Fueling Political Violence: Police-Protester Interactions during 2019 Hong Kong Protests

Name: Edwin So Student ID: s2574322

Supervisor: Simon Willmetts Second Reader: Joery Matthys

Program: Crisis and Security Management Master Thesis Table of Contents I. Introduction ...... 2 II. Theoretical Framework ...... 7 A. Insight into Hong Kong’s History of Social Movements ...... 7 B. Literature Review ...... 10 1. Contentious Politics ...... 10 2. Social Movements and Their Features ...... 11 3. What is Political Violence and When is it Used ...... 13 4. The Use of Repression ...... 14 5. Protest Policing ...... 15 C. The Four Dimensions of Political Violence ...... 17 Historically Rooted Culture of Violence ...... 19 III. Research Design ...... 21 A. Case Selection ...... 21 B. Operationalization ...... 23 C. Data Collection ...... 25 IV. Results and Analysis ...... 30 A. June 9th: First Large Procession Against Extradition Bill ...... 30 B. June 12th: Second Reading of Extradition Amendment ...... 32 C. July 1st: Occupation of the Main Hall ...... 35 D. July 21st: Yuen Long MTR Attacks ...... 37 E. August 11th: Tear Gas in Kwai Fong Station ...... 39 F. November 17th – 30th: Siege of Polytechnic University ...... 42 G. Analysis ...... 45 VI. Conclusions ...... 51 A. Conclusion ...... 51 B. Further Research ...... 52 VII. Bibliography ...... 53 VIII. Appendix ...... 53

I. Introduction

When the Hong Kong Government introduced an amendment to extradition law in February of 2019, it could not have predicted the response that it would trigger. The proposed changes would allow for the extradition of suspects between Hong Kong and China.1 Many political elites, including prosecutors from the Department of Justice, had voiced their concerns on the matter on June 6th.2 On June 9th, an estimated million people had participated in a protest march against the extradition law.3 As the protests moved into the evening, scuffles between protests and Police occurred outside the Central Government Offices.4 Despite the public disapproval, the government decided to continue forward with the second reading of the amendment on June 12th.5 On the morning of the second reading, protesters had surrounded the building and refused to let legislative members in.6 While most protesters remained peaceful, a violent group had made efforts to breach the police lines.7 After the group had entered the building, the police responded with tear gas and rubber bullets in attempts to disperse the entire crowd.8 With the indiscriminate use of force on all sections of the protests, this event would mark the beginning of a political crisis within Hong Kong.

Protests have been common in Hong Kong’s history dating back to the 1970s however, the use of violence during protests has not occurred until the 2014 Umbrella Movement.9 Hong Kong’s democracy movement began in the 1980s, while it was still under British colonial rule and continued after being returned to Chinese sovereignty.10 The handover would mark an increase in the amount of social movements although these would be exhausted quickly. Besides the 2019 events, a recent social movement foreshadowed the potential for escalation to occur. The Occupy

1 Martin Purbrick, “A Report of the 2019 Hong Kong Protests,” Asian Affairs 50, no. 4 (August 8, 2019): 466. 2 Ibid., 468 3 Jin Wu, Rebecca Lai, and Alan Yuhas, “116 Days of Hong Kong Protests. How Did We Get Here?,” The New York Times, October 1, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/world/asia/hong-kong-protests-arc.html. 4 Martin Pubrick, “A Report,” 468. 5 Ibid. 6 Ibid., 469-70. 7 Ibid. 8 Jin Wu, Rebecca Lai, and Alan Yuhas, “116 Days”. 9 Yongshun Cai, “Protesters and Tactical Escalation,” in The Umbrella Movement: Civil Resistance and Contentious Space in Hong Kong, ed. Edmund Cheng (Amsterdam University Press, 2019), 222. 10 Benny Yiu-ting Tai, “Stages of Hong Kong’s Democratic Movement,” Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 4, no. 4 (December 10, 2018): 352. Central with Love and Peace (OCLP) movement in 2014, later to known as the Umbrella Movement, would mark a dramatic shift in political culture within the country.11 The Umbrella Movement was a planned occupation of vital areas in Hong Kong if the city was not granted universal suffrage in electing the Chief Executive, the head position of the government.12 The initial plan for the movement was to maintain a peaceful campaign of civil disobedience.13 However, as a student-lead occupation of the Government Headquarters had unexpectedly spilt onto the main streets, police attempted to disperse the crowd through the use of tear gas.14 This would trigger a 79-day occupation of key locations throughout Hong Kong.15 In attempts to clear these occupation sites, protesters and police regularly scuffled.16 A trend towards violence had grown within the movement and in attempts to stop this, organizers of the OCLP turned themselves in.17 Although the demands of the movement would not be facilitated by the government, civil disobedience had become an accepted tool for social movements to use.18

The events in Hong Kong have highlighted the potential for radicalization to emerge through the dynamics between the police force and their interactions with protesters.19 Experiences gained during the Umbrella Movement had influenced the actions available to the 2019 protests. As social movements rely on unconventional means of actions that break regular routines and challenge the government, tensions are inevitably created.20 Governments are tasked with responding to the claims of protesters through a wide range of actions.21 They can choose to repress or facilitate the claims of the movement. The actions of the police forces during the 2019 Protests were heavily criticized by both citizens and external watchdogs, with demands of an investigation on their strategies.22 The use of indiscriminately force on protesters during the June

