The EU Foreign Service: Constituencies of Its Membership, Spanning All Aspects of How to Build a More Effective Economic and Social Life

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Mission Statement

The European Policy Centre is an independent, not-for- profit think tank, committed to making European integration work. The EPC works at the ‘cutting edge’ of European and global policy-making providing its members and the wider public with rapid, high-quality information EPC WORKING PAPER No.28 and analysis on the EU and global policy agenda. It aims to promote a balanced dialogue between the different The EU Foreign Service: constituencies of its membership, spanning all aspects of how to build a more effective economic and social life. common policy

Graham Avery Antonio Missiroli Jolyon Howorth Anne-Marie Le Gloannec David Rijks Richard Whitman Simon Duke Stephan Keukeleire Cornelius Adebahr Giovanni Grevi Julia Lieb Andreas Maurer

November 2007

European Policy Centre Résidence Palace 155 Rue de la Loi 1040 Brussels Tel: 32 (0)2 231 03 40 Fax: 32 (0)2 231 07 04 In strategic partnership with the King Baudouin Foundation Email: [email protected] and the Compagnia di San Paolo www.epc.eu

EU INTEGRATION & CITIZENSHIP With the support of the European Commission EUROPE IN THE WORLD EPC WORKING PAPER No.28

The EU Foreign Service: how to build a more effective common policy

EPC Working Papers represent the views of the authors and not necessarily those of the EPC.

November 2007

Graham Avery Antonio Missiroli Jolyon Howorth Anne-Marie Le Gloannec David Rijks Richard Whitman Simon Duke Stephan Keukeleire Cornelius Adebahr Giovanni Grevi Julia Lieb Andreas Maurer

EU INTEGRATION & CITIZENSHIP ISSN-1782-2424 EUROPE IN THE WORLD 4 November 2007 Annexes Executive summary Avery Graham by and recommendations conclusions Maurer Towards aEuropeanForeign Service: Andreas and Lieb Julia by timelines priorities, variables, oftheEEAS: The ‘how’ Cornelius by whatlessonsfortheEEAS? The EUSpecialRepresentatives: Duke Simon by Liaison GroupsandEUforeignpolicy David by Gloannec trends andoptions Le inthirdcountries: representation European diplomatic Anne-Marie and Howorth Jolyon by logicbehindtheEEAS The institutional Missiroli Antonio by andanarch – oftwo pillars Atale Introduction: Av Graham by Foreword Rijks and and Rijks Adebahr and Giovanni Grevi Grevi Giovanni and Adebahr ery and and ery and Stephan Keukeleire Stephan and Richard Whitman Richard Antonio Missiroli Antonio AL FCONTENTS TABLE OF 80 79 74 65 56 48 35 28 9 6 Centre’s EUNeighbourhoodForum. and ModernLanguages,University ofBathandChairtheEuropeanPolicy Richard Whitman isProfessorofPolitics, DepartmentofEuropeanStudies of Cambridge. David RijksisaPh.D. Candidate,CentreofInternationalStudies,University Antonio MissiroliisDirectorofStudiesattheEuropeanPolicy Centre. German InstituteforInternationalandSecurity Affairs (SWP). Andreas MaurerisHeadoftheResearch UnitonEUintegration atthe Institute forInternationalandSecurity Affairs (SWP). Julia Lieb works intheResearch UnitonEUintegration attheGerman de Recherches Internationales),Paris. Anne-Marie LeGloannecisDirectorofResearch atCERI(Centred'Etudeset University ofLeuven, and Visiting ProfessorattheCollegeofEurope(Bruges). Stephan Keukeleire isJean MonnetProfessorinEuropeanForeign Policy atthe and Jean MonnetProfessorofEuropeanPolitics attheUniversity ofBath. Jolyon Howorth is Visiting ProfessorofPolitical Scienceat Yale University Studies, Paris. Giovanni GreviisSeniorResearch Fellow attheEUInstituteforSecurity Maastricht. Simon DukeisaProfessorattheEuropeanInstituteofPublic Administration, Commission official. the EuropeanPolicy Centre’s BalkanEuropeForum, andaformerEuropean Graham Avery isaSenior Adviser totheEuropeanPolicy CentreandChairof Auswärtige Politik (DGAP)–theGermanCouncilonForeign Relations,Berlin. Cornelius Adebahr isProgramme OfficerattheDeutsche Gesellschaft für About theauthors

5 November 2007 6 November 2007 for doingthis. practice –notleastbecausethe Treaty isvague ontheprecisearrangements detail how thechanges enshrinedinthe Treaty mightbestbeimplementedin useful toreflectfurtheronthisreformofEU‘foreignpolicy’ andconsideredin In thecontextofnew Treaty, theEuropeanPolicy Centrefeltitwould be continued toattract universal support. having anEUforeignpolicy ‘chief’ backed by hisorherown ‘foreignservice’ ‘clarifications’ oftheprecisearrangements notwithstanding,thenotionof Presidency –thereforecameasasurprisetomany. ButtheBritishrequestsfor Conference (IGC)–andinthesubsequentnegotiationsunderPortuguese 2007 Summitwhich agreedadetailedmandatefortheIntergovernmental The UKgovernment’s decisiontoreopenthisissueintherun-upJune and analysts. of revision.Onthecontrary, ithadbeenwidelypraised by themainactors Constitution which beganinJanuary 2007.Norwas itconsideredinneed cause any realdifficultiesinthenegotiationsonareplacementfor and Dutch referendumcampaignsof2005,andwas notexpectedto This sectionofthe Treaty was notasource ofcontroversy inthe French the leastcontentiousaspectsofConstitutional Treaty. and SecurityPolicy andtheCommissionerforExternalRelations,was oneof roles andfunctionsofthecurrentHighRepresentative forCommonForeign to supportthefuture“UnionMinisterforForeign Affairs”, combiningthe Indeed, theproposaltoestablisha“EuropeanExternal Action Service”(EEAS) voice wherever possibleby developing acommonforeignpolicy. Union toplay astrongroleontheinternationalstageandspeakwithone Missiroli Opinion pollsconsistentlyshow highlevels ofpublicsupportfortheEuropean Antonio and Avery Graham by Foreword on fromanIssuePaper onthistopic,entitled on ‘EUIntegration andCitizenship’‘Europein the World’, follows This Working Paper, publishedundertheauspicesofEPC’s programmes the Constitutional Treaty initstracks. There was clearlyaneedtoresume published in April 2005,shortly beforethereferendathatstopped Towards an EU Foreign Service Foreign EU an Towards , h ru’ ok n éôeBcua includealltherelevant articlesfrom the group’s work, and Jérôme Bacquias– and thenfinalisedby hersuccessorsMariusOsswald, who alsocoordinated The Annexes –puttogetherinitiallyby EPCProgramme Assistant Sofie Thorin foreign policy. and allframe theEEASissuewithinbroaderdiscussion onEuropean function atBrussels‘Headquarters’andontheground inthirdcountries– highlight, atleastimplicitly, thedifferencebetweenway theEEASwill institutions have adapted(orhave toadapt)thisnewcontext. All tendto implications fortheestablishmentofEEAS,othersonway common Some dwell onthemaintrendsamongMemberStatesandtheirpossible ideas andrecommendations. preferably becalledaEuropeanForeign Service–andincludeanalyses, the keyissuesrelatedtoestablishmentofthisnewservice–which should its meetingsandfurtherrefinedinlightofthosediscussions. They tackle This Working Paper includesthemainpaperspresentedby thegroupduring force (assumingasuccessfulratification process). eventual ratification, ifitistobeestablishedassoonthe Treaty comesinto in moredetailsoonafterthesignatureofnew Treaty, andwellbeforeits this sincethecreationofEEASwillneedtobediscussedandnegotiated implementation ofthenewprovisions. Itfelttherewas anurgentneedtodo main findingsandproposalsintimeforthestartofdebateon outcome oftheIGC,groupdecidedtofinaliseapublicationwithits As aconsequence,despitesomeremaininguncertaintyover thefinal Common Foreign andSecurity Policy. Security Policy’) andareaffirmationofthedistinctive natureoftheUnion’s of ‘Foreign Minister’(renamed‘HighRepresentative forForeign Affairs and policy provisions oftheConstitutional Treaty –apartfromachange inthetitle The mandatefortheensuingIGCincludednext tonochange totheforeign European Councilof22-23June onthenewReform Treaty. issues, andthentoreassessthestateofplay inthelightofagreementat before thesummerbreak,firsttoexchange viewsonandanalysetherelevant To thisend,a‘projectgroup’was convened inMay 2007andmetthreetimes of expertsandofficialsinvolved intheprocessvarious capacities. that reflectioninlightofthenewsituation,andtoextenditanumber

7 November 2007 8 November 2007 Antonio Missiroli is Director ofStudiesattheEuropeanPolicyAntonio MissiroliisDirector Centre. Commission official. the EuropeanPolicy Centre’s Balkan Graham Avery isaSenior Adviser totheEuropeanPolicy CentreandChairof the rightdirection. phase ofthedebateonthisissueandguidingsubsequentdecisionsin It isourhopethatthis Working Paper willcontributetofosteringthenext in May 2005,beforethereferendathatputanendtophaseofdebate. High Representative andtheCommissionPresidenttoEuropeanCouncil the newReform Treaty aswelltheProgressReportdelivered jointlyby the uoeFrm andaformerEuropean Europe Forum, debate oninstitutionalarchitecture. involved, while alsotakinganoriginalanglein theongoingEuropean an interestingway ofhominginonthesubstancepolicy (orpolicies) opportunities theEUfacestoday. Focusing ontheforeignserviceistherefore In fact,ithascometoepitomisethecomplexityofchallenges andthe common European‘foreignservice’–intoapoliticalone. turning anapparentlytechnical issue–theexpectedcreationofasingle increasingly difficulttokeepallthoseboxesseparate) hascontributedto international stage)andtheonsetofglobalisation(which hasmadeit demands ontheUniontoactmoreeffectively anddecisively onthe The combinedeffectofprogressinEuropeanintegration (withgrowing politically aswellbureaucratically. programmes, ofteninconnectionwith privileged trade agreements. countries andregionswhere theCommunityran development aid stemmed, ofcourse,fromtheneedtobepresenton groundinallthose The gradual expansionoftheEuropeanCommission’s externalrepresentation Where from? TheEuropean Commission of specificforeign In otherwords, theissueof‘dualism’isquitearecentone,sincenumber in otherinternationalorganisationsliketheUnitedNationsorNATO. individual foreignpoliciesoftheMemberStates,includingtheirengagement Moreover, theyhave longcoexisted–moreorlesshappilywiththe developed separately alongparallel lines,withalmost nooverlap ordualism. It isalsotrue,however, thatforalongtimethesetwo dimensionshave the internationalstage. the EuropeanUnionfirstbegantohave anexternalpresenceandacton Maastricht Treaty intoformal‘pillars’.Indeed,thishasbeenthecasesince Community andintergovernmental dimensions,laterturnedby the long suffered(andstillsuffers)fromanintrinsic‘dualism’betweenits It isfrequentlyarguedthatEurope’s commonforeignpolicy has Missiroli Antonio By Introduction: Ataleof two pillars–andanarch policies were previouslycarriedoutinseparate ‘boxes’,

