Land Regime and Social Relations in Israel page / 129

Land Regime and Social Relations in Israel / Alexandre (Sandy) Kedar Oren Yiftachel

Introduction In this paper, we trace the making of the for distributing power and resources. The Israeli land regime by analyzing the state goals, institutions and practices typical of as an “ethnocracy” – a society shaped by ethnocratic societies have created legal coterminous processes of ethno-national structures and public norms that facil- expansion and internal ethno-class strat- itate the control of an expanding ethnic ification. We contend that the Judaization nation, while buttressing the internal dom- project which forms the spine of the Israeli ination of a leading ethno-class. This situ- regime, particularly its land and spatial ation enables dominant groups to deflect, components, has contributed significantly undermine, and even ignore, challenges to the creation and preservation of ethno- emerging from deprived peripheral groups, classes stratification. We highlight the illustrating how land control and societal important role of legal institutions and power mutually reinforce one another in practices in the making and possible trans- settling ethnocracies.2 formations of the Israeli land regime. However, our analysis also indicates that – like most political systems based Ethnocracy, stratification, on exclusion, control, and inequality – the and spatial control ethnocratic system is unstable in the long Defining ethnocracies run. The ethnocratic model can facilitate The model of ethnocratic regimes denotes a better understanding of settler societies that such regimes facilitate the expansion in general and Israel / Palestine in particu- of a dominant ethnic-nation in a multi- lar. It draws particular attention to the im- ethnic territory.1 Ethnicity, rather than pact of geographical dynamics (including citizenship, constitutes the main criterion immigration, settlement, dispossession Realizing Property Rights page / 130 and struggle) in producing social struc- societies are based on deeply ingrained tures, and to the special role of the law patterns of segregation and stratification. in shaping these dynamics. It also sheds This structure results in the emergence of new light on the key spatial factors often three primary ethno-classes in most set- overlooked in existing accounts of ethno- tler societies (despite obvious differences class relations in Israel. In this paper we between different local settings): focus on one key resource – land – and on the legal and political practices enmeshed A. The “Founders” (also termed the “char- in its ownership, allocation, use, and con- ter group”) – This group achieves dominant trol among Israel’s ethno-classes. status due to the high military, cultural, political, and economic standing estab- Ethnocratic settler societies lished during the state’s formative years. “Settling” ethnocracies differ from non- Furthermore, inter-generational mecha- settling ethnocracies by the pivotal role of nisms, such as the land regime together planned population movements and of eth- with rules of inheritance and transfer of nic spatial control in shaping the society property rights reproduce over time the in question. Planned ethnic settlement “founders” privileged position in differ- constitutes one of the main axes along ent societal realms. In Israel, the founders which the ethnocratic regime is shaped. are mainly associated with the Ashkenazi There are two major types of ethnocratic (Western) Jews. settler societies, which can be termed “ex- ternal” and “internal.” The former came B. “The Immigrants” – This stratum orig- into being due to invasion, immigration, inates from a different ethnic background and settlement (usually European) into to the “founders” (and is often split into other countries and continents. Internal a number of sub-groups based on ethnic settler societies were formed by ethno- background and race, as in the United ­national and ethno-class-based popula- States and Brazil). Officially, the immi- tion redistribution within the sovereign grants are part of the new nation being territory controlled by the state. Both “ex- constructed in the settler society. There- ternal” and “internal” settler societies (as fore, they undergo a prolonged process well as the mixture of the two) are based of “upward” assimilation into “the found- on an attempt to structure a hierarchy of ing group,” but in reality often remain “ethno-classes.”3 This process involves an subordinate in their economic, cultural, attempt by the expanding group to repro- ­geographical, and political positions. In Is- duce the social structure of the “mother rael, there are several groups of the “immi- country” in what has been termed “pure grant” ethno-class, most notably Mizrahi settler societies.” The settlers therefore re- (Eastern) and Russian-speaking Jews. frain from mixing with indigenous popula- tions or with groups considered “inferior.” C. Indigenous or “local,” and “foreign” By virtue of this formative process, such people – This stratum is not fully includ- Land Regime and Social Relations in Israel page / 131 ed in the “nation” as it is often considered morality of the ethnocratic project is of- as “alien”, “foreign,” and “threatening.” ten at odds with the stubborn reality of It is characterized by long-term margin- marginalization and inequality. Thus, ten- alization by the processes of nation and sions and contradictions resulting from state-building; they are generally isolat- the distortions of the “hegemonic moment” ed in the geographical, economic, and so- have a clear potential to create counter- cial periphery of the settler society. Such ­hegemonic challenges even within the groups include indigenous peoples such existing structures. The state, in its at- as the Native Americans in 19th century tempts to buttress the hegemony of “the U.S., the Inuit in Canada, the Aboriginee founders,” projects a democratic image. in Australia and the Maoris in New Zea- This forces the regime to grant signifi- land. They also include other “alien” cant rights and resources (albeit not full groups not fully included in the settling equality) to the other groups. This set- nation, such as the Chicanos in 19th cen- ting provides fertile ground for mobiliza- tury southwestern U.S., the Tamils in Sri- tion among the non-dominant groups, and Lanka or the Palestinians in Israel. More for the subsequent challenge of the con- recently, the definition of “alien” or “for- trolling and discriminatory policies of the eign” has been extended to long-term la- ethnocratic regime. bor migrants, such as Turks in Germany, long term “illegal” workers in Israel, or The legal and political geography of Philippines in Australia. Given the growing ethnocratic settler states mobility of labor on the one side and the The ethnocratic system includes several legal and social barriers erected against regime “bases.” The land system is such a the incorporation of such migrants in- “base,” being a crucial centerpiece in the to the nation, the category of “foreign” creation and institutionalization of eth- ­labor-migrants may develop in some eth- nocratic societies, especially of the “set- nocratic societies into a major stratum of tling” type. The “land regime” of a country its own. In Israel, the “indigenous” popu- includes its system of land ownership, as lation is Palestinian-Arab, including the well as the diverse state organs that shape Bedouins, while the “alien” group is com- its geography and development. These de- posed of several hundred thousands of re- termine processes such as residential re- cent labor migrants. location, industrial development, urban and regional planning, designation of state The ethnocratic state strives to restrict land use, or the size and location of mu- its reliance on coercive intimidation. In- nicipal jurisdictions. The core of the eth- stead, it aspires to reinforce the hegemony nocratic land regime lies in the two par- of “the founders” and impose its moral le- allel state