11 Ibid., 361. 12 Ibid., 359. 13 Ibid., 361. 14 Ibid. 15 Ngok Ma, “From Political Acquiescence to Civil Disobedience: Hong Kong’s Road to Occupation,” in The Umbrella Movement: Civil Resistance and Contentious Space in Hong Kong, ed. Ngok Ma and Edmund Cheng (Amsterdam University Press, 2019), 44. 16 Benny Yiu-ting Tai, “Stages of Hong Kong’s Democratic Movement”, 362. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid., 363. 19 Lorenzo Bosi and Stefan Malthaner, “Political Violence,” ed. Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements, 2015, 441. 20 Donatella Della Porta, Clandestine Political Violence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 14. 21 Ibid. 22 Martin Purbrick, “A Report of the 2019 Hong Kong Protests,” 470. 12th demonstration had shocked many citizens.23 On June 21st, in response, protesters sieged the Police Headquarters, assaulted many police officers and vandalized the exterior of the compound.24 Conflict between the two sides continue months after this event, with the frequency of violence increasing as little was done to calm the movement. Tensions between the government and its citizens were palpable.

Studying the cause for the escalation is necessary to improve strategies of diffusing social movements while understanding how social movements respond to certain actions. The focus of this thesis is: To what extent have the interactions between the Hong Kong police force and protesters led to the escalation to political violence during the 2019 Hong Kong Protests? As the police represent a form of government reaction to a social movement, their actions can directly influence a social movement and the actions they take towards a government.25 The Hong Kong Police Force has developed a positive public perception in their role in society before the Umbrella Movement.26 Signs of discontent towards protest policing were publicly voiced after police had used tear gas to disperse the crowd during the Umbrella Movement.27 In 2019, violent police-protester interactions became a frequent occurrence that saw large criticism towards the manner police handled protest events. Citizens and the media have emphasized police-protester interactions as the central factor of radicalization of the protests, despite research suggesting that many factors influence it. This research question seeks to explain whether these interactions between police and protesters caused the escalation or if there are other contributing factors.

Early research on social movements was focused on the increased activity found in Europe and the United States. The subsequent theoretical knowledge is focused on conditions found in these cities which might not translate to other countries. By applying this literature to the Hong Kong case, current understanding will be tested in a contextually different environment which can diversify theoretical knowledge. The Hong Kong Police Force may play a different role in protest policing as a result of these different political, historical and cultural environments. This may lead to different outcomes then expected due to these slight regional differences.

23 Ibid. 470 24 Ibid., 471. 25 Donatella della Porta, “The Policing of Protest,” African Studies 56, no. 1 (January 1997): 106. 26 Adrojan and Lee 524 27 Ibid., Furthermore, a focus into police-protester interactions can suggest the importance certain relationships have when attempting to control a social movement. Although indicators for political violence have been identified by scholars, they are not weighed against one another. This will test the overall role in which protest policing has on the emergence of political violence.

Hong Kong remains a unique space which it falls under Chinese sovereignty and influence, and yet retains the administrative and judicial systems negotiated by the British in 1997.28 The unique political situation of Hong Kong allows for overt forms of contention despite the government having to balance China’s expectations.29 Hong Kong citizens are hesitant to concede the way of life that they have established under this political system and use the space to voice displeasure towards China’s involvement in Hong Kong affairs.30 The continued use of violent forms of collective action suggests that there are inefficiencies in the current police strategies. Through the understanding of the response’s protesters had to certain police action, information can be gathered on improving the efficiency of protest policing strategies. Although reactions may differ around the world, this provides a baseline for further innovation in police- protester relationships.

After this introduction, the thesis will proceed as follows. The second chapter is divided into three subchapters. First, the Hong Kong Case will introduce a brief history into social movements in the city, with a specific focus on developments due to the 2014 Umbrella Movement. Second, a literature review will be conducted and separated into five sections that explain the features of social movement, the use of repression and the police as a form of repression. These subsections outline existing knowledge on features of contentious politics, cycles of social movements and available actions, emergence of political violence, the use of repression and use of police as a form of repression. The last chapter will explain the theoretical framework developed by Post, Ruby and Shaw that will be used to identify indicators associated with increasing the likelihood for political violence.

28 Charles Tilly, Regimes and Repertoires (University Of Chicago Press, 2006), 151-52. 29 Ibid. 30 The third chapter explains the methodology and choices made in the thesis. Specifics of the research design, including case selection and data collection, will be found in this chapter. It will also explain the limitations of the selected methodology and biases that arise from the choices. The fourth chapter will focus on the analysis and assessment of the empirical data collected through media analysis. The final chapter will summarize the findings of this thesis and provide an answer to the proposed research question.