9 November 2007 10 November 2007 new structures. as wellageneral staffingfreezethathamperedthe development ofthe headquarters, namelyfromrecurrentturfbattlesbetween Commissioners Tensions andproblems alsocamefrominsidetheCommission’s Berlaymont structures inBrusselsandtheMemberStates’embassies inthirdcountries. also highlightingforthefirsttimepotential‘dualism’ withtheCouncil Heads ofStaterather thanForeign Ministers–strengthenedthistrend,while Heads ofDelegationstoambassadorialstatus–throughaccreditationby necessarily becamemuch morediverse. The simultaneousupgrading ofthe This hadclearrepercussions forthecomposition oftheirstaff,which Service (1994),thescopeofDelegations’tasksbroadenedsignificantly. external economicaffairs)–andwiththeensuingcreationofaUnifiedExternal dedicated Commissioner(Hansvan denBroek)–asdistinctfromDGIproper(for With thecreationofDGIA(forexternalpoliticalaffairs)underauthoritya Security Policy (CFSP). structures inthedomainofnewlyestablishedCommonForeign and which was alsointendedto‘match’ theparallel development ofCouncil The signingoftheMaastricht Treaty promptedafurtherreorganisation, 90 officesonsixcontinentswithanincreasinglyprofessionalisedstaff. on trade andpoliticalaffairs.Bytheendofdecade,itencompassedsome the Delegations’network beganevolving intoastructurewithmoreemphasis because oftheparallel development ofEuropeanPolitical Cooperation (EPC), In the1980s,inpartbecauseofEU’s Iberianenlargementandinpart New York (UN),where ittookup‘observer’ status. offices inmultilateral organisations–inParis (OECD),Geneva (GATT), and New Delhi,Bangkok,Caracas and Tokyo, andopeneditsfirst‘diplomatic’ European Communityalsoextendeditsrepresentationtoplacessuch as However, duringtheera ofCommissionerClaudeCheysson(1973-81)the putting analmostexclusive emphasisonprojectmanagement. had aprimarilytechnical profile(engineers,agronomists,administrators), Lomé Convention. At thatpoint, however, mostoftheDelegations’personnel the wake oftheEU’s 1973enlargementtotheUKandsignature ofthe1975 Development) thatthenetwork ofDelegationsbegantakingrootandshape,in This explainswhy itwas inthethenDG VIII (today’s Directorate-General for 2 1 3 pares’ Director-General, andtheappointmentofChrisPatten asa resulting inthecreationofDGRELEX(ExternalRelations)properwithanew With theProdiCommission(1999-2004)cameanotherinternal reorganisation, which itwas “fullyassociated”–forfear of antagonisingtheMemberStates. hesitant orreluctanttouseitshard-won sharedrightofinitiative inCFSP–to of projectmanagement.Ontheotherhand,sameCommissionseemed enhancing itsroleinthefledglingCFSPthanonmoretraditional domain On theonehand,Commissionappearedmorefocusedonpreservingor was incharge of,amongotherthings,humanitarianaffairs. and, moregenerally, unnecessaryfragmentation: CommissionerEmmaBonino in thenewset-up,withoverlapping zonesofcompetence(forexample,intrade) with coordinatingexternalpolicies.However, therewerestillmany greyareas An internalCollegecommitteechaired by Jacques Santerhimselfwas tasked and ACP countries/Lomé(Joao deDeusPinheiro). Latin America/Mediterranean/Middle East/developing Asia (ManuelMarin) Commissioner Hansvan denBroek),industrialisedworld (LeonBrittan), geographical responsibilities:Central Europe/Russia/CIS(under economic affairs,andestablishedfourseparate DGswithmainly As aresult,theSanterCommission(1995-99)reunitedpoliticaland between theirstaffsprevented thepotential‘dualism’ fromnegatively The interaction betweenthetwo menandthe CFSP andSecretary-General oftheCouncilJavier Solana. new player on theothersideofRuedelaLoi,HighRepresentative for Chris Patten’s approach andattitude also helpedsmoothrelationswiththe individual Commissioners tobe‘coordinated’by afellow Collegemember. This newset-upworked reasonablywell,despitethereluctanceof structures intheCouncil. functional units,withaviewto‘matching’, onceagain,theemergingESDP Directorate forCFSPwas alsosetupwithinDGRELEXandarranged infour European SecurityandDefencePolicy (ESDP)was launched, aseparate Moreover, when the Amsterdam Treaty enteredintoforce andthenew for trade. for development aid,Günther Verheugen forenlargement,andPascal Lamy among theCommissionersincharge ofexternalrelations:Poul Nielson modus vivendi modus ‘primus inter inter ‘primus established 11 November 2007 12 November 2007 quite defensively onanumber ofrelevant issues,even afterthe somewhat by surprisein2003-04andhadsinceacted(orrather reacted) extent, thiscameasarelieftotheCommission,which hadbeencaught Constitutional Treaty inspring2005putallthisonholdforawhile. To some ‘hibernation’ oftheConstitutional Treaty inJune 2005. The crisistriggeredby theFrench the Commission). ENP (andpossiblysitonthenewForeign Affairs Councilonbehalfof proper, while BenitaFerrero-Waldner would remainCommissionerforthe new “UnionMinisterforForeign Affairs” would takeover theRELEXservices formal decisionwas takenatthattime,butitwas envisioned thatthe Treaty would enterintoforce, asplanned,on1November 2006.No This partialreorganisationwas basedontheassumptionthatConstitutional European NeighbourhoodPolicy). and BenitaFerrero-Waldner (externalrelationsandtherecentlyestablished (enlargement), Peter Mandelson (trade), LouisMichel (development aid), group ofCommissionersdealingwithexternalpolicies:OlliRehn were retained,butthePresidenttookback theroleofchairing the on themake-upofBarrosoCommission(2004-09). The existing DGs Constitutional Treaty inRomeon29October2004, hadadirectimpact The outcomeofthesubsequentIGC,withofficialsigning so tospeak,withthepossibleadditionofEEAS. suppressed –itwas onlycontainedand‘concentrated’ intooneindividual, union. The intrinsicdualismofEU’s foreignpolicy, inotherwords, was not chair anewlyestablishedForeign Affairs Council; Commission asoneofits Vice-Presidents (which Patten was not);would combining the‘hats’ofbothSolanaandPatten. Heorshewould beinthe Constitutional Treaty –toappoint a“UnionMinisterforForeign Affairs” That eventually ledtotheproposal–laterincorporated intheEU Convention ontheFutureofEurope(2002-03). fed moreorlessdirectlyintothediscussionsoninstitutionalreformin of “Pattana” –asitwas half-jokinglylabelled–fortheUnion. This, inturn, time. Iteven promptedmany analyststoadvocate theappointmentofasort affecting theoverall conductoftheUnion’s ‘foreignpolicy’ atadifficult the two rolesandfunctions,thenewfigurewas andis,basically, a by a“EuropeanExternal Action Service”(EEAS).Infact,farfrom‘merging’ 6 non and theDutch 4 5 and would besupported nee personal de facto de to the to ‘ExternalandPolitico-Military Affairs’ underRobertCooper. onset ofESDP, finally, thiswas transformed intoanexpandedDGEdevoted unit, while anotherwas incharge ofexternaleconomicrelations. With the Brian Crowe. Oneofhisdeputies(PierreChampenois) ledthenewCFSP In 1994,anewDirectorate-General forExternalRelations was setupunder Political Cooperation (EPC). into force oftheSingleEuropean Act, which institutionalisedEuropean a dedicatedEPCSecretariathadbeenestablishedin1987,aftertheentry before that,by virtueoftheCouncil’s own rulesofprocedure.Inparticular, Mentioned forthefirsttimeinMaastricht Treaty, itactuallyexistedlong Secretariat (CGS),basedintheJustus Lipsiusbuildingsince1995. foreign policy-making isinfact,moreoftenthannot,theCouncilGeneral What isnormallyreferredtoasthe‘Council’inspecificcontextofEU Where from? TheCouncil only fortheCommission. Here clearlylie,atthesametime,achallenge andanopportunity–not or energy. broadened them:sufficeittothinkofjusticeandhomeaffairs,environment, with externalimplicationsthanCFSPproper, butrecentdevelopments have (both legalandprofessional)thatcover amuch widerspectrumofpolicies and patchy. Ontheotherhand,notonlydotheyalready have competences and securitymatterstotheirBrussels‘headquarters’remainslimited,uneven As aresult,theDelegations’abilitytoprovide goodreportingonpolitical still predominantlyoneofprojectmanagementandtrade. modern diplomacy andinternationalcrisismanagement,astheircultureis the onehand,theymostlylack thespecificknow-how andexpertiseof More generally, itsofficialsfindthemselves inanambivalent situation.On relations outofatotalroughly25,000intheentireCommission. included andfourthifnot,withmorethan7,000staffinvolved inexternal (compared tothatoftheMemberStates)ranks seventh ifconsulatesare ‘diplomatic’ representationoutsidetheUnion’s territory, itsnetwork covering over 150countriesandinternationalorganisations.Intermsof This said,theCommissioncancurrentlyrelyon morethan120delegations 6 13 November 2007 14 November 2007 culture) ofnationaldiplomacies. horizontal andvertical ‘Europeanisation’inthebureaucratic machinery (and incorporate beforejoiningtheEU. As such, theyinducedacertaindegreeof structures –includingtheCommitteeonCivilian Aspects ofCrisis With thepartialexception ofthePSC,virtuallyallthesenewESDP-related (PSC), foreseen by theNice Treaty, such asthePolitical andSecurityCommittee This was followed by theestablishment,from2001,ofnewESDPbodies Warning Unit),asforeseenby the Amsterdam Treaty. creation ofhisdedicatedPolicy Unit(formallythePolicy PlanningandEarly CFSP andSecretary-General oftheCouncil(HR/SG)Javier Solanaandthe 1999/2001, firstofall,withtheappointmentHighRepresentative for The sizeandscopeofCGSstructuresweregiven asignificantboostin They wereallpartoftheCFSP the rotatingPresidency. were –andstillarechaired directlyby theCGS; others(themajority)by shaping withnationalforeignministries.Some(mostlyofatechnical nature) Secretariat andprovided apermanentchannel ofconsultationanddecision- Taken together, thesebodiescomplementedthework oftheCouncil the Permanent RepresentationsandtheCommission. periodically inBrussels,mostlypreparedby theRELEX/CFSPCounsellorsin or thevarious Council Working Groups/Parties and Task Forces convened ‘correspondents’ basedinnationalforeignministries(andtheCommission); Committee (PoCo) intheframework oftheEPC/CFSP, preparedby European have takenshapeover theyears: theregularmeetingsofPolitical number ofmoreinformalfora, functions,preparatory bodiesandgroups has beenoccurringsincethe1990s.Beforeandalongsidethem,however, a progressive institutionalisationofforeignpolicy bodiesandproceduresthat CFSP/ESDP-related structures,inotherwords, originatedmostlyfromthe like mostofthemilitarybodiesandnewCouncilagencies, thatcameinto Commission) todealwithinternationalcrisismanagement; andalsothose, composed ofambassador-level diplomatsfromtheMemberStates(and ‘Brusselisation’ ofEuropeanforeignpolicy thathadbeguninthelate1980s. Union (WEU)totheEU. existence throughthetransfer ofmostfunctionsthe Western European de facto de replacing thePoCo butpermanently basedinBrussels,and 10 acquis 8 They alsofurtherreinforced thecreeping that theapplicantcountrieshadto 7 9 loyalties have emergedsofar, eitherintheCouncilor theCommission number ofsecondedemployees. Still,nomajorcasesofconflicting Germany, UK)andtheNordic MemberStateswhich have the highest and itmay benoaccidentthatittendsto be thebiggestcountries(France, on itsown budget. This risksdiscriminatingamongtheMemberStates, Last butnotleast,aministrymustalsobeabletoafford tosecondpeople little ‘Europeanisation’. may facilitateupward mobility. Inthisarea,however, therehasbeenvery a role,especiallyincountrieswhere astintintheEUinstitutions Existing staffrulesandcareerpatternsinnationalforeignservicesalsoplay off spentforces andgettingridofdifficultpeople. then returnandthrive; or, conversely (butfortunatelylessandoften),sending to offeringopportunitiesforprofessionalgrowth topromisingofficialswho can Union does,exercising influenceandhaving ‘feelers’intheappropriateplaces; their salaries)tendtovary. They range fromkeepingsome‘control’over what the others todispatch theirown diplomatstoEUbodies(andsometimeseven cover The reasonswhy somenationalministrieswere–andstillaremorepronethan cases, however, certainprofessionalstandardshave tobemet. CGS torelyonadditionalstaffwithouthaving topay forthem.Even inthese place). Furthersecondments,especiallyfromsomecapitals,alsoenablethe and inDGE(where morestringentselectionprocedureshave beenputin designed explicitlytothiseffect,withanimplicitsystemofnationalquotas) operational capabilities. This hashappenedinthePolicy Unit(which was given theCouncilSecretariatanotherway tobolsteritsanalyticaland More generally, thepractice ofresortingtodiplomatsfromthecapitalshas supported by secondedofficialsfromtheircountriesoforigin. Commission asSpecial Advisers (atDirector-General level), andoften Interestingly, theyarenominatedby theCouncil,temporarily hiredby the shortage ofspecialisedandseniordiplomatsatthedirectserviceEU. launched, astheyofferedapragmatic andrelatively ‘light’solutiontothe the Maastricht Treaty) – wereusedever morefrequentlyaftertheESDPwas regions ofparticularrelevance fortheUnion’s CFSP(asalready foreseenby Last butnotleast,Council‘SpecialRepresentatives’ –roving ambassadorsto (EDA) –weresetupthroughsimpleCouncildecisionsorJoint Actions. Management, theSITCENand,lateron,EuropeanDefence Agency 11 15 November 2007 16 November 2007 management fromwhich itwillbedifficulttobacktrack. Iran); andoperational (thevarious ESDPmissions)–ininternationalcrisis the 2003EuropeanSecurityStrategy); diplomatic(inUkraine, Montenegro, Instead, theyhave helpedbuildadistinctive haunted andhamperedthedevelopment oftheEPCandCFSP. well beyond thelowest commondenominatorapproach which previously reflect theindividual interestsofalltheMemberStates,andhave oftengone very closetothecommonEuropeaninterest,even when thisdidnotfully CFSP/ESDP player intheirown right. At times,theyhave shapedsomething The HighRepresentative, thePolicy Unit and DGEhave becomea formula werewellknown: inhisview, itwould makeitimpossibleforthe hope. MrSolana’s allegedpersonalreservations aboutthe‘double-hatting’ Charlemagne, homeoftheCommissionservices)was oneofsatisfaction and reaction intheJustus Lipsius building(asdistinctfromtheBerlaymont and This may helpexplainwhy, when theConstitutional Treaty was signed,the modus operandi modus it hasalsotranslated intoashiftaway fromapurely‘intergovernmental’ decade, andthisgrowth hasnotbeensimplyinstitutionalandquantitative: policy-related bodiesandstructuresintheCouncilSecretariatover thepast Overall, however, therehasbeenaremarkablegrowth intheforeign vary enormouslyevery year. capitals orcontracted locallyforshortperiodsoftime,andwhose numbers on thegroundinESDPoperations, who aremostlysecondedfromthe To thesemustbeaddedthepersonnel–bothmilitaryandcivilian –working which theyareexpectedtoreturntheirministries. structures. Few ofthemhave assignmentslastinglongerthanfive years, after of 500Brussels-basedindividuals, includingthoseinthepolitico-military positions andthehybrid character ofsomearrangements, butitisintheorder to quantifythemprecisely, notleastbecauseofthehighturnover incertain in DGRELEXproper, letaloneintheCommissionDelegations.Itisquitedifficult relevant personnelintheCouncilGeneral Secretariatremainswellbelow that Even afterthelatestEUenlargements,however, thesizeofCFSP/ESDP- smaller scale. itself –where similararrangements arealsoinplace,althoughonamuch . acquis 12 – doctrinal(startingwith generis could onlyidentifyafewagreedprinciples. These startedwiththe outcome ofthereferendainFrance andtheNetherlands,ProgressReport In thesecircumstances, exacerbatedby themountinguncertaintyover the would “assist”theMinister. components (“relevant” Council,CommissionandMemberStatesofficials) alone theCommissionDelegations.Itsimplystatedthatitwould includethree relations withtheexistingstructuresandbodiesinCGSDGRELEX,let The Constitutional Treaty, infact,saidvery littleaboutitspreciseset-upand led totheMay 2005ProgressReportonestablishingtheEEAS. Declaration attached totheConstitutional Treaty, conductedthetalksthat COREPER’s Antici Group),following theinstructionsenshrinedina the climateandway inwhich CommissionandCouncil(includingthe Such expectations–equallyevidentonbothsidesofRuedelaLoiaffected foreign policy chief” –astheinternationalpressgenerally referredtohim. crowning histenureasthefirstHighRepresentative forCFSPand“European being nominatedtobecomethefirstsuch ‘Minister’on1November 2006,thus Mr Solanahimselfhaddonesosuccessfully. Butthisdidnotprevent himfrom ‘Minister’ totravel extensively andcarryouton-sitepersonaldiplomacy as remain difficulttodefine:someregionalandalso functionaldesks In themeantime,working relationsbetweenthetwo sidesofRuedelaLoi extremely sensitive debatewithoutacompelling legalobligationtodoso. main players (includingtheMember States)werereluctanttoengageinan the fateofConstitutional Treaty anditsprovisions, andpartlybecause allthe World’ exception oftheCommission’s June 2006Communicationon‘Europeinthe Furthermore, therehasbeenlittleornoreflectiononthisissue–withthelimited drawbacks ofthepersisting‘dualism’. souring theatmosphereinBrusselsand,above all,tohighlightingthe European foreignpolicy toagrindinghalt,buttheyhave contributedto reflection” have thereforehadasignificantimpact:theyhave notbrought The two ‘No’votes totheConstitutional Treaty andtheensuing“pause for of theEEAS–unanswered (see Annex 2). of convergence, butleftmany crucialquestions–such asthescopeandsize 14 (unique) natureofthenewserviceandcovered somegeneral points – sincethen. This ispartly because oftheprolongeduncertaintyover 13 sui 17 November 2007 18 November 2007 on theEEAS. between theoldEU‘pillars’.Itremainstobeseenhow allthismay impinge new HighRepresentative andmaintainingthetraditional separation contribute tocontainingthepossiblespill-over effectsof‘double-hatting’the on defendingits‘redlines’inthetreatynegotiations,theymay infact definitely moreworkable thanHRUFASP) will operate. of theCommission(theacronym HR/VPseemsbothmoreappropriateand institutional ‘environment’ inwhich theHighRepresentative and Vice-President Before consideringthis,however, itmay beworthwhile toexaminethenew slight change inthe Nevertheless, takentogether, thetwo changes inthetextseemtoherald a reiterates existingnorms. change iseven lesssignificant,inlegalterms,asitstatestheobvious and that itaimstodispelthefearsterm“Minister”triggers. The second The change inthe titleispurelycosmeticor, moreprecisely, symbolic,in security anddefencepolicy oftheMemberStates”. organisations”; neitherdothey“prejudicethespecificcharacter ofthe nor oftheirnationalrepresentationinthirdcountriesandinternational they currentlyexist,fortheformulationandconductoftheirforeignpolicy EEAS), provisions “donotaffecttheresponsibilitiesofMemberStates,as In particular, these maintainthat,even withthenewset-up(including subject tospecificproceduresandrules”. new Declarations attached tothetreatyunderline, Representative oftheUnionforForeign Affairs andSecurityPolicy”; andtwo minor changes: the“UnionMinisterforForeign Affairs” isrenamed“High all theCFSP/ESDP-relevant provisions oftheConstitutional Treaty, withonlytwo As already mentionedintheForeword, thenewReform Treaty retainsvirtually Where next? TheUnion world remaininplace. separate systemsofreportingfrom,andcommunicatingwith,theoutside policy-making, even insidesingleinstitutions.Ontopofthat,two quite call “inter-agency” debate,butwhich isalsooftensotypicalofEU mix ofcooperation andcompetitionwhich Americans euphemistically cooperate wellandcomplementoneanother, while othersindulgeinthat context . InsertedmainlyattherequestofUK,keen inter alia inter , that“theCFSPis and theoldformal raincoat andumbrella.Itwillbevery crowded indeedatthetopofEU, As aresult,alongwiththetwo ‘hats’,theHR/VPmay alsohave tocarrya COREPER, unquestionablyamajorplayer inforeignpolicy matters. Affairs Council(which alsodealswithenlargementissues)andthe all, therotatingPresidency islikelytoremaininplaceforboththeGeneral seems unlikelythattheywillleave theinternationalstagealtogether. After This may wellvary fromcountrytoandleaderleader:butit in thisfield,atleasttermsofvisibility, astheirrolewillbegreatlydiminished. their stintinthechair untilnow –may wellbetempted to(re)gainsomeground Council Presidency –who have generally beenincharge ofallEUaffairs during Head ofStateandGovernment andForeign Ministerofthecountryholding Finally, withthedemiseofrotatingPresidency inexternalrelations,the even internalmarketormonetarymattersareinvolved. whenever issuesrelatedtoenlargement,trade, justiceandhomeaffairs, difficult todraw alineandkeepitsPresidentoutofthisgame,especially so many policy areaswhich have anexternaldimensionthatitwillbe entirely fromintervening inforeignrelations. The Commissionisinvolved in Moreover, itseemsunlikelythattheCommissionPresidentwillrefrain degree ofduplicationbetweentheirrespective staff. of EuropeanCouncildecisionsandevents. At best,thiswillentail some closely withtheholderofthispostonallmatterslinkedtopreparation event ofacrisis). As aresult,theHR/VPwillhave toliaise constantlyand summits (includingthepossibilityofconvening extraordinary onesinthe some formofexternalcoordinationandrepresentationinrelationtoEU responsibilities –andarguablystaffoftheCouncilSecretariat,ensure President oftheEuropeanCouncil,who willtakeover someofthe Reform Treaty introduceanothernewinstitutionalfigure,namelythe Yet thismay notbethe endofthestory. BoththeConstitutionaland (thus oftenturnedintoa‘Sextet’)tootherdiplomaticoccasions. representatives atinternationalmeetings,fromtheMiddleEast‘Quartet’ problems: therewillnolongerbetwo oreven threedistinctEU could solve mostofthecurrentsystem’s fragmentation and‘dualism’ The endoftherotatingPresidency inexternalrelationsandthedouble‘hat’ a newinformalone(theEuropeanCouncilPresident, theHR/VPand troika of Presidency countriesmay wellbesucceeded by 19 November 2007 20 November 2007 lack isapoliticalsynthesis andajoined-upframework. European foreignpolicy have proved quite complementary:what theystill Also, insofarastheyhave notcompetedwith each other, thetwo ‘pillars’of synergy andcoordination,rather thanseparate boxes, approaches andstaffs. requires avaried andcomplexsetofinstruments and ahighdegreeof Afghanistan andIraq hasshown thatinternational crisismanagement This isapity, becausetheexperienceofpastfewyears inplacessuch as EU externalpolicy. legally –to‘mingle’thetwo inordertoachieve amorecoherentandeffective Community one. This willmakeitmoredifficult–politicallyrather than above insistontheseparation betweentheCFSP/ESDPpillarproperand greater extentthanpreviouslyassumed. The newDeclarations mentioned considers theimplicationsofchairing theForeign Affairs Council–toa The HR/VPwillalsohave tojugglethetwo ‘hats’–oreven three, ifone have tobemade. inevitably beatrialperiodforall,inwhich adjustmentsandarrangements will competence doesnotloseouttopoliticalexpediency. There will,atany rate, and West, couldproduceunpredictableresults. The hopeisthatpolicy ‘families’, b)bigandsmallcountries,c)NorthSouth,aswellEast If so,theneedforsomepoliticalbalanceandtrade-offs betweena)party being madeinonecomprehensive bundle. temporary HR/VP),infact,thechoice ofthenewEUtopteamcouldendup January 2009(and While theReform Treaty isexpectedtoenterintoforce on1 of 2009,inthewake oftheEuropeanParliamentary elections,orpossiblyearlier. especially ifitcomesdown toa‘package deal’tobestruck, say, inthesummer The modalitiesforappointingthethreetopEUofficialswillalsomatter, treaty language. this rolemattersmorethanhisorheractualcompetencesandeven the in which anofficialinterpretswhat isvery much ablanksheetanddefines personalities oftheincumbents.MrSolanahasalready shown thattheway Presidencies willlingeronthesidelines. ad hoc ad within thissortofnewEU At theendofday, theprecisedivision oflabourandeven thechemistry Commission President),while thenew arrangements have beenagreedforthepossibleappointmentofa troika will alsodependontheprofilesand 15 trio of successive Council aspect ofCFSP),andcouldalsochair thePSC. military componentwillremainmore‘compartmentalised’thanany other Defence Policy (CSDP)–andcrisismanagementproper(whose specifically One could,forinstance,cover ESDP–now renamedCommonSecurityand deputies. Buthow many andwhat roleswould theyplay? even theMay 2005jointProgressReportsays very littleinthisrespect:itis composition, sizeandinternalset-uparenotspeltout inthe Treaty, and HR/VP what thePolicy UnithasbeentotheHR/SG. Yet itsprecise to becomebothawalking stick andasatellitenavigator: itwillbetothe For thefutureEuropean‘foreignpolicy chief’, theEEAS isarguablyexpected HR/VP infulfillinghis/hermandate). of theMemberStates”–remainsame,asdoestheirtask(to“assist” the Commissionaswellstaffsecondedfromnationaldiplomaticservices from relevant departmentsoftheGeneral SecretariatoftheCounciland the wording inthe Treaty hasnotchanged: thethreecomponents–“officials How willallthisimpactonthepossiblemake-upofEEAS?Incase, Building anarch –theEEAS to have asingle In ordertomanagesuch anear-impossible briefbetter, theHR/VPmay have external actionintheReform Treaty, attherequestofFrance. has beeninsertedintothelistofobjectives oftheUnion’s common and pillars;and,now, also“theprotection of[EU]citizens”abroad,which coordination ofthefightagainstterrorism,which cutsacrosscompetences Last butnotleast,itremainstobeseenwhere exactlytoplacethe shares outportfoliosandresponsibilities. depend primarilyontheway inwhich thenextCommission(2009-14) ‘contamination’ may benotonlyinevitablebutalsonecessary. Yet thiswill between pillars,withmixedandoverlapping competencesandwhere some possibly, alsodevelopment aid–thatlieinthegreyareaacrossand Other deputiescoulddealwiththoseotherpolicies–such astheENPand, the EuropeanCouncilPresidency. she wearsthethirdhat,chairing theForeign Affairs Councilandliaisingwith but adeputyspecificallyforCFSPcouldalsoassisttheHR/VPwhen heor specifically CFSP(diplomatic)dimensionfromtheESDP(operational) one, cabinet – toensurecoherence 17 16 This risksseparating the – andalsotoappoint 21 November 2007 22 November 2007 could wellbecalledupontoensurethenecessarycoherence and common policiesoutsidethesphereofHR/VP, theCommissionPresident If italsocameto‘coordinate’relevant aspectsoftrade, enlargementand other external ramifications. service intothefunctional‘hub’forallthosecommon policiesthathave impossible. Bydoingso,theHR/VPwould turnthe Commission’s RELEX experience showed, thisiseasiersaidthandone,althoughcertainlynot taken “inagreementwiththe Vice-President”. However, asChrisPatten’s instance, certaindecisionsby individual Commissioners couldonlybe To achieve that,itwould sufficetoreformsomeinternalrulessothat,for gives the VP atangiblecoordinatingandsupervisoryroleinsidetheCollege. accountability –forexample,onbudgetaryandadministrative matters–that hierarchical internal‘chain ofcommand’,atleast anidentifiablelineof On theotherhand,Commissionmustestablish,ifnotarigidly, and coherenceofitspolicy towards Africa. wants toincreasetheoverall effectiveness the EEAS,especiallyifEU way undertheauthorityofHR/VPandthereby insomeconnectionwith externalaidprogrammes) shouldalsobeputinsome manages theEU DG RELEX.ButDevelopment and AIDCO (thededicatedoffice that ready tointegrate withtheEEAS–starting,ofcourse,thosein together. Onthe onehand,itshouldidentifythe‘core’policy areasitis In ordertodoso,however, theCommissionshouldfirstgetitsown act Charlemagne seizetheopportunityandplay totheirstrengths. importance andinfluence,especiallyifstaffintheBerlaymont and Union’s externalaction.Ifso,the‘Vice-Presidential’ hatwillgainin DG RELEXand,moreindirectly, otherCommissionservicesrelevant tothe obvious thatthebulkofEEASwould comefrom(and/orrelyupon) external actionmachinery (regardlessofwhere exactlyitisplaced),seems politico-military structures)remainsneatlyseparated fromtherestof moves tothenewPresidency oftheEuropeanCouncil,andifanotherpart(the Commission’s sidethaninitiallyimagined.IfpartoftheCouncilSecretariat negotiations may bethattheEEAS,inend,clingsmuch moreontothe Paradoxically, oneunintendedconsequenceoftheUKdemandsintreaty unclear what itcouldorshouldbeabout. reasonably clearwhat theEEASwillprobably not be about,butquite arbitrage . geographical In thisvein, thefirstbuildingblocks oftheEEAScouldincludeallmain from allthreecomponentsandtrain themtobemore‘interoperable’. from nationaldefenceministries,however, itwould bringtogetherofficials into apropervault. UnliketheEDA, which essentiallyonlyhostsofficials more stablestructure:thisinitialarch between thetwo pillarscouldthusturn least atthebeginning–butifproven effective, itcouldeasilyevolve intoa Defence Agency (EDA), itwould nothave any tenuredstaffofitsown –at between allthemainEuropeanforeignpolicy actors.LiketheEuropean The EEAS,inotherwords, couldbecomeasortoffunctional tenures andcontracts, totestthefacilitiesandappliancesfirst. would beginhostingafewselectedtenantsfromallofthem,withtemporary older ones,which would remaininplaceandcontinuetooperate. Butit The EEAScouldwellbesuch anew building: itwould notemptyany ofthe allow ittoexpandandbeextendedasrequired. one tostartwith,butbasedonamodular, LEGO-likescheme thatwould to buildabrand newsettlement-acondominium,probably, andasmall than tryingtomakethemallcompatiblewithoneanother, itwould bebetter 27 assortedapartmentblocks), heorshewould probablysuggestthatrather buildings withdifferenttenants,specificationsandappliances,flankedby foreign policy (atale,ifnotoftwo cities,thenoftwo radically different developer wereconfrontedwiththecurrentstateofaffairsinEuropean And what oftheinstitutionalbaseforEEAS?IfaBrusselsproperty Member States. only: fromtheCommission,CouncilGeneral Secretariat,andthe of inventing anewstatusforitsstaffcouldbebased onsecondments would preserve its that willgovern theEEASatoutset,however, apossiblesolution that grab theheadlines.Consideringtransitional nature ofthearrangements issues tendtobethoserelatingpersonnel,although they donotnormally And what statuswould the‘tenants’ofEEAShave? The mostintractable the General Affairs Counciltoensurethenecessarycoherence. European CouncilPresidency andassistingtherelevant officialsinpreparing Following the‘interface’model,thisshouldalsoincludeliaisingwith some streamliningandcoordinationisbothinordernecessary. where there hasbeenalotofduplicationover thepastfewyears, andwhere desks ofboththeCommissionandCouncil. This isanarea sui generis sui nature withoutopeningthePandora’s box interface 23 November 2007 24 November 2007 or takeninassecondednationalexperts,throughaformof Officials fromtheMemberStatescouldeitherbe‘lent’astemporary agents salaries, andwould