firm, consumer credit issuers, and related defendants arising from pre-dispute arbitration clauses and resulting arbitrations in each consumer's debt agreements, even though debtors pointed to only two specific mailings and did not have any specific examples of wire fraud; there were undoubtedly many thousands more mailings that would be revealed by discovery, and it strained credulity to believe provider did not send any e-mails in support of alleged fraud. In re National Arbitration Forum Trade Practices Litigation, D.Minn.2010, 704 F.Supp.2d 832, stay denied 2010 WL 1485959. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Coin dealer's alleged commission of mail and wire fraud in persuading buyer to purchase bullion coins on ten separate occasions over ten or eleven month period and in soliciting buyer to work for commission in his scheme to sell bullion coins was sufficiently continuous to constitute “pattern of racketeering activity” within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Wilson v. De Angelis, S.D.Fla.2001, 156 F.Supp.2d 1335. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint failed to allege more than one instance of mail fraud on borrowers, and thus failed to allege pattern of racketeering activity. Emery v. American General Finance, Inc., N.D.Ill.1996, 938 F.Supp. 495. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Each billing invoice sent to client by accountant for preparation of unfiled tax returns constituted separate mailing and therefore separate act of mail fraud and thus, plaintiff client established at least two predicate acts for purposes of civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) action. Zee-Bar, Inc. N.H. v. Kaplan, D.N.H.1992, 792 F.Supp. 895. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Numerous uses of mail in regard to only one insurance claim could not constitute “pattern” required for claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Vickers v. Gray & Co., Inc., E.D.Tex.1991, 761 F.Supp. 37, affirmed 977 F.2d 578. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Defendant's RICO conviction could be based on two predicate acts of wire fraud; there was no requirement that two acts be of different types. U.S. v. Butler, E.D.Va.1989, 704 F.Supp. 1338, affirmed 905 F.2d 1532, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 257, 498 U.S. 900, 112 L.Ed.2d 215. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Three acts of mail fraud spanning five-month period, arising from associating attorney's use of mails to send forged releases of attorneys' liens to defendants and his failure to correct defendant's impression that all attorneys' liens had been released, which resulted in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act plaintiff's name being omitted from settlement checks, did not amount to pattern of racketeering activity sufficient to support RICO claim where it was undisputed that, at most, associating attorney made single decision to defraud RICO plaintiff and that harms suffered by RICO plaintiff were cumulative rather than independent and did not result in repeated economic injury. Sutherland v. O'Malley, N.D.Ill.1988, 687 F.Supp. 392. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Pattern of racketeering activity was not established by allegation of fraud which consisted merely of isolated use of mails in order to effectuate single criminal episode involving sale of product line; there was no evidence that business was operated in fraudulent manner implemented by multiple acts of mail fraud. Gidwitz v. Stirco, Inc., N.D.Ill.1986, 646 F.Supp. 825. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Four discrete mailings of single documents to third parties could not constitute “pattern of racketeering activity” within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. District Telecommunications Develop- ment Corp. v. District Cablevision, Inc., D.D.C.1985, 638 F.Supp. 418. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 31

Since each mailing was a separate offense of mail fraud, each of the 14 counts of mail fraud was a racketeering activity and at least two such acts constituted a “pattern of racketeering activity” within meaning of par. (5) of this section. U.S. v. Beatty, E.D.N.Y.1984, 587 F.Supp. 1325. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

For purposes of this chapter, a pattern of racketeering activity includes two or more acts of mail and/or wire fraud; therefore, a plaintiff under this chapter must allege more than injury from predicate acts of mail and/or wire fraud. Furman v. Cirrito, S.D.N.Y.1984, 578 F.Supp. 1535, affirmed 741 F.2d 524, vacated 105 S.Ct. 3550, 473 U.S. 922, 87 L.Ed.2d 672, on remand 779 F.2d 36. Commerce 80

Separate acts of mail and wire fraud arising out of common nucleus of facts surrounding scheme by which chief legal officer responsible for handling legal claims against group of charities sold confidential information to various attorneys constituted two separate predicate acts required to establish pattern of racketeering activity under this chapter. Beth Israel Medical Center v. Smith, S.D.N.Y.1983, 576 F.Supp. 1061. Commerce 82.6

172. ---- Necessary but not sufficient, number of acts, pattern of racketeering

While two predicate acts are necessary to form Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) “pattern,” they may not be sufficient unless they are both related and amount to or pose threat of continued criminal activity; RICO pattern consists of continuity plus relationship. Schultz v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat. Bank, N.A., C.A.1 (Mass.) 1996, 94 F.3d 721. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

While two racketeering acts are necessary to make a pattern for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), they normally are not sufficient; besides showing a number of predicate acts, a plaintiff must also show that the acts are related and that they amount to or threaten continuing criminal activity. Shields Enterprises, Inc. v. First Chicago Corp., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1992, 975 F.2d 1290, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Two Racketeering Acts, while necessary to make pattern, are normally not sufficient. Uni*Quality, Inc. v. In- fotronx, Inc., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1992, 974 F.2d 918. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

Proof of at least two acts of racketeering activity is necessary, but is not sufficient, to convict under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. U.S. v. Alkins, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1991, 925 F.2d 541. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 26

Statutory definition of pattern of racketeering activity does not offer comprehensive definition of pattern requirement; while two acts are necessary, they may not be sufficient to form a pattern for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Lycan v. Walters, S.D.Ind.1995, 904 F.Supp. 884. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 26

While at least two acts must be shown to establish “pattern of racketeering activity” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), two acts do not per se constitute pattern. Jordan v. Berman, E.D.Pa.1992, 792 F.Supp. 380, affirmed in part , vacated in part 20 F.3d 1250, on remand. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Two or more predicate acts were not alone sufficient to establish pattern of racketeering activity. Jordan v. Ber- man, E.D.Pa.1991, 758 F.Supp. 269, reconsideration denied , affirmed in part , vacated in part 20 F.3d 1250, on remand. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) plaintiff is required to allege at least two predicate acts of racketeering activities; however, proof of two acts of racketeering activity, without more, does not suf-

fice to establish RICO pattern. Certilman v. Hardcastle, Ltd., E.D.N.Y.1991, 754 F.Supp. 974. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 25; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

Merely proving two predicate acts, without more, is insufficient to satisfy pattern element of RICO claim; plaintiff must show that racketeering predicates are related and that they amount to or pose threat of continued criminal activity in addition to satisfying statutory prerequisite of showing at least two predicate acts. Pyramid Securities, Ltd. v. International Bank, D.D.C.1989, 726 F.Supp. 1377, affirmed 924 F.2d 1114, 288 U.S.App.D.C. 157, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 85, 502 U.S. 822, 116 L.Ed.2d 57. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Even if single criminal scheme is sufficient to allege “pattern” of racketeering activity, not every criminal episode implemented through two or more “ministerial acts” must be raised to level of RICO violation. Four Star Corp. v. Clink, E.D.Mich.1987, 702 F.Supp. 617. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

173. ---- Securities violations, number of acts, pattern of racketeering

Plaintiff who alleged misrepresentations in connection with sale of securities did not allege two racketeering predicates. Newton v. Uniwest Financial Corp., D.Nev.1990, 802 F.Supp. 361, affirmed 967 F.2d 340. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Publication of allegedly misleading prospectus did not comprise “at least two acts” of racketeering, such as would support racketeering charge against investment fund promoters. Miller v. New America High Income Fund, D.Mass.1991, 755 F.Supp. 1099, affirmed 36 F.3d 170. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

Although plaintiff alleged that defendant, through at least two acts of mail, wire, or securities fraud, acquired interest, in form of common stock, in enterprise engaged in interstate commerce, complaint, which actually alleged that defendant acquired stock through single, allegedly fraudulent, transaction, was insufficient to state claim for relief under provision of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act making it unlawful for person, through pattern of racketeering activity, to acquire or maintain directly or indirectly, interest or control in enterprise engaged in interstate commerce. A.L. Williams Corp. v. Faircloth, N.D.Ga.1986, 652 F.Supp. 51. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Alleged actions by securities dealer's accounting firm in mailing audit confirmation letters to five investors separately on three separate days and in referring to different securities holdings satisfied requirement under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(5), that there be more than one predicate offense, and because predicate acts of mail fraud arose out of a single scheme, they were sufficiently related as to purposes, victims and methods of commission to constitute a pattern, and thus, accounting firm's alleged predicate offense involving securities fraud, when taken together with predicate act of mail fraud, also formed pattern. First Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n of Pittsburgh v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., S.D.N.Y.1986, 629 F.Supp. 427. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

174. ---- Unlawful debt, number of acts, pattern of racketeering

Only one act of collecting or attempting to collect unlawful debt is necessary to establish predicate act of racketeering. U.S. v. Eufrasio, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1991, 935 F.2d 553, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 340, 502 U.S. 925, 116 L.Ed.2d 280, denial of post-conviction relief affirmed 38 F.3d 693. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

175. Number of victims, pattern of racketeering

Mere presence of conditional seller and conditional buyer of land in connection with landowners' claim that village officials fraudulently coerced them into paying certain assessment before village would issue building permit did not turn village officials' alleged fraud into one that affected multiple parties, for purposes of claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. New Burnham Prairie Homes, Inc. v. Village of Burnham, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1990, 910 F.2d 1474. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Defendants' alleged use of mail fraud and wire fraud while marketing and selling film rights to investors constituted sufficient “pattern of racketeering activity” to subject defendants to liability under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; defendants engaged in nine separate acts of fraud involving 19 investors, acts occurred over period greater than one year, and contract envisioned ten-year relationship between defendants and investors. Fleischhauer v. Feltner, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1989, 879 F.2d 1290, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 1122, 493 U.S. 1074, 107 L.Ed.2d 1029, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 1473, 494 U.S. 1027, 108 L.Ed.2d 611. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Insurer sufficiently alleged continuity necessary to state claim under RICO against chiropractor in connection with submission of false claims for treatment, even though insurer was only victim involved, where each false claim involved a separate and distinct insured and involved at least one mailing, even aside from fact that insurer alleged two different schemes, involving different types of false claims. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan v. Kamin, C.A.6 (Mich.) 1989, 876 F.2d 543. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Allegations of multiple inducements by company and four of its officers to retire, made to at least 32 employees over extended period of time, satisfied continuity plus relationship requirement of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act and thus constituted “pattern of racketeering activity” within meaning of that statute. Saporito v. Combustion Engineering Inc., C.A.3 (N.J.) 1988, 843 F.2d 666, on remand , vacated on other grounds 109 S.Ct. 1306, 489 U.S. 1049, 103 L.Ed.2d 576, on remand 879 F.2d 859. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Competitor of defendant partnership was not a victim for purposes of determining, in civil RICO action, whether defendant had defrauded two victims, though competitor was injured when the partnership chose to pay another defendant in connection with fraudulent scheme by circumventing noncompetition agreement with the competit- or, where circumventing the agreement was not alleged predicate act under RICO. Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1987, 834 F.2d 1297, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 3241, 492 U.S. 917, 106 L.Ed.2d 588. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Multiple predicate acts relating to allegedly fraudulent efforts to induce employee to settle his workers' compensation claim, involving single victim, inflicting single injury, and occurring within two-month period, did not state “pattern of racketeering activity” and, therefore, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim was fatally defective. Tellis v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1986, 826 F.2d 477. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Allegedly fraudulent actions of credit card company, its attorneys, and state court judge to collect debt from credit card holder did not constitute “pattern of racketeering activity” necessary to establish claim under Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where there was only one alleged victim and one credit card agreement, and actions took place over short period of time. Rolfes v. MBNA America Bank N.A., D.S.D.2005, 416 F.Supp.2d 745, affirmed 219 Fed.Appx. 613, 2007 WL 911831. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

When determining whether there was pattern of racketeering activity, courts may find pattern where there is only single victim and single scheme, where there are repeated economic injuries. LaSalle Bank Lake View v. Seguban, N.D.Ill.1996, 937 F.Supp. 1309. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Although plaintiff was sole victim, allegations that defendants, on several occasions close in time, diverted information over the wires in order to lure clients away from plaintiff constituted “pattern,” as required to support civil RICO allegations. State Wide Photocopy, Corp. v. Tokai Financial Services, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1995, 909 F.Supp. 137. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Borrower did not demonstrate that lender had engaged in any predicate acts, and assuming that lender did commit such acts, acts were directed toward single entity and lasted only a short period of time, and thus did not meet pattern requirement under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) or Virgin Islands Criminal Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (CICO). Pemberton Sales & Service, Inc. v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, D.Virgin Islands 1994, 877 F.Supp. 961. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 5; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Where plaintiff alleges distinct injuries to a number of victims as result of single scheme and limited variety of predicate acts, no pattern of racketeering activity is shown. Pucci v. Litwin, N.D.Ill.1993, 828 F.Supp. 1285. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Conduct of attorney and accountant, in preparing allegedly false opinion letters in connection with real estate limited partnership offering, satisfied pattern of racketeering element, for purpose of imposing liability under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where letters were disseminated to multiple investors over relatively short period of time. Gilmore v. Berg, D.N.J.1991, 761 F.Supp. 358. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 29; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Indirect victims of alleged RICO scheme would not be considered in determining whether pattern of racketeering activity criterion had been met. Fiorentino v. Converse, E.D.Pa.1989, 705 F.Supp. 253, affirmed 884 F.2d 1383. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Competitor's alleged fraudulent exaggeration of physical therapy newspaper's circulation over three-year period was not “pattern” of racketeering sufficient to support civil RICO action where rival publisher was only “victim” directly injured by alleged misconduct, character of unlawful activity was not egregious and fraudulent scheme was not complex; injury to physical therapy job-seekers who relied upon publication and advertisers caused by alleged exaggerations was too indirect for those parties to be deemed “victims.” Forum Publications, Inc. v. P.T. Publishers, Inc., E.D.Pa.1988, 700 F.Supp. 236. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Telephone calls and letters all directed to single victim, to allegedly mislead victim into financing defendant's sales operation, did not constitute “pattern” of racketeering activity actionable under RICO statute. National Business Funding, Inc. v. Custom Muffler Specialists, Inc., E.D.Mich.1987, 675 F.Supp. 1080. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Claims that three limited partnership offerings were undertaken by same parties with same intent to defraud on three different occasions sufficiently alleged pattern of racketeering for RICO purposes, regardless of fact that there were many different victims rather than same few victims. Andreo v. Friedlander, Gaines, Cohen, Rosenth- al & Rosenberg, D.Conn.1987, 660 F.Supp. 1362. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Defendant could be charged with engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity notwithstanding fact that he was charged with defrauding only one victim in six incidents of wire fraud over a four-week period; it was precisely the fact that same victim was alleged that served as connecting link in predicate acts to establish “pattern of racketeering activity,” within meaning of section 1962 of this title prohibiting any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate commerce to conduct the affairs of that enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. U. S. v. Chovanec, S.D.N.Y.1979, 467 F.Supp. 41. Telecommunica- tions 1014(8)

Existence of single victim does not preclude existence of pattern of racketeering activity actionable under federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Elliott v. First Sec. Bank, Neb.1996, 544 N.W.2d 823, 249 Neb. 597. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

176. Organized criminal activity

RICO's pattern of racketeering concept does not require allegation and proof of an organized crime nexus. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., U.S.Minn.1989, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 492 U.S. 229, 106 L.Ed.2d 195, on remand 734 F.Supp. 879. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 37

177. Patents, copyrights and trademarks, pattern of racketeering

Alleged unauthorized copying of contract software programs and of back-up tapes did not give rise to RICO pattern of racketeering activity, and subsequent and varied uses of stolen software went only to issue of damages. Management Computer Services, Inc. v. Hawkins, Ash, Baptie & Co., C.A.7 (Wis.) 1989, 883 F.2d 48. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

False statements and misrepresentations made to Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) in application for patent for aluminum dump truck body was not pattern of racketeering activity necessary to support civil Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action brought by dump truck's designer against his business partner's attorney; business entities involved were only in existence for brief period of time and then filed for bankruptcy. Heden v. Hill, S.D.Tex.1996, 937 F.Supp. 1230. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Consent judgment against several of defendants, entered in similar case involving sales of auto parts and spurious packaging involving infringement of another automobile producers trademarks and copyrights, was insufficient to support finding of prior fraudulent activity on the part of defendants for the purpose of satisfying pattern requirement of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act in view of the fact that although defendants' activity encompassed a number of years, it was a single scheme and did not constitute pattern of racketeering activity. Ford Motor Co. v. B & H Supply, Inc., D.Minn.1986, 646 F.Supp. 975, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1094, supplemented 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1870. Federal Civil Procedure 2397.5

178. Pensions, pattern of racketeering

Single decision to withhold first pension plan's “excess assets” from transfer to second plan being “spun off” from first was not a “pattern” for purposes of participants' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim. Bigger v. American Commercial Lines, Inc., W.D.Mo.1986, 652 F.Supp. 123. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

179. Pleading, pattern of racketeering

City adequately pled causation requirement for standing on a civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) claim, in bringing action against out-of-state cigarette retailers and affiliated individuals, by alleging it lost tax revenue through retailers' predicate acts of mail and wire fraud, which were in furtherance of a scheme to defraud the city of taxes; any recoverable damages occurring by reason of the RICO violation flowed from the scheme to defraud the city of use taxes, which was at the heart of the alleged predicate acts of mail and wire fraud. City of New York v. Smokes-Spirits.com, Inc., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2008, 541 F.3d 425, certified question accepted 897 N.E.2d 1061, 868 N.Y.S.2d 580, 11 N.Y.3d 800, certiorari granted 129 S.Ct. 2159, 173 L.Ed.2d 1155, certified question answered 911 N.E.2d 834, 883 N.Y.S.2d 772, 12 N.Y.3d 616, reversed and remanded 130 S.Ct. 983, 559 U.S. 1, 175 L.Ed.2d 943. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Creditors did not plead predicate acts of bankruptcy fraud under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) with required heightened particularity, on allegations that debtor made various asset transfers “in contemplation of” bankruptcy, since some transfers occurred two years before petition was filed and before judgment was entered against debtor, and monthly transfers of $5,000 from mother to debtor, instead of return of

debtor's assets as part of effort to help conceal them, were just as likely to have been gifts from inheritance like those that she routinely sent to debtor's siblings during same period. First Capital Asset Management, Inc. v. Satinwood, Inc., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2004, 385 F.3d 159. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Teachers and Filipino nationals who had come from the Philippines to work in the United States sufficiently alleged multiple predicate acts, as required to state claim for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations against teacher recruiting service which had brought them into the country; teachers alleged that service had forced them to remain in teaching positions in Louisiana against their will by threatening them with deportation, lawsuits, and termination of their employment. Nunag-Tanedo v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., C.D.Cal.2011, 790 F.Supp.2d 1134. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 7

Alleged acts of Louisiana State Board of Private Security Examiners (LSBPSE) and its executive secretary in improperly issuing Louisiana security company cease-and-desist order, and out-of-state security companies' alleged acts of operating in-state without proper licensing and insurance, constituted one-time acts, and not an ongoing relationship, and thus were insufficient to demonstrate a continuing unit under definition of enterprise in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) section prohibiting the conduct of an enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. Able Security and Patrol, LLC. v. Louisiana, E.D.La.2008, 569 F.Supp.2d 617. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Corporate officers' alleged mailing of fraudulent corporate tax return and their alleged money laundering transactions did not constitute closed-ended pattern of racketeering activity necessary to support shareholder's claim against officers under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), even if money laundering transactions spanned period of more than three years, where shareholder failed to plead frequency or duration of alleged money laundering activities in enough detail for court to determine whether series of alleged predicate acts constituted “pattern.” Leung v. Law, E.D.N.Y.2005, 387 F.Supp.2d 105. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Allegation that mortgage lender violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by participating in scheme to prepare false loan applications for minority home purchasers in order to generate income through points and fees was not pled with sufficient particularity, where purchasers did not indicate which loans contained fraudulent statements, extent to which lender participated in scheme, and character of lender's involvement in each fraud. Wilson v. Toussie, E.D.N.Y.2003, 260 F.Supp.2d 530. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Plaintiff did not conduct reasonable prefiling inquiry into factual or legal viability of his initial RICO claim against defendant, and thus Rule 11 sanctions would be imposed, even though he later amended his complaint to eliminate such errors; initial complaint did not plead fraud with requisite specificity and failed to make out col- orable claim for “pattern” of racketeering. Cullen v. Darvin, D.Mass.1991, 132 B.R. 211. Bankruptcy 2187

180. Related or separate acts, pattern of racketeering--Generally

With respect to “relationship” element of a RICO pattern, the term is no more constrained than that used in Title

X of the Organized Crime Control Act, under which “criminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events.” H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., U.S.Minn.1989, 109 S.Ct. 2893, 492 U.S. 229, 106 L.Ed.2d 195, on remand 734 F.Supp. 879. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Relatedness of racketeering acts, required to establish civil claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganization Act (RICO) is established if acts have same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission. Word of Faith World Outreach Center Church, Inc. v. Sawyer, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1996, 90 F.3d 118, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 1248, 520 U.S. 1117, 137 L.Ed.2d 329. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Relatedness inquiry for purposes of showing violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) violation, focuses on interrelationship of charged RICO predicates, thereby ensuring that person is not subjected to sanctions for committing two widely separated and isolated criminal offenses. Heller Financial, Inc. v. Grammco Computer Sales, Inc., C.A.5 (Tex.) 1996, 71 F.3d 518. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 28

Pattern of racketeering activity requires at least two acts of racketeering activity, but two isolated acts of racketeering activity do not constitute a pattern; it is the factor of continuity plus relationship which combines to produce a pattern. Cox v. Administrator U.S. Steel & Carnegie, C.A.11 (Ala.) 1994, 17 F.3d 1386, modified on rehearing 30 F.3d 1347, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 900, 513 U.S. 1110, 130 L.Ed.2d 784. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) requires showing of relationship between predicate acts and threat of continuing activity. Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v. Matkari, C.A.4 (Md.) 1993, 7 F.3d 1130, 28 U.S.P.Q.2d 1533, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 1307, 510 U.S. 1197, 127 L.Ed.2d 658. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Definition of “pattern of racketeering activity” for purposes of RICO does not encompass a single criminal episode, though it may technically involve several crimes, nor does it consist of several different but totally separate instances of criminal conduct taking place over time. Apparel Art Intern., Inc. v. Jacobson, C.A.1 (Puerto Rico) 1992, 967 F.2d 720. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27; Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 28

Fact that two episodes seemed to victims to be part of common scheme was not sufficient to satisfy Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) “pattern” requirement. Feinstein v. Resolution Trust Corp., C.A.1 (Mass.) 1991, 942 F.2d 34. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Predicate acts required for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violation are sufficiently related when they have same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commis-

sion, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events. Hindes v. Castle, C.A.3 (Del.) 1991, 937 F.2d 868. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Relationship of predicate acts one to another does not by itself define “pattern” for purposes of RICO. U.S. Tex- tiles, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch Companies, Inc., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1990, 911 F.2d 1261. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 28

Relatedness and continuity necessary to show a pattern of racketeering acts may be established by relating two seemingly independent acts to the RICO enterprise. U.S. v. Local 359, United Seafood Workers, Smoked Fish & Cannery Union, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1989, 889 F.2d 1232. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Offenses not chargeable as RICO predicate acts could be joined to an indictment alleging RICO offenses and offenses chargeable as RICO predicate acts so long as offenses arose out of a single series of acts or transactions and satisfied the test of “logical relationship.” U.S. v. Brown, C.A.D.C.1987, 823 F.2d 591, 262 U.S.App.D.C. 183. Indictment And Information 129(1)

Language of this section proscribing participation in an enterprise's affairs “through a pattern of racketeering activities” requires government to prove that predicate offenses and affairs of enterprise are related. U. S. v. Dozier, C.A.5 (La.) 1982, 672 F.2d 531, rehearing denied 677 F.2d 113, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 256, 459 U.S. 943, 74 L.Ed.2d 200. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 49

Two predicate crimes required for violation on this chapter need not be related to each other, but must be related to the affairs of the enterprise. U. S. v. Phillips, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1981, 664 F.2d 971, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 2965, 457 U.S. 1136, 73 L.Ed.2d 1354, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 208, 459 U.S. 906, 74 L.Ed.2d 166. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 49

In order to fall within provisions of this chapter, the two or more predicate crimes must be related to the affairs of the enterprise, but need not otherwise be related to each other. U. S. v. Elliott, C.A.5 (Ga.) 1978, 571 F.2d 880, rehearing denied 575 F.2d 300, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 349, 439 U.S. 953, 58 L.Ed.2d 344. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Evidence of union's other allegedly extortionate corporate campaign activity against grocery retailer was relevant to establish pattern of racketeering activity against plaintiff employer, within meaning of Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Intern. Union, E.D.Va.2008, 586 F.Supp.2d 632. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 78

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint failed to show that racketeering predicates were related and amounted to or posed threat of continued criminal activity; alleged criminal acts did not have same or similar purposes, result, participants, or victims or methods of commission, and were not otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics, rather, acts constituted isolated events. Dibbs v. Gonsalves, D.Puerto Rico 1996, 921 F.Supp. 44. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Racketeering activities are “related,” for purposes of establishing a pattern of racketeering activity under Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), if they have same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events. Buck Creek Coal, Inc. v. United Workers of America, S.D.Ind.1995, 917 F.Supp. 601. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), relatedness requirement means that predicate acts must bear some common characteristics or relationship between each other rather than being isolated criminal acts. Ocaso, S.A., Compania De Seguros Y Reaseguros v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority, D.Puerto Rico 1996, 915 F.Supp. 1244. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

To prove pattern of RICO racketeering activity, plaintiff or prosecutor must show that racketeering predicates are related and that they amount to or pose threat of continued criminal activity; this relatedness test is not cum- bersome, and essentially all that is needed is showing that predicate acts have same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events. Bonton v. Archer Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., S.D.Tex.1995, 889 F.Supp. 995. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

To state claim under RICO and its state law correlate, the Colorado Organized Crime Control Act (COCCA), plaintiffs must allege pattern of racketeering activity of sufficient relatedness, and that poses sufficient threat of continuity; “predicate acts” are of sufficient “relatedness” if they have same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics, and are not isolated events. Alter v. DBLKM, Inc., D.Colo.1993, 840 F.Supp. 799. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 104

To make out “pattern of racketeering activity,” for purposes of establishing violations of Colorado and federal RICO statutes, predicate acts must bear some relationship to each other and must implicate threat of continuing activity; “relationship” requirement is satisfied if acts are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics, and “continuity” means either closed period of repeated conduct or past conduct which by its nature projects into future with threat of repetition. Purvis v. Hamwi, D.Colo.1993, 828 F.Supp. 1479. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 28

“Pattern of racketeering activity,” needed to support conviction under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act, requires showing that defendant committed at least two racketeering acts within ten years of each other, which are sufficiently related to constitute pattern. U.S. v. Delano, W.D.N.Y.1993, 825 F.Supp. 534, affirmed in part , reversed in part 55 F.3d 720. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26; Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

For purposes of civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim requiring proof of pattern of racketeering activity, predicate acts are considered related and continuous, combining to produce pattern of racketeering activity, if they have same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics so as not to be isolated incidents. Stand-

ard Chlorine of Delaware, Inc. v. Sinibaldi, D.Del.1992, 821 F.Supp. 232. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Court's inquiry for relatedness necessary to establish pattern of racketeering activity in action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) may focus on whether alleged predicate acts are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events; predicate acts relied upon to support conviction under RICO must have same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims or methods of commission or must be otherwise interrelated so as not to be isolated events. Marrazzo v. Bucks County Bank and Trust Co., E.D.Pa.1993, 814 F.Supp. 437. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Criminal conduct forms pattern of racketeering activity, for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) if it embraces criminal acts that have same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events. Downing v. Halliburton & Associates, Inc., M.D.Ala.1993, 812 F.Supp. 1175, affirmed 13 F.3d 410 . Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

To establish pattern of racketeering activity required to state claim under RICO, plaintiff must show relation and continuity between predicate racketeering acts and, thus, must plead either a past period of repeated racketeering or some future threat of the racketeering conduct. Brossman Sales, Inc. v. Broderick, E.D.Pa.1992, 808 F.Supp. 1209. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 72

Predicate acts of racketeering are related and may be pattern if they have same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, methods of commission, or are otherwise interrelated. Center Cadillac, Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. of New York, S.D.N.Y.1992, 808 F.Supp. 213, affirmed 99 F.3d 401. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 28

“Relatedness” requirement for pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiz- ations Act (RICO) is established by demonstrating that predicate acts have same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events. Zee-Bar, Inc. N.H. v. Kaplan, D.N.H.1992, 792 F.Supp. 895. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

“Relatedness” satisfying “pattern” requirement of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was demonstrated by temporal proximity, common goals and similarity of methods of predicate acts; within period of three years, defendants committed numerous sophisticated burglaries of commercial establishments, employing similar modi operandi. U.S. v. Bloome, E.D.N.Y.1992, 784 F.Supp. 23. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

In order to establish pattern of racketeering activity, plaintiff or prosecutor must show that racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose threat of continued criminal activity; relationship element is sat-

isfied by allegations of criminal acts that have same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or are otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events. Landy v. Heller, White & Co., S.D.N.Y.1991, 783 F.Supp. 125. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 28

To successfully allege that defendant has engaged in “pattern” of racketeering activities and has thereby violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), plaintiff must allege that racketeering activities have been sufficiently continuous, that they relate to each other, and that they relate to threat of continued criminal activity. Cadle Co. v. Schultz, N.D.Tex.1991, 779 F.Supp. 392. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 28

Predicate acts under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) are “related” if they have same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events. U.S. v. Quintanilla, N.D.Ill.1991, 760 F.Supp. 687, affirmed 2 F.3d 1469. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Factors to determine whether related predicate acts indicate ongoing criminal activity of sufficient scope and persistence to pose special threat to social well-being include the following: number and variety of predicate acts, length of time over which they were committed, number of putative victims, presence of separate schemes, and potential for multiple distinct injuries. Myers v. Finkle, E.D.Va.1990, 758 F.Supp. 1102, affirmed in part, reversed in part on other grounds 950 F.2d 165. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

“Relationship” between predicate acts, required for assertion of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim is established if acts have same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events. Certil- man v. Hardcastle, Ltd., E.D.N.Y.1991, 754 F.Supp. 974. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

“Relationship” exists among predicate acts if they have similar purposes, results, participants, victims, methods of commission or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events. Steco, Inc. v. S & T Mfg., Inc., E.D.Pa.1990, 745 F.Supp. 305. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Predicate racketeering acts are related if they have same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events. Reinfeld v. Riklis, S.D.N.Y.1989, 722 F.Supp. 1077. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Relatedness of predicate acts alone is not enough to satisfy RICO's pattern element; to establish a RICO pattern, it must also be shown that the predicates themselves amount to, or that they otherwise constitute a threat of continuing racketeering activity. Disandro-Smith & Associates, P.C., Inc. v. Edron Copier Service, Inc., D.R.I.1989,

722 F.Supp. 912. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

“Relationship” necessary to establish pattern of racketeering activity under RICO is established by proof of several related acts in furtherance of single criminal scheme. Johnson v. Schopf, D.Minn.1987, 669 F.Supp. 291. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Continuity plus relationship test for determining existence of pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act does not require some independent connection or similarity among predicate crimes apart from their status as activities related to the common purpose of continuing enterprise. U.S. v. Weinberg, E.D.N.Y.1987, 656 F.Supp. 1020. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Relationship prong of test for establishing pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act is satisfied by proof of several related acts in furtherance of single criminal scheme while continuity prong is satisfied by proof that defendants have committed same or other similar racketeering activities in the past or are engaged in other criminal activities elsewhere. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., D.Minn.1986, 648 F.Supp. 419, reconsideration denied 653 F.Supp. 908, affirmed 829 F.2d 648, certiorari granted 108 S.Ct. 1219, 485 U.S. 958, 99 L.Ed.2d 420, reversed on other grounds 109 S.Ct. 2893, 492 U.S. 229, 106 L.Ed.2d 195, on remand 734 F.Supp. 879. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

For purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, racketeering activities must be related to each other and the enterprise. Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, N.D.Ill.1986, 647 F.Supp. 1026. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 49

Although there must be continuity among predicate acts, separateness is not required in order to establish a “pattern of racketeering activity” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; declining to follow Northern Trust Bank/O'Hare, N.A. v. Inryco, Inc., 615 F.Supp. 828 (N.D.Ill.). Volckmann v. Edwards, N.D.Cal.1986, 642 F.Supp. 109. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

To establish “pattern of racketeering activity” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim, one cannot merely allege one past act of another as predicate act, regardless of whether he has been injured by that act or whether that act relates at all to other alleged predicate acts; it is factor of continuity plus relationship which combines to produce pattern. Conan Properties, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1985, 619 F.Supp. 1167. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

In prosecution for engaging in pattern of racketeering activity, only relation necessary for predicate acts is that they be in conduct of affairs of same enterprise; it therefore was not necessary, in such a prosecution, that activities charged as predicate acts, securities fraud and bankruptcy fraud, be related to each other. U. S. v. DePalma, S.D.N.Y.1978, 461 F.Supp. 778. Bankruptcy 3861; Securities Regulation 193

As used in par. (5) of this section, word “pattern” should be construed as requiring more than accidental or unrelated instances of proscribed behavior, and should be taken as requiring that racketeering acts must have been

connected with each other by some common scheme, plan or motive so as to constitute pattern and not simply series of disconnected acts. U. S. v. Stofsky, S.D.N.Y.1973, 409 F.Supp. 609. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Implicit in statutory definition of “pattern of racketeering activity” is a requirement that government prove inter- relatedness in order to obtain a conviction. U. S. v. White, E.D.Wis.1974, 386 F.Supp. 882. Gaming 62

Relatedness requirement for RICO claim is relationship with a criminal offense committed by defendant; pattern cannot be formed by commission of isolated and sporadic criminal offenses. Lichtenstein v. Polizzotto, N.Y.Sup.1991, 575 N.Y.S.2d 642, 152 Misc.2d 241. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

181. ---- Miscellaneous patterns of racketeering, related or separate acts, pattern of racketeering

Indictment adequately alleged “relatedness” sub-element of pattern of racketeering activity in charging defendants with violating, and conspiring to violate, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) where indictment stated that predicate crimes committed by defendants were all committed for same or similar purposes, including promoting and enhancing RICO enterprise and activities of its leaders, members, and associates, enriching leaders, members, and associates, and concealing and otherwise protecting enterprise's criminal activities, and several distinguishing characteristics implied that predicate crimes were not isolated events, including that four of six alleged schemes involved performance of service for clients of one enterprise member, who was defense attorney. U.S. v. Bergrin, C.A.3 (N.J.) 2011, 650 F.3d 257. Conspiracy 28(3); Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

There was sufficient evidence from which jury could have reasonably concluded that defendants agreed to commission of predicate acts under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) over four years until monies received from sale of limited partnership had been diverted to defendants through their escrow account; these counts had requisite relatedness, and from this evidence jury could have reasonably have inferred continuing threat of ongoing criminal activity. Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., C.A.7 (Ind.) 1996, 77 F.3d 951, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Predicate acts of leasing company owner's alleged commercial bribery of another company's employee and its use of mail and wire to fraudulently induce financing company into extending him credit were not sufficiently interrelated to constitute pattern of racketeering activity for purposes of civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) claims; purpose of bribery scheme was to maintain exclusive business relationship with company free of competition while purpose of alleged mail and wire fraud was to induce leasing company into making a loan on terms that would not have otherwise been available, predicate acts had dissimilar results and different methods of commission, participants in two types of alleged criminal activity were different, and two types of conduct financing company sought to connect in pattern were directed at different victims. Heller Fin- ancial, Inc. v. Grammco Computer Sales, Inc., C.A.5 (Tex.) 1996, 71 F.3d 518. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 31

Borrowers claiming that bank engaged in scheme to take over borrowers' businesses and furthered that scheme

by mail and phone failed to demonstrate either requisite predicate acts or requisite relatedness of those acts for purposes of nonconspiracy Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims; borrowers cited no specific evidence of motive for scheme, particular communications, how those communications were fraudulent, or how those communications furthered alleged scheme. Information Exchange Systems, Inc. v. First Bank Nat. Ass'n, C.A.8 (Minn.) 1993, 994 F.2d 478, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 79

Conduct of promoters of real estate venture directed at person with whom they contracted to make sales, which allegedly involved inducing him to enter into the marketing agreement and extortion, threats, and fraud in administration of the agreement, was not related for RICO purposes to conduct of the developers directed at ultimate purchasers, which allegedly included wire and mail fraud resulting from technical violations of laws regulating direct mail solicitation and marketing, misrepresentation, and use of illegal real estate contracts, and the two could not be combined to establish a pattern of racketeering. Vild v. Visconsi, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1992, 956 F.2d 560, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 99, 506 U.S. 832, 121 L.Ed.2d 59. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Relationship between predicate acts, required to allege pattern of racketeering activity under RICO was satisfied by pilots' allegations arising out of alleged scheme to relocate pilots' base to El Salvador; all predicate acts were aimed at achieving single goal of relocation of pilots' base, participants and victims were the same, and events were related in sense that they all occurred or commenced during or grew out of process of negotiating relocation of airline. Landry v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Intern. AFL-CIO, C.A.5 (La.) 1990, 901 F.2d 404, modified on denial of rehearing , certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 244, 498 U.S. 895, 112 L.Ed.2d 203, on remand. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Threats of officers of two participating banks to send borrowers to jail if they did not repay their debt at once were not a “pattern of racketeering activity” for purposes of the borrowers' civil RICO claim. Edwards v. First Nat. Bank, Bartlesville, Oklahoma, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1989, 872 F.2d 347. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 25

School board official's RICO conviction was supported by two predicate acts of fraud, despite reversal of his mail fraud convictions arising out of his receipt of kickbacks for awards of architectural contracts, where official was found guilty of both conspiracy to violate Hobbs Act and a violation of the Act. U.S. v. Alexander, C.A.11 (Ala.) 1988, 850 F.2d 1500, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 1346, 489 U.S. 1068, 103 L.Ed.2d 814, vacated 109 S.Ct. 3236, 492 U.S. 915, 106 L.Ed.2d 584, on remand 888 F.2d 777. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 10

Shipper plausibly alleged relatedness of the predicate acts, as required to establish a pattern of racketeering activity within meaning of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where it alleged that carrier, its parent corporation, and its sister subsidiary's specifically-identified, approximately 150 instances each of upweighting packages and overcharging for Canadian customs were interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and were not isolated events, it alleged a common method of commission, and it alleged a common purpose. U1IT4less, Inc. v. FedEx Corp., S.D.N.Y.2012, 896 F.Supp.2d 275. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations 28

Investors failed to show sufficient connection between alleged fraudulent investment scheme in India and Indian company's Florida affiliates' transactions in Florida to establish pattern of racketeering activity required to support investors' claims against affiliates under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where affiliates were not involved in original investment phase of alleged fraudulent scheme, affiliates appeared to be engaged in ordinary business transactions, and there was no evidence that funds transferred to affiliates were proceeds of scheme. Rajput v. City Trading, LLC, S.D.Fla.2010, 746 F.Supp.2d 1325, vacated 476 Fed.Appx. 177, 2012 WL 1292996. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Genuine issue of material fact as to whether defendant's use of internet in furtherance of scheme to defraud corporation were related, as would support corporation's claim of pattern of racketeering activity, precluded summary judgment in corporation's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action. Bloodstock Research Information Services, Inc. v. Edbain.com, LLC, E.D.Ky.2009, 622 F.Supp.2d 504. Federal Civil Pro- cedure 2509.5

Genuine issue of material fact, as to whether employer's extortion claims against union and other defendants under Virginia and North Carolina law serving as predicate acts of racketeering activity met “pattern” element, precluded summary judgment on Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims; predicate acts alleged were within scope of standard for relatedness in that they had the same or similar purpose, were participated in generally by the same people, had the same victim, method of commission was same or similar, and acts were not isolated events. Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Intern. Union, E.D.Va.2008, 585 F.Supp.2d 789. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Alleged predicate acts of parking ticket extortion racket and witness intimidation by city, county, and officials in conspiracy to create false evidence leading to arrestee's conviction were not sufficiently related to one another or continuous, as required to constitute pattern of racketeering activity in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); alleged acts were isolated incidents involving different officials at different times over more than ten years. Moore v. Guesno, W.D.N.Y.2007, 485 F.Supp.2d 300, affirmed 301 Fed.Appx. 17, 2008 WL 5082982. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Contractors' allegations that property owners, over a period of 17 months, used mail to demand that contractors remedy false repairs and to submit manipulated and falsified claims to contractors' insurance carriers demanding payment, used wire services to file state court action against contractors, and used mail to demand $4,000,000 from contractors with suggestion that contractors demand that their insurance carriers pay it, to advise contractors that expedited arbitration would take place in Colorado, and to demand that contractors immediately indem- nify one owner and hold her harmless for amount of arbitration judgment set forth sufficient facts to satisfy relationship test for a pattern under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) provision prohibiting conduct of enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. Gotfredson v. Larsen LP, D.Colo.2006, 432 F.Supp.2d 1163, motion to amend denied 2006 WL 2943008. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Allegations in investors' civil RICO complaint, that same individuals who had defrauded them in connection with real estate transaction had previously defrauded lending institutions by obtaining mortgage loans, intentionally defaulting on loans, and reacquiring property at cheaper price through nominees at foreclosure sale, did not sufficiently allege any relationship between defendants' alleged bank frauds and predicate acts which injured investors in real estate transaction, so that various acts could not be considered a “pattern of racketeering activity” for civil RICO purposes. Bernstein v. Misk, E.D.N.Y.1997, 948 F.Supp. 228. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Litigant failed to allege “pattern” of racketeering activity as required to impose liability under section of Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) which prohibits conducting affairs of enterprise engaged in interstate or foreign commerce through pattern of racketeering activity, based upon acts relating to lawsuit over ownership of certain real estate; complaint stated series of actions by each defendant, but failed to demonstrate any link between them. Davis v. Hudgins, E.D.Va.1995, 896 F.Supp. 561, affirmed 87 F.3d 1308, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 1440, 520 U.S. 1172, 137 L.Ed.2d 546. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

