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The Euthyphro occurs near the court of the archon basileus king magistratewhere and Euthyphro encounter each other; each man is present at the court for the preliminary hearings to possible trials 2a. Euthyphro has come to present charges of murder against his own father who, after arresting one of his workers for killing a slave from the family estate on Naxos Islandtied him and threw him in a ditch where he died of exposure to the elements without proper care and attention 3e—4d while Euthyphro's father waited to hear from the exegetes cf. d about how to proceed. Socrates is astonished by Euthyphro's confidence in being able to prosecute his own father for the serious charge of manslaughter, despite the fact that Athenian Law allows only relatives of the dead Euthyphro 1st edition to file suit for murder Dem. Euthyphro dismisses the astonishment of Socrates, which confirms his overconfidence in his own critical judgment of matters religious and ethical. Euthyphro says that what lies behind the charge of impiety presented against Socrates, by Meletus and the others, is Socrates' claim that he is subjected to a daimon divine signwhich warns him of various courses of action. Moreover, Socrates further expresses critical reservations about such divine accounts that emphasize the cruelty and inconsistent behaviour of the Greek gods, such as the castration of the early sky-god Uranus Euthyphro 1st edition, by his son Cronus ; a story Socrates said is difficult to accept 6a—6c. After claiming to know and be able to tell more astonishing divine stories, Euthyphro spends little time and effort defending the conventional, Greek view of the gods. Instead, Euthyphro 1st edition is led to the true task at hand, as Socrates forces him to confront his ignorance, by pressing Euthyphro for a definition of "piety"; yet, Socrates finds flaw with each definition of "piety" Euthyphro 1st edition by Euthyphro 6d ff. At the dialogue's conclusion, Euthyphro is compelled to admit that each of his of "piety" has failed, but, rather than correct his faulty logic, he says that it is time for him to leave, and excuses himself from their dialogue. To that end, Socrates concludes the dialogue with Socratic : Since Euthyphro was unable to define "piety", Euthyphro has failed to teach Socrates about piety. Therefore, from his dialogue with Euthyphro, Socrates received nothing helpful to his defense against a formal charge of impiety 15c ff. Socrates asks Euthyphro to offer him a definition of piety or holiness. The purpose of establishing a clear definition is to provide a basis for Euthyphro to teach Socrates the answer to the question: "What is piety? Socrates seeks a definition of "piety" that is a universal universally trueagainst which all actions can be measured to determine whether or not the actions are pious. That, to be universal, the definition of "piety" must express the essence of the thing defined pietyand be defined in terms of genus Euthyphro 1st edition, speciesand the differentiae. Hence, Euthyphro 1st edition Euthyphro dialogue is technically important for the dialectics of theologyethicsepistemologyand metaphysics. Indeed, 's approach in this dialogue is anachronisticbecause it is unlikely that Socrates was a master metaphysician; Euthyphro 1st edition, 's expositional treatment of metaphysics [ citation needed ] is rooted in the Platonic , especially in the Euthyphro. Ostensibly in order to better defend himself in an upcoming trial for being an impious citizen of AthensSocrates asks Euthyphro for a clear definition of piety holiness ; he offers Socrates four definitions. Euthyphro's first definition of piety is what he is doing now, that is, prosecuting his father for manslaughter 5d. Socrates rejects Euthyphro's definition, because it is not a definition of piety, and is only an example of piety, and does not provide the essential Euthyphro 1st edition that makes pious actions pious. Euthyphro's second definition: Piety is what is pleasing to the gods. This means that a given action, disputed by the gods, would be both pious and impious at the same time — a logical impossibility. Euthyphro argues against Socrates' criticism, by noting that not even the gods would disagree, among themselves, that someone who kills without justification should be punished. Yet Socrates argues that disputes would still arise — over just how much justification actually existed; hence, the same action could be pious and impious; again, Euthyphro's Euthyphro 1st edition cannot be a definition of "piety". To overcome Socrates' objection to his second definition of piety, Euthyphro amends his definition. Euthyphro's third definition of piety is: "What all the gods love is pious, and what they all hate is impious. Or is it pious because it is loved by the gods? Euthyphro seems unsure as to what the question means and so Socrates applies a dialectic technique: an analogy, to clarify his question 10a. He persuades Euthyphro to agree that when we call a thing "carried", it Euthyphro 1st edition simply