simplybe‘located’withtheEEASforanumberofyears. Delegations, althoughprobablyonlyover time. personality. This islikelytohave asignificantimpactontheroleof Under thetermsofReform Treaty, theUnionwillacquireafulllegal about itsramifications inthirdcountries? All thiswould applytotheBrusselsheadquartersof theEEAS.Butwhat towards theestablishmentofaEuropean“foreignservice”worthy ofthename. position. This meansthattheEEASagency would constituteonlyafirststep foreseen by thenew Treaty for2014willalsohave animpactontheHR/VP’s have tobeadopted,buttheone-thirdreductioninsizeofCommission whole set-up may have tobereviewedagain:notonlywillanewEUbudget covered withalimited‘mortgage’ontheoldbuildings.By2013,however, the The rent,basicfurnitureand runningcosts,inotherwords, would beinitially the currentFinancial Perspectives expire. budget, thusalsoinvolving theEuropeanParliament –atleastuntil2013,when instrument) andhave anadministrative budgetfundedprimarilyby theEU simple Councildecision(notaJoint Action, which isaquintessentialCFSP but rather anew, hybrid agency, be thatofanEUagency: neitheraCommissionnorCounciloneliketheEDA, Finally, thespecific‘material’usedtoconstructnewEEASbuildingcould small ‘pioneergroup’,tobegradually andprogressively expandedover time. States, andinpartonthefunding.Bothlogicexperiencesuggestaninitial existing imbalancebothbetweenCGSandDGRELEXamongtheMember depend inpartonthesharingcriteriatobeagreedupon,consideringalso Exactly how many ‘Indians’may endupservingunderthenew‘chief’ will This said,itisrather prematuretomentionapossible (orideal)sizefortheEEAS. process forselectingcandidatesbasedontheirprofessionalism. of nationalquotaswould betacitlyusedbutmatched withahomogenous all, whichever ‘component’theycomefromand,presumably, somesystem officials concerned. The lengthofthesecondmentshouldbesamefor the servicewithouthaving asignificantimpactonthe‘EUloyalty’ ofthe co-financing thatwould significantlyalleviatetheinitialcostsofsettingup As aresult,EU fonctionnaires would preserve theirstatus,careerpathand sui generis sui . Itcouldbeestablishedthrougha de facto de Michel Barnier, promptedby the Asian a reporttotheCouncilandCommissionby formerEuropeanCommissioner abroad. Someproposalsalongtheselineswereputforward inMay 2006 in missions, and Brussels headquarterswillhave tobewellconnectedwiththelocal could beputinplaceandtested–theunifiedregionaldesks ‘cascading’ effectsonotheraspectsoftheUnion’s external machinery. Last butnotleast,theprovisions oftheReform Treaty may alsohave of thecurrent Treaty given responsibilityforconsularrepresentation,buildingonboth Article 20 It willalsobeinterestingtoseewhether thefutureUnionDelegationsare European CouncilPresident’s services. established withalltherelevant CommissionDGstoo,aswellwiththe While thereisnoneedforonesingle,rigid‘template’,some example, inmost Asian countries). could have amuch strongerpolitico-diplomaticprofileandbackground (for some ACP countries,forinstance),while inotherstheHeadofDelegation (predominance oftheoldCommunity‘pillar’andprojectmanagement,in could begoodreasonsforcontinuingalongmoretraditional lines affairs inthethirdcountryquestion.Insomecases,forinstance,there may vary, dependingontherelative importanceofeconomicorpolitical introduced hereaswell,althoughhow itisarticulatedandimplemented As aconsequence,degreeof‘double-hatting’may wellhave tobe with theEEAS. authority oftheHR/VP, butdoesnotexplicitlymentiontheminconnection Constitutional Treaty beforeit)statesthattheywillbeplacedunderthe instruments ofDGRELEX.Onceagain,theReform Treaty (likethe way theirHeadscannotbeseen–atleastforthetimebeingsimplyas as theyalready dealwithtrade, development andotherissues.Inthesame In fact,theycannotbeconsideredmereinstrumentsofforeignpolicy proper, EEAS toacompletelydifferentlevel. experimental “EuropeanConsulates”would certainly raise thedebateon issues nobody wanted to addressatthattime,thecreationofleastafew While littleconsideration was given totheseideas,astheyraised sensitive context ofthepossiblecreationaEuropeancivil protectionforce. vice versa vice 18 and thenewcommitmentto“protect”EUcitizens . Goodcommunicationlineswillhave tobe 19 tsunami of December2005,inthe pilot formats 25 November 2007 26 November 2007 .Until2002,theForeign Ministershadonlyconvened formallyastheGeneral Affairs Council,themost‘senior’ 5. .For afirstformulationfromoutsidetheinstitutionsseeG. Andreani, C.Bertram, C.Grant, (2001) 4. In2001aninternalCommissionReportclarifiedthatHeadsofECDelegationshadtobeseenasrepresentatives 3. Lateron,ECrepresentationofficeswould beopenedinRome(FAO) and Vienna (OSCE). 2. For mostoftheinformationinthissectionseecf.David Spence’s chapters 14and15inD. Spence,G.Edwards 1. Endnotes ofStudiesattheEuropeanPolicyAntonio MissiroliisDirector Centre. delivering anever moreincisive andcoherentforeignpolicy fortheUnion. the nexttwo years –mindsthat,instead,shouldremainconcentrated on disputes onstatusfromabsorbingthemindsofBrussels-basedofficialsover debate onthisissuemay helptoprevent turfbattlesandcumbersome which itwillbeputinplacemattersagreatdeal. An earlyandconstructive The EEASisanimportantelementofthisnewarchitecture, andtheway in adequate internationalrole. for giving theUnion‘politicsofscale’thatwould permitittoplay an Union. The Reform Treaty provides agoodlegalbasisforachieving thisand European foreignpolicy andastrongerdemandforit,insideoutsidethe In conclusion,thereisnow bothgreatpotentialforajoined-upcommon Joined-up thinking requested by theUKwillaffectalltheseaspectsofnewset-up. the UnitedNations),anditisstillunclearwhether thenewDeclarations to happen,however, insuch placesas Washington, Moscow orNew York (at to theHR/VP, who inturnwillchair theForeign Affairs Council. This isunlikely local HeadoftheEUDelegation? After all,heorshewould beaccountable Under thenewsystemenshrinedinReform Treaty, couldthisjobfalltothe States have anembassyorconsulate:theUnitedStates,RussiaandChina). present, thereareonlythree‘third’countriesintheworld where all27Member capitals andregionsinwhich thecountrychairing theEUisnotrepresented(at such tasksfalltotherotatingPresidency, withadditionalarrangements for States’ ambassadorsinthirdcountriesorinternationalorganisations?Currently, Just tonameone:who willchair thecoordinatingmeetingsofEUMember (eds.) (2006) of theCommissionasawhole, notofthespecificinterestsindividual DGs. in 1954–anditsfirstheadwas an American citizen,formerlyaMarshallPlanofficial. third countrywas theinformationofficeopenedin Washington by theEuropeanCoalandSteelCommunity Military Revolution Military The European Commission European The , London:CER. The ideawas embraced anddeveloped by aConvention Working Group. 20 , London:John Harper. Interestingly, thefirst-ever representationina Europe’s Europe’s .‘Brusselisation’isanotherlooseconceptthatcombinespoliticalgeography (NATO, too,isbasedinBrussels) 9. 0 SeeJ.Howorth (2007) 10. 0 Interestingly, such a notion–thatcommunicatesquitewellanintuitive visionofEurope’s actingtogether,20. and The 15. SeealsoB. Hocking, D. Spence(2005) 6. 4 The Communication,however, essentiallyreferredtopossibleimprovements withinthe 14. Accordingtosuch ascenario,inNovember 2006,Solana’s deputyasSecretary-General oftheCouncil– 13. Total staffnumberintheCouncilSecretariat–includingallitsDGs(currentlyeight, plusthelegalservice)– 12 Bycontrast, ‘Personal Representatives’ areCouncilofficialswho areassignedaspecifictask–normallyof 11. ‘Europeanisation’isavery broadconcept,useddifferentlyby different authors:itgenerally alludestothe 8. 9 The 19. The articlestatesthat“every citizenoftheUnionshall,interritoryathirdcountrywhich theMember 18. This ESDP‘deputy’couldbeappointedby theCouncilorelectedby (andfromwithin)thePSCitself,possibly 17. For ananalysisofthisconcept,see.S.Nuttall,CoherenceandConsistency, inC.HillandM.Smith(eds.)(2005) 16. .For anoverview seeF. Hayes-Renshaw, Helen Wallace, (2006) 7. and institutionalvagueness –butitdefinitelyexcludesthepossibilityofa‘ D. Allen, ‘The EuropeanRescueofNationalForeign Policy?’, inC.Hill(ed.)(1996), Foreign Policy Foreign Union European the The International Relations of the European Union European the of Relations International The Communication oftheCommissiontoEuropeanCouncil,8June 2006. ‘Europe inthe World –SomePractical ProposalsforGreaterCoherence,Effectiveness and Visibility’, to EuropeanCouncilsessions–butwithoutspecifyingwhich ministersshouldtakepartineach configuration. from theoldGeneral Affairs Council,responsiblefor‘consistency’ aswellthepreparation ofandfollow up over two days. The Constitutional Treaty (andnow theReform Treaty) separated thenewForeign Affairs Council coordinating role,theyhave convened astheGeneral Affairs andExternalRelationsCouncil,normallyspread increasing numberofforeignpolicy issuesontheagendato the detrimentoftheiroverarching Council of allCouncilformations.Sincethen,inresponsetocriticismthattopdiplomatstendconcentrate onthe renders equallywelltheFrench ideaofEuropeas regions tostartwith:theBalkans,Caribbean, West Africa, andtheIndianOcean. (1989) Niels Ersboll(1980-94)andJürgen Trumpf (1994-99). General, thusseparating thetwo functionsonceagainandrestoringthebureaucratic tradition establishedby former French Permanent Representative PierredeBoissieu–would thenhave succeededhimasSecretary amounts toapproximately3,000. functional nature–by theHR/SGhimself. especially pp.61ff. R. Wong, ‘The EuropeanisationofForeign Policy’, inC.Hill,M.Smith(eds.)(2005) adaptation ofnationalstructuresandprocedurestothedemandsEUpolicy-making. For anoverview see Macmillan, especiallypp.68ff. pre-Maastricht era. Itwas coined(withspecificreferencetotheEPC RELEX Commissioner. The the incumbent(andpossiblysuccessor, althoughthishardlyhappenedinpractice), theHR/SG,and incumbent andthesuccessorMemberStateinPresidency. With the Amsterdam Treaty, itcametoinclude authorities ofany MemberState,onthesameconditionsasnationalsofthatstate”. State ofwhich heisanationalnotrepresented,beentitledtoprotectionby thediplomaticorconsular the EuropeanCouncilfortwo andahalf,thechairman oftheMilitaryCommitteeforthree. presently, forinstance,theHR/SGandCommissionpresidentareappointedfive years, thepresidentof mandate. Itisworth consideringsome‘standardisation’ofthetermstopofficialsacrossEUinstitutions: following theprecedentofEUMilitaryCommitteein2001,alsotermsprocedure(secretballot)and may alsoshareouttasksamongthemselves over aperiodof18months. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan;especiallythe Annex. Barnier Report Barnier troika Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community: The Politics of Scale of Politics The Community: European the of Actions Policy Foreign system forexternalrepresentationadoptedwiththeMaastricht Treaty includedthepreceding, the , London-New York: Routledge;pp.188-304. (‘For aEuropeanCivil ProtectionForce: Europe Aid’, 9May 2006)mentionedfourpossible , Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press;pp.134-153. Security and Defence Policy in the European Union European the in Policy Defence and Security trio , instead,isonlyatCouncillevel: threecountriescoordinatetheiragendasand Foreign Ministries in the European Union: Integrating Diplomats Integrating Union: European the in Ministries Foreign , Oxford:OxfordUniversity Press;quot.in8,pp.91-112. multiplicateur de puissance de multiplicateur The Council of Ministers of Council The acquis , Basingstoke:Palgrave Macmillan; communautarisation’ ) by aUSscholar: seeR.Ginsberg , Boulder:Lynne Rienner. International Relations and Relations International The Actors in Europe’s Europe’s in Actors The , Basingstoke:Palgrave – datesback tothe existing of CFSP. See framework: , 27 November 2007 28 November 2007 are currentlynofewerthan22 Alongside the Gloannec Le The dynamicsof institutionalisation Anne-Marie and Howorth Jolyon By The institutionallogicbehindtheEEAS Last butnotleast,withtheirlegitimacy atstake, these newinstitutions and securitypolicy decision-makingprocess. This isoneofthemostimportantproducts,orby-products, oftheEUforeign processes andoutlooksrequiredwhen decisionsaretobetakencollectively. socialisation processamongparticipants–the‘Europeanisation’ofpolicy unfulfilled forawhile. Butonthepositive side,itproducesandsustainsa act beforeitisready todosoandsuch expectationsmay therefore beleft There is,ofcourse,ariskinthisapproach thattheEUmay berequiredto also raises expectationswhich inturngenerate new obligations. provide toolsfordeveloping policiesandimplementingthem,theircreation action. Institutionscreatetheirown needs.Besidestheobvious factthatthey There aremany merits tothisapproach ofcreatinginstitutionsbeforetaking skeleton withoutmuch fleshandblood. engineering, while thefledglingdefencedimensionwas mainlyaninstitutional As such, inthe1990sCFSPwas primarilyanexercise ininstitutional to addresscommonforeignpolicy questions. devise aCommonForeign and SecurityPolicy (CFSP)andnewmechanisms time, institutionswerethemostplausibleanswer tothepressingneed Rationalisation ofthesystemseemsdesirable, ifnotinevitable.For along Commission’s overseas delegations. decision-shaping andmaking–thatdoesnotincludetheEuropean Common Foreign andSecurityPolicy/European SecurityandDefencePolicy foreign andsecuritypolicy. institutions facilitates–orcomplicatestheprocessof devisingaEuropean set or, toputitmoreexplicitly, towhat extent thelogicofthesenew deliver. The keyquestionistowhat extenttheyfulfilltheoverall objective require genuineefficiency inoutput. They areunderscrutiny andneed to national bodies thatshapeforeignandsecuritypolicy, there European bodies which have aninputinto defence policy, asimilar, andpowerful, At each junctureinthedevelopment ofaEuropeanforeign,securityand Institution-building and‘Brusselisation’: thehistorical record need, andenshrinedinthe1992Maastricht Treaty, wereprobablythebest The intergovernmental structuresandproceduresdevisedtorespondthis demanded ever greatercoordination. EU foreignpolicy, now understoodasgoingfarbeyond trade talks, end oftheCold War. Given auni-polarworld andachaotic ‘nearabroad’, politics, was –moreimportantlyaquasi-inevitableconsequenceofthe The CFSP, atonelevel aFranco-German trade-off betweenmoneyand establishment oftheCouncilSecretariat. primarily aboutmarkets.Itwas this,atleastinpart,which ledtothe with onevoice where possible–even ifthosediscussionswerestill Brussels) was aseriousobstacletoeffortsspeaktherestofworld Internal Market,thattheabsenceofacentral coordinationmechanism (in during thediscussionson1986SingleEuropean Act which createdthe circus’ mode,theEuropeanPolitical Cooperation (EPC)eventually decided, (WEU) coincidedwithitsformaltransfer toBrusselsenableitcarryout The referenceintheMaastricht Treaty tothe Western EuropeanUnion lead toacommondefence”. the eventual framing ofacommondefencepolicy […] which mightintime “shall includeallquestionsrelatingtothesecurityof the Union,including Maastricht, exceptforatentative andconvoluted formulationwhereby it However, the ‘security’componentofCFSPwas lefthighanddryat and Brussels-basedcoordination. for CFSP, whose underlyingdynamic was two-fold: externalrepresentation ‘Maastricht left-overs’) was thecreationofpost ofHighRepresentative few innovations inthe1997 Amsterdam Treaty (designedtotackle the major players, buttheywereclearlygoingtoprove inadequate.Oneofthe that couldbeachieved atthetime,given theconstraints facingsomeofthe After several decadesofoperating in leads inexorably tothecreationofaBrussels-basedinstitution. among andbetweennationalcapitalseventually proves inadequate,and form oranotherof‘Brusselisation’–hasprevailed. Policy coordination ad hoc ad institutional intergovernmental ‘travelling logic –involving some 29 November 2007 30 November 2007 ‘events’ –predominantly The same institutional logicwas atwork inallofthesedevelopments: The institutionallogic are likelytoprove tooexhausting,complicatedand toocostly. logic. ‘Rolling’roadshows may have theirattractions, butsoonerorlaterthey Member Statesbalkatthenotionofapermanentcollege,ithasaninherent more logicalthanthattheyshouldgettoknow each other? Although certain If troopsfromalltheEUMemberStatesaretooperate together, what couldbe 2002 andthenattheBelgianMilitary Academy in2003. Européenne des Académies Militaires(CEAM),which firstmetatStCyrin project faded,itwas resurrectedinanew(security)formby theConférence institution toescapethelogicofBrusselisation. Although thatinitialIHEDN gave risetotheEUInstituteforSecurityStudies–dateonlyCFSP Défense Nationale(IHEDN)metinParis inOctober1988and(indirectly) the Cold War. The first WEU sessionoftheInstitutdesHautesEtudesde The logicoftheEuropeanSecurityandDefenceCollegepredatesend Military CommitteeandtheStaffbecamefunctionallyindispensable. Security Committee(PSC)replacedtheperipateticPolitical Committee,andthe Declaration, which rapidly gave risetomoreBrusselisation:thePolitical and itself hadtobecomethekeyplayer. Hencethe Anglo-French Saint-Malo political decision-shaping,andsomeautonomousmilitarycapacity. The EU What was neededwas much strongerinstitutionalcapacityinBrusselsfor The creationoftheESDPbecameinescapablebecauseESDIdidnotwork. WEU was partoftheproblem,notsolution. Brussels-based inputs. What onlybecameclearwithhindsightwas thatthe involved thatforeignandsecuritypolicy coordinationrequiredstrong Meeting), proved toogreatfortheinstitutionitself.Itwas cleartothose of theentireESDIstory(especiallyafterJune 1996BerlinMinisterial But theexpectationsplacedon WEU, which founditselfthecornerstone and theEUbutalsobetweennationalcapitalsBrussels. capitalising onthisBrussels-basedcoordinationnotonlybetweenNATO European SecurityandDefenceIdentity(ESDI),invented asaway of UK andtheEU–moreeffectively. Beforelong,thiswas followed by the its fewseriousduties–liaisingbetweenFrance andNATO, andbetweenthe external ones –required internal policy coordination; Planning Cell–firstinrelationtoitsvery existence,andthenover itssizeand the PSC. And itwas evidentyet againinthenegotiationsonCivil-Military It was evidentagaininthe debateover thelevel ofseniority ofambassadorsto remained unfilledformorethantwo years). Representative forCFSP (ajobwhich, forthisreasonamongothers, control. This was evidentinthediscussionsonappointing High suspects’, themainimperative was fornationalcapitalstomaintaintight A debateensuedonthelevel ofsenioritythesenewbodies.For the‘usual own creativity. others –thantheyfoundthemselves wrestlingwiththeimplicationsoftheir institution –theCouncilSecretariat,HighRepresentative forCFSP, and sooner hadtheMemberStatesdecidedtoestablishanewBrussels-based There isalsoanother–countervailing –logicatplay: politicallogic.No The politicallogic Very fewinstitutionswere setback requireditsown, specificsolution. if each newproblem,each newquestion,each pushforward oreach the mostobvious ispreciselythatofinstitutionalproliferation. Itseemedas However, institutionalengineeringhasanumberofseriouspitfalls:one effectively toexternalpressures. world, buttheyhadtobecreatedcentrally (inBrussels)torespondmore new institutionshadtobecreatedmeetthepressingdemandsofoutside European External Action Service. The lessonsofthishistoryneedtobelearnedandappliedinrelationthe (COREPER) andthePSC:moreoftenthannotcompetitionhascreptin. similar level, such astheCommitteeofPermanent Representations cooperation betweentwo institutionsworking onsimilarproblemsatafairly Another majorproblemhasbeenthequestionofcoordinationand have notdisappeared. the Political Committeewas notaninstitutionbutanetwork anditsmembers exception andwas certainlynotcharacteristic ofthewhole process.Infact, discarded. The replacementofthePolitical Committeeby thePSCwas an replaced by newones;very fewwereactually 31 November 2007 32 November 2007 To date,common sense (assistedby clever politicalfootwork inkeyareas) whole EU policy process. political bodies,theonlydemocratically electedpoliticalactorsinthe logical communitarisationofforeignandsecuritypolicy. They arealso approach. Governments arenotjustobstaclesintheway ofanallegedly greater inter-pillar synergy. Itwas this which ledEuropeanHeadsofState choice ofpost-holder),but alsorecognisedthatcoherencedemandedever creation ofthepostHighRepresentative forCFSP(and,particularly, the the whole process. Thus, MemberStatesnotonlyeventually acceptedthe has always prevailed –ashasthesameinstitutionallogicwhich hasdriven fact, intertwine.Itisnotaquestionofinter-governmental well-known, thedistinctionbetweentwo isfarfromclear-cut andthey, in exemplified intheCFSP)andCommunityapproach –although,asis This certainlyreflectstwo differentlogics–theinter-governmental logic(as (Community policies),duplicationbecameunavoidable. (Common Foreign andSecurity Policy) andtheneedtowork withthefirst Political Cooperation. Yet withtheconsolidationofsecondpillar Commission atarm’s lengthandtoprevent itfrominterferinginEuropean structure. Onthecontrary, governments soughtatfirsttokeepthe Duplication didnotensuefromtheadditionofnew‘pillars’toUnion in controlofforeignandsecuritypolicy. This derives fromgovernments’ (entirelylegitimate)determinationtoremain nervousness innationalcapitalsandcausesacertainamountofduplication. The logicofBrusselisationiscompelling,but itcreatescountervailing EU MinisterforForeign Affairs, forcing achange inthename. reference (andbudget),andin2007,over thetitleandremitofproposed remit. The sametensionsaroseover theEuropeanDefence Agency’s termsof approaches, anotherdualismexists:apoliticallogic Besides thisdichotomy betweentheintergovernmental andCommunity for someofthem,butitisinevitable. assume thattheywillchange course. This may beanuncomfortablereality this samepathforthepastquarterofacentury, andthereislittlereasonto The MemberStateshave inched theirway nervously butirreversibly down but ofthemostpractical way tomakethemwork inharmony. versus versus a moretechnical supranational, certainly performavery importantfunctionthatother similarEUinstitutions Aside frominformingforeignpolicy-making andaction,theEEASwillalmost policy system,orwillitbelookeduponasacompetitor? powerful andresilientenoughtofostercoherenceinside theoverall foreign the ground(forinstance,development aidinthird countries)? Will itbe EEAS andEUSpecialRepresentatives? Will itbeabletocoordinatework on relationship bebetweennationaldelegationsandEEAS,orthe proactive intermsofforeignpolicy initiatives. In particular, what willthe to theentireEUsystem.Itisalsodoubtfulthatitwillprove strongly It isdoubtfulthatitwillprovide moreinformationthaniscurrentlyavailable what ‘added-value’ canitbring? the serviceprovides theUnionwithcapacitiesithasnothadtodate.So The EEASwillstrengthentheEU’s capacitytoactas a foreignpolicy agentif sets ofministries.Every MemberStatewelcomesthis. progressively narrowed theknowledge andunderstandinggapbetween27 years. Virtual communitieslinkedby e-mail,telephoneandair-miles have Exchanges ofdiplomatsandotherofficialshave takenplaceforalmost20 strengthen andemphasiseitscapacityasaforeignpolicy agent. seems necessaryfortheEUtohave aspecificservicewhich could call forsuch aforeignservice,emulatingthoseofstates.Inotherwords, it Obviously, thecreationofequivalent ofaForeign Ministerappearsto The dynamics behindtheEEASfollow the sameinstitutionallogic. The dynamicsbehindtheEEAS take placewithouttheBrussels-basedinstitutions. stakes inKosovo and Afghanistan beingratcheted upever higher)couldnot PSC hasalready establisheditselfasirreplaceable.ESDPmissions(withthe entirely attheircommand. The factis–andtheyallrecognisethisthatthe occasionally give theimpressionthattheyregardPSCasaninstrument growing Commissioninputstothework ofthePSC.Somegovernments Similarly, wehave witnessedtheacceptanceby allMemberStatesof by appointingafamiliarfiguretothepositioneven beforeitexisted). Minister forForeign Affairs (althoughtheyimmediatelyreassuredthemselves and Government toagree(in2004)thecreationofa(cross-pillar)Union 33 November 2007 34 November 2007 oiius Paris. Politiques, desSciences Nationale Fondation et deRecherches Internationales), LeAnne-Marie ofResearch GloannecisDirector atCERI(Centred'Etudes and JeanMonnetProfessor ofEuropeanPolitics ofBath. attheUniversity Jolyon Howorth Professor is Visiting Scienceat ofPolitical Yale University achieved by working together. significant resultsintheforeignandsecurityfield,thesearemostoftenbest If Europeans–asindividual MemberStatesorcollectively -wishtoachieve their own contributions;itissimplytherecognitionofagrowing reality. and actalikewho areeffective. This isnoslurontheMemberStatesor challenges –demandsEuropeanpersonnelwho work together, who think The externalworld –intheshapeofdiplomatic opportunitiesandsecurity value here,althoughitobviously cannotsolve thisproblemonitsown. areas, itislessvisiblethanotherforeignpolicy agents. The EEASshouldadd matched by visibility:despitetheEUinitiatives intheMiddleEastandother Union’s practical actionsontheground. Yet thispresencehasnotbeen Commission DelegationsandEUSpecialRepresentatives, aswellby the This presencehascertainlyalready beenstrengthenedby theEuropean It isalsolikelytoreinforce theEU’s presenceandvisibilityinthirdcountries. might eventually contributetoharmonisingtheforeignpolicy process. of devisingEuropeanways ofthinking,habits,codesandprocedures–which have nurtured–thatofcreatinganEUmould,fosteringaEuropeanspirit, the EEASwilllargelydependonwhether ornotitcanmakeaneffective These suggestionsarebasedontwo assumptions.First, thatthesuccess of experience withenhanceddiplomaticcooperation inthirdcountries. practice ofnationaldiplomatic representationsandfromprevious To thisend, paper aimstomakeafewsuggestionsdrawn fromthe division oflabourbetween thedifferentactorsinthirdcountries. Reform Treaty willbeafirstbutcrucialstep in working outthefuture distinctly national,interests.Giving theEUalegalpersonalityinnew interests andforeignpolicy prioritiesrelatetoMemberStates’ongoing, This reflectsarelative neglectofthefundamentalquestionhow theEU’s new service. and nationaldiplomaticservices,thusonthescoperemitof far lessagreementonhow todivide competencesbetweentheEEAS coherent representationoftheUnionabroadisnecessary. There is,however, Most expertsagreethattheEUneedsthiscapacityandamore national foreignpolicy prioritiesandinterests. potentially challenges thecurrentseparation ordistinctionofEuropeanand EU’s external relations,theenvisaged EuropeanExternal Action Service(EEAS) By creatingadedicateddiplomaticcapacitytosupporttheconductof third countries. EU function,mainlyinrepresentingtheUnion’s rotatingPresidency in of theEU’s MemberStateshave gradually alsocometoassumean diplomatic system.Over thepastfewdecades,however, theembassies between statesandremainoneofthemaincharacteristics ofthe of ambassador, arethetraditional channel forconductingrelations ‘Resident’ diplomaticmissions,headedby adiplomatwiththerank interests abroad. role: theyserve bothtorepresentthe‘sending’stateandhelpprotectits Member States’embassiesinthirdcountriescurrentlyperformadual Whitman Richard and Rijks David By trends andoptions European diplomatic representation inthird countries: 35 November 2007 36 November 2007 to theEU. especially Poland –andthisdespite(orpossiblybecauseof?)theiraccession stagnation amongtheEU-15andanincrease Visegrad countries, is aclearupward trend.More specifically, andinterestingly, therehasbeen ministries would sparkadecreaseinthenumberofembassies abroad,there In contrast tothewidely-heldassumptionthatfinancial pressuresonforeign (sub) regions. shows majordifferencesinMemberStates’diplomaticpresencedifferent remain betweenregionsintherate ofexpansion. The tablebelow also Despite thisgeneral increase,however, importantgeographical differences as agrouparecatching upwiththeolderonesinalmostevery region. patterns arerather similar, butinabsolutetermsthenewMemberStates embassies ofboththeEU-10andEU-15aroundworld. The relative The datadecisively pointstoanincreaseintheabsolutenumberof the Unionin2004and‘old’EU-15as Table 1below comparesthetrendsintenMemberStateswho joined the then25EUMemberStatesfrom2000to2006atthree-year intervals. This sectionsurveys thegeneral keytrendsinpatternsofrepresentation Patterns of national representation Developments inMemberStates’ diplomatic representation resident embassy. perceive theirintereststobestrongenoughopenormaintaina analysis, astheseprovide insightintowhere MemberStatesgenerally Trends innationalrepresentationarethestartingpointforour most effective. interest. This cantakevarious forms,ofwhich theresidentembassyis representations inthirdcountrieswhere theyperceive somesortofnational services. Second,thatstateswant tomaintainoropentheirown diplomatic EU MemberStatesandavoiding competitionwiththeirown diplomatic contribution toEUforeignpolicy, while alsoproviding addedbenefitsfor geographic region. groups andthevariation inthenumberofreceiving statesper coefficient isusedasacontrolforthedifferentsizesoftwo 1 groups . A standardised . A Table 1: Comparison of representation coefficients between EU-10 and EU-15 in third states for 2000-2006. 2000 2003 2006 EU-10 EU-15 EU-10 EU-15 EU-10 EU-25 November 2007 November AFRICA 9.73 38.44 10.42 38.28 11.44 38.32 Eastern Africa 6.47 36.09 5.88 36.47 4.71 39.22 Middle Africa 3.33 28.14 3.33 28.14 4.44 29.63 Northern Africa 25.71 61.90 28.57 62.86 34.29 61.90 Southern Africa 10.00 37.33 10.00 36.00 10.00 33.33 Western Africa 3.13 28.75 4.36 27.92 3.75 27.50 AMERICAS 26.64 54.41 29.21 53.66 31.60 54.06 Caribbean 0.77 18.46 3.08 17.44 3.08 18.46 Central America 7.50 44.17 8.75 43.33 10.00 45.00 South America 18.30 58.33 20.00 57.22 18.33 56.11 Northern America 80.00 96.67 85.00 96.67 95.00 96.67 ASIA 17.39 43.82 19.21 45.79 26.57 49.30 Central Asia 8.00 20.00 10.00 25.33 20.00 26.67 Eastern Asia 30.00 52.22 35.00 53.33 43.33 56.67 Southern Asia 16.67 45.19 14.44 44.44 16.67 51.11 South-east Asia 15.50 46.67 17.27 52.12 19.09 53.33 Western Asia 15.63 55.00 19.36 53.75 33.75 58.75 EUROPE 38.75 68.33 40.42 71.09 47.08 73.89 Eastern Europe 48.33 67.78 46.67 65.55 65.00 70.00 EFTA states 40.00 75.56 40.00 77.78 40.00 77.78 Southern Europe 21.67 42.22 30.00 52.22 38.33 58.89 OCEANIA 7.50 20.97 7.50 20.14 10.00 18.89 Australia/NZ 30.00 70.00 30.00 66.67 40.00 63.33 Melanesia 0.00 11.67 0.00 11.67 0.00 10.00 Micronesia 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 Polynesia 0.00 2.22 0.00 2.22 0.00 2.22 TOTAL 19.42 44.82 20.76 45.45 24.76 46.61

