Fogerty V. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S
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Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994) 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455, 62 USLW 4153, 1994 Copr.L.Dec. P 27,221... Copyright Act attorney fee provision gives no hint that successful plaintiffs are to be KeyCite Yellow Flag - Negative Treatment treated differently than successful defendants. Called into Doubt by Assessment Technologies of WI, LLC v. 17 U.S.C.A. § 505. WIREdata, Inc., 7th Cir.(Wis.), March 17, 2004 114 S.Ct. 1023 939 Cases that cite this headnote Supreme Court of the United States John C. FOGERTY, Petitioner, [2] Copyrights and Intellectual Property v. Attorney fees FANTASY, INC. Supreme Court's decision in Christiansburg Garment Co. construing language in Title VII, No. 92–1750. providing that court in its discretion may | allow prevailing party reasonable attorney Argued Dec. 8, 1993. fees as part of costs, as warranting application | of different standards to successful plaintiffs Decided March 1, 1994. than to successful defendants did not support interpretation of Copyright Act attorney fee Synopsis provision as warranting different treatment of Holder of copyright for song brought infringement action successful plaintiffs and successful defendants against musician who originally composed the song. in awarding attorney fees, despite fact that Musician counterclaimed seeking rescission of music there was similar language in the two statutes, publishing agreement entered into with copyright holder's given that goals and objectives of the two predecessor. The United States District Court for the statutes were not completely similar. 17 Northern District of California, Samuel Conti, J., 664 U.S.C.A. § 505; Civil Rights Act of 1964, § F.Supp. 1345, entered summary judgment for copyright 706(k), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e–5(k). holder on counterclaim and entered judgment for musician on infringement claim. Musician appealed. The 618 Cases that cite this headnote Court of Appeals, 984 F.2d 1524, affirmed. Certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants [3] Copyrights and Intellectual Property must be treated alike in awarding attorney fees under Attorney fees Copyright Act. Copyright Act section permitting prevailing parties to recover attorney fees was not Reversed and remanded. intended to adopt British rule which permits award of attorney fees as a matter of Justice Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the course to both prevailing plaintiffs and judgment. defendants absent exceptional circumstances. 17 U.S.C.A. § 505. 468 Cases that cite this headnote West Headnotes (5) [4] Federal Civil Procedure [1] Copyrights and Intellectual Property Result; prevailing parties; “American Attorney fees rule” Prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants It is general rule that unless Congress provides must be treated alike for purposes of awarding otherwise, parties are to bear their own attorney fees under Copyright Act, with attorney's fees. attorney fees awarded to prevailing parties only as a matter of the court's discretion; 71 Cases that cite this headnote © 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 1 Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994) 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455, 62 USLW 4153, 1994 Copr.L.Dec. P 27,221... should be interpreted alike is overborne by factors relied [5] Copyrights and Intellectual Property upon in Christiansburg and the Civil Rights Act which Attorney fees are noticeably absent in the context of the Copyright Act. Nonexclusive factors court is to consider The legislative history of § 505 provides no support for in determining whether to award prevailing different treatment. In addition, the two Acts' goals and party attorney fees under Copyright Act objectives are not completely similar. The Civil Rights include frivolousness, motivation, objective Act provides incentives for the bringing of meritorious unreasonableness (both in factual and in legal lawsuits by impecunious “private attorney general” components of case) and need in particular plaintiffs who can ill afford to litigate their claims against circumstances to advance considerations of defendants with more resources. However, the Copyright compensation and deterrence. 