systems of land allocation and gitimacy, mainly among the groups that urban and regional planning. In most eth- consider themselves as belonging to the nocracies, the founding group initially re- dominant ethnic nation. But, the putative ceives preferential status within state in- Realizing Property Rights page / 132 stitutions and spatial policy, as well as fa- cial place in the institutionalization and vorable land rights. While in most cases legitimization of these socio-spatial power these rights are acquired by force, they structures.6 Critical legal geographers ar- are subsequently translated into legal and gue that dominant groups construct “le- institutional arrangements that represent gal belief structures” that justify racial power relationships among the groups. and spatial inequalities through a com- The establishment of ethnocratic set- plex professional discourse, claiming to tler states usually entails the construc- be objective and impartial. By reconstitut- tion of new property regimes.4 The acquisi- ing settlers’ cultural biases and power re- tion of land is a crucial component in this lations into formalized rules such as prop- phase and often occasions a vast and vio- erty arrangements, law plays a significant lent dispossession of indigenous peoples role in the legitimation and endurance of from land they possessed for generations.5 ethnocratic settlers’ regimes. While in most cases land is originally ac- As recently exposed in an extensive UN quired by direct force, this violent acqui- comparative study, the legal system of- sition is subsequently translated into in- ten imposes insurmountable legal obsta- stitutional and legal arrangements that cles that prevent natives and other “out- represent and legitimize power relation- siders” from effectively affirming and pro- ships in the ethnocratic state. Ethnocrat- tecting their land interests. Settler states ic land regimes generally reproduce and frequently regard native lands as public reinforce social stratification, allocating land, which can be disposed of by govern- the “founders” control over most land re- ments without the natives’ approval or sources. Immigrants usually receive re- even knowledge.7 As a result, many na- duced land resources, while indigenous tives have become trespassers on their and “alien” groups, who often serve as own land. Even if the state recognizes the the main contributors of land, are gener- natives’ possession, it is usually conceived ally denied a fair share of its allocation. to be only “at the whim of the sovereign” By legitimizing, and protecting, these “in- which can revoke the license to occupy itial” spatial inequalities, the new prop- the land.8 Often however, the settlers’ legal erty system facilitates the perpetuation systems altogether deny any recognition over generations of the ethnocratic power of native land rights even when the native structure. group has been in possession of the land The land regime also constitutes a legal- since time immemorial as in the case of cultural order that reduces the necessity the doctrine of terra nullius (empty land) of direct force to maintain the ethnocratic in force in Australia until 1992.9 system. Elites of the dominant ethno- Yet, recently courts in Australia began cratic group strive to institutionalize a he- to play an important progressive role in re- gemony that deflects open debate about defining indigenous rights to land. In the the system and justifies their control of 1990s, the Australian Supreme Court be- the territory. Law and courts occupy a spe- gan to revolutionize the legal and politi- Land Regime and Social Relations in Israel page / 133 cal discourse by laying down its famous The Zionist project, therefore, was con- Mabo (1992) and Wik (1996) decisions. structed as a project that strives to fill the The Court rejected the legal doctrine of Land of Israel (Palestine) with the majority terra nullius and instead recognized Abo- of the Jewish people and offer a solution riginal indigenous title. These legal moves to the problem of violent anti-Semitism in form an important part of a political, eco- Jewish diasporas. nomic, social and cultural process, which The ethnocratic characteristics of the is changing the face of Australia.10 Simi- Israeli regime are quite clear. Rights and lar, though not identical, legal processes powers in Israel are largely stratified ac- have been occurring recently in New Zea- cording to an ethno-class configuration,13 land and Canada.11 and state protection of the country’s Arab Notwithstanding the limitations of minority against the majority is quite lim- these legal decisions, there are those who ited.14 In addition, the occupation of the perceive them as “catalytic events in Abo- West Bank and Gaza Strip and the ex- riginal decolonization”12 or as manifesta- istence of Jewish settlements in these tions of a “Jurisprudence of regret.” This partially annexed territories, along with judicial trend is an engaging attempt to the sovereign roles accorded to diaspora simultaneously acknowledge difficult past Jews and their representative organiza­ events while taking into account contem- tions in Israel (Jewish National Fund porary needs and constraints. It gives [“JNF”] and the Jewish Agency), have re- hope to the prospect of constructing a sulted in a lack of clear political and ter­ common and equitable future in these di- ritorial boundaries.15 vided societies. Following a prolonged ethnic struggle between the Jews and the Arabs in Pales- A Jewish-Israeli ethnocracy tine, the United Nations voted on Novem- We contend that Israel is an ethnocratic ber 29, 1947 in favor of the partition of regime, and that this perspective lends Palestine.16 The Jews accepted the parti- explanatory force to the analysis of the tion plan, after a fierce debate, while most Israeli land system. The Israeli regime Arabs rejected the plan. An ethnic war en- has clearly enabled, assisted, and pro­ sued, during which Arab armies assisted moted the Zionist project of Judaizing Is- local Palestinians in trying to destroy the raeli (and Palestinian) space. The ethno- Zionist project. The war ended with Israel ­national struggle over land control has controlling 78% of British Palestine, with been a major factor in shaping Jewish- other parts of the land being occupied by Palestinian relations, as well as the major Jordan and Egypt.17 During and following factor in relations between ethnic groups the 1948 Israeli “War of Independence” within these two nations. The Judaization (known as al-Nakba, or “the Catastrophe,” project is driven by the dominant Zionist among the Palestinians), Israel/Palestine premise that Israel is a territory and a experienced extensive population move- state that “belongs” to the Jewish people. ments. This included the flight and expul- Realizing Property Rights page / 134 sion of some 700,000 Palestinians who re- The Israeli-Jewish regime established af- sided in the territory to become Israel,18 ter 1948 was based on the primary bases and the arrival of a similar number of Jew- of ethnocratic regimes in general, as sur- ish refugees and immigrants fleeing from veyed above. Immigration policies allow Europe (mainly Holocaust survivors) and Jews and their families to enter Israel and Islamic countries.19 Some 160,000 Pales- receive immediate citizenship, while im- tinian-Arabs remained in Israel after the migration policies for non-Jews are much 1948 war and received its citizenship. stricter. Development policies and the flow These massive demographic changes of public capital systematically discrim- during the early years of Israel’s exist- inate in favor of Jewish localities, settle- ence played a central role in shaping an ments, and residents. Within the Jewish ethnic structure consisting of three ma- sector, powerful groups and settlements, jor layers.20 With a certain degree of over- which are usually – though not always – generalization, it is possible to character- members of the charter group, receive ize the ethno-class stratification of Israel preferential