Streamlining national representation

This is not to say that budget cuts are irrelevant, although the main question is how Member States respond to these challenges. Importantly, most countries find ‘solutions’ within their own diplomatic services and thus they

37 38 November 2007 have a option istohave anembassyheadedby a representation isnotpossibleorappropriate.Inthesecases,afrequently-used physical diplomaticpresenceinacountryeven thoughambassador-level In somesituations,MemberStatesdeemitdesirable tomaintainapermanent embassy isnotpossibleordesirable, avariety ofoptionshave developed. travel totheassignedcountryperiodically, buttheirofficeisinthehomecapital. or morecountriesbutarebasedintheMinistryofForeign Affairs athome. They Taking thisconceptonestepfurther, roving ambassadorsareaccreditedtoone state’s interests areregionalrather thancountry-specific. This canbringimportantbenefitsofscale,especiallywhen thesending regional embassies,withonediplomaticmissioncovering several countries. a cost-effective formofrepresentation,andisoftenusedinconjunctionwith ambassador toonecountryisalsoaccreditedormoreothers. This is a thirdstateistouse‘side’(ormultiple)accreditations,where aresident An alternative tohaving apermanentand/orextensive physical presencein diplomatic representationsisthereforequestionable. conducting bilateral affairs.Usingthemassubstitutesfor(political) representation, butdonotcarrythesameweightasresidentembassiesin commercial interests.Consulatesensuresomesortofpermanent citizens ofthe‘sending’statein‘receiving’ stateandpromoting subordinate toembassiesandtheirtasksaregenerally restrictedtoassisting consulates. Headedby aconsulrather thananambassador, theyare Another way ofmaintaininganationalpresenceinthirdcountries isvia office space,localsupportstaffandsecuritymeasures. are lesssignificant,astherestillconsiderable costsinvolved inproviding are mainlypolitical-thefinancialbenefitscomparedtoresidentembassies simply ‘representation’arethemostcommon. The advantages ofthisoption This arrangement goesby various names,ofwhich ‘embassyoffice’or downgrading oftheirimportance. have reservations aboutthisformofrepresentation, interpretingitasa with roving ambassadorsinparticular–isthatsome receiving statesmay the mainproblemsassociatedwiththeseaccreditations ingeneral –and Although thisapproach is increasinglyfavoured by MemberStates, oneof national character. Inplaceswhere openingormaintainingaresident chargé d’affaires chargé . sharing ofdiplomatic space inanotherMemberState’s mission.Furthermore, inpolitically for examplethroughlower buildingcostsormoving to lessexpensive office importantly, itreducesthecostsofa(semi-)permanentnational presence, Sharing diplomaticfacilitieshasanumberofdistinct advantages. Most Member Stateshave participatedinthese larger projects. Development andtheCommissionDelegation. To date,noneofthenew Embassies, theUKHighCommission,DepartmentofInternational second largestproject,inDarEsSalaam,involves theGermanandDutch the EuropeanCommissionarecurrentlylocatedinnewcompound. The of theprojectsinceitwas firstproposedin2001,andonlyfourstates has notproducedtheintendedresults.Many MemberStateshave optedout The mostambitiousplan,foranEUembassycompoundin Abuja, Nigeria, levels oflocalcooperation: thesharingofdiplomatic arrangements inthirdcountries. This paperdistinguishesbetweentwo main and masksimportantdifferencesinthescopeintensityofjoint The term“diplomaticcooperation”, asitisoftenused,rather ambiguous these, 77werehometoatleastoneresidentembassyoftheEU-15. 90 thirdcountrieswhere noneofthenewEUmemberswas represented;of representation throughoneofthe‘old’membersabound:in2006,therewere Member States,forexample,opportunitiestoensuresomesortof significant reductionsinoverhead andinfrastructure costs.For thenewer with otherEUmembers’bilateral embassies,which canpotentiallyyield Many MemberStateshave studiedthepossibilityofenhancingcooperation Joint representation inthird countries the majorityofprojectsinvolving onlytwo tothreepartners. arrangements todatehave beenlimitedtofive MemberStatesatmost,with Although thenumberofcountriesinvolved tendstodiffer, successfulsharing problems, andmutualmaterialpractical assistance. security measures,thepoolingofinformationonadministrative orpractical Other examplesincludethejointuseofcommunications(i.e.diplomaticbags), together withotherMemberStatesorrentingofficespacetoEUdiplomats. location’), which involves eitherconstructinganewembassycompound The formerincludestheshareduseofembassypremises(oftenreferredtoas‘co- capabilities . facilities 2 and the 39 November 2007 40 November 2007 procedures, hierarchy and culturearejustsomeofthem.Othernotorious capabilities very difficult.Differencesinforeignservices’ administrative practical obstaclesoftenmake the effective sharingofdiplomatic disadvantages. Apart fromobvious concernsaboutsovereignty, arange of Few examplesofthistypecooperation canbefound,asithasnoticeable previous presencethroughanothermember’s residentmission. organise someformofrepresentationinathirdcountrywhere ithadno What definesthistypeofcooperation isthataMemberStateready to embassies intheplaceswhere theywerenotpreviouslypresent. successful, asboththeUKandFrance have sinceopenedfullseparate possibility ofactingonbehalfeach other. The experimentwas notvery at thetime)andCôted’Ivoire (which hadnoBritishEmbassy)withthe not represented,andtoexperimentinGhana(which hadnoFrench Embassy between localembassies,inparticularwhere oneortheotherpartnerwas In thiscase,thetwo countriesagreedtointensifytheexchange ofinformation in Africa aspartoftheDecember1998Saint-MaloDeclaration. states, such astheJoint Declaration by theUKand France oncooperation representation. This requiresanexplicitagreementbetweentwo ormore the poolingofdiplomaticcapabilitiescanbeconsideredaformcommon As asubstitutefornationalpresenceintheformofresidentmission,only of officialstoeach other’s missionsorexchanging politicalinformation. representative tasksinthirdcountries,forexamplethroughthesecondment involve diplomaticcapabilities,i.e.thesharingofand The vast majorityofcooperation initiatives concernfacilities.Far fewer national diplomaticpresence. meetings. Sharingdiplomaticfacilitiescannotinpractice substitutefora increase inbothfinancialexpenditureandthetimespentjointNordic representation abroad,the‘commonNordicdimension’inBerlinledtoan though thisprojectwas initiatedwiththeaimofreducingcosts has asymbolicfunction:theembassies’operations arestilldistinct.Even as resources. Their jointembassybuildinginBerlin,forexample,mainly In thecaseofNordiccountries,symbolismisjustasimportant to enhancethesafetyofembassies. unstable areas,co-locationandjointsecuritymeasureshave proved useful 3 access tomaterialwhich theydidnotpreviouslyreceive. give someMemberStates withoutrepresentationinthatcountry/region of informationfromthefield. The availability of‘EU-made’informationwill Similarly, themainbenefitsformostMemberStatesrelateto thegathering boost thecoherenceandeffectiveness ofEUforeignpolicy. both theUnion’s first(Community)andsecond (CFSP)pillars,theEEAScould numbers. Furthermore,by beingabletodraw moreeasilyonresources from having asingleEU‘ambassador’rather than27rotatingnamesandtelephone important arethebenefitsforEU’s externalrepresentationresultingfrom ‘EU-made’ informationtofueltheUnion’s foreignpolicy-making. Equally Some oftheexpectedkeybenefitsEEASlieinitscapacitytoprovide Strengthening common representation ability toaccommodatethesechanges. in nationalforeignservices,asthesuccessofEEASmay dependonits general. At thesametime,carefulattentionshouldbepaidtodevelopments service’s strengthsinmuch thesameway as fromEUforeignpolicy in question. This issignificantasMemberStatescouldbenefit fromthe trends innationalforeignservicesanddiplomacy arekeyinanswering this Although oftenneglectedindiscussionsaboutinstitutionalcompetence, service’s eventual success. cement cooperation betweenthemandtheEEAS,thusfavours the complementarity withMemberStates’diplomaticrepresentations,helps on thecomplexquestionofhow toconstructtheEEASinaway thatensures Service? The following debatingpointsareacontribution tothediscussion How aretheseexperiencesrelevant fortheEuropeanExternal Action Implications andoptions capabilities seemstohave takenpriorityinrecentyears. international system,developing anationalnetwork ofdiplomatic Having onlyrelatively recentlyregainedindependenceasactors inthe the importanceofwaving thenationalflagshouldnotbeunderestimated. For theMemberStateswhich joinedtheEUin2004and2007particular, sharing ofsensitive information. stumbling blocks includesecurityprotocolsandregulationsregardingthe 41 November 2007 42 November 2007 I I I three broadcategories: individual MemberStatesindifferentgeographical locations. These fallinto considerable variation intherange ofdiplomaticcapabilitiesrequiredby reduce theriskofduplication,itisimperative totakeinto accountthe To makethebestpossibleuseofpotentialstrengthsEEASandto capabilities,Maximising minimisingduplication ambassadors ofsmallerMemberStatesdonotroutinelyenjoy. ambassador islikelytohave accesstoahoststate’s government atalevel that information orconveying theEUpositiontoforeigninterlocutors, for allnationalambassadorstoduplicatetheseefforts. When requesting Ministry ofForeign Affairs onbehalfoftheUnionislikelytoreduceneed scale. Over time,anEUambassadormakingenquirieswiththehostcountry’s The gatheringofthisinformationisalsolikelyto bringimportantbenefitsof departments couldbemaintained. example, bilateral trade sectionsandpolitical,cultural, anddefence material, perhapsfacilitatedby nationaldiplomatsontheground.For by theEEAS couldbecomplementedby country-specificpolitico-economic take theformofaresidentembassy. The moregeneral informationgathered wish toensureapermanentnationalpresence,althoughthisneednotalways Regions in which Member States take a strong interest, or third countries countries third or interest, strong a take States Member which in Regions national little relatively have States Member which in areas Geographical Areas and countries in which Member States perceive some of their foreign foreign their of functions may bedesired,aswellhighlevels ofstaffingandthehighest some perceive States Member which in countries and Areas of regionaland/orroving ambassadors. opinions tohostgovernments, perhapssupplementedby theoccasionaluse position, theEuropeandiplomaticservicemightsufficetocommunicate be anattractive option. As nationalpoliciesarelikelytooverlap withtheEU developments inthecountriesquestion.RelianceonEEASwould then requirements arelimitedtogatheringgeneral informationabout often minimal.Intheseinstances,mostMemberStates’diplomatic policy interests to be outside the EU framework, and/or where they have have they where and/or framework, EU the outside be to interests policy profile higher a has policy foreign national where interest strong bilateral relations and wish to maintain detailed national reporting reporting national detailed maintain to wish and relations bilateral strong capabilities . Here,theneedtomaintainapermanentdiplomaticrepresentationis . Intheseinstances,thefullspectrumofnationalembassy . Here,MemberStatesmay in thefollowing terms: The intendedgeographical scopeoftheEEAS network couldbeexpressed Scenarios for determining thescope of thenetwork inthird countries useful symbiosiswithMemberStates’foreignservices. exploring thedifferentscenariosunderwhich theEEAScoulddevelop a These variations inMemberStates’diplomaticrequirementsjustify A fulfil thatrolelocally). not have anembassyinathirdcountry, andreliesonotherswhich do,to presidencies (when aMemberStateholdingtherotatingEUPresidency does help tackle someoftheproblemscurrentlyassociatedwithlocal taking aconsistentdiplomaticapproach toallthirdcountries. This would retained intheReform Treaty (Art.188q),anditsmain advantage liesin This arrangement was reflectedintheDraft Constitutional Treaty andis or specificEUforeignpolicy priorities. EU Delegations,irrespective ofpatterns national diplomaticrepresentation the Unionwould seektotransform allcurrentCommissionDelegations into (eventually) have staffinallEUmissions in thirdcountries.Underthisoption, Maximalist versus minimalist The minimalist versus Maximalist advantage, astherehasbeenaspectacularincrease inthenumberofsuch assuming theresponsibilitiesoflocalpresidency. This would beasignificant A dedicatedEUembassywould relieve MemberStates oftheburden a fewMemberStatesarepresent. the mostpressingproblemsoflocalrepresentationin countries where only by individual Member States.EUembassieswould beestablishedtosolve on asystemofregionalhubsand/orfillinggapsinthe‘coverage’ provided minimalist States’ diplomaticcontactshasactuallydecreased. relationships separate andseparable fromthosesharedby all27EUMember not increasedgreatlyinrecentyears: infact,thenumberofspecial number ofMemberStateswhich have ‘specialrelations’withthirdpartieshas level ofsecurityfornationalinformation.Itshould,however, benotedthat the maximalist approach would meanlessuniversal missions,(perhaps) based approach isbasedonthepremisethatservicewill 43 November 2007 44 November 2007 number ofstatesinthethirdgroup,particularthose withthepotentially diplomatic capabilitiesamongsttheMemberStates outlined above. The This would reflecttheincreasingvariance inforeignpolicy prioritiesand given thirdcountry. those which donotwish,orareunable,tohave arepresentationinany Member States’representation),theycouldoperate as ‘subcontractors’ for implementation ofEUforeignpolicy (andarenotintendedtoreplace Although theUniondelegationsaretaskedwithadvancing the Role andfunctionof theUnionDelegations Conversely, the needed most. diplomatic services,which have established missionswhere theywere This approach would mirrorthedevelopment ofexistingnational the basisofwhere theEUis‘deepening’itsforeignpolicy commitments. commitments, andtheestablishmentofmissionsisdeterminedon in theareaswhere italready has‘heavy’ CFSP/externalrelations The third countrieswould bebasedonsubstantive foreignpolicy considerations. An alternative rationale forthedevelopment ofEUdiplomaticrepresentationin inorganic versus Organic represented atambassadorlevel. stories arelikelytobeinthirdcountrieswhere fewEUmembersare especially initsfirstyears ofoperation. For thisreason,thekeysuccess circumstances, itremainstobeseenhow effective theEEAScanbe, duplicating thework oftheircolleaguesinnationalembassies.Underthese embassies, EEASstaffinEUembassiesaremuch morelikelytorisk Conversely, inplaceswhere many MemberStatesmaintainresident have asmallstaff. this responsibilitycanbeoverwhelming, particularlyformissionsthatonly local presidenciesover thepastfewyears andtheworkload associatedwith decision accordingly. on asetnumberofmissionsitwants (orcanafford)andimplementsthis organic approach isbasedontheideathatEUestablishesmissions inorganic principle isthattheUniondecidesup-front that couldbefollowed elsewhere ifdeemeddesirable. it would streamlineanumberofpractical issuesand producea‘blueprint’ One oftheadvantages ofthisoptionover current co-location projectsisthat rationalise nationalforeignservices. ‘spokes’ ofaregionalembassy(thehub). This would contributetoefforts example, provide administrative supporttoaroving ambassadororasthe but would benefitfromitsinformationcapacityandlocalcontactsto,for number ofcases. These diplomatswould not be formallypartoftheEEAS, national diplomatsfrominterestedMemberStatescouldbeusefulina Providing officespaceintheUnionDelegationsforalimitednumberof ground while takingadvantage oftheEUDelegations’activities. could helpcaterfortheirdesirealimiteddiplomaticpresenceonthe alternatives tohaving aresidentambassador. Inmany places,theEEAS embassies proliferated, butMemberStateshave alsoexploredvarious representation where possible.Notonlyhasthenumberofresident As outlinedabove, mostEUstatesprefertohave someformofnational third countriesamidstchanging foreignpolicy demands. opportunity toexplorenewapproaches tomaintainingarepresentationin One ofthekeyadvantages theEEASoffersforMemberStatesis Co-location co-location andsubcontraction. Two possibleoptionstostructurethiscooperation areadvanced here: diplomatic structures. help countriesseekingfurthercooperation betweennationalandEuropean representation thatthisgenerates begsthequestionofhow theEEAScould in which theypreviouslyhadlittleinterest. The pressurefordiplomatic had todevelop acertainamountof‘new’foreignpolicy towards countries virtually every regionintheworld, thesmallerEUstates,inparticular, have has increased.InresponsetotheexistenceofEU-definedpositionson harmonisation offoreignpoliciesandhave fewerdiplomaticresources By contrast, thenumberofcountrieswhich aremore receptive togreater marginally over thelasttwo decades. greater logistical,humanandfinancialcapabilities,hasincreasedonly 45 November 2007 46 November 2007 diplomatic missionsintheearly21 practices, itprovides anopportunitytoreassesstheroleandfunctionof However, as the EEASisunencumberedby history, tradition orpast forms andpurposesofdiplomaticrepresentationinthirdcountries. Much oftheabove ispredicatedonthetraditional understandingofthe Finding theright model collectively throughEUforeignpolicy. foreign policy interestswhich extendbeyond thosealready pursued network inthirdcountries,and/ortaketheviewthattheydonothave states which faceresource constraints inrunning anextensive embassy that allows thelattertoactforthem. This arrangement islikely toappeal representation inthirdcountriestoEUDelegationsby signinganagreement Alternatively, MemberStatescoulddecidetosubcontract their Subcontraction contractual basis. States withexcessembassyspacetoaccommodatetheEEASona circumstances ifthisoptionispursued.OnepossibilitymightbeforMember Commission Delegationswould bethemostappropriatebuildingsinall creative thinkingwould berequiredonthequestionofwhether thecurrent Not allthecurrentCommissionDelegationswillbelargeenough,and accommodate allthenationaldiplomatsinterestedinhaving abasethere. Potential pitfallscouldincludethelack ofspaceinUnionDelegationsto the EUDelegations. different ‘hosts’,butcouldbenefitfromstandardisedproceduresat third countrieswould nolongerhave toseekarrangements with Member Statesinterestedinco-locatingdiplomaticpersonnel for instance,todifferencesinadministrative andsecuritycultures. Many oftheseprojectsarefraught withpractical difficulties,relating, should theEEASorganiseitselfalonglinestraditionally associatedwith effectively conductedby outsourcing ittootherorganisations?Indeed, staff inthirdcountries?Mightconsular-type work, forexample, bemore information gathering/representationwithoutnecessarily having extensive so far:towhat extentcould theEEAS‘outsource’ anduseITforefficient Yet this,inturn,generates anumberofquestionsthathave notbeenraised st century. .Inconsularaffairsthismay beadifferentmatter. Estonia,forexample,which doesnotmaintainan embassyin 3. For example, theUKandGermanrepresentationssharepremisesin Astana, Lima,QuitoandReykjavik; the 2. The representationcoefficientiscalculatedby dividing thesumofrepresentationsin onegeographic region 1. Endnotes Centre’s EUNeighbourhoodForum. ofBathandChairtheEuropeanPolicy University and ModernLanguages, ofEuropeanStudies Department Richard Whitman isProfessor ofPolitics, of Cambridge. University Studies, CentreofInternational Candidate, David RijksisaPh.D. significantly toputtingthefledgingEEASonrighttrack. Addressing, ifnotanswering infull,allthesequestionswillcontribute such transnational businessorganisations? organisation andrepresentationthatmightbeborrowed fromothercontexts diplomatic representationinthirdcountries? Are therealternative modelsof the Finnish EmbassyinNewDelhi. India, hasensuredrepresentationonconsularandtrade issuesin2005throughaconsulardiplomatbased Luxembourg inanumberofCentral Asian and African countries. UK andItalyinMinsk;theUK,Germany, France andtheNetherlandsin Almaty; andtheNetherlands between ‘new’and‘old’MemberStates. States, butisparticularlywell-suitedtogive acomparisonofthetrendsinglobalpatternsrepresentation information onthedistributionofembassieswithinageographic regionorwithinthetwo groupsofMember interpretation, therepresentationcoefficientisdenotedasapercentage. This percentage doesnotgive any every MemberStatewould have aresidentembassyinevery countryinthatregion. To facilitatethe This coefficientdenotestheactualdegreeof‘diplomaticstrength’comparedtotheoreticalsituationwhere per group(EU-10orEU-15)by theproductofnumber ofMemberStatesandthenumberreceiving states. 47 November 2007 48 November 2007 another inthisarea”. higher criteriaandwhich have made more bindingcommitmentstoone epitomised by permanentstructuredcooperation amongthosewho “fulfil formal aspectssaw fairlyquick recognitionofthe needforflexibility, The discussionsintheConvention ontheFutureofEuropemore formal thanothers. Flexibility intheESDPcontextappearsavariety ofways, some more policy asamoregeneral goal. ‘flexible pragmatism’ whilst retainingtheideaofcloserintegration inforeign motivated todoso. The ESDPhasillustrated theneedforadegreeof not allMemberStateswereequallycapableofbecominginvolved or Policy (ESDP).InthecaseofESDP, infact,itwas recognised earlyonthat for instance,fromthebriefhistoryofEuropeanSecurityandDefence The ideaofLiaisonGroupsisnotnewandhasacertainprovenance arising, apioneerfor theliaisonapproach?ESDP: which couldbemadeby usingLiaisonGroupsmorefrequently Keukeleire In thedebateabouthow toimprove theEU’s foreignpolicy, thecontribution Stephan and Duke Simon By Liaison Groups andEUforeign policy task toagroupofMemberStateswhich arewillingtoperformthisroleand Reform Treaty, merelyrecognise domain. Inmostcasesthough,theConstitutional Treaty, andnow the The moregeneral stipulationsonenhancedcooperation alsoapplyinthis have thenecessarycapability. intergovernmental CommonForeign andSecurityPolicy (CFSP). wider Unionwhich hasasinglelegalpersonality, butastillpredominantly encourage andfosterflexibilitywillbecomeeven moreevidentinanever- across thedifferent‘pillars’ofUniongrows. Above all,awillingness to will becomemoreapparentasthelistofchallenges thatrequireresponses The needforspecialisationandadivision oflabourinEUexternalrelations consensus –shouldnotbeoverlooked. course, thenecessarysafeguardstoensurethattheyoperate onthebasisof 2 The Councilmay alsoentrusttheimplementationofa de facto de developments intheESDP. 