December 1997 R ELIEF AND REHABILITATION NETWORK RRN 23 paper NETWORK

The Coordination of Humanitarian Action: the case of Sri Lanka by Koenraad Van Brabant

Abstract

This case study concerns humanitarian field Following a review of the coordination mechanisms coordination efforts during Eelam War 3 in Sri Lanka, in place at the outbreak of war, the different initiatives between 1994 and 1996. The war and the coordination used to strengthen it during the war are examined. efforts continue. Special attention is paid to the review of the NGO Consortium on Relief and Rehabilitation and the Most documented experiences of the coordination of Interagency Emergency Group. For organisational, but humanitarian action relate to situations in which also for political reasons, both functioned government was weakened, collapsed or not in control simultaneously and in parallel. of significant parts of its territory. Sri Lanka provides an example of a government that has asserted its The absence of professional knowledge regarding sovereignty and that simultaneously pursues political, coordination, and the occasional shortage of technical military and humanitarian objectives. The and methodological expertise, added to the usual government’s continued responsibility for the resistance to coordination, made it a difficult exercise. protection of and provision for its citizens is briefly Contextual constraints, such as the outbreak of the war examined in the light of its role in conflict. An overview coinciding with an effort to rethink coordination, and of the challenges for humanitarian action and capacity the complex and sensitive politics around humanitarian to respond leads to a discussion of the restriction of assistance also played their role. The most important ‘humanitarian space’ by the army. Throughout the obstacle to effective coordination remained however, period in question, humanitarian agencies not only the absence of an effective institutional link to needed to coordinate for programme effectiveness, but coordinate the humanitarian efforts of both the also to advocate for humanitarian space and access. government and those of specialised agencies.

2 ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION: the case of Sri Lanka ○○○○○○○○○○○○ Acknowledgements Comments receivedmaybeusedinfuture Newsletters. A copyofyourcommentswillbesenttotheauthor. Web site: www.oneworld.org/odi/rrn/ Email: [email protected] Fax: +44(0)1713931699 Tel: +44(0)1713931674/47/40 United Kingdom London SW1E5DP Stag Place Portland House Overseas DevelopmentInstitute Relief andRehabilitationNetwork Please sendcommentsonthispaperto: training, research orprogrammedesign, implementationorevaluation. holders. TheNetworkCoordinator wouldappreciatereceivingdetailsoftheuse anyofthismaterialin Requests forthecommercial reproductionofNetworkmaterialshouldbedirected totheODIascopyright Photocopies ofallorpart thispublicationmaybemadeprovidingthatthesource isacknowledged. © OverseasDevelopment Institute, London,1997. Price percopy:£5.00(excludingpostageandpacking) ISBN: Laura GibbonsandJohnBortonforvaluablecommentsonearlierdrafts. Special thankstoOxfam(UK/I)whichprovidedtheopportunitywriteupafirstreflection,and Overseas DevelopmentInstitute,London. working withtheRRNandbasedat Koenraad Van BrabantisaResearch Fellow Notes ontheAuthor 0-85003-367-5 in SriLankawho,waysgreatandsmall, This paperisdedicatedtoallthepeople work fortoleranceandpeace. Contents ○○○○○○○○○○○ Chronology of Major Events 4

1. The Coordination of Humanitarian Action 5 ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ What is field coordination? 5 NGO and UN coordination 5 Coordination by governments 6 2. Humanitarian Action in Sri-Lanka 7

Protection and provision - the responsibility of the government 7 Challenges for coordinated international humanitarian action 9 The capacity for humanitarian response 10 Humanitarian space 11

3. Mechanisms for Coordination 13

Mechanisms for coordination at the outbreak of the war 13

Strengthening coordination during the war 14 THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION: Effective coordination? 18

4. Structural and Contextual Constraints on Coordination 21

Structural constraints 21 Contextual constraints 22 Maps 24 Endnotes 26 Acronymns 26 References 27 Theme and structure of the paper

This case study concerns field coordination efforts during the outbreak of Eelam War 3 in Sri Lanka between 1994–1996. In addition to considering some of the general obstacles to effective coordination, its specific interest lies in the description of the difficulties of coordinating the humanitarian effort within the context of a strong government waging a war. Together with the war, the coordination efforts continue to date. the case of Sri Lanka A useful place to begin is by considering what coordination consists of, and then examining various NGO, UN and governmental experiences of coordination. The paper then presents the Government of Sri Lanka’s claim to authority in light of its past and current role in the conflicts that have torn this island. An overview of the challenges for humanitarian action and response capabilities leads directly to the issue of just how much humanitarian space was allowed for agencies to operate in. Next, coordination mechanisms in place at the outbreak of war are reviewed, followed by the different initiatives to strengthen it during wartime. This raises the question of their effectiveness and of structural and contextual constraints to coordination. 1 3

3 ○○○○○○○○○○○ Chronology of Events

1971 First JVP led youth insurgency in the south

○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ 1975 Emergence of Tamil militant groups 1976 Tamil United Liberation Front demands separate state 1983 Island-wide bloody riots against Tamils, start ‘Eelam War 1’ 1987 Indian intervention, Indo-Sri Lankan Peace Accord First national rehabilitation and reconstruction plan Indian-Peace Keeping Force fights with LTTE until 1990 Second JVP-led youth insurgency in the south until 1990 1990 Start Eelam War 2; expulsion of Muslims from the north August 1994 People’s Alliance wins elections and begin peace moves Preparatory study on national rehabilitation and reconstruction January 1995 Presidential Task Force for the north established April 1995 LTTE break off talks and starts Eelam War 3 Army abandons territory in the east Pilot resettlement scheme for IDPs in the east suspended Start Review Committee of NGO Consortium July 1995 Government moves the theatre of war from the east to Jaffna peninsula October 1995 Army offensive that leads to capture of Jaffna in December Population flees Jaffna city

the case of Sri Lanka UN proposes Multilateral Emergency Task Force/Forum Start Interagency Emergency Group November 1995 GoSL reaffirms its sovereignty and capacity to the UN Appointment Focal Point for relief to the north Media campaign against NGOs January 1996 Second draft proposal regarding Consortium on Humanitarian Aid April 1996 Army captures Jaffna peninsula Resettlement and Reconstruction Authority for the North created Appointment Focal Point for relief to cleared areas in the north June 1996 Evacuation of population and aid agencies from Kilinochchi in Vanni NGO Consortium formally disbanded Autumn 1996 Army occupies Kilinochchi New NGO Consortium on Humanitarian Aid inaugurated THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION: OF HUMANITARIAN THE COORDINATION

4 1 ○○○○○○○○○○○ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ The Coordination of Humanitarian Action

What is field coordination? Coordination is a notoriously difficult aspect of humanitarian action. There is a saying that everyone umanitarian action needs to be wants coordination but no one wants to be THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION: coordinated to achieve any overall coordinated. The obligation to coordinate with other H programme effectiveness. humanitarian actors is not normally an explicit Operational coordination is required to achieve the agency policy and it is also unclear which best resource allocation in terms of needs and mechanisms work best and why, and in what priorities, but resource allocation must also be context. However, there is a growing pool of coordinated in terms of coverage: duplication must experience available for comparative review (for be avoided but it is also important to avoid example, Bennett 1994b; Borton 1996; Donini omissions in sectors of work or in target groups 1996; Lanzer 1996; Whitman & Pocock 1996) to that require help. Secondly, coordination is required which this case study would like to add. when dealing with the standards and protocols of implementation. NGO and UN coordination But joint, and therefore coordinated action in a NGO coordination situation of active conflict may also be required to NGOs have been criticised for their competitiveness negotiate humanitarian space. Humanitarian space and poor coordination (Bennett 1994a: 2). NGOs refers in the first instance to the basic rights of have shown that they can cooperate and take a lead victims of conflict — at a bare minimum these in contexts where governments and the UN cannot rights include protection and material assistance. or do not want to. The Joint Church Action during Humanitarian space also refers to the right of access the Biafra war, the Emergency Relief Desk during for impartial agencies to provide humanitarian the Ethiopian civil war and the Oxfam–NGO assistance. Humanitarian space is not always consortium for an internationally isolated guaranteed: belligerent parties may restrict it, or it Cambodia, are examples of a large-scale operation, the case of Sri Lanka can be limited by threats to security. Where parties combined with international advocacy. The nature to a conflict restrict this space, joint action may be of NGO coordination tends to change when a formal required to assert humanitarian concerns and authority emerges, sometimes government, principles in the face of more dominant political or sometimes the UN, in the absence of an effective military concerns. Coordinated advocacy for government. NGOs need a collective voice to humanitarian principles and negotiation for space participate in national policy debates and national involves humanitarian agencies in ‘political’ aid planning to ensure recognition of their role in questions. civil society and raise issues of specific concern to them.