No “predicate acts” needed to establish pattern of racketeering activity to support RICO claim were established by evidence that wife's credit card account was closed because of her husband's delinquencies, that creditor failed to personally notify wife of account closing, or that creditor indicated payments had become current even though there had been no delinquency when reinstating her account; allegation involved single, isolated transaction. Pierce v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., D.Or.1994, 856 F.Supp. 1451, affirmed 92 F.3d 1193. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

Allegations that principals of limited partnership executed two separate but related schemes fraudulently to obtain interest in real estate, to borrow money from bank against that interest, and to divert that money to themselves sufficiently alleged “pattern of racketeering activity,” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violation. Attick v. Valeria Associates, L.P., S.D.N.Y.1992, 835 F.Supp. 103. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Sale of mortgage notes by pension trust's investment advisor and its sale of fee agreement to pension trust were sufficiently interrelated to be part of single scheme, not separate schemes to show pattern of racketeering activity, where sales were made during same time period and involved same deceptive offering memorandum and misrepresentations. Harris Trust and Sav. Bank v. Salomon Bros., Inc., N.D.Ill.1993, 832 F.Supp. 1169. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Relatedness element for finding pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act (RICO) was satisfied with respect to borrowers' claim that bank's vice-president fraudulently misrepresented that workout agreement was in default, where there were numerous instances of alleged wire and mail fraud having common purpose of declaring agreement to be no longer in effect. Blue Line Coal Co., Inc. v. Equibank, E.D.Pa.1991, 769 F.Supp. 891. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

“Meeting planning” organization's alleged acts of defrauding of customers were “related” predicate acts with re-

spect to Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) “pattern” requirement; alleged acts shared similar purpose and similar participants. Todaro v. Orbit Intern. Travel, Ltd., S.D.N.Y.1991, 755 F.Supp. 1229. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

There was sufficient evidence of pattern of racketeering activities to support defendants' convictions under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), in connection with scheme to operate illegal landfill and to illegally dispose of waste, where at least two of racketeering acts allegedly committed by each defendant were related by common participants, victims, methods, purposes, or results, related predicate acts themselves involved distinct threat of long term racketeering activity, and continued operation of landfill and waste disposal site demonstrated continued threat of racketeering activity. U.S. v. Paccione, S.D.N.Y.1990, 749 F.Supp. 478. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 95

Allegations of transactions consisting of sale of real property, private placement of cable television partnership interests, sales of interests in oil and gas programs, and sales of commodities fund that were unrelated to bonds purchased by plaintiffs would not satisfy RICO pattern requirement, even assuming that allegations of mail and wire fraud described indictable predicate acts. Sullivan v. Boettcher & Co., D.Colo.1989, 714 F.Supp. 1132. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Acts charged in the substantive RICO prosecution as constituting the required “pattern of racketeering activity” need not have some relationship to one another; where Government's arguments and to an extent the indictment reflected that most of the enterprise members charged operated as a stereotypical organized crime group, engaging in conventional variety of illegal activities, with added role of serving in effect as a death squad, such was “pattern” enough to satisfy the statute. U.S. v. Castellano, S.D.N.Y.1985, 610 F.Supp. 1359. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 28

In prosecution in which defendants were found guilty of conspiracy in violation of this chapter, although the mail and wire fraud offenses which served as additional predicate offenses were related to the bribery scheme, which comprised the initial predicate offense, they were separate offenses for purposes of establishing a pattern of racketeering activity. U.S. v. Marcello, E.D.La.1982, 537 F.Supp. 1364, affirmed 703 F.2d 805, rehearing denied 707 F.2d 515, rehearing denied 708 F.2d 720, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 341, 464 U.S. 935, 78 L.Ed.2d 309, post-conviction relief granted 876 F.2d 1147. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Relation back doctrine extended from initial common law fraud claims to subsequent claim under Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), since shareholder was on notice that he could have been subject to liability for those fraudulent acts under RICO theory ever since original complaint was filed. Feinberg v. Katz, S.D.N.Y.2002, 2002 WL 1751135, Unreported. Limitation Of Actions 127(3)

182. Robbery, pattern of racketeering

Tennessee robbery by New York Vietnamese street gang members was sufficiently related to gang affairs to constitute predicate act by gang to support convictions under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where member proposed robbing store that he believed was run by Vietnamese people, member

made proposal at place where members were staying, member took other members with him to execute robbery, selection of Asian target and manner of robbery's perpetration were indistinguishable from manner of gang's operations, and members turned loot over to gang leader. U.S. v. Thai, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1994, 29 F.3d 785, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 456, 513 U.S. 977, 130 L.Ed.2d 364, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 496, 513 U.S. 993, 130 L.Ed.2d 406, mandamus denied 1995 WL 450972. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 49

183. Sales, pattern of racketeering

Evidence failed to establish that seller of retail grocery stores and finance company engaged in a “pattern” of racketeering activity regarding sale of the stores to purchasers, where evidence indicated that sellers and company only engaged in approximately one month of breach of contract activity. River City Markets, Inc. v. Flem- ing Foods West, Inc., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1992, 960 F.2d 1458. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Nineteen-month period during which real estate sellers and professionals allegedly defrauded minority home purchasers was insufficient to establish closed-ended continuity necessary to show pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Wiltshire v. Dhanraj, E.D.N.Y.2005, 421 F.Supp.2d 544. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Vendor's allegation that purchasers misrepresented that they had received loan “commitment” to convince vendor to authorize voluntary subordination of its purchase money mortgage or to persuade state judge to “so order” authorization did not state “pattern” of racketeering activity; vendor alleged no more than single scheme which took place over finite period of eight months, and there were no allegations from which threat of future or continuing criminal conduct could be found or inferred. Ruby Development Corp. v. Charrim Development Corp., E.D.N.Y.1990, 742 F.Supp. 1213. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Three sales of used copy machines as new within approximately two years did not amount to a “pattern of racketeering activity” for purposes of Racketeer Influence Corrupt Organizations Act. Disandro-Smith & Associates, P.C., Inc. v. Edron Copier Service, Inc., D.R.I.1989, 722 F.Supp. 912. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 27

Investor in condominium project could not establish requisite “pattern of racketeering activity” necessary to state viable RICO claim against project promoters because all predicate acts of mail and/or securities fraud were alleged to further only single, isolated, finite scheme to sell interests in project; pattern did not exist merely because ten investors ultimately purchased interests in project. Logan v. Ledford, M.D.Tenn.1988, 699 F.Supp. 141. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

184. Securities violations, pattern of racketeering

Investor failed to establish threat of repetition of past conduct sufficient to satisfy “continuity” requirement of civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against bank based upon alleged conduct of its subsidiary, while performing bookkeeping and clearinghouse functions for investor, in relation to broker's

churning of investor's account, inasmuch as broker, who was only person shown to have actively participated in churning and apparently only one with any financial incentive to do so, could not have expected to continue manipulating investor's account after investor's owner returned from lengthy honeymoon and checked account, and allegation that threat existed to defraud others was not sufficiently supported. Pyramid Securities Ltd. v. IB Res- olution, Inc., C.A.D.C.1991, 924 F.2d 1114, 288 U.S.App.D.C. 157, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 85, 502 U.S. 822, 116 L.Ed.2d 57. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Bank shareholders' failure to meet filing requirements of Securities Exchange Act in soliciting proxies did not constitute RICO predicate act of fraud in sale of securities. First Pacific Bancorp, Inc. v. Bro, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1988, 847 F.2d 542. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Actions of securities brokerage firm and its employee, as alleged by investor, would, at worst, comprise one scheme to generate excessive sales commissions by recommending unsuitable investments and churning investor's account and, thus, investor failed to allege continuity necessary to establish “pattern” of racketeering activity required for civil RICO action. Deviries v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., C.A.8 (Mo.) 1986, 805 F.2d 326. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

Registration statement filed with the SEC by printer who sold bank notes to purchaser through auction house, stating that printer may sell other remaining material from its archives, did not provide evidence of any likelihood of future fraud to support finding of continuity or threat of continuity required for RICO claim. Barrett v. U.S. Banknote Corp., S.D.N.Y.1992, 806 F.Supp. 1094. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Related omissions of material fact in connection with sale of securities occurring simultaneously and undertaken for the single goal of generating demand for stock in corporation did not amount to a pattern of racketeering activity. Koulouris v. Estate of Chalmers, N.D.Ill.1992, 790 F.Supp. 1372. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Accountants' alleged securities fraud with respect to 15 separate investments by three investors over course of four years lacked continuity and was not pattern of racketeering activity. Myers v. Finkle, E.D.Va.1990, 758 F.Supp. 1102, affirmed in part, reversed in part on other grounds 950 F.2d 165. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 29

Predicate acts of securities fraud and wire fraud were sufficiently related to satisfy pattern requirement of civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim arising from minority shareholder's sale of her shares to corporation; predicate acts were performed by same persons and directed towards same victim with purpose of purchasing victim's stock for less than its true value. Helman v. Murry's Steaks, Inc., D.Del.1990, 742 F.Supp. 860, reargument denied 743 F.Supp. 289. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Securities brokerage house that alleged that customers engaged in predicate acts and courses of conduct constituting fraud in sale of securities and that various customers made separate misstatements of fact concerning their

abilities to pay for all transactions conducted on their behalf by brokerage house adequately pleaded “pattern” of racketeering as required under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. Smith, D.Ariz.1989, 736 F.Supp. 1030. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Multiple acts of false filings with Securities and Exchange Commission and transmittal of those filings through use of mails, sufficiently pled relationship between acts for purposes of claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, since acts were related and not isolated or sporadic, even though acts could be considered part of single scheme to defraud corporation's shareholders and officers. Azurite Corp. Ltd. v. Amster & Co., S.D.N.Y.1990, 730 F.Supp. 571. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Alleged single set of misrepresentations regarding subsidiary's financial prospects could not provide basis for two predicate acts under RICO, even if the misrepresentations resulted in two separate violations of securities laws, through purchase of subsidiary's shares and through placement of debt securities to finance purchase. Polycast Technology Corp. v. Uniroyal, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1989, 728 F.Supp. 926. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 32

Investors' allegations concerning stockbroker's misrepresentations and bad investment advice over several years as part of alleged scheme were insufficient to plead pattern of racketeering activity and to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. McIntyre v. Okurowski, D.Mass.1989, 717 F.Supp. 10. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

Allegations by purchasers of stock of securities fraud, mail fraud, and wire fraud, by corporation and its principals were sufficiently related and continuous to constitute “pattern of racketeering activity” necessary to bring claim for violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; acts allegedly constituted part of on going scheme to defraud shareholders by fostering false impression that corporation was rapidly growing company, and scheme was allegedly carried out over period of years and presumably would have continued, albeit not indefinitely, if new management had not ousted previous management. In re Crazy Eddie Securities Litiga- tion, E.D.N.Y.1989, 714 F.Supp. 1285. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31; Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

Alleged pattern of excessive markups in sale of securities, occurring over the course of two years, satisfied RICO pattern requirement. Elysian Federal Sav. Bank v. First Interregional Equity Corp., D.N.J.1989, 713 F.Supp. 737. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Investors' complaint failed to satisfy pattern requirement under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; action arose from alleged failure to execute securities trading orders in timely manner, complaint named only two victims, and alleged improprieties were of short duration, lasting less than two months, perpetrated by one named individual and three corporations. Schwartz v. Philadelphia Nat. Bank, E.D.Pa.1988, 701 F.Supp. 92, affirmed 879 F.2d 859. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

Under Oregon and federal law, investment companies' and its employee's alleged acts of securities violation, all part of single scheme to defraud, did not meet pattern requirement under RICO statutes. Pincetich v. Jeanfreau, D.Or.1988, 699 F.Supp. 1469. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Investors failed to sufficiently allege pattern of racketeering activity by accounting firm through lone Rule 10b-5 claim stemming from purchase of stock and notes in company that firm had certified. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Eisner & Lubin, D.N.J.1988, 685 F.Supp. 449, affirmed 897 F.2d 521, affirmed 897 F.2d 523. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

Fact that alleged civil RICO violation involved both note sales and bond issue and involved several purchasers did not establish a “pattern of racketeering activity,” as required to state a claim under RICO, where the sale of notes was intertwined extricably with sale of bonds and defendants were alleged to have committed very similar predicate acts during relatively brief period of time causing similar injuries to nine or more victims. Design Time, Inc. v. Synthetic Diamond Technology, Inc., N.D.Ind.1987, 674 F.Supp. 1564. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Even if factual allegations had been sufficient to support assertion that partnership which was defendant in action alleging violation of civil RICO statute had been involved with limited partnerships other than those invested in by plaintiffs, plaintiffs had not demonstrated that defendant partnership engaged in other fraudulent activity unrelated and sufficiently unconnected in time and substance from scheme asserted in instant case or that defendant partnership engaged in separate criminal activities elsewhere, so as to satisfy pattern of racketeering activity requirement of civil RICO statute. Nerman v. Alexander Grant & Co., W.D.Mo.1987, 671 F.Supp. 649, reconsideration granted 683 F.Supp. 1293. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Allegations that corporation committed securities fraud in relation to its standby commitment for municipal bonds for two separate cities sufficiently alleged “pattern of racketeering activity” to state RICO claim. Federal Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Provo Excelsior Ltd., D.Utah 1987, 664 F.Supp. 1405. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 72

Investors alleged sufficient “pattern” of racketeering activity to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiz- ations Act claim against broker-dealer of securities and vice-president; in addition to over 100 unauthorized transactions on four different accounts, there were allegations of forgery, fraudulent misrepresentations, and manipulation of known compulsive gambler to accomplish securities fraud, and predicate acts were sufficiently separated in time and place to be viewed as separate transactions. Donato v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., N.D.Ill.1987, 663 F.Supp. 669. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

Allegations of investment churning were sufficient to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act, despite contention churning offense involved only one fraudulent scheme, of which predicate acts were simply constituent elements of singular offense; declining to follow Northern Trust Bank O'Hare, N.A. v. Inryco, 615 F.Supp. 828 (E.D.Ill.); Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 615 F.Supp. 836 (E.D.Ill.); Professional As- sets Management, Inc. v. Penn Square Bank, N.A., 616 F.Supp. 1418 (W.D.Okl.); Allington v. Carpenter, 619 F.Supp. 474 (C.D.Cal.). Bergen v. Rothschild, D.D.C.1986, 648 F.Supp. 582. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

Investors' allegations of thousands of fraudulent transactions over course of time involving large class of investors and entailing numerous mailings and use of telephone communications regarding offering materials and related documents, investment contracts, technical and financial analyses, and legal opinions, and establishment of marketing and service network for investment contracts and systems sufficiently alleged existence of “pattern of racketeering activity” for purposes of civil RICO claims, rather than alleging single scheme that did not constitute “pattern.” In re Energy Systems Equipment Leasing Securities Litigation, E.D.N.Y.1986, 642 F.Supp. 718. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Investors, who alleged that account representative for brokerage house fraudulently induced them to open discretionary options trading account by misrepresenting risk in option tradings, and that representative churned their account, alleged predicate act satisfying both “continuity” and “relationship” factors, and thus adequately alleged RICO “pattern.” Levine v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1986, 639 F.Supp. 1391. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Criminal violation of securities fraud statute section 10(b) and allegation of conspiracy to violate that section constitutes separate predicate offenses involving fraud in the sale of securities, establishing the “pattern” of racketeering necessary for civil RICO liability. Kronfeld v. First Jersey Nat. Bank, D.N.J.1986, 638 F.Supp. 1454. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

While plaintiff's allegations of two predicate acts of mail, wire, and securities fraud as part of single scheme to defraud were sufficient threshold showing of pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, alleged facts as a whole did not establish existence of pattern of racketeering, in absence of proof of threat of continuity; only single bond offering with allegedly misleading official statement delivered to thousands of investors was involved. Sheftelman v. Jones, N.D.Ga.1986, 636 F.Supp. 263. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Customer's complaint against brokerage firm to effect that predicate acts of fraud constituted a pattern of activity and were carried out in furtherance of affairs of an enterprise that was involved in interstate commerce was sufficient to state claims under the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act notwithstanding failure to assert that customer suffered a distinct racketeering injury aside from injury inflicted upon him by brokerage firms' predicate acts of securities fraud. Smith v. Oppenheimer and Co., Inc., W.D.Mich.1985, 635 F.Supp. 936. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 75

Allegation that branch manager of securities firm and officer of security firm's subsidiary participated in malicious liquidation of customer's securities account was insufficient to establish pattern of racketeering activity so as to state claim under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c), creating civil cause of action for conduct of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity, even if each of multiple sales involved in liquidation violated securities laws; each sale was part of single transaction. Modern Settings, Inc. v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1986, 629 F.Supp. 860. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

Customer had failed to assert two predicate acts which were sufficiently related to constitute a pattern in connection with the conduct of an ongoing enterprise, as required to sustain federal or state RICO claims [18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.; West's F.S.A. § 895.01 et seq.], where asserted violations which plaintiff sought to amend securities action to add were the same claims based on the same legal theories as those which had been previously asserted and dismissed for failing to state a claim, and only a single claim of misrepresentation against defendant securities brokerage remained in action. Zerman v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1986, 628 F.Supp. 1509. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

185. Shareholder actions, pattern of racketeering

If majority shareholder's alleged actions in “forcing” other investors to make capital contributions by threatening to issue and buy new stock at an unreasonably low price to dilute investors' interest, in seeking to prevent company's CEO from selling his stock to another shareholder and in seeking to compel investors to consent to sale of the company amounted to extortion, a jury could find that majority shareholder engaged in a “pattern” of extortion within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Shields Enterprises, Inc. v. First Chicago Corp., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1992, 975 F.2d 1290, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 80

Seller of stock in corporation failed to demonstrate sufficient pattern of racketeering activity to recover under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) from buyer, another shareholder, and corporation for failure to disclose before sale of stock that other shareholder was embezzling from corporation, as asserted predicate acts were disjointed in time and sporadic in nature and posed no threat of continued criminal activity. Brode v. Cohn, C.A.8 (Ark.) 1992, 966 F.2d 1237. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Closely held, family corporation's acquisition of stock of four minority investors did not establish pattern of fraud necessary for claim under Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Short v. Bel- leville Shoe Mfg. Co., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1990, 908 F.2d 1385, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 2887, 501 U.S. 1250, 115 L.Ed.2d 1052. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

Alleged racketeering activity which continued over a ten-year period constituted long-term conduct meeting the RICO pattern requirement, notwithstanding the “closed-ended” nature of the conduct which was directed to the accomplishment of the single discreet objective of forcing out the minority in a single corporate structure. Walk v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R., C.A.4 1989, 890 F.2d 688, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 29

Predicate acts of racketeering alleged by minority shareholder in corporation as part of scheme to force shareholder to sell its minority interest lacked continuity required to establish pattern of racketeering activity for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); predicate acts alleged extended only over a few months and threatened no future criminal conduct. Shields Enterprises, Inc. v. First Chicago Corp., N.D.Ill.1991, 762 F.Supp. 1331, affirmed in part, reversed in part on other grounds 975 F.2d 1290, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Minority shareholder adequately alleged Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) pattern of racketeering activity with respect to defendants, who allegedly engaged in variety of predicate acts of mail fraud over two-year period, which harmed not only minority shareholder, but other stockholders as well and which had multiple aims, including but not limited to diminishing shareholder's say in corporate affairs. Grafman v. Century Broadcasting Corp., N.D.Ill.1990, 743 F.Supp. 544. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) did not apply to attempt by former shareholders to acquire a corporation, which attempt was finally terminated by repurchase of shareholders' shares by corporation; complaining shareholders were not able to establish that conduct of former shareholders was part of con-

tinuing pattern of racketeering, as opposed to one-time transaction which had been completed. Lou v. Belzberg, S.D.N.Y.1990, 728 F.Supp. 1010. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

Majority shareholders' actions did not constitute “racketeering activity” within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; majority shareholders allegedly conspired to cause merger of corporations for sole purpose of eliminating minority shareholder, failed to disclose to minority shareholder that they were engaged in negotiations to sell surviving corporations after merger, failed to make any provisions in merger terms for shares of corporations owned by purchaser from minority shareholder, grossly undervalued minority shareholder's shares in connection with merger, altered books and records of corporation to support undervaluation of stock, failed to notify minority shareholders of method used to value stocks in connection with merger, and refused to pay minority shareholder retained earnings which were due and owing. Ferdinand Drexel Inv. Co., Inc. v. Alibert, E.D.Pa.1989, 723 F.Supp. 313, affirmed 904 F.2d 694, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 154, 498 U.S. 856, 112 L.Ed.2d 120. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 15

Shareholder's allegations regarding diversion of corporation's profits were insufficient to establish more than single scheme to defraud and thus did not satisfy “multiple scheme” test for establishing RICO pattern of racketeering activity, even though shareholder alleged numerous racketeering acts designed to accomplish scheme, including diversion of monies earned by jointly owned corporation, misrepresentation of actual value of business, attempt to coerce shareholder into assigning his interest in corporation to defendants and dissipation of remaining assets of corporation. Wilson v. Askew, W.D.Ark.1989, 709 F.Supp. 146. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Plaintiff who alleged improper conduct by majority shareholders and directors of corporation in causing additional shares of stock to be issued to them did not allege a pattern and practice of racketeering as required for RICO, as all of the claims arose from a single set of acts aimed toward the single primary goal of increasing the defendants' ownership interests at the expense of the minority shareholders. Lochhead v. Alacano, D.Utah 1988, 697 F.Supp. 406. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

Alleged false statements and information about corporation's financial picture were nothing more than single nondisclosure and, thus, did not satisfy “pattern” requirement, for purposes of permitting investors to maintain civil action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act arising out of alleged securities fraud. Data Controls North, Inc. v. Financial Corp. of America, Inc., D.Md.1988, 688 F.Supp. 1047, affirmed 875 F.2d 314. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

Minority shareholder's claim, that majority shareholder committed series of acts to force him to sell his stock, including diversion of cash and concealment of other fraudulent acts, was insufficient to demonstrate a pattern of racketeering activity necessary to support his RICO action. Arnold v. Moran, E.D.Va.1988, 687 F.Supp. 232. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Shareholders' claims arising out of alleged misrepresentations that corporation owned land and water bottling factory in Ecuador, owned trademark, and was affiliated with other Ecuadorian corporation and arising out of investment to buy out departing directors alleged degree of continuity plus relationship between, or among, pre-

dicate acts and alleged pattern of racketeering activity; alleged goal of scam was not short-lived and did not have obvious terminating goal or date. Ohman v. Kahn, S.D.N.Y.1988, 685 F.Supp. 1302.

186. Single act, pattern of racketeering

Single act of making telephone call that encompassed two criminal offenses, both state bribery and federal extortion, could not form basis of pattern of racketeering so as to support conviction of RICO charge. U.S. v. Wal- gren, C.A.9 (Wash.) 1989, 885 F.2d 1417. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

It is not proper under RICO to charge two predicate acts where one action violates two statutes, though it would not be improper to charge predicate offenses where two different acts committed during course of single episode or single transaction violated two statutes. U.S. v. Kragness, C.A.8 (Minn.) 1987, 830 F.2d 842. Indictment And Information 125(41)

Single payment could not constitute “pattern” required for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, no matter how many statutes were violated. Mylan Laboratories, Inc. v. Akzo, N.V., D.Md.1991, 770 F.Supp. 1053. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

One allegedly overpriced contract did not involve type of repeated criminal activity at which Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) is properly directed. Farberware, Inc. v. Groben, S.D.N.Y.1991, 764 F.Supp. 296. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

187. Single objective, pattern of racketeering

Alleged racketeering acts attributed to escrow agent in real estate investment project, that of sending mailings and wires in course of its involvement in offering, taken together comprised only single effort to facilitate single financial endeavor of purchase and renovation of resort, and therefore could not satisfy “pattern” requirement under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Schultz v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat. Bank, N.A., C.A.1 (Mass.) 1996, 94 F.3d 721. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Alleged acts of tenants' association, association's president, and association's attorneys to prevent or delay sale of apartment building or secure ransom for allowing sale to proceed did not demonstrate “pattern of racketeering activity” based on closed period of continuous criminal activity, and, thus, real estate developer and its broker failed to state claim against those defendants under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where scheme entailed but single discrete injury consisting of loss of sale or payment of ransom and injury was suffered by only three victims, even though developer and broker alleged 15 predicate acts during three-year period. Edmondson & Gallagher v. Alban Towers Tenants Ass'n, C.A.D.C.1995, 48 F.3d 1260, 310 U.S.App.D.C. 409. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27; Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 30

In determining whether there has been a “pattern of racketeering activity” for purposes of civil RICO claim, object of related predicate acts is factor to be considered in assessing criminal dimension and degree. Walk v. Bal-

timore and Ohio R.R., C.A.4 (Md.) 1988, 847 F.2d 1100, vacated on other grounds 109 S.Ct. 3235, 492 U.S. 914, 106 L.Ed.2d 583, on remand 890 F.2d 688, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 28

Majority shareholder who made several secret withdrawals from corporate income in attempt to have loans he had made to the company repaid out of company funds, with repayments to continue until the loans had been repaid with interest, had a single objective and his actions thus did not amount to a “pattern” of RICO activity. Garbade v. Great Divide Min. and Mill. Corp., C.A.10 (Colo.) 1987, 831 F.2d 212. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Buyer of auto leasing company and its wholly owned subsidiary failed to allege pattern of racketeering activity sufficient to support Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim against seller and others who participated in sale, although buyer alleged various misrepresentations by seller, where alleged racketeering acts were all designed to defraud one victim, the buyer, on the one occasion of the sale. Lipin Enterprises Inc. v. Lee, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1986, 803 F.2d 322. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Fact that there is but one objective underlying separate acts of racketeering does not diminish the applicability of this chapter to those actions. U. S. v. Starnes, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1981, 644 F.2d 673, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 116, 454 U.S. 826, 70 L.Ed.2d 101. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

Where enterprise existed solely for purpose of renovating hotel, it did not reveal threat of continued racketeering activity so that alleged fraud did not amount to pattern of racketeering activity. McCormack Intern. Corp. v. Vohra, S.D.N.Y.1994, 858 F.Supp. 415. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Husband failed to establish open-ended continuity required for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against his wife and her attorneys in connection with her conduct in divorce action; all of predicate acts arose from single event of allegedly attempting to ruin husband's law practice so that he would be forced to divulge secret funds and incomes that wife and her attorneys believed he had, and predicate acts were thus isolated and did not form a pattern. Streck v. Peters, D.Hawai'i 1994, 855 F.Supp. 1156. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Tenants association did not engage in a pattern of racketeering activity necessary to support real estate developer's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against association and its attorneys when association attempted to exercise its right of first refusal under District of Columbia consumer protection laws in order to block developer's purchase of apartment building. Edmondson and Gallagher v. Alban Towers Tenants Ass'n, D.D.C.1993, 829 F.Supp. 420, affirmed in part , vacated in part 48 F.3d 1260, 310 U.S.App.D.C. 409. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Allegedly fraudulent representations that payment was on its way to contractor were not separate and distinguishable multiple acts involving use of mails or wires to execute fraudulent scheme and, therefore, would constitute only unitary predicate act under RICO; although promise was reiterated on at most three occasions, it re-

mained single promise. W.E. Darin Const. Enterprises, Inc. v. Detroit Coke Co., W.D.N.Y.1993, 814 F.Supp. 325. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Alleged mail and wire fraud to obtain plaintiff's computer program by hiring him as corporate president and fir- ing him after program was obtained was not racketeering pattern, even if multiple schemes were not necessary to establish pattern; repetitive acts delineated singular purpose to obtain discreet area of know how from single victim; and no facts suggested that scheme could be anticipated to continue or to repeat itself. Benard v. Hoff, D.Md.1989, 727 F.Supp. 211. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Single scheme directed only toward one victim constitutes “pattern” under RICO if scheme is open-ended and has no single goal. Bumgarner v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Kansas, Inc., D.Kan.1988, 716 F.Supp. 493. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Enterprise with single purpose, such as fraud, constitutes pattern, for purpose of providing basis of RICO violation, only if purpose has no obvious terminating goal or date. Krantz v. Schlesinger, E.D.N.Y.1987, 683 F.Supp. 32. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Allegedly misleading acts taken by attorneys who were defendants in action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1961 et seq.] did not create a “pattern” of racketeering activity as defined by 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(5), where every alleged action was in furtherance of isolated fraudulent episode of alleged scheme to defraud investor into delivering releases and letter of apology in exchange for nothing of value. Utz v. Correa, S.D.N.Y.1986, 631 F.Supp. 592. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Series of acts which occurred within a two-month period, consisting of two telephone calls setting up conference between three individuals and one individual's transfer of letters of credit as result of those meetings, constituted a single alleged criminal episode related exclusively to telecast of heavyweight prizefight and, thus, did not constitute a “pattern” of racketeering activity for purposes of liability under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1962(b, c) and 1964(c). Medallion TV Enterprises Inc. v. SelecTV of Califor- nia, Inc., C.D.Cal.1986, 627 F.Supp. 1290, affirmed 833 F.2d 1360, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 3241, 492 U.S. 917, 106 L.Ed.2d 588. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

188. Single scheme, pattern of racketeering

Closed-ended continuity was lacking on creditor's claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) which was based upon allegations that debtor engaged in single scheme to defraud two creditors by quickly moving his assets to his relatives and then concealing existence of those assets during his bankruptcy proceeding, since most predicate acts occurred over period of little more than one year, no additional predicate acts occurred for more than one year, later act involved same misrepresentations that debtor previously made to his creditors, creditors were not incrementally injured by later predicate act, and every factor other than duration cut against finding of closed-ended continuity. First Capital Asset Management, Inc. v. Satinwood, Inc., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2004, 385 F.3d 159. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Predicate acts which arise under single scheme may be “pattern” for RICO purposes if they are continuous and related. Menasco, Inc. v. Wasserman, C.A.4 (Md.) 1989, 886 F.2d 681. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 28

Attorney failed to allege sufficient “pattern of racketeering activity” to state RICO claim against another attorney, with whom she served as cocounsel in case, for diverting settlement payments to his firm; even assuming there were multiple acts of mail fraud, those acts were part of single scheme, were committed against only one victim, gave rise to only one distinct economic injury, and did not give rise to threat of continuing illegal activity. Sutherland v. O'Malley, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1989, 882 F.2d 1196, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 27

Predicate acts of arson, bankruptcy and wire fraud committed over four-month period to deprive four different petroleum companies of oil by conveying fraudulent picture of distributor's net worth were sufficiently “continuous” to constitute a “pattern of racketeering activity,” notwithstanding that acts were all part of single scheme. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1989, 875 F.2d 1271. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29; Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 30

Mere fact that predicate acts relate to same overall scheme does not necessarily mean that acts failed to satisfy RICO “pattern” requirement. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, C.A.7 (Ind.) 1989, 875 F.2d 1271. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Creditor of dissolved computer services corporation did not adequately plead a pattern of racketeering activity required to state a civil RICO claim where, although the allegations pointed to fraudulent acts spanning seven years, depriving the corporation due of money properly owed to it on many distinct occasions, the events were part of a single scheme perpetrated by the computer services company and its directors against a single victim. Flip Mortg. Corp. v. McElhone, C.A.4 (Va.) 1988, 841 F.2d 531. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 27

Repeated infliction of economic injury on a single victim, through false preparation of 19 false invoices, pursuant to a single scheme was sufficient to establish a pattern of racketeering activity for purposes of civil RICO action, where each false invoice resulted in distinct injury. Liquid Air Corp. v. Rogers, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1987, 834 F.2d 1297, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 3241, 492 U.S. 917, 106 L.Ed.2d 588. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 30

Pattern of racketeering activity necessary for violation under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act does not necessarily require more than one unlawful scheme. Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat. State, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1987, 832 F.2d 36. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Racketeering acts committed pursuant to single-fraudulent scheme can constitute “pattern” under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, regardless of whether scheme is potentially ongoing or open ended,

as notion of continuity does not compel requirement of open endedness. Barticheck v. Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat. State, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1987, 832 F.2d 36. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Underlying illegal acts are not required to be part of different criminal episode to be “pattern of racketeering activity” within meaning of RICO; declining to follow International Data Bank, Ltd. v. Zepkin, 812 F.2d 149 (4th Cir.); Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir.); Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, 810 F.2d 925 (10th Cir.); Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22 (1st Cir.); Morgan v. Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970 (7th Cir.) ; clarifying Schreiber Distributing Co. v. Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F.2d 1393 (9th Cir.). California Architec- tural Bldg. Products, Inc. v. Franciscan Ceramics, Inc., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1987, 818 F.2d 1466, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 698, 484 U.S. 1006, 98 L.Ed.2d 650, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 699, 484 U.S. 1006, 98 L.Ed.2d 650. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Alleged scheme to keep corporation afloat in order to loot corporation did not constitute “pattern of racketeering activity” required to establish private cause of action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; although the alleged acts, which included check kiting scheme, diversion of corporate assets, and defrauding of creditors, were sufficiently related to form pattern, acts constituted mere subdivisions of one fraudulent scheme; disagreeing with United States v. Ianniello, 808 F.2d 184 (2d Cir.). Madden v. Gluck, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1987, 815 F.2d 1163, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 86, 484 U.S. 823, 98 L.Ed.2d 48. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Allegations that corporation's directors secretly purchased real property and resold it at a substantial profit to the corporation failed to establish pattern of racketeering required to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; there was no indication, either in the nature of fraud itself or in any of other circumstances suggested, that activity was other than isolated incident, and undisputed facts revealed that single scheme at issue involved one victim, and had a single goal of recovery of secret profits by means of self-dealing in sale of business center. Torwest DBC, Inc. v. Dick, C.A.10 (Colo.) 1987, 810 F.2d 925. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Oil company failed to prove that former employee and others who wrongfully converted liquid petroleum gas engaged in a “pattern of racketeering activity” sufficient to support claim under Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act; actions of defendants comprised one continuing scheme to convert gas from pipeline, but there was no proof that defendants had ever engaged in such activities in the past and there was no proof they were engaged in other criminal activities elsewhere; record revealed one isolated fraudulent scheme. Super- ior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, C.A.8 (Ark.) 1986, 785 F.2d 252. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Real property owners' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint against mortgage lender and unnamed individual defendants did not adequately allege “pattern of racketeering activity” via conclusory statement that “[i]n doing the aforesaid acts, Defendants and each of them were participating in and have participated in a scheme of racketeering as that term is defined in RICO”; complaint did not adequately identify predicate acts that formed basis of alleged “scheme of racketeering.” Izenberg v. ETS Services, LLC,

C.D.Cal.2008, 589 F.Supp.2d 1193. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

A single scheme which lasts only a short period does not have the requisite continuity for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, even if there are multiple predicate acts and victims. Lycan v. Wal- ters, S.D.Ind.1995, 904 F.Supp. 884. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Copyright infringement defendant failed to adequately allege continuing pattern of racketeering activity to support his counterclaim for RICO violation; defendant alleged only single scheme (pursuance of lawsuit based on allegedly invalid copyright), single victim (himself), single injury (damage done to his competitive position). Harris Custom Builders, Inc. v. Hoffmeyer, N.D.Ill.1993, 834 F.Supp. 256. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Allegations of multiple racketeering acts committed in perpetration of one scheme over period of a year do not satisfy Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act's (RICO's) “pattern” requirements. Harris Trust and Sav. Bank v. Salomon Bros., Inc., N.D.Ill.1992, 813 F.Supp. 1340. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 72

Single scheme with a definite termination date can constitute a pattern of racketeering activity if there is a showing of a threat of continuation of the activity. Crabtree v. Tristar Automotive Group, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1991, 776 F.Supp. 155. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Limited partnership formed to fund development and marketing of computer software program adequately alleged “pattern” of racketeering activity against corporation that was to develop and market program even though there was only single victim and only single overall scheme to divert royalties; partnership alleged numerous predicate acts of mail fraud occurring over period of several years intended to restructure marketing agreement and limit partnership's royalties. Com-Tech Associates v. Computer Associates Intern., Inc., E.D.N.Y.1990, 753 F.Supp. 1078, affirmed 938 F.2d 1574. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Continuity required for claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act does not require proof of multiple schemes; multiple predicate acts within a single scheme may suffice. Reinfeld v. Riklis, S.D.N.Y.1989, 722 F.Supp. 1077. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Proof of multiple schemes was not required to establish pattern of racketeering for purposes of civil RICO claim. Amsler v. Corwin Petroleum Corp., S.D.N.Y.1989, 715 F.Supp. 103. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

One scheme can be enough, in certain circumstances, to establish pattern of racketeering activity under RICO. Snider v. Lone Star Art Trading Co., Inc., E.D.Mich.1987, 672 F.Supp. 977. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Single effort or scheme to defraud is not pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. One-O-One Enterprises, Inc. v. Caruso, D.D.C.1987, 668 F.Supp. 693, affirmed 848 F.2d 1283, 270 U.S.App.D.C. 251. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Civil RICO count alleging single scheme to defraud would not be dismissed on ground it did not satisfy RICO pattern of racketeering activity requirement; single scheme to defraud could satisfy pattern requirement. Tri- Continental Leasing Corp. v. Cicerchia, D.Mass.1987, 664 F.Supp. 635. Conspiracy 18

Physician failed to allege “pattern” of racketeering activity, in action against attorneys and newspaper publishers who allegedly filed lawsuits and published articles in effort to defraud physician, in that allegations involved only single scheme. Manax v. McNamara, W.D.Tex.1987, 660 F.Supp. 657, affirmed 842 F.2d 808. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, predicate acts must each be independently motivated criminal episodes, not merely ministerial acts performed in furtherance of single fraudulent scheme. Siegel v. Tucker, Anthony & R.L. Day, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1987, 658 F.Supp. 550. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 27

“Pattern of racketeering activity” required by Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act may be satisfied by single scheme. SI Handling Systems, Inc. v. Heisley, E.D.Pa.1986, 658 F.Supp. 362. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Former wife failed to allege pattern of racketeering activity sufficient to state civil RICO claim against former husband, who allegedly defrauded former wife of her interest in certain real property, where case only involved one victim who suffered only one injury on one occasion; predicate acts, while multiple, represented only one scheme which necessarily ended after its single accomplishment. Abernathy v. Erickson, N.D.Ill.1987, 657 F.Supp. 504. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Pattern of racketeering activity may be proven even when only one fraudulent scheme exists, for purpose of establishing Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim; declining to follow Fleet Management Systems, Inc. v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 627 F.Supp. 550 (C.D.Ill.). Hill v. Equitable Bank, D.Del.1987, 655 F.Supp. 631, affirmed 851 F.2d 691, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 791, 488 U.S. 1008, 102 L.Ed.2d 782. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Manufacturer's single scheme of efforts to market mortar and brick bonding compound for use in construction industry was not “pattern of racketeering activity” within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act. Behunin v. Dow Chemical Co., D.Colo.1986, 650 F.Supp. 1387. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Acts in furtherance of a single artifice or scheme for obtaining money or property, involving extortion, mail fraud, and wire fraud, involve only a single scheme and, thus, fail to allege a pattern of racketeering activity ne-

cessary to state a claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Brent Liquid Transport, Inc. v. GATX Leasing Corp., N.D.Miss.1986, 650 F.Supp. 467. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Allegations were insufficient to meet Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act's “pattern” requirement where there was alleged “scheme and conspiratorial plan” to defraud investors of their holdings in corporation, but there was nothing more than single allegedly fraudulent effort. Baum v. Phillips, Appel & Walden, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1986, 648 F.Supp. 1518, affirmed 867 F.2d 776, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 114, 493 U.S. 835, 107 L.Ed.2d 75, rehearing denied 110 S.Ct. 524, 493 U.S. 985, 107 L.Ed.2d 524. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

In order to assert claim under Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, multiple criminal episodes beyond mere short-term scheme was required to establish “pattern” of racketeering activity; declining to follow R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir.); Trak Microcomputer Corp. v. WearneBros., 628 F.Supp. 1089 (N.D.Ill.); Conan Properties v. Mattel, Inc., 619 F.Supp. 1167 (S.D.N.Y.). B.J. Skin & Nail Care, Inc. v. International Cosmetic Exchange, Inc., D.Conn.1986, 641 F.Supp. 563. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

More than two related acts are necessary to constitutes “pattern” of racketeering activity, for purposes of civil RICO liability; requisite pattern was lacking where although over 20 predicate acts involving at least three different third parties were committed over a two-year period those acts were merely ministerial acts performed in execution of single alleged fraudulent scheme to deprive plaintiffs of promised commission for bringing two defendants together for commercial endeavor; disagreeing with Conan Properties, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 619 F.Supp. 1167 (S.D.N.Y.); R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1350 (5th Cir.); Alexander T. Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Industries, Inc., 770 F.2d 717 (8th Cir.) and Systems Research, Inc. v. Random, Inc., 614 F.Supp. 494 (N.D.Ill.). Soper v. Simmons Intern., Ltd., S.D.N.Y.1986, 632 F.Supp. 244. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 27

189. Single transaction, pattern of racketeering

Plaintiff's allegations of seven predicate racketeering offenses, including collusion in robbery, mail fraud and wire fraud failed to allege pattern of racketeering activity sufficient to state civil Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, since each alleged predicate offense related solely to compelled sale of plaintiff's house, for which he was sole injured party. Zernik v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, D.D.C.2009, 630 F.Supp.2d 24. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Arrestee's allegation that deputy sheriffs kidnapped and falsely arrested him was insufficient to demonstrate pattern of racketeering activity necessary to establish claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where all acts complained of occurred during single incident. Curry v. Baca, C.D.Cal.2007, 497 F.Supp.2d 1128. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