1 – with,of on by thetypeofsolution-based pragmatism demonstrated by themilitary The flexibilitydemonstrated inthecaseofESDPisundoubtedlyspurred more generally? transferable totheCFSPand,even beyond, toEUexternalrelations Are such formsofstandardisation, specialisationanddivision oflabour Applicability beyond ESDP essential inthisrespect. collaboration onindustrialdefenceaspectsoftheEU’s work, hasproved Defence Agency (EDA), which startedoffin2004asarather looseforumof smaller onesareabletoprovide preciousniche capabilities. The European division oflabouramongtheMemberStates:asaresult,now even the These have beencomplementedby acertaindegreeofspecialisationand equipment, andtoaddresscapabilityshortfalls. common standards,toadoptvoluntarily bindingcodesrelatingtoarmsand At thesametime,increasingeffortshave beenmadetodefineandagree as theChairmanshipsofEUMilitaryCommitteeorStaff). and who wishtodoso,may occupy positionsofparticularresponsibility(such also ledtotacitrecognitionthatthosewho arecapableofcontributingmore, rapidly ininstitutionaltermsandpractical burden-sharing arrangements. Ithas much ofthewrangling goingoninotherEUinstitutions,theESDPhasevolved capabilities andnationalprioritieshasnotledtoanarchy. Instead,incontrast to Contrary tosomeexpectations,thefactthatMemberStateshave different of theCongoin2003–bulkforces. case withtheFrench leadinOperation Artemis intheDemocratic Republic undertake toprovide thenecessaryheadquartersfacilitiesand–aswas the in the‘framework nation’concept,whereby aparticularMemberStatewill The bestexampleofvoluntary, butdifferentiated,involvement canbefound individual administrative bodiesandagencies,alsovary. Contributions toindividual ESDPmissions,aswelltothestaffof contribution tomakegenerating thenecessarypersonnelandresources. so-called ‘battlegroups’,where itisuptoeach MemberStatetodecidewhat the ESDPalsodependsupondifferentiatedeffort,asincaseof When itcomestolessformalmodesofcooperation, theimplementationof 49 November 2007 50 November 2007 have hadalargelypositive effect,leadingtomore–notlessintegration. history oftheESDPsuggeststhatspecialisationand division oflabour thought-through distributionofrolesandfunctions. The relatively short for more–notlessspecialisation. They thereforedemandacarefully creation ofaEuropeanExternal Action Service(EEAS),aremorelikelytocall Representative oftheUnion forForeign Affairs andSecurityPolicy, andthe The prospectoflegalpersonalityfortheUnion,advent ofaHigh General, includingtheCommission’s ExternalService. this isexactlywhat happensbetweenandwithinthevarious Directorates- fact, comenaturally to foreign policy may alsohave moregeneral applicability. This ideashould,in Finally, theimplicationsofspecialisationanddivision oflabourinEuropean flexibility andbalancebetweencentralisation andre-nationalisation. of specialisationanddivision oflabourmay ensurethenecessarydegreeof bulwark againstpotential(re)nationalisation.Inbothcases,thevarious forms At thesametime,gradual ‘Europeanisation’ofnationaldiplomacy isa sensitivities aboutovert ‘Brusselisation’. well), willcontinuetoensureasenseofnationalownership andallay continued statusoftheCFSPasadistinctpillar(inReform Treaty as The increasingexercise ofnationalinfluence inBrussels,alongsidethe consensus-building attheEuropeanlevel. and diplomatsthemselves, who arenow morekeenlyaware oftheneedfor beyond thetraditional remitoftheSecretariat,andonnationalofficials Secretariat have hadanimpactbothonthe close integration intovarious aspectsofDGE’s work intheCouncilGeneral Indeed, theinvolvement ofsecondeddiplomatsinthePolicy Unitandtheir CFSP and,moregenerally, onEUexternalrelations. military, policeandcivilian levels) hasaconfidence-buildingeffectonthe Moreover, theheavy involvement ofsecondednationalpersonnel(atthe that any such groupenjoys thesupportofallMember States. CFSP and,arguably, strengthenstheUnion’s focusandoutreach –provided the Congo,Iran orSomalia)confirmstheexistenceofsimilarpractices inthe ‘Contact Groups’(such asthoseon Afghanistan, theDemocratic Republicof and policeservices.However, thepresenceofnumerousinformalintra-EU fonctionnaires working inexternalrelations,since fonctionnaires , who have gone division ofrolesamonginstitutions andcountriesparticipatinginthegroup, their internalactivities. There couldalsowellbefurtherspecialisationand Liaison Groupmemberswould agreeamongthemselves onhow tomanage Nations’ bodiesandinotherinternationalorganisations. Group; or, forinstance,inNew York, tocoordinate with(andwithin)United places, such asinthethird countryorregiondealtwithby theLiaison meet inBrussels,butcouldalsoconvene andoperate inotherrelevant Diplomats fromtheparticipatingcountriesandinstitutionswould notonly military structuresorotherEUagenciesintheLiaisonGroup’s activities. The Councilmay alsodecideto involve representatives ofthevarious represent aquintessentialtraining groundandlaboratory forthefutureEEAS. the Commission.Inprinciple,therefore,such agroupmightwellcometo Member States,theCouncil’s Policy UnitandDGE,relevant unitsfrom consist ofspecialiseddiplomatsorcivil servants fromtheparticipating At thediplomaticandadministrative levels, anEULiaisonGroupwould the areainquestionandattentionofinitialparticipantsevolve. Groups may alsochange over time,dependingonhow therequirementsof the overall EUapproach –andtheirown too.Membershipofsuch EULiaison and pooltheirnationaleffortstothatend,inorderbringadded-value to region orissue). They mustalsobeableandwillingtostepup,coordinate to supportEUengagementinaspecificforeignpolicy matter(acountry, time, todevote extra energy, attention, moneyandothernationalresources These MemberStateshave tobewillingandable,over alongerperiodof or Development Cooperation. issue; and,3)ifrelevant, thefutureCommissionerforNeighbourhoodPolicy commit themselves tointensifyingeffortsonaparticularforeignpolicy under his/herauthority);2)anumberofMemberStatesthatarewillingto Foreign Affairs andSecurityPolicy (oranEUSpecialRepresentative working Such groupswould consistof1)theHighRepresentative oftheUnionfor EU institutionalframework. hypothetical EULiaisonGroup,aswellitseventual positionwithinthe in moredetailonthemembership,creationandpossiblefunctionsofa How canallthisbetranslated intopractice? Itmay beworthwhile todwell Liaison Groups inpractice 3 51 November 2007 52 November 2007 Finally, LiaisonGroupswould notbeestablishedfor credibility toactasamediatorinregion,adequatepeace-keepingforces). contacts withtheelitesinathirdcountry, economicsupportorleverage, other nationalassets(forexample,diplomaticormilitaryinfluence,close possess thecapabilitiestodosointermsofpersonnel,financialmeansand They have toacceptthecommitmentactinaconcertedway, andmust able tostrengthentheirengagement. In any case,thecountriesthatjoinLiaisonGroupsmustbebothwillingand from above, inotherwords, rather thanfrombelow. more extensive poolingandcoordinationoftheireffortsresources – need tointensifyandfocuspolicy onaparticularissue,andtopromote Liaison Groupwhen, atacertainmoment,someMemberStatesfeelthe But anotherpossibilityisthatpoliticalleaderswould decidetolaunch anEU some MemberStatesandtheEUinstitutions. closer interaction andcooperation betweendiplomatsandofficialsfrom a specificforeignpolicy matterwould gradually crystalliseonthebasisof needs, demandsandopportunities. This meansthatanEULiaisonGroupon and organicallyfrombelow, basedonpractical experienceandconcrete probably themostlogicalandnatural –istoestablishthemincrementally EU LiaisonGroupscanbecreatedinseveral ways. Onepossibility–and on thegiven areaorissue,dependingontheircompetenceandexpertise. with different(setsof)actorsfocusingonspecificdimensionsofthepolicy As suggestedintheESDParea,aLiaisonGroup’s functionwould betotake common policy (asisoftenthecasewithinternational‘ContactGroups’). intended preciselytohelpbridgethosedifferencesinordershapea Member Statesontheissueinquestion–unless,ofcourse,itscreationwas there werefundamentaldifferencesofinterestorapproach amongstEU of aparticularEULiaisonGroupwould even beruledoutincaseswhere as thiswillnotalways bepossible,desirable oruseful.Indeed,thecreation individual effortsandassets ofaLiaisonGroup’s members. and follow-up ofEUpolicy, andtheintensification poolingofthe done throughitssupportforthepreparation, elaboration, implementation and (pro)active common policy onaspecificareaorissue. This would be special responsibilityfordeveloping amoreintensive, dynamic, coherent all foreign policy areas, participate init. rights, obligationsandinterestsofthoseMemberStates which donot decisions adoptedinthecontextofthesetreaties,and thecompetences, treaties (including,ifratified, theReform Treaty), thelegislationandother Firstly, anEULiaisonGroup must respecttheprinciplesofcurrent be observed. the perimetersforitswork. To thisend,threemainsafeguardsshould within theUnion’s broaderinstitutional,legalandpolicy framework andtoset within theUnion,itisessentialtoclearlydefinepositionofLiaisonGroups foreign policy, andtodispeldistrustofadivision oflabourandspecialisation To ensurethatanEULiaisonGroupstrengthens–anddoesnotundermine Coherence andlegitimacy I I I I I I I list ofpossibletasksforsuch groups: on thespecificneedsofareaorissue. What follows isanon-exhaustive An EULiaisonGroupcouldfulfilthisfunctionindifferentways, depending implementing any othertaskswhich theCouncilmay assigntothegroup. World Bank); UN agencies,theOrganisationforSecurityandCo-operation inEurope,the the areaoronissueatstake(otherthirdcountries,regionalorganisations, facilitating andenhancingcoordinationwithotherexternalactorsactive in specific problems; parties topromote,elaborate orproposeconcretesolutionsfor allowing theEUtomediateornegotiatemoreintensively withthird third countriesorregions; contributing tothebroadeningandintensificationofpoliticaldialoguewith or capabilities; policy domains where theUnionassuch haslittleornocompetence measures tofurthertheEUobjectives inthisareaorissue–particularly pooling groupmembers’effortsmoredecisively and/oradoptingnew national policiesoftheMemberStatesparticipatingingroup); dimensions ofhorizontalandvertical consistency (includingbetweenthe examining, proposingandenforcing measurestostrengthenthevarious EU decisionsrelatingtothisareaorissue; decisions, and/orinconcretising,implementingandensuringfollow-up on Representative) and/ortheCommissioninpreparingnewEU initiatives and supporting theCouncil,EEAS,HighRepresentative (orEUSpecial 53 November 2007 54 November 2007 a resemblancetothatofenhancedcooperation asapplied toforeignpolicy. At firstsight,infact,theLiaisonGroupconceptoutlined inthispaperbears concept and‘enhancedcooperation’ asappliedtoforeign policy. any case,questionsarise about therelationshipbetweenLiaisonGroup the Reform Treaty inmind,itisnotwholly dependentuponitsadoption.In Although theconceptisdesignedwithpossiblechanges introducedby foreign policy issues. distilled intoLiaisonGroupswhich would work onabroadrange ofEU States. Furthermore,thevarious formsofflexibilityexaminedherecouldbe need toberefinedandmadesubjectagreementbetweentheEUMember damaging theconsensualbasisofany such action. These formsofflexibility cooperation have enabledtheEUtoactoninternationalstagewithout The ESDP’s record,althoughbrief,suggeststhat flexibleformsof collaboration thathave arisen,especiallyintheESDPcontext. This paperhasconsideredanumberofflexiblepractices andformsof Enhanced cooperation indisguise? delegations tobemorecloselyinvolved inEUforeignpolicy. inter-institutional wrangling, andallows therelevant inter-parliamentary the interplay withparliamentaryactorswithoutraising legaldisputesand The EULiaisonGroupcould,infact,provide aflexiblesettingwhich facilitates consideration. Specifichearingscouldalsobeenvisaged. takes theParliament’s resolutions,reportsandotherfindingsinto informed abouttheLiaisonGroup’s activities andthatthegroup,inturn, Parliament committeesandinter-parliamentary delegationsarethoroughly Thirdly, alltherelevant EUbodiesmustensurethatthecompetentEuropean principles andrestrictions. and thatitsfunctioningdoesnotruncountertotheabove-mentioned should ensurethattheyareregularlyinformedaboutthegroup’s activities policies towards theregionorissueinquestion. The relevant EUbodies scope andactivities shouldnotundermine,orrival, existingcommon Liaison Grouphasbeencreatedtoaddress. This alsomeansthatthegroup’s policy-making processforthegeographic areaorpolicy issuethattheEU Secondly, allMemberStatesmustremainformallyinvolved inthegeneral .For furtherdetails,seealso:StephanKeukeleire (2007)‘EU CoreGroupsaftertheReform Treaty 3. The Reform Treaty now referstoCommonSecurityandDefencePolicy andnotESDP. The current 2. The ideaof‘EULiaisonGroups’was firstlaunched by theBelgianMinister ofForeign Affairs KarelDeGucht 1. Endnotes Europe (Bruges). Professor and Visiting attheCollegeof ofLeuven, at theUniversity Stephan Keukeleire isJeanMonnetProfessor inEuropeanForeign Policy Maastricht. Simon Duke isaProfessor ofPublic attheEuropeanInstitute Administration, that already existinsideandoutsidetheEUinstitutions. ‘enhanced cooperation’ properandthelooser‘clubs’contactgroups constituting apragmatic butstructuredintermediatesolutionbetween a systemofLiaisonGroupscouldmaterialiseinmuch lessformalway, thus cooperation canmeetandoverlap atsomepointinthefuture. At any rate, It remainstobeseenwhether theconceptsofLiaisonGroupsandenhanced specialisation anddivision oflabourinsuch groups. are already thesubjectofadynamic EUpolicy canalsoprofitfromthe Liaison Groupsisnotnecessarilyalast-resortmechanism: policy fieldsthat Last butnotleast,incontrast toenhancedcooperation, thesystemofEU common withintheUnion). only them(provided theyrespectthedecisionsandpoliciesagreedin powers, astheycanagreetogetheroninitiatives ormeasureswhich commit It alsoallows theparticipatingcountriestoactbeyond thelimitsofEU’s (nine intheReform Treaty) required for‘enhancedcooperation’. and intricateprocedurestheminimumthresholdofeightMemberStates Group canbecreatedinamoreflexibleandinformalway, withoutthelong There are,however, alsosomemajordifferences.For instance,aLiaison Another possiblelabelforEUCoreCroupsis‘EUContactGroup’,butthis namehasaneven more with theexistingunderstandingofa'coreEurope'(which isoftenperceived asexcludingMemberStates). label ‘EULiaisonGroup’hastheadvantage over thelabel‘EUCoreGroup’sinceitavoids beingassociated (http://www.upi-fiia.fi/fin/tilaisuudet/menneet_tilaisuudet_2005/towards_greater_effect_and_appeal/). The in hisspeech ‘Towards greatereffectandappeal–StrengtheningEUforeignpolicy’ (Helsinki,27/10/2005) Specialization anddivision oflabour inEUforeignpolicy’, terminology will,however, beretainedforthesakeofclarity. negative connotation. Governance Studies Governance , http://www.ggs.kuleuven.be/publications/workingpapers/default.htm Working Papers - Leuven Centre for Global Global for Centre Leuven - Papers Working – 55 November 2007 56 November 2007 Article 18(5)ofthe Treaty onEuropeanUnion(TEU),which states The legalfoundationfortheirwork isaJoint Action basedon Union anditsforeignpoliciesincrisisregions around theworld. EUSRs areappointedby theCouncilofMinisterstorepresent are atstake. defining theEU’s approach toregions andcountrieswhere Unioninterests include supportforpeace-andinstitution-building,assistancein management, buttheirmandateshave expandedover timeto The focusoftheEUSRs’work isonsecuritypolicy andcrisis they maketoCFSPandEUforeignpolicy atlarge. in 2005). This isasignofthegrowing importanceofthecontributionthat in 2002,SouthCaucasus2003,andCentral Asia, Sudan,andMoldova have beenadded(Macedoniaand Afghanistan in2001,Bosnia-Herzegovina To date,noneoftheEUSRs’mandateshave beenterminated,andnewones Political andSecurityCommittee(PSC). Representative fortheCommonForeign andSecurityPolicy (CFSP)andthe is alsonoteworthy thattheseEUSRsprecededthecreationofHigh management inCentral Africa, andconflictresolutionintheMiddleEast. It appointments reflectedtheEU’s long-standingengagementinconflict followed shortlyby theoneforMiddleEastPeace Process. These The firstEUSRwas nominatedfortheGreatLakesregioninMarch 1996, ground’ tohelpshapetheEU’s foreignandsecuritypolicy. 23 countriesorterritories,andprovided informationandexpertise‘fromthe The nineexistingEUSRshave representedtheUnioninnolessthan EEAS mightbedesigned. provides relevant lessonstobefedintotheupcomingdeliberations onhow the Action Service(EEAS).Nevertheless, theexperiencetheyhave accumulated preliminary exchanges concerningtheestablishmentofEuropeanExternal in thecoverage ofEUforeignpolicy-making and output,letaloneinthe Grevi The work oftheEUSpecialRepresentativesGiovanni (EUSR)hasnotfiguredprominently and Adebahr Cornelius By for theEEAS? The EUSpecialRepresentatives: what lessons security developments (the’eyes’ andthe‘ears’ofEU). provide theEUwithinformationandanalysisabout relevant politicaland help implementEUpolicies(a‘face’anda‘voice’ oftheUnion),and world’s mosttroubledcountriesandregions”. “are thevisibleexpressionofEU’s growing engagement insomeofthe In thewords ofEUHighRepresentative forCFSPJavier Solana,theEUSRs overleaf shows. nine currently, covering theEU’s majorregionsofconcern,asthetable The numberofEUSRshasrisenfromtwo in1996andfour2001to scopePolicy: andvariety of mandates I I I the EUSRs’work areofparticularrelevance: With aviewtosettingupthefutureEUforeignservice,threedimensionsof ministries theyhave mostlycomefromhasalsodifferedgreatly. months. The degreetowhich theyrelyforpractical helponthenational between Aldo Ajello’s fulldecadeintheGreatLakesregion,tojustafew Their tenureinofficemay vary (andhasindeedvaried) significantly, Commission, towhich theyareaccountableforbudgetarymatters. standpoint, however, theyhave CFSPadviser contracts withtheEuropean They are,therefore,aninstrumentoftheUnion’s CFSP. From alegal policy issues.” a SpecialRepresentative withamandateinrelationtoparticular that: “The Councilmay, whenever itdeemsnecessary, appoint These threeaspectswillbeaddressedinturnthefollowing sections. increasingly, withtheCommission,bothinfieldandat‘headquarters’; at the at the at the geographical distributionandfunctionalremit; due tothelack ofearlierrolemodels. interpreting anddeveloping theirmandateswitharesults-orientedapproach policy institutional EU policy-making EU level, thescopeandvariety oftheirmandates,bothinterms level, theirclosecooperation withtheCouncilbutalso, level, theirpragmatic, learning-by-doing style, 1 They representtheUnionand 57 November 2007 58 November 2007 information andintelligencetofuelEUforeignpolicy-making. lack informationfromthe field.Inotherwords, theyprovide ‘EU-made’ vast majority)which donothave extensive diplomaticnetworks abroadand The EUSRs’contributionisespeciallyvalued by thoseMemberStates (the easier toachieve consensus oncommonpolicy guidelines. for deliberation andnegotiationinthesecommittees, which may makeit Council working groupsandthePSC. This helpsprovide alevel playing field effective CFSPby contributingtopolicy-making withregularreports tothe They alsoplay asignificantroleinthe development ofastrongerandmore arrangements forcrisismanagementandresolution. (OSCE). Insodoing,EUSRscontributetosupportingmultilateral African Union,ortheOrganisationforSecurityandCooperation inEurope powers –andinternationalorganisationsliketheUnitedNations, actors –betheycountriessuch asRussia,theUnitedStatesorregional Moreover, theywork closelywith therepresentatives ofotherinternational 8Jl 05Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan) 28 July 2005 2005/558/CFSP,Joint Action Sudan 18 July 2005 2005/556/CFSP, Joint Action R 23 March 2005 2005/265/CFSP, Joint Action SouthCaucasus(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia) 7 July 2003 Joint Action 2003/496/CFSP, BosniaandHerzegovina 11 March 2002 Joint Action 2002/211/CFSP, Afghanistan 10 December2001 Burundi,Rwanda, Uganda) 2001/875/CFSP, Joint Action Former Yugoslav RepublicofMacedonia 29 June 2001 Joint Action 2001/492/CFSP, MiddleEastPeace Process 25 November 1996 Geographical remit Joint Action 1996/676/CFSP, 25 March 1996 1996/250/CFSP,Joint Action First appointment African GreatLakesregion(DRCongo, Central Asia (Kazakhstan,Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova-Ukr epublic ofMoldova (includingthe aine border) the geographic areascovered by anEUSR,(exceptCentral Asia To date,militaryand/orcivilian ESDPoperations have beendeployed inall EUSRs andESDP solutions tocomplexandmulti-dimensionalproblems. standing upfortheEU’s values andinterests,seekingcomprehensive conflict resolution,crisismanagement,tackling thenewsecuritythreatsand and humanrights)areemblematicofwhat EUforeignpolicy isallabout: representatives oftheHighRepresentative onnon-proliferation, terrorism Mr SolanahasarguedthattheEUSRs(togetherwiththreepersonal crisis managementandtoamoreintegrated EUforeignpolicy generally. thereby potentiallycontributingtoacomprehensive EUapproach towards (ESDP), theEuropeanNeighbourhoodPolicy (ENP),andenlargementpolicy, work spanspolicy areassuch astheEuropeanSecurityandDefencePolicy view toenhancingthecoherenceofallEUinstrumentsinfield. Their Coordination isanotherimportantfunctionperformedby EUSRs,witha each partnercountry. contribution tofulfillingtheobjectives oftheENP Action Plansconcludedwith and implementedby theCommission,but EUSRscanmakeanimportant as wellIsrael andthePalestinian Territories. ItisaCommunitypolicy designed The ENPappliestocountrieslikeMoldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, andGeorgia, EUSRs andENP overall effectiveness ofEUcrisismanagement. between ESDPmissionsandtheEUSRshas,onbalance,enhanced the ground. While cooperation hasnotalways beensmooth,theinterplay different ESDPactorswhen morethanonemissionhasbeendeployed on Increasingly, EUSRshave alsobeencalledupontocoordinatethework of local authorities. when need be,canaddresssensitive politicalaspectsofESDPmissionswiththe mandated toprovide localpoliticalguidancetocivilian ESDPmissionsand, in thepursuitofsharedobjectives, withamutually reinforcing effect.EUSRsare ESDP operations andEUSRsareexpectedtoperformcomplementaryfunctions have beendeployed (except Aceh-Indonesia andIraq). has beenanappointedEUSRforallgeographic areaswhere ESDPoperations 2 ), andthere 59 November 2007 60 November 2007 Council, theCommissionandMemberStates–inall phases oftheirwork. The EUSRsarecloselylinkedtoallthreemajorplayers inEUforeignpolicy –the cross-pillarInstitutions: cooperation community. be used,theEUSRisdouble-hattedasHighRepresentative fortheinternational in theBonnStatementofPeace ImplementationCouncil(PIC)may needto where security concernsaremoreprominentandthecoercive powers foreseen Interestingly, boththeseEUSRswearmorethanone‘hat’.InBosnia-Herzegovina, account forthedifferencesinconfigurations oftheEUSR’s post. reform path. The differentstageseach isatintheEU enlargement processalso between theEUSRandCommissioniscrucialtohelpthemstay onthe However, given thattransition isstillunderway inbothcountries,cooperation relevant theroleofCommissionand the the transition process,andthemorestablesecuritysituation, engagement isoneasingthetransition towards accession. The moreadvanced membership perspective andcandidatestatusrespectively, themainfocusofEU In countrieslikeBosnia-Herzegovina andMacedonia,which have anEU EUSRs andenlargement management andotheraspectsofsecuritysectorreforminMoldova. interplay betweentheEUSRteamandCommunityactorsonborder Commission officials,toaddresstheproblemoffrozenconflicts;and January 2007,involving theEUSRandhisteamanumberof include thefieldmissionwhich tookplaceacrosstheSouthCaucasusin Examples ofhow thishasfosteredconstructive cooperation inpractice overview ofallEUactivities, notablytherelevant aspectsoftheENP Action Plan. case ofMoldova, themandateofEUSRprovides thatheshouldmaintainan to assisttherelevant bodieswiththeimplementationofplanitself.In Action PlansforthethreecountriesofSouthCaucasusprovide fortheEUSR consultation tookplaceduringthenegotiationson Action Plans,andthe enhance respective prioritiesinthepursuitofcommonobjectives. Mutual Commission andtheEUSRhave devisedoriginalformatstocooperate and The experienceintheSouthCaucasusandMoldova shows thatthe double-hatted astheEUSR. 