5 ○○○○○○○○○○○ UN coordination as unwilling to take full responsibility for the The over-arching coordinating framework for the protection and provision of all its citizens because UN’s overall involvement in a given country it is itself party to a civil war. In principle however, typically rests with the UNDP, whose head national governments are responsibile for the represents the UN to the national government. In coordination of humanitarian action. humanitarian crises, the UN continues to search for The challenge for government becomes harder as a satisfactory institutional framework for ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ the number of international agencies increases, and coordination. There have been experiments with a if it has no plan for humanitarian aid or no formal lead agency model, for example using UNICEF in coordinating body. Often specialised ministries or south Sudan, UNHCR during wars in the former administrations are created for refugee affairs, relief Yugoslavia and with situation-specific operations and rehabilitation or humanitarian assistance in such as the UN Border Relief Operation (1982– general. Helpful as this is, it brings with it additional 1991) for Cambodian refugees in Thailand, or the internal coordination problems at the interface of UN Office for Emergency Operations (1984–1987) such specialised administration and the normal line for the famine response in Ethiopia. The creation ministries. in 1988 of a UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian and Economic Assistance Governmental coordination becomes sensitive and Programmes to Afghanistan (UNOCA) with a contentious where government is strong and specially appointed coordinator for the overall UN invokes national security concerns. This can be over efforts country-wide was therefore an innovative the presence of refugees in a context of regional approach. In 1993 however UNDP in Afghanistan tension, or where the government itself is a party took back the responsibility for rehabilitation and to a conflict. In such cases a Ministry of the Interior, economic and development assistance, leaving as in Guatemala, or a Ministry of Defence, as in UNOCA with a reduced mandate of relief only Thailand and Sri Lanka, becomes the de facto ‘lead (Donini et al. 1996). agency’; coordination can then seem more like control. The question of effective operational Dissatisfaction with perceived weaknesses in the coordination becomes linked to that of humanitarian UN’s capacity to mobilise a coordinated emergency space, with agencies demanding more than the response during the Gulf war (Minear et al. 1992) government is willing to allow. For international led in 1991 to the creation of a standing UN humanitarian agencies, this argument quickly department for coordination: the Department for becomes one of sovereignty. In such negotiation Humanitarian Affairs (DHA). It could be argued or argument over humanitarian space, the UN that in many ways the DHA was set up to fail the case of Sri Lanka usually finds itself in a different position from that (Dedring 1996). In some cases, such as Liberia and of NGOs. The UN has a recognised humanitarian Mozambique, there has been tension between the mandate but is an institution made up of member DHA and the Special Representatives of the states; while NGOs have a self-appointed mandate Secretary-General, whose main mission is to seek that may be morally recognised but have no political solutions to a conflict, and notably UNDP international legal status. This combination gives and UNHCR over operational coordination. them a strong position in the argument over Following the establishment of the DHA, in a major humanitarian space but also leaves them more crisis the UN can appoint a humanitarian vulnerable to an angry reaction from the coordinator at country level. In principle answerable government. to the DHA, this role has often been filled by the UNDP’s resident representative. His or her need to A special feature of Sri Lanka is that a belligerent express concern for an adequate humanitarian government provides a degree of humanitarian response does not always fit easily with the assistance also in opposition controlled areas. The diplomatic representation of the UN to a national government’s claim to authority in matters related government, as the events in Sudan (Karim et al. to humanitarian assistance is derived from the 1996: 270–73) and Sri Lanka show. assertion that it continues to protect and provide for all citizens in its national territory. The following Coordination by government section examines this assertion in the light of the government’s role in the conflict and its control over We see NGOs and the UN take a lead role in the humanitarian space. coordination of humanitarian action where a government is weak or collapsed, or where it is seen THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION: OF HUMANITARIAN THE COORDINATION

6 2 ○○○○○○○○○○○ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ Humanitarian Action in Sri Lanka

Protection and provision - the In 1956 however, Sinhalese nationalism became an responsibility and authority of the electoral rallying cry, leading to the first riots. Tamil THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION: government politicians wavered between a cross-cutting élitist alliance and straightforwardly ethnic politics, but Ethnic conflict or a crisis of governance? perceived political discriminations and subsequent riots as strengthening Tamil nationalism and their he ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka stems from demand for an autonomous or even independent a conflict over group rights that originates ‘Tamil Eelam’. Bloody riots in 1983 fueled the Tin the British colonial period (1815–1948). armed Tamil militancy, now openly supported by Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic and religiously diverse India, and led to Eelam War 1. They also fostered country of 18 million people of which the international sympathy with the Tamil cause. In predominantly Buddhist Sinhalese constitute a clear 1987 India intervened to stop the Sri Lankan army majority (circa 74 per cent). The largest minority from taking Jaffna, the political and cultural centre are the Tamils who themselves divided between of the Ceylon Tamils. The subsequent Indo–Sri the ‘Ceylon Tamils’ (12.5 per cent) and the ‘Indian Lankan peace accord brought in an Indian Peace- Tamils’ (now 5.5 per cent). The names are rather keeping Force (IPKF). This itself got quickly inappropriate given that all Tamils, like the entangled in a war with the Liberation Tigers of Sinhalese, originate from the Indian subcontinent. Tamil Eelam (LTTE), an effective guerrilla There is also a Muslim minority (7.5 per cent). For organisation that promptly bit the hand that had fed almost a century the colonial administration had it. The LTTE violently established its supremacy followed a policy of balanced — or ethnically equal over other Tamil militant groups, the remnants of — rather than proportional representation. The which would later cooperate with the government political aspirations of the Sinhalese majority forces to defeat the LTTE. A morally defeated IPKF became possible when universal suffrage was withdrew in early 1990. Peace negotiations between the case of Sri Lanka introduced in 1931. the government and the LTTE fell apart when the Immediately after independence in 1948 the new LTTE started Eelam War 2 in mid-1990, in which government enacted legislation depriving the it lost ground in the east but took control of most majority of the then much larger number of ‘Indian of the north, where only a ring of fortified army Tamils’ of their citizenship and voting rights, partly bases remained. Eelam War 2 drew the Muslims for ethnic reasons, partly to break the power of an into the conflict. In the east, they were set upon by organised working class. Several hundred thousand the LTTE and trained as home guards. This resulted would subsequently repatriate to India. in reciprocal massacres of Tamil and Muslim villagers. In November 1990 all Muslims were expelled from the LTTE-controlled north.

7

8 ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION: the case of Sri Lanka ○○○○○○○○○○○○ responsibility forallitscitizens. parts ofitsterritoryandcould orwouldnot,assume government effectivelylost controloversignificant Liberia, southSudanorAfghanistan,wherethe war-time situationsinAngola,Mozambique, internally displaced.Thisdistinguishesitfromother sends foodtothoseinthenorththatwarhas pensions andwelfareallowancestothepoor, GoSL continuestopayitscivilservants,gives towards thewar-affectedpopulations.Indeed, territory andanacceptanceofitsobligations GoSL thissignalscontinuedcontroloverits as themostseniorauthorityindistrict.For line ministrystaffandaGovernmentAgent(GA) includes afunctioningdistrict-levelpresenceof called ‘uncleared’orLTTE-controlled areas.This maintained askeletonadministrationintheso- Government ofSriLanka(GoSL)hasconstantly An unusualfeatureofthisconflictisthatthe Territorial presence government repression. issue, andthatallgroupshaveexperienced in SriLankaislessanethnicthanagovernance thatviolence makers inSriLanka,itcouldbeargued such viewisnotwidelyheldbyprominentopinion- the pluralityofSriLanka’s democracy. Eventhough government havehowever, raisedquestionsabout with aloofandélitistattitudesofthosein divides alltothelastvillagecommunity, combined political parties,anintensepatronagethat The ‘allornothing’rivalrybetweenitstwomain itself onhavingcontinueddemocraticelections. the Sinhalesebodypolitic.AndyetSriLankaprides Muslims, withintheTamil bodypoliticandwithin between Tamils andSinhalese,betweenTamils and Sri Lankaisrivenbymultipleinterrelatedconflicts: condemned forviolatinghumanrights. tactics, thegovernmentwasinternationally the Sinhaleseyouth.AlthoughJVPusedterrorist used anti-Tamil andanti-Indianrhetorictomobilise Vimukthi Peramuna(JVP)thatledtheuprising,also (Government ofSriLanka1990),theJanatha erosion ofdemocracyandstateaccountability and modernidentityinSriLanka,aperceived aspirations, unresolvedtensionsbetweentraditional was essentiallyrootedinfrustratedemployment having occurredin1971.Althoughthisinsurgency insurgency insouthandcentralSriLanka,thefirst bloodily suppressedasecondarmedyouth IPKF wasfightingtheLTTE, thegovernmenthad Meanwhile, between1987and1990,whilethe dominated north. difficult andcontentious,than overtheTamil- political settlementovertheeastwillbemore the excellentdeep-waterportofTrincomalee. A land forSinhalesesettlersfromthesouthandhas in theeast.Theeastoffersmuch-neededirrigated balance betweenMuslims,Tamils andSinhalese manipulation, thereisnowaroughdemographic population there.Asaresultofpastpolitical question thatdirectlyaffects thesubstantialMuslim districts ofTrincomalee, BatticaloaandAmpara,a issueremainsthefutureofeastern most difficult give theTamils substantialautonomy. Today, the Sinhalese bodypolitictoanagreementthatwould there wasalsosignificantoppositionwithinthe political settlementoftheconflict.Unfortunately not theTamils butLTTE astheonlyobstacletoa it hadbeenforcedtowagewarandwasfighting then claimedthemoralhighgrounddeclaringthat 1995 theLTTE startedEelamWar 3.TheGoSL LTTE refusedinternationalmediation.InApril rapidly brokedownafterwhichbothGoSLand sponsored teamofconsultants.Butthepeacetalks (ERRP 2),studiedandcostedbyaWorld Bank- rehabilitation andreconstructionprogramme Tamil-inhabited areasandamajornational offer substantialautonomytothepredominantly the preparationofapoliticalpackagethatwould initiated atriplestrategyforpeace:talkswithLTTE, for itspromisetomakepeace.Indeed,PA quickly felt thatthePeople’s Alliance(PA) hadbeenelected against Tamils andSinhalesealike.Itwaswidely had beenresponsibleforsignificantstaterepression government thathadheldpowerfor17years,and National electionsinmid-1994toppledtheUNP A war tomake peace as awaytoprotect themselvesfromGoSL abuse. is insufficientandtheysee internationalattention know thathumanitarianassistance fromtheGoSL fighting theLTTE andnottheTamils. Theydo They donotnecessarilyperceive theGoSLtobe among theTamil populationinthenorthand east. Eelam War 3hascreatedmuchhumanitarianneed Sinhalese nationalists.Meanwhiletheintensityof grievances withoutlosingthesupportof substantive concessionstoplacategenuineTamil the governmentisreallypreparedtomake the GoSL.Thereremainsaquestionsoverwhether stands condemnedwithgeneralsupportmovingto of theinternationalcommunity. TheLTTE now Eelam War 3,haveledtoamajorshiftintheattitude steps tomakepeace,andthattheLTTE initiated The factsthatthePA governmenttookconcrete The internationalattitude Challenges for coordinated Needs assessment and the adequacy of the ○○○○○○○○○○○ humanitarian action response The first practical challenge in organising a Displacement, drought, repatriation and coherent emergency response is to determine resettlement roughly how many people are involved. The GoSL During the peace talks (September 1994–April officially put the figure of the newly displaced at