because it is being carried by someone and not because it possesses an inherent characteristic, which could be called "carried". That is, "being carried" is not an essential trait of the thing being carried but a condition, a state that the object is currently in. Is something "beloved" in and of itself like being big or redor does it become beloved when it is loved by someone? Clearly, the answer is again the latter, something becomes beloved when it is loved. Euthyphro seems to be taken aback so Socrates reminds him the definitions he gave previously 10e. He had said that something is loved by the gods because it is pious, which means that their love follows from something inherent in the pious. Euthyphro 1st edition yet they just agreed that what is beloved is put in Euthyphro 1st edition state as a result of being loved. So piety cannot belong to what is beloved by the gods since according to Euthyphro it Euthyphro 1st edition not acquire its characteristics by something the act of being loved but has them a prioriin contrast to the things that Euthyphro 1st edition beloved that are put in this state through the very act of being loved. It seems therefore that Euthyphro's third argument is flawed. At that juncture Euthyphro 1st edition their dialogue, Euthyphro does not understand what makes his definition of "piety" a circular argument; he agrees with Socrates that the gods like an action because it is pious. Socrates then argues that the unanimous approval of the gods is merely an attribute of "piety", that divine approval is not a defining characteristic of "piety". That divine approval does not define the essence of "piety", does not define what is "piety", does not give an idea of "piety"; Euthyphro 1st edition, divine approval is not a universal definition of "piety". Socrates' argument is convoluted not only because of its structure but because of the language used, and is said to have "reduced translators to babble and driven commentators to despair". In the second half of the dialogue, Socrates suggests a definition of "piety", which is that "piety is a species of the genus 'justice'" 12d[4] but he leads up to that definition with observations and questions about the difference between species and genusstarting with the question:. Yet, Socrates later says that the information provided in his question to Euthyphro is insufficient for a clear definition of "piety", because piety belongs to those actions we call justthat is, morally good; however, there are actions, other than pious actions, which we call just 12d ; for example, bravery and concern for others. Socrates asks: What is it that makes piety different from other actions that we call just? We cannot say something is true, because we believe it to be true. We must find proof. In response, Euthyphro says that piety is concerned with looking after the gods 12ebut Socrates objects, saying that "looking after", if used in its ordinary sense with which Euthyphro agrees would imply that when one performs an act of piety one thus makes one of the gods better — an example of hubrisa dangerous human emotion frowned upon by the Greek gods. Euthyphro replies with his earlier third definition, that: Piety is what is loved by all the gods. Euthyphro then proposes a fifth definition: "Piety is an art of sacrifice and prayer". He proposes the notion of piety as a form of knowledgeof how to do exchange: Giving gifts to the gods, and asking favours in return. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. This article is about Plato's dialogue. For the prophet for whom the dialogue is named, see Euthyphro prophet. Plato from Raphael 's The School of — Marc Journal of the History of Philosophy. . Social gadfly Socratic intellectualism Socratic irony Socratic paradox . . film Socrates film. . Socratic Letters. Early life. Categories : Dialogues of Plato Socratic dialogues. Namespaces Article Talk. Views Read Edit View history. Help Learn to edit Community portal Recent changes Upload file. Download as PDF Printable version. Wikimedia Commons Wikiquote Wikisource. Part of a series on. Philosophy portal. Wikimedia Commons has media related to Euthyphro. Wikisource has original text related to this article: Euthyphro. Wikiquote has quotations related to: Euthyphro. Euthyphro: Summary | SparkNotes

Although it was originally applied to the pantheonthe dilemma has implications for modern monotheistic religions. Gottfried Leibniz asked whether the good and just "is good and just because God wills it or whether God wills it because it is good and just". Socrates and Euthyphro discuss the nature of piety in Plato's Euthyphro. Euthyphro then revises his definition, so that piety is only that which is loved by all of the gods unanimously 9e. At this point the dilemma surfaces. Socrates asks whether the gods love the pious because it is the pious, or whether the pious is pious only because it is loved by the gods 10a. Socrates and Euthyphro both contemplate the first option: surely the gods love the pious because it is the pious. But this means, Socrates argues, that