RICO claims by borrower against bank failed for lack of continuity or pattern where claims were based on one

alleged wrongdoer, one alleged victim, one transaction, and no enterprise. Howard Oaks, Inc. v. Maryland Nat. Bank, D.Md.1993, 810 F.Supp. 674. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27; Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Law firm's activities in allegedly providing false and misleading tax advice and assisting draft of offering circular for equine tax shelter that was structured as limited partnership and activities of accountant in allegedly giving advice and preparing financial statement for circular were not sufficiently continuous to constitute pattern of racketeering activity; information was provided solely in connection with one limited partnership; and there was no allegation of ongoing criminal activity or series of fraudulent transactions. Norman v. Brown, Todd & Hey- burn, D.Mass.1988, 693 F.Supp. 1259. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Alleged securities fraud in connection with purchase of dam project could not constitute “pattern of racketeering activity” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, where all alleged offenses related to one commercial transaction that involved single victim and single injury. Buran Equipment Co., Inc. v. Hydro Elec. Constructors, Inc., N.D.Cal.1987, 656 F.Supp. 864. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

Requisite continuity between predicate acts needed to establish Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act violation was not demonstrated in connection with City College Board's alleged perpetration of fraud on public by retaining manual food operations despite requesting bids and effectively excluding management corporation from vending operations bidding due to shortened contract period, where alleged wrongful mailings occurred within short period of about four months, and if any fraud was involved it embraced single transaction. Robinson v. City Colleges of Chicago, N.D.Ill.1987, 656 F.Supp. 555. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 31

In civil RICO action, more than one transaction or criminal episode is required to constitute pattern of racketeering activity. Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., S.D.Ohio 1986, 656 F.Supp. 49. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Developer of computer software failed to establish “pattern” of racketeering activity, and thus failed to state RICO claim, on part of National Safety Council and its official in fraudulently inducing developer into written contract defendants subsequently breached, as two alleged “schemes,” whereby developer was fraudulently induced by phone and mail to enter into contract, and then to subsequently modify it, were not even two separate transactions or criminal episodes, let alone two schemes. Techreations, Inc. v. National Safety Council, N.D.Ill.1986, 650 F.Supp. 337. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Preparation of audit report by accounting firm, although it involved numerous constituent actions, was a single unified transaction and not a “pattern” of racketeering activity to support civil action under RICO. Professional Assets Management, Inc. v. Penn Square Bank, N.A., W.D.Okla.1985, 616 F.Supp. 1418. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

For purposes of this chapter, each act of criminal activity is counted as an act of racketeering activity even if nu-

merous acts arise out of the same episode. Noland v. Gurley, D.C.Colo.1983, 566 F.Supp. 210. Commerce 82.6; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

General partners of limited partnership, who used partnership assets to purchase property for their own account, incurred no RICO liability to partnership absent evidence of ongoing criminal enterprise; alleged predicate acts of fraud all related to single transaction. In re Securities Groups, Bkrtcy.M.D.Fla.1988, 89 B.R. 204, affirmed 159 B.R. 964, affirmed in part, reversed in part on other grounds 2 F.3d 1098. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 34

190. Social threat, pattern of racketeering

In order to establish requirement under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) that racketeering predicates amount to or pose threat of continued criminal activity, it is not necessary that scheme pose so- cietal threat beyond commission of the criminal predicate acts; overruling Marshall-Silver Constr. Co. v. Mendel , 894 F.2d 593 (per Roth, Circuit Judge, with two Judges concurring and four Judges concurring in judgment). Tabas v. Tabas, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1995, 47 F.3d 1280, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 2269, 515 U.S. 1118, 132 L.Ed.2d 275. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

191. Time of acts, pattern of racketeering--Generally

Issue of whether racketeering conspiracy involving two former New York City police detectives and several organized crime figures continued to exist within five years of commencement of prosecution, for purposes of running of the statute of limitations in detectives' prosecution for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy activity, when two of the crime figures had been arrested and the detectives had retired from the police force and moved to Las Vegas, was for jury; although the defendant detectives were no longer selling confidential law enforcement information, evidence demonstrated that persons offering or performing the racketeering acts always included detectives, that the recipients of such services were members or associates of organized crime, and that the principal purpose of the enterprise was to earn money. U.S. v. Eppolito, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2008, 543 F.3d 25, certiorari denied 129 S.Ct. 1027, 555 U.S. 1148, certiorari denied 129 S.Ct. 1027, 555 U.S. 1148, 173 L.Ed.2d 313. Criminal Law 739(3)

Representation of plaintiff joint venturers by attorney and his firm at some 25 real estate closings during two months involved too short a term to support conclusion that attorney and firm were engaged in long-term criminal conduct at which the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was aimed so as to support finding continuity. Feinstein v. Resolution Trust Corp., C.A.1 (Mass.) 1991, 942 F.2d 34. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Evidence that defendant engaged in prohibited activity for a period of four and one-half years was sufficient to show a “pattern of racketeering activity” for purposes of this chapter prohibiting interstate racketeering. U.S. v. Kaye, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1977, 556 F.2d 855, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 395, 434 U.S. 921, 54 L.Ed.2d 277. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Statute of limitation on civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim is four years. In re New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litigation, D.Mass.2002, 236 F.Supp.2d 69, affirmed 346 F.3d 218. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 113

Investors in Ponzi scheme, which was allegedly orchestrated by bank's accountholder, failed to state racketeering claim based on predicate acts of wire and mail fraud against bank and bank employees and officers, since claims did not allege pattern of racketeering necessary to support claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); schemes had terminated and investors conceded racketeering activity was not open- ended, and predicate acts consisting of communication of checks and letters were alleged to span period of, at most, seven months. Brooks v. Bank of Boulder, D.Colo.1995, 891 F.Supp. 1469. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Length of time during which alleged criminal activity takes place is important factor in determining existence of pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Pemberton Sales & Service, Inc. v. Banco Popular de Puerto Rico, D.Virgin Islands 1994, 877 F.Supp. 961. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Alleged scheme of concealment of underlying predicate acts does not extend length of closed-ended scheme for purposes of determining duration of pattern of racketeering activity in closed-end period in action under Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Resolution Trust Corp. v. S & K Chevrolet, C.D.Ill.1994, 868 F.Supp. 1047. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Lenders' complaint against loan broker and its officer adequately alleged “pattern of racketeering activity” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where length of time was approximately 13 months, at least 13 uses of mails or wires were made in furtherance of alleged fraudulent activity, and wrongdoing involved four fraudulently induced loans from four different lenders based on misstatement of financial condition of two different corporations, each with distinct ownership and engaged in different businesses. A.I. Cred- it Corp. v. Hartford Computer Group, Inc., N.D.Ill.1994, 847 F.Supp. 588. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

In determining whether duration of activity has been sufficient to satisfy requirement of “pattern” of racketeering activity has existed for RICO purposes, courts are not to focus mechanically on raw span of time between first and last predicate act, but are to consider variety of factors such as number and variety of predicate acts, number of victims, presence of separate schemes and occurrence of distinct injuries. In re American Exp. Co. Shareholder Litigation, S.D.N.Y.1993, 840 F.Supp. 260, affirmed 39 F.3d 395. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 25

Scheme by investment advisor to induce pension trust to purchase its interests in fee agreements did not extend over substantial period of time to support claim that advisor was engaged in long-term criminal conduct targeted by Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where sales occurred only four months after alleged deception began; neither advisor's alleged searching for buyer nor its efforts to prevent discovery of any wrongdoing could serve to stretch life of scheme. Harris Trust and Sav. Bank v. Salomon Bros., Inc.,

N.D.Ill.1993, 832 F.Supp. 1169. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

RICO predicate acts may constitute pattern, even though they occur in close temporal proximity or even simultaneously, if there are similarities between them with respect to victim, methodology, goal, etc., and if there is evidence of threat of continuation of racketeering activity. W.E. Darin Const. Enterprises, Inc. v. Detroit Coke Co., W.D.N.Y.1993, 814 F.Supp. 325. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Buyer of integrated, robot-controlled, trim press operation for automated die cast production did not establish “pattern” of racketeering activity, as required in connection with Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) claim against seller corporation, its owners and various investors; duration of alleged racketeering enterprise was only four months, and it was directed toward procuring single order without indications of future contemplated criminal activity. Brunswick Corp., Mercury Marine Div. v. E.A. Doyle Mfg. Co., E.D.Wis.1991, 770 F.Supp. 1351. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27; Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Allegations that tire distributor, its officers, and tire manufacturer's employee systematically defrauded a tire manufacturer over a 13-year period involving repeated infliction of economic injury was sufficient to show a pattern of racketeering activity under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Mutual Trading Corp., N.D.Ill.1990, 749 F.Supp. 869. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

A defeated candidate for lieutenant governor failed to allege a “pattern” of racketeering sufficient to state a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) cause of action against governor and lieutenant governor and their respective campaign committees arising out of the governor and lieutenant governor's solicitation of funds through mail in furtherance of an alleged fraudulent scheme to funnel money from governor's campaign to lieutenant governor's campaign; the close-ended period over which the activity was alleged to have taken place, eight months, was not of sufficient duration to be considered a pattern. Hindes v. Castle, D.Del.1990, 740 F.Supp. 327, affirmed 937 F.2d 868. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Government's civil complaint against union and persons associated with union was sufficient to satisfy pattern of racketeering element of RICO, even though acts alleged occurred over period of time and in variety of places. U.S. v. International Broth. of Teamsters, S.D.N.Y.1989, 708 F.Supp. 1388. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Series of status reports, mailed to investors after they were allegedly fraudulently induced to invest in oil and gas partnership could not, as matter of law, be considered in determining whether investors had established pattern of racketeering activity sufficient to support RICO violation, where mailings were not furtherance of scheme but were made only after scheme had reached fruition. Fisher v. Samuels, N.D.Ill.1988, 691 F.Supp. 63. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 78

Length of time over which predicate acts were allegedly committed is only one of a number of relevant factors

for consideration by court in examining whether pattern of racketeering exists under particular facts of given case. Sheridan v. Weinberger, M.D.Pa.1987, 687 F.Supp. 152. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Car dealer's failure to allege any time span for alleged fraudulent activities by car manufacturer and subsequent franchisees, in allegedly coercing dealer to sell his franchise, and that any other dealers were target of such a scheme, precluded finding of a pattern of racketeering activity on part of manufacturer and subsequent franchisees, as required by Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Cemar, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp. in U.S.A., D.Del.1988, 678 F.Supp. 1091. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Allegations that misleading information was published in series of press releases and in annual report of corporation would be stricken, in civil RICO action alleging inside and outside directors of corporation and petroleum engineering consulting firm participated in multiple activities constituting mail, wire, and securities fraud that constituted engaging in pattern of racketeering activity, where allegations of misleading press releases and annual report related to events which occurred after plaintiffs purchased their stock, and such publications thus could not have proximately caused injuries to plaintiff stock purchasers. Miller v. Calvin, D.Colo.1985, 647 F.Supp. 199. Federal Civil Procedure 1126

For purposes of civil RICO claim the requisite “pattern” of activities, rather than a single criminal episode, was alleged in that although alleged fraud, albeit perpetrated on different plaintiffs, was committed in almost identical manner with similar results and purposes involving victims of similar status or circumstances, those acts took place over a period of almost six years, occurred all over the country and injured approximately 1,400 individual investors. Kronfeld v. First Jersey Nat. Bank, D.N.J.1986, 638 F.Supp. 1454. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Assuming telephone calls and letters to former clients of financial planning businesses fraudulently represented that another firm was lawful successor to financial planning businesses, in order to usurp such businesses' commission income, such acts were not sufficiently distinct in time or substance to comprise pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act, where supposed misrepresentations occurred over short period of time, were made to same people and took substantially same form. Paul S. Mullin & Asso- ciates, Inc. v. Bassett, D.Del.1986, 632 F.Supp. 532. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Since Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act section [18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(5)] provides that a pattern of racketeering activity requires at least two acts of such activity, the last act of which occurred within ten years after commission of prior act, charges as to acts committed by defendants between November 1967 and April 1974 were not “stale” so as to violate defendants' due process rights, as they met the statutory standard, and defendants failed to show any prejudice. U.S. v. Dellacroce, E.D.N.Y.1986, 625 F.Supp. 1387. Constitution- al Law 4580

A “pattern” of racketeering activity requires at least two acts of racketeering activity within ten years of each other, one of which must have occurred after effective date of this chapter, but each act of criminal activity counts as act of racketeering activity, even if numerous acts arise out of same episode. Harper v. New Japan Se-

curities Intern., Inc., C.D.Cal.1982, 545 F.Supp. 1002. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Under section 1962(b) and (c) of this title proscribing association with enterprise and existence of a pattern of racketeering activity, there must be at least two acts of racketeering activity, occurring within ten years of each other, in order for there to be a pattern of such activity. Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of Ku Klux Klan, S.D.Tex.1981, 518 F.Supp. 993. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

Six-month period during which scheme allegedly operated was too short to constitute “substantial period of time” required to find “pattern of racketeering activity” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). In re Windsor Plumbing Supply Co., Inc., Bkrtcy.E.D.N.Y.1994, 170 B.R. 503. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 29

192. ---- Continuity, time of acts, pattern of racketeering

Alleged ongoing understanding of testator's employees concerning the enforceability of non-disclosure agreements did not fraudulently conceal purported heir's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action against personal representatives of estate, as required to equitably toll statute of limitations; heir did not allege that the agreements required anyone to make misrepresentations of any sort, let alone lie under oath. Dummar v. Lummis, C.A.10 (Utah) 2008, 543 F.3d 614. Limitation Of Actions 104(2)

Alleged predicate acts attributed to relative of debtor, which spanned barely seven months, did not extend over sufficiently long period of time to satisfy requirements of closed-ended continuity, for purposes of creditors' claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), which was based on theory of bankruptcy fraud. First Capital Asset Management, Inc. v. Satinwood, Inc., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2004, 385 F.3d 159. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Allegedly fraudulent scheme to induce software developer and other companies to supply free or cut-rate services in producing scheduling system for buyer's client lacked continuity necessary for pattern of racketeering activity, even though developer's contract was not limited to any particular time period; scheme was closed ended lasting at most seven to eight months until completion of program for client, and developer was scheme's only victim. Uni*Quality, Inc. v. Infotronx, Inc., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1992, 974 F.2d 918. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Alleged threat by subcontractor's officers and law firm to put general contractor out of business if it did not pay for construction work, filing of allegedly fraudulent petition for involuntary bankruptcy of general contractor, and alleged generation of media publicity to convey message that general contractor was insolvent did not satisfy continuity requirement for pattern of racketeering activity; predicate acts were concluded in less than seven months, and allegedly illegal activity posed no threat of repeated criminal conduct over significant period. Mar- shall-Silver Const. Co., Inc. v. Mendel, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1990, 894 F.2d 593. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 28

Company's allegations that outside vendors participated in fictitious billing scheme for more than two years,

which involved numerous predicate acts and multiple participants, alleged closed-ended continuity, as required to support Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim. Fuji Photo Film U.S.A., Inc. v. McNulty, S.D.N.Y.2009, 640 F.Supp.2d 300. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Contractors' allegations that property owners engaged in a single scheme over period of 17 months by pursing false or fraudulent claims and a sham arbitration to garner a large sum of money from contractors were insufficient to establish closed-ended continuity required to prove a pattern under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) provision prohibiting conduct of enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity; contractors did not allege an extensive scheme or a wide variety of racketeering activities, and did not sufficiently plead a threat of future criminal conduct. Gotfredson v. Larsen LP, D.Colo.2006, 432 F.Supp.2d 1163, motion to amend denied 2006 WL 2943008. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Party asserting claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) may demonstrate continuity over closed period sufficient to establish “pattern of racketeering activity” by proving series of related predicates extending over substantial period of time, but predicate acts extending over a few weeks or months and threatening no future criminal conduct do not satisfy this requirement. SecureInfo Corp. v. Telos Corp., E.D.Va.2005, 387 F.Supp.2d 593. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Where alleged extortionate acts occurred over a period of less than three months and terminated when contractor abandoned project, they did not establish closed-ended continuity and thus did not establish pattern of racketeering activity. McCormack Intern. Corp. v. Vohra, S.D.N.Y.1994, 858 F.Supp. 415. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Predicate acts alleged by husband in connection with conduct of wife and her attorneys in divorce proceeding did not support closed-ended continuity, for purposes of establishing Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiz- ations Act (RICO) where predicate acts allegedly occurred over a four-month period. Streck v. Peters, D.Hawai'i 1994, 855 F.Supp. 1156. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Nine-month period in which chief of operations for prescription drug repackager was involved with alleged racketeering activity of others associated with repackager was sufficient to meet “continuity” requirement needed to state claim for aiding and abetting racketeering activity where he allegedly took excess drugs entrusted to repackager by pharmaceutical wholesalers and trained employees to hide these stolen “overages,” and he allegedly altered repackager's operating procedures to conceal keeping of overages by repackager; his involvement was on-going rather than sporadic, he committed many alleged racketeering acts, and there was evidence of multiple victims. Independent Drug Wholesalers Group, Inc. v. Denton, D.Kan.1993, 833 F.Supp. 1507, reconsideration denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Allegation that predicate acts had extended over period of more than three years, involving multiple acts, participants and victims, was sufficient to allege requisite “continuity” element of test for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) “pattern.” Todaro v. Orbit Intern. Travel, Ltd., S.D.N.Y.1991, 755 F.Supp. 1229. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Party alleging Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violation may demonstrate continuity over closed period by proving series of related predicates extending over substantial period of time; predicate acts extending over a few weeks or months and threatening no future criminal conduct do not satisfy requirement. Certilman v. Hardcastle, Ltd., E.D.N.Y.1991, 754 F.Supp. 974. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 29

Predicate acts of securities fraud and mail fraud allegedly committed by corporate officials to obtain minority shareholder's consent to sell her stock to corporation did not satisfy continuity requirement necessary to establish pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); alleged activities took place over period of, at most, 12 months, and there was no threat that activity would continue into the future. Helman v. Murry's Steaks, Inc., D.Del.1990, 742 F.Supp. 860, reargument denied 743 F.Supp. 289. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Plaintiffs failed to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act cause of action; predicate acts extending over few weeks or months and threatening no future criminal conduct did not satisfy continuity requirement of RICO pattern. Fry v. General Motors Corp., E.D.Mich.1989, 728 F.Supp. 455. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Period of less than four months between first and last predicate acts alleged did not satisfy continuity requirement for civil RICO claim, and complaint also lacked allegations of threat of continuity in that there could be no further, similar misrepresentations after nullification of exclusive dealership agreement involved. West Moun- tain Sales, Inc. v. Logan Mfg. Co., N.D.N.Y.1989, 718 F.Supp. 1084. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 28

Alleged scheme to defraud vendors into selling property for less than fair market value did not have sufficient “continuity” among alleged acts of racketeering to constitute “pattern” for purposes of RICO; alleged misrepresentations and false statements relating to the same transaction were transmitted at various times over period of a few months. McMullen v. Christenson, E.D.Mich.1987, 678 F.Supp. 1277. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Body shop's allegation that its former manager devised a scheme to defraud body shop through perpetration of mail frauds on eight specific occasions over a period of less than four months was insufficient to establish continuous racketeering activity to sustain action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Anton Motors, Inc. v. Powers, D.Md.1986, 644 F.Supp. 299. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

193. ---- Limitations, time of acts, pattern of racketeering

Alleged destruction of flight logs of specific flights taken by testator and pilot during time period testator allegedly met purported heir did not fraudulently conceal purported heir's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) action against personal representatives of estate, as required to equitably toll statute of limitations; alteration of the flight logs, alleged to have occurred nearly ten years prior to probate trial, did not prevent heir from discovering the falsity of testimony that testator had never left his hotel during subject time

period. Dummar v. Lummis, C.A.10 (Utah) 2008, 543 F.3d 614. Limitation Of Actions 104(2)

Statute of limitations for lender's civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) suit against its disbursing agent was not equitably tolled; lender pointed to no facts that made its case exceptional, although disbursing agent, its lawyer, and his brother purportedly attempted to conceal their alleged fraud, such attempts did not prevent lender from knowing of borrower's admission of a large diversion of loan funds, and when lender sued borrower, the lawyer, and his firm for fraud and conspiracy, it should have pressed harder, investig- ated more vigorously, drawn more inferences, and reached its conclusion about the disbursing agent's alleged RICO violations some three years sooner than it tardily did, which was when lawyer's brother pled guilty to federal crimes and disbursing agent ceased to use lawyer and his law firm. Pacific Harbor Capital, Inc. v. Barnett Bank, N.A., C.A.11 (Fla.) 2001, 252 F.3d 1246, as amended. Limitation Of Actions 104.5

Limited partners' securities fraud and securities registration claims could not serve as predicate acts under Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) where limited partners failed to file their action until five years after they had knowledge of their alleged injuries; securities fraud and registration claims were time barred and could not be cognizable predicate acts. Stitt v. Williams, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1990, 919 F.2d 516. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) section defining pattern of racketeering to require at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of the chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years after commission of prior act of racketeering activity, did not establish ten- year statute of limitations that would time bar predicate acts, but rather, established that pattern of racketeering activity was not established if predicate acts occurred more than ten years apart, so restriction did not aid defendant with respect to predicate act of murder which occurred in 1978 and predicate acts of extortion that were continuing offenses committed as part of mafia family's shakedown operation, which began in late 1981 and in spring of 1982. U.S. v. Pungitore, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1990, 910 F.2d 1084, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 2009, 500 U.S. 915, 114 L.Ed.2d 98, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 2010, 500 U.S. 915, 114 L.Ed.2d 98, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 2011, 500 U.S. 916, 114 L.Ed.2d 98, dismissal of habeas corpus vacated 68 F.3d 458, habeas corpus denied 945 F.Supp. 813, habeas corpus denied 947 F.Supp. 157, habeas corpus denied 965 F.Supp. 666, affirmed 172 F.3d 861, certiorari denied 119 S.Ct. 1483, 526 U.S. 1078, 143 L.Ed.2d 566, habeas corpus denied 970 F.Supp. 426, habeas corpus denied 993 F.Supp. 313, post-conviction relief denied 992 F.Supp. 766, post- conviction relief granted 2 F.Supp.2d 647, reconsideration denied , post-conviction relief denied 980 F.Supp. 803, post-conviction relief denied 15 F.Supp.2d 705, certification denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 29; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 90

If civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act complaint was filed within four years of last injury or last predicate act, plaintiff may recover for injuries caused by other predicate acts which occurred outside earlier limitations period but which are part of same “pattern.” Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1988, 863 F.2d 1125. Limitation Of Actions 58(1)

Four year statute of limitations period began to run on ex-wife's civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiz- ations Act (RICO) claim against ex-husband alleging fraudulent real estate investment scheme, when ex-wife

filed suit against ex-husband to set aside the parties' marital separation agreement, on grounds it was procured by fraud, since at that time ex-wife was put on notice of ex-husband's alleged fraudulent real estate investments and unreported proceeds from deal, and with reasonable diligence should have discovered scheme; publicly filed records of settlement of ex-husband's real estate action were available to ex-wife at time she re-opened divorce action, so documents verifying fraud could have been discovered with minimal effort. Cohen v. Cohen, S.D.N.Y.2011, 773 F.Supp.2d 373, affirmed in part , vacated in part 711 F.3d 353. Limitation Of Actions 100(12)

In action alleging medical supply retailers violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by inducing insurer to make payments to fraudulently incorporated medical companies, there was insufficient information to determine whether, as a matter of law, insurer knew or should have known of the injury from alleged scheme within the limitations period. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Grafman, E.D.N.Y.2009, 655 F.Supp.2d 212. Limitation Of Actions 199(2)

Former and current sales representatives that sold advertising space in telephone directories failed to plead with particularity circumstances surrounding fraudulent concealment in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) action against employers, union, and union agents, and thus waived defense that fraudulent concealment entitled representatives to equitable tolling of statute of limitations. Marceau v. International Broth. of Elec. Workers, D.Ariz.2009, 618 F.Supp.2d 1127. Federal Civil Procedure 677

Plaintiff's awareness of the facts and circumstances enabling him to identify that he had been injured and that the injury arose out of actions taken by the defendants with respect to the ownership of the technology precluded tolling on fraudulent concealment grounds of civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim arising out of transaction which allegedly constitute “fraudulent scheme” by defendants to deprive plaintiff of his ownership interests in certain technology; furthermore, RICO claim was barred by laches for the same reason. Blystra v. Fiber Tech Group, Inc., D.N.J.2005, 407 F.Supp.2d 636. Limitation Of Actions 104(1); Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 65

The limitations period for a private civil action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) is four years and begins to run when the plaintiff is injured or discovers his injury, regardless of when the racketeering activity that caused the injury is discovered. Burrowes v. Combs, S.D.N.Y.2004, 312 F.Supp.2d 449, affirmed 124 Fed.Appx. 70, 2005 WL 670644. Limitation Of Actions 95(3); Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 65

Four year limitations period in which corporate employer had to file civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) claim against life insurer, which sold employer “vanishing premium” life insurance policies for its employees, began to run when employer received written indication from insurer that additional out-of-pocket premiums would be due for three more years beyond alleged vanishing premium point. In re New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litigation, D.Mass.2002, 236 F.Supp.2d 69, affirmed 346 F.3d 218. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

That securities fraud claims by investors in real estate limited partnership were barred under statute of limita-

tions had no bearing on legitimacy of their RICO claims for which securities fraud was alleged as predicate act. Gurfein v. Sovereign Group, E.D.Pa.1993, 826 F.Supp. 890. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Time barred action could be used as predicate act for RICO purposes, so long as one of purported predicate acts occurred within five-year limitations period. U.S. v. McClendon, E.D.Ark.1988, 712 F.Supp. 723. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 18

RICO claims accrued at time plaintiff discovered or should have discovered the racketeering injury. Construc- tion Technology, Inc. v. Lockformer Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1989, 704 F.Supp. 1212, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1401. Limita- tion Of Actions 95(3)

Under last predicate act standard, which holds that limitation period commences to run on RICO claim from date of last predicate act comprising legal pattern, trust beneficiary's claim that trustee violated RICO in managing trust was timely since several predicate acts alleged in complaint took place within four years of filing of suit. Norris v. Wirtz, N.D.Ill.1989, 703 F.Supp. 1322. Limitation Of Actions 103(1)

Language of par. (5) of this section providing that a proscribed “pattern of racketeering activity” requires at least two acts of racketeering activity within ten years of each other, one of which must have occurred after effective date of statute, clearly contemplates a prolonged course of conduct and like statute of limitations for conspiracies, section 3282 of this title, which runs from date of last overt act, clearly provides for limitations to run from date of last alleged act of racketeering activity. U. S. v. Field, S.D.N.Y.1977, 432 F.Supp. 55, affirmed 578 F.2d 1371, certiorari dismissed 99 S.Ct. 43, 439 U.S. 801, 58 L.Ed.2d 94. Criminal Law 150

Limitations period for investors who participated in limited partnership tax shelters to bring civil action against tax shelter manager under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) to recover for tax-related injuries resulting from manager's fraudulent trading activities commenced when Internal Revenue Service (IRS) made final determination whether it would disallow income and expense items in question, even if not all investors accepted IRS's proposed settlement, and settlement was unclear as to whether investors could net interest due on refunds owed against interest on their deficiencies; even investors who did not settle claims knew that they had suffered tax liabilities, and that there was agreed-upon formula for calculating their tax arrears. 131 Maine Street Associates v. Manko, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2002, 54 Fed.Appx. 507, 2002 WL 31868146, Unreported. Limitation Of Actions 100(12)

Statute of limitations for claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) began to run at least by time that predicate mail fraud acts occurred upon which citizen explicitly relied in making out RICO claim. Lapides v. Tarlow, S.D.N.Y.2002, 2002 WL 31682382, Unreported. Limitation Of Actions 58(1)

Four year limitations period under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), for purchasing shareholder's claim that other shareholder and corporate officer looted parent corporation, began to run within year of when he purchased other shareholder's stock and took over company; purchasing shareholder immedi-

ately attempted to rescind purchase agreement alleging fraud as it rapidly became clear that company faced serious financial problems in months after purchase. Feinberg v. Katz, S.D.N.Y.2002, 2002 WL 1751135, Unrepor- ted. Limitation Of Actions 95(3)

194. Miscellaneous patterns of racketeering

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint sufficiently alleged that employer engaged in “pattern of racketeering activity,” by averring that employer engaged in open and ongoing pattern of violations of Immigration and Nationality Act, in particular, by knowingly hiring at least 10 individuals, with actual knowledge that the individuals were aliens during twelve-month period, concealing, harboring, or shielding from detection, or attempting to conceal, harbor or shield from detection aliens that had illegally entered the United States, and by encouraging or inducing an alien to come to, enter, or reside in United States, knowing or in reckless disregard of fact that such coming to, entry, or residence was or would be in violation of law. Willi- ams v. Mohawk Industries, Inc., C.A.11 (Ga.) 2006, 465 F.3d 1277, certiorari denied 127 S.Ct. 1381, 549 U.S. 1260, 167 L.Ed.2d 174. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Oil and gas lessees alleged “pattern of racketeering activity” as required to state claim under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against oil well drillers that had entered farm-out agreements with lessees, alleging that drillers engaged in claim-jumping schemes involving wire fraud, mail fraud, and Travel Act violations; complaint alleged two predicate acts within ten-year period and described conduct that demonstrated both continuity and relationship. Columbia Natural Resources, Inc. v. Tatum, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1995, 58 F.3d 1101, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied, certiorari denied 116 S.Ct. 1041, 516 U.S. 1158, 134 L.Ed.2d 189, rehearing denied 116 S.Ct. 1560, 517 U.S. 1163, 134 L.Ed.2d 661. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Horseracing track's acceptance of wagers on distant races without consent of track within 60 miles did create pattern of racketeering activity for asserting violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; Interstate Horseracing Act was intended to have purely civil, not criminal consequences. Sterling Suffolk Race- course Ltd. Partnership v. Burrillville Racing Ass'n, Inc., C.A.1 (R.I.) 1993, 989 F.2d 1266, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 634, 510 U.S. 1024, 126 L.Ed.2d 593. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Investors in tax-oriented limited partnerships sufficiently alleged a “pattern” of racketeering activity under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) based on the regular mailings of private placement memoranda (PPM) used in marketing partnership investments, which included allegedly misleading balance sheets prepared by accountant. Akin v. Q-L Investments, Inc., C.A.5 (Tex.) 1992, 959 F.2d 521. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Unsuccessful candidate for lieutenant governor alleging that successful candidates for lieutenant governor and governor violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) by soliciting contributions ear- marked for governor's campaign and funneling substantial portion of them to lieutenant governor's campaign failed to show necessary threat of continuing criminal activity or predicate acts of extended duration and, thus, failed to show pattern of racketeering activity required to state RICO claim; when governor and lieutenant governor were elected there ceased to be a threat of continuing racketeering activity and alleged scheme lasted for

only eight months. Hindes v. Castle, C.A.3 (Del.) 1991, 937 F.2d 868. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 29

Three instances in which partners in real estate investment company forged notices of release of Internal Reven- ue Service (IRS) tax liens, which instances occurred over period of 13 months, were sufficient to demonstrate a “pattern of racketeering activity” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and to permit title insurance company to recover treble damages under RICO for injuries it sustained as result of its reliance on forged release. Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Florida, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1991, 937 F.2d 447. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Purchasers of corporation failed to allege sufficient pattern of racketeering activity to state civil RICO claim relating to funding of leveraged buyout; allegations of short-term attempt to force purchased corporation into bankruptcy contained no additional threat of continued criminal activity or long-term association existing for criminal purposes. Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., C.A.3 (Pa.) 1991, 926 F.2d 1406, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 2839, 501 U.S. 1222, 115 L.Ed.2d 1007. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 28; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Evidence was sufficient to convict owner of car dealership of conducting affairs of district office of New York Department of Motor Vehicles through pattern of racketeering activity and of conspiring to do so, where owner admitted during interview with assistant United States attorney that purpose of blank New Jersey motor vehicle reassignment forms supplied to his salespeople was to “wash” documents through New York, that he knew that such documents would be filled out falsely, and that he supplied forms because he received four percent commission on sales of stolen vehicles. U.S. v. Alkins, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1991, 925 F.2d 541. Criminal Law 413.94(5)

Developers who leased real property with coal reserves and purchased machinery and processing facilities sufficiently alleged a pattern of racketeering activity to state a civil RICO claim against owners of the property; developers alleged numerous predicate acts of wire fraud and mail fraud, fraudulent misrepresentations during negotiations for a settlement agreement, and double billing under a separate agreement. Swistock v. Jones, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1989, 884 F.2d 755. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Sufficient pattern of racketeering activity existed to convict defendant of violating Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; defendant engaged in meter tampering, mail fraud, and bribery, in schemes to cheat Postal Service by not paying appropriate postage, and schemes were conducted for about five years, and surely would have continued but for their discovery. U.S. v. Gelb, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1989, 881 F.2d 1155, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 544, 493 U.S. 994, 107 L.Ed.2d 541, denial of post-conviction relief affirmed in part, vacated in part on other grounds 944 F.2d 52. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Pattern of racketeering activity could be discerned from allegations that developer induced execution of ten-year studio lease by fraudulently misstating its experience, expertise, and construction cost estimates, by inducing plaintiffs to continue with the project and to guaranty construction financing by fraudulently misrepresenting and concealing costs, by fraudulently diverting construction funds and charging excessive professional and other

fees, by improperly escrowing construction loan funds to build a cushion against discovery of alleged fraud, and by fraudulently scheming to collect interim rent for delays primarily caused by the developer. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Big Apple Indus. Bldgs., Inc., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1989, 879 F.2d 10, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 723, 493 U.S. 1022, 107 L.Ed.2d 743, on remand. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Purchasers of yacht failed to demonstrate that activities of independent contractor, in exercising managerial control over their yacht, fell within definition of “racketeering activity”, as required to prevail on RICO claim. Deckebach v. La Vida Charters, Inc. of Florida, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1989, 867 F.2d 278. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

Evidence that four victims were defrauded upon two occasions as part of single scheme, that shares of corporation purchased by victims were not legally authorized shares of corporation in which they were investing, and that further attempt was made to sell victims' shares in dissolved corporation, was sufficient to establish pattern of racketeering activity for civil Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act purposes. Deppe v. Tripp, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1988, 863 F.2d 1356. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Alleged scheme to defraud dentist of his confidences and secrets in connection with attorney's representation of dentist at license revocation proceedings before the Kansas Dental Board and subsequent representation of the Secretary of the Board in dentist's civil rights action against the Board failed to establish “pattern of racketeering activity” required to support claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Pitts v. Turn- er and Boisseau Chartered, C.A.10 (Kan.) 1988, 850 F.2d 650, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 838, 488 U.S. 1030, 102 L.Ed.2d 970. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Alleged, multiple predicate acts of fraud by physicians, who allegedly terminated work contracts with emergency medical provider, formed their own company, and replaced provider as company giving staff for emergency department of hospital, could not reasonably be characterized as amounting to separate and distinct transactions in time and place and failed to satisfy continuity prong of pattern of racketeering activity requirement, even though provider could point to number of predicate acts of mail fraud in furtherance of alleged scheme to defraud provider; alleged acts related to single transaction, replacement of provider as company providing emergency room services to hospital, involved single victim, inflicted single injury, and essentially occurred within two-month period. Medical Emergency Service Associates, S.C. v. Foulke, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1988, 844 F.2d 391. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Defendant's meetings with codefendant in which he requested codefendant to destroy property of his ex-wives were predicate acts required to constitute a pattern of racketeering under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act [18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c, d)]. U.S. v. Manzella, C.A.5 (La.) 1986, 782 F.2d 533, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 1991, 476 U.S. 1123, 90 L.Ed.2d 672, rehearing denied 790 F.2d 1260, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 457, 479 U.S. 961, 93 L.Ed.2d 403. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

Shipowners' threat to bring action against parent and parent's lender if parent did not pay subsidiary ship lessee's debt or inject capital into lessee was not threatened “fear” within definition of “extortion” under section 1951 of this title, nor did two threats to file civil action or one threat to file civil action and one instance of travel for

purpose of making such threat constitute “pattern of racketeering activity” under this section. I.S. Joseph Co., Inc. v. J. Lauritzen A/S, C.A.8 (Minn.) 1984, 751 F.2d 265. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

Where company was a perfectly legitimate business, the simple transfer of an ownership interest in that business from one party to another did not constitute the conduct of the business through a pattern of “racketeering” even though the transfer was part of an alleged payoff in a mail fraud scheme. U. S. v. Mandel, C.A.4 (Md.) 1979, 591 F.2d 1347, on rehearing 602 F.2d 653, rehearing denied 609 F.2d 1076, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 1647, 445 U.S. 961, 64 L.Ed.2d 236. Postal Service 35(10)

Evidence that prostitutes were brought from out of state, delivered to defendants, and were set up in business at establishments operated by defendants, and that some or all of them paid over earnings to defendants sustained jury's verdict that defendants were guilty of conspiring to operate an interstate prostitution ring through a pattern of racketeering activities. U. S. v. Clemones, C.A.5 (Ga.) 1978, 577 F.2d 1247, modified 582 F.2d 1373. Con- spiracy 47(3.1)

In prosecution under this chapter for conspiracy to conduct or participate in affairs of an enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity, evidence that defendant used a close friend as a personal source of amphetamines and that defendant disposed of small amount of meat which had been stolen by enterprise was insufficient to sustain his conviction. U. S. v. Elliott, C.A.5 (Ga.) 1978, 571 F.2d 880, rehearing denied 575 F.2d 300, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 349, 439 U.S. 953, 58 L.Ed.2d 344. Conspiracy 47(3.1)

Former California Highway Patrol (CHP) employee sufficiently alleged “pattern” of racketeering activity needed to sustain Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim; the predicate acts of witness tampering and retaliation which she alleged within ten year period were related insofar as both sought to advance criminal conspiracy to defraud State of California and to conceal nature and extent of their criminal activities. Vierria v. California Highway Patrol, E.D.Cal.2009, 644 F.Supp.2d 1219. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Claim that defendants engaged in monetary transaction in property derived from specified unlawful activity lacked required allegation of specific unlawful activity. Advanced Optics Electronics, Inc. v. Robins, D.N.M.2008, 633 F.Supp.2d 1237. United States 34

Allegations of predicate acts of threats of physical violence, contained in affidavit, could not be considered on motion to dismiss Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims. Advanced Optics Elec- tronics, Inc. v. Robins, D.N.M.2008, 633 F.Supp.2d 1237. Federal Civil Procedure 1833

Two letters which law firm sent to consumer to in attempt to collect on debt could not establish “pattern of racketeering activity” within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Neild v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., E.D.Va.2006, 453 F.Supp.2d 918. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 28

Boxer who allegedly engaged in fixed fight arranged by promoter was not liable to second promoter under section of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) prohibiting any person employed by or associated with any enterprise to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in conduct of such enterprise's affairs through pattern of racketeering activity, even if boxer “invested” in defendant-promoter's business by receiving less than specified fight purses and by paying business expenses, boxer received unsecured loans from business, and boxer appointed business his “attorney-in-fact.” Venzor v. Chavez Gonzalez, N.D.Ill.1997, 968 F.Supp. 1258. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Manager of venture capital fund engaged in predicate acts of mail and wire fraud, for purposes of establishing civil claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) brought by limited partner of fund, by intentionally, regularly, and repeatedly using mail and telephone conversations to further various schemes designed to support another venture capital fund that was failing and to improve manager's individual finances at expense of his investors, including scheme to defraud fund's investors and potential investors and scheme to divert funds to himself and to related entities. Lincoln Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Silver, N.D.Ill.1995, 966 F.Supp. 587, affirmed 114 F.3d 1191, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied, certiorari denied 118 S.Ct. 368, 522 U.S. 949, 139 L.Ed.2d 286. Postal Service 35(10); Telecommunications 1014(8)

Defendants including former nursing home owner and others did not acquire interest in enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), by virtue of wraparound mortgage which defendants extended to current owner of nursing home, as mortgage was not acquired or maintained, directly or indirectly, through pattern of racketeering activity. National Council of Young Israel v. Wolf, S.D.N.Y.1997, 963 F.Supp. 276. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Allegations failed to establish that title company and its attorney, who had prepared warranty deeds for sale of townhomes by developer, had engaged in conduct of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity, as would allow recovery by purchasers in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) action brought after developer failed to pay off mortgages and bank foreclosed on townhomes; neither title company nor attorney did anything more than provide routine services for developer, and alleged actions of attorney and company affected only six purchasers over period of roughly one year and did not constitute pattern of activity. Menuskin v. Williams, E.D.Tenn.1996, 940 F.Supp. 1199, appeal dismissed 98 F.3d 1342, affirmed in part , reversed in part 145 F.3d 755. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Applicants for public employment with town alleged sufficient predicate acts to support civil RICO claim where applicant asserted that political committee bribed applicant so he would decline position and political leader could be considered for position and that three letters were sent in mails in furtherance of fraudulent scheme. Eisert v. Town of Hempstead, E.D.N.Y.1996, 918 F.Supp. 601. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 69

Restaurant franchisees' allegation that franchisor removed equipment at restaurant just prior to franchisees' taking possession of restaurant and that illegal activity took place over period of less than seven weeks did not al-

lege “pattern of racketeering activity” necessary to state civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim. Hall v. Burger King Corp., S.D.Fla.1995, 912 F.Supp. 1509. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 72

