18Th Amendment: a Journey from Strong Federalism to Loose Federalism in Pakistan

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18th Amendment: A Journey from Strong Federalism to Loose Federalism in Pakistan

*DR. SYED MUSSAWAR HUSSEIN BUKHARI

**MUHAMMAD FAISAL KAMRAN

Abstract Loose federalism contributes to vitality of uniformity to the governance in a state. This arrangement enhances the autonomy and self ruling for the federating units to oblige the systemic local self government structure. In case of Pakistan, the system of third tier government either was held suspended under civil political regimes or arranged under the direct subordination to the federal government during military interlude. Since the adaptation of consensual 18th amendment, concurrent list has been abolished. Politically it is a skillful move of establishing decentralized federalism. This article finds the institutional arrangement to establish the new phase of federalism in Pakistan. Keywords: Lose Federalism, NFC award, 18th Amendment, New arena for Pakistan,

Introduction The idea of federalism is based on the contractual union of federating units on decentralized system of governance.37 The concept espouses two main principles. The first is the unity among federating units at political levels while second is the regional autonomy to the federating units in their administrative setup that are created through third tier of government. The third layer is directly derived under the regional territories. This practice has been successfully persuaded in several states having institutionalized federal system with diverse plural identities that are separated from one another on ethnic lines (Guelke, 2012, pp. 1-3; Lijphart, 1968, p. 14). It is the structured and institutional organization in a federal state that incorporate, safeguard, and provide accommodation to the all the segments of the society on the basis of constitutional autonomy and the principle of federal pluralism (Burgess, 1993, pp. 5-7). Apart from the principle of autonomy and pluralism, the existence of consociational society at divided lines is an appropriate condition of maintaining a federation at unified model on decentralized patterns (Lijphart, 1977, pp. 1- 2). The composition of ethnic communities usually finds their political interests by establishing lower tier of policy reforms. This system takes root from the locality of political activities under democratic regimes. Some booming states with such arrangements are; Belgium, Canada, India, Russia, Switzerland and United States of America (Anderson, 2008, p. 2). Federalism does not only make the institutions transparent and accountable but it also

*Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, The Islamia University of Bahawalpur. ** Research Student 37 The term federalism is derived from the Latin word „foedus‟, in 1645 that means “a mutual covenant agreed by a number of individuals”. The concept was used in the meanings of social integration and cultural harmony of various groups in 16th century. It was reshuffled into the meanings of “political organization of divided groups on democratic institutionalism” from late 19th century. For the time being, the concept was debated by the German and French theorists.

ijcrb.webs.com APRIL 2013 INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH IN BUSINESS VOL 4, NO 12 decentralizes the politico-economic and administrative structure by involving the citizens in local decision making progression. Unlike the developed federations, the systemic federalism in Pakistan did not inhale biased momentum for an active popular participation on decentralized blueprint in its long run political struggle. The main factors in its breakdown are; centralized regimes especially under the coinage of military (Muhammad and Kaleem, 2012, p. 331), the dominancy of the core group [punjabis] against the smaller ethnic groups [sindhis, balochis and pashtuns] (Ali, 1996, p. 135), partially motivated political culture, centralized constitutional trends, the long run authoritarian military regime, desertion of political parties at grass root level, the deeply divided tendencies of the ethnic groups in the regional territories, non consensual attitude of government and opposition elites on the principles of provincial autonomy (Faisal, 2010, p. 2), traditional subordination of bureaucracy to the centre (Yusuf, 1999, p. 6) and last but not was the lack of mutual consensus among the provincial elites on the criteria of reciprocated system of local government during the preceding civil political regimes. This article has focused on three multifaceted debates of the structure of federalism in Pakistan. First is the study of highly centralized trends in Pakistan; second is the ethnic consciousness at lingual roots since the passage of 18th amendment and third is to analyse the trends of decentralization in federalism in Pakistan in post 2010 regime and its implications on the future political trends. Hypothesis The structure of federalism in Pakistan is oscillated between central and semi-central tendencies since its establishment. The real change did not evolve at the institutional level to renovate it in the loose leaning. This article is based on the institutional design of structural federalism that has been evolved after the 18th amendment in Pakistan. Two other political ingredients of elite role and evolution of moderate public opinion at variant ethnic lines are recommended as the support engines to gear up the political process. In this approach, the evolutionary institutional system and step by development in consensus building of the elites are very important tools in establishing the loose federalism and the adaptation of systemic progressive level in Pakistan. Research Methodology Federalism is a systemic political engine to revive the relation between the centre [core] and the federating units [periphery] at institutional steps. To find these tendencies we have developed an analytical approach to study the development of federalism in Pakistan since its formation and its renovation in post 18th amendment period. The article approaches the institutional design of federalism from strong to loose scope by sorting out the system of local self governance at the grass root level. Literature Review The study of federalism is not a new phenomenon. It incorporates the volumes of sources in different aspects such as cultural, historical, traditional, lingual, ethnic, institutional trends. Our research is restricted to the institutional plan of federalism by focusing on the ethnic trends in Pakistan. It is in this perspective that the research sources that are taken up in the current article have ethnic and institutional precincts. A prominent researcher on studies of federalism in South Asia with special reference of India and Pakistan, Katharine Adeney (2007, 2004) emphasis on the ethnic and institutional development of federalism. She investigates the deep rooted ethnic trends of federalism