II. Theoretical Framework

To answer whether the interactions between the Hong Kong police force and protesters led to escalated violence during the 2019 protests, this thesis will attempt to understand when interactions between police and the social movement can create violence. First, the history of social movements in Hong Kong will be introduced. The concepts of social movements and contentious politics will be defined before exploring the features of social movements. Next, the reasons political violence can emerge will be explained. How governments choose to respond to a social movement also has severe impacts on the direction a social movement may trend towards. A common form of coercion or repression that a government may use is the police force.31 However, the misuse of the police force can backfire given the right conditions and situations.32 The extent to which a certain aspect of social movement influences escalation must be compared to a wide range of other potential factors. This thesis will utilize Post, Ruby and Shaw’s multidimensional approach towards explaining political violence in social movements through the examination of features such as the historical roots, organizational features, regimes, and current environment of protest.33

A. Insight into Hong Kong’s History of Social Movements

Contention does not operate in isolation and requires time and space to develop. Although Hong Kong has witnessed protests since the 1970s, protestors rarely broke into violence or utilized disruptive tactics.34 Political participation through mass marches and demonstrations had become popular since Hong Kong returned to Chinese sovereignty in 1997. Involvement of a more vocal youth in contentious politics evolved the tactics and repertoires of social movements throughout Hong Kong. Before the Umbrella Movement, the population had been more concerned about

31 Jennifer Earl, Sarah A. Soule, and John D. McCarthy, “Protest under Fire? Explaining the Policing of Protest,” American Sociological Review 68, no. 4 (August 2003): 585. 32 Donatella Della Porta, Clandestine Political Violence, 38. 33 Jerrold M. Post, Keven G. Ruby, and Eric D. Shaw, “The Radical Group in Context: 1. An Integrated Framework for the Analysis of Group Risk for Terrorism,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 25, no. 2 (April 2002): 73. 34 Francis Lee, “Solidarity in the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement in Hong Kong,” Critical Asian Studies 52, no. 1 (December 15, 2019): 20. social stability and familial interests that would increase their chances for monetary success.35 A sojourner mindset was firmly established in Hong Kong and citizens did not complain about governance as long as it worked “normally” by providing opportunities to earn money and better their lives.36 However, before the handover of Hong Kong back to the Chinese in 1997, the British had begun a process of democratization in the city.37 The “One Country, Two Systems” policy in Hong Kong, negotiated during the handover of Hong Kong allows Hong Kong to maintain its own economic and administrative systems while under Chinese sovereignty. This retained many of the civil liberties that Hong Kong would become used to. After China had promised that the fifth Chief Executive of Hong Kong would be elected by universal suffrage, an organization known as the Occupy Central with Love and Peace had planned the occupation of the main streets of Central District if promises were not kept.38

In general, citizens were not accepting of the idea of civil disobedience before 2014.39 Organizers of the OCLP understood that a nonviolent campaign of civil obedience was necessary to ease citizens into receiving these performances. However, the original plans of the movement were discarded after students had managed to gain access to the Government Headquarters Office during the night of 27th of September 2014.40 When supporters of the OCLP joined the student movement, the unexpected number of participants had led protesters spill onto the main streets. In an attempt to disperse the crowd, police used 87 canisters of tear gas on the peaceful protesters.41 This event triggered a massive mobilization of people who wanted to vent their frustrations with how the police handled the dispersion of the crowd. Although the OCLP was the central organization before, the new influx of participants was unreceptive to the student or OCLP leadership.42 In response the occupations, the government allowed police to utilize coercive tactics.43 The Hong Kong government also adopted a strategy in which they waited for the movement to die out by itself as the social inconvenience caused would led citizens and

35 Benny Yiu-ting Tai, “Stages of Hong Kong’s Democratic Movement”, 355. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid., 357. 38 Ibid., 359. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid., 362. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 Yongshun Cai, “Protesters and Tactical Escalation,” 230. companies to no longer tolerate it.44 As exhaustion began to set, students and more radical groups of the social movement attempted to besiege the Government Headquarters and clashed with police. Although the social movement failed in achieving its demands, a shift in political culture ensued as more disruptive tactics placed pressure on the government.45

Protest organizers in both the Umbrella Movement and 2019 protests committed to the use of nonviolent tactics in attempts to increase legitimacy and participation in the campaign.46 Nonviolent campaigns were more successful in reaching their political goals, with 53% doing so, compared to the 26% of instances in violent resistance.47 However, the change in political culture in Hong Kong had seen violent action justified when police used excessive force on protesters.48 The environment enabled more radical forms of action as public acceptance for these actions had increased since 2014. Along with the polices use of tear gas and indiscriminate force when controlling the crowd protesting outside the Government Headquarters on June 12th, protesters had been given justification to reciprocate the force they were met with. This attempt at social control had backfired and saw citizens of Hong Kong demanding an investigation into the incident.49 Although there was a small group of militant demonstrators that vandalized the Government Headquarter buildings, the indiscriminate use of force had raised concerns of excessive force being used on protesters.50 There would be numerous allegations of excessive force during future protests such as July 14th and August 31st.51 Along with the lack of action when protesters were attacked on the subway in Yuen Long on July 21st, the dynamics between protesters and police have dramatically changed. With media presence and smart phones, interactions between police and protesters during an event are highly visible. The increased exposure had led citizens to criticize police action as the cause for the violent clashes.