Taxpayers who participated in limited partnership tax shelters established Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) claim against owners of corporation that was allegedly used by tax shelter managers to conduct fraudulent transactions, in view of allegations that owners, both former business associates of tax manager, encouraged use of corporation as counterpart to factitious and prearranged trades among investment partnerships and that owners stood to profit from “loan” of their corporation. 131 Main Street Associates v. Manko, S.D.N.Y.1995, 897 F.Supp. 1507. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 10; Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Combination of predicate acts of mail and wire fraud committed by “administrators” of “employee” groups, in mailing fraudulent administrator applications, individual subscriber applications, billing statements and payments to group health insurer and in wiring funds from banks to furtherance of scheme of securing health coverage for nonexistent employee groups constituted “pattern of racketeering activity.” Empire Blue Cross and Blue Shield v. Finkelstein, E.D.N.Y.1995, 887 F.Supp. 473, remanded 101 F.3d 684, opinion after remand 111 F.3d 278. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Codefendants' participation in fraudulent claim-processing enterprise constituted “pattern of racketeering activity” as required under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); codefendants used United States Postal Service numerous times within two years to embezzle funds from insurer through fraudulent claim- processing scheme, predicate acts were frequently repeated during two-year period, and acts were performed by the same participants and related to common purpose of defrauding insurer. Corporacion Insular de Seguros v. Reyes-Munoz, D.Puerto Rico 1994, 849 F.Supp. 126. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Off-track facility's acceptance of wagers on simulcast horseraces did not, as a matter of law, amount to “pattern of racketeering activity,” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action. Sterling Suffolk Racecourse Ltd. Partnership v. Burrillville Racing Ass'n, Inc., D.R.I.1992, 802 F.Supp. 662, affirmed 989 F.2d 1266, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 634, 510 U.S. 1024, 126 L.Ed.2d 593. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 80

Hospital's and physician's concerted refusal to deal with radiologist who would not agree to remit to hospital's management group 30% of his professional fees in exchange for referrals was not “pattern of racketeering activity” which could support radiologist's RICO claim. Jackson v. Radcliffe, S.D.Tex.1992, 795 F.Supp. 197. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Tenants asserting civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) failed to show that landlord engaged in “pattern of racketeering activity” or that they sustained injury proximately resulting from purported predicate acts; even if landlord misled and then coerced tenants into abandoning right to continued occupancy of their leased premises for another year at prevailing rate, tenants reserved all of their rights, obtained counsel and reached satisfactory understanding with landlord through arms-length negotiation, and landlord's conduct during

one week of, inter alia, allegedly fraudulently billing retroactive rent adjustments, did not constitute “long-term criminal conduct” or threat thereof sufficient to satisfy continuity requirement. Jordan v. Berman, E.D.Pa.1992, 792 F.Supp. 380, affirmed in part , vacated in part 20 F.3d 1250, on remand. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Lenders' RICO claim that borrower and officer of cable television company conspired to get money under false pretense that borrower would transfer its shares in company to lenders accrued when borrower fired lender as its president and refused to pay note and officer removed lender from cable television franchise application and received approval from city, rather than when borrower's successor allegedly committed last predicate act of filing for bankruptcy and seeking approval of agreement to sell its shares in company to officer free and clear of en- cumbrances; bankruptcy filing was not part of same pattern of racketeering activity. Owens v. Wade, E.D.Pa.1992, 789 F.Supp. 168. Limitation Of Actions 58(1)

Alleged wrongful termination of employee in retaliation for “whistleblowing” was not predicate act under Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and resulting injury to employee could not form basis for RICO standing. Casper v. Paine Webber Group, Inc., D.N.J.1992, 787 F.Supp. 1480. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

Tax collector's resignation after misappropriation of tax funds was uncovered would not preclude finding that continuity requirement for pattern of racketeering was satisfied; in each successive year amount of pilfered money grew significantly, and there was not reason to believe that tax collector would have discontinued racketeering activity during third term. Lehighton Area School Dist. v. Gilbert, M.D.Pa.1992, 787 F.Supp. 429. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Custodian of cattle under range feeding agreement did not state predicate acts necessary to establish pattern of racketeering activity, for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act suit against owner of cattle and others, even though custodian claimed 16 acts of mail fraud, more than 40 acts of wire fraud, three acts of extortion and at least one act of interstate transportation of stolen goods, extending over period of two years and one month. Rindal v. Seckler Co. Inc., D.Mont.1992, 786 F.Supp. 890. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 70

Pattern of racketeering was not established by evidence of a large number of mailings of invoices to customers of one company whose business had allegedly been fraudulently diverted to another company by an employee, where the employee's scheme of diverting business from the employer to new company had a definite conclusion and there was no threat of continued criminal activity after the employee left the employer and began working for the competitor. Midwest Grinding Co., Inc. v. Spitz, N.D.Ill.1991, 769 F.Supp. 1457, affirmed 976 F.2d 1016. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Trucker failed to establish pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) by truck broker and third-party creditor of broker on basis of broker's accounts receivable financing by third party, where particular predicate acts alleged to constitute mail or wire fraud transpired over period lasting little more than five months, scheme was closed-ended and there was no threat of continued crim-

inal activity, and scheme was single, short-lived attempt to achieve single purpose in finite period of time. Delta Pride Catfish, Inc. v. Marine Midland Business Loans, Inc., E.D.Ark.1991, 767 F.Supp. 951. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 27; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Employee stock option plan (ESOP) participants failed to sufficiently allege acts by plan fiduciaries which constituted a pattern of racketeering activity as required to state a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act; predicate acts involved fraudulent operation of ESOP and involved the same participants and victims, but they did not indicate any threat of long-term racketeering activity continuing beyond the plan's termination and did not involve the type of continuing racketeering activity intended to be encompassed by RICO. Hood v. Smith's Transfer Corp., W.D.Ky.1991, 762 F.Supp. 1274. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Allegations that defendants committed 11 predicate acts of mail or wire fraud over the course of one year, which caused distinct injuries to three corporate victims, was sufficient to satisfy pattern requirement of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), notwithstanding defendants' claim that the corporations were not multiple victims because they were related companies. Dynabest Inc. v. Yao, N.D.Ill.1991, 760 F.Supp. 704. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Attorney's business activity of setting up corporate structure for seller of interests in gas wells/leases fell far short of criminal activity that posed threat of series of injuries over significant period of time, and thus, did not constitute “pattern of racketeering activities” for purposes of investors' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) action. Martin v. Brown, W.D.Pa.1990, 758 F.Supp. 313. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Complaint alleging fraud against corporate directors sufficiently alleged at least two predicate acts that were related and that, if true, amounted to or threatened likelihood of continued criminal activity, and thus established pattern of racketeering activity; complaint alleged repeated acts of securities fraud, mail fraud and wire fraud and claimed that directors' conduct at board of directors' meetings constituted predicate acts. Harris v. Wells, D.Conn.1991, 757 F.Supp. 171. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Allegedly concerted activities of bank officers apparently to obstruct criminal investigation of bank and prevent bank employee's cooperation with investigation did not pose threat of continued criminal activity and did not amount to pattern of racketeering activity written meaning of RICO. Miranda-Rodriguez v. Ponce Federal Bank, F.S.B., D.Puerto Rico 1990, 751 F.Supp. 18, affirmed 948 F.2d 41. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 28

Alleged predicate acts consisting of illegal gambling business, loan-sharking conspiracy, murder, attempted murder, and travel in aid of racketeering enterprise by one defendant constituted “pattern” of racketeering activity, where at least two acts committed by each defendant were related by common participants, victims, methods, or motive, and where threat of continued racketeering activity was shown by commission of acts in furtherance of criminal enterprise whose business was racketeering activity. U.S. v. Giovanelli, S.D.N.Y.1989, 747 F.Supp. 897. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or-

ganizations 28

Allegation that defendants carried out affairs of enterprise through scheme to defraud investors which continued in one form or another over a number of years, that defendants committed various acts of securities fraud and mail fraud, and that the fraudulent acts were the defendants' regular way of forming and issuing interests in partnerships were sufficient to allege a pattern of racketeering activity. Griffin v. McNiff, S.D.N.Y.1990, 744 F.Supp. 1237, affirmed 996 F.2d 303. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Corporate president's alleged use of false financial statements to obtain credit and to enter into agreement to sell corporation's assets did not amount to threat of continuing racketeering activity necessary to constitute “pattern” of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Clouser v. Tempor- aries, Inc., D.D.C.1989, 730 F.Supp. 1127. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Allegations by participants in pension plan terminated by plan purchaser, that purchaser advised scheme to retain excess assets after terminating plan, did not by its nature show threat of future criminal conduct for purposes of RICO. Hutchinson v. Wickes Companies, Inc., N.D.Ga.1989, 726 F.Supp. 1315. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Allegedly defrauded investor alleged both requisite relationship and continuity of predicate acts to make out valid RICO “pattern”; over two-year period, defendants contacted investor on at least five occasions and conducted scores of telephone conversations regarding investments and loans, and each of transactions had similar purpose, victim, method of commission, and result. Obee v. Teleshare, Inc., E.D.Mich.1989, 725 F.Supp. 913. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Air carriers' agent failed to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim against travel agency arising out of agency's alleged failure to report or pay for airline ticket sold; pleading did not indicate that agency's conduct presented threat of continuity sufficient to establish pattern of racketeering activity, as it alleged single scheme which covered 13-month period. Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Aero Voyagers, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1989, 721 F.Supp. 579. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Owner of apartment complex failed to set forth sufficient pattern of racketeering activity to state civil claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act against savings and loan association and related parties as result of allegedly coerced sale of complex and its subsequent resale at considerably greater price; facts as alleged involved only one general scheme, one major transaction, one actual victim, and one distinct injury, and threatened no repeated harm. Orchard Hills Co-op. Apartments, Inc. v. Germania Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n, C.D.Ill.1989, 720 F.Supp. 127. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

Actions of stock exchange and securities firm in allegedly conspiring to prevent trader from obtaining seat on exchange until he paid debts owed securities firm by corporation of which he had been officer was not criminal activity with kind of continuity necessary to show “pattern” of racketeering activity so as to support cause of action under RICO; only two active perpetrators were involved in short-lived scheme which caused single injury to

sole victim. Peterson v. Philadelphia Stock Exchange, E.D.Pa.1989, 717 F.Supp. 332, on reconsideration. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Complaint which alleged that defendant had defrauded plaintiff by fraudulently inducing him to invest in the development of certain property and had previously defrauded another individual by inducing him to forego foreclosure on his security interest in the land adequately alleged a pattern of racketeering. Lingle v. Ziola, N.D.Ill.1988, 701 F.Supp. 158. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Investor in limited partnership stated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act cause of action against chief executive officer of company which created limited partnerships; investor alleged at least four predicate acts of securities fraud, mail fraud, and state securities fraud, and thus alleged a pattern of racketeering activity. Gruber v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., D.Conn.1987, 679 F.Supp. 165. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Transaction with respect to which it was alleged that defendant induced plaintiff through puffed up salesmanship to make an investment in limited partnership based on profits and tax breaks plaintiff would derive from a motel and conference center renovation project but that the project, due to defendants' failures, did not prove to be profitable was too limited to constitute a “pattern” under RICO. Bamco 18 v. Reeves, S.D.N.Y.1987, 675 F.Supp. 826. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 25

Allegations by importer of watches that United States and Swiss watch manufacturers committed three acts of mail fraud were sufficient to satisfy pattern requirement in RICO action; each document allegedly falsely denied any common ownership or control among United States and Swiss companies. Shaw v. Rolex Watch, U.S.A., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1987, 673 F.Supp. 674. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 31

Investors in oil and gas limited partnership sufficiently pled pattern of racketeering activity by general partner and broker to state RICO claim; investors alleged multiple violations of federal securities law and numerous victims, alleged that conduct continued over period of several months, and that participation of several investors was needed to create each separate limited partnership. In re Rexplore, Inc. Securities Litigation, N.D.Cal.1987, 671 F.Supp. 679. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

Corporation selling shared telecommunication services sufficiently alleged a pattern of racketeering under Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; corporation alleged that former president caused corporation to receive at least five invoices from bogus enterprises over a period of six months and that former president authorized corporation to send separate checks to bogus enterprises in payment of each invoice. Shared Network Technologies, Inc. v. Taylor, N.D.Ga.1987, 669 F.Supp. 422. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

Bank defendants in civil RICO action did not engage in requisite pattern of racketeering activity in connection with airline ticket scam; neither relationship nor continuity requirements were satisfied, as those defendants were not accused of receiving or converting airline tickets or participating in agencies' operation, but merely of

helping alleged perpetrator accomplish accreditation and there was little evidence that those defendants engaged or would engage in similar activities in past or future. Airlines Reporting Corp. v. Barry, D.Minn.1987, 666 F.Supp. 1311. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Claim that broker committed both securities and wire fraud was insufficient to establish required “pattern of racketeering activity” necessary to prove violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; alleged wire fraud was broker's telephonic communication to investor of stock transactions which constituted alleged securities fraud. Winer v. Patterson, D.N.H.1987, 663 F.Supp. 723. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 32

Manufacturer of bladders used in footballs failed to establish that football manufacturer engaged in pattern of racketeering activity under RICO due to its use of allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations to obtain trade secrets, where alleged misrepresentations were part of single scheme to defraud single victim, and there was no evidence that football manufacturer engaged in mail or wire fraud in pattern of racketeering activity. Fabrico Mfg. Corp. v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., N.D.Ill.1987, 660 F.Supp. 601. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 30

Complaint charging that defendants conspired to acquire interest in corporation through pattern of racketeering activity sufficiently alleged pattern of racketeering activity, involving multiple transactions and multiple victims, and conspiracy, as required to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Ross v. Bolton, S.D.N.Y.1986, 639 F.Supp. 323. Conspiracy 18; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 72

Fact that there may have been numerous misrepresentations in connection with single transaction involving sale of limited partnership interests would not create pattern under interpretation of RICO statute, as single fraudulent transaction does not constitute pattern; there must be multiple events to satisfy continuity inherent in term “pattern.” Anisfeld v. Cantor Fitzgerald & Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1986, 631 F.Supp. 1461. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 27

Alleged threat, made on one occasion, that proceedings before state agency were “rigged” did not constitute a pattern of racketeering activity and, thus, provided no basis for civil action under Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1964(c). Park South Associates v. Fischbein, S.D.N.Y.1986, 626 F.Supp. 1108, affirmed 800 F.2d 1128. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26

A count charging a RICO violation based on allegation that an FBI agent paid money to defendant to be used to pay bribes was not fatally deficient because the money in three of the four payments came from the FBI and therefore was not “dirty” funds obtained from a pattern of racketeering activity; FBI payments can constitute income derived from a pattern of racketeering activities so long as the payor has the intention or understanding specified in the Illinois bribery statute. U.S. v. Gonzales, N.D.Ill.1985, 620 F.Supp. 1143, reconsideration denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 16

Journalist who alleged that broadcasting company engaged in fraudulent misrepresentation and wire fraud in connection with allegedly unauthorized use of journalist's investigative article in news broadcast failed to develop facts tending to show criminal acts necessary to establish requisite pattern of racketeering activity, and thus journalist's civil claims against broadcasting company under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act could not stand. Peckarsky v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., D.C.D.C.1984, 603 F.Supp. 688. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Although overall master labor-leasing scheme, to have local labor official control local union to facilitate expan- sion of business of labor-leasing companies conducted thorough named corporations under control of enterprise, was shown to have been implemented at three separate locations and different combination of defendants were involved at each particular occasion, evidence was sufficient to permit finding that defendants had participated in affairs of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity in violation of this chapter and had committed mail fraud. U.S. v. Boffa, D.C.Del.1983, 557 F.Supp. 306, affirmed 723 F.2d 899, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 1415, 465 U.S. 1066, 79 L.Ed.2d 741. Postal Service 49(11); Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 31

A violation of section 1962 of this title proscribing association with enterprise and existence of pattern of racketeering activity was not established with respect to alleged interference by defendants with rights of class of Viet- namese fishermen represented by plaintiffs prior to and during shrimping season where, while plaintiffs adequately demonstrated that defendants were associated with enterprise, plaintiffs failed to establish that there was a pattern of racketeering activity in case. Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of Ku Klux Klan, S.D.Tex.1981, 518 F.Supp. 993. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Even if each of two union conventions involved expenditures in violation of the section 501 of Title 29, where acts which allegedly constituted racketeering activities did not appear to have significant relation to the conduct of the union enterprises, acts did not amount to a “pattern of racketeering activities” within meaning of section 1962 of this title which makes it a violation to conduct or participate in conducting union affairs through a “pattern of racketeering activities.” U.S. v. Ladmer, E.D.N.Y.1977, 429 F.Supp. 1231. Extortion 19; Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 49

There was sufficient evidence linking dogfighting and drug trafficking conspiracies as a pattern of racketeering activity to support a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conviction; the same individuals involved in the drug trafficking conspiracies also hosted the dogfights, wagering and winning exceedingly large amounts of money, defendant was the central player in organizing the dogfights, as with the drug trafficking, and there was testimony that drug proceeds were used to bet a large quantity of money on dogfights. U.S. v. Mark, C.A.3 (Virgin Islands) 2012, 460 Fed.Appx. 103, 2012 WL 120092, Unreported, certiorari denied 132 S.Ct. 2705, 183 L.Ed.2d 61. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 28

IV. ENTERPRISE

Generally 221 Associations 242 Banks 243 Business competition 223 Common or shared purpose 224 Continuity 225-227 Continuity - Generally 225 Continuity - Distinct from pattern of racketeering activity 227 Continuity - Personnel 226 Cooperatives 244 Corporation and individuals 245a Corporations and stockholders 245 Courts, governmental or political entities 248 Defendants 240 Distinct from pattern of racketeering activity, continuity 227 Elements 222 Estates 246 Fire departments, governmental or political entities 249 Governmental or political entities 247-256 Governmental or political entities - Generally 247 Governmental or political entities - Courts 248 Governmental or political entities - Fire departments 249 Governmental or political entities - Governors 250 Governmental or political entities - Legislators 251 Governmental or political entities - Miscellaneous governmental or political entities 256 Governmental or political entities - Municipalities 252 Governmental or political entities - Police departments 253 Governmental or political entities - States 254 Governmental or political entities - Tax bureaus 255 Governors, governmental or political entities 250 Inanimate objects 257 Individuals 238 Insurance 258 Knowledge 228 Labor organizations 259 Law firms 260 Legislators, governmental or political entities 251 Legitimate or illegitimate enterprise 229 Marriage 261 Miscellaneous entities considered enterprises 267 Miscellaneous entities not considered enterprises 268 Miscellaneous governmental or political entities 256 Mortgage lenders 243a Multiple entities 230 Municipalities, governmental or political entities 252

Objects 257 Operation and management 231 Organized criminal activity 232 Other legal entity 233 Partnerships 262 Pattern of racketeering 234 Personnel, continuity 226 Persons 237 Plaintiffs 239 Pleading 266 Police departments, governmental or political entities 253 Prostitution rings 263 Single scheme 235 Sole proprietorships 265 States, governmental or political entities 254 Structure 236 Tax bureaus, governmental or political entities 255 Trusts 264 Victims 241

221. Generally, enterprise

In the context of proximate cause, the reasonably foreseeable victims of a violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) are the targets, competitors, and intended victims of the racketeering enterprise. Lerner v. Fleet Bank, N.A., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2003, 318 F.3d 113, as amended , certiorari denied 124 S.Ct. 532, 540 U.S. 1012, 157 L.Ed.2d 424, on remand 2005 WL 2064088. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 62

In determining whether a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) “enterprise” exists, the existence of an association-in-fact is often times more readily proven by what it does, rather than by abstract analysis of its structure. U.S. v. Coonan, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1991, 938 F.2d 1553, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 1486, 503 U.S. 941, 117 L.Ed.2d 628. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

Government was entitled to name as members of RICO “enterprise” individuals, corporations, and partnerships associated in fact; Government was not limited to only charging individual, partnership, corporation or association-in-fact. U.S. v. Perholtz, C.A.D.C.1988, 842 F.2d 343, 268 U.S.App.D.C. 347, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 65, 488 U.S. 821, 102 L.Ed.2d 42. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 105

For purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) section which makes it unlawful “for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity,” an “enterprise” is a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct, the existence of which is proven by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit.

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Valley Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation, P.C., E.D.N.Y.2007, 475 F.Supp.2d 213, vacated in part on reconsideration 555 F.Supp.2d 335, certification denied 2008 WL 4856103. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35

Proof used to establish pattern of predicate racketeering acts may be relied on to show existence of “enterprise” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim. Tribune Co. v. Purcigliotti, S.D.N.Y.1994, 869 F.Supp. 1076, affirmed 66 F.3d 12. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 34

“Enterprise” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) may be individual or entity and is vehicle through which racketeering activity is executed. Dudley Enterprises, Inc. v. Palmer Corp., N.D.Ill.1993, 822 F.Supp. 496. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 34; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35

“Racketeering activity” in violation of RICO must have some nexus with the “enterprise.” Jackson v. Radcliffe, S.D.Tex.1992, 795 F.Supp. 197. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 49

Government must establish individual actions by defendants that form violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and not simply state that membership in group is sufficient to find predicate act. U.S. v. District Council of New York City and Vicinity of United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of Amer- ica, S.D.N.Y.1991, 778 F.Supp. 738. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 5

Committee established by alleged theocratic enterprise, as front for enterprise leader's campaign for presidential pardon, did not qualify as legitimate or innocent business to which relief was available under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Committee to Defend U.S. Constitution v. Moon, D.D.C.1991, 776 F.Supp. 568. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 57

An “enterprise,” as defined by Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, could consist of both individuals and corporations, and statutory definition did not preclude lumping together corporations or other legal entities, for purposes of RICO obscenity prosecution. U.S. v. Pryba, E.D.Va.1987, 674 F.Supp. 1504, affirmed 900 F.2d 748, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 305, 498 U.S. 924, 112 L.Ed.2d 258. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 35

Characterization of “enterprise” as an “association in fact,” rather than a legally cognizable entity, was permissible under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. In re Gas Reclamation, Inc. Securities Litiga- tion, S.D.N.Y.1987, 659 F.Supp. 493. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

Mere fact that defendant works for legitimate enterprise and commits racketeering acts while on business premises does not establish that affairs of enterprise have been conducted through pattern of racketeering activity under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, instead, it must be shown that defendant is enabled to commit predicate offenses solely by virtue of his position in enterprise or involvement in or control

over affairs of enterprise, or that predicate offenses are related to activities of that enterprise. Roche v. E.F. Hut- ton & Co., Inc., M.D.Pa.1986, 658 F.Supp. 315, affirmed 862 F.2d 307, affirmed 862 F.2d 310. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 49

RICO statute requires showing of ongoing enterprise through which defendants engaged in pattern of racketeering activities, with showing of two predicate acts, which must be linked to pattern, not separate isolated acts. In- ternational Paint Co., Inc. v. Grow Group, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1986, 648 F.Supp. 729. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 3

Defendants failed to state a claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act where they alleged that they were injured not by use of pattern of racketeering activity in connection with a RICO enterprise, but rather by the predicate acts, namely, the individual alleged acts of mail fraud and wire fraud that comprised the pattern of racketeering activity. Happy Dack Trading Co., Ltd. v. Agro-Industries, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1984, 602 F.Supp. 986. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 63

Statutory definition of “enterprise” contained in this section, which “includes” any individual, corporation, association, or group of individuals, is broad enough to embrace an enterprise defined as a “group of individuals associated in fact with various corporations.” U. S. v. Thevis, N.D.Ga.1979, 474 F.Supp. 134, affirmed 665 F.2d 616, rehearing denied 671 F.2d 1379, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 2300, 456 U.S. 1008, 73 L.Ed.2d 1303, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 3489, 458 U.S. 1109, 73 L.Ed.2d 1370, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 57, 459 U.S. 825, 74 L.Ed.2d 61. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

222. Elements, enterprise

Characteristics that distinguish RICO enterprise include common or shared purpose that animates individuals associated with it, ongoing organization whose members function as continuing unit, and ascertainable structure distinct from that inherent in conduct of pattern of racketeering activity; proof of all three characteristics is necessary in order to avoid danger of guilt by association that arises because RICO does not require proof of single agreement as in conspiracy case, and in order to insure that criminal enterprises, which are RICO's target, are distinguished from individuals who associate for commission of sporadic crimes. U.S. v. Kragness, C.A.8 (Minn.) 1987, 830 F.2d 842. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38

Enterprise under this chapter must have a common or shared purpose, some continuity of structure and personnel, and an ascertainable structure distinct from that inherent in the conduct of a pattern of racketeering. U. S. v. Lemm, C.A.8 (Neb.) 1982, 680 F.2d 1193, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 739, 459 U.S. 1110, 74 L.Ed.2d 960. Commerce 82.6; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35

Elements of RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) claim are conducting enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity and causing injury to plaintiff's business or property. Fineberg v. Credit Intern. Bancshares, Ltd., D.Del.1994, 857 F.Supp. 338. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 3

To establish existence of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise, plaintiff must demonstrate that enterprise is ongoing organization, with some form of structure which is used in making and carrying out decisions, that enterprise members function as continuing unit with established duties, and that enterprise has existence separate from pattern of racketeering activity in which it engages. Standard Chlorine of Delaware, Inc. v. Sinibaldi, D.Del.1992, 821 F.Supp. 232. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35

A RICO “enterprise” is generally a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct, and evidence of an ongoing organization, the associates of which function as a continuing unit, suffices to prove an enterprise. Perez-Rubio v. Wyckoff, S.D.N.Y.1989, 718 F.Supp. 217. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 35; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act “enterprise” is a group of persons associated together for common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct, and existence is proven by evidence of ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that various associates function as a continuing unit. The Limited, Inc. v. McCrory Corp., S.D.N.Y.1988, 683 F.Supp. 387. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

Two elements are necessary to establish an “enterprise” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961(4), 1962(b, c): first, there must be evidence of ongoing organization, formal or informal, and evidence that various associates function as a continuing unit; and, second, enterprise must have existence separate and apart from pattern of activity in which it engaged. Medallion TV Enterprises Inc. v. Se- lecTV of California, Inc., C.D.Cal.1986, 627 F.Supp. 1290, affirmed 833 F.2d 1360, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 3241, 492 U.S. 917, 106 L.Ed.2d 588. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35

223. Business competition, enterprise

Allegations of business referrals between bank and investment advisors, as discrete number of members who mutually benefited from such arrangement, stated association-in-fact enterprise under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) separate and distinct from members' alleged scheme to defraud investors, where investors provided sufficient detail of members of enterprise and how they functioned and associated as group; members allegedly had nefarious scheme to induce investment, and to obtain loans for purposes of further investment, in entities that otherwise would have existed to generate sales and income for members as co- owners, partners, or beneficiaries. Schuster v. Anderson, N.D.Iowa 2005, 413 F.Supp.2d 983. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Plaintiffs alleging a conspiracy to defraud Vietnam veterans under loan guaranty program, by means of an “invoice-packing scheme” under which mobile home retailers received improperly undisclosed rebate from manufacturer, failed to establish existence of RICO “enterprise”; evidence relied upon merely represented typical incentives to succeed in competitive market place, and did not indicate any kind of agreement between manufacturers and retailers. Arthur v. Guerdon Industries, Inc., D.Del.1993, 827 F.Supp. 273. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

224. Common or shared purpose, enterprise

Investor failed to allege a continuing Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise distinct from foreign currency trading service itself, as required to state a claim against service based on its conducting the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity; others who were unaware of service's allegedly deceptive practices, who were employees and agents of service, and who operated as part of same corporate structure as service could not be members of the alleged RICO enterprise. Cruz v. FXDirect- Dealer, LLC, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2013, 720 F.3d 115. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 38

City satisfied Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act's (RICO) distinctness standards with respect to primary enterprises, in bringing action against out-of-state cigarette retailers and affiliated individuals, by alleging that enterprises were innocent corporations, with their own legal basis for existing, and that the persons were employees or officers of the organizations unlawfully directing the enterprises' racketeering activities. City of New York v. Smokes-Spirits.com, Inc., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2008, 541 F.3d 425, certified question accepted 897 N.E.2d 1061, 868 N.Y.S.2d 580, 11 N.Y.3d 800, certiorari granted 129 S.Ct. 2159, 173 L.Ed.2d 1155, certified question answered 911 N.E.2d 834, 883 N.Y.S.2d 772, 12 N.Y.3d 616, reversed and remanded 130 S.Ct. 983, 559 U.S. 1, 175 L.Ed.2d 943. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Enterprise engaged in drug-related activities need not have goal “separate and apart” from illegal drug dealing in order to be racketeering enterprise, within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and statute prohibiting murder in aid of racketeering, even though existence of “enterprise” and “pattern of racketeering activity” must be proven as separate elements. U.S. v. Rogers, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1996, 89 F.3d 1326, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 495, 519 U.S. 999, 136 L.Ed.2d 387. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 39

Plaintiff's allegation that defendant, by serving through mail its false answers to interrogatories, engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity, thereby disrupting court processes, did not state cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, where litigants before court did not share with court's personnel a common purpose with respect to the activity complained of. Averbach v. Rival Mfg. Co., C.A.3 (Pa.) 1987, 809 F.2d 1016, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 3187, 482 U.S. 915, 96 L.Ed.2d 675, certiorari denied 108 S.Ct. 83, 484 U.S. 822, 98 L.Ed.2d 45. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

Fact that each convicted defendant in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act prosecution had participated in affairs of criminal enterprise, with its drug and prostitution rings, through different, even unrelated crimes, was irrelevant so long as it could be reasonably inferred that each claim was intended to further the enterprise's affairs. U.S. v. Watchmaker, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1985, 761 F.2d 1459, rehearing denied 766 F.2d 1493, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 879, 474 U.S. 1100, 88 L.Ed.2d 917, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 880, 474 U.S. 1100, 88 L.Ed.2d 917, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 880, 474 U.S. 1101, 88 L.Ed.2d 917, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 881, 474 U.S. 1101, 88 L.Ed.2d 917. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Evidence in prosecution for violating this chapter, including evidence showing informal association with common purpose of making money from repeated criminal activity which united defendant with others, and evidence that associates functioned as continuing unit for six years under constant leadership of defendant, was sufficient

to support defendant's conviction. U.S. v. Cagnina, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1983, 697 F.2d 915, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 175, 464 U.S. 856, 78 L.Ed.2d 157. Conspiracy 47(3.1)

For purpose of this chapter, an “enterprise” can be proved by evidence that individuals not only associated together through a formal or informal ongoing organization but also functioned as the continuing unit for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct and a pattern of racketeering activity can be proved by evidence of defendants' participation in the required number of racketeering acts committed by the enterprise. U.S. v. Dickens, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1982, 695 F.2d 765, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 1792, 460 U.S. 1092, 76 L.Ed.2d 359, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 1883, 461 U.S. 909, 76 L.Ed.2d 812, denial of post-conviction relief affirmed 67 F.3d 291. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 26; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 35; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

Fact that each of the participants in the scheme shared with the principal the purpose of setting arson fires so as to defraud one or more insurance companies and that each carried out that purpose to some extent was sufficient to show a common purpose for enterprise under this chapter. U. S. v. Lemm, C.A.8 (Neb.) 1982, 680 F.2d 1193, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 739, 459 U.S. 1110, 74 L.Ed.2d 960. Commerce 82.6; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35

Although evidence gave rise to permissible inference that each defendant acted only for himself in bribing police officers and only to protect interest of its own gambling operation, evidence was sufficient to support finding that, whatever private purposes there may have been, there was also requisite commonality of purpose between the defendants to give form to the associational enterprise charged under this chapter. U. S. v. Griffin, C.A.4 (Md.) 1981, 660 F.2d 996, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1029, 454 U.S. 1156, 71 L.Ed.2d 313. Bribery 11

Independent auditing company engaged in business of verifying its members' circulation for advertising purposes did not share a common purpose with newspapers, their publishers, distributors, and various officers, directors, employees, representatives, or agents, and, thus, alleged association-in-fact enterprise of which auditing company was purportedly a member was not a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise, where auditing company could not share enterprise's unlawful purpose of artificially inflating circulation given that it was a victim of bloated circulation figures, did not share enterprise's lawful purpose of managing circulation of newspapers, and enterprise did not share auditor's lawful purpose of auditing circulation numbers. Crabhouse of Douglaston Inc. v. Newsday Inc., E.D.N.Y.2011, 801 F.Supp.2d 64. Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations 36

Evidence that mortgage lender re-sold loans and servicing rights was not sufficient to establish that lender was part of enterprise whose common purpose was to defraud homeowners, in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Allan v. GreenPoint Mortg. Funding, N.D.Cal.2010, 730 F.Supp.2d 1071. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 43

Genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether insurer shared a common purpose with marketing organizations and sales agents that sold its products, as required to establish an associated-in-fact enterprise within mean-

ing of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), precluding summary judgment in purchasers' putative class action based on insurer, organizations, and agents' alleged scheme to defraud them into purchasing deferred annuities that were inappropriate for them. In re Nat. Western Life Ins. Deferred Annuities Litigation, S.D.Cal.2009, 635 F.Supp.2d 1170. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Former employees who sued construction companies and principal, alleging that employment of undocumented aliens depressed their wages, adequately pleaded conduct of “enterprise,” as required to state claim under Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); complaint averred that principal and companies themselves constituted two distinct entities, and that all defendants, as association-in-fact, worked together to obtain illegal workers for employment. Nichols v. Mahoney, S.D.N.Y.2009, 608 F.Supp.2d 526. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint against employers who used alien workers on offshore structures sufficiently alleged enterprise, in form of association-in-fact between employers and providers of crew recruitment and contract labor services; complaint alleged that employers and providers conspired to violate federal immigration laws and harbor illegal workers, and that employer and providers shared common purpose of obtaining illegal workers for employment. Cunningham v. Offshore Specialty Fabrications, Inc., E.D.Tex.2008, 543 F.Supp.2d 614, affirmed 663 F.3d 759, certiorari denied 132 S.Ct. 2103, 182 L.Ed.2d 868. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 40

Chicken producer, bank, and appraiser did not comprise an “association-in-fact enterprise” under Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in farmer's action alleging racketeering scheme, absent evidence that entities operated as a continuous unit with a shared purpose of consolidating chicken producer's control over its farmers. Do v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp., E.D.Tex.2007, 512 F.Supp.2d 764. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 39

Medical insurers, which claimed that drug manufacturers created a large association-in-fact enterprise consisting of numerous medical marketing firms and physicians to illegally promote off-label uses of drug in violation of federal law, sufficiently alleged “shared common purpose” component of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) enterprise requirement. In re Neurontin Marketing, Sales Practices and Products, D.Mass.2006, 433 F.Supp.2d 172. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

Legitimate associated-in-fact enterprise was not alleged in suit under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiz- ations Act (RICO) claiming that bidder seeking to provide satellite launch services operated enterprise consisting of government agencies and bidders for those contracts through a pattern of racketeering activity by employing proprietary information improperly obtained from another bidder to influence bid process; bidders could not be associated for necessary common purpose as they each sought to be awarded contracts placing them in a competitive relationship. Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Boeing Co., M.D.Fla.2005, 357 F.Supp.2d 1350. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

Even if district court had jurisdiction over Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim brought on behalf of individuals who suffered damages under apartheid South Africa against multinational cor-

porations that did business with apartheid South Africa, plaintiffs failed to plead that corporations formed racketeering enterprise, as required to state actionable RICO claim; plaintiffs failed to explain “common purpose” of corporations, particular fraudulent course of conduct engaged in, or how corporations, which were engaged in multitude of different industries, worked together to achieve such purpose. In re South African Apartheid Litiga- tion, S.D.N.Y.2004, 346 F.Supp.2d 538, affirmed in part , vacated in part and remanded 504 F.3d 254, motion to stay mandate denied 509 F.3d 148, affirmed 128 S.Ct. 2424, 553 U.S. 1028, 171 L.Ed.2d 225, on remand 617 F.Supp.2d 228, reconsideration denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

There is no requirement that common or shared purpose of RICO enterprise in fact be criminal or injurious scheme of which plaintiff complains, or even that common or shared purpose be illegal activity aimed at victim or other victims, but rather enterprise need only have shared or common purpose, which may be legal or otherwise, and may be related to predicate acts or not, as case may be, as well as other organizational characteristics of enterprise, continuity of structure, and structure distinct from that inherent in pattern of racketeering activity, in order to meet enterprise element of claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Reynolds v. Condon, N.D.Iowa 1995, 908 F.Supp. 1494, modified on denial of reargument, reconsideration denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38

“Common purpose” requirement, for establishing that an association of fact is a “enterprise” for purposes of stating RICO cause of action, could be satisfied by pleading that banks, promoter of cattle feeding scheme and corporation through which scheme was carried out had as their common purpose facilitating a fraudulent scheme, involving solicitations of funds for purposes of feeding cattle in an arrangement which would result in commission of fraud and production of profits for all. DeWit v. Firstar Corp., N.D.Iowa 1995, 904 F.Supp. 1476 . Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

“Enterprise” for RICO purposes is generally group of persons associated together for common purpose of engaging in course of conduct, and evidence of ongoing organization, the associates of which function as a continuing unit, suffices to prove an enterprise. O & G Carriers, Inc. v. Smith, S.D.N.Y.1992, 799 F.Supp. 1528. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

There was sufficient evidence that individual defendants and their affiliated defendant partnership and corporations were in fact associated as ongoing enterprise with common purpose shown by continuing operation and core of personnel to establish enterprise element of defendants' convictions under Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO), for illegal operation of landfill and disposal of waste materials. U.S. v. Pac- cione, S.D.N.Y.1990, 749 F.Supp. 478. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 95

Real estate development corporation sufficiently pled civil RICO claim against former representatives and rival developer; claim sufficiently alleged predicate acts of racketeering activity in form of mail and wire fraud and sufficiently pled pattern of racketeering activity by alleging separate diversions of real estate opportunities and threat of continued fraudulent activity, and allegation that representatives and rival functioned as continuing group with common purpose to divert corporate opportunities away by improper means sufficiently alleged “enterprise.” GLM Corp. v. Klein, S.D.N.Y.1987, 665 F.Supp. 283, reconsideration denied 684 F.Supp. 1242. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Notwithstanding fact that RICO charge alleged existence of crime family, union, union benefit funds, and separate companies, charge which alleged that separate organizations conducted meetings together to conduct affairs of common enterprise and to discuss payment, collection, and distribution of payoffs from and to members of enterprise and monopolization of Government moving contracts sufficiently alleged existence of enterprise under RICO; declining to follow United States v. Lemm, 680 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir.), United States v. Bledsoe, 674 F.2d 647 (8th Cir.). U.S. v. Rastelli, E.D.N.Y.1986, 653 F.Supp. 1034. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 39

Allegations that defendant insurers and insurance broker had dealt with each other for purpose of working out agreement concerning renewal of insured's product liability insurance and scope of each insurer's liability to insured under previous policies adequately alleged existence of enterprise, for purposes of RICO section defining prohibited activities [18 U.S.C.A. § 1962]. UNR Industries, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., N.D.Ill.1985, 623 F.Supp. 1319. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

In prosecution for a substantive RICO violation the government can establish existence of the required enterprise by proving existence of a group of persons having common purposes, a community of interests and a continuing core of personnel, for purposes of pretrial review of the indictment that requirement was satisfied by allegations concerning claimed “crew,” which the government asserted possessed a hierarchical structure and an ongoing group of members who associated for the agreed purpose of profiting from a variety of interrelated criminal activities. U.S. v. Castellano, S.D.N.Y.1985, 610 F.Supp. 1359. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 35

“Enterprise” for RICO purposes must be entity separate and apart from pattern of racketeering activity in which it engages and must be entity whose members are associated together for common purposes of engaging in course of conduct; in addition, enterprise must have common or shared purpose, must function as continuing unit, and must have ascertainable structure distinct from that inherent in conduct of pattern of racketeering activity. Nunes v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., D.C.Md.1985, 609 F.Supp. 1055. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 35; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38

With regard to allegations of a racketeer “enterprise” within meaning of this chapter, the enterprise must be separate and apart from pattern of activity in which it engages or, if not a legal entity, the enterprise must be a group of individuals associated together for common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct with an ongoing organization and with various associates functioning as a continuing unit. Laterza v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1984, 581 F.Supp. 408. Conspiracy 1.1

If illegitimate association in fact has common purpose, continuity of structure and personnel, and structure distinct from pattern of racketeering, it is an “enterprise” for purposes of this chapter. Instituto Nacional De Comer- cializacion Agricola (Indeca) v. Continental Illinois Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Chicago, N.D.Ill.1983, 576 F.Supp. 991. Commerce 82.6

Industrial machinery owner, which failed to allege what “common purpose” characterized defendants' enterprise, which did not sufficiently allege existence of continuing unit, and which did not allege individual roles of de-

fendants but merely alleged that defendants conspired to defraud it in connection with title, purchase, shipment and sale of its industrial machinery, failed to aver a continuing unit functioning for a common purpose as required for claim under this chapter. Seville Indus. Machinery Corp. v. Southmost Machinery Corp., D.C.N.J.1983, 567 F.Supp. 1146, affirmed in part , reversed in part 742 F.2d 786, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 1179, 469 U.S. 1211, 84 L.Ed.2d 327. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

225. Continuity, enterprise--Generally

To satisfy “associates function as continuing unit” element for enterprise under Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO), government must demonstrate that each person performed role in the group that is consistent with organizational structure established by organization and that furthers activities of organization. U.S. v. Console, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1993, 13 F.3d 641, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 1660, 511 U.S. 1076, 128 L.Ed.2d 377, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 64, 513 U.S. 812, 130 L.Ed.2d 21, denial of habeas corpus vacated 124 F.3d 187 , denial of habeas corpus affirmed 178 F.3d 1279. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35