ijcrb.webs.com APRIL 2013 INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH IN BUSINESS VOL 4, NO 12 and proposes the institutional paradigm to minimize the disputes among the regional identities in Pakistan. The writers such as Anderson (2008), Guelke (2012), Hetcher (1975), Lijphart (1968, 1973) and Park (1967) have developed institutional models such as geographical tendency of the federating units [loose federalism], deep divided tendencies of the ethnic groups and their coalitional participation, centre-periphery centripetal and centrifugal frictions [centre-units relations], consociationalism, coalitional unity and regional political maturity respectively; to evolve the participatory federalism and to increase the participatory public opinion at he grass root level in a state having multiple ethnic, racial and lingual groups. At the historical and present patterns, the studies of Ayaz and Kaleem (2012), Zulfqar (2012), Langah (2011), Mustafa (2011), Waseem (2011a, 2011b, 2010), Faisal (2010), Talbot (2009), Ziring (1997, 1980), Jalalzai (1996), Maluka (1995), Aziz (2007) and Sayeed (1968) find the evolution of federalism in Pakistan on ethnic and institutional lines. These studies also describe about the multiple perspective of federalism such as Mustafa (2011), Waseem (2011a, 2011b, 2010) are more inclined towards fiscal and political arrangements, Maluka (1995), Talbot (2009) and Ziring (1997, 1980) have concentrated on the administrative, constitutional, ethnic and political trends of federalism while Langah (2011), Faisal (2010) and Jalalzai (1996) have dealt with the ethno-political and centralized political trends of federalism in Pakistan. All these studies have the characteristics of ethnic and institutional provisions and implicate the sign of institutional bend while studying the history of federalism in Pakistan. Understanding the Federalism: An Analytical Paradigm Federalism is a mutually derived covenant by federating territories having multiethnic trends that wish to organize the system of governance under the aegis of a central government. The union is administered in an overarching political system by transferring import subjects such as; communication, currency, defence, foreign affairs and external trade etc., to the central government by equipping remaining job to constituent units under the aegis of a written constitution (Kuper and Kuper, 1980, p. 292; Daun and Watson, 1978, p. 204). This relationship braces more succinctly in democracy and finds its pace towards decentralization while it treks to highly innermost political tendency in totalitarian federal countries. It cherishes federating units to share political sovereignty in their local affairs based on collective participation having decentralist themes (O’Neil, 2007, pp. 21-42; Burgess, 1993, p. 11). In other terms, it is a mutually exclusive jurisdiction of the federating units with that of the central government with the ability of sharing characteristic of political sovereignty (Adeney, 2007, p. 6; Park, 1967, p. 44; Ahmad, 1993, p. 25; O’Neil, 2007, p. 21). The structure of federalism is more significant to multiethnic states having moderate sovereignty (Adeney, 2007, p. 6), territorial and political autonomy (Daun and Watson, 1978, p. 204) that encompass the politico-economic and ethnic trends in groups living in a state at geographically divided lines. The system reflects the political intrigues and their politicization in finding out their solution on the principle of elite participation (Gagnon, 1993, p. 18; O’neil, 2007, p. 41). Two formative objectives are integrated in this way; the reduction of the level of vigor and the incitation of compromise at political levels (Guelke, 2012, pp. 3-5). In civic terms, federalism is a mechanics to accelerate unity in citizens of a state living at divided ends from their co-state individuals (Burgess, 2006, p. 20). Among the divided ethnic groups, the uniformity is created under the core structure of institutionalism. In other meanings, federalism is a political unification of conflicting forces under one central government (Ali, 1996, p. 7).