44 Benny Yiu-ting Tai, “Stages of Hong Kong’s Democratic Movement”, 360. 45 Yongshun Cai, “Protesters and Tactical Escalation,” 228. 46 Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, “Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict,” International Security 33, no. 1 (July 2008): 9. 47 Ibid., 8. 48 Daniel Shek 12 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. B. Literature Review 1. Contentious Politics

Contentious politics describes/refers to episodic and public interactions of claim-making, through collective action, in which the government is involved.52 The involvement of politics affects the way contention occurs. As the state holds a monopoly over coercive means, such as the police force, it gives them an advantage over the claimants.53 States also govern the rules and spaces in which contention can occur in. This provides a political opportunity in which collective action can be facilitated or inhibited based on the features of contentious politics. Under the Public Order Ordinance (Cap.245) in Hong Kong, groups who intend to hold a public meeting of more than 50 people or public procession of more than 30 people must notify the Commissioner of Police.54

Contentious politics can vary greatly in the issues, claims, actors, interactions, and outcomes depending on the context in which it arises from. Despite the variations of features of contentious politics, there are similarities in the performances and repertoires based on the context of contention.55 A performance can be described as the act of collective claim making on another set of actors.56 There are a variety of forms of action that actors can take to bring attention to their claims.57 The most common performance in modern contentious politics are demonstrations, a passage through a public space on behalf of a claim.58

Contentious repertoires are the known and available performances and tools that claimants can use in the pursuit of shared interests.59 Repertoires not only involve the forms of action but also their previous history and the expectations from others.60 As a result, these repertoires can

52 Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, Contentious Politics (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015), 8. 53 Ibid. 9. 54 Hong Kong Government, “How to Give Notice of Public Meetings or Processions in Hong Kong,” GovHK, accessed May 2020, www.gov.hk/en/residents/government/rights/givenotice/givenotice.htm. 55 Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, “Contentious Politics and Social Movements,” in Oxford Handbooks Online, ed. Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes (Oxford University Press, 2009), 441. 56 Ibid. 57 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement : Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 3rd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 98. 58 Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, “Contentious Politics and Social Movements,” 441. 59 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement : Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 98. 60 Ibid. change and are influenced by previous encounters.61 During an episode of contention, there are three categories of collective action or repertoires that are available to a group. Violent actions are easy to initiate and can be carried out by small groups with minimal resources that are willing to risk repression.62 Contained actions build on expected routines but lack excitement.63 Disruptive tactics often break up routines and is the source of innovation in repertoires yet can easily lead towards violence or become institutionalized.64

2. Social Movements and Their Features

Social movements are a form of contentious politics that are defined as sustained campaigns of organized and public collective claim-making that involve the state.65 The group interacts with the state or regime in hopes of enacting social change or raising awareness of injustice within society.66 Social movements and other forms of contention do not disappear but instead exhibit cyclical behaviours.67 After a period of heightened conflict within the social system, there is a diffusion of collective action from the group of initiators to groups that were once unrelated.68 This is the beginning of mobilization and where new opponents; potential alliances and institutional settings shape the progress of the social movement.69 It is also the phase in which innovation in performances occurs.70 Although these performances are exciting at first, they require high levels of commitment from participants and organizers.71 A decline in participation occurs, although this decline does not occur at an equal pace and results in a shift in balance between moderates and radicals within the movement.72 This provides the conditions for radicalization: the shift in ideology towards the extreme and the adoption of violent repertoires of

61 Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, “Contentious Politics and Social Movements,” 441. 62 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 199. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, “Contentious Politics and Social Movements,” 442-3 66 Ibid. 67 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 201. 68 Ibid., 205. 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid., 199. 71 Ibid., 206. 72 Ibid. action.73 Institutionalization is the shift away from extreme ideology and the adoption of contained forms of action. Despite being opposing processes, they can occur simultaneously as social movements are rarely unified under the leadership of a single organization.

Social movements utilize a mixture of unconventional and conventional performances in attempts to push their opponents towards conceding to their demands.74 As part of the diffusion stage, the use of disruptive tactics helps increase excitement and pushes the mobilization of new participants. However, disruptive tactics are perceived as unstable as they can easily harden into violence or become routinized.75 Disruption provides uncertainty that can be used as leverage against the authority, yet they are often uncommon and unsustainable.76 Innovation in disruptive forms of action require a high level of commitment from participants especially when met with police and a stable regime.77 Stereotyped performances, such as mass gatherings and solidarity marches, lose effectiveness the more frequently they are used.78 To avoid the exhaustion of contentious actions, innovation is necessary to ensure continued participation and to find new methods for claim-making.79 Innovative repertoires often put pressure on the authoritative party as they scramble to find an appropriate response to these new actions. Over time, these innovations will become conventionalized as authorities develop new strategies to cope with the disruption.

Hong Kong has witnessed this cycle in its history of social movements, as once innovative performances became normalized. Due to the dissatisfaction for Hong Kong’s first Chief Executive, along with the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome epidemic, a large-scale procession and demonstration was planned on July 1st.80

73 Ibid. 74 Paul Almeida, Social Movement: The Structure of Collective Mobilization (California: University of California Press, 2019), 6. 75 Donatella Della Porta, Clandestine Political Violence, 99. 76 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 103. 77 Ibid. 78 Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly, Dynamics of Contention (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2001), 138. 79 Ibid. 80 Ngok Ma, “From Political Acquiescence to Civil Disobedience,” 32. 3. What is Political Violence and When is it Used

Walter Benjamin and Giorgio Agamben proposed that violence constantly looms over politics and power.81 Political violence can be defined as collective action that involves the use of physical force towards an opponent to achieve a political objective.82 This form of action can be used by both the state, state sponsored actors and non-state actors as well.83 Decisions to use violence are shaped by the actors' goals and identity but also in response to the changing environment and actions of their opponents or allies.84 However, violence is not adopted overnight. From a relational perspective, encounters between social movements and authorities cause reciprocal adjustments. Consistent clashes between police and political adversaries heightens radicalism and justifies the use of violent forms of action.85 Cultural processes such as the emotional realm of contention also contribute to the likelihood of violence emerging. Especially since political violence can be seen as a symbolic gesture, its emotional intensity along with the narratives created can cause violence.86 The emergent characteristic of violence emphasize that not only do motivations change through action, but cleavages, identities and interests are affected during the struggle.87 These assumptions on the contextual, organizational and interpersonal perspectives (micro, meso and macro levels) on when political violence may be chosen.