1995) GoSL and UNHCR had re-started the 100,000 while the estimate of Government Agent ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ repatriation of Sri Lankan refugees from India. The (GA) in Jaffna and the agencies was 400,000. In GoSL had also initiated a voluntary resettlement practice the GoSL used a figure of over 300,000 to programme for internally displaced people (IDP), calculate food rations and the problem of the with stated entitlements and guidelines, and a pilot number of affected people would not arise until scheme in the east. Eelam War 3 interrupted both later.¹ programmes. Food security remained a major concern because The army offensive in the autumn of 1995 led to of the restrictions on its trade and production, Jaffna being returned to GoSL control, but not caused primarily by an economic embargo on the before virtually all the inhabitants had fled the city, north but aggravated by drought. The war and joining the tens of thousands of IDPs from earlier displacement from Jaffna made health a major phases of the war. Some 150,000 went to the eastern concern. The Jaffna Teaching Hospital which had part of the Jaffna peninsula, only to be returned been the major referral centre for health no longer home when that too came under GoSL control in functioned. There was a great need for surgical the spring of 1996. Another 250,000 crossed the capacity, curative care and public health. Although Jaffna lagoon into the Vanni. The Vanni is the mixed the majority of displaced were taken in by local THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION: jungle and agricultural region between the lagoon residents or found refuge in ‘welfare centres’, often and Vavuniya town. The bulk initially settled schools, temples and public buildings, there were around Kilinochchi, the major urban centre in the immediate shelter needs. In the medium term, Vanni, but would become displaced again, together people would have to be relocated from the welfare with Vanni residents, by subsequent fighting there. centres and from overcrowded residences. Although the drought reduced the risk of In the east LTTE regained control of much of the communicable diseases and the incidence of hinterland and resettled villagers found themselves malaria, as well as extra pressure for shelter against back in an ‘uncleared’ area. There is no clear the rains, it did increase concerns over food frontline as in the north, and civilians in many production and access to sufficient quantities of safe places have to cross the ‘lines’ on a daily basis. drinking-water. Many have more limited access to food and basic services than in the north, and the Tamils are less In these key areas, the needs and the impact of the likely to get financial support from relatives abroad humanitarian response had to be monitored over than their counterparts from urban Jaffna. In the time. As no agency covered all districts and sectors, east, both LTTE and notably the police are less interagency collaboration in assessment, disciplined, and there is a gruesome history of monitoring and evaluation was required. massacres and disappearances. The army often disregards the official policy on voluntary Protection resettlement and has prevented resettled villagers Protection is an explicit aspect of the mandate of from fleeing again to safer urban areas. Sinhalese some operational organisations, notably the ICRC villagers also tend to get more generous relief and and UNHCR. Others feel they have a ‘witnessing’ resettlement assistance from the authorities than role. The situation in Sri Lanka raised many the case of Sri Lanka Tamils and Muslims. The north and east constitute protection issues. In the past both warring parties the ‘dry zone’ in Sri Lanka and the whole situation had massacred civilians, and fierce arguments have was aggravated by a country-wide severe drought arisen between agencies and the GoSL over reports in 1995-1996. The category of IDPs became of new such instances. Civilians being used — by complemented with one of residents who were either side — as shields behind which to travel, ‘drought-affected’. hide or carry out attacks is an unacceptable tactic. Medical facilities came under fire from both the army and LTTE, who each justified such action with 9 the argument that enemy casualties were being

9

10 ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION: the case of Sri Lanka ○○○○○○○○○○○○ to planning,aslowdisbursement offundsand thesemostlystemfromatop-down approach occur, logistical infrastructuregood. Whereproblems compared toothercountries, iseasyandthe years ofexperience.The terraininSriLanka, Ministry ofReconstructionandRehabilitationwith affected bywarornaturaldisaster. Therewasa policies andguidelinesforthepoorpeople as aneffectivesystemofregistration.Therewere place inmostoftheconflict-affectedareas,aswell weakened butstillfunctioningadministrationin to providehumanitarianassistance.Therewasa The GoSLitselfhadsignificantpotentialcapacity Government capacity response capacityforThe humanitarian or wouldoughttoplay. position andconsiderwhatpossibleroletheycould governments. ButNGOsalsohadtodefinetheir UN, andbytherepresentativesofmajordonor The requestwassharedanddiscussedwithinthe for immediatereliefandrehabilitationinJaffna. community amulti-milliondollarfundingproposal The GoSLthenpresentedtotheinternational under GoSLcontrol,theTask Forcewasrevived. peninsula, andover200,000Tamils againcame 1996, whenthearmyhadtakenwholeJaffna suspended whenEelamWar 3brokeout.InApril governmental, NorthernTask Forcewhichwas January 1995theGoSLsetupitsown,exclusively providers toparticipantsinreconstruction.In and considerthechangeofrolefromrelief themselves yetreadytothinkonsuchagrandscale two meetingswithconsultantsbutwerenot consulted intheprocess.Theydidmanagetoobtain important implementingpartners,werenot UN, NGOs,althoughportrayedintheplanas zones.Unlikethe reconstruction ofthewar-affected plan forthelarge-scale rehabilitationand World Banksponsored consultantspreparedadraft During thepeacetalksinlate1994,agroupof Rehabilitation andreconstruction to them. regarding humanrightsabuse,andhowtorespond Agencies hadtodecidewhatpositiontake Children FundallianceandUNICEF. is atthecoreofmandatesSave of theConventionRightsChild,which killings. LTTE useschildsoldiersincontravention and abusedprisonerscarriedoutextrajudicial treated inthem.Bothsideshistoricallyhavetortured north. also refusednewINGOsarrivingtoworkinthe presence. With anexplicitreferenceto Rwanda,it the GoSLmadeitcleardidnotwantalargerUN At thetimeofexodusJaffnapopulation, people fromallethnicgroups. channel humanitarianassistancetoconflict-affected internationally affiliated churchorganisations also haveprogrammesinthesouth.Afew escalation oftheethnicconflict,andmanywhich of whichwereworkinginSriLankabeforethe (INGO) operationalinthenorthandeast,several approximately eightmajorinternationalNGOs assistance inthenorthandeast.Thereare a veryimportantroleinbothprotectionandrelief during theyouthinsurgencyinsouth,andplays since 1993.TheICRCwasinvitedinbytheGoSL country postof‘AdviseronHumanitarianAffairs’ activities. To dothisUNDPhasfundedanin- resident representativeincludedhumanitarian emergency phase.StillthebriefofUNDP reconstruction programme,butnotinthe play aleadroleinrehabilitationand As inothercountries,UNDPwouldbelikelyto marginal totheUN’s efforts intheconflictzone. was anawkwardone—beingbothcentraland north. ThepositionofUNDPontheotherhand through theGoSL.Ithadnofieldpresencein UNICEF wastoworkinconflictareaswithand had absorbedrepatriatedrefugees.Theroleof UNHCR’, andalsoprovidedrelieftoareasthat The agencyconsideredIDPsas‘ofconcerntothe thousands ofrefugees,mostlyfromsouthernIndia. Lanka islinkedtotheneedrepatriatetensof government authorities.UNHCR’s presenceinSri NGO partners,andtoalesserdegreewithlocal has beentheleadagency, mostlyworkingwith For theUN,UNHCRinpracticaloperationalterms International agencycapacity organisations (CBO)thatprovided reliefand organisations organisations, anda rich arrayofcommunity-based Buddhist andsomeHindu andMuslimcharitable In war-timeSriLankathere werealsomany National non-governmental capacity macro-economic support. humanitarian assistance,andindirectlythrough aid, directlyfordevelopmentprojectsand Sri Lankacangenerallycountonsignificantforeign one million,thetreasuryisseverelyburdened,but the numberofIDPsfluctuatingbetweenhalfand bureaucratic attitudesthatinhibitconsultation.With welfare assistance. Some of these, with increased would, without warning, add restrictions on other ○○○○○○○○○○○ foreign funding from INGOs, the UN or even items such as bicycles and their spare parts, tinned bilaterally through the Ministry of Reconstruction food and boxes of matche, all of which could and Rehabilitation, have grown into intermediary presumably be used by LTTE guerrillas. NGOs. Most of these cover small geographical Periodically, cash carried by agencies to pay salaries areas and have varied but generally limited and make local purchases would also be limited. expertise and capacity. Some, not all, tend to be Humanitarian agencies could carry restricted items ethnically oriented. after obtaining a permit which required ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ endorsement by the MoD, but even then, the local It is quite possible that the Tamil Relief military command at Vavuniya and Trincomalee Organisation (TRO) has the largest operational could impose their own more arbitrary restrictions capacity in the north. It denies affiliation to LTTE on every possible relief item; towels, clothes, and claims to be an independent NGO. Others see buckets, hurricane lanterns, plastic sheeting, most it as the relief and rehabilitation wing of LTTE. medical drugs and even soap and Oral Rehydration Whatever its status, there is little doubt that LTTE, Salt. Although not officially restricted, there would as with other national organisations in the territory always be bureaucratic or logistical problems as it controls, has a major say in the policies, to why such items could not be allowed entry or at programmes and resources of TRO. least only in minimal quantities (Van Brabant 1996). No less problematic was the fact that drought-relief Host population measures were initiated all over the country except As in other countries, significant but hidden relief in the north, where no permit was ever granted for is being provided to the many IDPs by resident host spare parts to repair the many damaged pumps and drilling rigs.