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In this explanation, the concept is considered more apprehension with the mutually recognized powers of federal government and those that of the federating units. In other words, federalism is a mode of political organization to choose for the integration of separate identities in an overarching political structure. We can say that, federalism is a political process for creating parity of relations between the centre [core] and the regional governments [periphery] on the principle of institutional mechanics to incorporate the endless conflicting goals (Burgess, 1993, p. 3) at one step and among the federating units [periphery-to-periphery] at the other step under the coercion of a written edict at decentralized rule (Faisal, 2010, p. 26). It accentuates the procedural political working of multiethnic groups under the aegis of democratic institutions by proposing substantial powers to the ingredient units (Nugent, 1994, pp. 16-17). By glancing at theoretical perspectives we conclude that federalism is successfully working in states having historical homogeneity [America since 1776]38, shared customary laws and diversification of powers and flexibility in centre towards the regional governments [Belgium, Russia and United States of America]. By analyzing the history of federalism, it is calculated that since late 18th century to the present day; federalism has fetched progress under the wings of democracy (Faisal, 2010, p. 24). That is why we scrupulous that, federalism is more appropriated to democracies with decentralized political system rather than in aristocratic regimes. It steps forward in institutionally developed political regimes such as; in Switzerland, Belgium, United States of America and Canada etc., less driven in centralized states of Indonesia, India, United Arab Emirates, Philippine and in Pakistan etc. The significant political measures of decentralization of powers and balance in institutions have played their role in the storming of federalism in a state. Historical Diversity of Federalism in Pakistan The inclination for adaptation of federalism expanded in post colonial regimes due to the privilege of having classy population in Africa, Asia and Latin America.39 They joined the pillars of federalism at the principle of centrality that created problems in their internal management from the very beginning. The framework of federalism in post colonial societies; with weak and inefficient democratic regimes in most cases, experienced the centripetal tendency in power sharing organization. The impulse of institutionalism did not evolve as the federal states perish into the disillusioned political regimes with normative political tendencies having lack of ethnic cohesion and elite institutionalism (Covell, 1987, p. 75). With dominion status after independence, Pakistan having segregated lingual groups also adopted the system of federalism at the same footing under the refined India Act of 1935.40 From the very beginning, the administration of the state was stood on political diarchy from the very beginning (Ali, 1967, pp. 237-239) by expanding their interests in the provincial jurisdiction. The tendency of centralization (Ali, 1996, p. 41) had kept at the outlay of

38 For example, the origin of federalism in USA was based on “Declaration of Independence Act of 1776” that was singed by the representatives of thirteen colonies/states. 39 The states are Nigeria, Malaysia, Belau, Comros, Micronesia, Nevis, India and Pakistan. 40 After partition, the population of East Bengal was lingually homogenous while in West Pakistan it was divided into Punjabi, Sindhi, Balochi and Pashtu lingual identities.

ijcrb.webs.com APRIL 2013 INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH IN BUSINESS VOL 4, NO 12 weak rooted Muslim League41 that had eventually declined after the 1954. The roots of provincialism was going to evolved since 1950, which were managed at short sighted military-bureaucratic oligarchy with the back support of apolitical elites decisions after the promulgation of One Unit scheme (Yusuf, 1999, p. 64). Instead of finding the politico-institutional solution, the federal government reserved the power of centralization beneath their supervision. The modus operandi traditions such as civil bureaucracy, the maneuver of emergency, martial laws, dismissal of provincial governments, the federal administrative Acts and imposition of governor rules and the imposition of emergency in the federation were revitalized to confirm the centrality in the following period of political instability during the following five decades. That is why decentralization was remained at half hearted paths. The bases of federalism in Pakistan discovered from the India Act of 1935. The successive constitutions of 1956, 1962 and even fewer than 1973 ruled out in such a way to extenuate supremacy to the centre. The constitutionalists notice to colonial covenants as the conducting path for new contracts. The centripetal tendencies dominated to that of centrifugal forces. An effective political tendency did not institute on decentralized principles of federalism (Faisal, 2010, p. 2, Jalazai, 1996, p. 489). During civilian governance [1947-58, 1971-77, 1988-1999, 2008-2010] while in military regimes [1958-71, 1977-88, 1999-2008]; the centre had the provisional apparatus of several powers of decision making over the provinces. The authoritarian regimes consumed local government structure (1960-69, 1980-88, 2001-2007) while political ambiance created either troika [1953-58, 1985-1997, 2008- present42] of civil machinery to prolong their rule. The provinces and the ethnic authorities were sidelined from the decision making environment [1947-71, 1977-85] due to the existence of this oligarchic nexus. The contrivance of centre was remained strong in the provinces. During the prior political circumstances of Pakistan, the several lingual movements at the geographical levels (Talbot, 2009, p. 14) [1948-71 in East Bengal, 1964-present in Sindh, in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 1947-2010, in South Punjab and Bahawalpur since 1970-present, in Hazara since 198143 and in Balochistan from 1970-present] were emerged for multiple tendencies such as autonomy, separate territorial identity, cultural uniqueness and the division of federating units into geographically located ethno-lingual groups (Ali, 1996, p. 11). The whereabouts revised from time to time with small and large intensity. Inspite of all manifestations the centralization was remained at the upper edge. In political echelons, the existences of structural weakness derive the elites towards group rivalry. This system dismantled the organizational roots of political parties on the principles of universality, grass root enrichment and