treatment. The Israel Defense during its formative period according to Forces (“IDF”) is in essence a Jewish army, the ethnocratic model as follows:21 Those and military service is a prerequisite for Jews who formed the vast majority of Jews substantial benefits in employment, edu- residing on the land before the creation cation, land allocation, and access to state of Israel (and hence the dominant group) power centers. Jewish-Israeli Hebrew cul- constituted the dominant “charter” group ture is the dominant force in shaping Is- of “founders.” As this group originated rael’s prevailing public space. In addition, principally from Europe, many Jews arriv- the State constitutional system, including ing after the creation of Israel from similar the 1992 new Basic Laws, reinforces its backgrounds were better integrated into Jewish character.24 this ruling social layer. Mizrahi Jews, ar- While Palestinian-Arabs have paid the riving from Islamic countries, formed the main price for the Judaization project, it core of the “immigrant” stratum, attempt- has also had a negative impact on the sit- ing to integrate “upwards” into the “found- uation of Mizrahi Jews. First, on the cul- ers” strata, but in the main remaining tural level, Mizrahim found themselves inferior, economically, politically, and in a stigmatized position upon their ar- ­geographically.22 More recently immigrants rival in Israel. The “Western” and “anti- originating from the former Soviet Union, Arab” aspects of the Jewish-Ashkenazi Ethiopia and other locations have added nation-building project deprived them of significant sub-groups to the make-up the most of their cultural resources. Moreover, “immigrant” stratum.23 The Palestinian- the Israeli economic and military frame- Arabs that remained in Israel and became works relegated them to the peripheries its citizens, form the third “indigenous,” of the Jewish ethnos and ethos. Israeli “local,” or “alien” group and occupied the land and settlement policies, which we peripheries of Israeli space and society. will discuss in depth later, transformed Land Regime and Social Relations in Israel page / 135

Mizrahim into a passive “spearhead” of values. The size of agricultural land held the Judaization of the land, often simul- by the Arab rural sector is smaller still, taneously isolating them in poor neigh- covering only half the size of the per capita borhoods and regions. Clearly, there is a allocation of Mizrahi Moshavim. The un- marked difference between the near to- even allocation, which was formed most- tally dispossessed or the exiled Palestin- ly in the 1950s, has remained largely un- ians and the uprooted but resettled Miz- changed to date. rahi Jews, with the latter joining the Zion- The powerful position of the “founders” ist project, and hence the dispossession of in terms of land holding is also generally the Palestinians. However, it’s important expressed in terms of location (occupying to note that both groups have suffered sig- better agricultural land with higher rede- nificant losses, dislocation, and marginali- velopment values), and strength of legal zation as a result of the political geography land possession (with kibbutzim having of the Zionist-Palestinian conflict.25 usually renewable leasehold contracts for 21, 49 or 98 years, while some immigrant Ethnocracy, space, and social dispari- Moshavim have no leases at all, being clas- ties in Israel sified as “licensees” only).26 Arabs, who Two major phenomena are related to Is- constitute 19 % of the Israeli population, rael’s ethnic settlement and land policies. hold only 3.5 % of the land in private own- First, space has been divided unevenly, ership, and another 0.3 – 0.5 % in leased and second, this division of space has con- land, some of it seasonal. Israeli history tributed to the development and main- has shown that private ownership does not tenance of ethno-class disparities in Is- guarantee long-term possession, given a raeli society. A brief description of these widespread practice of land expropriation, two structural processes assists our exercised chiefly vis-à-vis Arabs. analysis. The disparities are also notable in the First, in the division of space, the priv- urban sector, highlighted mainly by the ileged position of the “founders” has been superior legal rights, dwelling size, and prominent. That group, which includes location of the founders’ housing stock. the kibbutzim and “veteran” Moshavim As shown by Elmelech and Lewin-Epstein (being different types of Jewish collective (1998), Ashkenazim possess housing settlements), has received greater alloca- which, on average, is worth 22% more tions of land than Mizrahi or Arab farm- than Mizrahi families, while their home- ers. Our analysis shows that on average, ownership rate is 21% higher. Arab hous- farmers in Ashkenazi dominated locali- ing is persistently found to be more dense ties received 64% more land per capita and less valuable (except in towns with ex- than those in Mizrahi dominated localities. treme land shortage) than the two main In addition, the new Mizrahi immigrants Jewish groups. were located mainly at peripheral areas, Second, the way space has been hence reducing their potential property shaped and divided has indeed contribut- Realizing Property Rights page / 136 ed to a long-term stratification of society, influence social standing, and such stand- resembling the typical ethno-class struc- ing is subject to ceaseless struggles and ture of most settler societies. The Ashke­ oppositions. Yet, as illustrated by the fol- nazi “founding” group and its descendants lowing table, the spatial marginality of Pal- occupy a dominant position in most soci- estinian-Arabs and Mizrahim – created to etal spheres: the economy, culture, poli- a large extent by the Judaization project – tics, academia, legal system, and the pro- cannot be separated from their inferior fessional. The link between the division of social position in Israeli society. Group spatial assets and social stratification is, marginality in Israel is thus closely asso- needless to say, neither direct nor totally ciated with a combination of place, ethni­ stable. There are other key factors, which city and class. Land Regime and Social Relations in Israel page / 137

Yet, despite these problematic consequenc- nology since the outbreak of the “al-Aqsa es, the Judaization project has enjoyed a intifada” (the Palestinian uprising which hegemonic status within Jewish-Israeli began in September 2000). Yet, we dis- society, with very few voices speaking cern significant, long-term civil process- out against it. Notably the divisions be- es, which are likely to surface again, and tween the “left” and “right” in Israel, or be- challenge the ethnocratic logic of the Is- tween the secular and religious, tend to raeli state, once the current round of Jew- ­address mainly regime features, refrain- ish-Palestinian violence subsides.28 Let ing from challenging its overall ethnocratic us turn now to an analysis of the evolu- structure. tion of practices, laws, policies, and in- But we should also note that the stitutions which have created the Israeli ­processes described above have not been land regime. unidirectional. For example, the Oslo Ac- cords of 1993 represented a historical The Judaization of space: mutual recognition of the Zionist and The making of the Israeli land regime ­Palestinian national movements. This rec- How did Israel create a legal and institu- ognition began a gradual (and so far lim- tional framework which both Judaized the ited) process of de-Judaization in some land in question, and divided it unevenly Palestinian territories. The de-Judaiza- among its ethno-classes? Let us begin with tion process continued even under a right the 1948 war and the creation of the Pales- wing government with the recent Israeli tinian refugee problem. The central char- disengagement from the Gaza Strip and acter of the Israeli land regime was de- a small part of the West Bank. Within the termined by the state’s decision to block Jewish