populations. The majority of IDPs — Sinhalese, THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION: Tamil or Muslim — are not in camps, but have been There was an arbitrary measure that white plastic accommodated and supported by family, friends or sheeting could be distributed to the IDPs on the sympathetic local people. Host populations have Jaffna peninsula but not in the Vanni, although the in turn been affected by the drought and moving bulkier and harder to distribute cadjan (woven palm battlelines. leaves used to construct simple huts) was allowed. Notwithstanding this significant overall capacity In the east the embargo was more unofficial without that, if well coordinated, could have been applied being less arbitrary. As the army withdrew its effectively, the condition of civilians in the Vanni outlying camps, many villages found themselves and in the east gradually deteriorated. A major again in ‘uncleared’ territory. Those who had reason for this has been the tight control and resettled were entitled to food rations, available restriction of humanitarian space. from the government controlled centres, but found that they could only take small quantities at a time, Humanitarian space forcing people to travel back and forth continuously. The economic and the military embargo Controlling humanitarian assistance to the north was easy in practical terms. There were only two From the time when LTTE gained control of most possible routes of entry where the lines had to be of the north in the early 1990s, an economic crossed. There was the landroute to the Vanni, with embargo was declared. Some items, with obvious check-points in place at Vavuniya, and a sea route security implications, were banned. These include, to the Jaffna peninsula, with checks at the port of for example, binoculars, barbed wire, small Trincomalee. Agencies would not use military

batteries (used for detonators), petrol or diesel fuel the case of Sri Lanka planes or Navy ships to go to Jaffna, nor the private and urea-based fertiliser (urea can be used to make vessels chartered by the GoSL. The ICRC operated explosives). Other items such as paraffin and its own ship between Trincomalee and the cement (used to build bunkers) were allowed only peninsula, thereby offering ‘neutral’ transport. in controlled quantities. In the summer of 1995 the restrictions on urea-based fertiliser were extended Perceived impartiality to other ‘straight’ fertilisers, even though it is not actually feasible to make explosives with them. The international humanitarian agencies made several joint representations to the GoSL to point Although an official list of banned and restricted out the unmet needs of the population in the north, 11 items would be ‘gazetted’, the Ministry of Defence

11 ○○○○○○○○○○○ and to argue particular measures for health, water, assistance role as complementary to GoSL capacity shelter and food security. Arguing humanitarian as they had a stronger presence and programme in concerns, and easier access for assistance, was LTTE-controlled areas, madking them more likely always a politically sensitive affair. The GoSL and to witness, and speak out about, large-scale civilian the military remained concerned that the aim of death caused by the government forces, than about LTTE was to politically exploit the humanitarian the massacres of civilians carried out by LTTE. argument. There were also quite some doubts about They also had no access problems in government- ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ the impartiality of the international agencies, controlled areas. Although there were occasional ranging from the belief that they were politically signals from LTTE command that it might exercise naïve and unaware of how LTTE manipulated their a greater control over their work, as it did over local presence and assistanceto the suspicion that, out of NGOs, this did not occur, so the agencies did not solidarity with the Tamil ‘underdog’, some staff experience much restriction of the humanitarian might consciously support LTTE. NGOs space from LTTE. It was structurally difficult to particularly were the object of suspicion, something appear impartial and balanced because of the that has to be seen in the light of years of situation on the ground. international condemnation of the (previous) GoSL over human rights, election violence and state It was obvious that control over the Tamil civilians repression. in the north was an important aspect of the political and military strategies of both parties to the conflict. The perception was fueled by the fact that the The humanitarian agencies had to balance humanitarian agencies had to argue more over the considerations of need against the risk of playing situation in LTTE-controlled areas than the one in into these strategies. GoSL-controlled areas — many saw their material the case of Sri Lanka THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION: OF HUMANITARIAN THE COORDINATION

12 3 ○○○○○○○○○○○ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ Mechanisms for Coordination

Mechanisms for coordination at the Information Unit, managed by the UN or by an outbreak of the war interagency committee including the GoSL was THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION: floated, but the project never got off the ground. The Government For its part, UNHCR developed close programming he Ministry of Rehabilitation and relationships with a number of NGOs, as Reconstruction appeared the natural intermediaries or final implementers of its various T locus for coordination. Within it was rounds of quick-impact projects that had started in located the office of the Commissioner General for late 1993 to assist communities to which repatriated Essential Services (CGES) who would organise the refugees had returned. Programming and review GoSL assistance to the LTTE-controlled north, meetingw were organised with its partners. notably food rations, paraffin and medicine. However because most agencies were directly The NGO Consortium operational or worked through line ministries and local NGOs, the humanitarian and rehabilitation The NGO Consortium on Relief and Rehabilitation activities of the GoSL, the UN (except UNICEF) constituted the largest forum, originating in 1985 and the NGOs would operate parallel, without a with informal meetings between NGOs. On the single attempt to work according to an agreed escalation of war in 1987 these meetings became overall plan. formalised as the NGO Consortium. Representatives from GoSL, the UN, and the Red The UN Cross were routinely invited to the monthly meetings, the agenda included district updates, The UNDP hosted an ‘NGO-Donor Forum’ every information exchange of activities planned or in month to bring together representatives from the progress, and any issues arising. A ‘coordinator’ the case of Sri Lanka donors, the UN, the Red Cross, INGOs and the post existed between 1987–1993 which was then GoSL to discuss development issues and to provide replaced by a half-time post of ‘secretary’ and an updates on the humanitarian situation. Between Advisory Committee of seven member NGOs. 1990 and 1994 it had been the forum where NGOs had articulated their concerns over what was A review of the first decade of the consortium perceived as an intimidating style of the Presidential revealed a profound discrepancy between its stated Commission of Inquiry in Respect of Non- objectives and the minimalist practice of Governmental Organisations (Van Brabant 1995). coordination that the members allowed. The In 1994 the idea of setting up an NGO project objectives included: assessments of relief and database within UNDP, as the core of a potential rehabilitation needs; sharing of technical resources