Continuity requirement for association in fact enterprise under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was not satisfied by mineral development partner's association with other parties to deprive his wife of her interest in partnership. Calcasieu Marine Nat. Bank v. Grant, C.A.5 (La.) 1991, 943 F.2d 1453, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 41

In racketeering prosecution, existence of a RICO enterprise was established by sufficient evidence as to ongoing organization with decision-making framework or mechanism for controlling the group, function as a continuing unit, and existence separate and apart from pattern of racketeering activity. U.S. v. Sanders, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1991, 928 F.2d 940, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 142, 502 U.S. 845, 116 L.Ed.2d 109, denial of post-conviction relief affirmed 21 F.3d 1123. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38

Pilots' union, which was continuously in existence throughout period when alleged predicate acts occurred, could be found to be the enterprise which was a vehicle for racketeering activities. Landry v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n Intern. AFL-CIO, C.A.5 (La.) 1990, 901 F.2d 404, modified on denial of rehearing , certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 244, 498 U.S. 895, 112 L.Ed.2d 203, on remand. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 45

A Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act enterprise must be an entity separate and apart from pattern of activity in which it engages; continuity or ongoing nature of association in fact is linchpin of enterprise status. Ocean Energy II, Inc. v. Alexander & Alexander, Inc., C.A.5 (La.) 1989, 868 F.2d 740. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 38

Allegations that attorney and others formed enterprise to destroy physician's medical practice was insufficient to state claim under RICO statute; association was allegedly formed for immediate accomplishment of specific end, which therefore lacked continuity required to bring it within RICO's ambit. Manax v. McNamara, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1988, 842 F.2d 808. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 42

In order for association to be enterprise within purview of civil RICO statute, “association-in-fact” enterprises, like corporate or partnership enterprises, must have ongoing organization or be continuing unit, such that enterprise has existence that can be defined apart from commission of predicate acts; thus, two individuals who join together for commission of one discrete criminal offense have not created “association-in-fact” enterprise, even if they commit two predicate acts during commission of this offense as their relationship to one another has no continuity, but if individuals associate together to commit several criminal acts, relationship gains ongoing nature coming within purview of RICO. Montesano v. Seafirst Commercial Corp., C.A.5 (La.) 1987, 818 F.2d 423. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

Evidence that defendant would buy marijuana and redistribute it through organization that he headed, that distribution group was an ongoing organization possessing a well-defined structure with continuity of membership and purpose of making money through coordinated and connected series of marijuana transactions was sufficient to establish an enterprise under this section. U.S. v. Zielie, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1984, 734 F.2d 1447, rehearing denied 740 F.2d 979, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 957, 469 U.S. 1189, 83 L.Ed.2d 964, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 1192, 469 U.S. 1216, 84 L.Ed.2d 338. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Evidence, which indicated that the series of bust out schemes as well as associations among defendants began at least in the early 1970's and continued for many years and that defendants operated at least a dozen bust outs during that time and that the participants in those schemes overlapped to a significant degree, was sufficient to prove existence of an “enterprise” under this chapter. U.S. v. Hewes, C.A.11 (Ga.) 1984, 729 F.2d 1302, rehearing denied 734 F.2d 1481, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 790, 469 U.S. 1110, 83 L.Ed.2d 783. Commerce 82.6

Fact that partnership received handling fee for crude oil transactions which involved mail fraud demonstrated an ongoing association for purposes of engaging in interstate commerce under this chapter and partnership was thus an enterprise for purposes of this chapter. U. S. v. Zang, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1982, 703 F.2d 1186, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 103, 464 U.S. 828, 78 L.Ed.2d 107. Commerce 82.6; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 39

The existence of an enterprise is an element of an offense under this chapter which is separate from the element of a pattern of racketeering activity in which the enterprise engages; enterprise is proved by evidence of a continuing organization and by evidence that members function as a continuing unit. U. S. v. Phillips, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1981, 664 F.2d 971, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 2965, 457 U.S. 1136, 73 L.Ed.2d 1354, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 208, 459 U.S. 906, 74 L.Ed.2d 166. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38

Real property owners' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint against mortgage lender and unnamed individual defendants did not adequately allege the existence of an “enterprise”; allegations sufficiently pled that defendants had a common purpose, i.e., to collect and foreclose on mortgages illegally, but they did not adequately plead existence of ongoing organization that functioned as a continuing unit. Izenberg v. ETS Services, LLC, C.D.Cal.2008, 589 F.Supp.2d 1193. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 43

“Continuing unit” requirement for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise means that associates of alleged enterprise must perform role in group consistent with organizational structure and which furthers activities of organization. Harry Miller Corp. v. Mancuso Chemicals Limited, E.D.Pa.2006, 468 F.Supp.2d 708. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35

Law firm's withholding of checks on behalf of its client in excess of contractually specified termination fee for anticipated legal expenses in contract dispute did not satisfy required continuity for civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action, in absence of evidence supporting inference that defendants would wrongfully withhold checks over period that was longer than a few months. Carousel Foods of America, Inc. v. Abrams & Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.2006, 423 F.Supp.2d 119. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Litigant failed to allege “enterprise” as required to impose liability under section of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) which prohibits conducting affairs of enterprise engaged in interstate or foreign commerce through pattern of racketeering activity, based upon acts relating to lawsuit over ownership of certain real estate; complaint was devoid of any indication that defendants constituted “enterprise,” or functioned as continuing unit. Davis v. Hudgins, E.D.Va.1995, 896 F.Supp. 561, affirmed 87 F.3d 1308, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 1440, 520 U.S. 1172, 137 L.Ed.2d 546. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Small Business Administration (SBA) did not prove by preponderance of evidence that principals of small business investment company functioned as continuing unit in making loans to entities in which they held ownership interests, as required to prove violation of civil provisions of Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act. Small Business Admin. v. Echevarria, S.D.Fla.1994, 864 F.Supp. 1254. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 79

Investors' RICO complaint failed to sufficiently allege continuity element of offense of conducting affairs of RICO enterprise where investors alleged that firm prepared and distributed offering materials over period of a few months, complaint failed to raise any inference that firm's action posed threat of continuing criminal conduct, and predicate acts attributed to firm in complaint were insufficient basis for inference that predicates were regular way of conducting firm's ongoing legitimate business. Landy v. Heller, White & Co., S.D.N.Y.1991, 783 F.Supp. 125. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

Sale of gas wells which was executed over five to seven-week period by single perpetrator with specific begin- ning and specific ending point was not type which because of its organization, duration, and objectives posed threat of series of injuries over significant period of time; thus, sale did not satisfy continuity requirements of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) statute. Martin v. Brown, W.D.Pa.1990, 758 F.Supp. 313. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Grandchildren did not allege sufficient continuity of structure and personnel in alleged enterprises that were used to obtain property from grandmother, thereby diverting assets away from her estate and inter vivos trust that was residuary beneficiary under her will and from grandchildren who were beneficiaries of trust and, thus,

grandchildren failed to allege Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) cause of action for conduct of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity. Firestone v. Galbreath, S.D.Ohio 1990, 747 F.Supp. 1556, affirmed in part 976 F.2d 279, rehearing denied , certified question answered 616 N.E.2d 202, 67 Ohio St.3d 87, answer to certified question conformed to 25 F.3d 323, on remand 895 F.Supp. 917. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

Evidence of an ongoing organization, the associates of which function as a continuing unit, suffices to prove an “enterprise” for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) purposes. Griffin v. McNiff, S.D.N.Y.1990, 744 F.Supp. 1237, affirmed 996 F.2d 303. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35

Continuity requirement of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) did not mandate that racketeering enterprise be actually in existence at time of trial. Minpeco, S.A. v. Hunt, S.D.N.Y.1989, 724 F.Supp. 259. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 34

Government had to show “ongoing” and “continuing” economic association that was separate and apart from pattern of racketeering activity that was allegedly being engaged in by enterprise to state criminal RICO charge, even where Government indicted wholly illegitimate enterprise; enterprise had to at least exist for some purpose--legitimate or illegitimate--in addition to carrying out particular pattern of racketeering forming basis for RICO charge. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961(4, 5), 1962(c). U.S. v. McClendon, E.D.Ark.1988, 712 F.Supp. 723. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act enterprise must have continuity of structure and purpose which each member shares. Marriott Bros. v. Gage, N.D.Tex.1988, 704 F.Supp. 731, opinion supplemented on denial of reconsideration 717 F.Supp. 458, affirmed 911 F.2d 1105, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35

Alleged enterprise by employer and its officers involved recruiting of stockbrokers in effort to capture brokers' client bases had clear terminating goal, which was accomplished once brokers left employer, and thus did not satisfy “continuing” requirement of RICO, so that brokers could not maintain RICO suit against employer and officers; although first broker began working with employer in July 1982 and all five brokers had left employer by February 1985, there was no suggestion that criminal activity would continue upon accomplishment of alleged scheme. Cullen v. Paine Webber Group, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1988, 689 F.Supp. 269. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 44

Distributor claiming scheme by its marketing employees and its supplier to put distributor out of business and to boost position of newly created competitor by using distributor's customer lists and other confidential information failed to allege sufficient continuity of enterprises to allow distributor to seek redress under RICO statute, though alleged enterprises remained in existence and continued to engage in alleged activity, where alleged scheme would not, in any event, last longer than the time it would take for capture by competitor of that portion of the market previously controlled by distributor. Celpaco, Inc. v. MD Papierfabriken, D.Conn.1988, 686 F.Supp. 983. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

There were no allegations or evidence to support existence of continuing racketeering “enterprise”; although bank alleged that attorney, in combination with others, formed organization with purpose of assisting his client to steal funds from bank and to cover up trail, association lacked continuity and enterprise terminated when it achieved its goal. Riggs Nat. Bank of Washington, D.C. v. Freeman, S.D.Fla.1988, 684 F.Supp. 1086. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Association of business organizations that provided and marketed energy conservation systems and area dealers constituted “enterprise” for purposes of dealer's RICO action against businesses and another dealer; association was continuing organization, and individual members of association functioned as continuing unit and engaged in business in several states. North Cent. Watt Count, Inc. v. Watt Count Engineering Systems, Inc., M.D.Tenn.1988, 678 F.Supp. 1305. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Complaint failed to state claims for violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, absent allegation of enterprise that was ongoing entity distinct from defendants, in which any defendant had legal or beneficial ownership, that any defendant had ability to exercise direct or indirect influence over policy and decision-making process thereof, in which any defendant acquired or maintained interests through racketeering acts or in which any defendant conducted or participated in conduct through pattern of racketeering activity. Adamson v. Alliance Mortg. Co., E.D.Va.1987, 677 F.Supp. 871, affirmed 861 F.2d 63. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38

RICO complaint adequately alleged enterprise where it alleged that defendants associated together for common purpose of engaging in elaborate laundering and check kiting scheme with funds fraudulently obtained from plaintiff; given the necessary continuity of structure and personnel required to conduct ongoing banking schemes, plaintiff adequately pleaded association in fact. Grunwald v. Bornfreund, E.D.N.Y.1987, 668 F.Supp. 128. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Entity that functions legitimately upon termination of its single criminal episode is not enterprise the conduct of which violates RICO. Khaimi v. Schonberger, E.D.N.Y.1987, 664 F.Supp. 54, affirmed 838 F.2d 1203. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 37

In order to meet enterprise requirement under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, enterprise must have ongoing formal or informal organization, and its various associates must function as continuing unit. U.S. v. Weinberg, E.D.N.Y.1987, 656 F.Supp. 1020. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

“Enterprise” requirement under RICO is proven by existence of continuing organization with framework for carrying out decisions, and by evidence that members function as continuing unit with established duties. Cincin- nati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Elec. Co., S.D.Ohio 1986, 656 F.Supp. 49. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35

In order to establish “enterprise” under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(4), defining “enterprise” for purpose of statutes gov-

erning Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, and 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c), prohibiting persons employed or associated with enterprise engaged in activities affecting interstate or foreign commerce from conducting enterprise's affairs to pattern of racketeering activity, there must be evidence that various associates function as continuing unit, and that enterprise had existence separate and apart of pattern of activity in which it engaged. Allington v. Carpenter, C.D.Cal.1985, 619 F.Supp. 474. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38

Venture formed to commit one criminal episode does not come within the meaning of “enterprise” for purposes of this chapter; venture entered into by defendant for the purpose of committing a single criminal act did not constitute an “enterprise.” U. S. v. Moeller, D.C.Conn.1975, 402 F.Supp. 49. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

226. ---- Personnel, continuity, enterprise

Evidence was sufficient to permit jury to conclude beyond reasonable doubt, under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), that defendant and other persons were associated in fact and functioned as continuing unit in narcotics trafficking in housing complex, where, among other things, defendant and his relatives provided drugs to “lieutenants,” lieutenants used street-level dealers to sell narcotics, and defendant and his relatives collaborated in enforcing enterprise's exclusive control over complex. U.S. v. Jones, C.A.2 (Conn.) 2006, 455 F.3d 134, republished at 482 F.3d 60, certiorari denied 127 S.Ct. 1306, 549 U.S. 1231, 167 L.Ed.2d 119, on remand 2007 WL 1670141. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

Evidence that defendant committed certain rules to writing in a “bible” that set forth the structure and bylaws of his gang, that these books were distributed to gang members, that defendant held gang's highest rank, “reverend,” and four other founding members and one non-founding member held gang's next-highest rank, “minister,” and that ministers were expected to teach the “bible” to lower-ranking members was sufficient to establish that gang members functioned as a “continuing unit,” as required to support enterprise element of defendant's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) conspiracy conviction. U.S. v. Smith, C.A.10 (Utah) 2005, 413 F.3d 1253, certiorari denied 126 S.Ct. 1093, 546 U.S. 1120, 163 L.Ed.2d 908, post- conviction relief dismissed 2007 WL 1795743, certificate of appealability denied 283 Fed.Appx. 647, 2008 WL 2588697, certiorari denied 129 S.Ct. 316, 555 U.S. 932, 172 L.Ed.2d 229. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Requirement of continuity of personnel for enterprise under this chapter is not absolute; requirement may be met even where some changes in personnel occur and where different individuals manage the affairs of the enterprise at different times and different places; determinative factor is whether the associational ties of those charged with a violation of this chapter amount to an organizational pattern or system of authority. U. S. v. Lemm, C.A.8 (Neb.) 1982, 680 F.2d 1193, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 739, 459 U.S. 1110, 74 L.Ed.2d 960. Commerce 82.6; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35

Requirement of continuity of personnel is not absolute for purposes of determining whether racketeering “enterprise” exists, under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), and determinative factor is whether associational ties of those charged with RICO violation amount to organizational pattern or system of

authority. U.S. v. Garfinkle, D.Nev.1993, 842 F.Supp. 1284, affirmed 67 F.3d 1421, denial of habeas corpus affirmed 125 F.3d 859. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35

Change of membership of alleged Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise did not mean that enterprise ceased to exist; simple change in membership that did not disrupt structure or mechanism for controlling and directing affairs of group on ongoing basis did not destroy enterprise as long as core of members remained in organization. American Trade Partners, L.P. v. A-1 Intern. Importing Enterprises, Ltd., E.D.Pa.1991, 757 F.Supp. 545. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 34

227. ---- Distinct from pattern of racketeering activity, continuity, enterprise

Participants in real estate fraud scheme were not an “enterprise” for purposes of action under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where there was no evidence of structure amongst participants beyond that which was inherent in real estate fraud scheme, and no evidence of decision-making apparatus that limited or guided participants in performance of their roles in real estate transactions. Chang v. Chen, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1996, 80 F.3d 1293. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 44

Corporation's subsidiaries were not “enterprises” conducted by corporation such that corporation could be sued under section of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act proscribing conduct of affairs of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity, absent allegation that corporation had role in racketeering activity distinct from undertakings of subsidiaries. Gasoline Sales, Inc. v. Aero Oil Co., C.A.3 (Pa.) 1994, 39 F.3d 70. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Essential characteristics of enterprise under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) include common or shared purpose, some continuity of structure and personnel, and ascertainable structure distinct from that inherent in pattern of racketeering; enterprise cannot simply be undertaking of acts of racketeering and neither can it be minimal association which surrounds those acts. Stephens, Inc. v. Geldermann, Inc., C.A.8 (Ark.) 1992, 962 F.2d 808. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 34

Members of enterprise did not function as continuing unit, as required to establish Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act association-in-fact enterprise, where enterprise did not operate with hierarchical or consensual decision making structure. Clark v. National Equities Holdings, Inc., E.D.Tex.2006, 561 F.Supp.2d 632, remanded in part 229 Fed.Appx. 314, 2007 WL 1573954, on remand 558 F.Supp.2d 692. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

For purposes of civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) action in which alleged enterprise was defendant's marriage, defendants were distinct from marriage in absence of any evidence that either defendant acted in any way other than in harmony with one another regarding alleged insurance fraud as marriage required association and commitment of two individuals. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Townson, E.D.Tenn.1995, 912 F.Supp. 291. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 41

To establish an “enterprise” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, plaintiff must establish

enterprise having an existence separate and apart from pattern of racketeering activity in which it is engaged, and plaintiff must also demonstrate existence of “ongoing” organization in which various associates function as a continuing unit. Streck v. Peters, D.Hawai'i 1994, 855 F.Supp. 1156. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 35; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38

In order to be “enterprise,” within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) section proscribing person associated with enterprise from participating in conduct of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity, alleged association must have identity separate and apart from alleged pattern of racketeering. Independent Drug Wholesalers Group, Inc. v. Denton, D.Kan.1993, 833 F.Supp. 1507, reconsideration denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38

Allegations of former employee's complaint against former employer, its parent corporation, and former supervisor did not satisfy requirement of pursuing claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) of alleging enterprise that was distinct, where employee merely alleged that enterprise was collective entity, and did not substantiate allegation that enterprise had existence distinct from individual person or entity employed by or associated with enterprise. Casper v. Paine Webber Group, Inc., D.N.J.1992, 787 F.Supp. 1480. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act enterprise must have ascertainable structure distinct from pattern of racketeering activity; if nothing joins association members except commission of predicate acts, there is no enterprise. Marriott Bros. v. Gage, N.D.Tex.1988, 704 F.Supp. 731, opinion supplemented on denial of reconsideration 717 F.Supp. 458, affirmed 911 F.2d 1105, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35

228. Knowledge, enterprise

There was no evidence that providers of medical products and services covered by insurance policies or subscribers to policies suffered direct injury as a result of extortionate threats allegedly made by insurers and claims administrators, as required for providers and subscribers to establish claim under Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) based upon insurers' and administrators' alleged violations of Hobbs Act. Sanc- hez v. Triple-S Management, Corp., C.A.1 (Puerto Rico) 2007, 492 F.3d 1, certiorari denied 128 S.Ct. 806, 552 U.S. 1076, 169 L.Ed.2d 606. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Association requirement of racketeering statute requires that defendant be shown to have been aware of at least general existence of enterprise named in indictment; it is not necessary that defendant has specific knowledge of every member and component of enterprise, and it is sufficient that defendant know general nature of enterprise and know that enterprise extends beyond defendant's individual role. U.S. v. Eufrasio, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1991, 935 F.2d 553, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 340, 502 U.S. 925, 116 L.Ed.2d 280, denial of post- conviction relief affirmed 38 F.3d 693. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Genuine issue of material fact as to whether purported partner in allegedly fictitious company was aware of, and participant in, alleged scheme to defraud merchandiser precluded summary judgment in merchandiser's action

against partner for conspiracy, fraud, and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violations. International Floor Crafts, Inc. v. Adams, D.Mass.2008, 578 F.Supp.2d 231. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

It would be premature to rule that defendants were RICO persons who had participated in a RICO enterprise where key issues of knowledge and intent had not been adjudicated. In re American Continental Corporation/Lin- coln Sav. and Loan Securities Litigation, D.Ariz.1992, 794 F.Supp. 1424. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 80

229. Legitimate or illegitimate enterprise

Term “enterprise” as used in this chapter encompassed both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises, since, though its major purpose was to protect legitimate business enterprises from infiltration by racketeers, it also made criminal participation in association which performs only illegal acts and which has not infiltrated or attempted to infiltrate legitimate enterprise. U. S. v. Turkette, U.S.Mass.1981, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 452 U.S. 576, 69 L.Ed.2d 246, on remand 656 F.2d 5. Commerce 82.6; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 37

Congress did not draft this chapter to apply solely to infiltration of legitimate enterprises, but this chapter also reaches wholly criminal organizations; however, this chapter was not intended to reach any criminals who merely associate together and perpetrate two of the specified crimes. U. S. v. Bledsoe, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1982, 674 F.2d 647, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 456, 459 U.S. 1040, 74 L.Ed.2d 608. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 37

This chapter applies to both illegitimate and legitimate enterprises. U. S. v. Thevis, C.A.5 (Ga.) 1982, 665 F.2d 616, rehearing denied 671 F.2d 1379, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 2300, 456 U.S. 1008, 73 L.Ed.2d 1303, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 3489, 458 U.S. 1109, 73 L.Ed.2d 1370, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 57, 459 U.S. 825, 74 L.Ed.2d 61. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 37

Under this chapter prosecution is not required to specify whether the enterprise is either a “legal entity” or “a group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.” U. S. v. Stratton, C.A.5 (La.) 1981, 649 F.2d 1066. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 91

This chapter applies to any enterprise, whether or not legitimate. U. S. v. Mannino, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1980, 635 F.2d 110. Commerce 82.6; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 37

In prosecution for a racketeering conspiracy regarding the operation of the tavern business within a county, defendants' activities were not wholly illegitimate such as would remove the activities from term “enterprise” contained in this chapter. U. S. v. Zemek, C.A.9 (Wash.) 1980, 634 F.2d 1159, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 1359, 450 U.S. 916, 67 L.Ed.2d 341, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 1525, 450 U.S. 985, 67 L.Ed.2d 821, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 3031, 452 U.S. 905, 69 L.Ed.2d 406. Conspiracy 28(1)

This chapter is designed to protect legitimate commercial enterprises from the onslaught of racketeers and provide means of repairing the effects of such incursions, and “enterprise” therein means only legitimate enterprise, and thus section 1962 of this title making it unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise affecting interstate or foreign commerce to participate in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity cannot be used to reach any individual or groups of individuals who engage in a pattern of exclusively criminal racketeering activity. U. S. v. Turkette, C.A.1 (Mass.) 1980, 632 F.2d 896, certiorari granted 101 S.Ct. 938, 449 U.S. 1123, 67 L.Ed.2d 109, reversed on other grounds 101 S.Ct. 2524, 452 U.S. 576, 69 L.Ed.2d 246, on remand 656 F.2d 5. Commerce 82.6; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 37

To prove “enterprise” in prosecution for violation of this chapter, it was not necessary to prove any organization which had legitimate purpose, but, rather, association formed for sole purpose of illegal racketeering can satisfy the “enterprise” requirement. U.S. v. Provenzano, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1980, 620 F.2d 985, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 267, 449 U.S. 899, 66 L.Ed.2d 129. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

This chapter is not limited to the operation of legitimate businesses through a pattern of racketeering; this chapter may be applied to racketeering activities which promote any enterprise, including an illegal enterprise, affecting interstate commerce. U. S. v. Whitehead, C.A.4 (Va.) 1980, 618 F.2d 523. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 34

That phrase “any enterprise” within section 1962 of this title is broad in scope does not mean that, because it includes both legitimate and illegitimate enterprises instead of only one or the other, it is therefore vague. U. S. v. Aleman, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1979, 609 F.2d 298, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 1345, 445 U.S. 946, 63 L.Ed.2d 780. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Although a significant purpose of this chapter was to address the problem of infiltration of legitimate business by persons connected with organized crime, this purpose hardly leads to the conclusion that this chapter applies only in the case of an actual infiltration of a legitimate business. U. S. v. Rone, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1979, 598 F.2d 564, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 1345, 445 U.S. 946, 63 L.Ed.2d 780. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 2

This chapter encompasses not only legitimate businesses but also enterprises which are from their inception organized for illicit purposes. U. S. v. Elliott, C.A.5 (Ga.) 1978, 571 F.2d 880, rehearing denied 575 F.2d 300, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 349, 439 U.S. 953, 58 L.Ed.2d 344. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 37

This chapter applies to all enterprises that are conducted through pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debts and not just to legitimate ones. U. S. v. Altese, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1976, 542 F.2d 104, certiorari denied 97 S.Ct. 736, 429 U.S. 1039, 50 L.Ed.2d 750.

In respect to this chapter, the term “enterprise” has a very broad meaning and is not just limited to legitimate business enterprises. U. S. v. Hawes, C.A.5 (Ga.) 1976, 529 F.2d 472.

“Enterprise” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) can be one with primarily legitimate or illegitimate ends. Rodriguez v. Banco Cent., D.Puerto Rico 1991, 777 F.Supp. 1043, affirmed 990 F.2d 7. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 37

Plaintiffs could not link the preinvestment conduct of those who arranged for offering of securities with the postinvestment conduct of the company itself to assert a pattern of racketeering for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) purposes where the RICO defendants were alleged to have played a significant part in conducting an ongoing legitimate business and where the complaint alleged that the association which they formed to issue the securities did not exist for legitimate purposes and was created only to carry on the allegedly illegitimate scheme. Insurance Consultants of America, Inc., Employee Pension Plan v. Southeastern Ins. Group, Inc., D.N.J.1990, 746 F.Supp. 390. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 32

Group of legal entities could not be RICO enterprise. U.S. v. McClendon, E.D.Ark.1988, 712 F.Supp. 723. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35

Although this chapter was intended to prevent infiltration of legitimate businesses by funds derived from racketeering activities, wholly illegitimate enterprises such as one charged in indictment could use money gained from their illegal activities as springboard into sphere of legitimate enterprise, and therefore government had to be given opportunity to prove applicability of this chapter to charged conduct. U.S. v. Shakur, S.D.N.Y.1983, 560 F.Supp. 347. Commerce 82.6; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 37

Purpose of this chapter is to deal with organized crime's control over business enterprises of all sorts, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Noonan v. Granville-Smith, S.D.N.Y.1981, 537 F.Supp. 23. Commerce 82.6; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

Illegal gambling operation may be an “enterprise” for purposes of this chapter. U. S. v. Mazzio, E.D.Pa.1980, 501 F.Supp. 340, affirmed 681 F.2d 810, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 2961, 457 U.S. 1134, 73 L.Ed.2d 1351. Gaming 62

Under this section's definition of “enterprise,” the term “enterprise” is not limited to legal enterprises. U. S. v. Mannino, S.D.N.Y.1980, 487 F.Supp. 508. Commerce 82.6; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 37

Within meaning of section 1962 of this title making it a federal crime for any person associated with any enterprise whose activities affect interstate commerce to participate in conducting affairs of enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity, term “enterprise” is not limited to legitimate enterprises. U. S. v. Fineman, E.D.Pa.1977, 434 F.Supp. 189. Commerce 82.6

This chapter was not designed solely to eliminate infiltration of legitimate businesses and unions but, rather, was intended to eradicate patterns of racketeering activity contaminating any organization engaged in or affecting interstate commerce. U. S. v. Frumento, E.D.Pa.1976, 426 F.Supp. 797, affirmed 552 F.2d 534, affirmed 563 F.2d 1083, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 1256, 434 U.S. 1072, 55 L.Ed.2d 775, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 1258, 434 U.S. 1072, 55 L.Ed.2d 776. Extortion 4

Within meaning of this chapter, word “enterprise” encompasses illegitimate as well as legitimate enterprises or businesses, and thus this chapter prohibits the infiltration of racketeering funds into both legitimate and illegitimate businesses. U. S. v. Castellano, E.D.N.Y.1975, 416 F.Supp. 125.

For purposes of this chapter, the “enterprise” with which the defendants were allegedly associated when they engaged in the racketeering must be a lawful business enterprise; indictment which alleged that defendants were associated with an enterprise organized for the purpose of burning and destroying buildings did not state an offense under this section. U. S. v. Moeller, D.C.Conn.1975, 402 F.Supp. 49. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 37; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

This chapter was aimed not at legitimate business organizations but at combatting a society of criminals who seek to operate outside of the control of the American people and their governments. Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1975, 66 F.R.D. 109. Criminal Law 1222.1

230. Multiple entities, enterprise

“Enterprise” under RICO statute may consist of more than one entity, so long as those entities have been connected by defendant's participation in them through a pattern of racketeering activity. U.S. v. Butler, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1992, 954 F.2d 114. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Entities that are separate and distinct enterprises for some purposes may jointly be enterprise for RICO purposes where they have been connected by defendant's participation in them through pattern of racketeering activity. U.S. v. Stolfi, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1989, 889 F.2d 378. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35

231. Operation and management, enterprise

To constitute an association-in-fact enterprise under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), a group need not have a hierarchical structure, a chain of command, or other business-like attributes; decisions may be made on an ad hoc basis and by any number of methods. Boyle v. U.S., U.S.2009, 129 S.Ct. 2237, 556 U.S. 938, 173 L.Ed.2d 1265. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

City adequately pled an enterprise under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) with respect to internet cigarette business and New Mexico limited liability company by alleging companies entered profit sharing and employment agreements, that limited liability company transferred assets from internet cigarette business to limited liability company in order to hide assets and that limited liability company regularly transferred funds earned from illegal cigarette sales to internet cigarette business, that alleged acts of mail and wire fraud were essential to the two companies' business, and that the businesses were made up of several defendant persons who operated or managed the affairs of the enterprise. City of New York v. Smokes-Spir- its.com, Inc., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2008, 541 F.3d 425, certified question accepted 897 N.E.2d 1061, 868 N.Y.S.2d 580, 11 N.Y.3d 800, certiorari granted 129 S.Ct. 2159, 173 L.Ed.2d 1155, certified question answered 911 N.E.2d 834, 883 N.Y.S.2d 772, 12 N.Y.3d 616, reversed and remanded 130 S.Ct. 983, 559 U.S. 1, 175 L.Ed.2d 943. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Trial court erred in failing to instruct jury that government must prove that defendant participated in operation or management of enterprise to impose liability under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO); “operation or management” language is required pursuant to Supreme Court's decision in Reves. U.S. v. Masotto, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1996, 73 F.3d 1233, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 54, 519 U.S. 810, 136 L.Ed.2d 18. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 97

Provision of traditional legal services did not constitute “operation or management” of enterprise for purposes of liability under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Kelly v. Palmer, Reifler, & Asso- ciates, P.A., S.D.Fla.2010, 681 F.Supp.2d 1356. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Foreign corporations and their sole shareholder failed to allege the existence of an enterprise for Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) purposes, in action against former managers and advisors, arising out of their alleged unauthorized sale of corporate assets to other foreign corporations, where plaintiffs' amended complaint simply grouped together all of the individuals and entities involved in the racketeering acts and called them an enterprise, and there was no indication that the group was an “ongoing organization” as opposed to an ad hoc collection of entities and individuals who each happened to have been involved in one scheme or another against plaintiffs, since no participant was alleged to have acted for benefit of any other participant. Cedar Swamp Holdings, Inc. v. Zaman, S.D.N.Y.2007, 487 F.Supp.2d 444. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Former client's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim failed to demonstrate his alleged injuries derived from attorney's direct or indirect investment in, or maintaining an interest or control over, or participating in the operation or management of the affairs of a qualifying “enterprise.” Tenamee v. Schmuk- ler, S.D.N.Y.2006, 438 F.Supp.2d 438. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) section making it unlawful for person employed by enterprise to participate in conduct of such enterprise's affairs through pattern of racketeering activity requires that defendants have some part in directing enterprise's affairs. Portland General Elec. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., W.D.Pa.1993, 842 F.Supp. 161. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

232. Organized criminal activity, enterprise

Sufficient evidence established the existence of a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise, as required to support defendant's RICO conviction; cooperating witnesses testified that individuals distributing narcotics in area were members of a “family” or “street family” who made money together and protected each other, the family was protective of its territory, defendant was member of family and packaged cocaine and provided whatever assistance was needed, defendant was introduced as “shooter in the family,” and defendant was allowed to distribute drugs at a family spot which he would not have been allowed to do had he not been a member of the family. U.S. v. Payne, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2010, 591 F.3d 46, certiorari denied 131 S.Ct. 74, 178 L.Ed.2d 246. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 95

Evidence was sufficient to sustain finding that “enterprise” existed in defendant's crime family for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), despite fact that internecine warfare had erupted between factions in family; member of rival faction expected defendant to continue sharing loan-sharking proceeds, crime family members expected relationships to return to normal after war was over, and other crime families pressured rival factions to resolve their dispute and end violence. U.S. v. Orena, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1994, 32 F.3d 704, post-conviction relief denied 956 F.Supp. 1071. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 95

Jurisdictional reach of this chapter is not limited to large enterprises engaged in organized crime. U.S. v. Gottes- man, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1984, 724 F.2d 1517, 222 U.S.P.Q. 206, rehearing denied 729 F.2d 1468. Commerce 82.6

Each element of racketeering, that is, predicate acts, pattern of such acts and enterprise requirement, was designed to limit applicability of this chapter to individuals engaged in organized crime from ordinary criminals. U. S. v. Bledsoe, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1982, 674 F.2d 647, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 456, 459 U.S. 1040, 74 L.Ed.2d 608. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 3

Evidence was sufficient to prove defendant's membership in an enterprise within meaning of the Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where detective who interrogated defendant after his arrest testified that defendant admitted he had been a member of gang for one year and that he held “status” within a subunit of the gang, and former gang members testified that defendant held a leadership role within the subunit. U.S. v. Castro, E.D.N.Y.2009, 669 F.Supp.2d 288, affirmed 411 Fed.Appx. 415, 2011 WL 652475, certiorari denied 132 S.Ct. 153, 181 L.Ed.2d 69. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 95

Evidence established more than association of individuals for commission of sporadic crime and was sufficient to establish racketeering “enterprise,” as required for conviction under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act (RICO), where evidence established organizational structure of authority with father and son acting as central authority for enterprise and with defendant firmly established as lieutenant, poised to carry out orders from organizational heads. U.S. v. Garfinkle, D.Nev.1993, 842 F.Supp. 1284, affirmed 67 F.3d 1421, denial of habeas corpus affirmed 125 F.3d 859. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 95

233. Other legal entity, enterprise

Law firm that was acting as agent for its retail clients in sending pre-suit civil theft demand letters was not separate and independent entity, as required for enterprise liability under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act (RICO); law firm's tactics, even if deceptive or extortionate, were not separate and apart from its corporate client seeking to obtain civil recovery, even if firm's legal services took backseat to its collection services on behalf of client. Kelly v. Palmer, Reifler, & Associates, P.A., S.D.Fla.2010, 681 F.Supp.2d 1356. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 42

Film company's allegations that outside vendors exercised their discretion in preparing and submitting fictitious invoices to company and setting rate for rebate processing services alleged that vendors exercised control over the alleged Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise, as required to support RICO claim. Fuji Photo Film U.S.A., Inc. v. McNulty, S.D.N.Y.2009, 640 F.Supp.2d 300. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Mortgagors sufficiently alleged “enterprise” element of claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiz- ations Act (RICO) when they asserted existence of association-in-fact consisting of mortgage lender and its subsidiaries, including those offering loan-closing services, notwithstanding defendants' contention that lender and subsidiaries were insufficiently distinct to serve as RICO enterprise, given mortgagors' assertions that subsidiaries' participation allowed enterprise to function more effectively since they played distinct roles and performed tasks that normally would be conducted independently, thereby avoiding checks and balances within mortgage process and concealing fraudulent scheme. In re Countrywide Financial Corp. Mortg. Marketing and Sales Prac- tices Litigation, S.D.Cal.2009, 601 F.Supp.2d 1201. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 43

Congress did not intend to limit plain meaning of words “other legal entity” in statutory definition of enterprise for purpose of this chapter governing racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations. U. S. v. Barber, S.D.W.Va.1979, 476 F.Supp. 182. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35

Investors that allegedly made certain purchasers from antique dealer in reliance on her false representations failed to satisfy their burden of demonstrating any racketeering “enterprise” separate from dealer herself, as required for investors to maintain cause of action under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, where entities identified in investors' complaint as being companies for which dealer worked were merely trade names utilized by dealer to carry on her business. In re McGinty, Bkrtcy.N.D.Miss.2000, 276 B.R. 489. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 44

234. Pattern of racketeering, enterprise

Proof that a defendant violated statute prohibiting the operation of a gambling business does not establish that the defendant conspired to participate in the affairs of a gambling enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); in order to prove the latter offense, the prosecution must prove either that the defendant committed a pattern of gambling operation violations or a pattern of state-law gambling crimes. Boyle v. U.S., U.S.2009, 129 S.Ct. 2237, 556 U.S. 938, 173 L.Ed.2d 1265. Conspiracy 28(3)

To establish a “pattern,” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) section which makes it unlawful “for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity,” a plaintiff must show that the predicate acts of racketeering activity by a defendant are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Valley Physical Medicine & Rehabilitation, P.C., E.D.N.Y.2007, 475 F.Supp.2d 213, vacated in part on reconsideration 555 F.Supp.2d 335, certification denied 2008 WL 4856103. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 28

Real property owners sufficiently pled distinct Racketeer and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) “enterprise” and persons to state a claim under RICO provision prohibiting conducting affairs of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity by alleging that property insurance program operated in part by nondefendants constituted the RICO enterprise, as the program itself constituted the association-in-fact enterprise separate from the individual defendant companies. Charleswell v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., D.Virgin Islands 2004, 308 F.Supp.2d 545. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38

Golf cart distributor failed to state claim that manufacturer which had allegedly dealt improperly with distributor violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), by conducting or participating in affairs of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity; distributor failed to make necessary showing that manufacturer was “person” separate from enterprise it operated. Club Car, Inc. v. Club Car (Quebec) Import, Inc., S.D.Ga.2003, 276 F.Supp.2d 1276, affirmed 362 F.3d 775, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied 111 Fed.Appx. 1003, 2004 WL 1585294, certiorari denied 125 S.Ct. 618, 543 U.S. 1002, 160 L.Ed.2d 461. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

“Enterprise” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) is substantially different from acts forming pattern of racketeering activity. Miranda-Rodriguez v. Ponce Federal Bank, F.S.B., D.Puerto Rico 1990, 751 F.Supp. 18, affirmed 948 F.2d 41. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 34

235. Single scheme, enterprise

Alleged scheme by borrower, borrower's agent, and real estate appraiser to fraudulently induce lender to accept overvalued property as collateral for loan did not constitute enterprise under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where alleged enterprise purportedly existed to commit single act, and there was no indication of alleged enterprise's hierarchy, organization, or activities. Ferri v. Berkowitz, E.D.N.Y.2009, 678 F.Supp.2d 66. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Debtor's claim that credit card company was business enterprise was insufficient to establish existence of “enterprise” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where only activities of alleged enterprise were those of purported racketeering scheme to defraud debtor. Rolfes v. MBNA America Bank N.A., D.S.D.2005, 416 F.Supp.2d 745, affirmed 219 Fed.Appx. 613, 2007 WL 911831. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 43

“Enterprise” element of civil RICO suit was not satisfied where alleged enterprise had a single target, a deceased singer's estate, and one finite goal, the transfer of decedent's shares in certain companies to his widow, even though defendants allegedly continued to control and receive income from companies formed from alleged estate assets. Bingham v. Zolt, S.D.N.Y.1988, 683 F.Supp. 965. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Investors failed to sufficiently allege existence of enterprise so as to state civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim against broker and two of its agents; churning scheme alleged was completed after 24 month period, and no subsequent or prior frauds, nor frauds against other parties, had been alleged. Newman v. L.F. Rothschild, Unterberg, Towbin, S.D.N.Y.1987, 677 F.Supp. 146. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 44

An enterprise with a single purpose could provide basis for Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act violation. Reiter's Beer Distributors, Inc. v. Christian Schmidt Brewing Co., E.D.N.Y.1987, 657 F.Supp. 136. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35

236. Structure, enterprise

An association-in-fact enterprise under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was required to have a structure, but it did not need to have an ascertainable structure beyond that inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity in which it engaged. Boyle v. U.S., U.S.2009, 129 S.Ct. 2237, 556 U.S. 938, 173 L.Ed.2d 1265. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

City failed to allege facts supporting its stock allegation that New Mexico corporation's association-in-fact dis- played a continuity of structure and personnel, and had a consensual decision-making structure, as required to establish an association-in-fact enterprise under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). City of New York v. Smokes-Spirits.com, Inc., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2008, 541 F.3d 425, certified question accepted 897 N.E.2d 1061, 868 N.Y.S.2d 580, 11 N.Y.3d 800, certiorari granted 129 S.Ct. 2159, 173 L.Ed.2d 1155, certified question answered 911 N.E.2d 834, 883 N.Y.S.2d 772, 12 N.Y.3d 616, reversed and remanded 130 S.Ct. 983, 559 U.S. 1, 175 L.Ed.2d 943. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Evidence was sufficient to permit jury to conclude beyond reasonable doubt, under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), that relatively structured narcotics trafficking enterprise existed, which had been conducted over substantial period of time, where, among other things, participant testified that “lieutenants” typically obtained prepackaged heroin and crack and delivered bundles of packets to street-level dealers, another participant testified that lieutenants were responsible for supervising four or five sellers and making sure that dealers were adequately supplied with product, and lieutenants were generally salaried at $500 per week. U.S. v. Jones, C.A.2 (Conn.) 2006, 482 F.3d 60, certiorari denied 127 S.Ct. 1306, 549 U.S. 1231, 167 L.Ed.2d 119, on remand 2007 WL 1670141. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 95

Hallmark of “enterprise” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) is structure; enterprise includes informal organizations such as criminal gangs, and, although there must be some structure, to dis-

tinguish enterprise from mere conspiracy, there need not be much. U.S. v. Rogers, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1996, 89 F.3d 1326, certiorari denied 117 S.Ct. 495, 519 U.S. 999, 136 L.Ed.2d 387. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 35; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