sector, groups of Mizrahim have the return of Palestinian refugees, and its mobilized upwards into the Israeli middle goal to settle the massive wave of “Olim classes, especially in the major cities. Israel Hadashim” (“new Jewish immigrants”) – has also eased some of the mechanisms composed mainly of Jewish refugees and used to control Arab citizens.27 In addi- immigrants that reached Israel during its tion, “civil-society” activity has increased, first five years of statehood. Most Jews ar- expressed by a rapid rise in the public riving in Israel before 1953 were settled profile and activity of ideological, non-gov- on land previously held or used by Ar- ernmental organizations, such as feminist abs, as were approximately 350 out of the or environmental groups. This has caused 370 Jewish settlements established dur- some erosion in the ethnic foundation of ing the period.29 Israeli public life. To be sure, the ethno- Similar to other settler states, Isra- cratic foundations of the Israeli regime el initiated a comprehensive land and are still strong, as shown by the rise of ­settlement policy after attaining state- the nationalists to power in Israel in early hood. This policy rested on new, power- 2001, and by a return of the public ful legislation that transferred public and ­discourse to a polarizing ethnic termi- Arab land into Jewish-Israeli hands. In Realizing Property Rights page / 138 addition to the massive transfer of land tine.31 However, land officially owned by to Jewish possession and ownership, the Jewish individuals and organizations only spatial Judaization project involved the amounted to approximately 8.5% of the destruction of most Arab villages, towns, state’s total area.32 With the addition of and neighborhoods. It also involved in- land that was formally owned by the Brit- tensive Jewish settlement, spatial restric- ish Mandatory Government and thereby tions on Arab localities and development, inherited by Israel, only about 13.5% (2.8 ­Hebraization of the landscape, parallel million dunums) of Israeli territory was development of Jewish urban and occu- in state or Jewish ownership. According pation centers, and the redrawing of mu- to the vision of J. Weitz and other Zionist nicipal boundaries in ways that ensured leaders, the Israeli state rapidly and effi- wide Jewish control.30 ciently increased the amount of land in its At the end of the war, Israel control- possession, transforming it into Jewish- led an area covering approximately 20.6 Israeli land. million dunums (about 5 million acres) A new land regime was simultaneous- of land, or 78% of British-Mandate Pales- ly fashioned during the first two decades Land Regime and Social Relations in Israel page / 139 of Israel’s existence. It was shaped as a ian refugees, who no longer resided in Is- ­national-collectivist regime that rapidly rael, was fully transferred to public / Jew- implemented the principles of ethnic ter- ish ownership. In addition, Palestinian Ar- ritorial expansion and control. At the con- abs that remained in Israel and became clusion of this phase, approximately 93% citizens lost approximately 40 – 60 % of the of Israeli territory (within the pre-1967 land they had possessed prior to 1948. “green line”) was owned, controlled, and The confiscation of Arab land began dur- managed by either the State or the Jew- ing the war, when land was seized either ish nation (through the Jewish National on the basis of temporary emergency re­ Fund). gulations or with no legal justification As illustrated in Figures 1 & 2, the new whatsoever. After a short period, the Israe- Land Regime was based on: li legal system began to legalize this trans- fer of land. Until the mid 1950s, this legal ___Nationalization and Judaization of ordering was effected mainly through the ­Arab land and other land. Approximately Absentee Property Law (1950), the Land 17 million dunums were transferred to Acquisition Law (1953), administrative ac- Jewish-Israeli ownership (Fig. 1). tions taken in conjunction with these stat- ___Centralized control of this land by state utes, and court decisions interpreting and and Jewish institutions. implementing these statutes.34 ___Selective and unequal allocation of land In the early 1950s a new phase of land rights (Fig. 2). transfer, based on “settlement of title” be­ gan. This process deprived many Arab We shall now turn to a more detailed de- landholders of the right to retain their scription of major components of the Is- land, especially in the “frontier” areas raeli land regime as it developed during of the Galilee and the Negev.35 In later its formative period, crystallizing mainly ­phases, when virtually no land remained until the 1960s and essentially remaining in Arab hands, the legal focus shifted from in this form until the 1990s. expropriation of ownership and possession to land-use limitations. This was achieved Confiscation of Arab-owned and Arab- primarily through planning and zoning possessed land through the military, laws, as well as the strict delimitation of administrative and legal powers of the municipal boundaries. Today, Arab citi- State zens of Israel, constituting approximately Israel employed these tools not only upon 18 % of the population, own only 3.5 % of Arabs who became refugees, but also the land and have municipal control over those that remained. It is estimated that about 2.5 %.36 before 1948, Palestinian-Arabs owned or possessed between 4.2 and 5.8 million dunums of land in the territory that be- came Israel.33 The property of the Palestin- Realizing Property Rights page / 140

Transfer of this land to the State The “Mawat” categorization, operating in and to the management of Jewish / conjunction with Ottoman and Manda- public institutions tory laws and their interpretation by Is- Following the confiscation of refugee land, raeli courts, enabled the state to claim the state created a legal and institutional ownership and prevent its previous hold- structure which transferred that land to ers from securing residency or cultiva- the ownership and management of State tion rights, regardless of how long they and Jewish exclusive organizations. This had possessed it. Simultaneously, cru- was achieved by pooling all refugee land cial changes took place in “adverse pos- under a new entity called the “Develop- session” rules (which allowed land pos- ment Authority” and the appointment sessors to acquire property rights in the of the Israel Land Authority in 1960 to land they cultivated). The new rules made manage these lands. Power in the Israeli it extremely difficult for Arab landholders Land Authority was to be shared equally to prove their right to hold their land and between the Israeli Government and the considerably decreased their chances of JNF. As we shall see later, land allocation registering it in their name. It is therefore and management also involved the Jewish misleading to present this land settlement Agency. In this way, all public and state process simply as a formal ordering oper- lands were managed by a combination of ation. The central role played by the Is- Jewish organizations, causing the struc- raeli Supreme Court in this dispossession tural exclusion of Arabs. made us refer to the process as “judicial land redemption.”38 Registration of all land owned by the British Mandate in the name of the Transfer of land and power to the State of Israel Jewish National Fund The British Mandate formally claimed During the early 1950s, the Jewish Natio­ ownership over about one million dunums nal Fund more than doubled its land hold- of land. During the process of “settlement ing, as the result of purchasing two million of title,” the Israeli state transferred mil- dunums of (previously Arab) agricultural lions of dunums into its ownership as land from the state. The financial details “state land,” mainly in the Negev and Gali- of this sale are not fully known, and some lee. Much of the land transferred to State- lands were returned to the state during the ownership during this formal process of late 1950s.39 However, following this trans- registration had hitherto been unregis- fer, the exclusively Jewish JNF became the tered, but indeed belonged to the state. largest owner of agricultural land in Israel, However, an additional part of this land blocking the accessibility of Arab citizens was transferred to the state as a result of to these lands. the categorization of Bedouin-held land in the Negev and the Galilee as “Mawat” (“dead” land).37 Land Regime and Social Relations in Israel page / 141