According to Charles Tilly, collective violence can be separated into six categories. Brawls are attacks between individuals in groups that were part of a previously nonviolent gathering which require little coordination. Opportunism explains individuals who are shielded from social control use damaging means to pursue otherwise illegal ends such as looting during a natural disaster. Scattered attacks describe when participants engage in damaging acts during the course of nonviolent interactions. Broken negotiations are less likely to result in violence but can when one escalates the conflict through the threat of violence. Coordinated destruction describe when

81 Jeffrey Stevenson Murer, “Political Violence,” in The Oxford Handbook of U.S. National Security, ed. Derek S. Reveron, Nikolas K. Gvosdev, and John A. Cloud (Oxford University Press, 2018), 493. 82 Donatella Della Porta, Clandestine Political Violence, 6. 83 Lorenzo Bosi and Stefan Malthaner, “Political Violence,” ed. Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani, The Oxford Handbook of Social Movements, 2015, 440. 84 Ibid., 441. 85 Ibid., 19. 86 Ibid., 20. 87 Ibid., 21. individuals or organizations deliberately damage others such as terrorism and war. Violent rituals are the most certain to result in violence as they are a known script of violence used by organizers to compete for priority.88 These definitions allow for an easier identification of violent actions during the 2019 Hong Kong protest.

4. The Use of Repression

“When a government is vulnerable or receptive to challenges, disruption works, however when they are not, disruption invites repression.”89 Innovations in tactics can also create tension as the government attempts to react to these new performances.90 If a government perceives disruptive tactics as a threat, they will respond in a manner that maintains control and the status quo.91 They do not often sit idly by as these groups act and perform their versions of contention, although some regimes will attempt to wait for exhaustion to occur.92 Instead, the government can choose strategies that either repress, facilitate or a combination of the two. However, due to the high costs associated with accommodating the movements demands, governments are less likely to offer concessions. Governments resort to repression when faced with increased dissent activities, with unique disruptive performances and when abnormal interactions occur.93 Severe repression should also be expected the larger the perceived threat is to the government.94

Repressive tactics are often distinguished by two characteristics: the visibility of repression (covert or overt), and the kind of force used (coercive or channelling).95 Despite the differences between the types of repression, their goals remain the same. Repression increases the cost of protest by discouraging potential participants and making mobilization difficult for the

88 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 106-7. 89 Marco Guigni, “How Social Movements Matter: Past Research, Present Problems, Future Developments,” in How Social Movements Matter, ed. Marco Guigni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly (University Of Minnesota Press, 1999), xviii. 90 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 101. 91 Jacqueline H. R. deMeritt, “The Strategic Use of State Repression and Political Violence,” Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, October 26, 2016. 92 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 103. 93 Sabine C. Carey, “The Use of Repression as a Response to Domestic Dissent,” Political Studies 58, no. 1 (February 2010), 168. 94 Jennifer Earl, Sarah A. Soule, and John D. McCarthy, “Protest under Fire?,” 583. 95 Jennifer Earl, “Repression and Social Movements,” The Wiley-Blackwell Encyclopedia of Social and Political Movements, January 14, 2013; 1. movement.96 One of the most common methods of repression is increased policing or protest policing.97 With the police being tasked with maintaining law and order, it is often placed between protesters and their political aims. The constant interactions between the two parties highlight the cyclical behaviour of contention, as the adaptations from these experiences are reciprocal to one another.98 The process of re-stabilization is not easy for governments.99 There are serious consequences to using repression. Protests and repression are interrelated strategic decisions by the government and opposition.100 Although governments seek to maintain the status quo, evidence has suggested mix results in the effectiveness of repression on dissent.101 When repression is successful, it can halt the mobilization of social movements along with increasing costs for future action.102 It can also backfire, in which social movements can escalate towards violence and public outrage.103

5. Protest Policing

Political violence in social movements often arise as a result of inter-group competition from within or during struggles with the police.104 Della Porta has stated that policing of protests are a central factor in the radicalization of protests.105 The police are able to employ many strategies in response to social movements. There are three approaches in explaining the variety of police action in tackling? social movements. The threat approach states that police repression increases as the threat to political elites increases.106 The weakness approach suggests that governments will only repress movements that they assume will fail under pressure.107 Weakness can be defined as the inability of protest participants to react to repressive forces. It can also describe