41 Hardly found on provincial roots, the political party had no experience to exercise political powers except by the leadership from East Bengal during 1937 and 1946 and in the Interim Government in 1946-1947. 42 The statement is based on the analysis of Daily Newspapers publishing from Pakistan during the last five years, as the military chief met several times with the civilian political leadership to discuss the political and security conditions of the state. 43 For the firs time, in 1981 census Seraiki-speaking and Hindko-speaking population was considered on the lingual basis. The reaction was emerged in more intense way. Zia-ul-Haq proposed Ansari Commission to sort out the problems of the federation, which in their final report, submitted to the federal government, recommended the creation of multiple federating units on administrative lines rather than on lingual basis. Earlier, such proposals were also provoked from Asghar Khan from Tehrik-i-Istaqlal party during 1960s.

ijcrb.webs.com APRIL 2013 INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH IN BUSINESS VOL 4, NO 12 secular algorithms. That is why the political parties appeared into small factions (Ziring, 1980, p. 112) representing the interests and policies for the sake of a particular community rather than to tune-up services to the citizens of the state. The extra-constitutional drifts haul out the appendage of the electoral democracy from the lower basis on the principles of accountability and expanded the parochial political frustration in the provinces and lingual groups against one another [peripheral groups against the core groups] and against the federation (Maluka, 1995, p. 299). This culture fragiled the rational decisions and created a paradoxical boundary [troika] by granting the powers to the military-bureaucratic aristocracy (Ali, 1967, pp. 241-243). The tendencies may be studied in the following successive regimes [1953-1958, 1985-1997 and 2008-present]. Sometimes, the troika system leads to the direct coup de‟ tat [1958-1971, 1999-2008] in Pakistan. From the above discussion, we may cease that the highly centralized design of federalism has created hurdles throughout the history of Pakistan. It did not perk up the level of public participation from the starting place of democratic mobility. The main causes of centralization in Pakistan were; the rivalries among political elites, over ruling of the institutions, aristocratic leanings, politicized power structure and the imbalanced configuration of the federating units. These grounds halted a line of political consensus in acute marginalized cleavages and the state was remained at abeyance in political development and lingual harmony.

Regime Centralization in Pakistan From the very investiture period, the geographical structure of the provinces in Pakistan have had remained imbalanced. This discrepancy offers a unique political trend to the centre [core] to exploit their powers by extending its political influence in the provinces [periphery]. This incongruity had inflexed the tendency of regionalism in Pakistan in early 1950s. Unlike India which reorganized its several states on lingual criteria and introduce the Panchayati Raj system of local government under the constitution originated from the British Imperialism (Cheema et. al, 2003, p. 2); the federation in Pakistan did not adopt such compulsions (Adeney, 2012, p. 3; Faisal, 2010, pp. 49-51). This decay developed a severe challenge to the veracity of state. The regionalism also tended to grow in early 1960s and got intensified in East Bengal [1952-1971]44 in Sindh [1964-96], in Balochistan [1970s-present] and in NWFP [1985-present]. The military authoritarianism was the main prospectus of centralization in Pakistan. Under the coup setup, the administration had relayed on the working of the bureaucracy as the right hand force of the martial rulers. They also adopted other judicial, constitutional and discretionary ordinances to prolong their governance without considering the actual political demands of the country.45 They expanded the political participation at the lower tier

44 The tendency was grown on lingual lines in 1952, strengthened into the regional nationalism in mid 1960 to the secession in 1970 and finally into separate state in 1971. This result measures that the central in Pakistan between 1947-71 did not announce any uniform political decentralization tendency. 45 Ayub Khan, Zia ul Haq and Pervez Musharraf adopted the constitutions while it is surprising that Yahya Khan spent its two and half years’ tenure under provisionally adopted Legal Framework Order.