we are forced to reject the second option: the fact that the gods love something cannot explain why the pious is the pious 10d. Socrates points out that if both options were true, they together would yield a vicious circle, with the gods loving the pious because it is the pious, and the pious being the pious because the gods love it. And this in turn means, Socrates argues, that the pious is not Euthyphro 1st edition same as the god-beloved, for what makes the pious the pious is not what makes the god-beloved the god-beloved. After all, what makes the god-beloved the god-beloved is the fact that the gods love it, whereas what makes the pious the pious is something else 9da. Thus Euthyphro's theory does not give us the very nature of the pious, but at most a quality of the pious 11ab. The dilemma can be modified to apply to philosophical theism, where it is still the object of theological and philosophical discussion, largely within the Christian, Jewish, and Islamic traditions. As German philosopher and mathematician Gottfried Leibniz presented this version of the dilemma: "It is generally agreed that whatever God wills is good and just. But there remains the question whether it is good and just because God wills it or whether God wills it because it is good and just; in other words, whether justice and Goodness are arbitrary or whether they belong to the necessary and eternal truths about the nature of things. Many philosophers and theologians have addressed the Euthyphro dilemma since the time of Plato, though not always with reference to the Platonic dialogue. According to scholar Terence Irwinthe issue and its connection with Plato was revived by Ralph Cudworth and Samuel Clarke in the 17th and 18th centuries. Philosophers and theologians aiming to defend theism against the threat of the dilemma have developed a variety of responses. The first horn of the dilemma i. Roughly, it is the view that there are independent moral Euthyphro 1st edition some actions are right or wrong in themselves, independent of God's commands. This is the view accepted by Socrates and Euthyphro in Plato's dialogue. The Mu'tazilah school of Islamic theology also defended the view with, for example, Nazzam maintaining that God is powerless to engage in injustice or lying[4] as did the Islamic philosopher Averroes. Contemporary philosophers of religion who Euthyphro 1st edition this horn of the Euthyphro dilemma include Richard Swinburne [17] [18] and T. Mawson [19] though see below for complications. Contemporary philosophers Joshua Hoffman and Gary S. Rosenkrantz take the first horn of the dilemma, branding divine command theory a "subjective theory of value" that makes morality arbitrary. To this they reply that God is omnipotent, even though there are states of affairs he cannot bring about: omnipotence is a matter of "maximal power", not an ability to bring about all possible Euthyphro 1st edition of affairs. And supposing that Euthyphro 1st edition is impossible for God not to exist, then since there cannot be more than one omnipotent being, it is therefore impossible for any being to have more power than God e. Thus God's omnipotence remains intact. Richard Swinburne and T. Mawson have a slightly more complicated view. They both take the first horn of the dilemma when it comes to necessary moral truths. But divine commands are not totally irrelevant, for God and his will can still effect contingent moral truths. First, there are some divine commands that can directly create moral obligations: e. Rather, they create obligations only because of God's role as creator Euthyphro 1st edition sustainer and indeed owner of the universe, together with the necessary moral truth that we owe some limited consideration to benefactors and owners. For example, whether a public policy is morally good might indirectly depend on God's creative acts: the policy's goodness or badness might depend on its effects, and those effects would in turn depend on the sort of universe God has decided to create. The second horn of the dilemma i. Roughly, it is the view that there are no moral standards other than God's will: without God's Euthyphro 1st edition, nothing would be right or wrong. This view was partially defended by Duns Scotuswho argued that not all Ten Commandments belong Euthyphro 1st edition the Natural Law in the strictest sense. Scotus Euthyphro 1st edition note, however that the last seven commandments " are highly consonant with [the natural law], though they do not follow necessarily from first practical principles that are known in virtue of their terms and are necessarily known by any intellect [that understands their terms. Euthyphro 1st edition it is certain that all the precepts of the second table belong to the natural law in this second way, since their rectitude is highly consonant with first practical principles that are known necessarily ". William of Ockham went further, contending that since there is no contradiction in it God could command us not to love God [49] and even to hate God. One common response to the Euthyphro dilemma