3 In Macedonia,theCommission’s HeadofDelegationhasbeen less central thepositionofEUSR. exercised throughthesecond(CFSP)pillar. first (Community)pillarneedtobecombinedwiththe politicalleverage management indifficultareas. The economicincentives provided under the essential forEUSRstomaximisetheimpactofEUforeign policy andcrisis Maintaining closecontactswithbothCommissionand MemberStatesis (Kazakhstan) andisnow duetobeheldonanannual basis. of MissioninCentral Asia which tookplaceinautumn2006 Astana as requiringthemtosubmitjointreports,andthemeetingofallEUHeads national missions.Stepshave beentakentowards achieving thisgoal,such joint politicalassessmentandcommon That said,morecouldbedonetopromotetheexchange ofinformation, of Missionaswell. In thirdcountries,EUSRsholdregularmeetingswithMemberStates’Heads provide officespacefortravelling EUSRsandfortheiradvisers inthefield. Delegations areaprimarycontactfortheEUSRs. These Delegations usually Brussels (allotherEUSRs),therespective HeadsoftheCommission Herzegovina, Macedonia,and Afghanistan) orflyintotheirregion from Whether theyarebasedintheircountryofresponsibility(Bosnia- have hadtobeovercome andmuch scopeisleftforimproving coordination. Commission andMemberStatesinthefield,althoughconsiderable obstacles There hasalsobeenprogressinfosteringcooperation betweenEUSRs,the policy-making acrossthedifferentpillarsofUnion. Commission participatesdirectlyinsomeofthem,enhancingjoint other things,toprovide EUSRswithregularpolicy inputandthe approach tocrisismanagement. These taskforces aresupposed,among EUSR teamshave beensetuptoensureamorecoherentandeffective including stafffromtheCouncilSecretariat,DGE,Policy Unit,andthe strategic guidancefromthePSC.Over thelastfewyears, regionaltaskforces EUSRs receive operational guidancefromtheHighRepresentative, and for thebudgetallocatedtheirmissions. Special Advisers forCFSP. As such, theyareresponsibletotheCommission appointed, theyconcludeacontract withtheCommissiontobecome Policy Unit,andtheEUPresidency onbehalf oftheMemberStates.Once involving theCouncilSecretariat,HighRepresentative’s They arenominatedby theCouncilfollowing aselectionprocedure démarches between theEUSRsand cabinet and 61 November 2007 62 November 2007 Brussels foreignpolicy machinery. importance oftheirmandates,didtheybecomemore integrated intothe Only withtheincreaseintheirnumbersand,parallel, thegrowing disconnected fromtheinstitutionalmechanisms andstructuresinBrussels. Representative andthePSC wereintroduced,theEUSRsstillsomewhat institutional void. Later, when CFSPinstitutionssuch astheHigh The firsttwo EUSRshadtoperformtheirfunctionsinarelative political and of EUforeignpolicy. learning-by-doing approach thatissymptomaticof the overall advancement development. Instead,much ofthisdevelopment hasresultedfromthe Representatives nornationalspecialenvoys served asatemplatefortheir pre-existing model.NeithertheUnitedNation’s Secretary-General’s Special foreign serviceisthatEUSRswerenotdeveloped onthebasisofany A thirdreasonwhy theEUSRs’experiencecouldfeedintonewEU learning byEU logic: doing Representative oftheinternationalcommunity. Herzegovina, when thetimeisripeforclosingOfficeofHigh representation tothe African Unionand,over themedium-term,inBosnia- including double-hatting,couldbeappliedin Addis Ababa, attheEU consensus thatmoreintegrated formsofEUexternalrepresentation, positions willdependoncircumstances ontheground. There seemstobe in practice, althoughthespecificconfiguration offuturedouble-hatted The experienceinMacedoniahasshown that such double-hattingcanwork programme forward. commitment toaddressresidualtensionsinthecountryandpushreform establishing adouble-hattedEUSRreflectedtheUnion’s strongpolitical ESDP missiontobedeployed inacandidatecountry. Ontheother, entered intoin2005.Ontheonehand,itwas feltinappropriateforan and, second,inrecognitionofthenewstagetransition thecountry fewer opportunitiesforthirdpartiestoplay oneEUactoragainsttheother; achieve greatercoherencebetweenthefirstandsecondpillar, andprovide This innovation was introducedfortwo mainreasons:first,to fulfilling therolesofEUSRandHeadCommissionDelegation. which hasoccurredforthefirsttimeinMacedonia,withsameperson A particularinstanceofsuch cross-pillarcooperation isthe‘double-hatting’ Representative mightwellbeovercome. the distinctionbetweenEUSRsandPersonal Representatives oftheHigh (such asnon-proliferation, newepidemicsandterrorism).From thisstandpoint, They couldalsobeaskedtoaddressquestionsofahorizontal,functionalnature intervention ortosharpentheEUstrategic approach topivotal globalregions. EUSRs couldbemandated,astheyaretoday, totackle crisesrequiringurgent one oftwo baskets: basis withaviewtoaddressingspecificissueswhich may fall,essentially, in Second, EUSRscouldstillbeappointedwithinthenewserviceonan fall withintheremitofnewservice. tools. Their roleofrepresentation,reportingandcoordination will naturally integrated UnionDelegations. As such, theycanberegardedastransitional Delegations ornot,willlargelybereplacedby theHeadsofnew, First, field-basedEUSRs,whether double-hattedastheHeadsofCommission ongoing debate. In thisrespect,two mainpointsareworth highlightinginrelationtothe in thenewEEAS. established progressively. Onthewhole, EUSRsarelikely tobesubsumed features oftheEEAS,which canhardlybeanticipated andwillprobablybe the EUSRsinnewstructure. Their rolewilllargelydependon theprecise EEAS –itselfanunprecedentedundertakingandindefiningtheplaceof A certaindegreeofflexibilitywillsurelyberequiredinsettingupthe the formalarchitecture ofthenewservice. Pragmatism andpoliticalgoodsenseindailypractice willcountasmuch as be acentral featureofforeignpolicy-making underthenewEEAS. consensus-seeking amongMemberStates. This delicatebalancingactwill and initiative, regularexchanges with‘headquarters’ inBrussels,and Member States. They needtostrikeabalancebetweentheirown autonomy Brussels institutionalmachinery andoftherespective positionsofthe success oftheirmissionsthattheydevelop anin-depthunderstandingofthe While theEUSRspioneerforeignpolicy abroad,itisvery importantforthe foreign policy-making. framing thework oftheEUSRsmorefirmlywithinwidersystemEU At theendof2006,importantinnovations wereintroducedtothiseffect, geographic and functional . ad hoc ad 63 November 2007 64 November 2007 .SeethePICBonnconclusions,Bonn,10December1997, Article XI.2. 3. EUBAM Moldova isnotanESDPmissionbutacrisismanagementworking invery closecooperation 2. Openingremarksby Javier Solana,SeminarwithEUSpecialRepresentatives, Brussels,29 June 2005. 1. Endnotes Paris. Studies, Giovanni Grevi isSeniorResearch Fellow forSecurity attheEU Institute Berlin. Relations, Politikfür (DGAP)–theGermanCouncilonForeignAuswärtige Cornelius Adebahr isProgramme attheDeutscheGesellschaft Officer an internationalactorinitsown right. do nothave anembassyinagiven countryorregion,butalsoforthe EUas information, intelligenceandanalysisnotonlyforthoseMemberStatesthat hallmarks ofEuropeanforeignpolicy. They alsoprovide valuable comprehensive crisismanagement,which isregardedasoneofthe The EUSpecialRepresentatives embody theUnion’s approach to regions, althoughalotisyet tobeachieved inthisrespect. engagement have contributedtoraising theUnion’s politicalprofileinthese the EU. The continuityoftheirpresenceandthevisibility than 20crisis-riddencountrieslocatedinregionsofmostdirectrelevance to The EUSRshave provided theUnion witheffective representationinmore coherence atboththeinstitutionalandpolicy level. process ofestablishingtheEEAS,notablyinrelationtoquestion achievements, aswellthesystem’s shortcomings,shouldinformthe EUSRs have developed intoarelevant foreignpolicy tool. Their to theEU,andby gradually proving theirusefulnesstoMemberStates,the By enhancingthesynergybetweeninstrumentsandresources available Conclusion work oftheenvisaged EEAS,soastominimiseconfusionandavoid turfwars. Last butnotleast,thecreationofnewEUSRpostsshouldduplicate with therelevant EUSR. could work toresolve potentialdisputesover theconflicting interestsofthe develop a‘masterplan’forthecreationofnew service. Such agroup European Parliament andselectedexternalexperts–could besetupto Member States,theCommissionandCouncilSecretariat, butalsothe To thisend,anadvisory group– includingnotonlyrepresentatives ofthe potential tensionshouldbeidentifiedanddiscussedat anearlystage. bureaucratic interestsandpoliticalviewsofthemain players, areasof To prevent theEEASfrombeingunderminedatoutsetby thediverse freeze, already revealed someareasofpotentialtension. Treaty andtheFrench andDutch referendawhich consignedittothedeep preparatory work in2004-05betweenthesigningofConstitutional different stagesintheimplementationprocess.Indeed,seven monthsof diplomatic action–awiderange ofsensitive questionsareboundtoariseat EU –andconflictingvisionsoftheconcreteshapescopecommon Given theexistenceofdifferentdiplomaticpatternsandpractices acrossthe relevant actors. creation oftheEEAShasbeenlefttosubsequentnegotiationsbetween This meansthatthetaskofaddressingmostintricatequestionsrelatedto those provisions intothenewReform Treaty withoutany significantchanges. and furthernegotiation,theIntergovernmental Conference(IGC)transferred The broadtermsoftheConstitutional Treaty leftampleroomforinterpretation Action Servicetosupporttheholderofthispost. European CommissionerforExternalRelations)andofa Representative fortheCommonForeign andSecurityPolicy andthe Affairs andSecurityPolicy (combiningthejobsofcurrentHigh creation ofthenewpostHighRepresentative oftheUnionforForeign represent amajorsteptowards amorecoherentEU‘foreignpolicy’: the The implementationoftwo innovations, in particular, isexpectedto external action. failed Constitutional Treaty, includingtheprovisions relatingtotheUnion’s The newReform Treaty takesontheinstitutionalchanges containedinthe Maurer Andreas and Lieb Julia By of theEEAS: variables,The ‘how’ priorities, timelines 65 November 2007 66 November 2007 But where exactlydothe areas ofpotentialtensionlie? of thesituationcouldbemadeinsmallcircles andclosed sessions. has been(successfully)completed. As in2004-05,however, afirst(re)assessment remain reluctanttoopentheEEASdossierbefore Treaty ratification process Representatives ofboth national governments andtheEUinstitutionswill diverging methodsandconceptsofEUforeignpolicy-making. are asomewhat unstablecompromisebetweendifferentandsometimes A clashofdiverging objectives isstillpossible, since the Treaty provisions vertical coherenceintheUnion’s externalrepresentationandaction. provides anopportunity, but notacast-ironguarantee ofmorehorizontaland Common Foreign andSecurityPolicy proper, andnationalforeignpolicies– of itsthreekeyelements–theEuropeanCommunity’s externaldimension,the consistent andintegrated Europeanforeignpolicy. The expectedconsolidation There are,however, noguarantees thatthiswillresultinamorecoherent, the MemberStates.” Commission aswellstaffsecondedfromnationaldiplomaticservicesof departments oftheGeneral SecretariatoftheCounciland services oftheMemberStatesandshallcompriseofficialsfromrelevant Action Service. This serviceshallwork incooperation withthediplomatic mandate, theHighRepresentative shallbeassistedby aEuropeanExternal Article 13a-3oftheReform Treaty statesthat: “In fulfillinghisorher able torelyonthesupportofaqualitatively newbody. cornerstone andlinchpin oftheUnion’s new‘foreignpolicy’ andwillbe double-hatted HighRepresentative will bemandatedtoactasthe The treatyprovisions forestablishingtheEEASareclearononepoint: Towards aEuropean foreign service foreign policy andfacilitatetheimplementationofnewprovisions. 2009 –couldbeconsideredasameansbothtoenhancecurrentEuropean existing legalframework –which isboundtoremaininplaceuntil atleast At thesametime,measurestoimprove theUnion’s externalactionwithinthe coherent templatetodrive theprocess. main actorsatanearlystage,andhelptodraw upaviableroadmap anda Preparations willhave to beginonthebasisofpolitical with thequestionoffinancing,which hashardlybeenaddressedsofar). The institutionalarrangements arguablyrepresentthemostsensitive issue(along Institutional arrangements EEAS, theCouncilSecretariatandCommissionneeds tobeaddressed, Because ofthesepotentialconflicts,thequestion linksbetweenthe Directorate-General forExternalRelations(DGRELEX). (possibly includingthemilitarystructures),and theCommission’s duplication andbringtogetheratleasttheCouncil’s DGE, itsPolicy Unit remains vague onthispoint,mentioningonlyacommon willtoavoid functional instrumentsofacommondiplomaticservice. The Progress Report of EUforeignpolicy-making, andthequestionofcompetences service’s structuresandhierarchies. This alsoappliestotheoperational level development oftheEEAS,withimportantconsequencesfornew Clarification oftheinstitutionalconfiguration isessentialforthe national andbureaucratic interests. different understandingofEuropeanintegration andinpart,also,specific part, theMemberStatesaresplitalongvarious lines,reflectinginparttheir policy goals,encompassingthefullspectrumofEUcapabilities.For their small Policy Unitandenhancing itsown pivotal roleinformulatingforeign The CouncilSecretariatisfocusingonthedevelopment ofitscomparatively finding itselfbeingtransformed intoatechnical supportingbody. a combinedre-nationalisationofintegrated foreignpolicy structuresand network ofdelegations,fearssomekindintergovernmental ‘contamination’, The Commission,withitsspecialisedDirectorates-General andwidespread again asbothstrive topreserve theirrespective structuresandcompetences. concerning thepreciseinstitutionalsetting. This questionisexpectedtocomeup Yet thereisanevidentconflictbetween theCommissionandCouncilSecretariat the CouncilandCommission”. unlike anything thathasgonebefore),andone“(…)withcloselinkstoboth agreed thentoestablishaservice Commission. According tothelastProgressReport(see Annex 2),itwas during the2004/2005negotiationsbetweenCouncilSecretariatand “sui generis” “sui (i.e. anewtypeofbody ‘acquis’ ‘acquis’ reached 67 November 2007 68 November 2007 foreign affairsanddiplomacy. Directorates-General tospreadthespecificknowledge and‘culture’of ministries. Additional effortsshouldalsobemadeinallCommission other foreignministrydepartmentsandinternationally-oriented specifically EU-relatedsectionsofnationalforeignministries,butalsoin level. Inotherwords, ‘Europeanisation’mustoccurnotonlyinthe and careerplanningwillbeessentialatboththenationalEuropean already adoptedfortheEuropeanSecurityandDefenceCollege. approved by MemberStates,noteven inthe ‘virtual’anddecentralised format elaborated. To date,theideaofaEuropean Diplomatic Academy hasnotbeen developed. Inthelongerterm,however, anintegrated conceptneedstobe In theshortterm,existingprogrammes andbilateral initiatives shouldbefurther European diplomatic Similarly, ifoneofthegoalsEEASisgradual creationofa adopted fortherotationofstaffwillbecrucial. institutions andnationalforeignministries. This iswhy themodalitiestobe administrative separation andhierarchy between theBrussels-basedEU emergence ofa‘core’and‘periphery’withintheEEAS;i.e.creeping Attention needstobefocusedinthepreparatory phaseonpreventing the members; nominationonmerit;andappropriateselectionprocedures. adequate representationandgeographical balance;equalstatusforall rotation ofstaff;noquotastogovern thenationalityofpersonnel,but rotation ofstaff. There isconsensusonlyonthefollowing points:regular The ProgressReportisalsovague onthequestionofsecondmentand Staff rotation andtraining Commission needtoengageinaprocessofmutual(internal)consultation. almost alltheCommission’s Directorates-General, theEEASand Given thattheUnion’s externalrelationsareanyway affectedby thework of be considered. relationship oreven asymbiosisbetweentheEEASandCommissionshould established throughanintensive interlocking ofrelatedpolicy areas,aclose policy cycle, thecoherenceof theUnion’s external action canonlybe Constitutional Treaty. Given thateven intheearlystagesofforeign bearing inmindtheprincipleofcoherence,onlybrieflyalludedto esprit de corps de esprit , adegreeofstandardisationintraining inevitably face. going wellbeyond theadministrative hurdlesthecreationofEEASwill urgency intothedrive to enhancetheEU’s effectiveness ontheworld stage, restricted circles ofBrussels-basedofficialsandinject agreatersenseof technical arrangements, but would helpwidenthediscussionbeyond the It would notreplacethetechnical bodiesexpectedtonegotiateonthemore policy-making ininternationalaffairs. Parliament, andselectedexpertswithsomeexperienceofgovernment and Member States,theCommission,CouncilSecretariat,European development planfortheEEAS,shouldincluderepresentatives ofthe union. This newgroup,taskedwithputtingtogetheramulti-stage President Jacques Delorsin1989topreparetheroadmapformonetary group, arguablymodelledontheonesetupby formerCommission The taskofelaborating such ascheme couldbegiven toan concentrate mindsonreaching asharedandmutuallybeneficialgoal. help resolve theobvious conflictsofinterestbetweenthevarious players and A convincing implementationscheme forthedevelopment oftheEEASwould A master planfor theEEAS effects inother, and morepolitical,spheresofdiplomacy too. delivery couldopenupinterestingperspectives andgenerate spill-over would bewelcome.Inthiscontext,thefieldofconsularaffairsandvisa clarification ofthepossibleformscooperation andthedivision oflabour While asingletemplateapplicabletoallcaseshardlyseemsrealistic,some require “detailedexamination”. actions towards thirdparties,andtheProgressReportindicatesthatitwill a crucialissue,asitwillhave animpactonfutureEuropeandiplomatic upgraded EUDelegationsandnationalembassiesinthirdcountries. This is Another importantquestionconcernsthefuturerelationshipbetween departments –couldbeenvisaged. bilateral embassies–i.e.theintegration ofexpertsfromothergovernmental would have tobemembersoftheEEAS. A constellationsimilartothatof as an“integral partoftheEEAS”.However, notalltheDelegations’staff The 2005ProgressReportconceives ofthecurrentCommissionDelegations Delegations andbilateral embassies ad hoc ad advisory 69 November 2007 70 November 2007 this Codewould forbidthemtakinginstructions from agovernment, all staffassignedtotheEEAS. As isthecasewithCommissionofficialstoday, common DiplomaticCodeofConductwhich would bebindingon During Phase1,consideration shouldalsobegiven toestablishinga for aminimumofthreetofive years. facilitating theirrapid insertionintotheEEAS,andsecondmentsshouldbe from theMemberStatesshouldthereforebedesignedwithaviewto and a‘periphery’ofsecondednationalofficials. Training periodsforofficials consist ofa‘core’officialsfromtheCommissionandCouncilSecretariat important toavoid theimpressionthatnewstructurewilleffectively In ordertosecureacceptanceoftheEEASinMemberStates,itwillbe policy administration. (more orlessdeliberate) formationofatwo- orthree-tierEUforeign be keypriorities.Morespecifically, itwillbeessentialtoprevent the the serviceandpreparingthemtowork togetherinacoherentmannerwould In thiscontext,offeringuniformtraining foralltheofficialsrotatinginto be assessed,streamlinedandmadeever morecompatiblewithoneanother. ‘foreign policy’. Existingcoordinationandcommunicationsystemsshould existing ‘branches’ thatcontributetotheelaboration andexecutionofEU to comeintoforce –theemphasisshouldbeoncoordinationof emerged inthisareasofar, itmay beappropriatetobeginformalising the private industryorany othersource. While nomajorproblemshave well suffice. administration. At thisstage,however, asimple‘missionstatement’could operandi modus In This processcoulddedivided roughlyintothreephases. options andspecificrecommendations. but rather todevelop aflexiblestep-by-step scheme, includingalternative It shouldnotaimtoestablishthefinalshapeofEEASonceandforall, report couldbepresentedtotheEuropeanCouncilinfirsthalfof2008. Ahtisaari –who would give furtherauthoritytoitsproposals,andfinal Patten orformerFinnish PresidentandUnitedNationsmediatorMartti statesman’ ofthecalibreformerExternalRelationsCommissionerChris The groupcouldbechaired by arenowned personality–aEuropean‘elder Phase 1 Phase – tobeconcludedby 2009,when theReform Treaty isexpected of theEEASifgoalremainstoestablisha sui generis sui consideration following theexperienceandassessmentmadeinPhase2,takinginto indicators forreaching ‘criticalmass’intheEEASwillhave beenestablished secondary law. and incrementalreformsonthebasisofexisting treatiesandrelated coherent andconsistentforeignpolicy throughpragmatic adaptations There arealready someoptionsavailable thatcoulddeliver amore Progress withintheexisting legalframework Council decisionwhereby theinstitutions(both atMemberStateand rules andbudgeting–shouldoccur. A morerobustoptionwould beaformal a CodeofConduct,internalprocedures,linesaccountability, staff into aformalisedsetofproceduresfortheEEAS-training andrecruitment, Towards theendofthisthirdphase,some‘codification’previouspractice ‘Europeanised’, diplomaticcultureand of amulti-tierserviceandpromotingshared,increasingly (and outof)theEEAS:asystemaimedatbothpreventing thedevelopment incentives andrewards shouldalsobeadoptedforallofficialsrotatinginto In thiscontext,somesortofEU-widehomogeneoussystemcareer them instructions. EU level) which sendofficialstotheservice‘renounce’theirrightgive Phase 3 Phase By theendof the newEUbudgetpost-2013. also applytothefinancialunderpinningforEEASbeincorporated into common operating proceduresandstandards.Needlesstosay, thiswould subsequently, todevelop general aswellpolicy-, case-andregion-specific be subjecttoanevaluation agreedtoby alltheMemberStates;and, experiences ofcommonforeignrepresentationinthefield,which would then The goalofPhase2shouldbefortheEEAS tocollectanumberof ‘pilot representations’. an extentthattheEEAScouldbetestedandevaluated inselected of thenewHighRepresentative shouldhave beendeveloped tosuch strategic coordinationcapacitiesundertheleadershipandresponsibility period covered by theEU’s current2007-13Financial Perspectives), the could beconcludedby 2015orshortlythereafter. Bythen,the two Phase 2 Phase rotations inthefledglingnewstructure. , inapproximately2012(towards theendof esprit de corps de esprit . 