ijcrb.webs.com APRIL 2013 INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH IN BUSINESS VOL 4, NO 12 but restricted their improvement under the pouch of the central executive instead of finding the structure of political liberalism (Cheema et. al, 2003, p. 26). The centrality had also swelled due to the competitor political forces working in the centre (Aziz, 2007, p. 42) and in the provinces as the federal government wanted either to exert the political wings or to reduce their provincial functioning under the constitutional and the executive clout. Both these two characteristics supported the provision for the federal ascendency in the previous constitution of 1956, 1962 and in 1973 in the perspective of emergency provisions. The dominancy may be seen during 1947-58, 1973-77, 1988-97.46 The friction of the adversary section also played their role in dismantling the political characteristics of good governance. The political instability that was emerged in the early phase after independence was continued in the following period (Ziring , 1997, p. 101). The provision of the constitutional dictatorship also had played their role in the increasing role of centralization of the federalism in Pakistan (Sayeed, 1968, p. 259). The whole structure of provisionally adopted India Act of 1935, the constitution of 1962, 8th and 17th amendment in 1973 constitutions were such provision of constitutional dictatorship of the central executive (Ali, 1996, p. 131) to produce their extreme political and administrative pressure on the provinces to control and negate their performance in decision making process. Under the 1973 constitution, the institution of Council of Common Interest47 was established, but its functioning was remained abeyance during last thirty years except a few meetings in 1990s. Due to the arrival of military ruling spark in the democratic transition, the systemic interest articulation of the policies collapsed down. The democratic transition stopped. The self-crafted and so-called decentralized power structure of local governance was hassled (Chadda, 2000, p. 3). The hierarchy of the federal government was triumphed and it ensured their superiority through the privileged position of bureaucracy over the partyless elected representatives at the lower tier. As they conceived that non party participation was best suited to the Pakistani nation. (Talbot, 2009, p. 158). Despite all these provisions, the role of the public opinion had played their significant role in ousting the military rulers from their autocratic positions. It was the movement of opposition parties under the umbrella of Democratic Action Committee against Ayub Khan in 1969 (Yusuf, 1999, pp. 106-107), Movement for Restoration of Democracy against Zia (1988)48 and Pakistan People’s Party led parliamentary force against Pervez Musharraf in 2008 which terminated their autocratic political powers under the privileges of public opinion . The preceding discussion reveals that Pakistan always tends back towards democratic federalism (Waseem, 2011a, p. 6) despite long term authoritarian decrees, as the public opinion supports this process. The same is true with Pakistan; which experienced four democratic transitions since its establishment. The first transition is termed as the

46 Various provincial ministries were dismissed and governor rules were imposed for several times. 47 The council of common interests is an executive body under Article 153 of the 1973 constitution which follows the equal participation from all the provinces to decide upon the matters that are indulged in the concurrent list, but, after April 2010, the concurrent list has been demolished. Under 18th amendment, the role of CCI has become more prerogative unlike its earlier its earlier performance. 48 The Movement for Restoration of Democracy was launched in 1983 and until Zia’s demise in plan crash in August 1988, the movement was converted into the mass led political agitation against the military ruler. (see Ziring, 1997, pp. 460-62)

ijcrb.webs.com APRIL 2013 INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH IN BUSINESS VOL 4, NO 12 constitutional democratic transition (1947-56), the second encircles the popular democratic transition (1971-77), the third is considered an institutional democratic transition (1988-99) and the fourth is the decentralized federal democratic transition (2008-present). It is of utmost significant political privileges that the political elites and the public opinion had played their role at all these four levels. They emancipate the authoritarianism regime back to the federalism on democratic paths which was derailed due to the non democratic hurdles. 18th Amendment: A Consensus for loose federalism History of federalism in Pakistan reveals the important role of political elites in resolving the several issues. After 1999, the new regime of centralization was exercising their power under the patronage of Pervez Musharraf that had amended the constitution of 1973 under their own political prerogatives until 2008.49 He established a supra- hierarchical rule like his predecessors; Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Zia-ul-Haq. The political activities were restricted and the parties were divided into the factions supporting for dictatorial illegitimacy. Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, the two exiled leaders of main political parties; Pakistan People’s Party and Pakistan Muslim League decided to convene a meeting in London which proposed a contractual political charter to grease up the democracy and revocation of greater provincial autonomy to the provinces by erasing the concurrent list from the covenant by restoring the original document of 1973 constitution.50 In the following years, the consciousness of the elites and the public opinion positively tilted in the favor of this document. The elections that were organized in 2008 under the military regime were won by the PPP and PNL (N) at the basis of charter of democracy (Pakistan Times, 2006). The election results had downtrodden the Pervez Musharraf’s vision of troika- crafting consciousness. After the polls, a coalition government based on the political reconciliation was established which considered to draft the 18th amendment in 2010 under the aegis of 27 members Special Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Reforms.51 The amendment deleted the most glaring obstacle of concurrent list in the path of provincial autonomy (Adeney, 2012, pp. 8-9). In post 18th amendment scenario, the provinces are more flexible towards centre as compared to previous political regimes. Eighteenth amendment empowered the provinces at three levels; such as at constitutional, political and administrative rank. The 18th amendment has reformed the whole structure of the centralized edict. The old hierarchy of the federal government was broken down and the new period of institutionalism replaced (Faisal, 2010, p. 128). This amendment has also modules the provincial political participation in Pakistan at the broader occurrence unlike the previous political regimes. The close cooperation of the political elites was obliged in making the institutional structure of the state through the political dialogue. The systemic parliamentary system was refurbished. The