Determination that ownership of this Transfer of the control and administra- land will remain perpetually in the tion of all “Israel Lands” to a special hands of the Israeli State or Jewish Na- institution – the Israel Lands Adminis- tional Organizations tration (“ILA”) In 1960, Israel adopted the long-term pol- In 1960, following years of negotiation icy of the JNF and declared that all state and a final agreement between the State lands will never be sold, thereby ensur- of Israel and the Jewish National Fund, ing the perpetual ownership of state and the administration and effective control of Jewish organizations over all lands ac- all JNF land was transferred to the newly cumulated in the hands of the state and created ILA, which was to manage state Jewish organizations (Section 1 of Basic lands, and lands of the JNF and the De- Law: Israel Lands (1960)). velopment Authority mentioned above. Although it owns only about one-sixth of public lands, the JNF received close to equal representation (50 %) on the exec- utive Council of ILA.40 The Council con- Realizing Property Rights page / 142 sisted overwhelmingly of representatives Figure 2 illustrates this process in some of the “founding” group (usually from the detail, by charting the main channels of Jewish agricultural sector). Within the gov- land allocation. Quantitative research ernmental framework, ILA and its Board on the allocation of land and housing enjoy a quasi-sovereign status. Govern- among Jewish groups reveals a distinct ment decisions possess the authority of and consistent gap between the extensive recommendation alone, and are not con- land assets held by the privileged, mainly sidered binding by the ILA Board. Over the Ashkenazi founding group and later “im- years, ILA has been characterized by cen- migrant” groups (mainly the Mizrahim, but tralized and often secretive forms of con- also more recent immigrants from Ethi- trol over 93 % of Israel’s land area under opia and the former Soviet Union). While its control. land allocation operated officially accord- ing to settlement patterns, that allocation Ethnocratic allocation of land also corresponded closely to ethnic ori- In addition to the nationalization of Arab gin. Kibbutzim and older Moshavim (those lands and the intensification of land con- established before the establishment of trol, the creation of the Israeli land re- the State in 1948) had clear Ashkena- gime involved the allocation of posses- zi majorities. On the other hand, Miz- sion of much of the land now belonging rahi Jews constituted a decisive major- to the state, the Development Authority, ity of the population of new immigrants’ and the JNF (“Israel Lands”). The pos- Moshavim (Moshavei Olim), “development session of this land, (including Arab land towns” and “neighborhoods” (“shechunot,” transferred to these bodies), was allocat- referring to concentrations of public hous- ed to Jewish residents and settlement ing in big cities). The Arab citizens of Isra- movements (fig. 2). The ethnic logic of el remained almost totally excluded from the system functioned mainly to mini- public land allocation. As late as 1995, mize Arab control over the land. Yet, as they were allocated only approximately noted above, typical to an ethnocratic re- 0.25 % of all public land.42 gime, it also had an impact on stratifica- As already briefly noted, allocation dif- tion and fragmentation within the Jew- fered not only regarding the amount of ish sector. Here, mechanisms that were land distributed, but also in the practices less distinct but still effective functioned of land allotment, the terms of posses- to deepen – through the same process of sion, and, most significantly, the creation Judaization – the gap between “founders” of distinctive legal categories of land pos- and “immigrants.” This was reinforced pri- session. Concurrent with the process of marily through the unequal allocation of allocation, laws and administrative prac- land control and housing, which usually tices that define distinct, unequal arrange- favored “founders” over “immigrants,” ments for different groups were crafted. thereby creating structural gaps between While these arrangements were formu- Ashkenazim and Mizrahim.41 lated in seemingly neutral language, the Land Regime and Social Relations in Israel page / 143 spatial / legal categories to which they culturists and Arab agriculturists into were applied usually denoted distinctive distinctive legal categories permitted the social groups. In Mizrahi localities such enactment and implementation of dis- as “the neighborhoods” (in the main cit- criminatory laws, while simultaneously ies) and the development towns, many maintaining a neutral facade that helped received public housing rights which preserve the ethnocratic hegemony. consisted of short-term leases that were The gap between Ashkenazim and immediately terminable and could not be ­Mizrahim further widened in the late inherited. Many landholders in the Arab 1970s, when some 160 new settlements, sector that could not meet the formal re- usually referred to as “Community Set- quirements of “land settlement” were de- tlements” (Yeshuvim Kehilatiyim) or “Pri- prived of their land, which was registered vate Settlements,” were established across as state land. Those holders who were not the country (including in the Occupied physically removed were categorized as il- Territories). The establishment of such a legal trespassers (for example, residents ­settlement usually depended on proxim- of the “unrecognized” Bedouin villages). ity to the corridors of power. Hence, they Land of Moshavim, Kibbutzim and com- were inhabited mainly by the Ashkenazi munity settlements, which were usually middle classes. Rapidly, and with large populated by members of the founding public subsidies for land, development group,43 was transferred to residents in and services, these became “high-quality” long-term legal arrangements (including localities. This high social status has been inheritance rights) that were preferable, in reinforced by the legal power granted to reality, though not always de jure, to those these localities to “screen” their resi- in public housing and neighborhoods. dents. In order to buy (at a subsidized Thus, many Jewish agricultural land- price and sometimes free of charge) state holders possessed land only under the cat- land in such localities, a person must be egory of “licensees” (bnei reshut). Seem- accepted as a member of a local associ- ingly, this is a weak legal status in Israeli ation. The association (often with partic- land law. Yet, despite its formal weakness, ipation of the settlement department of and the fact that licenses could formally Jewish Agency) has veto power over ac- be revoked almost immediately (similar to ceptance. This delegation of state power the position of public housing residents has enabled the exclusion of Arabs from and Bedouin “trespassers”), administra- access to state land in vast areas of Is- tive and legal practices strengthened the rael, and has also enabled middle-class status of licensees within the Jewish ag- (mainly Ashkenazi) groups to preserve ricultural sector.44 It thus became almost the social character of these settlements. impossible in practice to vacate such licen­ Thus, such groups made use of state sees, and a partial right of bequest was resources such as land, infrastructure recognized. The different categorization and power of resident selection, in or- of public housing tenants, Jewish agri­ der to better their socio-economic status. Realizing Property Rights page / 144

