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Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: a Research Agenda Articles Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky Mainstream comparative research on political institutions focuses primarily on formal rules. Yet in many contexts, informal insti- tutions, ranging from bureaucratic and legislative norms to clientelism and patrimonialism, shape even more strongly political behavior and outcomes. Scholars who fail to consider these informal rules of the game risk missing many of the most important incentives and constraints that underlie political behavior. In this article we develop a framework for studying informal institutions and integrating them into comparative institutional analysis. The framework is based on a typology of four patterns of formal- informal institutional interaction: complementary,accommodating, competing, and substitutive. We then explore two issues largely ignored in the literature on this subject: the reasons and mechanisms behind the emergence of informal institutions, and the nature of their stability and change. Finally, we consider challenges in research on informal institutions, including issues of identification, measurement, and comparison. ver the last two decades, institutional analysis has that many “rules of the game” that structure political life become a central focus in comparative politics. are informal—created, communicated, and enforced out- O Fueled by a wave of institutional change in the side of officially sanctioned channels.6 Examples abound. developing and postcommunist worlds, scholars from diverse For decades, Mexican presidents were selected not accord- research traditions have studied how constitutional design, ing to rules in the Constitution, the electoral law, or party electoral systems, and other formal institutional arrange- statutes, but rather via the dedazo (“big finger”)—an unwrit- ments affect political and economic outcomes.1 These stud- ten code that gave the sitting president the right to choose ies have produced important theoretical advances. his successor, specified the candidate pool, and prohibited Nevertheless, a growing body of research on Latin Amer- potential candidates from openly seeking the job.7 In Japan, ica,2 postcommunist Eurasia,3 Africa,4 and Asia5 suggests the “strict but unwritten rules” of Amakudari (“descent from heaven”), through which retiring state bureaucrats are awarded top positions in private corporations, have sur- Gretchen Helmke is assistant professor of political science at vived decades of administrative reform.8 In Central Asia, the University of Rochester ([email protected]). Her clan-based norms have “become the rules of the game,” book Courts Under Constraints: Judges, Generals, and while the constitutional structures created after the collapse Presidents in Argentina, will be published by Cambridge Uni- of the Soviet Union are “increasingly . inconsequen- versity Press. Steven Levitsky is associate professor of govern- tial.”9 And in much of the developing and postcommunist ment at Harvard University (levitsky@wcfia.harvard.edu). world, patterns of clientelism, corruption, and patrimoni- He is the author of Transforming Labor-Based Parties alism coexist with (and often subvert) new democratic, mar- in Latin America: Argentine Peronism in Comparative ket, and state institutions.10 Perspective and is currently writing a book on competitive Attention to informal institutions is by no means new authoritarian regimes in the post–Cold War era. The to political science. Earlier studies of “prismatic soci- authors thank the Weatherhead Center for International eties,”11 “moral economies,”12 “economies of affection,”13 Affairs at Harvard University and the Kellogg Institute for legal pluralism,14 clientelism,15 corruption,16 and consoci- International Studies at the University of Notre Dame for ationalism,17 as well as on government-business relations generously sponsoring conferences on informal institutions. The in Japan,18 blat in the Soviet Union,19 and the “folkways” authors also gratefully acknowledge comments from Jorge of the U.S. Senate20 highlighted the importance of unwrit- Domínguez, Anna Grzymala-Busse, Dennis Galvan, Goran ten rules. Nevertheless, informal rules have remained at Hyden, Jack Knight, Lisa Martin, Hillel Soifer, Benjamin the margins of the institutionalist turn in comparative pol- Smith, Susan Stokes, María Victoria Murillo, and Kurt itics. Indeed, much current literature assumes that actors’ Weyland, as well as three anonymous reviewers and the incentives and expectations are shaped primarily, if not editors of Perspectives on Politics. exclusively, by formal rules. Such a narrow focus can be December 2004 | Vol. 2/No. 4 725 Articles | Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics problematic, for it risks missing much of what drives polit- to vote by local brokers, such elections are won not by ical behavior and can hinder efforts to explain important ideological candidates but by those with the largest political political phenomena.21 machine.32 This article broadens the scope of comparative research Informal institutions also shape formal institutional out- on political institutions by laying the foundation for a sys- comes in a less visible way: by creating or strengthening tematic analysis of informal rules. Our motivation is sim- incentives to comply with formal rules. In other words, ple: good institutional analysis requires rigorous attention they may do the enabling and constraining that is widely to both formal and informal rules. Careful attention to attributed to formal institutions.33 Since the Federalist Papers, informal institutions is critical to understanding the incen- scholars have recognized that the norms underlying formal tives that enable and constrain political behavior. Political institutions matter. The stability of the United States’ pres- actors respond to a mix of formal and informal incen- idential democracy is not only a product of the rules laid tives,22 and in some instances, informal incentives trump out in the Constitution, but is also rooted in informal rules the formal ones. In postwar Italy, for example, norms of (such as gracious losing, the underuse of certain formal corruption were “more powerful than the laws of the state: prerogatives, and bipartisan consensus on critical issues) that the latter could be violated with impunity, while anyone prevent formal checks and balances from deteriorating into who challenged the conventions of the illicit market would severe conflict among the branches of government. meet with certain punishment.”23 To take a different exam- These are hardly isolated examples. Informal rules shape ple, although Brazilian state law prohibits extra-judicial formal institutional outcomes in areas such as legislative executions, informal rules and procedures within the public politics,34 judicial politics,35 party organization,36 cam- security apparatus enable and even encourage police officers paign finance,37 regime change,38 federalism,39 public admin- to engage in such killing.24 Thus officers who kill suspected istration,40 and state building.41 violent criminals know they will be protected from pros- Bringing together a large but disparate body of scholar- ecution and possibly rewarded with a promotion or bonus.25 ship, we develop a research agenda aimed at incorporating In such cases, a strict analysis of the formal rules would be informal institutions into the theoretical toolkits used by stu- woefully insufficient to understand the incentives driving dents of comparative politics.42 In the first section we clarify behavior. the concept of informal institution, distinguishing it not only Consideration of informal rules is also often critical to from that of formal institution, but also from other informal explaining institutional outcomes. Informal structures shape phenomena, including weak institutions, informal behav- the performance of formal institutions in important and ioral regularities, informal organizations, and culture. In the often unexpected ways. For example, executive-legislative second section we examine how formal and informal rules relations cannot always be explained strictly in terms of interact. Expanding on the work of Hans-Joachim Lauth,43 constitutional design. Neopatrimonial norms permitting we distinguish among four types of informal institution: com- unregulated presidential control over state institutions in plementary, accommodating, competing, and substitutive. Africa and Latin America often yield a degree of executive The third and fourth sections are devoted to issues of infor- dominance that far exceeds a presidents’ constitutional mal institutional emergence and change—questions largely authority.26 Informal institutions may also limit presiden- ignored in recent comparative research. Finally, we discuss tial power. In constitutional terms, Chile possesses “one of specific challenges related to research on informal institu- the most powerful presidencies in the world.”27 Yet, due to tions, such as issues of identification, measurement, and a set of informal institutions that encouraged executive con- comparison. sultation and power sharing, Chilean presidents systemati- A few caveats are in order. Although the term informal cally underused their constitutional prerogatives during the institution encompasses a wide range of social (e.g., the 1990s;28 consequently, Chile was cited as an exception in a handshake, or the rules of dating) and economic (e.g., black region characterized by presidential dominance.29
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