49 Pervez Musharraf ruled out the state until 2008 and resigned at the political threat of an impeachment decision from parliamentary elites against him. 50 The charter was consisted on 35 point agenda. The file was a road map between the two major political parties for political cooperation. The document stated the restoration of the constitution at the pre-1999 period under civilian government. (see the text of “Charter of Democracy”, quoted in Pakistan Times, Islamabad, May 16, 2006). 51 Out of 27 members, 18 members either were belonged from smaller provinces or from regional political parties. The committee spent almost seven month and received 982 proposals from the public groups. The draft was passed from the parliament in April 2010 and promulgated at the same day.

ijcrb.webs.com APRIL 2013 INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH IN BUSINESS VOL 4, NO 12 institutional structure of the political institutions such the judiciary, executive and the legislature was also executed that was the imperative demand of the PML (N) since 2008 electoral campaign (Adeney, 20008, p. 2). The constitutional role of the several state institution such as legislature and judiciary was emerged (Awan, 2012) and the provincial executives were empowered in making their political and administrative decisions. At the political level, the amendment has highlighted the sense of cooperation among the political elites from national and regional political parties on the critical issues. Among the major was the two at major levels such as the renaming of the NWFP into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, the elimination of concurrent list. Under the original 1973 constitution, there were two legislative lists each contained with separate subjects. But the federal government was enjoying dual legislation; on the federal list and on the concurrent list to overrule of provincial descisions. The concurrent list was the main hurdle behind the provincial autonomy as the central government had articulated this as a political weapon against the provincial decisions during the previous regimes and articulated their supremacy. However there have also been emerged the voices for the creation of new provinces in Pakistan. But the parties having no consensus on its criteria. The PML (N) call for the acceptance of the administrative division of the provinces (Waseem, 2010, p. 20) while the other parties such as MQM and the ANP retrieved ‘no province. It is PPP which call for language base provinces, however, this provision did not accept in Pakistan since partition. What would be the consequences in the future for the new territorial reorganization is more dependent on the political elites and their consensus under the parliamentary traditions? At the administrative basis, the provinces have acquired their unique position unlike the earlier political reformations. It designated the enhancing role of the Council of Common Interests, the incorporated decision for the establishment of the local governance system under the provincial tier and the adaptation of the new provision for the establishment of loose federalism with institutionalized structure in Pakistan. The 18th amendment have sought the concerns of the smaller provinces and resolve their terms for the period long provincial demand of the greater political decision making at transparent level under the provincial elites to meet their local interests (Adeney, 2012, p. 10). However, the process of provincial autonomy is at the beginning stage as the bureaucracy tendencies in the provinces will remain under the aegis of the federal government. it would be create a long run challenges to the provinces especially for the smaller provinces as hey lacked in their local bureaucratic and administrative system. Overall, the 18th amendment is considered a new wave of consensus building among the opposition elites at one front and cooperating behavior of the provincial leadership. The constitutional overrule is considered to be the major drawback in the development of federalism in Pakistan. The promulgation of 17th amendment influenced the working of government in the previous years. The current government has portrayed the good polity and changed the old shadows of political intrigues. The responsibility is more rigid than less transitory in its functioning. Economic Decentralization under 7th NFC Award The fiscal policies adopted by the federal government were based on the centralized structure during the previous political regimes. The prior fiscal formulas put forwarded by National Finance Commission and mainly were based on population census. The criteria lack of harmony amongst the provinces also conceded the primary cause behind the dissatisfaction over the resource distribution. The consensus based formula was needed to adopt. The 7th NFC

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Award is a unique tendency for fiscal provincial consolidation in Pakistan which had not been implemented in the preceding regimes (Adeney and Wyatt, 2004, p. 2). The earlier NFC Awards in Pakistan did not meet the consensus of the provincial government at any levels. Their adaptation was kept on the centralized patterns having no dictation from the provinces. The fiscal policy was dragged on the centralized administrative tendencies. For example the 6th Awards ended with the zero-consensus among the provinces, which finally was adopted at the only discretion of President Pervez Musharraf. The formula affirmed the 45 per cent share of the provinces from the divisible pool with the 1 per cent annual increment in the next five years (Waseem, 2010, p. 13). The formula was based on the population census and did not meet with additional factors such as poverty level of each province and their share in the national GDP growth. The centralization was confiscated by the federal government to preserve their political and economic umbrella on the smaller provinces.