In this way, resources were transferred ously, such land came under the con- from weak to strong groups within Israeli trol of the “Jewish People” through the society. involvement of international Jewish or- In addition to land ownership and ganizations in ownership, management, allocation, Judaization of the land has and control of all State and public land been prominent in other spheres of spa- in Israel. This situation was legalized in tial control, and specifically in the settle- covenants signed between the Govern- ment process. Since 1948, about 600 Jew- ment of Israel and Jewish organizations, ish settlements were established within specifically with the JNF and the Jewish Israeli territory. During the same peri- Agency. Such covenants were ratified by od, the authorities established no new legislation.46 Arab settlements. The only exception to As part of the process of establishing this rule was the establishment of close community settlements, a sophisticated to twenty Bedouin townships which were system designed to exclude Arabs crys- imposed on the Bedouins as part of the tallized. Jews receive public land in these Israeli policy of Bedouin sedentarization, areas by a complex land allocation sys- relocation, and concentration. The Ar- tem. Initially, the whole settlement land ab settlement map was therefore “frozen” is assigned through a system known as and simultaneously surrounded by Jew- “the three-party lease.” According to this ish settlements, thus creating a “geogra- arrangement, three parties sign the ini- phy of enclaves” in which the vast majority tial land allocation contract: A) ILA as the of the Arab citizens of Israel remained. As public landowners’ agent;47 B) The Jew- ­noted, about 97.5 % of all Israel’s land area ish Agency, and C) the Jewish settlement is under Jewish municipal control.45 as a collective (its legal entity is a coop- At this juncture, it is logical to ask: erative). In order to lease (normally at a how did Israel succeed in preserving Jew- subsidized price and sometimes free of ish spatial control? How did the State by- charge) an individual plot of land in such pass democratic and market mechanisms a settlement, a person must be accepted through which Arabs could, at least the- as a member of a cooperative that incor- oretically, challenge this process? We at- porates all residents of the community. tempted to illustrate much of the answer The cooperative (often with participation in figures 1 and 2, which summarize the of the Jewish Agency) has the power of se- main processes of land transfer and al- lection and practical veto power over ac- location. A major element in this system ceptance. A major rationale of this dele- was the unilateral and consistently uni- gation of state power is to preclude Arabs directional transfer of land from Arab to from access to land. As a result, in prac- Jewish ownership, but practically never tice, Arabs were barred from buying or the other way around. As we have seen, leasing land in approximately 80 % of Is- expropriated land was transferred into rael’s territory.48 However, the same sys- state and public ownership. Simultane- tem serves simultaneously to preserve the Land Regime and Social Relations in Israel page / 145 mainly middle class character of these gal. For the first time, the Israeli Supreme settlements. Court ruled that Israel could not discrim- Given this institutional-geographi- inate between Arab and Jewish citizens in cal setting, the Regional Councils have their access to public land. ­become a key factor in the control of However, the material implications of Jewish space. These incorporate Kibbut- this milestone decision are not yet clear: zim, Moshavim, and Community Settle- the Court was careful to confine the deci- ments, whose residents belong mainly to sion only to Katzir, and not to other Jew- the founding group. Such Councils cover ish settlements, especially Kibbutzim and 84 % of the State’s land area, and gener- Moshavim, which form the vast majority ally control the local planning commit- of rural settlements blocked to Arabs. Fur- tees, which regulate land development. ther, more than five years after the de- Regional Councils thus play a central role cision, a range of legal and institutional in shaping the spatial processes taking means has prevented the Kaadans to actu- place in Israeli society, such as subur- ally live in Katzir. It appears that the High banization and the development of com- Court’s watershed decision about the ille- mercial and industrial areas. gality of discrimination against Arabs in This system has been challenged in the allocation of state land will not be eas- the well-known Kaadan vs. Katzir case ily expressed in a new geography of Arab- brought in front of the Israeli High Court Jewish relations in Israel.50 in 1995.49 Katzir is a Jewish Community Regardless of the final outcome of the Settlement located in a region with a high Kaadan case, we should note that the in- concentration of Arab residents. The chal- volvement of the Jewish Agency had been lenge includes a petition to the High Court an extremely effective tool in “legally” pro- of Justice against the refusal of Katzir’s hibiting Arabs from defying the Judaiza- Admission Committee to accept an Arab tion of the territory. According to ethno- family to the settlement. A major justifica- cratic logic, this mechanism also functions tion for this refusal was that the by-laws to exclude Jews that are not “suitable” for of the Jewish Agency, which has a repre- these settlements. Thus, it contributes to sentative on the Admission Committee, the strengthening of ethno-class segrega- prohibit the leasing of land to non-Jews. tion within the Jewish sector. Though this The President of the Court, Aharon Barak system is firmly grounded, a number of declared the case to be one of the most challenges are presently contesting its he- difficult he has encountered in his ca- gemonic status, especially as larger tracts reer. After five years of delays and delib- of agricultural state land are being trans- eration, the High Court brought down a formed into “community settlements” at watershed decision in March 2000, de- the fringes of dozens of Kibbutzim and claring discrimination in land allocation Moshavim. The semi-privatization of ag- on grounds of national affiliation (that ricultural land into residential property is is, discrimination against Arabs), as ille- one of the most central issues in Israeli Realizing Property Rights page / 146 society today, creating a profound trans- beginning to crack. The deep institution- formation of the land regime and chang- alization of Jewish-Ashkenazi dominance ing social relations in Israeli society. The which propelled the Judaization project scope of this paper does not allow a thor- now creates increasing tensions with the ough discussion of this issue. self-representation of the regime as egal- itarian and democratic. These tensions A concluding note have begun to generate opposition and To conclude then, in the foregoing we pre- resistance, which are still some distance sented an account of an ethnocratic state from undermining the foundations of the and its land regime, and analyzed the ma- system, but undoubtedly herald a new era jor legal, institutional, and geographical of change, adjustment, and conflict in the aspects of the Israeli case. Our analysis Israeli land regime. has shown that, like in other settler so- cieties, the Israeli land regime has func- tioned, first, as a major tool in extending ethno-national control over contested ter- ritory. And second, it has acted as a segre- gating and stratifying social force, creating disparities in the distribution of land con- trol, possession, size and location, among Israel’s ethno-classes. Given the social implications of land possession, and es- pecially its durability and tendency to in- crease in value, the Israeli land regime can be said to have produced long-term dis- parities between the “founding” Ashkenazi group, the “immigrant” Mizrahim and the “indigenous” Palestinian-Arab group. However, within Israel one can dis- cern at the same time a growing opposi- tion voiced by various groups aggrieved by the Israeli land regime. These include Palestinian-Arabs, public housing ten- ants, peripheral Mizrahim, and other immigrants living in peripheral settle- ments and neighborhoods, and some ac- tivist circles who side with these groups, as well as NGOs. Like in most hegem- onic systems, the solidity of the unchal- lenged “truth” advanced by the regime is Realizing Property Rights page / 292