13

14 ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION: the case of Sri Lanka ○○○○○○○○○○○○ zone. Theagendaandoutcomes ofthemeetings had noprogrammesorpresence inthewar-affected agencies suchasWFP, FAO andWHO who then Force meetings,chairedby UNDP. Theseincluded 1995 theUNinitiateditsinternal EmergencyTask preparedness.InOctober reviewed theiremergency on theJaffna peninsula,internationalagencies When inthesummerof1995warintensified A UNinitiative Strengthening coordination agencies, forgovernmentandvisitors. as anidentifiableandeffectivefocalpointforother cost lowbutalsotheprofile.Itthuscouldnotact meeting placeamongmembers,notonlykeptthe the letterheadofamemberagencyandrotating secretary intheofficeofamemberagency, using a meetingandsendpapersaround.Locatingthe time secretarywasjustenoughcapacitytoprepare longer termvisionorsenseofdirection.Ahalf- mechanism ofgovernanceanddidnotproducea Advisory Committeewasnotaneffective nobody wasrequiredtogiveupanyautonomy. The therefore remainedalooseassociationinwhich the cloutandcapacitytobecomemoreeffective.It independence, hadrefusedtogiveittheformality, the members,presumablyfearinglossof highlighted itsstructuralweaknesses,buteachtime choice. Reviewsin1989andagain1991had with itsperformance,hadbeenthemembers’own This ineffectiveness,andtheresultingdiscontent war-affected areas. scale rehabilitationandreconstructionplanforthe such asthequestionofNGOlegislationoralarge- it usedastheforumforevencriticalchallenges around policyandprogrammeissues.Neitherwas The consortiumfailedtostimulatecriticaldebate There wasnodatabaseofwhoworkingwhere. details ofbudgets,staffingorprojects. agency directorygaveageneralprofilebutwithout consortium withnolinkorfeedbacktoit.The schemes, occuredinnetworksoutsidethe Thematic exchange,suchasonsavingsandcredit the initiativeofaninterestedmemberagency. in healthoragriculture,woulddependentirelyon unmet needs.Sectoralcoordination,forexample, reporting agency’s activitiesratherthanfocuson would varyinqualityandsometimeslistedthe unimaginative monthlymeetings.Districtupdates In practicetheconsortiumdidlittlemorethanhold and collectiveliaisonwithgovernmentagencies. and expertise;strengtheningoflocalorganisations with the‘FocalPoint’,iteventually transpiredthat months, agenciesmetindividually andcollectively agencies inparticular. Althoughoverthefollowing between GoSLandtheinternational humanitarian improvement incommunication andinteraction raised thatthiswouldheraldamuch-needed relief fortheLTTE-controlled north.Hopeswere to serveasinterlocutoronmatterspertaining the appointmentofacivilservantas‘FocalPoint’, One immediateresultofthisclashwiththeUNwas The Government crisis. leaving GoSLtomaintaintheleadinmanaging effectively definedtheconflictasaninternalaffair, UN presence,letalonedirectintervention.It but alsomadeitclearthatdidnotwantalarger and capacitytoprovidehumanitarianassistance, Affairs. itscommitment Thegovernmentreaffirmed caused asharpreplyfromtheMinisterofForeign for areliefoperationonanappropriatescale.This for apotentialhumanitariancrisis,andtheneed Secretary-General publiclyexpressedhisconcern population wasfleeingJaffna city, theUN the seminar. Whenitbecame clearthatthe A publicclashwiththeUNoccuredshortlyafter peninsula. death ofschoolchildreninanairraidontheJaffna of anMSF-Francepressrelease,condemnedthe when thedirectorofUNESCOinParis,onbasis the north.TheGoSLhadalsoformallycomplained by theagencyasapreconditionfortheirworkin the MoDrefusedpermissionforradiosseen back twomedicaldoctors,UNVolunteers, when between theGoSLandUN.UNDPhadtosend Friction hadalreadybeengrowinginrelations the GoSL. sharing ‘forum’.Butthisalsowasunacceptableto of ataskforcewasmodifiedtoaninformation- outsiders intothedecision-makingprocess,idea it becameclearthattheGoSLwasreluctanttoinvite agencies, theRedCross,NGOsanddonors.When representatives fromgovernment,otherUN representative, itbroughttogethersenior of EssentialServicesandtheactingUNDP Presided overbyboththeCommissionerGeneral the managementofhumanitariansituation. hoped wouldresultinamultilateraltaskforcefor organised aoneandhalfdayseminarthatitwas experienced UNHCRemergencyofficer, theUN That samemonth,followingafieldvisitofan were notsharedhowever, atleastnotwithNGOs. the role carried with it no effective authority. It was humanitarian concerns, though not to the point of ○○○○○○○○○○○ simply to try and ‘facilitate’ solutions to the many creating a mass emergency, which would have practical problems that the agencies experienced, generated more international pressure. The MoD with no return flow of information on the GoSL’s assumed overriding authority over any matters plans and activities, let alone any joint planning. pertaining to the war zone. Staff of the MoD and the Joint Operational Command did not attend In April 1996, when the whole Jaffna peninsula had interagency meetings or meetings with the Focal come under army control, the GoSL revived the Points and were, like the office of the Secretary of ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ Resettlement and Reconstruction Authority for the Defense, barely contactable. There were thus no North (RRAN), the successor of an interministerial possibilities for information exchange and Presidential Task Force North that had first been confidence-building. created in January 1995, at the time of peace talks and when a national reconstruction programme was The NGO Consortium on Relief and being prepared. As with its predecessor, it was not Rehabilitation clear who participated in RRAN, what its precise role and procedures were and on the basis of what During the first 18 months of war, for external and information it made decisions. Remarkably the internal reasons, the NGO Consortium did not offer international agencies were informed that the an effective mechanism for coordination. A major authority of the Ministry of Reconstruction and external reason was the climate of intimidation and Rehabilitation over the north was withdrawn, and suspicion that quickly arose. Noone remained restricted to the war-affected areas of the centre unaffected by the renewed outbreak of war and and east. Confusingly, a second Focal Point was inevitably the unease between most Sinhalese and now appointed, to serve as the interlocutor for the Tamils, heightened including amongst those areas of the north newly brought under government involved in relief work. A vicious press campaign THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION: control. Once again, what real authority this post in November 1995 alleged that humanitarian entailed was unclear, and the appointment did not agencies were intentionally or unintentionally open a channel for effective dialogue and supporting LTTE. At one point a crowd mobilised communication, let alone coordination, between by local radio against an NGO meeting, turned international agencies and the GoSL. aggressive. Church-affiliated organisations providing relief were intimidated when two priests The absence of effective communication and were arrested and accused of smuggling banned coordination with central government, was in items to the north. The smear campaign effectively contrast to the situation on the ground, at least in intimidated agencies who then became secretive. the northern districts where GAs and line ministry The fact that some statements made at a consortium staff faced the problems generated by sudden and meeting were leaked to and distorted in the press, large-scale displacement compounded by drought. raised great concerns over their confidentiality. In Close cooperation ensued between the humanitarian any case, Government officials stopped attending agencies within the framework of district relief consortium meetings. committees. In December 1995 it appeared that the GA in Vavuniya, in whose district lay the ‘crossline’ Internally, the consortium had not built up a land route into the Vanni, would become that area’s tradition of proactive coordination. This would not coordinator. materialise overnight, so a review process was set in motion which coincided with the first year and a Combining this role as logistical hub with one of half of the war. information centre proved difficult in practice. Notwithstanding support from the international Objectives To enhance the quality, effectiveness, agencies, the lack of skill and discipline in the flow professionalism and transparency of the work of the case of Sri Lanka of information between the many players in its members became the aim of the new consortium. Colombo, and the GA and agency offices in the It formulated three objectives: Vanni, led to often incomplete, confused or • to render services of interest to its members; unverified information, making coordination impossible. • to provide a forum for different stakeholders in That there was no effective coordination with the humanitarian response to meet and government was due to the fact that military and encourage its members to develop a common political objectives were allowed to override position and take collective initiatives; 15

15

16 ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION: the case of Sri Lanka ○○○○○○○○○○○○ face ofpublicdoubtsandcriticisms. more effectivelytoargue theirroleandplaceinthe would havehelpedagenciespositionthemselves the conflict.Betterknowledgeofthesetwoissues Lankan analystsonthecausesandpoliticsof or oftheavailabilitydocumentationbySri intercommunal dialogueandreconciliationefforts, There appearedlittleawarenessoflocal-level psycho-social orgenderdimensionsofconflict. devoted tolocalcapacities,livelihoodsofthe aspects ofrelief.Littlefocusedattentionhadbeen to bedominatedbythetechnicalandlogistical also ontheconflict.Previousdiscussionstended and constraintsofthoseagenciesworkinginbut provide aforumtoexploretheroles,opportunities Another newproposalwasfortheconsortiumto the differentconflictsinSriLanka. partiality andrevealinganinadequateanalysisof north, makingitvulnerabletoaccusationsof Previously itsmembershadbeenfocusedonthe consortium wasconfirmedasisland-wide. Importantly thegeographicalscopeof important objective,wasthelast. Clearly themostdemanding,butalso • new ConsortiumonHumanitarian Aideffectivelystartedworkintheautumn of1996. individuals fromagencies withdemonstratedinterest,theoldconsortiumwas disbanded.The for thecreationofanew consortium hadbeendetailed,andanInterimCommittee createdof Committee hadsubstantiallytakenovertheroleof the Advisory Committee. After aworkplan funding andmembershipcouldonlybereturned toinmid-1996.ByJuly1996theReview 1996 (ReviewCommittee1996).Thewarslowed theprocessconsiderablyandquestionsof The firstdraftproposalwasreadyinSeptember 1995, withasecondfollowinginJanuary firmer guidancewhilemaintainingtransparencyand accountability.² structure ofgovernancewasproposed,withanelected SteeringCommitteethatwouldoffer priorities. Questionsofcapacityandfundingwere framedbystatedobjectives.Finally, a statement ofaims,objectivesandpotentialactivities, andwasaccompaniedbyrecommended Then avisionforSriLankaandtheNGOsector wasarticulated.Thisfollowedbya situation inSriLankaandtheNGOsectorrelationshipsofNGOswithotherplayers. foreigners, wereselectedonthebasisofcommitmentandexperience.Theyanalysed reference wereapprovedbyconsortiummembers.Themembers,fourSriLankansandthree the majorissuesandsensitivities.On7MayaReviewCommitteewascreated,whosetermsof Advisory Committeethenorganised someexploratoryreflectionsthathighlighted 1995. The approach. Theeffectivenessoftheconsortiumhadbeenquestionedbymembersinearly A reviewtookplaceinaconsultativeandaccountablemannerstrategicplanning learning andskilldevelopment. initiatives, proactivecoordination,collective to promoteandfacilitatejointstrategic The ReviewProcessoftheNGOConsortium had tobedevelopedwithhumanrights it wasfeltthatrelationshipsoftrustandcooperation would appeartohavecomefromthem.Although particularly iftheinformationaboutviolations a fieldpresencewaryaboutbacklashagainstthem, of conduct.Thismakesoperationalagencieswith do notformacohesivegroupwithanagreedcode human rightsorganisationsinSriLanka,however, denunciations byhumanrightsorganisations.The have beenverysensitiveoverstatementsand could befullmembers?BoththeGoSLandLTTE raised whetherpurehumanrightsorganisations are withyoubutnotofyou’.Thequestionwasalso they mightbettermaintainaseparateidentity:‘we NGO legislationremainedathreat,andtheyfelt formal NGOconsortium.New, morecontrolling were uneasyaboutbecomingfullmembersofa Interestingly, somechurch-affiliated organisations against greaterqualityandeffectiveness. smaller membershipwouldhavetobebalanced individuals whoshowednoactivecommitment.A and thepossibilityofrevokingmembershipfrom screened, statedrightsandobligationsformembers Association, formalmembershipapplicationstobe organisation wasproposed,withArticlesof action. Thereforeaclearertypeofmembership inclusive membershiphadyieldedlittleeffective about membership.Thepreviouspolicyofopenand Membership Thereviewraisedimportantquestions organisations, it was decided that only operational framework for continued assessment and ○○○○○○○○○○○ agencies should become members of the programme planning, UNHCR and the ICRC then consortium. participated in these. The GoSL’s restriction on the number of international agencies also helped, as Capacity To be effective the consortium needed a well as, ironically, the restrictions on access and small secretariat. To fund it, and avoid any relief goods. The exchange and pooling of material continuation of a largely passive membership, the and technical resources is more spontaneous when principle of a membership contribution had to be such goods are scarce. ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ honoured. It was proposed to raise the token membership fee. Reference criteria for a new fee The Interagency Emergency Group could be the level of the annual salary of an unskilled worker in an NGO office, or 1 per cent of With the intensification of the war in the autumn an agency’s annual budget, which seemed a of 1995, eight larger operational NGOs began to reasonable price for information and coordination have their own regular meetings. This coalition benefits. For those with the willingness but not the derived spontaneously from the common ability to pay, contributions in kind could be experience of bureaucratic obstacles, and from the considered. realisation, after the clash between the GoSL and the UN, that as international agencies they had a NGO coordination at district level somewhat different ‘political’ position than Sri Lankan agencies. Sri Lankan agencies had also been In several districts of the north and east, NGOs had reluctant to join in collective advocacy and their own regular gatherings. Apart from the field representations to the GoSL, or to sign even office representatives of larger international or carefully worded press releases. The NGO national agencies, they were mostly made up of Consortium was not at the time an effective forum. THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION: local CBOs or intermediary NGOs. Their meetings Very quickly UNHCR, the ICRC and the other tended to be rather formalistic, and limited mostly major relief providers joined in. Later UNICEF and to information exchange, not unlike that of the NGO WFP occasionally attended meetings. UNHCR and Consortium in Colombo prior to the review. The the ICRC because of their specific international Jaffna grouping had been most comprehensive in legal status at times followed a different protocol its agenda, but the occasional high-handedness of in raising issues with the GoSL, so written the TRO had caused bad feeling. In Trincomalee, communications from the group would only be some reflection had started on the role and signed by the NGOs. Even so, the forum ensured a functioning of a coordinating body. At least until common understanding and continued common 1996 the communication between district-NGO objectives. consortia and the NGO Consortium in Colombo depended entirely on the field staff of larger In the spring of 1996 questions arose over the organisations. This in the medium term seemed an participation of donor representatives. It was felt inadequate mechanism. The reflections and that humanitarian concerns should remain clearly agreements in the capital did not always find their distinguished from a broader foreign policy agenda way to the field, while not all concerns raised at of donors and the GoSL, so preference was given field level — especially in places other than Jaffna to the Interagency Group making special and the Vanni — were followed up in Colombo. representations to the donor community. There were Ideally a direct communication and collaborative also questions raised about the participation of effort could be developed between coordinating advisers on humanitarian affairs of which there bodies in the capital and in the district. This would were two: one working for the Canadian require preliminary investment in a similar International Development Agency, and one the case of Sri Lanka collective reflection at district level, and probably working for the UN. While the adviser working for some support for institution building, as the donor agency adopted very much an observer’s international agencies had provided for district- role and kept most interventions to advice, the UN level NGO coordinating bodies in the south. adviser was sometimes made to act as spokesperson However, this could not be done in the middle of by the head of UNDP. an emergency. Given that UNDP had no operational activities in Some rather effective collaboration in the field did the conflict-affected areas, and that the GoSL had occur though, certainly in the north. The district shown clear irritation over too firm an advocacy 17 relief committees chaired by the GA provided a about humanitarian concerns by UNDP, several