An enterprise under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) must have ascertainable structure separate and apart from that inherent in the pattern of racketeering activity; if enterprise did not need to have separate structure, enterprise element of RICO action would become superfluous, because every pattern of racketeering activity would become an enterprise whose affairs are conducted through pattern of racketeering activity. Chang v. Chen, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1996, 80 F.3d 1293. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise must be more than a group of people who get together to commit pattern of racketeering activity; enterprise requires ongoing structure of persons associated with time, joined in purpose, and organized in manner amenable to hierarchial or consensual decision- making. Gagan v. American Cablevision, Inc., C.A.7 (Ind.) 1996, 77 F.3d 951, rehearing denied. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 35

Structure sufficient to qualify as “enterprise” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute existed in league of four individuals in conspiracy to defraud investor, where informal enterprise persisted as identifiable entity through time with differentiation of roles of individuals within conspiracy in which one person acted as respectable front man to enlist investor, while the other three persons created and operated over period of two years series of tax shelters designed to separate investor from her money. Burdett v. Miller, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1992, 957 F.2d 1375, amended on denial of rehearing. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 39

To be considered an “enterprise” for purposes of claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), any group or entity constituting the enterprise must exist independently from the racketeering activity in which the enterprise engages; that is, each group or entity must have a structure for making decisions and controlling the affairs of the group on an ongoing, rather than an ad hoc, basis, and, to this end, plaintiff must allege facts which show that the group or enterprise has some function wholly unrelated to the racketeering activity. Von Grabe v. Sprint PCS, S.D.Cal.2003, 312 F.Supp.2d 1285. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 38

Complaint, which alleged that forced placement of insurance on automobiles serving as collateral for consumer credit contracts purchased by banking corporation's subsidiary from automobile dealers constituted violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), failed to identify structure to putative enterprises sufficient to satisfy RICO, where plaintiffs failed to identify which automobile dealerships comprised enterprise and described banking corporation merely by attaching its SEC 10-Q filing without identifying which holdings were involved or how each subsidiary or holding was connected to pattern of racketeering activity. Brannon v. Boatmen's Bancshares, Inc., W.D.Okla.1997, 952 F.Supp. 1478, affirmed 153 F.3d 1144. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act enterprise must have decision-making structure, be it consensual or hierarchical, which directs enterprise's affairs on ongoing, not ad hoc basis. Marriott Bros. v. Gage, N.D.Tex.1988, 704 F.Supp. 731, opinion supplemented on denial of reconsideration 717 F.Supp. 458, affirmed 911 F.2d 1105, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35

237. Persons, enterprise

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act requires that “person” and “enterprise” engaged in racketeering activities be different entities. Board of County Com'rs of San Juan County v. Liberty Group, C.A.10 (N.M.) 1992, 965 F.2d 879, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 329, 506 U.S. 918, 121 L.Ed.2d 247. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 38

Lender and its wholly owned subsidiary could not be racketeering enterprise and persons charged with conducting it. Arzuaga-Collazo v. Oriental Federal Sav. Bank, C.A.1 (Puerto Rico) 1990, 913 F.2d 5. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 35

For purposes of Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act, retail computer store franchisor could not combine with other entities to form enterprise, when franchisor was already “person” whose behavior Act was designed to punish. Entre Computer Centers, Inc. v. FMG of Kansas City, Inc., C.A.4 (Va.) 1987, 819 F.2d 1279 . Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Defendant could not be convicted under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act as both the “person” and the “enterprise” that had its affairs conducted through a pattern of racketeering activity. U.S. v. Di- Caro, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1985, 772 F.2d 1314, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 1458, 475 U.S. 1081, 89 L.Ed.2d 716. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38

Complex investment scheme operated by network of individuals and companies, which purportedly allowed high income individuals to initially lease thoroughbred mares, breed those mares for a season and then keep the resulting foal, and also later provided alternative mineral investment opportunities, contained both “persons” and “enterprise,” as required for claim under Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act; individual persons and corporate entities were each capable of holding legal of beneficial interest in property so as to qualify as “person,” and persons and entities operated an association-in-fact enterprise to persuade investors to participate in lease program and, subsequently, alternative investment schemes in order to fund oil and gas interests of interest to one of corporate entities. In re ClassicStar Mare Lease Litigation, E.D.Ky.2011, 823 F.Supp.2d 599, opinion supplemented on reconsideration , amended in part 2012 WL 1080569, affirmed 2013 WL 3746220. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 39; Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations 64

Carrier that allegedly engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was a “person” sufficiently distinct from “enterprise” which included its parent corporation and sister subsidiary, although all were businesses operating in a unified corporate structure, where, as separately incorporated legal entities, parent corporation and subsidiaries had legal rights, obligations,

powers, and privileges different from each other. U1IT4less, Inc. v. FedEx Corp., S.D.N.Y.2012, 896 F.Supp.2d 275. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 47

Title insurer was separate and distinct “person” from alleged enterprise, which consisted of insurer as well as title and settlement agents, thus satisfying distinctiveness requirement for homeowners' claim under civil statute of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) arising from alleged overcharging; although agents had agency agreement with insurer, agents were not employees of insurer, but were merely non-exclusive agents who also worked with different title insurance companies. Schwartz v. Lawyers Title Ins. Co., E.D.Pa.2010, 680 F.Supp.2d 690. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Investors who sued ambulance services, affiliates and officers, alleging that they were induced to invest through series of misrepresentations, failed to aver separate and district enterprises, as required to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); complaint averred that RICO enterprise and persons engaging in pattern of racketeering activity were same. DeFazio v. Wallis, E.D.N.Y.2007, 500 F.Supp.2d 197. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Subsidiary and parent corporations could not be both “persons” and the “enterprise” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) section prohibiting any person employed by or associated with enterprise affecting interstate commerce from conducting enterprise's affairs through pattern of racketeering activity. Nord- berg v. Trilegiant Corp., N.D.Cal.2006, 445 F.Supp.2d 1082. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Plaintiff's ex-wife, her divorce attorney, and others involved in her divorce proceedings did not constitute “enterprise,” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), despite plaintiff's contention that they conspired to obtain disproportionate and unfair settlement of cash and property. Milgrom v. Burstein, E.D.Ky.2005, 374 F.Supp.2d 523. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35

Controlling shareholder of developer was not sufficiently distinct from developer, which was alleged Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise, to be “person” for purposes of RICO provision prohibiting “person” from conducting affairs of “enterprise” through pattern of racketeering activity; plaintiff purchasers' allegations were insufficient to establish that shareholder played role distinct from that played by developer in alleged fraudulent land sale scheme. Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, D.N.J.1993, 845 F.Supp. 182, affirmed 43 F.3d 1462, vacated on rehearing 66 F.3d 312, on remand 897 F.Supp. 826. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Racketeering “enterprise” may exist, despite overlap between persons and enterprise itself, if overlap is only partial and, therefore, inclusion of additional alleged participant would satisfy nonidentity requirement. Center Cadillac, Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. of New York, S.D.N.Y.1992, 808 F.Supp. 213, affirmed 99 F.3d 401. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38

Individual defendants and partnerships could not be both RICO “persons” and the RICO enterprise. O & G Car-

riers, Inc. v. Smith, S.D.N.Y.1992, 799 F.Supp. 1528. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38

Corporation's individual directors and officers could be deemed “persons” and company could be deemed the “enterprise” for purposes of establishing requisite elements of RICO charge. Comwest, Inc. v. American Operat- or Services, Inc., C.D.Cal.1991, 765 F.Supp. 1467. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Though law or accounting firm may be an “enterprise” through which individual members act, the firms must have been acting through an enterprise or enterprises other than themselves in order to be liable as “persons” under RICO. Bingham v. Zolt, S.D.N.Y.1988, 683 F.Supp. 965. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 42

A person can be both a “person” and “enterprise” within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiz- ations Act. Shared Network Technologies, Inc. v. Taylor, N.D.Ga.1987, 669 F.Supp. 422. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38

Although RICO enterprise may be a named defendant, one or more of the defendants must also be the person who acts upon the enterprise in such a way that the enterprise's affairs are conducted in the pattern of racketeering. Ross v. Omnibusch, Inc., W.D.Mich.1984, 607 F.Supp. 835. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 38

Although entity can be both “person” and “enterprise” under RICO, it cannot fit both definitions for purposes of same RICO claim. Cashco Oil Co. v. Moses, N.D.Ill.1985, 605 F.Supp. 70. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38

238. Individuals, enterprise

Testimony of allegedly defrauded individual that he had met a person twice, once when she was in a car and identified as an officer of an organization and once when he dropped by the organization's offices, was not sufficient to link her to an “enterprise” formed or operated to defraud him to allow civil RICO liability. Copeland v. Smith, C.A.4 (Va.) 1985, 779 F.2d 215. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint sufficiently alleged series of enterprises involving drug manufacturers and medical marketing firms, promoting off-label uses of the drug in violation of federal law, by alleging that manufacturers formulated “tactical plans” with the marketing firms to promote drug on an ongoing basis, that there was regular communication between the marketing firms and manufacturers and financial ties between the marketing firms and manufacturers; however, complaint failed to allege continuing relationships between specific physicians and specific medical marketing firms such that physicians could be considered members of those enterprises. In re Neurontin Marketing, Sales Practices and Products, D.Mass.2006, 433 F.Supp.2d 172. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 44

Single individual could not be both “person” and “enterprise” so as to be in violation of RICO statutes. Zahra v.

Charles, E.D.Mich.1986, 639 F.Supp. 1405. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38

Under this chapter, even a single individual may be considered an “enterprise.” U. S. v. Hawkins, M.D.Ga.1981, 516 F.Supp. 1204. See, also, U.S. v. Joseph, E.D.Pa.1981, 526 F.Supp. 504. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35

239. Plaintiffs, enterprise

Plaintiff marketer of solar energy systems could be federal racketeering enterprise or part of racketeering enterprise; thus, plaintiffs were free to allege that they or one of their members was enterprise or part of enterprise. United Energy Owners Committee, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Management Systems, Inc., C.A.9 (Cal.) 1988, 837 F.2d 356. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

240. Defendants, enterprise

Enterprise, even if itself blameworthy, cannot also be answerable as defendant under section of Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) proscribing conduct of affairs of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity. Miranda v. Ponce Federal Bank, C.A.1 (Puerto Rico) 1991, 948 F.2d 41. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 38

Person named as defendant in RICO action cannot also be entity identified as enterprise. Nagle v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., S.D.Iowa 1992, 790 F.Supp. 203. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 38

“Person” charged with RICO offense cannot also be “enterprise” under statutory scheme. Charles River Data Systems, Inc. v. Oracle Complex Systems Corp., D.Mass.1991, 788 F.Supp. 54. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 38

Even though an individual RICO defendant could not be a “enterprise” for purposes of meeting the enterprise requirement of the RICO statute, a number of such defendants could come together to form an enterprise. Jeffreys v. Exten, D.Del.1992, 784 F.Supp. 146. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35

An enterprise must exist separately and apart from the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) defendant. Wiley v. Hughes Capital Corp., D.N.J.1990, 746 F.Supp. 1264. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38

Defendant could constitute an “enterprise” for purposes of this chapter. U.S. v. Benny, N.D.Cal.1983, 559 F.Supp. 264. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

241. Victims, enterprise

Grant assurances and financial statements transmitted by municipal airport commission to Federal Aviation Ad- ministration (FAA), even if fraudulent, were not proximate cause of any injury to private jet hangar operator, precluding operator's claim against commission under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); operator essentially argued that commission's statements impeded FAA from taking steps to dismantle commission's jet fuel monopoly, but the eventuality posed by operator, that FAA might someday revoke commission's proprietary right to sell jet fuel, was too speculative in light of FAA's consistent condonation of commission's status as airport's sole jet fuel provider. Rectrix Aerodome Centers, Inc. v. Barnstable Municipal Air- port Com'n, D.Mass.2009, 632 F.Supp.2d 120, affirmed 610 F.3d 8. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiz- ations 62

Superseding indictment and bill of particulars were broad enough to include murder of former member of Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise whose activities were perceived as inconsistent with the interests of the enterprise and conspiracy to murder his girlfriend; indictment alleged the “enterprise” as an ongoing international criminal organization which was devoted to making as much money as possible through repeated bolita gambling and protecting that money by any means necessary. U.S. v. Battle, S.D.Fla.2006, 473 F.Supp.2d 1185. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 91

Indictment stating that insurance company was both enterprise through which racketeering acts were committed and victim of such racketeering activity was sufficient to allege Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) violation, where defendant and company were named as part of enterprise and victims of enterprise included company as well as another insurance company, regulators, policyholders, customers, potential customers, insurance agents, public and others. U.S. v. Stewart, E.D.Pa.1997, 955 F.Supp. 385. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 91

Under RICO definitions, “enterprise” may include legitimate legal entity as victim of racketeering activity, so long as it is distinct from person violating RICO. LaSalle Bank Lake View v. Seguban, N.D.Ill.1996, 937 F.Supp. 1309. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38

There is no requirement under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act that the enterprise benefit from the racketeering activity and the enterprise may be a passive instrument of the racketeering, or even a victim of the activities. Anton Motors, Inc. v. Powers, D.Md.1986, 644 F.Supp. 299. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 49

242. Associations, enterprise

Indictment adequately alleged “enterprise” element in charging defendants with violating and conspiring to violate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) where indictment indicated that alleged enterprise was association-in-fact of five individuals and four corporations, who associated and engaged in course of conduct for several common purposes, and was ongoing organization comprised of associates who operated as unit to provide illicit services to clients of one member, who was defense attorney, and each other, indictment alleged facts respecting enterprise's purposes, relationships among members, and longevity sufficient to enable enterprise to pursue its goals of, inter alia, making money and protecting its own members and criminal schemes, and indictment contained sufficient facts to apprise defense that government would seek to prove that enterprise was distinct entity. U.S. v. Bergrin, C.A.3 (N.J.) 2011, 650 F.3d 257. Conspiracy 28(3); Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Allegations by insured that group health insurer conducted and participated in the affairs of another company that marketed the insurance products, that insurer assisted the company in setting the dues or premiums, and that the insurer controlled the marketing information disseminated by the company about insurer's health care products did not state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against insurer under association-in-fact enterprise theory, absent any allegation that the insurer directed or conducted an enterprise, that the insurer and company had more than a marketing arrangement, or that the enterprise had an organizational structure or hierarchy. Crichton v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., C.A.7 (Ill.) 2009, 576 F.3d 392. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 47; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Creditors' conclusory allegations that various entities were constituted to conceal debtor's assets were not sufficient to state association-in-fact enterprise under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), since there were no details of any course of fraudulent or illegal conduct separate and distinct from predicate racketeering acts, there was no nexus between alleged enterprise and alleged RICO predicates, and there was no solid information regarding hierarchy, organization, and activities of alleged enterprise to conclude that organization was ongoing or that its members functioned as continuing unit. First Capital Asset Management, Inc. v. Satinwood, Inc., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2004, 385 F.3d 159. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Property owner sufficiently alleged Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise in nature of association in fact, comprised of owner and partner in joint farming venture, as farming venture apparently existed separate and apart from partner's alleged pattern of racketeering, extended beyond partner's alleged acts of fraud and theft, and lasted for almost four years. Crowe v. Henry, C.A.5 (La.) 1995, 43 F.3d 198, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Evidence did not establish that alleged association-in-fact enterprise, consisting of bank corporation and its officers, was distinct from corporation for purposes of showing corporation's participation in affairs of enterprise as required to maintain civil enforcement claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, which thus supported dismissal of claim; alleged predicate acts of mail fraud and extortion concerned activities of employees of bank merely carrying out business of bank. Riverwoods Chappaqua Corp. v. Marine Mid- land Bank, N.A., C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1994, 30 F.3d 339. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Association in fact between law firm and medical practice whereby inflated medical bills were submitted to insurance companies on behalf of accident victims represented by firm constituted Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) “enterprise” pursuant to statutory definition of that term. U.S. v. Console, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1993, 13 F.3d 641, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 1660, 511 U.S. 1076, 128 L.Ed.2d 377, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 64, 513 U.S. 812, 130 L.Ed.2d 21, denial of habeas corpus vacated 124 F.3d 187, denial of habeas corpus affirmed 178 F.3d 1279. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Association between insurer, its counsel, and its litigation consultant lacked continuity required for “association-in-fact enterprise” for purposes of civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim; alleged association performed all alleged predicate acts during course of litigation of single action, and action had ended in summary judgment for both sides. In re Burzynski, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1993, 989 F.2d 733. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

Customer of commodities broker failed to prove existence of enterprise that extended beyond minimal association surrounding pattern of racketeering activity in connection with scheme by commodities broker to wait until the end of each trading day to determine to which of two accounts to allocate various trades. Stephens, Inc. v. Geldermann, Inc., C.A.8 (Ark.) 1992, 962 F.2d 808. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 44

Alleged conduct by president of international adoption agency and other employees of the agency in using the agency to defraud prospective parents seeking to adopt children from Uganda, and in comingling agency's funds with their individual funds stated claim for associated-in-fact enterprise in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Heslep v. Americans for African Adoption, Inc., N.D.W.Va.2012, 890 F.Supp.2d 671. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 47

Under nerve center test used to determining territoriality of an alleged Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act (RICO) enterprise, non-vessel operating common carriers' (NVOCC) association-in-fact was a “domestic,” rather than “foreign” enterprise, even though the effects of its alleged scheme were felt abroad, where enterprise members were all United States corporations, and the shipments which were part of the alleged scheme to charge foreign vessel operating common carrier (VOCC) for unnecessary or nonexistent inland car- riage of freight had been arranged in substantial part within the United States. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd. v. Sea- master Logistics, Inc., N.D.Cal.2012, 871 F.Supp.2d 933. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 23; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Family, members of which had been convicted of conspiracy to obtain forced labor and to harbor alien fugitive for private financial gain, constituted association-in-fact enterprise under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-

ganizations Act (RICO), supporting victim's RICO claim against family; purpose of alleged enterprise was to obtain, maintain, and conceal victim's involuntary labor, parents cooperated with each other in conducting enterprise and directed their children's enterprise-furthering activities, and enterprise unlawfully held victim captive and extracted involuntary labor for nineteen years. Martinez v. Calimlim, E.D.Wis.2009, 651 F.Supp.2d 852. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Company's allegation that former employee used his influence in division of company where he worked to retain a collection of outside vendors, most of which were single-person entities owned and operated by employee's wife and friends, to defraud company alleged an association-in-fact enterprise, as required to support company's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims against outside vendors and former employee. Fuji Photo Film U.S.A., Inc. v. McNulty, S.D.N.Y.2009, 640 F.Supp.2d 300. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 47

Medical equipment company's allegations that its vice president of marketing and sales recruited other employees and former employees to form competing companies to steal equipment and business from company, that vice president used his position to coordinate and facilitate theft of equipment and business opportunities by other companies, that structure of alleged association-in-fact was not fluid or undefined, and that competing companies were in business of buying, selling, renting, and servicing biomedical equipment were sufficient to plead organizational structure of alleged association-in-fact necessary to plead “enterprise” element of claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Freedom Medical Inc. v. Gillespie, E.D.Pa.2007, 634 F.Supp.2d 490. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

Cigarette manufacturers and tobacco-related trade organizations comprised association-in-fact “enterprise,” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), even though organizations were dissolved pursuant to prior master settlement agreement, where parties shared central objective of maximizing manufacturers' profits by acting in concert to preserve and enhance market for cigarettes through overarching scheme to defraud existing and potential smokers, manufacturers created and used formal and informal entities, many with overlapping participants and purposes, to serve that central mission, enterprise functioned as continuous unit for over fifty years, manufacturers continued to adhere to many positions formulated at enterprise's genesis, manufacturers taken together had bought and sold over $1 trillion of goods and services in interstate and foreign commerce since enterprise was formed, each defendant knew general nature and purpose of enterprise, that it extended beyond any defendant's individual role, and that all other defendants were participating in enterprise to achieve their shared objective, each individual defendant was separate legal entity, high-level employees of each manufacturer participated in enterprise's operation and management, each manufacturer, acting through those employees, played significant role in making and implementing decisions in furtherance of enterprise's activities and purposes, and most manufacturers endeavored to conceal or suppress information and documents and to destroy records that may have been detrimental to interests of enterprise's members. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., D.D.C.2006, 449 F.Supp.2d 1, for additional opinion, see 449 F.Supp.2d 1, clarified 477 F.Supp.2d 191, on reconsideration in part 783 F.Supp.2d 23, stay pending appeal denied 449 F.Supp.2d 988, stay granted 2006 WL 4608645, affirmed in part , vacated in part 566 F.3d 1095, 386 U.S.App.D.C. 49, certiorari denied 130 S.Ct. 3501, 177 L.Ed.2d 1090, certiorari denied 130 S.Ct. 3502, 177 L.Ed.2d 1090, rehearing denied 131 S.Ct. 57, 177 L.Ed.2d 1142, on remand 787 F.Supp.2d 68, clarified 778 F.Supp.2d 8, appeal dismissed 686 F.3d 839, 402 U.S.App.D.C. 41, clarification denied 793 F.Supp.2d 164. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations

Individuals who were allegedly wrongfully enrolled in membership programs for goods and services failed to establish existence of an association-in-fact enterprise within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO), based on third party contracts between program operator, its parent corporation, and certain financial institutions, where third-party contractual agreements were not alleged to have formed a hierarchical or consensual structure which provided a mechanism for controlling affairs of alleged enterprise, and alleged improper billing scheme perpetuated through the third-party contracts was both the alleged racketeering activity and the enterprise. Nordberg v. Trilegiant Corp., N.D.Cal.2006, 445 F.Supp.2d 1082. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Independent auditing company engaged in business of verifying its members' circulation for advertising purposes did not share a common purpose with newspapers, their publishers, distributors, and various officers, directors, employees, representatives, or agents, and, thus, alleged association-in-fact enterpriseof which auditing company was purportedly a member was not a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise, where auditing company could not share enterprise's unlawful purpose of artificially inflating circulation given that it was a victim of bloated circulation figures, and it did not share enterprise's lawful purpose of managing circulation of newspapers. Crab House of Douglaston, Inc. v. Newsday, Inc., E.D.N.Y.2006, 418 F.Supp.2d 193. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Evidence of hierarchical structure or decision-making authority was sufficiently inferred, for purpose of investors' claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) that investment advisors and bank were involved in association-in-fact enterprise, based on allegations that advisors created and operated various business entities together, in some cases acting as shareholders or directors, and advisors and bank all collaborated to create numerous mutually beneficial investment opportunities. Schuster v. Anderson, N.D.Iowa 2005, 413 F.Supp.2d 983. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35

Cable subscribers sufficiently alleged existence of enterprise between cable operator, its principal security officers, and law firm as required to support claim under section Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) prohibiting pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt; subscribers alleged that cable operator and law firm formed association-in-fact to deprive subscribers of their property by demanding either that subscribers pay settlement demand or be sued for purchasing unauthorized cable decoders, and that partners in law firm worked on contingency basis and represented the only two cable operators who regularly sued their customers. Calabrese v. CSC Holdings, Inc., E.D.N.Y.2003, 283 F.Supp.2d 797. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Creditors adequately alleged existence of association-in-fact enterprise under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) as element of their claims that debtor acquired or maintained interest in enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity and that debtor conducted or participated in conducting of affairs of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity when creditors alleged that debtor's “financial empire” was RICO enterprise, with purpose of accomplishing fraudulent transfer of debtor's assets and continuing custodian- ship of those assets to shield them from creditors, that several persons, including debtor, functioned together to

form and maintain such enterprise, and that debtor participated in various business entities through pattern of racketeering activity, thereby connecting those entities to form enterprise. Cadle, Co. v. Flanagan, D.Conn.2003, 271 F.Supp.2d 379. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), enterprise may be comprised of either legal entities or “associations-in-fact” comprised of individuals by themselves or together with legal entities working for common purpose. Ocaso, S.A., Compania De Seguros Y Reaseguros v. Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Au- thority, D.Puerto Rico 1996, 915 F.Supp. 1244. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

Proof of association in fact requires evidence of existence of group of persons associated together for common purpose of engaging in course of conduct. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Townson, E.D.Tenn.1995, 912 F.Supp. 291. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

Characteristics of an “association in fact” sought to be established as an “enterprise” for purposes of RICO, include (1) common or shared purpose, (2) some continuity of structure and personnel and (3) ascertainable structure distinct from that inherent in pattern of racketeering. DeWit v. Firstar Corp., N.D.Iowa 1995, 904 F.Supp. 1476. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

Under RICO's definition of enterprise, there is no restriction upon associations embraced by the definition; “enterprise” includes any union or group of individuals associated in fact, and illegal organization or legitimate business entity, such as a corporation, may constitute an enterprise for RICO purposes. Bonton v. Archer Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., S.D.Tex.1995, 889 F.Supp. 995. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Pleadings of RICO plaintiff which were inadequate to show defendants' intent to commit mail fraud also were inadequate to establish that defendants associated with another defendant for the purpose of perpetrating the alleged fraudulent scheme, and thus plaintiff failed to demonstrate existence of requisite RICO enterprise. D'Orange v. Feely, S.D.N.Y.1995, 877 F.Supp. 152. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

Ongoing organization requirement to establish association-in-fact enterprise for RICO purposes is satisfied by showing that some sort of structure exists within the group for the making of decisions, whether it be hierarchical or consensual; in other words, there must be some mechanism for controlling and directing affairs of the group on an ongoing, rather than ad hoc, basis. Libertad v. Welch, D.Puerto Rico 1993, 854 F.Supp. 19. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

Defendant's body shop was a “Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise,” even if it was not a legal entity; RICO enterprise may consist of association of businesses and individuals. U.S. v. Gal- ati, E.D.Pa.1994, 853 F.Supp. 152. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Enterprises were sufficiently described as associations-in-fact composed of identified individuals and corpora-

tions to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). American Credit Indem. Co. v. Legge, S.D.N.Y.1993, 829 F.Supp. 649. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Association-in-fact consisting of groups of related corporations, three real estate limited partnerships, and two individuals who were general partners of those partnerships were adequately pled “enterprise” for purposes of RICO claim for conducting affairs of “enterprise” through pattern of racketeering activity, even though one of corporations owned 50% interest in each of two of partnerships, and corporations were involved in development and promotion of partnerships; there was no indication that individuals were officers of any of corporations and, in fact, individuals opposed corporations and were ultimately displaced as general partners by corporations. Gur- fein v. Sovereign Group, E.D.Pa.1993, 826 F.Supp. 890. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Entity is “association in fact” for RICO purposes, if structure exists for making decisions within group so as to satisfy “ongoing organization” requirement, if associates function as “continuing unit” in that each person performs role in group which furthers activities of organization and which is consistent with established organizational structure, and if association exists for purposes other than simply to commit predicate acts. Corporacion Insular de Seguros v. Reyes Munoz, D.Puerto Rico 1993, 826 F.Supp. 599. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise may include virtually any de facto or de jure association. Standard Chlorine of Delaware, Inc. v. Sinibaldi, D.Del.1992, 821 F.Supp. 232. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

If racketeering enterprise is an “association in fact” enterprise, plaintiffs must show evidence of ongoing organization, formal or informal, that functions as continuing unit over type of hierarchical or consensual decision- making structure. Broyles v. Wilson, M.D.La.1993, 812 F.Supp. 651, affirmed 3 F.3d 439. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

Group of persons associated together for common purpose of engaging in course of conduct may be “association-in-fact enterprise” within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), even though they are not legal entity, as long as members of enterprise function as continuing unit that is separate and apart from pattern of activity in which it engages. Center Cadillac, Inc. v. Bank Leumi Trust Co. of New York, S.D.N.Y.1992, 808 F.Supp. 213, affirmed 99 F.3d 401. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

Evidence concerning relationship between financiers of real estate transactions and developer that allegedly distributed misleading promotional material established association in fact for purposes of civil Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim; relationship lasted for period of several years, and involved shared personnel, resources, and control. Rodriguez v. Banco Cent., D.Puerto Rico 1991, 777 F.Supp. 1043, affirmed 990 F.2d 7. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Association-in-fact under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) must exhibit: shared or common purpose; continuity of function; and ascertainable structure distinct from pattern of racketeering activity itself. Bowman v. Western Auto Supply Co., W.D.Mo.1991, 773 F.Supp. 174, reversed 985 F.2d 383, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 2459, 508 U.S. 957, 124 L.Ed.2d 674. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

There was sufficient evidence that each defendant was aware of existence of criminal enterprise involved in illegal operation of landfill and disposal of waste materials, was associated with and employed by enterprise, and knowingly and intentionally participated in enterprise's illegal activities to establish association element of charged violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). U.S. v. Paccione, S.D.N.Y.1990, 749 F.Supp. 478. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 95

Business association of individuals may be an “enterprise” for RICO purposes. Gutfreund v. Christoph, N.D.Ill.1987, 658 F.Supp. 1378. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35

Evidence was sufficient to support finding that association was a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) enterprise, as required to sustain defendant's racketeering convictions under RICO; evidence demonstrated that the association had a core membership that remained constant over a 12-year period, established and protected a territory in which only they, or people to whom they gave permission, could sell cocaine and crack cocaine, shared opportunities to distribute cocaine and cocaine base in locations in Texas, Virginia, South and North Carolina, and Connecticut, and adhered to certain rules, including prohibiting cooperation with the police and dealing violently with those who did. U.S. v. Dixon, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2006, 167 Fed.Appx. 841, 2006 WL 374120, Unreported, post-conviction relief denied 2010 WL 3311837. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

243. Banks, enterprise

Under section of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) proscribing conduct of affairs of enterprise through pattern of racketeering, bank which allegedly discharged employee in order to obstruct federal money-laundering probe could not be both the racketeer and the enterprise. Miranda v. Ponce Federal Bank, C.A.1 (Puerto Rico) 1991, 948 F.2d 41. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 43

In absence of proof that bank and borrower formed organization or functioned as continuing unit, existence of commercial loan transaction was insufficient to suggest “association in fact” necessary to satisfy definition of “enterprise” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Foval v. First Nat. Bank of Commerce in New Orleans, C.A.5 (La.) 1988, 841 F.2d 126. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 43

Bank could be both “person” and “enterprise” under section of RICO prohibiting person from investing racketeering income into enterprise engaged in interstate commerce. Wilcox v. First Interstate Bank of Oregon, N.A., C.A.9 (Or.) 1987, 815 F.2d 522. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 43

Bank, its holding company, and three employees were not associated in any manner apart from activities of

bank, for purpose of establishing RICO violation. Atkinson v. Anadarko Bank and Trust Co., C.A.5 (Tex.) 1987, 808 F.2d 438, certiorari denied 107 S.Ct. 3276, 483 U.S. 1032, 97 L.Ed.2d 780. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 43

Allegations of association of investors, that bank, bank's chief executive officer (CEO), and operators of investment enterprise associated with each other for purpose of defrauding Indonesian investors of their funds in order to enrich themselves, and that they maintained relationship from the time that operators affiliated themselves with enterprise until enterprise finally folded, successfully alleged that bank, CEO, and operators of enterprise formed an enterprise-in-fact as defined under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), as required to state RICO claim. Perkumpulan Investor Crisis Center Dressel--WBG v. Regal Financial Bancorp, Inc., W.D.Wash.2011, 781 F.Supp.2d 1098. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 43

Foreign bank and branch used to conduct business in state were not distinctive entities as required to show violation of provision of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) imposing civil liability on “person” who conducts affairs of “enterprise” through racketeering activity; bank and branch were alleged to be separate entities operating within same corporate structure guided by single corporate consciousness. China Trust Bank of New York v. Standard Chartered Bank, PLC, S.D.N.Y.1997, 981 F.Supp. 282. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 43

Nominating bank, which allegedly improperly advanced funds under letter of credit, could constitute an “enterprise” within meaning of wire fraud provisions of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Leonard A. Feinberg, Inc. v. Central Asia Capital Corp., Ltd., E.D.Pa.1997, 974 F.Supp. 822. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 43

There was no evidence from which an inference could be drawn that bank, in its corporate status, acted as an enterprise to conspire with other defendants, such that the required predicate acts of racketeering could be met; therefore claim under Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) could not be maintained against bank, which allegedly was involved in a conspiracy to permit the unauthorized withdrawal of monies from development project. Mery v. Universal Sav. Ass'n, S.D.Tex.1990, 737 F.Supp. 1000. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Investment corporation could be held liable under civil RICO action brought by FSLIC, where complaint alleged that defunct savings and loan association, which was victimized by improper acts was an “enterprise” and that corporation and former vice-president were employed by or associated with that enterprise and conducted or participated, directly or indirectly, in conduct of association's affairs through pattern of racketeering activity. Federal Sav. and Loan Ins. Corp. v. Shearson-American Exp., Inc., D.Puerto Rico 1987, 658 F.Supp. 1331. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Bank and its holding company, which were two separate legal entities, constituted distinct person and enterprise for purposes of RICO liability. Pappas v. NCNB Nat. Bank of North Carolina, M.D.N.C.1987, 653 F.Supp. 699. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 43

Bank customers' allegations that bank and three individuals employed by bank associated for common purpose of defrauding plaintiffs was insufficient to establish enterprise under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiz- ations Act. H.G. Gallimore, Inc. v. Abdula, N.D.Ill.1987, 652 F.Supp. 437. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 43

Customer's individual trust and bank's income common trust fund, which allegedly were RICO enterprises, did not enjoy an existence separate and apart from bank which served as their fiduciary for purposes of RICO and therefore bank was entitled to summary judgment in RICO action by a customer. Witt v. South Carolina Nat. Bank, D.C.S.C.1985, 613 F.Supp. 140. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 43

Defendant bank and one corporation formed for purposes of acquisition of newspaper were sufficiently identified as enterprises for purposes of this chapter. Joseph v. Algemene Bank Nederland, N.V., W.D.Pa.1984, 592 F.Supp. 141. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

If bank charged with among other things, fraudulently increasing interest rate were considered the “enterprise” for purposes of this chapter, inasmuch as owner of beneficial interests in land trust did not identify any “person” employed with or associated with that “enterprise” as participating in context of bank affairs through pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt, owner's claim would fail entirely. Fields v. National Repub- lic Bank of Chicago, N.D.Ill.1982, 546 F.Supp. 123. Commerce 80; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 73

243a. Mortgage lenders, enterprise

Mortgagors sufficiently alleged “enterprise” element of claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiz- ations Act (RICO) when they alleged association-in-fact consisting of mortgage lender and its subsidiaries, including those offering loan-closing services, and mortgage brokers who had contracts with lender pursuant to which they directed borrowers into loans issued by lender, notwithstanding defendants' contentions that mortgagors failed to plead requisite connections between independent mortgage brokers and that mortgagors' allegations were too vague and overbroad; association-in-fact enterprise did not require any particular structure, and mortgagors identified those making up enterprise. In re Countrywide Financial Corp. Mortg. Marketing and Sales Practices Litigation, S.D.Cal.2009, 601 F.Supp.2d 1201. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 43

244. Cooperatives, enterprise

Although cooperative, as legal entity, could qualify as enterprise under this chapter, where government did not present such theory at trial, court of appeals was not required to consider whether cooperatives qualified as enterprise where case was tried against individual defendants, not cooperatives. U. S. v. Bledsoe, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1982, 674 F.2d 647, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 456, 459 U.S. 1040, 74 L.Ed.2d 608. Criminal Law 1134.60

Cooperative corporation and two of its shareholders failed to state claim under this chapter against architectural firm that inspected building before renovation and whose report was included in selling prospectus for cooperative or against architect who inspected and approved work of construction firm that renovated building, absent allegation that such defendants invested in, maintained interest in, or participated in an enterprise defined under this chapter, and showing how activities of enterprise affected interstate commerce. Gramercy 222 Residents Corp. v. Gramercy Realty Associates, S.D.N.Y.1984, 591 F.Supp. 1408. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 69

245. Corporations and stockholders, enterprise

Bank holding company's corporate relationship with its lender subsidiary, standing alone, did not make it an “enterprise” and the lender subsidiary a “person” so as to support a federal racketeering claim by borrowers alleging that the lender subsidiary improperly obtained “force placed” insurance on the used automobiles which served as collateral for the loans; some activity by the holding company that might reasonably be understood to implicate it in the lender subsidiary's alleged scheme was needed. Brannon v. Boatmen's First Nat. Bank of Ok- lahoma, C.A.10 (Okla.) 1998, 153 F.3d 1144. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Jury's confirmation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) plaintiff's 8% ownership in parent company, which demonstrated that he retained 8% relative ownership in each related company, rather than the 8.69565% interest he claimed, precluded RICO fraud claim based on redemption of stock in related corporations, which was dependent upon determination that there was fraud in 1963 stock redemption agreement for parent corporation. Conkling v. Turner, C.A.5 (La.) 1994, 18 F.3d 1285, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 55

Corporation was separate and distinct entity from defendant, who was its controlling shareholder, so that Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) enterprise involving corporation consisted of more than defendant conducting his own affairs via pattern of racketeering, where corporation employed several hundred people and filed separate income tax returns. U.S. v. Robinson, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1993, 8 F.3d 398, habeas corpus denied 1994 WL 68494. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Even though insurance company's participation in the affairs of insurance agency or other association-in-fact took place largely through the acts of individual agent, company exercised sufficient control over affairs of RICO enterprise to withstand scrutiny under the control test for RICO liability, in light of evidence that, after company had received numerous warnings concerning agency's fraudulent sales tactics, company continued to allow, if not actively encourage, agent and his associate to carry on with their scheme. Davis v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1993, 6 F.3d 367, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 1298, 510 U.S. 1193, 127 L.Ed.2d 650. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

An ongoing corporation that engaged in activities other than the allegedly fraudulent sales of tax-oriented limited partnership interests “enterprise” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); corporation was alleged to have associated with accounting firm which was accused of participating in scheme to defraud investors by distorting financial statements, with the effect of aiding the sale of partnerships. Akin v. Q-L Investments, Inc., C.A.5 (Tex.) 1992, 959 F.2d 521. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza-

tions 47

Individual defendants who were officers and employees of corporation can be “persons” who were conducting pattern of racketeering through corporation as an enterprise within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Glessner v. Kenny, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1991, 952 F.2d 702. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 47

Alleged enterprise consisting of an oil company, its chemical subsidiary which manufactured allegedly degrad- able trash bags and their advertising agencies did not satisfy “distinctiveness” requirement for RICO enterprise claim; advertising agencies did no more than conduct normal affairs as agents of corporations, while the defendant corporations were the actual entities through which the alleged racketeers carried out their fraudulent activity but were not alleged to have taken a distinct role in the alleged racketeering activity. Brittingham v. Mobil Corp., C.A.3 (Pa.) 1991, 943 F.2d 297, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Evidence was insufficient to establish predicate act of bankruptcy fraud in action brought under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act, even though one corporation had transferred funds to another corporation's bank accounts prior to filing bankruptcy, where corporations were alter egos and essentially one company, and bank accounts to which funds were transferred became part of bankruptcy estate. Howell Hydrocarbons, Inc. v. Adams, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1990, 897 F.2d 183, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Party bringing civil action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act failed to sufficiently establish existence of RICO enterprise to enable maintenance of action, where affidavit in opposition to summary judgment asserted at most that some RICO defendants were engaged in aspect of petroleum industry, that there were some unspecified contractual relations among several of them, and that executive personnel and staff of three corporations constituted identifiable structure, without stating what structure controlled or how it operated. Shaffer v. Williams, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1986, 794 F.2d 1030. Federal Civil Procedure 2539

Organization having no corporate existence separate and apart from that of corporation itself, but having substantial number of corporate employees working within grouping or division known by organization's name, constituted “group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity” and thus was “enterprise” within purview of this chapter. U. S. v. Computer Sciences Corp., C.A.4 (Va.) 1982, 689 F.2d 1181, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 729, 459 U.S. 1105, 74 L.Ed.2d 953. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

A corporation can simultaneously be named as a defendant and satisfy “enterprise” requirement under this chapter. U. S. v. Hartley, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1982, 678 F.2d 961, rehearing denied 688 F.2d 852, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 815, 459 U.S. 1170, 74 L.Ed.2d 1014, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 834, 459 U.S. 1183, 74 L.Ed.2d 1027. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38

A group of corporations can be an “enterprise” within meaning of this chapter. U. S. v. Huber, C.A.2 (N.Y.)

1979, 603 F.2d 387, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 1312, 445 U.S. 927, 63 L.Ed.2d 759. See, also, Moravian Devel- opment Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co., E.D.Pa.1986, 651 F.Supp. 144; Trak Microcomputer Corp. v. Wearne Bros., N.D.Ill.1985, 628 F.Supp. 1089; Morosani v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta, N.D.Ga.1984, 581 F.Supp. 945.