centers on a distinction between value and Euthyphro 1st edition. Obligation, which concerns rightness and wrongness or what is required, forbidden, or permissibleis given a voluntarist treatment. But value, which concerns goodness and badness, is treated as independent of divine commands. The result is a restricted divine command theory that applies only to a specific region of morality: the deontic region of obligation. Adams, [86] Philip L. Quinn[87] and William P. A significant attraction of such a view is that, since it allows for a non-voluntarist treatment of goodness and badness, and therefore of God's own moral attributes, some of the aforementioned problems with voluntarism can perhaps be answered. God's commands are not arbitrary: there are reasons which guide his commands based ultimately on this goodness and badness. Our obligation to obey God's commands does Euthyphro 1st edition result in circular reasoning; it might instead be based on a gratitude whose appropriateness is itself independent of divine commands. One problem remains for such views: if God's own essential goodness does not depend on divine commands, then on what does it depend? Something other than God? Here the restricted divine command theory is commonly combined with a view reminiscent of Plato: God is identical to the ultimate standard for goodness. Something is a meter long inasmuch as it is the same length as the standard meter bar, and likewise, something is good inasmuch as it approximates God. If one asks why God is identified as the ultimate standard for goodness, Alston replies that this is "the end of the line," with no further explanation available, but adds that this is no more arbitrary than a view that invokes a fundamental moral standard. This solution has been criticized by Wes Morriston. If we identify the ultimate standard for goodness with God's nature, then it seems we are identifying it with certain properties of God e. If so, then the dilemma resurfaces: is God good because he has those properties, or are those properties good because God has them? To produce a satisfying result, however, it would have to give an account of God's goodness that does not trivialize it and does not make God subject to an independent standard of goodness. Moral philosopher Peter Singerdisputing the perspective that "God is good" and could never advocate something like torture, states that those who propose this are "caught in a trap of their own making, for what can they possibly mean by the assertion that God is good? That God is approved of by God? AugustineAnselmand Aquinas all wrote about the issues raised by the Euthyphro dilemma, although, like William James [] and Wittgenstein [62] later, they did not mention it by name. As philosopher and Anselm scholar Katherin A. Rogers observes, many contemporary philosophers of religion suppose that there are true propositions which exist as platonic abstracta independently of God. As Rogers puts it, "Anselm, like Augustine before him and Aquinas later, rejects both horns of the Euthyphro dilemma. God neither conforms to nor invents the moral order. Rather His very nature is the standard for value. The basis of the false dilemma response—God's nature is the standard for value—predates the dilemma itself, appearing first in the thought of the eighth-century BC Hebrew prophetsAmosHoseaMicah and Isaiah. Amos lived some three centuries before Socrates and two before Thalestraditionally regarded as the first Greek Euthyphro 1st edition. Snaith"is recognized by all as marking a considerable advance on all previous ideas," [] not least in its "special consideration for the poor Euthyphro 1st edition down-trodden. He has a particular regard for the helpless ones on earth. Hebrew has few abstract nouns. What the Greeks thought of as ideas or abstractions, the Hebrews thought of as activities. Euthyphro 1st edition Snaith writes:. Tsedeq is something that happens here, and can be seen, and recognized, and known. It follows, therefore, that when the Hebrew thought of tsedeq righteousnesshe did Euthyphro 1st edition think of Righteousness in general, or of Righteousness as an Idea. On the contrary, he thought of a particular righteous act, an action, concrete, capable of exact description, fixed in time and space If the word had anything like a general meaning for him, then it was as it was represented by a whole series of events, the sum-total of a number of particular happenings. The Hebrew stance on what came to be called the problem of universalsas on much else, was very different from that of Plato and precluded anything like the Euthyphro dilemma. Like AristotleAquinas rejected Euthyphro 1st edition. Aquinas frequently quoted with approval Aristotle's definition, "Good is what all desire. Aquinas's discussion of sin provides a good point of entry to his philosophical explanation of why the nature of God is the standard for value. Josef Pieperhowever, replies that such arguments rest upon an impermissibly anthropomorphic conception of God. However, "it does not belong to the essence of the free