17

18 ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION: the case of Sri Lanka ○○○○○○○○○○○○ for allconcerned. humanitarian coordinator, causedsignificantunease diplomatic representationoftheUNandactingas cautious. Thesestructuraltensionsbetween priorities andapproachhadbecomeexcessively operational agenciesfeltthatthehead’s agenda, been appropriate. To facilitateinput,information with acomputeriseddatabase didnotseemtohave In retrospecttheattemptto process thevariousdata used forjointoperational or advocacyinitiatives. issues andtrends.Suchan overview couldthenbe security, publichealthandlogisticsidentifykey developments, populationmovements,food postholder wouldmonitorpoliticalandmilitary Information Officer. Theoriginalideawasthatthe The InteragencyGroupfairlyquicklyappointedan perceived needs. IDPs andhostfamilies,togaininsightabouttheir also conductedsemi-structuredinterviewswith member agencies.ImportantlyoneortwoNGOs Group wasderivedfromthereportingof by andlargethepicturebuiltupinInteragency contents wassharedatdistrict-levelmeetings,but accessible tointernationalagencies.Someoftheir situation reportsbydistrict,thesewerenotnormally Assessment the InteragencyEmergencyGroup. serious attemptatcoordinationwasundertakenby implementation. Throughoutthewar, themost and guidelinescoordinatedplanning resource allocation,standardisationofprocedures were intheareasofneedsandcapacityassessment, The majorchallengesforoperationalcoordination The coordinationofhumanitarianaction Effective coordination? situation. an impartialpositioninahighlypoliticised mandate inordertocollectivelymaintain meaning andnatureofthehumanitarian advocacy initiatives;andtodiscussthe a forumtoinitiatecoherentlobbyingand and thediplomaticcommunity;toprovide analytical pictureofthesituationtoGoSL communicate acomprehensiveand displaced andthehostpopulationto Group weretomonitortheconditionof The objectivesoftheInteragencyEmergency The purposesoftheInteragency AlthoughtheGAsregularlyproduced Emergency Group Moreover, meetings thatithadinitiated inthespringof1994. year ofwar, itfailedtocall anyofthequarterly the appropriateauthority, butthroughoutthe first Logically, theMinistryofHealthshouldhave been coordination occuredcentrally inColombo. However, noeffective informationexchangeor response capacityofthehealthservicesinnorth. allowed themonitoringofhealthneedsand Ministry ofHealthandagencystaff participated, The districthealthcommittees,inwhichlocal picture wasonlyavailableforoneareaofoperation. collated bytheotheragenciesinvolved,adetailed firmer intervention.Assimilarinformationwasnot facilities andactivitiesarguingtheneedfora water levelsinwells,keepinganinventoryof agency involveddevelopedadossier,monitoring In thesectorofwaterandsanitation,onlyone was greaterinpartsoftheeastthannorth. food togivetheirchildren,andthatinsecurity becoming malnourishedduetosacrificingtheirown revealed thatmothersandtheelderlywere household foodsecuritysurveybyICRCthat not allowedaccesstothenorth.Itwaseventuallya concerned abouttheimpactofdrought,were model, nousewasmadeofthisdata.WFPandFAO, available but,withoutanadequatefoodsecurity about localfoodproductionandmarketpriceswas ration supplylinewasimpossible.Information political reasonsindependentmonitoringofthe persisted overfoodsecurity. Forpracticaland signs ofsignificantmalnutrition,graveconcern Although initialnutritionalsurveysdidnotshow transfers. agencies accordinglyavoidedinvolvementinfood formal responsibilityforrations,thehumanitarian AstheGoSLhadtaken used asa‘weaponofwar’. international pressstatementsthatfoodwasbeing and unsubstantiatedreportsoffoodshortages especially aftertheGoSLtookoffence overhasty Food securitywasapoliticallysensitiveissue, others not,thatwerenotproperlycollated. information onthesesectors,somequantifiedand water andhealth.Therewerevarioussourcesof vulnerabilities layintheareasoffoodsecurity, emergency householditems,whereasthegreatest wasspenttrackingthesupply of much effort attention oneasilyquantifiableactivities.Thus importantly, thedatabaseapproachfocused burden andwereunwillingtofillthemin.More Agency fieldstaffhoweversawtheseasanextra format, forwhichspecialformsweredesigned. was soughtfrommemberagenciesinastandard the de facto decisions over health supplies were taken by a Medical Committee in In light of the operational limitations experienced, ○○○○○○○○○○○ the MoD. This was closed and inaccessible to and of the significant local capacity, hindsight humanitarian agencies, and the rationale for its shows that more attention could have been paid to decisions was never reported. capacity building, especially for CBOs, intermediary NGOs and associations of IDPs, On the whole an adequate interagency monitoring however difficult in a context of continuing and information system proved difficult and slow displacement.

to develop. Through the verbal reports at the weekly ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ meetings, however, a reasonable and fairly Standardisation of guidelines and procedures In comprehensive picture could be maintained, albeit the absence of effective task force work, little not always substantiated with hard data. This systematic attention was paid to standardisation. contributed to the overall situation reports of the UNHCR and its implementing partners streamlined UN Adviser on Humanitarian Affairs. In this procedures for the submission of proposals for politically very charged context, a UN report still quick-impact projects. Agencies distributing carried more clout than one produced by NGOs, household items agreed on a package and whom the GoSL continued to keep at arms length. procedures. But different agencies continued to use different methodologies in nutritional surveys, or The biggest omission was the assessment of different policies for the applications to revolving capacity. Fortunately, the TRO and the skeleton loan funds that had been set up prior to the latest government administration in the north showed escalation of war. remarkable organisational talent, while the IDPs and host population in general had more assets than Joint planning and implementation Few involved was at first feared. After two years of war and in relief and rehabilitation expected the entire Jaffna displacement, those original assets had been largely population to flee. A quick response to such a large- THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION: depleted. scale crisis was seen as a higher priority than a planned response. Although there was some rapid Resource allocation In geographical terms, the consultation on who was planning to do what, agencies, followed the moving population agencies made their own decisions on what supplies concentrations, both pushed by the war in the north. to purchase. Some engaged in advance ‘flag The most glaring strategic weakness of the whole planting’, and then could not deliver. coordination effort, however, was the neglect of the east. Politically crucial, militarily more fuzzy and Proactive interagency planning mostly revolved insecure, and logistically more demanding, there around providing shelter. In line with MoD were pockets of much greater need, and more stipulations some agencies had imported white infringement and violation of people’s rights, than plastic sheeting that could not be used for in the north. camouflage. The agencies were very aware of GoSL concern that too much assistance would consolidate As far as sectoral allocation is concerned, the the displacement of the Jaffna population, who imbalances in the type of material assistance GoSL were anxious to see return. Coordination did provided cannot be blamed on the agencies, but take place around methodologies of targeting and result from the restrictive policies of GoSL and distribution that would leave IDPs themselves with MoD. Most agencies were unwilling to get involved maximum choice where they would reside. These in food ration provision, which GoSL had officially plans were disturbed by arbitrary restrictions on taken on as its responsibility. They were keen on the transport of plastic sheeting to the Vanni. stimulating local food production, but found their Detailed joint operational planning in the face of efforts hampered by restrictions on fertiliser, seed unpredictable restrictions on importing or and cement for the repair of irrigation canals. transporting relief items ceased being useful or the case of Sri Lanka Support in the sectors of health, water and shelter realistic. Because of constraints and shortages, there was inadequate due to the restrictions imposed. As was much pragmatic exchange and pooling of a result more effort went into the supply of resources once these had been taken across the lines. emergency household items than would normally have been the case. A major demand of the IDPs As far as the 1996 GoSL request for the funding of was for income opportunities, for which there was relief and rehabilitation in Jaffna is concerned, this limited expertise available among the agencies. was shared with the UN and donors but not with Some local initiatives were funded to provide much- NGOs, who were also excluded from the informal needed psycho-social counselling. discussions that the donors and UN held about 19 them.