17 U.S.C.A. § Act's primary objective is to encourage the production 505. of original literary, artistic, and musical expression for the public good; and plaintiffs, as well as defendants, 1188 Cases that cite this headnote can run the gamut from corporate behemoths to starving artists. Fantasy's argument that the dual approach to § 505 best serves the Copyright Act's policy of encouraging litigation of meritorious infringement claims expresses a one-sided view of the Copyright Act's purposes. Because * **1024 Syllabus copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the general *518 public through access to creative works, After petitioner Fogerty's successful defense of a copyright it is peculiarly important that the law's boundaries be infringement action filed against him by respondent demarcated as clearly as possible. Thus, a defendant Fantasy, Inc., the District Court denied his motion seeking to advance meritorious copyright defenses should for attorney's fees pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505, which be encouraged to litigate them to the same extent provides in relevant part that in such an action “the court that plaintiffs are encouraged to litigate meritorious may ... award a reasonable attorney's fee to the prevailing infringement claims. Fantasy also errs in urging that the party as part of the costs.” The Court of Appeals legislative history supports the dual standard based on the affirmed, declining to abandon its “dual” standard for principle of ratification. Neither the two studies submitted awarding § 505 fees—under which prevailing plaintiffs are to Congress while it considered revisions to the Act, nor generally awarded attorney's fees as a matter of course, the cases referred to in those studies, support the view while defendants must show that the original suit was that there was a settled construction in favor of the dual frivolous or brought in bad faith—in favor of the so- standard under the virtually identical provision in the 1909 called “evenhanded” approach, in which no distinction is Copyright Act. Pp. 1027–1033. made **1025 between prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants. (b) Also rejected is Fogerty's argument that § 505 enacted the “British Rule,” which allows for automatic recovery Held: Prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants must of attorney's fees by prevailing plaintiffs and defendants, be treated alike under § 505; attorney's fees are to be absent exceptional circumstances. The word “may” in § awarded to prevailing parties only as a matter of the 505 clearly connotes discretion in awarding such fees, court's discretion. Pp. 1027–1033. and an automatic award would pretermit the exercise of that discretion. In addition, since Congress legislates (a) Fantasy's arguments in favor of a dual standard against the strong background of the American Rule— are rejected. Section 505's language gives no hint that which requires parties to bear their own attorney's fees successful plaintiffs are to be treated differently than unless Congress provides otherwise—it would have surely successful defendants. Nor does this Court's decision in drawn more explicit statutory language and legislative Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 98 comment had it intended to adopt the British Rule in § 505. S.Ct. 694, 54 L.Ed.2d 648, which construed virtually While there is no precise rule or formula for making fee identical language from Title VII of the Civil Rights determinations under § 505, equitable discretion should be Act of 1964, support different treatment. The normal exercised “in light of the considerations [this Court] has indication that fee-shifting statutes with similar language © 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517 (1994) 114 S.Ct. 1023, 127 L.Ed.2d 455, 62 USLW 4153, 1994 Copr.L.Dec. P 27,221... identified.” Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 436–437, The copyright infringement claim went to trial and a jury 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1941, 76 L.Ed.2d 40. P. 1033. returned a verdict in favor of Fogerty. 984 F.2d 1524 (CA9 1993), reversed and remanded. After his successful defense of the action, Fogerty moved for reasonable attorney's fees pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § REHNQUIST, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, 505. The District Court denied the motion, finding that in which BLACKMUN, STEVENS, O'CONNOR, Fantasy's infringement suit was not brought frivolously or SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, and GINSBURG, JJ., in bad faith as required by Circuit precedent for an award joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the of attorney's fees to a successful defendant. 5 The Court judgment, post, p. 1033. of Appeals affirmed, 984 F.2d 1524 (CA9 1993), and declined to abandon the existing Ninth Circuit standard for awarding attorney's fees which treats successful Attorneys and Law Firms plaintiffs and successful defendants differently. Under Kenneth I. Sidle, Los Angeles, CA, for petitioner. that standard, commonly termed the “dual” standard, prevailing plaintiffs are generally awarded attorney's fees Lawrence S. Robbins, Washington, DC, for respondent. as a matter of course, while prevailing defendants must show that the original suit was frivolous *521 or brought Opinion in bad faith. 6 In contrast, **1027 some Courts of *519 Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion Appeals follow the so-called “evenhanded” approach in of the Court. which no distinction is made between prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants. 7 The Court of Appeals for The Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 505, provides in the Third Circuit, for example, has ruled that “we do relevant part that in any copyright infringement action not require bad faith, nor do we mandate an allowance “the court may ..