96 Jacqueline H. R. deMerritt, “The Strategic Use of Repression”. 97 Jennifer Earl, “Repression and Social Movements,” 2. 98 Donatella Della Porta, Clandestine Political Violence, 68. 99 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 209. 100 Abby Peterson and Mattias Wahlström, “Repression,” in Oxford Handbooks Online, ed. Donatella Della Porta and Mario Diani (Oxford University Press, 2014), 644. 101 Ibid. 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid. 104 Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, “Contentious Politics and Social Movements,” 452. 105 Donatella Della Porta, Clandestine Political Violence, 36. 106 Jennifer Earl, Sarah A. Soule, and John D. McCarthy, “Protest under Fire?,” 583. 107 Ibid. external audiences’ willingness to monitor and react to repression as protesters are not protected by the media.108 Thirdly, internal police characteristics such as their capacity and resources can determine the level of repression that is possible.109 The variety of actions available to the police can be further categorized as coercive, persuasive and information strategies.110 Coercive strategies refer to the use of coercive force or arms in order to control or disperse a crowd.111 Persuasive strategies are attempts to control protests through contact with organizers and activists.112 Finally, information strategies are covert measures of information gathering in attempts to identify those who break the law or as a preventative element.113

Protest policing represents one of the most common forms of repression that is available to a government.114 Not only do police interact directly with protesters, they also represent the larger system of repression and systems of social control that a government is implementing.115 While the police are sensitive to the demands of the government, they are also subjected to public opinion.116 Once police are present at an event, they cannot simply ignore acts that threaten their ability to control the space.117 Applying the weakness approach, police will target weaker protesters although the amount of force will be capped as not to increase attention of the media and public.118 However, police are also placed in a difficult situation in which psychological conditions breakdown self-control.119 Certain coercive strategies require officers to act aggressively while anonymous due to protective gear.120 Along with the justification that these actions are for upholding the law, aggression and violence are a circumstance of the situation.121 It becomes difficult for police to restraint themselves in these situations and the reciprocal adjustments that occur in these interactions can lead to escalation from both sides. Even if police forces may have developed techniques for controlling mass crowds, they may still be ill prepared

108 Ibid., 584. 109 Ibid. 110 Ibid. 111 Ibid 112 Ibid 113 Ibid. 114 Ibid., 585. 115 Ibid. 116 Donatella Della Porta, Clandestine Political Violence, 122. 117 Jennifer Earl, Sarah A. Soule, and John D. McCarthy, “Protest under Fire?,” 586. 118 Ibid. 119 Donatella Della Porta, Clandestine Political Violence, 125. 120 Ibid. 121 Ibid. for isolated and small groups within larger ones.122 Ultimately, the dynamics of the environment severely influence the responses of the police, especially when coercion is planned.

C. The Four Dimensions of Political Violence

With the plethora of factors influencing the chances of escalation in tactics, a concise framework to incorporate the historical, cultural and contextual features, organizational structure, actors involved and triggering event is necessary. The dynamics and processes of contention vary greatly through space and time, an analysis of an episode of contention should not only involve the current event but also a retrospective overview. Increased frequency in political violence during an episode suggests a deep-rooted issue or frustration emanating from society. Analyzing an event such as the 2019 Hong Kong Protest requires a framework that allows for an expansive exploration into the mechanisms leading to political violence. This thesis will utilize the framework developed by Post, Ruby and Shaw (PRS). The PRS framework conceptualizes the process of radicalization through four dimensions: historical, cultural and contextual features, key actors affecting the group, group characteristics and processes and the triggering events.123 Each of these dimensions has individual indicators that provide an overall picture of variables that access a groups risk of political violence. By assessing multiple variables that may present in the Hong Kong protests, the influence that police-protester interactions had on the use of violent collective action can be measured.

The first dimension of the PRS framework involves the historical, cultural and contextual features that influence a group towards violence.124 The environment in which a social movement develops from can be conducive to radicalization. Historical acceptance of violence as a legitimate means to voice discontent in a region increases the chance for future groups to use similar tactics. Current conflict between domestic groups, whether it is religious, ethnic or socioeconomic, should also be taken into account. Lastly, political, economic and social

122 Ibid., 126. 123 Ibid., 77-78. 124 Ibid., 78. instability of a region can provide reason to use violence as the regimes are viewed as weak and unable to handle these issue areas.

The second dimension focuses on the social movements relationship with other actors involved such as the government, opponents, supporters and competitors.125 While the government may be the main opponent in contentious politics, other opponents can originate from alternate sources.126 These opponents are often aligned with the government, whether they are tolerated or allied. The identity of a group along with their sympathizers or foreign support groups can influence the direction the social movement takes.127 It should be noted that these supporters can either deter or encourage radical behaviour depending on their influence over the movement. Additionally, the presence of other radical groups that are competing for similar benefits or goals can increase the chance of violence being used.128

According to the Post et al. article, the third dimension highlights the groups characteristics, processes and structures that increase the risk for political violence and is considered the ultimate indicator on a group’s progression towards violence.129 The ideology and goals of a group, as defined by their leaders, can indicate the level of risk associated with a group. Members with prior experience in violent campaigns can be used to predict future violence. These individuals can share their expertise or influence the recruitment of more radical members. As the personality of leadership shapes the group, exhibiting signs of narcissism, paranoia and sociopathy are common indicators for the risk of violence. Authoritarian or charismatic leadership styles can have a profound effect on the risk of violence as the group may be more willing to follow the orders of their leader. Organizational decision-making variables such as absence in central authority, factionalization and split decision-making can be conducive to violence. Processes such as recruitment, screening and selection, socialization, training and attrition can introduce radical elements into the social movement as militant member increase due to these processes. Groupthink and polarization can also leave groups vulnerable to decision- making that directs groups towards radicalization. Ideological, financial and material support a

