NO. 27 JUNE 2019 Introduction

Beyond Obama’s Red Lines: The Syrian Arab Army and Chemical Warfare Can Kasapoğlu

The Syrian Arab Army’s chemical warfare capacity has been a game-changer through- out the civil war. Unlike intelligence estimates, Bashar al-Assad’s military planners considered these deadly weapons to be tactical arms for battlefield use, rather than last-resort strategic assets. During the reconstruction period, the West should pur- sue a comprehensive approach to address issues concerning ’s weapons of mass destruction.

Recent studies have specified 336 chemical Of the three characteristics of Syria’s CW strikes in Syria to date over the course of program – the president’s centralized grip the civil war. Estimates suggest that Assad’s on the arsenal, the involvement of a limited forces are responsible for 98 percent of number of personnel, and the principality of these attacks. Notably, around 90 percent ballistic missiles as a means of delivery – of the use of chemical weapons (CW) took only the latter has seemed to change place after the “red lines” were drawn by throughout the civil war. Open-source in- Barack Obama’s administration back in telligence suggests that the regime has pri- 2012. marily used barrel in CW delivery Prior to the civil war, experts had little for certain reasons. – a commer- information about the Syrian Arab Army’s cially use chemical – was not included in (SAA) chemical warfare doctrine. Intelli- the disarmament deal. It blurred the red gence reports from the Cold War era showed lines and, unlike nerve agents, has not that only a small number of well-trusted generated harsh international response. personnel in the infamous strategic weap- Thanks to help from Russia and Iran, the ons proliferation hub CERS (Centre d’Etudes regime has managed to keep its rotary-wing et de Recherches Scientifiques) took part platforms operational, despite heavy attri- in the Baath regime’s shady efforts. Late tion. Besides, barrel bombs require few, if President Hafez al-Assad exercised full any, technical skills in order to be dropped control over the CW arsenal. Declassified from choppers. In brief, although the CIA assessments predicted that the Scud Syrian military has suffered from consider- ballistic missile variants were the primary able manpower losses, it has managed to delivery means. keep its helicopters flying and its chlorine/

barrel production lines active. Never- tion when dispersed as aerosol, as well as theless, in some critical cases, such as their low persistency, which causes short- Ghouta, Saraqeb, and Khan Sheikhun, non- term, primary contamination, thereby persistent nerve agents were the CW of allowing incursions by follow-on forces. choice to deliver devastating results. Notably, The very persistent nerve agent VX and having analyzed environmental samples the persistent blister agent sulfur mustard collected from the impact points following would be more suitable for contaminating the April 2017 Khan Sheikhun attacks, an area for a long period of time and deny- French intelligence not only found the un- ing it to the enemy. The latter has a rela- deniable presence of sarin, but also hexam- tively slow rate of action compared to nerve ine, which is the signature stabilizer sub- agents. It would take hours to observe blis- stance of the Syrian CW program used in tering and edematous effects after exposure the synthesis of sarin. to sulfur mustard. However, since mustard lesions need months of medical care, the agent could significantly stress an adver- The Dark Art of Chemical Warfare sary’s operations by overstretching its mili- tary medicine capabilities. Alternatively, Chemical warfare aims at compensating for if the belligerent wants to keep a relatively conventional shortfalls. A belligerent could low profile, it could use incapacitating deploy these dreadful weapons within a choking agent derivatives of chlorine, as number of concepts of operations (CONOPS), widely observed in Syria. such as leading an offensive blitz by deliv- ering rapid shock-and-awe impact, displac- ing civilians or depopulating a settlement, Thinking Like an SAA General or denying an area to the adversary. Chemi- cal weapons are effective psychological The military rationale behind the Baath warfare assets, too. regime’s CW use roots back to a major From a military standpoint, operational degradation of the SAA’s manpower at the and tactical objectives determine the agent outset of the conflict. Although the regime of choice. Persistency is a key parameter in sent detachments from its elite units (such this respect. For example, at 25°C, 1 cubic as the Republican Guard) to bulky conven- meter of air can hold approximately 22,000 tional formations for keeping the disci- mg of Sarin (a very deadly, non-persistent pline, the army lost nearly half of its per- nerve agent), some 900 mg of sulfur mus- sonnel. Whereas the SAA had some 325,000 tard (a persistent blister agent), and 10 mg troops in 2011, the number fell below of VX (venomous agent X – a very per- 180,000 in 2013. This was a major blow. sistent and very lethal nerve agent). Other Even before the civil war, Syria had a critical factors are lethality and the rate of very corrupted conscription and mobiliza- action. Environmental factors such as wind, tion system that adversely affected regular temperature, and topography also affect the units when the unrest broke out. The outcomes. regime’s efforts to call up the reservists Whereas offensive planning would opt (male Syrians in their 20s and 30s who com- for the deployment of non-persistent agents pleted their conscription service) backfired with high rate of action, defensive planning and triggered even more desertions. would focus on persistent agents for deny- However, interestingly, we have not wit- ing terrain, disrupting enemy lines of com- nessed a total collapse of the SAA. To grasp munication, and slowing the adversary’s the unexpected resiliency of the Syrian operational tempo. Sarin variants, for ex- military, one should have a closer look ample, would make ideal agents for staging at the political-military legacy of Hafez aggressive assaults thanks to their strong al-Assad, and how Bashar capitalized on it. neurotoxic effects, easy respiratory absorp- The Syrian defense apparatus has long