19 ○○○○○○○○○○○ The coordination of humanitarian A painful test in this regard occurred in December diplomacy 1995, when it was accidentally discovered that a British medical relief agency planned to carry out The Interagency Group as a whole, or at least the an ‘assessment’ at Elephant Pass, a military camp NGO part of it, made a number of collective at the Jaffna lagoon, then still fully inside LTTE- approaches to GoSL, LTTE and donor controlled territory and only accessible by military representatives. Initially these tended to focus on plane. The agency was new to Sri Lanka and only ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ access for the humanitarian agencies (with GoSL) had a small project in the government-controlled and on their independence (with LTTE), but east. It had informed the other agencies about its increasingly the emphasis turned to the needs of hope to start a medical programme in the Vanni, the civilians. Several memorandums or short reports but not about the Elephant Pass. It did not were produced on topics like: the unmet needs in participate in the NGO Consortium meetings. The health, the impact of fertiliser on agricultural planned assessment raised grave concerns, not in production and the impact of drought and the least among the agency’s staff. Not only had displacement on access to safe drinking-water. LTTE shot down some military planes, but it was The NGOs were individually and collectively also felt that the agency, through such close unprepared to argue for humanitarian principles and association with the military, might expose itself humanitarian space. There was no clear concept of to LTTE retaliation if it intended to start work in what was considered basic rights of civilians in a the Vanni. It was also known that only one civilian war situation. They did not master international resided at Elephant Pass, which rather compromised humanitarian and human rights conventions, and the ‘humanitarian’ character of the assessment. were generally unaware of which ones the GoSL Finally, the existing agencies at the time felt had signed. They even failed to take the GoSL’s reluctant to move too hastily into areas in the north existing policies of entitlement for the poor, the that had returned to government control, as these drought-affected or IDPs and GoSL guidelines on held few civilians and were under tight military resettlement as reference. They were unaware, until administration. much later, of the Red Cross and NGO Code of The overwhelming need remained in LTTE- Conduct in disasters, on which they might have controlled areas, access to which was severely based an argument for their own role and restricted. One agency moving on its own into the humanitarian principles. army-controlled area might open the door to Nevertheless, the Interagency Group did provide a pressure on the others to follow suit and to shift forum for collective reflection on the ways in which their attention away from the civilians in LTTE- the case of Sri Lanka humanitarian efforts could be co-opted by parties controlled areas. It was hard to see in the planned to the conflict, and then entangled with political assessment more than a publicity and fundraising and military strategies. This contributed to a more exercise. In the end, the assessment did not take insightful and careful collective positioning, and place but whether that was due to the pressure prevented a situation in which agencies could be exercised by the other agencies remains uncertain. played off against each other. The episode underlined again the aggressive competitiveness of some NGOs. THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION: OF HUMANITARIAN THE COORDINATION

20 4 ○○○○○○○○○○○ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ Structural and Contextual Constraints on Coordination

Structural Constraints profile. Collaboration and coordination have a cost,

but so does competition, and when done effectively THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION: Resistance to coordination it can render the combined efforts of agencies considerably more cost-effective — although this he history of the NGO Consortium may not show in their individual accounts. highlights some of the usual agency Coordination in practice may fail due to substantive T objections to coordination. Agencies claim reasons, but most often it breaks down because of they have different mandates. Different agencies poor leadership. But resisting it a priori, on the may indeed focus on different target groups, for grounds of agency independence, negates the best example, refugees, prisoners, children or the interests of the target groups (and of the taxpayer) disabled, or on a specific sector such as health, food which, in turn, contravenes the agency’s proclaimed or logistics. But it is obvious that neither population humanitarian ethos and principles. categories nor sectoral assistance can be looked at in isolation from each other. The work of different Seeking to collaborate and coordinate is not specialised agencies is inherently complementary generally an explicit agency policy. It should be which supports the case for coordination. Moreover, made so and written into the job description of every all share a similar underlying humanitarian country-level representative. In many cases mandate: to save lives and to reduce suffering, and appropriate decision-making should be delegated, where possible to protect and restore livelihoods but the decision whether to try and collaborate and and local capacity. Another objection is that coordinate should not be left to the discretion of agencies have different operating principles. That country representatives, as is current practice, often appears the case for the ICRC which therefore may at the mercy of personal likes and dislikes. adopt a separate approach (Doppler 1996). Other agencies, that may want to combine material Knowing about coordination assistance with protection and/or with conflict the case of Sri Lanka mediation roles, have generally not thought through Knowing how to foster coordination is not a the implications for operational conduct. What is professional skill that is commonly required of aid needed here are divisions of labour and learning workers, nor is the experience and model of from each other, again an argument for and not coordination part of organisational memory and against collaboration. professional training. Rather, making coordination happen is entirely dependent on the motivation and It should be admitted that the real reason why skills of individuals. These skills include diplomacy, agencies find it so difficult to coordinate is that they consultation, trust, chairing effective meetings, want to maintain their independence and individual maintaining a sense of direction with a continuously

21

22 ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION: the case of Sri Lanka ○○○○○○○○○○○○ play asmallerrolethanin coalitions, andthehead stress onindividualsisless. Peergroupdynamics When equippedwithcapacity oftheirown,the and assumeamoreinstitutionalised commitment. Formal associationshavea longer termperspective beyond theoneonlogistics. Group didnotdevelopothereffectivetaskforces of technicalexpertise,meantthattheInteragency agency. Lackoftime andleadership,sometimes addition tosomeone’s workloadataparticular can quicklybecomeanotherfull-timetaskin and witheverychangeofagencyhead.Allthis have tobereaffirmedateachandeverymeeting consuming activity. Trust, interestandcommitment is thatmaintainingcoalitionsaverytime- contextual allianceselsewhere.Anotherproblem should, breakupasmembersidentifymoreuseful immediate interest.Theythereforemay, andindeed Coalitions dependonacontinuingsenseofshared were simplyaddressedastheyarose. practical problemsoffundingandhumanresources and commitment.Ithadnoformalstructure perceptions oftrustworthiness,commoninterest of theconflict,andpartlyonmoresubjective the structuralpositionofanagencyinpolitics participants intheirmeetingsdependedpartlyon observers. Individualswhowereincludedbythe was noformaldistinctionbetweenmembersand basis andinresponsetoaspecificsituation.There of agenciesthatstartedmeetingonaself-selected at itsinceptionin1987,wasaninformalcoalition The InteragencyGroup,liketheNGOConsortium associations Situational coalitionsandformal receptacle forcollectivelearning. standardisation andcoordinationbutalsoa available, taskforcesbecomenotonlyaforumfor technical expertise.Wheresuchknowledgeis toformulatewherethereisinsufficientdifficult security models.Coordinatedapproachesare nutritional surveys,logisticsplanningorfood gender analysis,participatoryappraisalmethods, knowledge regardingperhapsrevolvingloanfunds, have anadequatetechnicalandmethodological coordination requiresatleastsomeparticipantsto sectoralandthematiccollaboration Effective Technical andmethodologicalknowledge strongly recommended. shared vision.Specifictrainingincoordinationis relevant agendaanddevelopingarticulatinga Timing Contextual Constraints phase ofwar, everyagency —nationaland political situationwithpeace proposalsandanew Lankan organisations.Inthe lightofthechanged humanitarian agenciesand hadsilencedmanySri particular spotlighton theinternational around humanitarianassistancewhichhadputa the tremendouslypoliticallychargedatmosphere group ofinternationalorganisations alsoreflected and priorities.Buttheconsolidationintoasmaller agencies tofocuscollectivelyontheirownconcerns operational to thepragmaticneedoflarge would recommend.Ontheonehandthiswasrelated that theReviewCommitteeofNGOConsortium Consortium andpractisingmanyoftheprinciples a restrictedInteragencyGroupparalleltoanNGO A remarkablefeatureofthiscaseisthecreation Politics of it. identified beforeanemergency andnotin thecentre the substanceandformatofcoordinationarebetter rehabilitation programmes.Thelessonhereisthat involved inlessstressfulandcontroversial have takenrootmorevigorouslyandpossiblybeen Committee oftheNGOConsortiumwouldalready and coordinationarticulatedbytheReview much later, thenthenewvisionforcollaboration Had EelamWar 3 notbrokenout,orhaditdoneso there toserve. interests thanthoseofthepeopletheiragencyis conservative votersmoreconcernedwiththeirown important decisionsblockedbyamajorityof views ofotherwiseuninterestedmembersorwith common denominator, wastingtimelisteningtothe greater theriskthattheyendupwithlowest membership. Themoreinclusivetheyare,the address theproblemofsizeandquality Both coalitionsandformalassociationsneedto agenda irrelevantandthediscussionsboring. coalitions buttheirmeetingsbecomesterile,the leadership. Theydonotcollapseasquickly formal associationscanalsosuffer frompoor history oftheNGOConsortiumalsodemonstrates, coalitions inissue-specifictaskforces.Asthe framework formalassociationscanaccommodate to theagendaforitsmeetings.Withintheir situationally dependent,itcanbringabroaderscope can actmoreauthoritativelywhenneeded.Less does nothavetoremainessentiallyafacilitatorbut international — had to review its analysis of the the final authority, but did not participate in the ○○○○○○○○○○○ situation and its role and position in relation to it. agency efforts, keeping the agencies outside their The operational constraints imposed by GoSL and own intra-governmental coordination mechanisms. MoD meant that operational coordination occured This effectively separated the provision of mostly at district level and that the Interagency humanitarian assistance by the GoSL from that of Group remained focused on the questions of other players. The latter then could assess, agree impartiality and humanitarian space. Opening itself and plan among themselves, but in the face of to new members was certainly conceivable but not unarticulated policies or arbitrary decisions, they ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ without first a mature dialogue about how any could never be sure of being able to implement their newcomer saw its role and position in the overall policies. politics of the conflict. The shape that coordination efforts take, and their No coordination without authority focus and effectiveness are not, as this case study shows, only influenced by the motivations and skills The single most important impediment to effective of the agencies and their representatives, but also humanitarian coordination was the fact that the by the political environment in which humanitarian GoSL, and more particularly the military, retained action takes place. THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION: the case of Sri Lanka

