1962: Plans to Create Pretexts for War with

By Bill Vann, international editor, General Maxwell Taylor World Socialist Web Site. • He directed the UN forces and was the commanding general of the U.S. 8th Army in Korea (1953) n 1997, the Assassination Records • Chief of Staff, U.S. Army (1955-59) IReview Board, an agency created • Chair, (1962-64) by Congress to declassify docu- • U.S. Ambassador, S. Vietnam (1964-65) ments relating to the 1963 assassina- • Special Consultant to the President and tion of President John F. Kennedy, re- Chairman, Foreign Intelligence Advi- leased documents drafted by the Joint sory Board (1965–1969) Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for the Kennedy • As the key military advisor to President White House related to contingency Johnson, Taylor played a very pivotal planning for a U.S. invasion of Cuba. role in escalating the Vietnam War. What is extraordinary about these declassified Pentagon papers is General Taylor asked his staff to the rare glimpse they provide of the prepare a report on how “to plan and covert methods that the U.S. govern- ment has employed, and continues to incite a revolt in Cuba.” He wanted employ, to prepare military aggression plans drawn up for “engineering an around the world. incident as a cause for invasion.” The documents show how the Defense Department and the White in the wake of the failed 1961 Bay of to direct , asked House drafted detailed plans to stage a Pigs invasion, in which a 1,500-strong the JCS to review top secret plans for provocation to serve as the pretext for Cuban exile force had been organized creating a pretext to invade Cuba. a full-scale U.S. assault on Cuba. and trained by the CIA. In response to In March 1963, the new chair- The planning was carried out this fiasco, the Kennedy administra- man of the JCS, General Maxwell tion launched Operation Mongoose, Taylor, asked his staff to prepare a re- 1959: CIA Plots Soviet directed by the president’s brother, At- port on how “to plan and incite a re- torney General Robert Kennedy. This volt in Cuba.” Taylor wanted plans Arms Deal with Cuba covert operation was aimed at assassi- drawn up for “engineering an incident In a declassified telegram from the UK nating Castro and bringing down his as a cause for invasion.” ambassador in the U.S. to the British radical nationalist regime. Many of the documents deal Foreign Office, we learn of a plan by A memo dated April 1962, with scenarios, prepared by military CIA Director Allen Dulles to create a written by JCS chairman General intelligence, for just such engineered pretext for U.S. action against Cuba: , was addressed to pretexts. For the most part the media Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. has ignored this declassified material. e [Dulles] said he greatly hoped It stated that “the Cuban problem must To the extent that they have covered Hthat we would decide not to go be solved in the near future,” adding the story, they have treated the Penta- ahead with the Hunter [warplane] deal. that “military intervention by the U.S. gon’s plans for provocation as far- His main reason was that this might will be required to overthrow the fetched inventions of low-level intel- lead the to ask for Soviet or present communist regime.” ligence operatives. In reality, the docu- Soviet bloc arms.... It was, of course, a A CIA report drafted in the ments carried the endorsement of the fact that in the case of Guatemala it same month dealt with “probable re- Joint Chiefs of Staff and were certi- had been the shipment of Soviet arms actions to a U.S. military intervention fied by the military command as “suit- that brought opposition elements to- in Cuba.” It warned that the Castro able for planning purposes.” gether and created the occasion for regime had made extensive prepara- Among the proposals hatched what is done. The same might be true tions to resist any U.S. assault, and cau- more than 30 years ago were flights in the case of Cuba, and the presence, tioned that while some Cubans might over Cuban airspace to harass Cuban for instance, of MiGs would have a tre- welcome a U.S. intervention, “at least planes and ground control. Cuba’s mendous effect, not only in the U.S., as many more would regard it as de- downing of just such a flight served as but with other Latin-American coun- signed to reimpose upon the Cuban the pretext for Washington’s imposi- tries.... He hoped that any refusal by people the yoke of `Yankee imperial- tion of the Helms-Burton Act in 1996, us to supply arms would directly lead ism.’” Therefore, the CIA concluded, bringing sanctions against foreign to a Soviet bloc offer to supply. Then “a prolonged U.S. military occupation companies doing business in Cuba. he might be able to do something. of Cuba would probably be necessary” Source: “Pentagon documents detail following a successful invasion. Dur- Source: National Security Archives provocations against Cuba,” Decem- ing this period, Brig. Gen. Edward html/iwb12-8/cuba.htm> 16 Press for Conversion! Issue # 50 January 2003 Operation Northwoods – the Top Secret Documents eprinted below is a declassified pared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). R“Top Secret” memo called “Justi- The JCS delivered these documents to fication for U.S. Military Intervention the U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert in Cuba.” It was originally attached to McNamara on March 13, 1962. another “Top Secret” document (“Pre- The JCS “consist of the Chair- texts to Justify Military Intervention in man, the Vice Chairman, the Chief of Cuba,” see pages 18-19), that proposed Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval pretext incidents that the U.S. could Operations, the Chief of Staff of the create in order to justify invading Cuba. Air Force and the Commandant of the These plans revealed in docu- Marine Corps.... Responsibilities as ments were key components of Opera- members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff tion Northwoods. They were written take precedence over duties as the in response to a request from Colonel Chiefs of Military Services. The Chair- Edward Lansdale, Chief of the “Cuba man of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the Project.” Operation Northwoods was principal military adviser to the Presi- part of a covert U.S. destabilization/ dent, Secretary of Defense and the Na- Robert McNamara terrorist program known as Operation tional Security Council” (Defense • U.S. Air Force (1943-46) Mongoose (1961-1964). Technical Information Center, U.S. • Exec., Ford Motor Co. (1946-61) These documents were pre- Department of Defence). • Secretary of Defense (1961-68) • Pres., World Bank (1968-81) Justification for U.S. • has served on boards of Royal Dutch Petroleum, the Bank of Military Intervention in Cuba America, The Washington Post and Corning Inc. 1. Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of Operations, Cuba • member, Council on Foreign “Chief of Operations, Relations and the Trilateral Project, for General Craig, subject: Commission “Operation Mongoose,” dated 5 Cuba Project [Colonel , which requested brief Edward Lansdale]... but precise description of pretexts requested brief but which the Joint Chiefs of Staff con- sider would provide justification for precise description of U.S. military intervention in Cuba. pretexts which the 2. The projects listed in the enclosure Joint Chiefs of Staff hereto [“Pretexts to Justify Military Intervention in Cuba”] are for- consider would provide warded as a preliminary submission justification for U.S. suitable for planning purposes. military intervention 3. This plan, incorporating projects se- in Cuba.” lected from the attached sugges- tions, or from other sources, should be developed to focus all efforts on States in the apparent position of a specific ultimate objective which suffering defensible grievances from would provide adequate justification a rash and irresponsible government for U.S. military intervention. Such of Cuba and to develop an interna- a plan would enable a logical build- tional image of a Cuban threat to Colonel Edward Lansdale up of incidents to be combined with peace in the Western Hemisphere. • U.S. Air Force, World War II other seemingly unrelated events to 4. Time is an important factor in reso- • worked for the CIA and military camouflage the ultimate objective lution of the Cuban problem. There- intelligence and led “counter- and create the necessary impression fore, the plan should be so time- insurgency” operations in: of Cuban rashness and irresponsi- phased that projects would be oper- • Philippines (1950-54) bility on a large scale, directed at able within the next few months. • Vietnam (1954-68) other countries as well as the U.S. 5. It is recommended that primary re- • Cuba (1962) The plan would also properly inte- sponsibility for developing military • Nicaragua (1985) grate and time phase the courses of and paramilitary aspects of the plan • Honduras (1985) action to be pursued. The desired for both overt and covert military • depicted by Graham Greene in resultant from the execution of this operations be assigned the Joint his novel “The Quiet American” plan would be to place the United Chiefs of Staff. January 2003 Issue # 50 Press for Conversion! 17 Pretexts to Justify Military Intervention in Cuba

A “Remember the Maine” incident could be arranged .... We could blow up a U.S. ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba. Well coordinated incidents will be planned to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces. Guantanamo U.S. Naval Base he courses of action which follow are a preliminary 3. A “Remember the Maine” incident could be arranged in Tsubmission suitable only for planning purposes. several forms: Together with similar inputs from other agencies, (a) We could blow up a U.S. ship in Guantanamo Bay and they are intended to provide a point of departure for the blame Cuba. development of a single, integrated, time-phased plan. Such a plan would permit the evaluation of individual projects (b) We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere within the context of cumulative, correlated actions designed in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such inci- to lead inexorably to the objective of adequate justification dent in the vicinity of or Santiago as a spectacular for U.S. military intervention in Cuba. result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the 1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate provoca- intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that tion as the basis for U.S. military intervention in Cuba a the ship was under attack. cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary The nearness to Havana or actions... could be executed as an initial effort to provoke We could develop Santiago would add cred- Cuban reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to con- a Communist Cuban ibility especially to those vince the Cubans of imminent invasion would be empha- terror campaign in people that might have heard sized. Our military posture throughout execution of the plan the Miami area, the blast or seen the fire. will allow a rapid change from exercise to intervention if in other Florida Cuban response justifies. 4. We could develop a Com- cities and even munist Cuban terror cam- 2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned to in Washington. paign in the Miami area, in take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine ap- other Florida cities and even pearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces. Incidents in Washington. The terror campaign could be pointed at to establish a credible attack (not in chronological order): Cuban refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could (1) Start rumours (many). Use clandestine radio. sink a boatload of Cubans enroute to Florida (real or simu- lated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees (2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform “over the in the United States even to the extent of wounding in in- fence” to stage attack on U.S. base. stances to be widely publicized. Exploding a few plastic (3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents base. and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cu- (4) Start riots near the base main gate (friendly Cu- ban involvement also would be helpful in projecting the bans) idea of an irresponsible government. (5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires. 5. A “Cuban-based, Castro-supported” filibuster could be (6) Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage) simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the (7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base. vein of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Repub- Some