But the 7th NFC Award address the latent issues by evolving discussion about the multiple issues such as poverty, economic inequality and the level of development of each province. At their juncture of economic consolidation for federating units, the coalitional government decided to demonstrate a multiple criteria for the distribution of resources unlike the previous Awards. The criteria included the multiple variations such as; population 82 per cent, poverty and backwardness 10.3 per cent, revenue collection/generation 5 per cent, Inverse population density including urban rural development 2.7 per cent (Mustafa, 2011, pp. 7-8).

Many elites from various national and regional political parties in Pakistan; including President Asif Ali Zardari, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani and Nawaz Sharif; widely hailed consensus over 7th NFC Award as a remarkable achievement of the federal government. Under the new award the provincial share from the divisible pool was boomed from 47.5 per cent to 56 per cent in fiscal year 2010-11 and further expanded to 57.5 per cent in the afterward years under the vertical distribution of the federal resources (Waseem, 2010, p. 13). Despite all these immunities from the federal government Adeney confirmed that the centralization in economic policies will continue in Pakistan (Adeney, 2012, pp. 11-12), as the federating units continuously are dependent on the federal government in acquiring their financial resources until the broader consensus would evolve between the centre and the provincial governments and among the federating territories at eh platform of CCI. In coming years, the provincial governments will need to make consensus on mutually decided financial arrangements under their own jurisdictions or via federal government.

. 18th amendment: New arena of loose federalism The development of federalism is measured into three phase’s centralized federalism [core], semi-centralized [periphery] and decentralized federalism [loose federalism]52. In case of Pakistan, during previous civil and military regimes, structure of federalism was remained either at centralized [core] tendencies (1947-71, 1977-88, 1999-2010) or deviated to the semi-centralized position (1988-1999, 2010-present) but it made their position back to their

52 Hatcher has provided a detailed thesis about the core-periphery model by applying it on colonial regimes. (for further study see; Hechter, Michael. (1975). Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development 1936-1966, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul).

ijcrb.webs.com APRIL 2013 INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH IN BUSINESS VOL 4, NO 12 political nucleus due to the existence of authoritarian regimes [centripetal forces]. Thus the peripheral tendencies become weak in the non-existence of political forces [Political Parties] during that regimes and did not breed at grass root level [loose forces]. The overall system was remained at centralized structuralist compulsion (Waseem, 2010, p. 23). Since the adaptation of 18th amendment, Pakistan has gradually moved towards relative liberalized principles of coordination and cooperation among the provinces and between provinces and the centre itself. It is a transitional journey of federal from centralization [core] to loose federalism [periphery]. That is why, current political interval is considered very important in constitutional, political, ethnic and administrative perspectives; as the federal government has started to liberate the concept of provincial autonomy, which was remained the most prominent voice in post partitioned political history of Pakistan (Alqama, 1997, p. 294). The post 18th amendment period is the completion of first phase of federalism [since June 2011]. Now the regime has pierced into second phase that will complete after the promulgation of third tier of federalism [local government plan] under the provincial administration based on the systemic involvement of political forces. The tendency must be a transition towards decentralized political and administrative system (Adeney, 2012, p. 18). After the successful completion of second phase; the anticipation for the factual working of federalism in Pakistan in its full competence under the institutional governance with loose propensity (not interfering in the provinces); will come into comprehensible design. That would be the final phase of federalism that is adopted in most of the states having federal configuration. When the system of federalism is transformed from one phase to next; some convinced political frictions are come ashore that may create serious dilemma for political elites in making verdict in broader sensitivity. These impasses might be examined in the previous regimes in the form of political instability (1947-58, 1988-97). In the post 18th amendment scenario; the major friction that is swelled up is the creation of new ethnic tendencies for separate provincial identity inside the federation on lingual, economic, political and administrative disarrays of one [marginalized] group against the [core] group (Waseem, 2010, p. 20). The constitutional incorporation of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa instead of the earlier name of frontier province, have stressed the ethnic and lingual consciousness inside that province in Hazara region and in the South Punjab.53 It was the first instance in the constitutional history of Pakistan; that the creation of new provinces has been debated at every political forum. It also has become a widely accepted constitutional issue for all national and regional political elites (Langah, 2011, p. 15). Likewise Hazara and Seraiki identity issues, the Urbanized Pashtuns from Balochistan also want either an independent territorially based provincial identity or their geographical coincident with the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. The case of Karachi from Mutahida Quomi Movement is also laid down on the same footing but unlike other ethnic tendencies they had demanded the division of Sindh province on administrative lines by dividing it into rural and urban areas (Waseem, 2011b). Although, since the establishment of current regime there have no clear indication in this perspective, but there historical records regarding this issue come across since early 1990s. A new debate about