tions covers cropland, except for irrigation Asia 28, 1998. projects, which then covered only a tiny frac- 12 The full results of the 1999 survey are de- tion of agricultural land. scribed in R. Prosterman, B. Schwarzwalder 6 The Nationalists had, of course, by then fled to & Y. Jianping, “Implementation of 30-Year the island province of Taiwan. There, chas- Land Use Rights Under China’s 1998 Land tened by their failure to win peasant support Management Law: An Analysis and Recom- on the mainland, they promulgated their mendations Based on a 17 Province Survey,” own local, and successful, land-reform pro- 9 University of Washington Pacific Rim Law gram. See, e.g. Chen Cheng, “Land Reform & Policy Journal 9/3, 2000, p. 507– 67. The in Taiwan,” Taiwan 1961. full results of the 2001 survey are described 7 The exceptions were substantially the same in B. Schwarzwalder, R. Prosterman, Y. Jian- as those in the platform, noted above, ex- ping, J. Riedinger & L. Ping, “An Update on cept state-owned land also was to include China’s Rural Land Tenure System Reforms: large and contiguous tracts of land for Analysis and Recommendations Based on a growing bamboo, fruit, tea, and mulber- 17 Province Survey,” Columbia Journal of ries which were previously owned by land- Asian Law 16/1, 2003, p. 141– 225. lords. Land in suburban areas previously 13 The following originally appeared in R. Pros- owned by landlords was also to be under terman & B. Schwarzwalder, “From Death state ownership. to Life: Giving Value to China’s Rural Land,” 8 India’s overall infant mortality rate, for exam- China Economic Quarterly 8/1 (2004). The ple, was 60 per 1000 as of 2004. title refers to Hernando de Soto’s concept of 9 This uses the low-end figure for an agricultural bringing “dead capital” to life. population of 750 million calculated from 14 The remaining responses were spread among an article in “Caijing Magazine” in August consolidation of land parcels, changes in 2005, “After agriculture has received all the the village cadres, scale farming, and the benefits,” written by Chen Xiwen, one of the two-field system. top rural policy officials. This is multiplied by 1775 RMB, the per capita amount that would be required to bring average rural Land Regime and Social Relations in Israel incomes from their 2004 level of 2936 RMB Alexandre (Sandy) Kedar, Oren Yiftachel up to 4711 RMB, which would be one-half the 2004 urban income level (9422 RMB, as 1 O. Yiftachel, “Ethnocracy: The Politics of noted in the text). Judaizing Israel/Palestine,” Constella- 10 From the “Caijing Magazine” article cited in tions 6/3 (1999) p. 364 – 90; O. Yiftachel the preceding footnote (RDI translation from & A. Ghanem, “Understanding Ethnocratic Chinese). Regimes: the Politics of Seizing Contested 11 For a review of the literature, with a special eye Territory,” Political Geography 22/4 2004, to the issue in China, see R. Prosterman et p. 538– 68. al., “Large-Scale Farming in China: An Ap- 2 O. Yiftachel & H. Yacobi (2003). “Urban Eth- propriate Policy?” Journal of Contemporary nocracy: Ethnicization and the Production Notes page / 293

of Space in an Israeli Mixed City,” Environ- 7 Singer (1991; see n.5) argues that “property ment and Planning D: Society and Space 21, interests traditionally held by Indian nations 2003, p. 673– 93. and tribal members are often treated as a 3 Ibid. commons available for non-Indian purposes 4 P. Russel, “High Courts and the Rights of Abo- when needed by non-Indians.” riginal Peoples: The Limits of Judicial Inde- 8 See Daes (n.6). Even when states recognize pendence,” Saskatchewan Law Review 61 native possession of land, this has generally (1998) p. 247–76. been regarded as an act of grace. Thus, na- 5 N. Blomley, “Acts, Deeds and the Violence of tives have been entitled to retain their land Property,” Historical Geography 28, 2000, only with the consent of the authorities, p. 86 –107; J. Singer, “Sovereignty and Prop- and such consent has often been revoked. erty,” Northwestern University Law Review Similarly, Singer argues that tribal property 86/1, 1991, p. 1– 56; Ibd., “Re-reading Prop- rights are not properly understood as rights erty,” New England Law Review 26/3, 1992, at all, but merely as revocable licenses (see p. 711– 33. n.5). In New Zealand, the traditional view 6 For a more detailed analysis see A. (S.) Ke- was that the Maori had no legally recognized dar, “On the Legal Geography of Ethnocratic rights to their lands and fisheries after the Settler States: Notes Towards A Research British annexation. Their rights were consid- Agenda,” Current Legal Issues 5, 2002, p. ered at the sufferance of the Crown. See S. 401– 41; Singer (n.5); Russell (n. 4); E.-I. Wiessner, “Rights and Status of Indigenous A. Daes, Special Rapporteur, Human Right Peoples: A Global Comparative and Inter- of Indigenous Peoples: Indigenous People national Legal Analysis,” Harvard Human and their Relationship to Land (Second Rights Journal 12, 1999, p. 57–70. Progress Report 1999) at: http://www.un- 9 See Mabo v. Queesland, 175 C.L.R. at 109. hchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/ This denial is based partly on a “cultural E.CN.4.Sub.2.2001.21.En?Opendocument. clash of paradigms” in which the “modern On the attitude of U.S law to Chicanos in Western” legal system does not recognize the Southwestern U.S. see G. T. Luna, 1998 ways locals organized their spatial relations “Chicana/Chicano Land Tenure in the Agrar- as giving rise to property rights. ian Domain,” Michigan Journal of Race and 10 See the Native Title Act 1993. Law 4, 1998, p. 39; Ibd., “Beyond/Between 11 See Russel (n.4). Colors: On the Complexities of Race: The 12 See Russel (n.4) p. 258. Treaty of Guadalupe Hildago and Dred Scott 13 G. Shafir G. & Y. Peled, “Citizenship and Strat- v. Sanford,” University of Miami Law Review ification in an Ethnic Democracy,” Ethnic 53, 1999, p. 691; W. Fisher III, “Property and Racial Studies 21/3, 1998, p. 408 – 27. and Power in American Legal History,” in: 14 A. Ghanem, “State and Minority in Israel: the R. Harris, A. (S.) Kedar, A. Likhovsky & P. Case of Ethnic State and the Predicament Lahav (eds.), “The History of Law in a Multi- of Its Minority,” Ethnic and Racial Studies Cultural Society: Israel 1917–1967,” London 21/3, 1998, p. 428 – 47. 2002, p. 393 – 405. 15 A. Kemp, “Speaking Borders: The Construc- Realizing Property Rights page / 294