71 November 2007 72 November 2007 joint Press statementsand imminent operational implications. matters relevant forthepreparation ofdecisions,especiallythosewith well startcooperating onamoresystematicproductionofjointpapers Council SecretariatandDGRELEX,EUSpecialRepresentatives could policy’. CommissionDelegationsinthirdcountries,regionaldesksthe March 2006ReporttotheEuropeanCouncilona‘commonexternalenergy A promising,butrelatively isolated,precedentwas establishedwiththe further developed. by CouncilandCommissionbodiesofficialscould–shouldbe the Treaties, andisbadlyneeded.Inparticular, jointreportingandanalysis broader domainof‘foreignpolicy’ doesnotrequireany change to Improving existingreportingandanalyticalcapacitiesinthe be done. provisions oftheReform Treaty. Below areafewexamplesofhow thiscould the Union’s externalactionsandtofacilitatetheimplementationofnew In summary, theseoptionscouldbeconsideredasameansbothtoimprove practical cooperation betweenMemberStates. arrangements; thedevelopment ofcommontraining structures;andbetter policy practices andstructures;improvements intermsofconsular European foreignpolicy; instrumentsforstreamliningestablishedEUforeign These includeinformalmeasuresforoptimising theday-to-day businessof be improved throughenhancedmutualinvolvement inproceduresand bilaterally, betweensomeMemberStatesandtheCouncil Secretariat, The currentpractice ofexchanging personnel–betweenMemberStates administrative levels. decisions takenby both CouncilandCommissionofficialsatdifferent the objective shouldbetospeakwithonevoice and,therefore,toproduce Whenever differentEUplayers areworking togetheronagiven policy issue, the samesubjectby two orthreeEUbodies. ending thecurrentsituationwhere separate declarations areoftenissuedon and therotatingEUPresidency shouldbebettercoordinated,withaviewto individual Commissioners,theOfficeofcurrentHighRepresentative statements. The reporting,analysisandgeneration ofstatementscould 1 communiqués on foreignpolicy issuesmadeby .Several reportsandpapersincludeavariety ofreformoptions:‘Stocktaking reportonmeasurestoincreasethe 1. Endnotes JuliaLiebworks inthesameResearch Unit. Wissenschaft undPolitik). (Stiftung Affairs andSecurity forInternational German Institute Andreas MaurerisHeadoftheResearch atthe UnitonEUIntegration crucial testinggroundforthefuturedevelopment oftheEEAS. must thereforebehandledwithcareandflexibility. Butitcouldprove a This isavery sensitive questioninbothinstitutionalandpoliticalterms, further intensifiedandextended. and plannedfortheUnion’s representationtothe African Union–couldbe This institutionalinnovation –already inplace intheRepublicofMacedonia representatives inthirdcountriesandregionsrelevant toEUforeignpolicy. Last, butcertainlynotleast,therecouldberecourseto‘double-hatted’ these examples. appropriate incentives offeredtoothersencourage themfollow staff secondmentscouldbelookedatascasesofbestpractice –and itself. Those countriesthathave gonefurthestindeveloping exchanges and more widespreaddiplomaticnetwork acrosstheUnionandwithinBrussels in individual Foreign Ministriesshouldnothamperthecreationofa be intensifiedandextended. The differingprioritiesandguidelines and throughsecondmentstoboththeCouncilCommission–could (16419/06); NonPaper oftheFinnish Presidency visibility ofEUexternalpoliciesandfuturework’, CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,8December2006 (8909/07); ‘Stocktaking Reportontheimplementationofmeasurestoincreaseefficiency, coherenceand effectiveness, coherenceandvisibilityofEUexternalpolicies (COM(2006) 278final). World –SomePractical ProposalsforGreaterCoherence,Effectiveness and Visibility, 8June 2006 Journal C.30of10.02.07);CommunicationfromtheCommissiontoEuropeanCouncil,‘Europein consular protectionofUnioncitizensinthirdcountries’,28November 2006(COM(2006)712final–Official and visibilityofEUexternalpolicies’,July 2006;European Commission‘GreenPaper ondiplomaticand , , ‘Checklist ofmeasurestoincreasetheefficiency, coherence ’ , CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,13June 2007 73 November 2007 74 November 2007 component ofthe Treaty metwithfewobjections. Treaty, atnationallevel andintheEuropeanframework, the‘foreignaffairs’ They notedthatinthemany debateswhich tookplaceontheConstitutional real chance toimprove theeffectiveness ofEurope’s actionsintheworld. The ProjectGroupwas unanimousinconsideringthatthisreformoffers a Improved effectiveness for European foreign policy issues stillneedtoberesolved. their Joint ProgressReportofJune 2005in Annex 2),provides abasis,many key conducted in2004-05by theHighRepresentative andtheCommission(see intensively forplanningthenewservice. Although thepreparatory work The ratification period,which islikelytolastabout12months,shouldbeused in June 2009). will enterintoforce in2009(beforetheelectionstoEuropeanParliament was signed threeyears agoon29October2004)andthatthe Treaty would takeplacebeforetheendof2007(theConstitutional Treaty States. MembersoftheGroupexpressedhopethatsigningceremony The Reform Treaty stillhastobesigned,andthenratified by EUMember can beoperational. and political–remaintoberesolved beforethenewpersonandservice President andtheEuropeanExternalService,many questions–bothpractical provides basicguidelinesforthecreationofHighRepresentative/Vice- ‘new architecture’ requiresagreatdealofcarefulplanning. Although the Treaty In thefirstplace,GroupagreedthatimplementationofReform Treaty’s Need for goodplanning themes oftheGroup’s work. not representacommonviewpoint,theyillustrate anumberofconverging External Action ServiceinMay-July 2007. Although thesecontributionsdo views expressedby participantsintheEPC’s ProjectGroupontheEuropean The precedingsectionsofthis Working Paper reflectsomeoftheideasand Avery Graham By and recommendations Towards aEuropean Foreign Service: conclusions and afterconsultingtheParliament. majority vote intheCouncil, onaproposalfromtheEuropeanCommission the EuropeanParliament, while Communityaffairswillbedecidedby decided by MemberStates unanimouslyintheCouncilofMinisters,without at thelevel ofdecision-making,where, normally, CFSPmatterswillbe Under thenew Treaty, thetwo pillarswillcontinuetoco-exist,particularly foreign policy. ‘supranational’ approach which underliestheCommunityinstrumentsof provides theframework fortheCommonForeign andSecurityPolicy andthe the distinctionwillremainbetween‘intergovernmental’ approach which the two ‘pillars’thatpresentlycharacterise theEU’s activity inforeignaffairs: It would bewrongtoimaginethatthisreformwilleliminatethedualityof radical transformation. ‘new architecture’ willbeanoccasionforpractical reform,not arrangements forEUforeignpolicy: theimplementationof The membersoftheGroupsharedarealisticapproach tothefuture A pragmatic approach direction ofasuper-state. vocabulary ofthenationstate,suggeststhatEUisdeveloping inthe improvement inthesensethatterm‘Minister’,borrowed fromthe from alinguisticpointofview(anditmakeshorribleacronym), itisan Affairs andSecurityPolicy”. While thenewnameisworse thantheoldone Foreign Affairs” becomes“HighRepresentative oftheUnionforForeign change ofname,notsubstance–isthatthetitle“UnionMinisterfor The onlychange that hasbeenmadeinthetextof Treaty –anditisa field offoreignaffairsarepractically identicaltothoseofitspredecessor. In lightofthis,itisnotsurprisingthattheprovisions ofthenew Treaty inthe deliver what citizenswant. improvement. This isanareawhere institutionalreformcanhelptheEUto foreign affairs,andrecentglobaldevelopments have strengthenedthecasefor supported jointdecision-makingandactionby Europeansinthefieldof significant factor. OpinionpollsintheMemberStateshave consistently Netherlands, theprospectofanEUMinisterforForeign Affairs was nota Whatever thereasonsfor‘No’votes inthereferendaFrance andthe 75 November 2007 76 November 2007 in accordancewiththeEU’s budgetaryprocedures. to expressaview, particularlysincethenewservicewillhave tobesetup closely involved thanin 2005,andtheEuropeanParliament willalsowish which theysuspendedinMay 2005. The MemberStatesshouldbemore Representative andthe European Commissionshouldresumethework re-commence assoontheReform Treaty issigned. The High Preparation forthecreationofEuropeanExternal Action Serviceshould 1. Beginpreparations soon in apositiontoendorsethem. although notallitsmembers–particularlythosefromtheEUinstitutionswere points representaconvergence ofviewsamongmemberstheGroup, its work, therecommendationswhich canbemadeatthisstage. The following Against thisbackground, Iwas askedby theGrouptosummarise,inlightof Recommendations be anopportunitylost. draw thepillarsclosertogetherinamorecoherentframework. That would superficial rearrangement ofnamesandtitles,withoutaseriouseffortto So theimplementationofnewstructuresneedstobemorethana in situationswhere theycanexploitit. much interestedinunderstandingthedifferencebetweenpillars,except the EUtospeakwithonevoice andactmorecoherently;theyarenot decision-making. Ourpartnersintherestofworld generally want policy –thereisplentyofscopeformorecoherenceinEuropean Upstream anddownstream –thatisintheformationandexecutionof overall policy. different instrumentscomplementeach otherandformpartofacoherent remain, theobjectofreformistobringthemclosertogether, sothatthe make nodifferencetothefunctioningofEU. Although thepillarswill But, equally, itwould beanerrortosupposethatthenewarrangements will role oftheEuropeanParliament”. not give newpowers totheCommissioninitiatedecisionsorincrease British government iscorrectinsaying that“theprovisions covering CFSPdo In thissense,theDeclaration attached tothenew Treaty obtainedby the the newUnionDelegationsinnon-MemberStates. be drawn uptodefineits functions,bothatheadquartersandinrelationto provisions concerningtheEEASareimprecise. A missionstatementshould To functioncorrectly, an organisationneedsaclearmandate.Butthe Treaty’s 6. Define thetasks Commission, andexecutethemmoreeffectively. it shouldassumeanumberoftaskspresentlyundertakenby Counciland a ‘thirdwheel’, addingtothecomplexityofBrusselsmachinery; instead, not beduplicatedintheCouncilandCommission). The EEASshouldnotbe institutions shouldbeavoided (for example,itsgeographical ‘desks’should Duplication betweenthenewserviceandotherservicesofEU 5. Avoid duplication will beapre-requisiteforitssuccess. Satisfactory participationby MemberStatesas‘stakeholders’intheservice Commission) butalsofromMemberStates’own diplomaticservices. quality –notonlyfromtheEUinstitutions(theCouncilSecretariatand The newserviceshouldincludeadequatepersonnel–inquantityand 4. Includeadequate personnel objective ofcoherenceshouldbereflectedinthedesignEEAS. reason why theHighRepresentative/Vice-President hasa‘doublehat’, andthis (in theexecutionofpolicy andtherepresentationofUnion). That isthe both upstream(intheconceptionanddevelopment ofpolicy) anddownstream particularly atthedecision-makinglevel, itshouldbringthemclosertogether Although the Treaty willnoteliminatethetwo ‘pillars’ofEUforeignaffairs, 3. Make a reality of ‘double-hatting’ interim reportonthestateofpreparations duringthefirstsemesterof2008. High Representative andtheCommissionPresidentshouldproducean this issueforEuropeancitizensandtheParliament’s interest. The should beadequateprovision fortransparency, inviewoftheimportance Although thiskindofpreparatory work cannotbeconductedinpublic,there 2. Provide information onprogress 77 November 2007 78 November 2007 Commission official. the EuropeanPolicy Centre’s Balkan Graham Avery isaSenior Adviser totheEuropeanPolicy CentreandChairof cooperation betweentheservicesofCouncilSecretariatandCommission. service comingintoexistenceshouldaccelerate (notdelay) better (with theCommunication‘Europein World’). The prospectofthenew example, onthelinesproposedby theEuropeanCommissioninJune 2006 already beundertakenby EUinstitutionsandMemberStatesnow –for To facilitatethecreationofnewservice,interimmeasuresshould 10. Take actionnow capacity fortraining inEuropeandiplomaticaffairs. should fullyunderstandtheEU.Oneofitsprioritiesbetocreatea diplomatic practice, andthosecomingfromnationaldiplomaticservices service comingfromtheEuropeaninstitutionsshouldfullyunderstand The newserviceshouldhave highprofessionalstandards:membersofthe 9. Give priorityto training kinds ofconsularactivity shouldbeconsidered. after thenewservicehasbeencreated,possibilityofassumingsome account ofexperienceacquiredandtheneedforadjustments.For example, EEAS todevelop smoothlyandgradually over aperiodoftime,taking The decisiononitscreationshouldincludean evolutive clausetoallow the It willnot,however, beabletoperformallitspotentialtasksimmediately. 8. Provide for development Commission beginsitsmandate(which isscheduled forNovember 2009). process iscompletedsuccessfully),oratthelatestby thetimenext the Reform Treaty comesintoforce (inJanuary 2009,assumingtheratification The newserviceshouldbeready tobeginitsprincipalactivities themoment 7. Ensure commencement ontime uoeFrm andaformerEuropean Europe Forum, implementation ofa(more)commonpolicy vis-à-vistheoutsideworld. competences andbureaucratic infighting,tothedetrimentofactual the comingmonthsfrombecomingaperiodofinternalconfrontationover for theestablishmentofEEASitself–inhopehelpingtoprevent In addition,itdraws uparoadmap,timelineandfewguidingprinciples existing toolsandnorms. effective conductof‘foreignpolicy’ ina27-strongUnionandbetteruseof and inthirdcountries;exploressomepossibleavenues forbothamore It examinesthecurrentstateofaffairs,bothatBrussels‘headquarters’ debate andofferingviablesolutions. provide ananalyticalbackground andafewideasaimedatframing the immediately afterthenew Treaty issigned,this Working Paper triesto With thenegotiationsover thepreciseshapeoflatterduetostart (EEAS) toassisthim. renamed) andtheestablishmentofaEuropeanExternal Action Service Foreign Affairs andSecurityPolicy (asthe“Foreign Minister”hasbeen appointment ofa‘double-hatted’HighRepresentative oftheUnionfor previously enshrinedintheill-fatedConstitutional Treaty, includingthe the EU’s “foreignpolicy”. Itbasicallyincludesalltherelevant provisions The Reform Treaty provides anewinstitutionalframework fortheconductof Executive summary 79 November 2007 80 November 2007 ai ik CambridgeUniversity EuropeanPolicy Centre EuropeanParliament (Sub-Committeeon EuropeanPolicy Centre David Rijks Eberhard Rhein EuropeanCommission Stiftung Wissenschaft undPolitik EuropeanPolicy Centre Stiftung Wissenschaft undPolitik Gerrard Quille Charlotta OzakiMacias EuropeanPolicy Centre Marius Osswald EuropeanPolicy Centre Lucia Montanaro-Jankovski Antonio Missiroli Yale/IFRIAndreas Maurer CollegeofEurope,University ofLeuven EuropeanPolicy Institute Julia Lieb EUInstituteforSecurityStudies John Kotsopoulos EuropeanCommission Permanent Representationof Austria totheEU Stephan Keukeleire EuropeanPolicy Centre EuropeanInstituteofPublic Administration Jolyon Howorth Permanent RepresentationofHungarytotheEU Sara Hagemann Giovanni Grevi EuropeanPolicy Centre Marie-Hélène Fandel Jutta Edthofer Peter Dun CouncilSecretariat EgmontInstitute EuropeanPolicy Centre Simon Duke InternationalCrisisGroup Szilvia Dora Permanent RepresentationofGermany totheEU EuropeanPolicyPhilippe deSchoutheete Centre EgmontInstitute Jacki Davis Cesira D'Aniello Elizabeth Collett Neil Campbell EuropeanUniversity Institute,Florence EuropeanPolicy Centre,and Trans-European Fraser Cameron Breul Rainer Sven Biscop EuropeanPolicy Centre Politikfür AuswärtigeGesellschaft Deutsche Xiana Barros-Garcia Graham Avery Amanda Akçakoca Cornelius Adebahr List of participants ‘Towards aEuropean Foreign Service’ Project Group Annex 1 Policy Studies Association Security andDefence) (K.U. Leuven) (K.U.C) eii ut oa Permanent RepresentationofSpaintotheEU EgmontInstitute Permanent Representation ofLatviatotheEU Commission European University ofBath EuropeanPolicy Centre Cecilia Yuste Rojas Karel Van Hecke SwedishInstitute ofInternational Affairs Richard Whitman Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik Philipe Willaert Dace Treij Sofie Thorin May-Britt Stumbaum Maria Strömvik 81 November 2007 82 November 2007 adopted aresolutiononthissubject26May. on 11May, afterpreparation intherelevant Committees, andsubsequently 5. The European Parliament alsohadadebateontheEEASinplenarysession paragraphs 14and15. orientations have emergedasaresultofthesediscussions, asreflectedin the CouncilLegalServiceandCommissionservices. Somepreliminary Six meetingshave takenplaceonthebasisofanumberpapersdrawn upby questions, administrative functionsandthemanagementofUnionDelegations. technical aspects:thelegalstatusofEEAS,personnelissues,budgetary 4. Inparallel, discussionshave begunamongMemberStatesonanumberof these discussions. This reporthasbeendrawn uponthebasisofjointissuespaperand stocktaking ofthesebilateral meetingstookplaceinCOREPERon12May. 29 April, andalsosubsequentlywithRomaniaBulgaria. A collective then carriedoutbilateral meetingswithallMemberStatesbetween27and 3. The Presidency, togetherwiththeCouncilSecretariatandCommission, on 10March 2005. the basisforafirstroundofdiscussionswithMemberStatesinCOREPER President oftheCommissioncirculated ajointissuespaperwhich served as Commission aswelltheMemberStates. The HighRepresentative andthe undertaken by theSecretary-General/High Representative andthe preparatory work ontheEuropeanExternal Action Service(EEAS)was 2. Following thesignatureofConstitutional Treaty inOctober2004, Introduction Service foritsmeetinginJune 2005atthelatest. joint progressreportonpreparatory work ontheEuropeanExternal Action Secretary-General/High Representative andtheCommissiontopreparea 1. The EuropeanCouncilatitsmeetingon16-17December2004invited the the Commission by theSecretary-General/High Representative and 9 June2005:Joint Progress Report to theEuropean Council Annex 2 desks dealingwithissuessuch ashumanrights,counter-terrorism, with geographical deskscovering allregionsoftheworld andthematic comprise servicescurrentlydealingwithCFSP(includingCSDP),together to fulfilallhisresponsibilitieseffectively. ItsuggestedthattheEEASshould highlighted theneedtoensurethatdouble-hattedMinisterisequipped 8. OntheissueoforganisationEEAS,jointissuespaper conduct theCFSP/CSDPandtofulfilhisrepresentationalduties. relevant treatyprovisions. At thesametime,hemustbeinaposition to proposals, andtoensureoverall coherenceandconsistency, subjecttothe Commission. Hemusthave themeanstoshapeagenda,make the Ministerinhisvarious functions,includingthatof Vice-President ofthe 7. All MemberStatesunderlinedthatthepurposeofservicewas toassist this asanimportantfactorinminimisingduplicationandsaving costs. General SecretariatoftheCounciland/orCommission.Indeedsomesee Member States,theEEAScouldusesupportfunctionscarriedoutby the close linkstoboththeCouncilandCommission.For alargenumberof “institution”, butaserviceundertheauthorityofForeign Minister, with of thisapproach, which would meanthattheEEASwould notbeanew far aspossible.Inthisrespect,therewas broadagreementthatthegeographical 9. MemberStatesagreedthattheduplicationoffunctions shouldbeavoided as Council Secretariatshouldbeincluded. also expressedinthisrespect. Views differedover whether Sitcenfromthe tended toviewthemilitarystaffaspartofservice,but somedoubtswere and oftheCommission(DGExternalRelations). A largebody ofopinion at leasttherelevant partsoftheCouncilSecretariat(DGEandPolicy Unit) with mostasaresultdrawing theconclusionthatEEASshouldconsistof majority ofMemberStatesliessomewhere betweenthesetwo positions, consensus thattrade policy shouldnotbeincluded). The viewofthe such asenlargement,neighbourhoodanddevelopment policy (thereisa whilst a fewwould insteadpreferittohave abroadremitincludingareas States considerthattheEEASshouldberestrictedtocovering CFSP/ESDP, non-proliferation andrelationswiththeUN. A smallnumberofMember the CommissionindicatedthatEEASshouldbeaserviceof 6. The jointissuespaperfromtheHighRepresentative andthePresidentof The form andfunctionsof theEEAS generis” nature. There isbroadconsensusamongMemberStatesinsupport “sui 83 November 2007 84 November 2007 feeling was thatthedecisionshouldbetakenonan advanced inthejointissuespaper. As togroupswithmixedcompetences,the were opento,chairmanship by amemberoftheEEAS,inlinewithapproach or groupsworking closelywiththePSC,amajoritysaidtheycouldaccept,or continue tobechaired by therotatingPresidency. ConcerningpureCFSPgroups area ofexternalrelationsanddealingwithwhat arenow firstpillarmattersto 10. Many MemberStateswould prefertheCouncil’s preparatory bodiesinthe Council preparatory bodies their tasks. fields such astrade, development orenlargementsoastoallow themtofulfil not prevent theCommissionfromorganisingitsDirectorate-Generals inother General SecretariatoftheCouncilorCommission,even thoughthiswill and thematicdeskswithintheserviceshouldnotbeduplicatedeitherin on additionaltaskssuch asconsularprotection andvisas. A majorityofMember 12. The joint issuespaperalsoraised theideathatUnionDelegationsmighttake head ofmission)asamodelforthefuturefunctioningUnionDelegations. from differenthomeministries,yet allcollectively undertheauthorityof own embassiesorpermanentrepresentationstotheEU(composedofstaff services oftheCommission).Many MemberStatescitedtheexampleoftheir management offinancialassistancewould continuetocomefromthe members oftheEEAS(thosecovering specificpoliciessuch astrade and necessarily implythatallstaffworking intheDelegationswould