SWP Comment 27 June 2019

2 manifested the pronounced sectarian char- areas, punishing the local populace, com- acteristics of the regime. The SAA’s elite pensating for the lack of manpower, and units (such as the 4th Armored Division, terrorizing opponents. Air Force Intelligence, and the Republican Guard), which benefit from favoritism, are predominantly manned by the Alawites, a Beyond the Red Lines sect from which the ruling clans of Syria – most notably the Assads and the Makhloufs The history of intelligence analysis un- – hail. Hafez al-Assad had maintained the cloaks many failures. The Japanese strike Alawite officer corps’ loyalty through a com- on Pearl Harbor, the Arab Spring, the Tet plex socio-economic structure. Damascus’ Offensive, the 1979 Iranian Revolution, and social fabric was redesigned by Hafez the 9/11 terrorist attacks would be the top al-Assad based on regime security needs. mentions. Does the Syrian case mark yet The military housing system remains the another intelligence failure? Well, at the most visible example in this respect. Hafez outset of the civil war, the Western stra- al-Assad initiated large-scale inhabitation tegic community fell short of anticipating projects for the Alawite-dominated “warrior the real meaning of CW for the Baath class” and families in Damascus. Likewise, regime. Unlike most predictions, Assad’s the praetorian units’ headquarters were military planners have not considered their built along the gateways of the capital, CW capacity to be a strategic asset of last ready to repel any attempt to overthrow the resort, but a tactical means to compensate Baathist dictatorship. Sectarian policies for for conventional shortcomings. The Obama manning key military and security posts administration believed that drawing red have linked nearly every Alawite tribe to lines – albeit without credible military co- the Syrian state apparatus in one way or ercion backing them – would deter Damas- another. This lucrative benefits system and cus and prevent chemical strikes. However, social ascent of the Alawite community the regime was well aware of the fact that came at a price. The Assad clan has built a Soviet Russia-style transition – in which a broad surveillance capacity resembling the old security elite could keep their oli- Moscow’s firm oversight on the Red Army. garchic positions in the new status quo – The SAA’s elite manpower has always been was not relevant for Syria at all. Any form under strict scrutiny. Together, the above- of regime change would not only claim the mentioned factors have kept the regime’s positions of Syria’s ruling clans, but prob- core warfighting capacity relatively intact, ably the lives of Assad and his nomenklatura. at the expense of attrition in large conven- Thus, the Syrian war machine was tasked to tional formations due to Sunni desertions. quell the uprising with all means necessary, Inevitably, Assad’s military planners have including chemical warfare. Finally, the adopted a “selective deployment” strategy, transparency of the regime’s CW declara- focusing on the key geopolitical axis across tions to the Organisation for the Prohibition Damascus and , and the Mediter- of Chemical Weapons was very problematic. ranean coast. This military geostrategic All in all, the regime has carried on with approach was tantamount to defending chemical warfare well after the disarma- around 20 percent of the country’s territory ment deal. with some 30,000 battle-hardened troops Maybe in an effort to undo the legacy of fighting alongside local pro-regime militia. George W. Bush concerning the Iraq weap- In doing so, the SAA’s generals considered ons of mass destruction case, the Obama ad- the CW arsenal to be a tactical game- ministration and its followers badly needed changer. Tellingly, the majority of chemi- la belle époque of disarmament and nonprolif- cal attacks took place along the Aleppo– eration through diplomacy. In fact, as open- Damascus axis, particularly in key choke source intelligence writings suggest, the points for depopulating opposition-held Syrian Baath regime’s failure to report any