In defining term “enterprise” for purposes of this chapter, there is no distinction between a duly formed corporation that elects officers and holds annual meetings and an amoeba-like infra-structure that controls a secret criminal network. U. S. v. Elliott, C.A.5 (Ga.) 1978, 571 F.2d 880, rehearing denied 575 F.2d 300, certiorari denied 99 S.Ct. 349, 439 U.S. 953, 58 L.Ed.2d 344. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 37

Foreign corporation which affected interstate of foreign commerce was an “enterprise” within section 1962 of this title which proscribes acquiring an enterprise affecting commerce, through a pattern of racketeering activity, and thus acquisition of such corporation through such a pattern of activity was a violation of this section. U.S. v. Parness, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1974, 503 F.2d 430, certiorari denied 95 S.Ct. 775, 419 U.S. 1105, 42 L.Ed.2d 801, on remand 408 F.Supp. 440. Commerce 82.10

Alleged Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise, consisting of defendant mortgage lender and its loan closing service subsidiary, did not satisfy “distinctiveness” requirement; complaint did not explain how “façade of independence” of lender and subsidiary facilitated the alleged unlawful activity. Capitol West Appraisals, LLC v. Countrywide Financial Corp., W.D.Wash.2010, 759 F.Supp.2d 1267, affirmed 467 Fed.Appx. 738, 2012 WL 345903. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 43

Investors who sued ambulance services, affiliates and officers, alleging that they were induced to invest through series of misrepresentations, failed to aver that defendants acquired or maintained control in enterprise, as required to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); complaint did not aver that defendants acquired interests in legitimate companies other than their own. DeFazio v. Wallis, E.D.N.Y.2007, 500 F.Supp.2d 197. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

Chemical company that sued competitor, stemming from competitor's alleged conduct following settlement of trade secret litigation, failed to demonstrate existence of ongoing organization, as required to establish “enterprise” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim; there was no evidence that competitor and others, as purported conspirators, were organized according to internal hierarchy, engaged in routine activity, or held specific roles and responsibilities. Harry Miller Corp. v. Mancuso Chemicals Limited, E.D.Pa.2006, 468 F.Supp.2d 708. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Allegations regarding operations of life insurance company, associations in fact between life insurance company and licensed agents that sold deferred annuities, and description of corporate structure of company, as it related to its parent company, were sufficient to establish that company provided legitimate services and had an ascertainable structure apart from any alleged racketeering activity, as was required for purchaser of deferred annuities to establish enterprise distinct from the pattern of racketeering in civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) action. Bendzak v. Midland Nat. Life Ins. Co., S.D.Iowa 2006, 440 F.Supp.2d 970. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Distributor of golf carts failed to establish involvement of manufacturer in enterprise, as required for claim that manufacturer violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) in its dealings with distributor; conclusory allegations that there were enterprises, comprised of manufacturer and its parent, and manufacturer and another customer, presented without explanation, were insufficient. Club Car, Inc. v. Club Car (Quebec) Import, Inc., S.D.Ga.2003, 276 F.Supp.2d 1276, affirmed 362 F.3d 775, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied 111 Fed.Appx. 1003, 2004 WL 1585294, certiorari denied 125 S.Ct. 618, 543 U.S. 1002, 160 L.Ed.2d 461. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 74

For purposes of RICO provision barring a person employed or associated with enterprise engaged in interstate or foreign commerce from conducting enterprise's affairs through pattern of racketeering activity, corporation cannot be both “enterprise” and “person.” DeWit v. Firstar Corp., N.D.Iowa 1995, 904 F.Supp. 1476. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

If enterprise alleged in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim is legal entity, such as corporation, person or entity sued for conducting affairs of enterprise through racketeering must exist separately from enterprise. Bankcard America, Inc. v. Universal Bancard Systems, Inc., N.D.Ill.1995, 904 F.Supp. 753. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Both company and members of family of founder constituted an “enterprise,” for purposes of Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) liability. In re Crazy Eddie Securities Litigation, E.D.N.Y.1993, 812 F.Supp. 338. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Corporate “enterprise” and its employees are not separate and distinct for purposes of RICO statute prohibiting person employed by or associated with enterprise engaged in interstate or foreign commerce from conducting affairs of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity; since person charged with RICO violation under statute cannot be same entity as alleged enterprise, corporation is not liable under statute for predicate acts committed by its employees. Pagnotti Enterprises, Inc. v. Beltrami, M.D.Pa.1992, 787 F.Supp. 440. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Related corporate entities cannot be named as both defendants and the enterprise in claims under section of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) where there is no evidence that corporate entities, as distinct from officers and employees acting on their behalf, played a separate role in the alleged racketeering activity. Korman v. Trusthouse Forte PLC, E.D.Pa.1992, 786 F.Supp. 458. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38

Corporation, like individual, may be held liable as “person” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO). R.E. Davis Chemical Corp. v. Nalco Chemical Co., N.D.Ill.1990, 757 F.Supp. 1499. Corpora-

tions And Business Organizations 2504; Corporations And Business Organizations 2612

Corporation cannot conspire with its own employees to violate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). U.S. Concord, Inc. v. Harris Graphics Corp., N.D.Cal.1991, 757 F.Supp. 1053. Conspiracy 2

Association-in-fact of corporate importer, its officer-shareholders, and second corporation constituted Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) “enterprise”; importer acting through officer-shareholders breached accounts purchase agreement by which importer's invoices were purchased at discount to finance importer's operations, officer-shareholders who were guarantors breached their guarantees, importer and officer- shareholders breached security agreement and violated trusts through their conduct including failure to remit monies and dissipation of assets, and enterprise engaged in and its activities affected interstate and foreign commerce. American Trade Partners, L.P. v. A-1 Intern. Importing Enterprises, Ltd., E.D.Pa.1991, 757 F.Supp. 559. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

The combination of a corporation and its employees does not constitute an enterprise for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Brownell v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., E.D.Pa.1991, 757 F.Supp. 526. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 40

Claim by putative finders seeking fee in connection with corporate acquisition, that acquired and acquiring corporation violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), adequately alleged existence of RICO “enterprise,” even though it was claimed that any alleged conspiracy had a definite short term goal of injuring finders in particular transaction rather than a continuing purpose; RICO continuity requirement was met by allegations that fraud and extortion were a regular way that acquiring and acquired corporations did business. Deem v. Lockheed Corp., S.D.N.Y.1989, 749 F.Supp. 1230, reargument denied. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 73

Corporation could not be held liable for RICO violation under the doctrine of respondeat superior as long as it constitutes the RICO enterprise. Bigay v. Taco Maker, Inc., D.Puerto Rico 1990, 730 F.Supp. 463. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Parent corporation can be a “person” separate and distinct from its wholly owned subsidiary, the “enterprise,” for RICO purposes. Elysian Federal Sav. Bank v. First Interregional Equity Corp., D.N.J.1989, 713 F.Supp. 737. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38

Brokerage firm customer, who alleged that brokerage firm was a culpable person under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and that the firm, with two officers, was an enterprise engaged in pattern of racketeering activity, failed to adequately allege the existence of an enterprise under RICO. Hanline v. Sinclair Global Brokerage Corp., W.D.Mo.1987, 652 F.Supp. 1457, cause dismissed 815 F.2d 713. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Members of same corporate family could be both “enterprise” and “person” in single RICO violation; fact that

wholly-owned subsidiary would be compliant to will of its parent corporation in no way would preclude parent from associating with subsidiary, or from conducting subsidiary's affairs through pattern of racketeering activity. Philadelphia TMC, Inc. v. AT & T Information Systems, Inc., E.D.Pa.1986, 651 F.Supp. 169. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 38

Alleged association in fact of stockholders in affairs of company, within meaning of RICO statute [18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c)], was not dissolved by sale of their holdings in company; alleged fraudulent pattern of racketeering activity formed very essence of affairs of that enterprise and clearly fell within scope of RICO statute. Media General, Inc. v. Tanner, W.D.Tenn.1985, 625 F.Supp. 237. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Although corporate entity may not be simultaneously the “enterprise” and the “person” who conducts affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity under RICO [18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(3, 4)], complaint alleging that three corporations had associated in fact to form an enterprise separate and distinct from the individual corporations which were named defendants was legally sufficient. Fustok v. Conticommodity Services, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1985, 618 F.Supp. 1074. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Corporation fell within definition of “enterprise” for purposes of RICO, and corporation and individual met definition of “person.” Ross v. Omnibusch, Inc., W.D.Mich.1984, 607 F.Supp. 835. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35

Surety which issued performance and payment bonds to contractor as result of fraudulent failure to disclose payment of bribes to employee of surety and actual financial condition of principal established violation of Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act and, thus, was entitled to award of treble damages for fraud amounted to racketeering, there were at least two instances of fraud in the previous ten years and majority shareholder of principal had made arrangements with others which constituted “enterprise” within broad definition of Act, especially where contractor was preexisting economic structure from which principal shareholder operated. Allstate Ins. Co. v. A.M. Pugh Associates, Inc., M.D.Pa.1984, 604 F.Supp. 85. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 79

A corporation cannot be both a “person” and an “enterprise” under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act; thus, RICO counterclaim against corporation had to be dismissed. Shared Diagnostic Services, Inc. v. Henningsen, E.D.Pa.1984, 602 F.Supp. 428. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38

Group of corporations set up by defendant to defraud government by creating appearance of separate and independent vendors bidding competitively for defense contracts constituted “enterprise” for purposes of defendant's liability under this chapter. U.S. v. Perkins, E.D.Pa.1984, 596 F.Supp. 528, affirmed 749 F.2d 28, affirmed 749 F.2d 29, certiorari denied 105 S.Ct. 2018, 471 U.S. 1015, 85 L.Ed.2d 300. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Complaint alleging that defendants, their corporation, and another acted together in numerous schemes in-

volving trading in wide variety of commodities on an international scale and alleging that fraud involved in connection with land purchase option was but a particular manifestation of defendants' global illegal activities was sufficient to establish an enterprise under this chapter. Lopez v. Richards, S.D.Miss.1984, 594 F.Supp. 488. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Under this chapter the enterprise must be an entity separate and distinct from the pattern of activity in which it engages and, hence, since majority shareholder and his counsel were not part of the corporation they could not be considered part of the enterprise, for purpose of minority shareholder's claim based on securities fraud in connection with merger, but the corporation and directors and officers could collectively be deemed the requisite enterprise. Umstead v. Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc., M.D.N.C.1984, 578 F.Supp. 342. Commerce 80

Legitimate business, such as corporation, admittedly engaged in interstate commerce, constitutes “enterprise” within meaning of section 1962 of this title; furthermore, defendant in action alleging violation of section 1962 of this title may be both “enterprise” and “person,” within meaning of section 1962 of this title. B.F. Hirsch, Inc. v. Enright Refining Co., D.C.N.J.1983, 577 F.Supp. 339, affirmed in part , vacated in part 751 F.2d 628, on remand 617 F.Supp. 49.

Consumers who brought action against business services corporation, dealers and infomercial actor, stemming from leasing of e-commerce services and products, properly alleged that corporation and officers “conducted” illegal enterprises, as required to maintain RICO claim; complaint charged that corporation's leases were linchpin of schemes to defraud consumers, that corporation determined both content of leases and means by which they were enforced, and that officers were principally responsible for design and implementation of alleged unfair and deceptive practices. Zito v. Leasecomm Corp., S.D.N.Y.2003, 2003 WL 22251352, Unreported. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

245a. Corporation and individuals, enterprise

Group of individuals, cigarette manufacturers, and trade organizations associated in fact could qualify as “enterprise” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), even though defendants were mixed group of corporations and individuals, rather than just individuals. U.S. v. Philip Morris USA Inc., C.A.D.C.2009, 566 F.3d 1095, 386 U.S.App.D.C. 49, certiorari denied 130 S.Ct. 3501, 177 L.Ed.2d 1090, certiorari denied 130 S.Ct. 3502, 177 L.Ed.2d 1090, rehearing denied 131 S.Ct. 57, 177 L.Ed.2d 1142, on remand 787 F.Supp.2d 68. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

246. Estates, enterprise

Estate of decedent was “enterprise” within definition of same in this chapter. Gunther v. Dinger, S.D.N.Y.1982, 547 F.Supp. 25. Commerce 82.6; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 48

Executor of nursing home resident's estate sufficiently alleged “pattern” of racketeering activity to state Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims for charging of excessive fees under nursing home's pharmaceutical policies, where he alleged that scheme to defraud residents was in place for at least four

years, that individual residents were coerced into purchasing pharmaceuticals at inflated prices, and that victims possibly numbered in the hundreds of thousands. Rohlfing v. Manor Care, Inc., N.D.Ill.1997, 172 F.R.D. 330. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 72

247. Governmental or political entities, enterprise--Generally

Government entity may constitute “enterprise” within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO). U.S. v. Freeman, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1993, 6 F.3d 586, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 1661, 511 U.S. 1077, 128 L.Ed.2d 378, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 2177, 511 U.S. 1147, 128 L.Ed.2d 896. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 46

An “enterprise,” for purpose of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act liability, may be a public entity like a township. Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., C.A.3 (N.J.) 1991, 937 F.2d 899. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 46

Term “enterprise” as used in this chapter includes governmental agencies or offices. U. S. v. Clark, C.A.8 (Ark.) 1981, 646 F.2d 1259. Commerce 82.6; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 46

This chapter was applicable to defendants' bribery activities and misuse of office of county law enforcement officials, despite alleged lack of an “enterprise” and impact on interstate commerce. U. S. v. Karas, C.A.4 (W.Va.) 1980, 624 F.2d 500, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 857, 449 U.S. 1078, 66 L.Ed.2d 800. Bribery 1(1)

Under this chapter an “enterprise” includes public as well as private entities. U. S. v. Brown, C.A.5 (Ga.) 1977, 555 F.2d 407, rehearing denied 559 F.2d 29, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 1448, 435 U.S. 904, 55 L.Ed.2d 494.

It is possible for governmental entity to constitute “enterprise” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiz- ations Act (RICO). Ferluga v. Eickhoff, D.Kan.2006, 408 F.Supp.2d 1153. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 46

Criminal and civil penalties in this chapter governing racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations supported fact that Congress intended to combat takeovers of private business through illegal activity; however, it did not follow that, had Congress specifically addressed question, it would have excluded public entities from substantive provisions of this chapter governing racketeer influenced and corrupt organizations. U. S. v. Barber, S.D.W.Va.1979, 476 F.Supp. 182. Commerce 82.6; Criminal Law 1220; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 46

248. ---- Courts, governmental or political entities, enterprise

Office of judge of Seventh Judicial Circuit was “enterprise” for RICO purposes. U.S. v. Grubb, C.A.4 (W.Va.) 1993, 11 F.3d 426, habeas corpus denied 859 F.Supp. 227, affirmed as modified 65 F.3d 167. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 39

County circuit court qualified as “enterprise” for purposes of prosecution of police officer under Racketeer In- fluenced and Corrupt Organizations Act provision making it unlawful for any person associated with enterprise to conduct affairs of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity [18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c) ]; officer was charged with taking bribes to influence judicial decisions in traffic court. U.S. v. Blackwood, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1985, 768 F.2d 131, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 569, 474 U.S. 1020, 88 L.Ed.2d 554. Racketeer Influenced And Cor- rupt Organizations 46

Governmental units such as New York City Civil Court are “enterprises” within meaning of subsec. (4) of this section. U. S. v. Angelilli, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1981, 660 F.2d 23, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1258, 455 U.S. 910, 71 L.Ed.2d 449, rehearing denied 102 S.Ct. 2024, 456 U.S. 951, 72 L.Ed.2d 476, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1442, 455 U.S. 945, 71 L.Ed.2d 657, rehearing denied 102 S.Ct. 1998, 456 U.S. 939, 72 L.Ed.2d 460, rehearing denied 102 S.Ct. 1999, 456 U.S. 939, 72 L.Ed.2d 460. Commerce 82.6; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 46

In prosecution for conspiracy to violate this chapter, term “enterprise” as defined in this section was broad enough to include municipal court which was one part of city government, and where government did not con- tend at trial that city, rather than court, was relevant “enterprise,” but rather government used city's interstate purchases to establish effect of court on interstate commerce, there was not fatal variance by reason of indictment's charge that enterprise was municipal court and government's evidence that municipal court was not separate entity from city and that interstate purchases necessary to create federal jurisdiction were made by city, not court. U. S. v. Sutherland, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1981, 656 F.2d 1181, rehearing denied 663 F.2d 101, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1451, 455 U.S. 949, 71 L.Ed.2d 663, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 1617, 455 U.S. 991, 71 L.Ed.2d 852. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 46

Where defendant, an Arkansas county judge, i.e., a county executive, regarded his office not merely as his elective position but as an operating entity within the county government which included at least three other persons, and indictments under this chapter charge that the office was an enterprise, defendant could not complain on appeal that indictment failed to charge that he conducted or participated in an enterprise through a pattern of unlawful activity because such office was nothing more than an unfilled state elective office. U. S. v. Dean, C.A.8 (Ark.) 1981, 647 F.2d 779, on rehearing 667 F.2d 729, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 2296, 456 U.S. 1006, 73 L.Ed.2d 1300. Commerce 82.6; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 46

The Philadelphia Traffic Court was an “enterprise” within the meaning of this chapter. U.S. v. Bacheler, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1979, 611 F.2d 443. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 46

Enterprise under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act need not be criminal in nature, but rather, all that is required is organization; thus, supreme court in Queens, New York was “enterprise” within meaning of RICO statute. U.S. v. Brennan, E.D.N.Y.1986, 629 F.Supp. 283, affirmed 798 F.2d 581, habeas corpus granted 685 F.Supp. 883, affirmed 867 F.2d 111, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 1750, 490 U.S. 1022, 104 L.Ed.2d 187. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 37

Where deputy's duty was to “attend upon” courts on day he was assigned as court bailiff and to obey court or-

ders while circuit court was in session, deputy was “associated with” circuit court, which was alleged to be “enterprise” whose activities affected interstate commerce, for purposes of this chapter. U.S. v. Kaye, N.D.Ill.1984, 586 F.Supp. 1395. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

As creature of statute, Philadelphia traffic court was “legal entity” and was therefore “enterprise” for purposes of this chapter. U.S. v. Vignola, E.D.Pa.1979, 464 F.Supp. 1091, affirmed 605 F.2d 1199, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 1015, 444 U.S. 1072, 62 L.Ed.2d 753. Commerce 82.6

249. ---- Fire departments, governmental or political entities, enterprise

City's fire department was legitimate governmental entity possessing clear organizational structure, thus qualifying as “enterprise” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). U.S. v. Balzano, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1990, 916 F.2d 1273. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35

250. ---- Governors, governmental or political entities, enterprise

Identifying “The Office of Governor” or any other governmental office as “enterprise” under this chapter unnecessarily tends to disrupt comity in federal-state relationships. U. S. v. Thompson, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1982, 685 F.2d 993, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 494, 459 U.S. 1072, 74 L.Ed.2d 635. Commerce 82.6; Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 46

Government entities are not enterprises within meaning of this chapter; therefore, defendants who were connected with office of governor of Tennessee, and who were charged with “selling” executive clemency and immunity from extradition through the governor's office, were entitled to have their convictions vacated. U. S. v. Thompson, C.A.6 (Tenn.) 1982, 669 F.2d 1143, on rehearing 685 F.2d 993, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 494, 459 U.S. 1072, 74 L.Ed.2d 635. Bribery 1(1); Commerce 82.6; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 46

A political entity or governmental agency, as distinguished from a private business, labor union, or nonprofit corporation, may constitute an “enterprise” within this chapter; the governor's office of the state was an “enterprise” within the meaning of this chapter with respect to charges that persons in that office exercised the pardon and parole powers of that office through a pattern of bribery and extortion. U. S. v. Sisk, M.D.Tenn.1979, 476 F.Supp. 1061. Bribery 2; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 46

251. ---- Legislators, governmental or political entities, enterprise

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) was not unconstitutional as applied to legislative aide who allegedly secured political contributions in return for explicit promise to secure passage of legislation. U.S. v. Freeman, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1993, 6 F.3d 586, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 1661, 511 U.S. 1077, 128 L.Ed.2d 378, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 2177, 511 U.S. 1147, 128 L.Ed.2d 896. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 2

Office of senator in South Carolina Legislature was an “enterprise” within meaning of this chapter. U. S. v. Long, C.A.4 (S.C.) 1981, 651 F.2d 239, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 396, 454 U.S. 896, 70 L.Ed.2d 212. Com- merce 82.6; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 46

252. ---- Municipalities, governmental or political entities, enterprise

Genuine issue of material fact, as to whether village defendants schemed to purchase business either for mayor's benefit or benefit of mayor's advisor and/or advisor's business partner/fiancee or to improve village's chances of securing Major League Soccer team, to his own personal political benefit, precluded summary judgment for them on Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims predicated on acts of mail fraud. LaFlamboy v. Landek, N.D.Ill.2008, 587 F.Supp.2d 914. Federal Civil Procedure 2509.5

Municipality could serve as “enterprise” for purposes of bringing RICO claim that municipal employees had extorted money from developers seeking to construct housing and gravel pit on land, even though some of the individuals named did not work directly for municipality; it was sufficient to allege an indirect association with enterprise. DeFalco v. Dirie, S.D.N.Y.1996, 923 F.Supp. 473. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 46

Use of city as enterprise element of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) charges was justified where city encompassed all acts of bribery and extortion allegedly committed by public officials, and, thus, even if Government might have chosen entity that would render application enterprise element unconstitutionally vague, RICO was not unconstitutionally vague with reference to defendants. U.S. v. Lobue, N.D.Ill.1990, 751 F.Supp. 748. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 2

253. ---- Police departments, governmental or political entities, enterprise

Evidence established that informal consortium of law firm and two police departments satisfied “enterprise” requirement under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), despite contention of defendants, who were members of law firm and police departments, respectively, that enterprise, unless an illegal entity, can only be group of individuals. U.S. v. Masters, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1991, 924 F.2d 1362, rehearing denied, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 2019, 500 U.S. 919, 114 L.Ed.2d 105, certiorari denied 112 S.Ct. 86, 502 U.S. 823, 116 L.Ed.2d 58. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 95

Actions of police officer in furtherance of drug trafficking established pattern of racketeering activity for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), despite claim of insufficient connection between actions and his employment by police department, which was his “enterprise” for RICO purposes; officer's acquisition of cocaine and his quid pro quo conduct were inextricably intertwined with his authority and activities as police officer, and his activities in support of traffickers were possible because he was a police officer. U.S. v. Ruiz, C.A.1 (Mass.) 1990, 905 F.2d 499. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 49

City police department was “enterprise” within meaning of this chapter, even though such “enterprise” was harmed and not benefited by its affairs being conducted through pattern of racketeering activities. U. S. v.

Kovic, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1982, 684 F.2d 512, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 304, 459 U.S. 972, 74 L.Ed.2d 284. Com- merce 82.6; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 49

County sheriff's department was an “enterprise” for purposes of this chapter. U. S. v. Baker, C.A.4 (N.C.) 1980, 617 F.2d 1060. See, also, U.S. v. Davis, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1983, 707 F.2d 880; U. S. v. Lee Stoller Enterprises, Inc., C.A.7 (IIl.)1981, 652 F.2d 1313, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 636, 454 U.S. 1082, 70 L.Ed.2d 615. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 46

Within broad language of this section, city police department and individual officers were legal entities and thus qualified as “enterprises” through which racketeering could be conducted. U. S. v. Grzywacz, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1979, 603 F.2d 682, certiorari denied 100 S.Ct. 2152, 446 U.S. 935, 64 L.Ed.2d 788. Gaming 62

Under this chapter, city police department was an “enterprise.” U. S. v. Brown, C.A.5 (Ga.) 1977, 555 F.2d 407, rehearing denied 559 F.2d 29, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 1448, 435 U.S. 904, 55 L.Ed.2d 494.

This chapter might have been violated by systematic extraction of money from employees of sheriff's office during a finite period did not convert the office as an entity into criminal organization; thus any extortion, bribe or other racketeering activity committed by any employee did not become a violation of this chapter chargeable against everyone in the office and; defendant employees who were not involved in bribe could not be charged with that bribe merely because another of the defendant employees participated in it. U. S. v. Cryan, D.C.N.J.1980, 490 F.Supp. 1234, affirmed 636 F.2d 1211. Bribery 3

254. ---- States, governmental or political entities, enterprise

In criminal prosecution for alleged violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) arising from activities of defendant and codefendant-associate while defendant was serving as Illinois Secretary of State and Governor and during defendant's candidacy for office of Governor, State of Illinois could serve as RICO enterprise. U.S. v. Warner, C.A.7 (Ill.) 2007, 498 F.3d 666, rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc denied 506 F.3d 517, motion to stay mandate denied 507 F.3d 508, certiorari denied 128 S.Ct. 2500, 553 U.S. 1064, 171 L.Ed.2d 786, post-conviction relief denied 759 F.Supp.2d 975, affirmed 645 F.3d 913, vacated 132 S.Ct. 2099, 182 L.Ed.2d 866, on remand 688 F.3d 845. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 46

State of Maryland is not an “enterprise” for purposes of this chapter. U.S. v. Mandel, D.C.Md.1976, 415 F.Supp. 997, supplemented 415 F.Supp. 1025. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 46

255. ---- Tax bureaus, governmental or political entities, enterprise

Scheme by several high-ranking employees of county board of appeals to effectuate unlawful property tax reductions by circumventing the board's procedures concerning the application for assessment reductions was a corrupt “enterprise” within meaning of this chapter, even though it involved a public entity. U. S. v. Burns, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1982, 683 F.2d 1056, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 821, 459 U.S. 1173, 74 L.Ed.2d 1018. Commerce

82.6; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 46

State agency charged with responsibility of enforcing tax laws on interstate industry engaged in importing cigarettes from points outside state is an “enterprise” within this chapter. U. S. v. Frumento, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1977, 563 F.2d 1083, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 1256, 434 U.S. 1072, 55 L.Ed.2d 775, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 1258, 434 U.S. 1072, 55 L.Ed.2d 776. Commerce 82.10

County board of tax appeals was an “enterprise” for purposes of this chapter; and, those defendants who were not actually employees of board were nonetheless “associated with” the enterprise. U. S. v. Lavin, N.D.Ill.1981, 504 F.Supp. 1356. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 46

Under this chapter, Pennsylvania Department of Revenue's Bureau of Cigarette and Beverage Taxes was an “enterprise.” U. S. v. Frumento, E.D.Pa.1976, 426 F.Supp. 797, affirmed 552 F.2d 534, affirmed 563 F.2d 1083, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 1256, 434 U.S. 1072, 55 L.Ed.2d 775, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 1258, 434 U.S. 1072, 55 L.Ed.2d 776.

State Bureau of Cigarette and Beverage Taxes constituted an “enterprise * * * the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce,” within meaning of section 1962 of this title prohibiting employees of such enterprises from engaging in pattern of racketeering activity, and thus district court had jurisdiction to hear indictment charging employee of Bureau with acceptance of bribes as part of cigarette-smuggling conspiracy. U. S. v. Frumento, E.D.Pa.1976, 409 F.Supp. 136, affirmed 563 F.2d 1083, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 1256, 434 U.S. 1072, 55 L.Ed.2d 775, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 1258, 434 U.S. 1072, 55 L.Ed.2d 776. Bribery 1(1)

Bureau of cigarette and beverage taxes in the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue was an “enterprise” within scope of section 1962 of this title prohibiting any person employed by or associated with any enterprise, whose activities affected interstate or foreign commerce, from participating in conduct of enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt contrary to claim of defendant, chief investigator for bureau, that only private ventures were included within scope of this chapter. U. S. v. Frumento, E.D.Pa.1975, 405 F.Supp. 23. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 46

256. ---- Miscellaneous governmental or political entities, enterprise

County prosecutor's office was “enterprise” within meaning of this chapter. U. S. v. Altomare, C.A.4 (W.Va.) 1980, 625 F.2d 5. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 34

Congressman's office functioned as “continuous” organization so that it could be charged as Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) “enterprise,” where office had continued existence during time that Congressman was ranking minority member on House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee and House Small Business Committee, although employees came and went, they were presumably replaced and perhaps even augmented, and work of office, legitimate or allegedly otherwise, went on despite comings and goings of employees. U.S. v. McDade, E.D.Pa.1993, 827 F.Supp. 1153, affirmed in part , appeal dismissed in part 28 F.3d 283, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied , certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 1312, 514 U.S. 1003, 131 L.Ed.2d 194.

Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 46

Alleged “network” between individual and corporate defendants who were affiliated in some way with political candidate and association formed to further candidate's political interests constituted “enterprise” for purposes of civil action under this chapter. Hudson v. Larouche, S.D.N.Y.1983, 579 F.Supp. 623. Commerce 80

Construction and building inspection division of city's department of housing and community development was an “enterprise” within the meaning of this chapter, creating a cause of action on behalf of persons injured by an unlawful enterprise, and, thus, defendant, who was charged with using his official position in the division to assist in the rigging of what was supposed to be a competitive bidding system for city demolition projects, was not entitled to dismissal of the charge on the grounds that there was no unlawful enterprise. State of Md. v. Buzz Berg Wrecking Co., Inc., D.C.Md.1980, 496 F.Supp. 245. Municipal Corporations 231(2); Public Con- tracts 460

Louisiana Department of Agriculture is an “enterprise” within the meaning of this chapter. U. S. v. Dozier, M.D.La.1980, 493 F.Supp. 554. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 46

West Virginia Alcohol Beverage Control Commissioner was legal entity, and thus came within literal meaning of “enterprise” as such term was defined for purposes of this chapter. U. S. v. Barber, S.D.W.Va.1979, 476 F.Supp. 182. Intoxicating Liquors 131

257. Inanimate objects, enterprise

Bank account is inanimate object which cannot constitute RICO “enterprise.” Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, C.A.5 (La.) 1992, 954 F.2d 278. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 43

Inanimate object cannot constitute RICO “enterprise.” Elliott v. Foufas, C.A.5 (La.) 1989, 867 F.2d 877. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35

Bank account is inanimate object which cannot constitute RICO “enterprise.” Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, E.D.La.1990, 740 F.Supp. 1208, affirmed as modified on other grounds 954 F.2d 278. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act enterprise must be an association of natural persons or entities and cannot be a collection of inanimate objects or a technology. Creed Taylor, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1989, 718 F.Supp. 1171. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35

258. Insurance, enterprise

Evidence established that “enterprise” existed among liability insurance purchase group and its affiliated service companies operating as continuing business unit, for purposes of parent corporation's Racketeer Influenced and

Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim against individual associated with many of the companies for failing to properly forward premiums that had been paid to insure health maintenance organizations (HMOs) owned or managed by parent's subsidiary. United HealthCare Corp. v. American Trade Ins. Co., Ltd., C.A.8 (Minn.) 1996, 88 F.3d 563. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Separate entity formed by insurance agents for the purpose of selling insurance policies to scores of individual clients across the country by enticing them with false claims that the clients could reduce or even eliminate their federal income tax liability constituted a separate ongoing “enterprise,” for purpose of finding agents in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Hofstetter v. Fletcher, C.A.6 (Ohio) 1988, 905 F.2d 897. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Fact that insurance agent, its parent company, and claims handler charged with violating Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act did not control insurance company did not preclude finding that insurance company through which policies were purchased was a RICO “enterprise.” Ocean Energy II, Inc. v. Alexander & Al- exander, Inc., C.A.5 (La.) 1989, 868 F.2d 740. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Frustration of rights available to remedy requests for reimbursement under contract had to be established by subscribers to certain health plans, out-of-network medical care providers, as assignees of certain subscribers' benefits claims, and medical associations, in their associational capacity on behalf of their members, to have cognizable claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) based upon insurers' alleged scheme to under-reimburse beneficiaries and medical care providers by manipulating “usual, customary, and reasonable” (UCR) data. American Medical Ass'n v. United Healthcare Corp., S.D.N.Y.2008, 588 F.Supp.2d 432. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 59

Allegation that insured borrowed money, made loans, and obtained insurance while its attorneys and accountants provided necessary legal and financial advice, guidance, and information sufficiently identified enterprise that existed apart from underlying alleged racketeering activity, as required to state claim under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Royal Indemnity Co. v. Pepper Hamilton LLP, D.Del.2007, 479 F.Supp.2d 419. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Alleged scheme of insurer and sales agents to defraud senior citizens into purchasing deferred annuities that were inappropriate for them constituted “enterprise,” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiz- ations Act (RICO), where insurer and sales agent organizations purportedly developed and disseminated misleading marketing and sales materials, including high-pressure sales techniques and scripted sales presentations to be used by individual sales agents, instructed sales agents to use standardized sales materials and techniques, and rewarded sales agents with perks and high commissions for selling deferred annuities to senior citizens, and many of insurer's services and products were legitimate and non-fraudulent. In re National Western Life Ins. De- ferred Annuities Litigation, S.D.Cal.2006, 467 F.Supp.2d 1071. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 47

Insurer sufficiently asserted existence of “enterprise,” to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO), when it alleged that insurance broker and others constituted entity that shared common

purpose of obtaining commercial vehicle insurance which was not otherwise available at favorable premium, that entity was structured with broker at top, and that entity engaged in wrongful conduct other than predicate acts of mail and wire fraud, including selling insurance under insurer's name without its approval. United States Fire Ins. Co. v. United Limousine Service, Inc., S.D.N.Y.2004, 303 F.Supp.2d 432. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 44

Health insurer established “racketeering enterprise” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act among individuals and corporate administrators of union health insurance programs to enroll members of public as “associated members” in union group health insurance plans and collect portion of premiums “associated members” paid over what insurer charged union members; activity occurred over significant period of time, and involved approaching and procuring contracts from numerous insurers, soliciting various unions for inclusion, and administering insurance contracts. Soanes v. Empire Blue Cross/Blue Shield, S.D.N.Y.1997, 970 F.Supp. 230. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 30

Insured satisfied Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) requirement of establishing an “enterprise” for purposes of pleading RICO cause of action against its insurer; insured had alleged that her insurer and an insurance claims auditing service had associated together to deny claims for “soft tissue” injury arising out of automobile accidents. Brownell v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., E.D.Pa.1991, 757 F.Supp. 526. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Group of insurance fraud defendants were an “enterprise” within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act; planning of bogus automobile accidents by one member, other members' support in providing corroborating accounts of the accidents to police, health care providers and insurance companies, conveyance of report to insurance company through mails, and group's profiting by receiving insurance compensation demonstrated enterprise status. Keystone Ins. Co. v. Houghton, E.D.Pa.1988, 692 F.Supp. 466, reversed on other grounds 863 F.2d 1125. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Corporation engaged in commercial real estate development, and brokers engaged to procure insurance for property, did not form “enterprise,” for purposes of claim that president of corporation operated “enterprise” through pattern of racketeering activity, in violation of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); brokers and corporation were in conventional business relationship, involving sale of a service, and lack common purpose needed for RICO “enterprise.” RD Management Corp. v. Samuels, S.D.N.Y.2003, 2003 WL 21254076, Unreported. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

259. Labor organizations, enterprise

Local union was not an enterprise separate and distinct from local union and its business agent for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v. Drivers, Chauffeurs & Helpers Local Union 639, C.A.D.C.1989, 883 F.2d 132, 280 U.S.App.D.C. 60, rehearing granted , on rehearing in part 913 F.2d 948, 286 U.S.App.D.C. 182, certiorari denied 111 S.Ct. 2839, 501 U.S. 1222, 115 L.Ed.2d 1007. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 45

Evidence that defendant conducted affairs of local union by serving as chief steward when he appointed himself as a union steward and accepted payment as union steward from contractors for services which were not rendered was sufficient to show that his illegal activities were in the conduct of the union's affairs and that he was thus engaged in an “enterprise” for purposes of this chapter. U.S. v. Kaye, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1977, 556 F.2d 855, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 395, 434 U.S. 921, 54 L.Ed.2d 277. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 45

Genuine issues of material fact as to whether union and other defendants acted with wrongful purpose, i.e., wrongful means, through their corporate campaign precluded summary judgment for them on employer's Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims predicated on acts of extortion under state law based on failure to satisfy “wrongfulness” requirement of Virginia and North Carolina extortion statutes; while defendants offered evidence their intent was to secure fair process agreement pursuant to which non-National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) supervised election would be conducted, employer offered evidence that campaign's intent was to force it to give up valuable property rights by recognizing union and agreeing to first contract whether agreements were secured by fraudulent “shoebox election” or other means. Smithfield Foods, Inc. v. United Food and Commercial Workers Intern. Union, E.D.Va.2008, 585 F.Supp.2d 789. Federal Civil Proced- ure 2509.5

Local unions were properly included in alleged “enterprise” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO), even though allegations of racketeering acts at local unions did not mention defendant officers of labor organization representing unions, as officers had duty to remedy corruption at local unions, violation of which could establish aiding and abetting liability; additionally, officers of organization were also officials of various local unions. U.S. v. District Council of New York City and Vicinity of United Broth. of Carpenters and Joiners of America, S.D.N.Y.1991, 778 F.Supp. 738. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 45

Claim defining union local as racketeering “enterprise” could state a valid claim for violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise provision where allegation clearly excluded that union local from all of the other defendants who were “persons employed by or associated by this Enterprise” and thus did not impermissibly characterize local as both the enterprise and a person. Amendolare v. Schenkers Intern. Forwarders, Inc., E.D.N.Y.1990, 747 F.Supp. 162. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Older airline pilots, who alleged that pilots union, along with airline and lender that financed debtor- in-possession (DIP) loan, formed an association-in-fact for the purpose of devising and carrying out a scheme to defraud pilots through decimation of pilots' pension plan for their own financial and monetary advantages, sufficiently alleged existence of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise; liberally read, pilots' complaint alleged that defendants were intent on continually reducing pilots' pensions, and facts alleged in complaint sufficiently supported existence of a common purpose among defendants, multiple interac- tions between defendants, an ascertainable structure of the enterprise, an enterprise that was distinct from the alleged predicate acts, and “some” participation in the enterprise's affairs by each defendant. Vaughn v. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Intern., E.D.N.Y.2008, 395 B.R. 520, affirmed 377 Fed.Appx. 88, 2010 WL 1932388, affirmed 604 F.3d 703. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

260. Law firms, enterprise

Law firm did not go beyond rendering traditional legal services to its clients by sending pre-suit civil theft demand letters on behalf of retailer clients, and thus law firm did not participate in operation or management of alleged Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise itself, even if firm had used computer software to generate thousands of demand letters that automatically calculated demand amount, wrongfully threatened lawsuit, and electronically affixed attorney's signature without attorney review. Kelly v. Palmer, Reifler, & Associates, P.A., S.D.Fla.2010, 681 F.Supp.2d 1356. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 50

Neither law firm nor adoption agency constituted a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) “enterprise”; acts involving both entities were performed in course of their regular business. Broyles v. Wilson, M.D.La.1993, 812 F.Supp. 651, affirmed 3 F.3d 439. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 42

Law firm could constitute an “enterprise” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c). Park South Associates v. Fischbein, S.D.N.Y.1986, 626 F.Supp. 1108, affirmed 800 F.2d 1128. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 42

261. Marriage, enterprise

Complaint which failed to allege that defendant participated in the operation or management of any enterprise thus failed to state a claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), for purposes of action alleging provision of support for terrorists involved in September 11th attacks. In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, S.D.N.Y.2005, 392 F.Supp.2d 539, affirmed 538 F.3d 71, certiorari denied 129 S.Ct. 2859, 174 L.Ed.2d 576. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Marriage can be enterprise under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Townson, E.D.Tenn.1995, 912 F.Supp. 291. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 41

262. Partnerships, enterprise

Evidence supported conclusion that defendants and Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise were not one and the same; limited partnership was duly organized Arizona limited partnership which had separate and distinct legal existence independent from each defendant, and acquisition of limited partners' interests by defendants occurred after limited partnership's assets had been sold. Gagan v. American Cablevi- sion, Inc., C.A.7 (Ind.) 1996, 77 F.3d 951, rehearing denied. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Association between law firm and medical practice whereby inflated medical bills were submitted to insurance companies on behalf of accident victims represented by firm was “enterprise” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); there was ongoing organization in that doctor agreed to inflate bills of firm's

clients in exchange for continued patient referrals from firm, various employees of law firm and medical practice each performed roles within enterprise structure and through their roles advanced scheme to defraud insurance companies through submission of inflated bills, and enterprise was entity separate and apart from pattern of activity in which it engaged for both law firm and medical practice coordinated commission of multiple predicate offenses and continued to provide legitimate services during period in which they were engaged in racketeering activities. U.S. v. Console, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1993, 13 F.3d 641, certiorari denied 114 S.Ct. 1660, 511 U.S. 1076, 128 L.Ed.2d 377, certiorari denied 115 S.Ct. 64, 513 U.S. 812, 130 L.Ed.2d 21, denial of habeas corpus vacated 124 F.3d 187, denial of habeas corpus affirmed 178 F.3d 1279. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Government's proof demonstrated that defendant's business was a limited partnership organized under state laws, that it had a formal organization and had operated continuously for purpose of seeking maximum long- term appreciation of partners' capital, and that it was an entity different from both defendant and pattern of racketeering activity it sought to punish under this chapter; therefore, having shown that the entity existed, government met burden of proving enterprise element under this chapter. U.S. v. Cauble, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1983, 706 F.2d 1322, rehearing denied 714 F.2d 137, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 996, 465 U.S. 1005, 79 L.Ed.2d 229. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Partnership could not both be liable as person under RICO and be enterprise alleged in RICO complaint for purposes of criminal prohibition against conducting enterprise's affairs through pattern of racketeering activity. R.C.M. Executive Gallery Corp. v. Rols Capital Co., S.D.N.Y.1995, 901 F.Supp. 630. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Complaint of investors that general partner and sales agent for limited partnerships organized for purpose of investing in certain real estate projects adequately pleaded enterprise for purpose of RICO; complaint outlined hierarchy of general partners, selling agent, and construction consultants in alleged scheme to defraud and alleged that enterprise existed separate and apart from racketeering scheme. Levine v. Prudential Bache Proper- ties, Inc., N.D.Ill.1994, 855 F.Supp. 924. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 44

Complaints alleging that accounting firm and appraisers prepared misleading financial projections and appraisals with knowledge or reckless disregard of fraud by promoters of real estate limited partnership investment scheme adequately alleged “willful” conduct by defendants for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) predicate act based on violation of securities fraud law. In re Colonial Ltd. Partnership Litiga- tion, D.Conn.1994, 854 F.Supp. 64. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 11

Partnership and corporation were legal entities capable of holding interest in property and thus were “persons” within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) section prohibiting person associated with enterprise from participating in conduct of enterprise through pattern of racketeering activity, where plaintiff alleged that prescription drug repackager was enterprise through which racketeering activities took place and that partnership and corporation were persons employed by or associated with repackager; partnership and corporation were not alleged to be the “enterprises” through which racketeering activity was conducted. In- dependent Drug Wholesalers Group, Inc. v. Denton, D.Kan.1993, 833 F.Supp. 1507, reconsideration denied.

Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

RICO claims can be sustained against members of accounting partnerships. In re American Continental Corpora- tion/Lincoln Sav. and Loan Securities Litigation, D.Ariz.1992, 794 F.Supp. 1424. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Pleadings of limited partnership investors stated RICO claim arising from real estate investment sufficient to avoid motion for judgment on pleadings where complaint alleged set of circumstances in which general partner, acting on behalf of two limited partnerships, fraudulently induced investors to invest in two projects that he and other principals may never have intended to build or, at the very least, principals intended to utilize facade of partnerships to induce investors and at least one bank to provide them with money that principals could divert to other enterprises or for their own uses. Silverman v. Niswonger, E.D.Mich.1991, 761 F.Supp. 464. Federal Civil Procedure 1061

Agent's association with principals' partnership was not relationship with “enterprise” for purposes of principals' civil RICO action arising when principals discovered that agent had not disclosed substantial “commissions” and “kickbacks” on race horses purchased for principals; partnership was incidental business association of the principals, and there was no evidence that agent worked for partnership or used his association with it to carry out alleged pattern of racketeering activity. Gussin v. Shockey, D.Md.1989, 725 F.Supp. 271, affirmed 933 F.2d 1001. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Allegations of investors in limited partnerships were insufficient to establish existence of enterprise whose illicit activities were continuing ones for purposes of RICO claim made against individuals and corporations involved in sale of limited partnership units; investors claimed to have invested in partnerships based on certain misrepresentations in private placement memoranda; however, limited partnerships by their terms were limited to duration of slightly more than five years, objective of each private placement memorandum was to induce one time investment and to provide tax-advantaged investment, investors did not dispute that their short-term tax objectives were fully realized during first years of each partnership's existence, and complaint simply alleged certain acts of fraud. Bruce v. Martin, S.D.N.Y.1988, 691 F.Supp. 716, reargument denied 702 F.Supp. 66, on reconsideration 712 F.Supp. 442. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 29

Allegations of investors in oil and gas limited partnerships concerning alleged racketeering activities of general partner and broker sufficiently alleged enterprise to support RICO claim; investors alleged that affiliated limited partnerships had existed separate from RICO defendants. In re Rexplore, Inc. Securities Litigation, N.D.Cal.1987, 671 F.Supp. 679. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Allegation that defendant was partnership of certified public accountants organized and existing under laws of state of Illinois satisfied meeting requirement of RICO claim that defendant be individual or entity capable of holding legal or beneficial interest in property. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S. v. Alexander Grant & Co., S.D.N.Y.1985, 627 F.Supp. 1023. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 69

263. Prostitution rings, enterprise

Evidence supported jury's conclusion that defendant agreed to participate in a Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise, the overall objective of which was to make money prostituting juveniles; jury could have found that defendant was a member of an informal, ongoing organization with a continuing association, bound together to make money prostituting juvenile females based on evidence that defendant worked the track with his prostitutes, collecting the proceeds from their dates and flagging down customers, complied with the rules of “the game,” serving other pimps when prostitutes chose him and collecting money from other pimps when one of his prostitutes chose another pimp, taught his prostitutes the rules, and disciplined his prostitutes for infractions, and that defendant directed another pimp to take his prostitutes shopping for clothes and to drive them to the track for work. U.S. v. Pipkins, C.A.11 (Ga.) 2004, 378 F.3d 1281, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied 125 Fed.Appx. 268, 2004 WL 2647339, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied 125 Fed.Appx. 979, 2004 WL 2806034, vacated 125 S.Ct. 1617, 544 U.S. 902, 161 L.Ed.2d 275, on remand 412 F.3d 1251. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Organized prostitution activity, though organized from its inception for illicit purposes, constituted an “enterprise” within this chapter. U. S. v. McLaurin, C.A.5 (Fla.) 1977, 557 F.2d 1064, rehearing denied 562 F.2d 1257, rehearing denied 562 F.2d 1258, certiorari denied 98 S.Ct. 743, 434 U.S. 1020, 54 L.Ed.2d 767. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 7

264. Trusts, enterprise

Trusts created by settlor for benefit of her four children did not constitute “enterprise” under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); trusts fell within class of intangible rights that could not be legal entity enterprise under RICO, and bore no characteristics of association-in-fact. Bonner v. Henderson, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1998, 147 F.3d 457. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

265. Sole proprietorships, enterprise

Sole proprietorship qualifies as individual (or, in appropriate circumstances, as group of individuals associated in fact) and therefore as RICO “enterprise.” Guidry v. Bank of LaPlace, C.A.5 (La.) 1992, 954 F.2d 278. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Sole proprietorship can be “enterprise” with which its proprietor can be “associated” within meaning of provision of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act making it unlawful for any person associated with enterprise engaged in interstate commerce to participate in conduct of enterprise's affairs through pattern of racketeering activity, as long as there are other people besides proprietor working in organization. McCullough v. Suter, C.A.7 (Ill.) 1985, 757 F.2d 142. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 35

266. Pleading, enterprise

Complaint filed by purchasers of third-party automobile sales contracts, promissory notes, and equity ownership interest in automobile dealership failed to allege existence of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations

(RICO) Act enterprise, and thus failed to state claim against automobile dealership and others under RICO, where purchasers, relying on facts not in complaint, made bare assertions that because certain individuals loaned dealership owners money to establish dealership, they were not just lenders but owners that controlled RICO enterprise, and that by providing owners financial resources that allowed dealership to continue, other individuals became financial backers of racketeering enterprise. Crest Const. II, Inc. v. Doe, C.A.8 (Mo.) 2011, 660 F.3d 346. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 47; Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 50

Conclusory description of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise as “conspiracy” and “joint effort” between banks and operator of consumer watchdog service was insufficient; there was no indication, apart from these empty epithets, to indicate that operator's negative statements were made by or in cooperation with any of the banks. Mendez Internet Management Services, Inc. v. Banco Santand- er de Puerto Rico, C.A.1 (Puerto Rico) 2010, 621 F.3d 10. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Ex-employees' complaint alleging that meat processing facility knowingly employed undocumented, illegal im- migrants for unskilled positions in effort to reduce labor costs by driving down employee wages failed to adequately specify enterprise as required to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Baker v. IBP, Inc., C.A.7 (Ill.) 2004, 357 F.3d 685, rehearing and rehearing en banc denied , certiorari denied 125 S.Ct. 412, 543 U.S. 956, 160 L.Ed.2d 318. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

No-fault insurers sufficiently alleged that provider of radiology services, as purportedly fraudulently-incorporated assignee of injured motorists' no-fault benefits, constituted enterprise distinct from racketeering activity, as required to support insurers' civil Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claims, even though non-physicians that allegedly engaged in racketeering activity were provider's nominal or actual owners, since insurers' complaint satisfied RICO's distinctiveness rule by alleging that non-physicians, who were distinct from corporation itself, unlawfully conducted corporation's affairs. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Excel Imaging, P.C., E.D.N.Y.2012, 879 F.Supp.2d 243. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 47

Insurance subscribers and health care providers alleged only that health insurer “knowingly participated in the formation and maintenance” of database used to determine “usual, customary, and reasonable” (UCR) rates for out-of-network service (ONS) reimbursements paid to subscribers and providers, and thus they failed to alleged that insurer directed enterprise, as required to maintain their action against insurer under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) provision regarding participation in conduct of RICO enterprise. In re WellPoint, Inc. Out-of-Network UCR Rates Litigation, C.D.Cal.2011, 865 F.Supp.2d 1002. Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations 50

Foreign buyers of vehicles seeking damages for diminution in market value of vehicles in light of acknowledged and/or perceived defects failed to reasonably notify vehicle manufacturer and its subsidiaries of their purported roles in scheme involving defective vehicles, as required to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza- tions Act (RICO) claim against manufacturer with particularity. In re Toyota Motor Corp., C.D.Cal.2011, 785 F.Supp.2d 883. Federal Civil Procedure 636

Consumers against whom debt-buying company, debt collection agency, and process service company had allegedly obtained fraudulent default judgments in state court adequately alleged enterprise under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where complaint alleged that defendants formed joint ventures to purchase portfolios of defaulted debts, agreed to collect on debts through litigation coupled with fraudulent means, including filing of fraudulent affidavits of service, and used proceeds of scheme to fund purchase of new debts to continue enterprise. Sykes v. Mel Harris and Associates, LLC, S.D.N.Y.2010, 757 F.Supp.2d 413. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Borrower alleging that mortgage loan servicer used mail and wires to engage in fraudulent mortgage foreclosure scheme failed to plead enterprise separate from servicer itself, as required to state claim under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where borrower failed to plead any allegations of mail fraud or wire fraud against any defendant other than servicer. Walters v. Fidelity Mortg. of CA, E.D.Cal.2010, 730 F.Supp.2d 1185. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 43

Borrower who sued commercial lender in connection with delinquent mortgage account failed to allege that lender was part of actionable “enterprise,” as required to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO); complaint averred that lender alone constituted entirety of enterprise to collect mortgage-secured promissory note as allegedly unlawful debt. McLaughlin v. CitiMortgage, Inc., D.Conn.2010, 726 F.Supp.2d 201. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 43

Agricultural workers' allegations that a certain nursery employee extorted money from them were insufficient to plead the existence of an enterprise that included nursery, as required for action alleging violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), absent allegations that nursery and employee operated as an enterprise or shared a common purpose of extorting money. Montize v. Pittman Properties Ltd. Partnership No. 1, W.D.Ark.2010, 719 F.Supp.2d 1052. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Indictment failed to sufficiently plead a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise where the “person” and the “enterprise” were functionally the same licensed attorney. U.S. v. Bergrin, D.N.J.2010, 707 F.Supp.2d 503, reversed 650 F.3d 257. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38

Complaint sufficiently alleged the existence of a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise where it alleged that a couple of individuals enlisted the help of three global financial institutions, while also involving two leading accounting firms and two prominent rating agencies, in committing a nearly $3 billion fraud. In re National Century Financial Enterprises, Inc., Inv. Litigation, S.D.Ohio 2009, 617 F.Supp.2d 700. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 43

Shipping company sufficiently pleaded the existence of a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise involving Kuwaiti defendant; company asserted a hierarchy, with defendant and codefendant at the top, running, either personally or through their agents, a number of corporations, which operated across the world to perpetrate frauds both on the sending and receiving ends of shipments, and company alleged a com- pelling modus operandi involving shifting identities, dummy corporations, and fraudulent legal claims on carri-

ers. Maersk, Inc. v. Neewra, Inc., S.D.N.Y.2008, 554 F.Supp.2d 424. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organ- izations 47

Professional wrestling promoter that sued makers of action figures and video games and licensing agents, alleging commercial bribery in connection with licensing agreements, averred sufficient “enterprise” to state claim under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); although complaint did not allege ascertainable structure beyond purported racketeering acts, “enterprise” was properly averred as sum of predicate acts. World Wrestling Entertainment, Inc. v. Jakks Pacific, Inc., S.D.N.Y.2006, 425 F.Supp.2d 484, affirmed 328 Fed.Appx. 695, 2009 WL 1391807. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

Palestinian residents of West Bank failed to allege criminal enterprise, as required to state cause of action under Racketeering Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) against United States congregation that allegedly raised funds to support settlement movement in West Bank, in that residents at various times identified enterprise as an association between various defendants, as certain land in West Bank, and as illegal occupation of such land. Doe I v. State of Israel, D.D.C.2005, 400 F.Supp.2d 86. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 73

While partnership, corporations, and groups involved in alleged mail and wire fraud could have been Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) enterprises, failure to specify which entity was RICO “enterprise” would not automatically require dismissal where allegations would permit proof that defendants acted or conspired to act in prohibited manner with respect to entities capable of being RICO enterprises. Spira v. Nick, S.D.N.Y.1995, 876 F.Supp. 553. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

To satisfy “enterprise” element of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim, RICO plaintiff must specify enterprise and, in case of association-in-fact enterprise, plead the necessary organizational characteristics. Cadle Co. v. Schultz, N.D.Tex.1991, 779 F.Supp. 392. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 73

Proper pleading of substantive violations of this chapter, violations such as those charged by the plaintiffs required averment of “enterprise” affecting interstate or foreign commerce, and defendant's participation in the enterprise and in “pattern of racketeering activity,” and it was also necessary that allegations of fraud be set forth with particularity. Bennett v. E.F. Hutton Co., Inc., N.D.Ohio 1984, 597 F.Supp. 1547. Federal Civil Procedure 636; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

267. Miscellaneous entities considered enterprises

In RICO prosecution predicated upon mail fraud scheme to deprive state of sales tax receipts from operation of retail gasoline stations, RICO racketeering enterprise consisted not only of 12 gas stations which underpaid their sales taxes, but also jointly owned realty companies that owned or leased those gas stations' land and management company through which wholesale purchases of gasoline were funneled in order to conceal volume of sales at individual stations; however, racketeering enterprise did not include four other operating companies which were acquired with funds from gas stations but did not underpay their sales taxes or jointly owned trucking and

security companies which serviced gas stations but were not integral part of fraudulent scheme. U.S. v. Porcelli, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1989, 865 F.2d 1352, certiorari denied 110 S.Ct. 53, 493 U.S. 810, 107 L.Ed.2d 22, on remand. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Alleged RICO enterprise consisting of two individuals and seven corporations was “group of individuals associated in fact,” and, thus, Government was required to establish that members of group shared common purpose of engaging in course of conduct, that there was ongoing organization, that associates functioned as continuing unit, and that enterprise existed separate and apart from pattern of activity in which it engaged. U.S. v. Feldman, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1988, 853 F.2d 648, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct. 1164, 489 U.S. 1030, 103 L.Ed.2d 222, habeas corpus denied 924 F.2d 1062, habeas corpus denied 924 F.2d 1063. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 36

Indictment, defining “enterprise” as group of individuals associated in fact to promote and facilitate illegal importation and smuggling of multiton quantities of marijuana into United States from places outside United States and distribution of that marijuana, adequately defined “enterprise” involved for purposes of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1962(c, d), proscribing the conduct of affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity and proscribing a conspiracy to commit that offense. U.S. v. Mitchell, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1985, 777 F.2d 248, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 1493, 475 U.S. 1096, 89 L.Ed.2d 895, certiorari denied 106 S.Ct. 2921, 476 U.S. 1184, 91 L.Ed.2d 549. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 97

Allegations in civil complaint under this chapter that defendants were in joint real estate venture were sufficient to allege existence of enterprise. Battlefield Builders, Inc. v. Swango, C.A.4 (Va.) 1984, 743 F.2d 1060. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Where defendant and her husband operated film company for many years as distributors of pornographic films, and used auspices of that company to commit two acts of racketeering, i.e., interstate transportation of unauthorized videotapes of copyrighted movies, such activity fulfilled “enterprise” requirement of this chapter. U.S. v. Gottesman, C.A.11 (Fla.) 1984, 724 F.2d 1517, 222 U.S.P.Q. 206, rehearing denied 729 F.2d 1468. Commerce 82.6

Evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that an organization existed which satisfied requirements for an “enterprise” for purposes of this chapter, and that all the members of the conspiracy knowingly agreed to participate in or conduct the enterprise through a pattern of racketeering. U.S. v. Riccobene, C.A.3 (Pa.) 1983, 709 F.2d 214, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 157, 464 U.S. 849, 78 L.Ed.2d 145. Conspiracy 47(3.1)

As entity providing numerous legitimate services, and as incorporated body under state laws, corporation which owned and operated retirement community had ascertainable structure apart from any predicate acts of mail fraud and was thus appropriately named as “enterprise” in complaints for purposes of stating claim under this chapter. Bennett v. Berg, C.A.8 (Mo.) 1982, 685 F.2d 1053, on rehearing 710 F.2d 1361, certiorari denied 104 S.Ct. 527, 464 U.S. 1008, 78 L.Ed.2d 710, on remand. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 37

Lengthy association between two defendants, who on number of occasions sought to introduce agent and informant to sources of narcotics located in various parts of country so that they could obtain percentage of any resulting narcotics transactions, defendants' demand of payments from agent for introductions to narcotics sources, and attempt to provide informant with “crew” to facilitate narcotics distribution, standing apart from predicate acts of charged narcotics distribution, established existence of criminal “enterprise” required for charge under this chapter. U. S. v. DeRosa, C.A.9 (Cal.) 1982, 670 F.2d 889, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 353, 459 U.S. 993, 74 L.Ed.2d 391, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 372, 459 U.S. 1014, 74 L.Ed.2d 507. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 95

This chapter's definition of “enterprise” covered the enterprise alleged in the instant case, viz., a “group of individuals associated in fact with various corporations.” U. S. v. Thevis, C.A.5 (Ga.) 1982, 665 F.2d 616, rehearing denied 671 F.2d 1379, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 2300, 456 U.S. 1008, 73 L.Ed.2d 1303, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 3489, 458 U.S. 1109, 73 L.Ed.2d 1370, certiorari denied 103 S.Ct. 57, 459 U.S. 825, 74 L.Ed.2d 61.

Enterprise charged in indictment under this chapter, a group of individuals associated in fact for purpose of establishing a pattern of racketeering activity in the New York and New Jersey waterfront businesses, was not outside scope of term “enterprise” as employed in this chapter. U.S. v. Clemente, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1981, 640 F.2d 1069, certiorari denied 102 S.Ct. 102, 454 U.S. 820, 70 L.Ed.2d 91. Commerce 82.6; Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

Defendant's circle of bribed racehorse jockeys who were joined through defendant with a circle of informed bet- tors who profited from the illegal fixing of races constituted an enterprise that was unlawful under this chapter. U. S. v. Errico, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 1980, 635 F.2d 152, certiorari denied 101 S.Ct. 3142, 453 U.S. 911, 69 L.Ed.2d 994. Gaming 62

Gold mine, which allegedly was Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise, constituted “enterprise * * * engaged in * * * interstate or foreign commerce” within meaning of RICO, in view of evidence that defendant purchased supplies and equipment for use in mine from interstate commerce, that defendant sought workers for mine from out of state, and that defendant took $30,000 worth of gold with him out of state. U.S. v. Robertson, U.S.Cal.1995, 115 S.Ct. 1732, 514 U.S. 669, 131 L.Ed.2d 714, on remand 73 F.3d 249, on remand 74 F.3d 1247. Commerce 82.60

Evidence was sufficient to prove that gang was an “enterprise” within meaning of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), rather than a disparate network of local cliques, where four former gang members testified as to structure and organization of the gang, explaining that the cliques were not separate gangs, but rather subunits within the same gang, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) special agent provided testimony corroborating testimony of the former gang members. U.S. v. Castro, E.D.N.Y.2009, 669 F.Supp.2d 288, affirmed 411 Fed.Appx. 415, 2011 WL 652475, certiorari denied 132 S.Ct. 153, 181 L.Ed.2d 69. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 95

Network of clinics, clinics' officers and directors, management companies, and healthcare providers, which worked together over a four-year period to operate sham medical clinics and billing agencies so as to defraud in-

surers, constituted an “enterprise” within meaning of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Allstate Ins. Co. v. Palterovich, S.D.Fla.2009, 653 F.Supp.2d 1306. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Former California Highway Patrol (CHP) employee sufficiently alleged facts to establish involvement by former Staff Service Manager (SSM) for Disability and Retirement Section (DRS) in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) “enterprise”; she alleged, inter alia, that SSM, State Compensation Insurance Fund (SCIF), and attorney of record for CHP, who was also member of SCIF board of trustees, associated for common purpose of engaging in course of conduct, that SSM was involved in formal, or informal, ongoing organization, and facts that, if proven, provided sufficient evidence that various associates functioned as continuing unit. Vierria v. California Highway Patrol, E.D.Cal.2009, 644 F.Supp.2d 1219. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 73

“Enterprise” was established, for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), by indictment alleging that defendant was founding member of ongoing organization established to distribute large quantities of marijuana, alleging that codefendants controlled group and its distribution network, alleging that members of organization functioned as a continuing unit via numerous distribution activities that occurred over period of more than six years, and alleging 18 racketeering acts coordinated and committed over six-year period. U.S. v. Haworth, D.N.M.1996, 941 F.Supp. 1057. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Prime contractors and their area manager were capable of associating with each other to form Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise, for purposes of subcontractor's claim under RICO section making it unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise to conduct or participate in conduct of such enterprise's affairs through pattern of racketeering activity, where subcontractor alleged that prime contractors were separate corporate entities and that prime contractors' area manager was independently associated with each. Eagle Traffic Control, Inc. v. James Julian, Inc., E.D.Pa.1996, 933 F.Supp. 1251. Racket- eer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Investors satisfied requirement for stating cause of action under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), that there be an enterprise; complaint alleged that there were three groups formed for perpetrating fraud in connection with investments in video rental business, including a group that solicited investors, another that operated business, and a third that raised capital. Pahmer v. Greenberg, E.D.N.Y.1996, 926 F.Supp. 287, affirmed 123 F.3d 717. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 44

Taxpayers who participated in limited partnership tax shelters adequately alleged Racketeer Influenced and Cor- rupt Organizations Act (RICO) “enterprise,” for purposes of RICO claim brought against owners of corporation that was allegedly used by tax shelter managers to conduct fraudulent transactions, where taxpayers claimed that association, led by tax shelter managers, informally met over period of roughly five years for common, illegal purpose of operating trading program on phony basis and thereby garnering financial rewards. 131 Main Street Associates v. Manko, S.D.N.Y.1995, 897 F.Supp. 1507. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Defendants involved in fraudulent claim-processing scheme constituted a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act (RICO) “enterprise”; defendant admitted he and codefendants composed ongoing organization with structure and common purpose, fraudulent issuing and processing of all 11 insurance claim checks affected interstate commerce as stolen monies were sent through United States postal system, defendant admitted in sworn testimony that he signed fraudulent checks, and that codefendant created system by which claim checks were processed and issued without detection. Corporacion Insular de Seguros v. Reyes-Munoz, D.Puerto Rico 1994, 849 F.Supp. 126. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 43

Enterprise was financial services firm's client on whose behalf the firm acted and firm's rendition of professional services was not equivalent to operation or management of the served entity so as to bring financial services firm's actions within realm of racketeering statute making it unlawful for person employed by enterprise engaged in interstate or foreign commerce to conduct or participate in conduct of such enterprise's affairs through pattern of racketeering activity. Wiselman v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., M.D.Fla.1993, 835 F.Supp. 1398. Rack- eteer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Even assuming no communication or cooperation among or between officer-shareholders of importer and other defendants occurred after mid-January 1990, purchaser of importer's accounts receivable sufficiently alleged existence of single Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) “enterprise” comprised of all defendants even though corporate defendant was not formed until January 1990; allegedly overarching goal of bilking accounts purchaser out of its funds was agreed to by every entity and remained the goal before and after formation of corporate defendant and exclusion of officer-shareholder defendants, and importer and corporate defendant performed perfectly legitimate business activity during period that illegal acts were allegedly engaged in, thus providing “enterprise” separate and apart from predicate acts. American Trade Partners, L.P. v. A-1 In- tern. Importing Enterprises, Ltd., E.D.Pa.1991, 757 F.Supp. 545. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 38

There was sufficient evidence of enterprise's activities on interstate commerce to establish that element of charged violations of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), for illegal operation of landfill and disposal of waste materials based upon telephone calls and letters of various defendants, interstate travel undertaken, and out-of-state actors involved. U.S. v. Paccione, S.D.N.Y.1990, 749 F.Supp. 478. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 95

Allegations that defendants associated in various combinations in an ongoing organization to sell interests in un- limited series of limited partnerships, that the association was engaged in the business of oil and gas exploration, and that defendant law firm was part of the enterprise as result of its preparation of fraudulent private placement memoranda and the financial interest in the partnerships held by its senior partner were sufficient to satisfy the “enterprise” element under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). Griffin v. McNiff, S.D.N.Y.1990, 744 F.Supp. 1237, affirmed 996 F.2d 303. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 42

Allegations by securities brokerage house that customers were a group of individuals associated in scheme to defraud brokerage house and that brokerage house was itself enterprise were sufficient to satisfy Racketeer Influ-

enced and Corrupt Organizations Act's “enterprise” pleading prerequisite. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. Smith, D.Ariz.1989, 736 F.Supp. 1030. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Allegation that defendants, acting as association in fact, conducted activities aimed at manipulating price of target corporation's stock was sufficient to allege enterprise for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act. Azurite Corp. Ltd. v. Amster & Co., S.D.N.Y.1990, 730 F.Supp. 571. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

Condominium in which plaintiffs purchased units could be “enterprise” within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, insofar as condominium was legal entity requiring plans and specifications for its creation and operation, and also represented association of unit owners. Bhatla v. Resort Development Corp., W.D.Pa.1989, 720 F.Supp. 501. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

“National Tire Workers Litigation Project” which allegedly was formed by attorneys and physicians to examine tire workers for asbestos-related injuries was racketeering “enterprise”; alleged mail and wire fraud by “Project” was pleaded as separate from “Project” itself which was alleged to be group of people associated together for claims against asbestos manufacturers. Raymark Industries, Inc. v. Stemple, D.Kan.1988, 714 F.Supp. 460. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Complaint which alleged that bank, developer, and individuals were associates who constituted an enterprise for RICO purposes and that the purpose of the enterprise was the development of a parcel of land adequately alleged a distinct RICO enterprise. Lingle v. Ziola, N.D.Ill.1988, 701 F.Supp. 158. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 43

Allegations in coal companies' complaint, that union and individual members picketing at mine had associated in fact in attempt to force companies to accede to union's demands through their multiple acts of violence, were sufficient to satisfy “enterprise” element for civil RICO claim. MHC, Inc. v. International Union, United Mine Workers of America, E.D.Ky.1988, 685 F.Supp. 1370. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 45

Builder of single-family homes adequately alleged enterprise requirement of civil RICO action against parties involved in sale of two lots in a subdivision allegedly suitable for development through claims of joint ownership and overlapping agency on part of persons involved. J.G. Williams, Inc. v. Regency Properties, Ltd., N.D.Ga.1987, 672 F.Supp. 1436. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Buyer's complaint, alleging that combination of individuals and corporations had committed fraud by offering buyer certain art plates and screens while at same time misrepresenting their value, could be construed to state an “enterprise” which was separate and distinct from individual defendants, and thus stated Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act claim; complaint alleged combination of defendants as “enterprise,” leading to conclusion that such enterprise could be construed to be association of all defendants. Snider v. Lone Star Art Trading Co., Inc., E.D.Mich.1987, 659 F.Supp. 1249, on reconsideration 672 F.Supp. 977. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Branch manager, marketing manager, senior sales representative, and sales representative of subdivision of division of corporation constituted a group of individuals associated in fact and, thus, constituted an “enterprise,” for purposes of RICO claim, which conducted industrial espionage separate from subdivision's regular business of selling computer equipment. Continental Data Systems, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., E.D.Pa.1986, 638 F.Supp. 432. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations complaint which alleged ongoing organization that purchased horses on five occasions, which alleged suggestion of partnership status for horse investor, which claimed action of various alleged enterprise members as salesmen, purported investors, sales agent, boarder and trainer of horses, or treasurer, and which alleged monthly bills sent in names of purported partners sufficiently alleged “association in fact” to satisfy requirement of pleading “enterprise” and of alleging enterprise apart from predicate acts of racketeering. Karel v. Kroner, N.D.Ill.1986, 635 F.Supp. 725. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 39

Amended complaint filed by investors in government securities who suffered losses when dealer hypothecated securities, to extent complaint alleged association in fact composed of accountant, dealer, and accounting firm, or any two of them, adequately alleged an enterprise within meaning of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1961(4). First Federal Sav. and Loan Ass'n of Pittsburgh v. Oppenheim, Ap- pel, Dixon & Co., S.D.N.Y.1986, 629 F.Supp. 427. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 44

This chapter could properly be applied to the conduct of the affairs of an enterprise whose only business was the loaning of money at usurious interest rates, through the collection of unlawful debts and conspiracy to accomplish the same. U. S. v. Castellano, E.D.N.Y.1975, 416 F.Supp. 125. Usury 149

Allegation that patentee, his agents, his attorneys, corporate entities under his control, and others constituted enterprise associated for purpose of coercive patent enforcement through pattern of frivolous lawsuits sufficiently pled “enterprise,” as required to state Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) claim. Lemelson v. Wang Laboratories, Inc., D.Mass.1994, 874 F.Supp. 430, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d 1216. Racketeer Influ- enced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Sufficient evidence established that defendant was involved in an enterprise as required to support his conviction for violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); cooperating witnesses testified they committed crimes as part of an ongoing criminal group and were members of an enterprise, plea allocutions of group members acknowledged the existence of an enterprise, individuals testified to the structure and hierarchy of an enterprise, and other evidence established the ongoing nature of the criminal activities committed by members of the enterprise. U.S. v. Amato, C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2004, 86 Fed.Appx. 447, 2004 WL 114999, Unreported, certiorari denied 125 S.Ct. 38, 543 U.S. 823, 160 L.Ed.2d 34. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 95

scheme by which it would recruit companies making fraudulent pitches for different products, which would induce customers to enter leases with corporation that would be aggressively enforced, despite customers' anticipated dissatisfaction with products and services provided. Zito v. Leasecomm Corp., S.D.N.Y.2003, 2003 WL 22251352, Unreported. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

268. Miscellaneous entities not considered enterprises

District court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing terminated union members' Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) complaint against international union and local union activists, for failure to allege nexus between termination and alleged wire fraud, with prejudice; even if members amended complaint to further articulate their theory, amendment would not have saved complaint as the chain of causation was simply too attenuated to create civil RICO standing. Anderson v. Ayling, C.A.3 (Pa.) 2005, 396 F.3d 265. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 62

Briber and the bribed were not, solely by virtue of that unlovely relation, a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) “enterprise.” Williams Electronics Games, Inc. v. Garrity, C.A.7 (Ill.) 2004, 366 F.3d 569, on remand 2005 WL 2284280. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Buying club, its franchisees, its officers and directors, its members, and participating manufacturers and wholesalers, were not an “enterprise” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), as required to support members' civil RICO claim, based on alleged fraudulent representations that members would have access to first quality merchandise at special wholesale prices; club's ongoing business dealings with manufacturers, wholesalers, and members did not established that they functioned as a continuing unit or as an ongoing structured organization. Stachon v. United Consumers Club, Inc., C.A.7 (Ill.) 2000, 229 F.3d 673. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Affiliates and agents of automobile manufacturer, including dealers, trusts, and foreign subsidiaries which participated, directly or indirectly, in retail sales of automobiles and accessories, did not amount to “enterprise” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), for purpose of consumers' warranty fraud claim, as affiliates' and agents' role in manufacturer's allegedly illegal acts was entirely incidental. Fitzgerald v. Chrysler Corp., C.A.7 (Ill.) 1997, 116 F.3d 225. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Allegation of an association-in-fact composed of field employees who carried out fraudulent scheme involving shorting of materials used in oil well stimulation procedures failed to state an “enterprise” within meaning of section of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); association-in-fact either had no existence as an entity separate and apart from actual pattern of racketeering or consisted of defendant corporate entity functioning through its employees in the course of their employment, and corporation could not be both the enterprise and the RICO perpetrator. Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Industries, C.A.5 (Tex.) 1992, 972 F.2d 580, rehearing denied 985 F.2d 555. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 36

Investor failed to show “separate enterprise” needed to prevail on claim against investment broker under Racket- eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act for failing to disclose markups on bonds since alleged association

and its activities were nothing more than single broker going about its ordinary business of dealing in securities by and through its officers and employees. Board of County Com'rs of San Juan County v. Liberty Group, C.A.10 (N.M.) 1992, 965 F.2d 879, certiorari denied 113 S.Ct. 329, 506 U.S. 918, 121 L.Ed.2d 247. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 44

Absent allegation in complaint or in Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) statement that parent corporation, subsidiary, or purchaser of parent corporation which produced allegedly defective oil fur- naces had any active role in alleged racketeering activity apart from activities of their affiliated entities, employees, and agents, there could be no showing that corporate defendants were distinct from alleged association in fact among defendants and their employees as necessary to meet enterprise requirement for stating § 1962(c) RICO claim. Glessner v. Kenny, C.A.3 (N.J.) 1991, 952 F.2d 702. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 47

Employees' claim, alleging that employers were members of integrated, comprehensive, consolidated health care delivery system, with common ownership, failed to plead existence of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organ- izations Act (RICO) enterprise, as required to support RICO claim against employers; health care system did not associate with others to form enterprise sufficiently distinct from itself. Gordon v. Kaleida Health, W.D.N.Y.2012, 847 F.Supp.2d 479. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 40

Fictitious company allegedly used as conduit to divert equipment from medical equipment company did not constitute “enterprise” under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), where company had no legal existence, and there were no allegations concerning its structure or organization or how long it existed or who was associated with it. Freedom Medical Inc. v. Gillespie, E.D.Pa.2007, 634 F.Supp.2d 490. Racketeer In- fluenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Borrowers failed to adequately allege that lenders formed enterprise to engage in predatory lending practices, and thus failed to state claim against lenders under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), even though complaint identified four entities, where one entity was successor of entity that made loan, and there were no allegations specific to other entities. Ayala v. World Savings Bank, FSB, C.D.Cal.2009, 616 F.Supp.2d 1007. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Enterprise did not exist as entity separate and apart from pattern of illegal activity, as required to establish Rack- eteer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act association-in-fact enterprise, where sole, discrete goal of enterprise was to engage in fraudulent activity of “scamming” those who might have been interested in engaging in oil and gas industry. Clark v. National Equities Holdings, Inc., E.D.Tex.2006, 561 F.Supp.2d 632, remanded in part 229 Fed.Appx. 314, 2007 WL 1573954, on remand 558 F.Supp.2d 692. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 38

Plaintiff failed to establish association-in-fact enterprise necessary to support his claim under Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), despite convictions of two alleged enterprise members for wire fraud and misprision of felony, where there was no evidence that enterprise's members functioned as continuing unit, as shown by hierarchical or consensual decision-making structure. Clark v. National Equities Holdings,

Inc., E.D.Tex.2007, 558 F.Supp.2d 692, affirmed 2008 WL 58774. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 39

Commercial relationship between manufacturer of bulldozers used by Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) to destroy homes of Palestinians and the government of Israel did not arise to an “enterprise,” for purposes of claim that manufacturer violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), brought by family of peace activist who was run over and killed by a military bulldozer in the Gaza Strip, and a number of Palestini- ans who lived in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. Corrie v. Caterpillar, Inc., W.D.Wash.2005, 403 F.Supp.2d 1019, affirmed 503 F.3d 974. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 47

Allegation that physician offices, hospitals, and independent clinical laboratories joined with clinical laboratory chain to form association with chain in order to obtain benefits of associating with chain was insufficient to establish that members of association, namely chain and physician office, hospital, or independent laboratory, shared common purpose and, thus, such associations were not viable enterprises within meaning of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). In re SmithKline Beecham Clinical Laboratories, Inc. Labor- atory Test Billing Practices Litigation, D.Conn.1999, 108 F.Supp.2d 84. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Or- ganizations 39

Automobile dealership did not participate in operation or management of enterprise of automobile manufacturer, and thus could not be held liable in civil action brought under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act by automobile purchaser, who alleged that the mails had been used in scheme to defraud purchasers of extended warranty purchase plan; while dealership processed plan application, charged inspection fee, and would have conducted repair work, dealership was outsider which did not exert control over manufacturer's affairs. Williams v. Ford Motor Co., N.D.Ill.1997, 980 F.Supp. 938. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organiza- tions 50

Municipal employee deferred compensation plan was not a “resulting trust” and therefore did not qualify as Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise; since plan qualified for preferable federal income tax treatment, no division of title would be permitted in amounts deferred and thus there could not be separation of legal and equitable interests in trust corpus. City of Philadelphia v. Public Employees Ben. Ser- vices Corp., E.D.Pa.1994, 842 F.Supp. 827. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 46; Trusts 62

Investors claiming that stock broker fraudulently represented that corporation was guaranteed to increase in value failed to establish that successive brokerage firms which employed broker were a joint “enterprise” for Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) purposes; there was no evidence that firms worked together to commit any predicate acts as “ongoing organization” or that they functioned as a “continuing unit.” Downing v. Halliburton & Associates, Inc., M.D.Ala.1993, 812 F.Supp. 1175, affirmed 13 F.3d 410. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 79

Local office of securities brokerage firm was not separate from securities brokerage firm, as to constitute separate Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) enterprise; plaintiff will not be permitted to

carve out piece of corporate defendant to artificially create distinct enterprise for RICO purposes. Nagle v. Mer- rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., S.D.Iowa 1992, 790 F.Supp. 203. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 44

Association of manufacturer, some of its employees and its advertising agency was not an “enterprise” distinct from manufacturer the “person,” as required to state claim under section of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) proscribing conduct of affairs of enterprise through pattern of activity or collection of unlawful debt. Moffatt Enterprises, Inc. v. Borden, Inc., W.D.Pa.1990, 763 F.Supp. 143. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 50

Savings and loan allegedly induced to make inappropriate investments through misrepresentations of defendants including two brokerages and broker could not be considered “enterprise” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) section proscribing conducting affairs of enterprise affecting interstate commerce through pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt; merely influencing one or a few decisions of those acting within the enterprise's operational sphere was insufficient. Cooperativa de Ahorro y Credito Aguada v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., D.Puerto Rico 1991, 758 F.Supp. 64. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 43

Former employee's allegations of scheme to harass employee and to discharge her in order to obstruct criminal investigation of employer did not indicate enterprise under Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO); allegedly concerted activities of employer's bank officers appeared to have no purpose distinct from alleged obstruction of investigation. Miranda-Rodriguez v. Ponce Federal Bank, F.S.B., D.Puerto Rico 1990, 751 F.Supp. 18, affirmed 948 F.2d 41. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 43

Count which alleged that a group of individuals and entities engaged in a group association which had no other purpose than carrying out bribery scheme adequately alleged existence of a RICO enterprise. U.S. v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., D.Conn.1990, 741 F.Supp. 334. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 91

Recording company's catalog of master recordings was not an appropriate “enterprise” for purposes of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. Creed Taylor, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., S.D.N.Y.1989, 718 F.Supp. 1171. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Investors in limited partnership could not bring RICO claim against accounting firm for its role in preparing financial statement used in challenged offering, as accounting firm did not “conduct” affairs of partnership, and conclusory statement that accounting firm would continue to profit in future, apparently through trickle down of fees from partnership, did not recreate relationship or identity of actions sufficient for it to have “conducted” affairs of enterprise. Goldman v. McMahan, Brafman, Morgan & Co., S.D.N.Y.1989, 706 F.Supp. 256. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 64

Investors in tax shelters failed to state RICO cause of action against organizers and promoters of shelters by alleging that tax shelters constituted “enterprises” that were interstate networks of defendants engaged in chain of

illegal promotion of securities, as investors failed to allege that “enterprises” had an ascertainable structure that existed for purpose of maintaining operations directed toward economic goal apart from commission of predicate acts of securities fraud, mail fraud and wire fraud constituting pattern of racketeering activity. Nielsen v. Professional Financial Management, Ltd., D.Minn.1987, 682 F.Supp. 429. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Plaintiffs alleging class action fraud case under civil RICO failed to adequately allege “enterprise” element of RICO; involved ten defendants, several individuals, several brokerage firms and several corporations, but there were no allegations from which it could be inferred that defendants belonged to an association to sell purported insurance, and no allegations of how long association lasted, who did what when, and thus how the acts were related to common purpose of “enterprise.” Plount v. American Home Assur. Co., Inc., S.D.N.Y.1987, 668 F.Supp. 204. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 73

Lender failed to satisfy enterprise requirement in action brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or- ganizations Act against employee of company operated by borrower's brother; even though company cashed borrower's check, there was no proof that borrower's corporation and brother's company were associated for the common purpose of engaging in course of conduct or pattern of racketeering activity. Barlow v. McLeod, D.D.C.1986, 666 F.Supp. 222, affirmed 861 F.2d 303, 274 U.S.App.D.C. 70. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 39

Wife's complaint which alleged that husband and others formed an enterprise with common purpose of murdering her in order to avoid husband's obligations to her and their children failed to satisfy “enterprise” element of a RICO claim; although activities of associates in murder plot were sufficiently related for RICO purposes, association was not continuing or ongoing; its common purpose had an obvious terminating goal, the death of the wife, and associates in scheme did not function as a continuing unit to dispose of spouses for hire. Pohlot v. Pohlot, S.D.N.Y.1987, 664 F.Supp. 112. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 41

Complaint which alleged that accounting firm certified materially false financial statements of corporation which managed energy business in which plaintiffs participated failed to state a claim under the Racketeer Influ- enced and Corrupt Organizations Act; “enterprise” requirement was not satisfied by engagement of finite duration and scope, undertaken for particular client; nor did employment of accounting firm express the essential “continuity” element of a racketeering enterprise. Plains/Anadarko-P Ltd. Partnership v. Coopers & Lybrand, S.D.N.Y.1987, 658 F.Supp. 238. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 42

Securities accounts in which defendant broker allegedly gained an interest as result of violations of securities laws were not “enterprises” within meaning of this chapter. In re Catanella and E.F. Hutton and Co., Inc. Secur- ities Litigation, E.D.Pa.1984, 583 F.Supp. 1388. Racketeer Influenced And Corrupt Organizations 44

18 U.S.C.A. § 1961, 18 USCA § 1961

Current through P.L. 113-55 (excluding P.L. 113-54) approved 11-27-13

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