tion of Political Territory in Israel 1949 – the social framework devised by the “found- 1967,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Tel Aviv Univer- ing” group. However, overall it seems that sity 1997. the proportion of immigrants coming from 16 The resolution was accepted by the Jews and Christian and especially eastern European rejected by the Arabs. For a more extensive backgrounds, that successfully integrated depiction of the history of this strife, and was much higher than the proportion of for references, see A. (S.) Kedar, “The Le- Jews coming from Muslim countries. gal Transformation of Ethnic Geography: 23 A new group has appeared over the past few Israeli Law and the Palestinian Landholder years: foreign workers, devoid of citizen- 1948 –1967,” NYU J. Of International Law ship and illegal residents. Their increasing and Politics 33/4, 2001, p. 923 –1000. presence changes the human geography of 17 The War resulted in Israel controlling most Israel and introduces complex legal dilem- of the territory, while most of the rest came mas, such as the responsibilities of land- under the control of Jordan and Egypt. lords to their tenants, minimum standards 18 The estimates of the number of Arab refugees of construction, etc. and of those who remained in Israel vary. 24 See Basic Law Human Liberty and Dignity See R. Patai, (ed.), “Encyclopedia of Zionism section 1 and 1a (1992, 1994). and Israel,” New York 1971, p. 72; W. Lehn, 25 We want to emphasize, however, that we do “The Jewish National Fund,” London 1988; not place the Mizrahim and Palestinians on E. Said, “The Question of Palestine,” London the same plane, and we are aware that the 1980, p. 14, 45; J. Abu-Lughod, “The Trans- Mizrahim took part in the Judaization of the formation of Palestine,” Evanston 1971. Israeli-Palestinian space. However, it is im- 19 E. Benvenisti & E. Zamir, “Private Claims to portant to note that these two groups were Property Rights in the Future Israel-Palestin- both harmed by the same process. ian Settlement,” American Journal of Inter- 26 O. Yiftachel. & A. (S.) Kedar, “Landed Power: national Law 89, 1995, p. 295, 297. The Making of the Israeli Land Regime,” 20 We are aware of the need for a more in-depth Theory and Criticism 16, 2000, p. 67–100 and nuanced analysis, focusing on the im- (Hebrew). portant differences existing within each 27 S. Smooha, “Class, Ethnic and National Cleav- layer, the changes taking place within the ages in Israel,” in: U. Ram, Israeli Socie- groups’ internal structures, and the con- ty: Critical Perspectives, Tel-Aviv 1993, p. tinuing evolution of the relationships among 134 – 55. them. 28 Y. Peled & A. Ophir (eds.), “Israel: From Mo- 21 The ethnocratic model is a dynamic one, and bilized to Civil Society?” Jerusalem 2001; Y. changes do occur over time. The picture we Peled & A. Ophir (eds.), “Shas – The Chal- present here is a generalization of the social lenge of Israeliness,” Tel-Aviv 2001. structure in the years immediately following 29 G. Falah, “The 1948 Israeli-Palestinian War the creation of Israel. and Its Aftermath: the Transformation and 22 The picture is complicated. We do not mean De-Signification of Palestine’s Cultural Land- that all Ashkenazi Jews fitted easily into scape,” Annals of the American Association Notes page / 295

of Geographers, 86/2, 1996, p. 256 – 85; A. The Making of the Israeli Land Regime,” Golan, “The Transfer to Jewish Control of Theory and Criticisms 16, 2000, p. 67–100 Abandoned Arab Lands during the War of (Hebrew). Independence,” in: S. I. Troen & N. Lucas 39 A. Golan, “Spatial Change – the Result of War: (eds.), “Israel – The First Decade of Independ- ex-Arab Areas in the State of Israel, 1948- ence,” Albany 1995, p. 403 – 40. 1950,” Sde-Bokker 2001; Y. Holzman-Gazit, 30 M. Benvensiti, “The West Bank Data Project,” “The use of Law as a Status Symbol: The Washington DC 1988; Ibd., “Sacred Land- Jewish National Fund Statute 1953,” Iyuney scapes,” Los Angeles 2001; G. Furman & Mishpat 26/2, 2002, p. 601– 44. A. (S.) Kedar, “From Arab Land to ‘Israel 40 The head of the council is a government min- Lands’: The Legal Dispossession of the Pal- ister and therefore the State has one addi- estinians Displaced by Israel in the Wake of tional vote in the council. 1948,” Environment and Planning: Society 41 Y. Elmelech & N. Lewin-Esptein, “Immigra- and Space 22, 2004, p. 809 – 30. tion and Housing in Israel: Another Look at 31 0.247 acres equal one dunum. 1,000 dunums Inequality,” Megamot 39, 1998, p. 243 – 69 equal one square kilometer. (Hebrew). 32 This number includes about 940,000 dunums 42 O. Yiftachel, “Planning and Social Control: Ex- of Jewish National Fund land, about 130,000 ploring the Dark Side,” Journal of Planning of the PICA organization and about half a mil- Literature 12/4, 1998, p. 395 – 406. lion dunums in private Jewish ownership. 43 Though not always. As we have seen, many 33 R. Kark, “Planning, Housing and Land Pol- of the Moshavei Olim were populated by icy 1948 –1952: The Formation of Con- Mizrahi immigrants. But these were partly cepts and Governmental Frameworks,” in: integrated in the founding group. S. I. Troen & N. Lucas (n.29), p. 461– 94. 44 A. (S.) Kedar, “Majority Time, Minority The uncertainty as to the exact amount Time, Land Nation, and the Law of Adverse relates to the different ownership catego- Possession in Israel,” Law Review 21, 1998, ries used by previous (Ottoman and Brit- 665 –746 (in Hebrew); N. Zalzman, “License ish) land regimes; these have conflicting in Land,” Hapraklit 42, 1996, p. 24 – 63. interpretations. 45 Likewise, about 55% of the West Bank shift- 34 Laws of the State of Israel; see I. Lustick, “Ar- ed into Jewish control as well. This was abs in the Jewish State: Israel’s Control over achieved through Israeli intensive procla- a National Minority,” Austin 1980; Kedar mation of “state lands” in the occupied ter- (n.6. 16. 26), Furman & Kedar (n.30). ritories. In addition, by 1999, Israel had 35 Kedar (n.16). settled about 360,000 Jews in these terri- 36 O. Yiftachel (n.1) tories (including East Jerusalem) and had 37 Kedar, (S.) Alexandre, “Land Settlement in annexed all of their settlements de facto. the Negev in International Law Perspective,” Other means of Judaization and control of Adalah Newletter 8, 2004, at: http://www. this territory were employed as well, such adalah.org/newsletter/eng/dec04/ar1.pdf as the establishment of military encamp- 38 O. Yiftachel & A. (S.) Kedar, “Landed Power: ments, local and regional municipalities, Realizing Property Rights page / 296

Jewish industrial areas, and recently even Human Rights, Property Rights, “Jewish” roads. and Human Security 46 See Holzman-Gazit (n. 39). Jody Williams 47 That is the agent for Mekarkei Israel (the State, the Development Authority or the JNF). 1 United Nations General Assembly, “Vienna 48 This includes the area under the jurisdiction Declaration and Programme of Action,” Art. of regional councils. The jurisdiction of these 5, A/Conf. 157/23, July 12, 1993. councils covers 84% of Israel’s land area. As 2 J. Donnelly, “Universal Human Rights in The- a rule, Kibbutzim, Moshavim and Commu- ory & Practice,” Cornell University Press, nity Settlements control these councils. Most Ithaca 2003, p. 23. of the area under their jurisdiction was not 3 United Nations General Assembly, “Vienna used for settlement, rather for agriculture. Declaration and Programme of Action,” Art. However, the hundred of rural settlements 25, A/Conf. 157/23, July 12, 1993. that are under the jurisdiction of these coun- 4 See “Fact Sheet No. 16 (Rev. 1), The Committee cils are open for Jews (at least theoretically), on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,” but usually not for Arabs. Office of the UN High Commissioner for Hu- 49 H.C. 6698/95, Kaadan v. Minhal Mekarke’ey man Rights, United Nations, Geneva, July Yisrael, 54(1) P.D. 258. For an analysis of 1991, see also, Donnelly (n. 2) p. 27– 33. the case, see A. (S.) Kedar, “A First Step on 5 Ch. Raghavan, “Economic, Cultural and Social a Difficult and Sensitive Road,” Bulletin of Rights only ‘Goals,’ says US,” Third World Israel Studies 16, 2000, p. 3 –11. Network, Geneva, March 30, 2001. 50 See A. (S.) Kedar, “The Legal Construction of 6 For more information, see The Human Security Rural Space in Israel,” State and Society Network webpage, at: http://www.humanse- 4/1, 2004, p. 845 – 83. curitynetwork.org/. 7 United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Human Security” Property Rights and Human Rights in webpage, at: http://ochaonline.un.org/web- the Americas page.asp?MenuID=9671&Page=1494. José M. Pallí 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 1 http://hrw.org/english/docs/2003/12/31/ 10 P. Baker, “Bush, at U.N., Links Anti-Poverty cuba7002.htm. Agenda to War on Terrorism,” Washington Post, September 15, 2005, p. A8. 11 This is measured in 1993 purchasing power parity (“PPP”), which the Bank defines as “a method of measuring the relative purchas- ing power of different countries’ currencies over the same types of goods and services. Because goods and services may cost more in one country than in another, PPP allows