will to be able to decide for evil. A deviation from the norm would not even be thinkable. Thus the Euthyphro 1st edition horn of the Euthyphro dilemma, divine command theory, is also disposed of. Thomist philosopher Edward Feser writes, "Divine simplicity [entails] that God's will Euthyphro 1st edition is God's goodness which Euthyphro 1st edition is His immutable and necessary existence. That means that what is objectively good and what God wills for us as morally obligatory are really the Euthyphro 1st edition thing considered under different descriptions, and that neither could have been Euthyphro 1st edition than they are. There can be no question then, either of God's having arbitrarily commanded something different for us torturing babies for fun, or whatever or of there being a standard of goodness apart from Him. Again, the Euthyphro dilemma is a false one; the third option that it fails to consider is that what is morally obligatory is what God commands in accordance with a non-arbitrary and unchanging standard of goodness that is not independent of Him He is not under the moral law precisely because He is the moral law. William James, in his essay " The Moral Philosopher and the Euthyphro 1st edition Life ", dismisses the first horn of the Euthyphro dilemma and stays clear of the second. He writes: "Our ordinary attitude of regarding ourselves as subject to an overarching system of moral relations, true 'in themselves,' is It follows that "ethics have as genuine a foothold in a universe where the highest consciousness is human, as in a universe where there is a God as well. For James, the deepest practical difference in the moral life is between what he calls "the easy-going and the strenuous mood. This too is why, in a merely human world without a God, the appeal to our moral energy falls short Euthyphro 1st edition its maximum stimulating Euthyphro 1st edition. From this unsparing practical ordeal no professor's lectures and no array of books can save us. Gale, "God inspires us to lead the morally strenuous life in virtue of our conceiving of him as unsurpassably good. Euthyphro - Wikipedia

Socrates encounters Euthyphro outside the court of Athens. Socrates has been called to court on charges of impiety by Meletus, and Euthyphro has come to prosecute his own father for having unintentionally killed a murderous hired hand. Socrates flatters Euthyphro, suggesting that Euthyphro must be a great expert in religious matters if he is willing to prosecute his own father on so questionable a charge. Euthyphro concurs that he Euthyphro 1st edition indeed know all there is to be known about what is holy. Socrates urges Euthyphro to instruct him and to teach him what holiness is, since Euthyphro's teaching might help Socrates in his trial against Meletus. First, Euthyphro suggests that holiness is persecuting religious Euthyphro 1st edition. Socrates finds this definition unsatisfying, since there are many holy deeds aside from that of persecuting offenders. He asks Euthyphro instead to give him a general definition that identifies that one feature that all holy deeds share in common. Euthyphro suggests that what is holy is what is agreeable to the gods, in response to which Socrates points out that the gods often quarrel, so what Euthyphro 1st edition agreeable to one might not be agreeable to all. Euthyphro's most important attempt to define holiness comes with his suggestion that what is holy is what is approved of by all the gods. Socrates sets up a rather elaborate argument to show that the two cannot be equivalent. What is holy gets approved of by the gods because it is holy, so what is holy determines what gets approved of by the gods. And what gets approved of by the gods in turn determines what is approved of by the gods. It follows from this reasoning that what is holy cannot be the same thing as what is approved of by the gods, since one of these two determines what gets approved of by the gods and the other is determined by what gets approved of by the gods. Euthyphro is next led to suggest that holiness is a kind of justice, specifically, that kind which is concerned with looking after the gods. Socrates wonders what Euthyphro means by "looking after the gods. Euthyphro's final suggestion is that holiness is a Euthyphro 1st edition of trading with the gods, where we give them sacrifices and they grant our prayers. Our sacrifices do Euthyphro 1st edition help them in any way, but simply gratify them. But, Socrates points out, to say that holiness is gratifying the gods is similar to saying that holiness is what is approved of by the gods, which Euthyphro 1st edition us back in our previous conundrum. Rather than try to find a better definition, Euthyphro leaves in a huff, frustrated by Socrates' questioning. Election Day is November 3rd! Make sure your voice is heard. Summary Context Analysis and Themes 2a - Euthyphro 1st edition 4e - 6e 7a - 9e 10a - 11a 11b - 14a 14b - 16a. Review Quiz Study Questions Bibliography. Summary Summary. Next section Context. Popular pages: Euthyphro. Take a Study Break.