125 Ibid., 81. 126 Ibid. 127 Ibid. 128 Ibid., 83-84. 129 Ibid., 84. group can alter their direction as they receive weapons or change their initial ideology. Political violence becomes a legitimate option when there is a perceived threat, making it a crucial indicator for prediction.130

The final dimension focuses on the immediate events that challenge a social movement and their reaction to it.131 As a contrast to the long-term indicators in the previous dimensions, this dimension looks at singular events or a series of events in close succession that cause a group to use violence. These events include attacks, arrests or assassination of members, fraudulent voting results or anniversaries commemorating violent events. In Hong Kong, the use of tear gas to disperse a peaceful crowd in 2014 can be identified as the triggering event for the mobilization of more supporters.

Table 1: Summary of Dimensions and Indicators

Indicators Indicator-Specific Categories

Historical, Cultural and Historically Rooted Culture of Contextual Features Violence Current Communal Conflict Political, Economic and Social Instability Key Actors Affecting the Opponents Regime Group Other Opponents Constituents and Supporters Competitors Group Characteristics, Group Ideology and Goals Processes and Structures Groups Experience with Violence Leadership Personality Narcissistic Personality Characteristics Paranoid Personality Sociopathic Personality Malignant Narcissism Leadership Style and Charismatic Leader-Follower Organizational Decision Making Relationship Authoritarian/Totalitarian Leadership and Strong Central Organizational Decision Making

130 Ibid., 96. 131 Ibid., 97-98. Communities of Belief

Factionalization and Split

Open vs Closed Group

Organizational Processes Recruitment Screening and Selection Socialization Training Assignment and Promotion Attrition Groupthink and Polarization Group Psychological Progression Humiliation and need for towards Terrorism Revenge Sense of Threat Negative Characterization of the Target Group Type of Support Behavioral Indicators of Assessment that the Benefits of Movement toward Terrorism Terrorism Outweigh the Risks Formation of Fighting Units Negative Actions toward Target Group Final Preparations for Violence and Terrorism Immediate Situation Triggering Events

III. Research Design

The choices behind the research design of this thesis will be explained and justified in this chapter. First, the selection of specific incidents and the rationale behind these choices will be explained. Follow this, the research question will be dissected so that the key concepts become measurable. Once these variables are operationalized, the method of collecting data on these variables will be explained, along with the limitations and biases presented.

A. Case Selection

The 2019 Hong Kong Protests has yet to conclude. Nonetheless, there have been numerous incidents that can be used in the study of the extent police-protesters interactions have caused the increase of violent tactics. In order to narrow the scope of the study, this thesis will focus on seven incidents that occurred throughout 2019. The Independent Police Complaint Commission (IPCC) released a report that selected six specific incident dates due to the number of complaints surrounding them along with public concern expressed over these incidents.132 Although these incidents may be connected to one another, they represent an events that are resolved over a single day. Including the siege of Hong Kong Polytechnic University allows for an analysis of how interactions between police and protesters develop and evolve over multiple days.

June 9th is the first date in question, as a protest march from Victoria Park to the Government Building deteriorated into violence as protesters clashed with police in the evening.133 As the first large scale procession against the Extradition Bill, estimates of 240,000 to 1 million people participated.134 However, the majority of clashes occurred after the procession had concluded, when protesters refused to disperse. 23 total complaints were lodged by both civilians and reporters who cited the use of batons against them.135

132 Independent Police Complaints Council, “A Thematic Study by the IPCC,” Independent Police Complaints Council (Hong Kong: Independent Police Complaints Council, May 2020), ipcc.gov.hk/em/public_communications/ipcc_thematic_study_report. 133 Martin Pubrick, “A Report,” 468. 134 Ibid. 135 Independent Police Complaints Council, “A Thematic Study by the IPCC.” The second date selected is June 12th, as the continuation of the second reading of the amendment had caused protesters to surround the Government Headquarters.136 A few hundred protesters made violent efforts in attempting to break into the building and eventually gained access. This causecauses the police to respond by attempting to clear the entire crowd, including those that had remained nonviolent. A total of 60 complaints were filed with 37 claiming the use of excessive force by the police.

The third date in question is July 1st, as protesters had yet again gained access into the Government Headquarters and began to vandalize the interior.137 July 1st also marks the yearly celebration for the handover of Hong Kong and a subsequent counter rally held by the Civil Human Rights Front.138 Although complaints were few, the manner in which the situation unfolded was scrutinized by citizens.

On July 21st, protesters returning from the event were attacked by suspected triad members in the Yuen Long MTR station.139 Despite hundreds of emergency calls made to the police, they did not arrive at the scene until much later. Once the police arrived, the attackers that remained were questioned but no arrests were made. The approach taken by the police had led citizens to suspect that they were in collusion with triad members. Previous public perceptions and trust of police had plummeted even further due to these allegations.140

In the fifth case, police conduct during clashes that occurred in the subway stations in Hong Kong had been brought to attention. On August 11th, the use of rubber bullets and tear gas in the confined space of Kwai Fong station had led to many complaints about endangering protesters. The actions had sparked more protest activities such as a series of sit-ins at the international airport.