SWP Comment 27 June 2019

3 VX in known operational sites should have Secondly, the Western policy community served as a warning in the beginning. The should map the regime’s chemical warfare impracticality of carrying out a chemical kill chain and publicly disclose the respon- disarmament mission amidst a civil war sible personnel. Russia, which won the war being fiercely fought was another under- at large but still badly needs a consensus estimated drawback. for reconstructing Syria, has to understand Regarding CW, Syria was never totally that no war criminal general of the SAA can disarmed, nor was Assad deterred by the be pardoned or rehabilitated. Nor can they “red lines.” Inevitably, the United States, have a place in the country’s defense appa- the United Kingdom, and France had to con- ratus in the future. In the absence of a © Stiftung Wissenschaft duct punitive military strikes. At the time viable and just security sector reform, no und Politik, 2019 of writing, the threat of CW was high in reconstruction fund should be initiated – All rights reserved Idlib. Some sources have already reported apart from the humanitarian aid for the chlorine use by the regime. people of Syria through the United Nations This Comment reflects and non-governmental agencies. the author’s views. Thirdly, cutting the Baath regime’s mili- The online version of What the West Can Do? tary ties with North Korea is essential to this publication contains prevent the regime from fully restoring its functioning links to other Eliciting and attributing the use of CW in offensive strategic weapons capacity. Pre- SWP texts and other relevant Syria go well beyond dealing with Middle venting illegal shipments and the transfer sources. Eastern affairs. A North Korean general of know-how remain critical. SWP Comments are subject in his well-decorated uniform revisiting Finally, the weapons of mass destruc- to internal peer review, fact- preparations for military action along the tion programs of rogue nations generally checking and copy-editing. demilitarized zone needs to know that he depend on a narrow group of scientists and For further information on cannot get away with having any record security elite. Putting Syria’s CW circles our quality control pro- of engaging in chemical warfare, given the under strict control should be a top priority cedures, please visit the SWP website: https://www.swp- fate of his Syrian counterparts. Failing to for Western intelligence services – before, berlin.org/en/about-swp/ set a credible precedent in Syria could lead during, and after the reconstruction period. quality-management-for- to an irreparable erosion in precious and swp-publications/ hard-earned international norms. The West should use its political and economic SWP leverage and pinpoint sanctions to weed Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik out “chemical ringleaders” and perpetrators German Institute for of crimes against humanity. In 2018, Ger- International and man authorities, for example, issued Security Affairs an arrest warrant against General Jamil Hassan, one of the strongest military figures Ludwigkirchplatz 3–4 10719 Berlin in the Baath regime. As head of the Syrian Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 Arab Air Force Intelligence Directorate, Fax +49 30 880 07-100 General Hassan commands the most critical www.swp-berlin.org security branch of the regime. Moreover, [email protected] he came to prominence as the one and only

ISSN 1861-1761 Syrian general who shattered a taboo by doi: 10.18449/2019C27 criticizing Bashar al-Assad in a Sputnik Arabic interview. If Germany’s efforts can prove that General Hassan is not untouch- able, no other Syrian war criminal figure will be able to dream of a safe retirement.

Dr Can Kasapoğlu was the 2018 IPC-Stiftung Mercator Fellow at SWP. The Mercator IPC Fellowship Programme at SWP is funded by Stiftung Mercator.

SWP Comment 27 June 2019

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