53 In South Punjab, two separate movements of Bahawalpur Province and Seraiki Province have been working since the abolition of One Unit in July 1970.

ijcrb.webs.com APRIL 2013 INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH IN BUSINESS VOL 4, NO 12 the provincial status of Federally Administered Tribal Areas has also been approached from the corridors of Awami National Party to merge the region with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa with the consent of the tribal people (Zulfqar, 2012, pp. 148-149). The creation of provinces in Pakistan relatively will remain an important constitutional issue.54 It is important that the constitutional provision should describe in two ways. Firstly, it necessitates a broader political consensus of all the regional and national elites. At second extent; it important to measure the rating of public opinion by means of an institutinalised modus operandi; such as referendum, grand parliamentary commission or political liberalization by implementing third tier federal system. Future perspectives of federalism in Pakistan While adopting the constitution of 1973, the tripartite constitutional coalition of Pakistan People’s Party, Awami National Party and Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam emphasized on the practice of provincial autonomy under the systemic and institutional federalism in Pakistan. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan announced in a sitting that the government shall arrange such institutional arrangements to stir up the regional political consensus on the issue of provincial autonomy. It was also variedly voiced by the political elites that after a gap of ten years the subjects of the concurrent list will transfer to the federating units under an institutional understanding. It was also decided that the institutional structure shall also be strengthened in this concern. The promise was remained unfulfilled for another thirty years, as the state fluctuated between authoritarianism (1977-88, 1999-2008) and instable civil political regimes (1988-97). In post 1973 tenure of Pakistan’s history of federalism, the announcements and decision of the political elites regarding the regional political autonomy were disrupted two times; once in 1977 military coup and in 1999 undeclared military supremacy in the political system of the state. The state derived into the centralized patterns by inducing the local bodies system of West Punjab in 1979 and Local self Government Plan in 2001 under the aegis of federal government. In the following eighteen years until 1997, the centralized regime was remained at their prevalence in Pakistan. The 1997-99 democratic periods rejuvenated the parliamentary democracy to evolve the regional consensus on provincial autonomy but unfortunately another coup friction of 1999 transit the state into politically centripetal patterns until 2010. In Pakistan, the real dilemma was the transition of political powers from the centre to the provinces. After the abolition of concurrent list and the political restoration of 1973 Constitution since April 2010, the elites have opened their tendency towards the loose federalism. The political journey of federalism towards the transparent working in the state will start only after the adaptation of the system of local government on the institutional lines by involving the grass root level political participation. The system of local governance will not only ensure the territorial autonomy for the provinces but it also develops their role in wide-ranging political atmosphere. The system shall make the citizens and the several ethnic groups to make their political choices at the lower level and their involvement in decision making evolution on more crucial

54 Article 239 of 1973 constitution has clearly defined about the procedure of the creation of new provinces. Under this Article; the constitutional amendment related to the creation of the province shall require two-third majority of the parliament along with conditional consensus of the Provincial Assembly.

ijcrb.webs.com APRIL 2013 INTERDISCIPLINARY JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH IN BUSINESS VOL 4, NO 12 issues such as the creation of new provinces, greater administrative and socio-political and economic system. The arena of loose federalism in Pakistan will also introduce the systemic political and economic changes in the divided cleavages separated on territorially marginalized contour from one another and which are plunk on stagnant positions since the last six decades. The 18th amendment is a remarkable political achievement of political elites in the constitutional history of Pakistan. It is a period of decentralized evolution of federalism. It is a drift to the trail of constitutional stipulation for provincial rights and demands under the approved scheme of federalism. It is a herald of political sovereignty and general will for the people of Pakistan on economically, politically, administratively and constitutionally opaque issues in their future. The myth of loose federalism in Pakistan also transmits a political liability for elites from all provinces to find their institutional role in stemming their job to complete this arena on mutually consensual privileges that are validated from their people. This process will not only enhance the institutional correlation but also minimize the political frictions with the passage of time. It also will find the role of federal government at more transparent, liberal and accommodative environment by evolving the consensus with the provinces.

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