needtobe representation oftheUnion.For mostMemberStatesthisdoesnot provisions covering theinstitutionalresponsibilities forexternal of theEEAS.Moreover, thesearrangements willhave torespectthetreaty under theauthorityofForeign Minister, theyshouldbeanintegral part consequence oftheprovision oftheConstitutionaltreatywhich places them delegations shouldbecomethefutureUnionDelegations,andthatasa 11. There isbroadconsensusthattheexistingnetwork ofCommission Delegations Union DelegationsshouldbesharedwithMemberStates. from MemberStates.Itwas alsoproposedthat certaincategoriesofreportsfrom Delegations shouldprovide logisticalandtechnical supportfor high-level visits which would requiresomedetailedexamination. Some suggestedthatUnion States supportedthis,althoughitwas recognisedthatthiswas acomplexissue ad hoc ad basis. and afterobtainingtheconsentofCommission. Council shallactonthisproposalafterconsultingthe EuropeanParliament put forward aproposalfor aEuropeanDecisionestablishingtheEEAS. The work ontheEEAS.OnceConstitutionentersintoforce, theMinisterwill SG/HR, theCommissionandMemberStatesshall beginpreparatory or government have decidedthatfollowing itssignatureon29October, the the settingupofaEuropeanExternal Action Service(EEAS).HeadsofState Vice-President oftheCommission(theMinister). The treatyalsoprovides for of aUnionMinisterforForeign Affairs who shallatthesametimebe innovations inthefieldofforeignaffairs.Itforeseescreationpost 1. The Constitutional Treaty (thetreaty)introducesimportantinstitutional Introduction Issues paperontheEuropean External ActionService examination, buildingonthediscussionswhich have taken placetodate. status, andotherpersonnelbudgetaryissuesrequiredfurther authorising officeroftheEEASaswellrelatedissueitsadministrative the budgetofUnion,roleMinisterinrelationtofunction 15. DelegationsagreedthattheimplicationsoffinancingEEASfor adequate geographical balance,whilst avoiding theintroductionofquotas. decisions. Almost alldelegationsunderlinedtheimportanceofguaranteeing should implyacentral rolefortheMinister, includinghisagreementonfinal EEAS tobebasedonmerit,withappropriateselectionprocedures. These 14. There was broad agreementontheneedfornominationofstaffto had thesamestatusandconditionsofemployment. agents rather thansecondednationalexpertstoensurethatallstaffintheEEAS all consideredthatpersonnelfromtheMemberStatesshouldbetemporary national diplomatsintheEEASandarange ofpositionsatalllevels. Nearly States underlinedtheimportanceforthemofhaving asufficientnumberof three sources (CouncilSecretariat,CommissionandMemberStates), it shouldbedefinedby itsscopeandfunctions. As itsstaffwill bedrawn from delegations expressedaviewontheoverall sizeoftheservice,consideringthat and organisationalquestionsthatrequirefurtheranalysis.Inthiscontext,few 13. The jointissuespaperhighlightedanumberofadministrative Personnel andbudgetary issues 85 November 2007 86 November 2007 preparatory bodies of the various Council configurations, with the exception the with configurations, Council various the of bodies preparatory dealing withissuesgoingtotheForeign Affairs Council: Minister. The textofthedraft appliesthesamelogictoworking groups under article307ofthetreaty, willbechaired by arepresentative ofthe stipulates thatthePSC,whose roleintermsofCFSPandCSDPisdefined contained inaDeclaration oftheIGCconcerningarticle24treaty implies fundamentalchanges elsewhere intheorganisation. A draft Decision innovation. The replacementoftherotatingPresidency intheexternalfield 5. Giving thechair oftheForeign Affairs CounciltotheMinisterisamajor subject totheirrespective decision-makingprocesses. by coherentuseoftheresources oftheEUaswellby nationalinstruments, at EUlevel. Itisimportanttoensurethatonceadopted,apolicy isbacked up than EUmeans–,andalsoforCFSPotherinstrumentsofexternalaction own specificity. This istruefornationalmeans–which areinfactfarlarger and execution,thetreatymakesclearthatvarious instrumentsretaintheir and proposition,coordinationrepresentation.Intermsofdecision-making 4. The Ministerwillthushave importantresponsibilities intermsofinitiative 3. Article 28ofthetreatygives theMinisteranumberoftasks: The roles of theMinister requested by theEuropeanCouncilinDecember2004. the HRandCommissionforEuropeanCouncilinJune 2005,as Member Statesinthecontextofpreparation ofajointprogressreportfrom structure oftheEEAS.Itisintendedtoserve asthebasisforfirstdiscussionswith President oftheCommission,setsoutsomeissuesrelatingtotasksand 2. This paper, which ispresentedjointlyby theHighRepresentative andthe of the Foreign Affairs configuration, shall fall to the member of the group the of member the to fall shall configuration, Affairs Foreign the of chairing the relevant configuration…” relevant the chairing CoordinatingotheraspectsoftheUnion’s externalactionwithin • BeingresponsiblewithintheCommissionforresponsibilitiesincumbenton • Ensuringtheconsistency oftheUnion'sexternalaction; • Presiding over theForeign Affairs Council; • ConductingtheUnion’s CommonForeign andSecurityPolicy (CFSP)and • the Commission. it inexternalrelations; Common SecurityandDefencePolicy (CSDP); . “The chair of the of chair “The elaborate the Union's external action on the basis of strategic guidelines laid guidelines strategic of basis the on action external Union's the elaborate with thediplomaticservicesofMemberStatesandwill compriseofficials Secretariat (CGS)andtheCommission. The EEASwillwork in cooperation preclude himfromdrawing onotherserviceswithintheCouncilGeneral 10. The EEAS willassisttheMinisterinfulfillinghismandate. This doesnot The EEAS 9. Against thisbackground, anumberofprinciplesshouldberespected: Principles political orientationsoftheUnionwhich hewillhelp toshape. instruments atthedisposalofUnion,buttoensurecoherencewith 8. ItisnotthetaskofMinistertomanageallvarious externalaction representational roleintheseareas,includingthereplacementof Troika. he mustbeinapositiontoconducttheCFSP/CSDPandfulfilhis and consistency, subjecttotherelevant treatyprovisions. At thesametime, to shapetheagenda,makeproposals,andensureoverall coherence 7. For theMinistertobeable tofulfilhismandate,hemusthave themeans external actionandbetweentheseitsotherpolicies. have toensureconsistency betweenthedifferentareasofUnion's Article 292-3,theCouncilandCommission,assistedby theMinister, Foreign Affairs Councilwillbeincharge notonlyofCFSPmatters,but that objective, asdescribedinparagraph 3.Itshouldbenotedthatthe external action. The creationofthepostMinisterismeanttocontribute 6. Itisimportanttoensureconsistency betweenthedifferentareasofEU Consistency andcoherence inexternal actions down by the European Council and ensure that the Union’s action is action Union’s the that ensure and Council European the by down consistent” Coherenceandconsistency ofexternal action. • Avoidance ofduplicationresponsibilitiesandestablishmentaclear • Strictcompliancewiththeprovisions ofthetreaty, includinginparticular • division oftasks; institutions laiddown by thetreaty(see Article 308); the applicationofproceduresandextentpowers ofthe , asstatedin Article 24-3.Moregenerally, inaccordancewith “shall 87 November 2007 88 November 2007 of theauthorstreatytoforeseeaninnovative insertion ofaspecificlegalbasewithinthetreatyconfirmspoliticalwill staff secondedfromnationaldiplomaticservicesoftheMemberStates. The from therelevant departmentsoftheCGSandCommissionaswell international organisationssuch astheUN. such ashumanrights,counter-terrorism, non-proliferation andrelationswith 14. There shouldbesinglethematicdesks,locatedwithintheEEAS,onissues to fulfiltheirtasks. fields such astrade, development orenlargementsoastoallow them prevent theCommissionfromorganisingitsDirectorate-Generals inother framework forrelationswithaparticularcountryorregion. This willnot Commission, shouldassisttheMinisterinshapingacoherentpolicy world. These desks,which shouldnotbeduplicatedeitherintheCGSor comprises geographical deskswhich cover allthecountries/regionsof and thePresidentofEuropeanCouncil. This requiresthattheEEAS briefing notonlytotheMinister, butalsototheotherCommissioners by thetreaty, theEEASmustbeabletoprovide unifiedpolicy advice and 13. Inordertoallow theMinistertoplay theroleshehasbeengiven assessments andevaluations directly. Minister willbeoneofitsmainclientsandmustabletoorder of theSITCEN,itslocationrequiresfurtherthought.Inany event, the all EUinstrumentsforcrisismanagement.Inviewofthemultiplefunctions by purelymilitarymeansandunderlinestheimportanceofbringingtogether European SecurityStrategy emphasisesthattoday’s threatscannotbetackled responsibilities, theMilitaryStaffshouldbeintegrated withintheEEAS. The that CSDPandcrisismanagementarepartoftheMinister’s core Council andtheCommissionshouldbeanintegral partoftheEEAS.Given CSDP), theservicespresentlyworking inthoseareasbothwithinthe 12. InviewoftheMinister'sparticularroleinconductingCFSP(including relations withtheCommissionandCGSservices. question inthisrespectconcernsthescopeofEEASandnatureits Minister isequippedtofulfilallhisresponsibilitieseffectively. The first 11. The organizationoftheEEASneedstoensurethatdouble-hatted or whether itshouldbepartlyattached toeitherorboth. should beanautonomousservice,neitherintheCommissionnorCGS, the creationofanewintegrated service. The questionarisesastowhether this sui generis sui solution, i.e. as theprovision ofotherservicestoMemberStates. delegations inconsularprotectionandpossiblythe issuingvisasaswell 19. Questionsrequiringfurtherthoughtincludethefuture roleoftheUnion Union delegation. EU bodiesinthirdcountriesshouldbeapartofsingle structure,i.e.the diplomatic missions.Itisimportanttomakesurethat all representatives of the authorityofHeadDelegation,asisruleinnational agriculture, transport andotherareas.Such personnelshouldbeunder from otherservicestocover issuessuch astrade, JHA,financialmatters, embassies, theUniondelegationscanincludepersonnelseconded financial management,shouldapplyaccordingly. As isthecasefornational concerning staffregulations,originandrecruitmentofpersonnel 296 inparticular),thedelegationsshouldformpartofEEASornot.Rules representation oftheEUasdescribedintreaty(see Articles 22,26and as towhether inviewofthevarious responsibilitiesintermsofexternal delegations willbeundertheauthorityofMinister. The question arises delegations inthirdcountries.Under Article 328ofthetreaty, theUnion 18. A majorinnovation ofthetreatyisestablishmentUnion Union delegations into detailsatthisstage. protocol, security, press,andinformationtechnologies. Itistooearlytogo relations withtheEP. Itwillrequireinadditionsupportservicessuch as external relations,theEEASshouldcontainaserviceresponsiblefor 17. Inviewofthegrowing importanceoftheEuropeanParliament in however co-ordinatedby theMinisterinsideCommission. corresponding servicesintotheEEAS.Generally speakingtheseareasare their specificnature,thereisnoprimafaciecaseforintegrating the financial assistanceprogrammes, andtheenlargementnegotiations.Dueto development policy andhumanitarianassistance,managementofexternal 16. Beyond theseareasofexternalaction,therearealsosuch astrade, between theEEASandservicesofCGS. significant externalprojection.Similarissuescouldariseover theinterface those primarilyresponsibleforthemanagementofinternalpolicieswith and theservicesofCommissionwithexternalresponsibilitiesincluding 15. Itwillbeimportanttoorganizeeffective consultationbetweentheEEAS 89 November 2007 90 November 2007 the MemberStates,tobepresentedatlatestJune EuropeanCouncil. a jointprogressreportonthepreparatory work, carriedoutby themselves and the Secretary-General/High Representative andtheCommissionwillprepare 22. InlinewiththeconclusionsofEuropeanCouncilDecember2004, Concluding remark just tolistafewgeneral questionsthatrequirefurtherwork: to belookedatwithrespectthefutureEAS. At thisstage,itmay beuseful 21. Itisprematuretotackle themany administrative questionsthatwillhave Administrative questions national diplomaticservices. These include: 20. QuestionsalsoariseconcerningtherelationshipbetweenEEASand How tomeettheadministrative costsoftheEEASincludingpayment ofstaff • How specificrequirementsoftheEEAScouldbereflectedingeneral • How theMinistercouldbeappointingauthority, responsiblefor • How theEEAS,althoughdrawing onthreeseparate sources ofpersonnel, • Arrangements fortheHeadsofEUdelegationstochair allmeetingsof • Exchange ofinformationbetweentheEEASandnationaldiplomatic • from theEUbudgetwithnecessarydegreeofmanagementautonomy. be subject; implementing rulesoftheStaffRegulations,towhich itsstaffwould three sources ofpersonnel(Council/Commission/MemberStates); the broadestpossiblegeographical basis,drawing asappropriateonthe recruitment onthebasisofmerit,while ensuringthatstaffarerecruitedon could have asingle Heads ofMissionsEUMemberstatesinthirdcountries. services atheadquartersandinthirdcountries; “tableau d'effectifs” “tableau ; Policy, who shallchair theForeign Affairs Council,shall contribute through 1. The High Representative oftheUnionforForeign Affairs andSecurity 13a TEU Article extent thatthisisconsistentwithparagraphs 2and3. the HighRepresentative shall beboundby Commissionprocedurestothe responsibilities withintheCommission,andonlyfor these responsibilities, other aspectsoftheUnion'sexternalaction.Inexercising these responsibilities incumbentonitinexternalrelationsandforcoordinating action. HeorsheshallberesponsiblewithintheCommissionfor Commission. Heorsheshallensuretheconsistency oftheUnion'sexternal 4. The HighRepresentative shallbeoneofthe Vice-Presidents ofthe 3. The HighRepresentative shall preside over theForeign Affairs Council. defence policy. by theCouncil. The sameshallapplytothecommon securityand the development ofthatpolicy, which heorsheshallcarryoutasmandated security policy. Heorsheshallcontributeby hisorherproposalsto 2. The HighRepresentative shall conduct theUnion'scommonforeignand may endhisorhertermofofficeby thesameprocedure. of theUnionforForeign Affairs andSecurityPolicy. The EuropeanCouncil of thePresidentCommission,shallappointHighRepresentative 1. The EuropeanCouncil,actingby aqualifiedmajority, withtheagreement 9e TEU Article Policy/Vice-President of theEuropean Commission High Representative of theUnionfor Foreign Affairs andSecurity Amendments andnewinsertionstotheEC/EU Treaties. from theReform Treaty, October2007. These extracts concerningthe‘newarchitecture’ forforeignpolicy aretaken Extracts from Reform Treaty Annex 3 91 November 2007 92 November 2007 preceding theappointmentofHighRepresentative oftheUnionfor 1. The Conference declaresthat,inthecourseofpreparatory work Lisbon on18/10/07) 9eofthe ad TreatyDeclaration Article onEuropeanUnion(adoptedin and SecurityPolicy. (…) representative oftheHighRepresentative ofthe Union forForeign Affairs (…) The ChairofthePolitical andSecurityCommitteeshallbeheldby a of theCouncil concerning theEuropeanCouncildecisiononexercise ofthePresidency 9c(9)ofthe 3on Treaty 2ofDeclaration Article Article onEuropean Union Representative shallend. the termofofficememberhaving thesamenationalityasHigh the HighRepresentative oftheUnionforForeign Affairs andSecurityPolicy, end oftheirtermoffice.However, ontheday oftheappointment establishing theEuropeanCommunityshallremaininofficeuntil the Treaty amendingthe Treaty onEuropeanUnionandthe Treaty The membersoftheCommissioninofficeondateentryintoforce of 5 article IV, Title Protocol No10on Transitional Provisions, management operations referredtoin Article 28.(…) Representative, thepoliticalcontrolandstrategic direction ofthecrisis shall exercise, undertheresponsibilityofCouncilandHigh (…) Within thescopeofthisChapter, thePolitical andSecurityCommittee 25ofthe TEU amendedby 23 theReformTEU (formerarticle Article Treaty) international conferences. express theUnion'spositionininternationalorganisationsandat political dialoguewiththirdpartiesontheUnion'sbehalfandshall to thecommonforeignandsecuritypolicy. Heorsheshallconduct 2. The HighRepresentative shallrepresenttheUnionformattersrelating the EuropeanCouncilandCouncil. security policy andshallensureimplementationofthedecisionsadoptedby his orherproposalstowards thepreparation ofthecommonforeignand on EuropeanUnionandthe Treaty establishingtheEuropeanCommunity The Conferencedeclaresthat,assoonthe Treaty amending the Treaty 13aofthe 22on TreatyDeclaration Article onEuropeanUnion European Parliament andafterobtainingtheconsentofCommission. shall actonaproposalfromtheHighRepresentative afterconsultingthe Action Serviceshallbeestablishedby adecisionoftheCouncil. The Council Member States. The organisationandfunctioningoftheEuropeanExternal Commission aswellstaffsecondedfromnationaldiplomaticservicesofthe from relevant departments oftheGeneral SecretariatoftheCounciland with thediplomaticservicesofMemberStatesandshallcompriseofficials a EuropeanExternal Action Service. This service shallwork incooperation 3. Infulfillinghisorhermandate,theHighRepresentative shallbeassistedby 13a TEU Article European External ActionService Union's externalrepresentation.(…) other casesprovided forinthe Treaties, it[theCommission]shallensurethe 1. (…) With theexceptionofcommon foreignandsecuritypolicy, and 9d TEU Article Role of Commission inexternal representation with theprovisions of Articles 9dand9eofthe Treaty onEuropeanUnion. duration asthenextCommission,heorshewillbeappointedinaccordance term ofofficewillstartinNovember 2009atthesametimeandfor Representative oftheUnionforForeign Affairs andSecurityPolicy whose 2. Furthermore,theConferencerecallsthat,asregardsHigh appropriate contactswillbetakenwiththeEuropeanParliament. the endoftermofficeCommissioninonthatdate, transitional provisions andwhose termofofficewillbefromthatdateuntil 9e ofthe Treaty onEuropean Union and Article 5oftheProtocolon the Treaty establishingtheEuropeanCommunityinaccordancewith Article entry intoforce ofthe Treaty amendingthe Treaty onEuropeanUnionand Foreign Affairs andSecurityPolicy which isduetotakeplaceonthedateof 93 November 2007 94 November 2007 policy shallcover allareasofforeignpolicy and all questionsrelatingtothe 1. The Union's competenceinmattersofcommonforeignandsecurity 11 TEU Article Common Foreign andSecurityPolicy to theCouncil. Commission, forotherareasofexternalaction,may submitjointproposals Policy, fortheareaofcommonforeignandsecurity policy, andthe 2. The HighRepresentative ofthe UnionforForeign Affairs andSecurity 10b TEU Article Joint proposals inthefieldof external affairs cooperate tothateffect. Foreign Affairs andSecurityPolicy, shallensurethatconsistency andshall the Commission,assistedby theHighRepresentative oftheUnionfor external actionandbetweentheseitsotherpolicies. The Counciland 3. (…) The Unionshallensureconsistency betweenthedifferentareasofits 10a TEU Article Consistency of external action in closecooperation withMemberStates'diplomaticandconsularmissions. Representative oftheUnionforForeign Affairs andSecurityPolicy. They shallact 2. UniondelegationsshallbeplacedundertheauthorityofHigh shall representtheUnion. 1. Uniondelegationsinthirdcountriesandatinternationalorganisations 188qECT Article Union Delegations States shouldbeginpreparatory work ontheEuropeanExternal Action Service. for thecommonforeignandsecuritypolicy, theCommissionandMember is signed,theSecretary-General oftheCouncil,HighRepresentative provisions covering CFSPincludinginrelationtothe HighRepresentative of 11 ofthe Treaty onEuropeanUnion,,theConferenceunderlinesthat In additiontothespecificproceduresreferredinparagraph 1of Article policy No31concerningthecommonforeignandsecurity Declaration international peaceandsecurity. responsibility oftheSecurityCouncilanditsMembersformaintenance of theCharterUnitedNationsand,inparticular, by theprimary It stressesthattheEUanditsMemberStateswillremainboundby theprovisions security anddefencepolicy oftheMemberStates. Security andDefencePolicy donotprejudicethespecificcharacter ofthe The Conferencealsorecallsthattheprovisions governing theCommon representation inthirdcountriesandinternationalorganisations. for theformulationandconductoftheirforeignpolicy noroftheirnational not affecttheresponsibilitiesofMemberStates,astheycurrentlyexist, and SecurityPolicy andthe establishmentofanExternal Action Service,do creation oftheofficeHighRepresentative oftheUnionforForeign Affairs Union covering theCommonForeign andSecurityPolicy, includingthe The Conferenceunderlinesthattheprovisions inthe Treaty onEuropean policy No30concerning thecommonforeignandsecurity Declaration of Article 240aofthe Treaty oftheFunctioningEuropeanUnion review thelegalityofcertaindecisionsasprovided forby thesecondparagraph of itsjurisdictiontomonitorthecompliancewith Article 25ofthis Treaty andto shall nothave jurisdictionwithrespecttotheseprovisions, withtheexception this areaisdefinedby the Treaties. The CourtofJustice oftheEuropeanUnion Treaties. The specificroleoftheEuropeanParliament andoftheCommission in Affairs andSecurityPolicy andby MemberStates,inaccordancewiththe shall beputintoeffectby theHighRepresentative oftheUnionforForeign of legislative actsshallbeexcluded. The commonforeignandsecuritypolicy acting unanimously, exceptwhere the Treaties provide otherwise. The adoption shall bedefinedandimplementedby theEuropeanCounciland The commonforeignandsecuritypolicy issubjecttospecificprocedures.It policy thatmightleadtoacommondefence. Union's security, includingtheprogressive framing ofacommondefence 95 November 2007 96 November 2007 security anddefencepolicy oftheMemberStates. Security andDefencePolicy donotprejudicethespecificcharacter ofthe The Conferencealsorecallsthattheprovisions governing theCommon decisions nordotheyincreasetheroleofEuropeanParliament. and SecurityPolicy donotgive newpowers totheCommissioninitiate The Conferencealsonotesthattheprovisions covering theCommonForeign membership oftheSecurityCouncilUN. participation ininternationalorganisations,includingaMemberState's policy, itsnationaldiplomaticservice,relationswiththirdcountriesand Member Stateinrelationtotheformulationandconductofitsforeign will notaffecttheexistinglegalbasis,responsibilities,andpowers ofeach the UnionforForeign Affairs andSecurityPolicy andExternal Action Service 00-Cover-WP-17 24-05-2005 13:18 Page 1

Mission Statement

Graham Avery Antonio Missiroli Jolyon Howorth Anne-Marie Le Gloannec David Rijks Richard Whitman Simon Duke Stephan Keukeleire Cornelius Adebahr Giovanni Grevi Julia Lieb Andreas Maurer

November 2007

EU INTEGRATION & CITIZENSHIP With the support of the European Commission EUROPE IN THE WORLD