damage to installations. lic). We know that Castro is backing subversive efforts clan- (8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea destinely against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, or vicinity of Guantanamo City. and Nicaragua at present and possible others. These efforts (9) Capture militia group which storms the base can be magnified and additional ones contrived for expo- (10) Sabotage ship in harbour; large fires – sure. For example, advantage can be taken of the sensitiv- ity of the Dominican Air Force to intrusions within their napthalene national air space. “Cuban” B-26 or C-46 type aircraft could (11) Sink ship near harbour entrance. Conduct fu- make cane-burning raids at night. Soviet Bloc incendiaries nerals for mock victims. could be found. This could be coupled with “Cuban” mes- 18 Press for Conversion! Issue # 50 January 2003 We could sink a boatload of Cubans sages to the Communist under- enroute to Florida (real or simulated).... tional distress frequency a “May ground in the Dominican Re- Day” message stating he is un- public and “Cuban” shipments We could foster attempts on lives of der attack by Cuban MIG air- of arms which could be found, Cuban refugees in the United States. craft. The transmission will be or intercepted, on the beach. interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will be triggered by radio signal. This will 6. Use of MIG type aircraft by U.S. pilots could provide allow ICAO [International Civil Aviation Organization] ra- additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on dio stations in the Western Hemisphere to tell the U.S. what surface shipping and destruction of U.S. military drone air- has happened to the aircraft instead of the U.S. trying to craft by MIG type planes would be useful as complemen- “sell” the incident. tary actions. An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the 9. It is possible to create an incident to make it appear that pilot of the transport were to announce such fact. The pri- Communist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft mary drawback to this suggestion appears to be the security over international waters in an unprovoked attack. risk inherent in obtaining or modify- (a) Approximately 4 or 5 F-101 air- ing an aircraft. However, reasonable Harassment of civil air, craft will be dispatched in trail from copies of the MIG could be produced attacks on surface Homestead AFB, Florida, to the vicin- from U.S. resources in about three shipping and destruction ity of Cuba. Their mission will be to months. of U.S. military drone reverse course and simulate fakir air- 7. Hijacking attempts against civil air aircraft by MIG type craft for an air defense exercise in and surface craft should appear to con- planes would be useful as southern Florida. These aircraft would tinue as harassing measures condoned complementary actions.... conduct variations of these flights at by the government of Cuba. Concur- frequent intervals. Crews would be rently, genuine defections of Cuban reasonable copies of the briefed to remain at least 12 miles off civil and military air and surface craft MIG could be produced the Cuban coast; however, they would should be encouraged. from U.S. resources be required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile actions were 8. It is possible to create an incident in... three months. taken by the Cuban MIGs. which will demonstrate convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down a char- (b) On one such flight, a pre-briefed pilot would fly tail- tered civil airliner enroute from the U.S. to , Gua- end Charley at considerable interval between aircraft. While temala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would be near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that he chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba. had been jumped by MIGs and was going down. No other The passengers could be a group of college students off on calls would be made. The pilot would then fly directly west a holiday or any grouping of persons with a common inter- at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an Eglin est to support chartering a non-scheduled flight. auxiliary. The aircraft would be met by the proper people, quickly stored and given a new tail number. The pilot who (a) An aircraft at Eglin AFB [Air Force Base] would be had performed the mission under an alias, would resume painted and numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil reg- his proper identity and return to his normal place of busi- istered aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organiza- ness. The pilot and aircraft would then have disappeared. tion in the Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be substituted for the actual aircraft and would be (c) At precisely the same time that the aircraft was pre- loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under care- sumably shot down, a submarine or small surface craft would fully prepared aliases. The actual registered aircraft would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etc., at approximately 15 be converted to a drone. to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots re- turning to Homestead would have a true story as far as they (b) Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual air- knew. Search ships and aircraft could be dispatched and craft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of parts of aircraft found. Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying aircraft will descend to minimum altitude and go directly Source: This declassified, “Top Secret” “Project into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements Northwoods” document by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff will have been made to evacuate the passengers and return was delivered to U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert the aircraft to its McNamara on original status. It is possible to It is possible to create an Mar. 13, 1962. The drone aircraft create an incident incident which will make it For images of the meanwhile will which will demonstrate appear that Communist originals, see the continue to fly the National Security filed flight plan. convincingly that a Cuban MIGs have destroyed Archive web site: When over Cuba Cuban aircraft has a USAF aircraft over January 2003 Issue # 50 Press for Conversion! 19