23

23

24 ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION: the case of Sri Lanka ○○○○○○○○○○○○ Gulf ofMannar Katunayake COLOMBO Negombo Talimannar Chilaw Ambalangoda Kankesanturai Beruwala Mannar Maps ofSriLanka Puttalam Jaffna Anuradhapura WESTERN NORTH Kurunegala WESTERN Galle Nawalapitiya NORTHERN Vavuniya NORTH CENTRAL Ratnapura Kilinochi Elephant Pass Mankulam Rambewa Habarane Matara Mihintale SOUTHERN CENTRAL Dambulla 0 miles 0 kms Eliya Nuwara Mullaittivu Polonnaruwa Badulla 550 25 UVA 50 Hambantota Welikanda Bibile Trincomalee EASTERN Maha-Oya Amparai 100 Valaichchenai INDIAN OCEAN Batticaloa 75 province main railways main roads main airports boundaries Pottuvil 150 100 ○○○○○○○○○○○ ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ Kankesanturai

Jaffna Elephant Pass

Mullaittivu Kilinochi

Talimannar Mankulam NORTHERN

Mannar THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION: Gulf of Mannar

Vavuniya

Trincomalee

Rambewa Anuradhapura Mihintale

NORTH

Displacement

FRONTLINE the case of Sri Lanka

Map showing the front line and principal displacement effects of the conflicts in Sri Lanka.

25

25

26 ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION: the case of Sri Lanka ○○○○○○○○○○○○ H World Health Organisation World Food Programme UnitedNational Party WHO United NationsHighCommissioner forRefugees United NationsDevelopmentProgramme WFP Tamil Relief/Rehabilitation Organisation UNP People’s ResettlementandReconstruction AuthorityfortheNorth Alliance UNHCR UNDP Non-governmentalorganisation TRO MinistryofDefence RRAN LiberationTigers ofTamil Eelam PA GovernmentofSriLanka GovernmentAgent NGO MoD FoodandAgricultureOrganisation LTTE IndianPeace-Keeping Force GoSL Internati Internallydisplacedperson GA FAO InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross IPKF Emergency ReliefandRehabilitationProgramme INGO DepartmentofHumanitarianAffairs IDP CommissionerGeneralforEssentialServices ICRC Communitybasedorganisation ERRP DHA CGES CBO 1975. individuals, bytheCommitteeforCoordinationofServicestoDisplacedPersonsinThailand,founded Cooperation CommitteeforCambodia,hadbeenpartiallyinspired,againthroughexperiencesof (Pakistan) withwhomoneoftheReviewCommitteemembershadbeeninvolved.Thisinturn,like 2. InspirationwasdrawnfromtheexperienceofAgencyCoordinatingBodyforAfghanRelief remain constant. more recentIDPs.Thecategoriesofpeopleinneed,andthescaleproblem,didnottherefore receiving supportfromhumanitarianagencies,deterioratedasattentionandresourcesshiftedtothe affected bydroughtanddisplacement.ThesituationofIDPsfromearlierphaseswar, whohadbeen Over time,however, theresidentpopulationsawitscapacitytosupportIDPsdecline,orbecomeitself in welfarecentresweretargeted.Theyconstitutedatmost15percentandcouldeasilybeidentified. the factthatmanynewIDPshadassetsandweresupportedbyresidentpopulation,meantthose not ofcentraloperationalimportanceatfirst.Althoughthetotalsupplyreliefgoodsremainedsmall, or otherwiseinterferedwiththewareffortofGoSL.Thequestionnumbersnewlydisplacedwas they werereducedtopreventgreaterinternationalinvolvementthatcouldhavebeenexploitedbyLTTE 1. Whereassometimesfiguresareexaggeratedtoattractmoreinternationalassistance,hereitappears Acronymns onal non-governmentalorganisation Endnotes References ○○○○○○○○○○○

Bennet, J. (1994a) NGO Coordination at Field Level. A handbook. INTRAC, Oxford.

Bennet, J. (1994b) Meeting Needs. NGO Coordination in Practice. Earthscan, London. ○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○○ Borton, J. (1996) An Account of Coordination Mechanisms for Humanitarian Assistance during the International Response to the 1994 Crisis in Rwanda. Sophia University, Institute of Comparative Culture, Tokyo. Dedring, J. (1996) Humanitarian Coordination. In J. Whitman and D. Pocock, D. (eds.) After Rwanda. The Coordination of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance. Macmillan, London: 35–50. Donini, A. (1996) The Policies of Mercy. UN Coordination in Afghanistan, Mozambique and Rwanda. Brown University, T. Watson Inst. for International Studies, Providence. Donini, A., E. Dudley and R. Ockwell (1996) Afghanistan. Coordination in a Failed State. DHA, Lessons Learned Unit, New York. Doppler, B. (1996) The ICRC in Complex Emergencies. An Outsider or Part of a Team? In J. Whitman and D. Pocock (eds.) After Rwanda. The Cooordination of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance. Macmillan, London:124–35. THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION: Government of Sri Lanka (1990) Report of the Presidential Commission on Youth. Colombo Karim, A. et al. (1996) Operation Lifeline Sudan. A Review. Birmingham, Univ. of Birmingham Lanzer, T. (1996) The UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs in Angola. A Model for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance? Queen Elizabeth House, Refugee Studies Programme, Oxford. Minear, L. et al. (1992) United Nations Coordination of the International Humanitarian Response to the Gulf Crisis 1990–1992. Brown University, T. Watson Inst. for International Studies, Providence. Review Committee (1996) Deliberations and Recommendations of the Review Committee of the Sri Lanka NGO Consortium. Mimeo, Colombo. Van Brabant, K. (1995) NGO Legislation. The Sri Lanka Case. Refugee Participation Network Newsletter 19:12–15. Van Brabant, K. (1996) Banned, Restricted or Sensitive. Working with the Military in Sri Lanka. Relief and Rehabilitation Network Newsletter 5:4–6. Whitman, J. and D. Pocock (eds.) (1996) After Rwanda. The Coordination of United Nations Humanitarian Assistance. Macmillan, London. the case of Sri Lanka

27

27 RRN

Background The Relief and Rehabilitation Network was conceived in 1993 and launched in 1994 as a mechanism for professional information exchange in the expanding field of humanitarian aid. The need for such a mechanism was identified in the course of research undertaken by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) on the changing role of NGOs in relief and rehabilitation operations, and was developed in consultation with other Networks operated within ODI. Since April 1994, the RRN has produced publications in three different formats, in French and English: Good Practice Reviews, Network Papers and Newsletters. The RRN is now in its second three-year phase (1996-1999), supported by four new donors – DANIDA, ECHO, the Department of Foreign Affairs, Ireland and the Department for International Development, UK. Over the three year phase, the RRN will seek to expand its reach and relevance amongst humanitarian agency personnel and to further promote good practice.

Objective To improve aid policy and practice as it is applied in complex political emergencies.

Purpose To contribute to individual and institutional learning by encouraging the exchange and dissemination of information relevant to the professional development of those engaged in the provision of humanitarian assistance.

Activities To commission, publish and disseminate analysis and reflection on issues of good practice in policy and programming in humanitarian operations, primarily in the form of written publications, in both French and English.

Target audience Individuals and organisations actively engaged in the provision of humanitarian assistance at national and international, field-based and head office level in the ‘North’ and ‘South’.

The Relief and Rehabilitation Network is supported by:

Ministry of Foreign Affairs DANIDA ECHO

Department of Foreign Affairs, Ireland Department for International Development