The final incident that will be examined is the siege of Hong Kong Polytechnic University as it represents an intense period of conflict. Starting on November 17th, protesters had set-up roadblocks around the main roads, one of which is the entrance to the Cross-Harbour Tunnel.

136 Martin Pubrick, “A Report,” 469. 137 Ibid. 138 Ibid. 139 Ibid., 473. 140Daniel Shek, “Protests in Hong Kong (2019–2020): A Perspective Based on Quality of Life and Well- Being,” Applied Research in Quality of Life, March 13, 2020, 7. Protesters had retreated into the university campus and been trapped in by the police force. After multiple days of sieging, the police were able to enter the university and confiscate any weapons found. Investigating this event allows for data to be collected on how police and protesters interact over consecutive days rather than the span of one day.

These events not only represent a range of environments in which protesters and police had interacted in, but also show varying levels of escalation in response to one another. A diverse representation allows for a better understanding of the kind of actions that can contribute to the use of violence. It is important to note that all examples involve environment of high tension, intensity and emotion among the participants involved. Selecting these cases allows for an analysis on how violence emerged from these interactions.

B. Operationalization

In order to collect the necessary data, the relevant concepts in the research question must be made measurable. Social movements utilize different forms of collective action in order to achieve their established political goals, often relying on innovative performances to increase support. The government often responds to these repertoires of action by choosing to facilitate or repress the movement. Not willing to concede to the demands of a movement, governments may often choose to repress it. This can lead to the subsequent radicalization of a movement and the use of violent tactics may appear. Violent interactions can be operationalized into six categories as defined by Charles Tilly.141 The six typologies are: scattered attacks, opportunism, brawls, violent rituals, broken negotiations and coordinated destruction.142 Using this typology allows the identification of violent collective action during the seven dates selected in the Hong Kong case. During a social movement event, it may be difficult to distinguish between disruptive and violent tactics. This presents a clear definition for violent actions that can be applied to protesters actions and how police respond will reveal certain strategies used by the police. The level of coordination for each typology indicates how widespread the mentality to resort to violence has become within the social movement as well.

141 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, 106-7. 142 Ibid. By analyzing the media portrayals of interactions between police and protesters during the given events, the indicators used by the PRS framework can be applied to actions to see the potential effects it may have on further escalation during a social movement cycle. Using a chronological sequence of events will also help in potentially linking indicators to this escalation. This escalation will be measured by the level of coordination required for the violent collective actions shown during these interactions. Categorizing the actions observed by the three news outlets into the typologies will aid in determining the coordination involved. The overall effect may show if any link between protester-police interactions may cause the escalation or de- escalation of social movement repertoires.

C. Data Collection

This thesis will utilize qualitative research methods in attempting to answer the research question; whether these interactions between police and protesters caused the escalation or if there are other contributing factors. The research method selected is media content analysis. Media content analysis utilizes a wide range of data collected from media sources that can identify discourse on a topic over an extensive period of time.143 Ronald Berger defines the method as a technique that attempts to measure something (escalating violence due to police- protester interactions) in a representative sampling of a form of mass media.144 Newspaper articles will be the form of mass media analyzed and the selected cases occur over a period of 6 months. Observing the way the media outlets have reported on the protests allows for a general overview of potential public opinion, attitude and perception.

In order to tackle this question, media content analysis of three Hong Kong based, English news media outlets will be used. To ensure a representative sampling is achieved and any potential political bias is addressed, the three media outlets selected have varying political variation while also being popular sources in Hong Kong. The South China Morning Post (SCMP) is the largest English-language newspaper in Hong Kong and thus reaches a large portion of society. Having been purchased the Alibaba Group in 2015, there has been a gradual increase in pro-Beijing sentiment, despite the opinion section still retaining some degree of variety.145 The Standard a free English-language newspaper that is owned by the Sing Tao News Corporation.146 Sing Tao News Corporation’s investors have ties with China and to maintain their relationships, often have a pro-Beijing stance, which carries over to The Standard. Finally, the Hong Kong Free Press (HKFP) is an independent English-language newspaper that predominately leans towards a pro-democracy perspective on local politics. Without pressure

143 Jim Macnamara, “Media Content Analysis: Its Uses; Benefits and Best Practice Methodology,” Asia Pacific Public Relations Journal 6, no. 1 (2005): 6. 144 Ibid., 2. 145 Sonny Shiu-Hing Lo, Steven Chung-Fun Hung, and Jeff Hai-Chi Loo, “Influencing Civil Society through Mass Media, Education and Migration,” in China’s New United Front Work in Hong Kong (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 293. 146 Ibid., 304. from mainland owners or stakeholders, they have been able to take a critical stance towards the response to protesters in Hong Kong.147

Table 2: Keywords for Factiva Criteria

Incident Keywords Used June 9th barricades, clashes, June 12th Second reading, Legislative Council July 1st Occupied OR stormed, destruct* July 21st Triads, Yuen Long, MTR, assault August 11th Kwai Fong, MTR, November 17th - 30th siege, Polytechnic University,

Due to the growth of interest into the 2019 Hong Kong Protests as the movement drawn out, events that occurred later in the period experienced more coverage from the same news outlets. Some articles would take a more comprehensive look at the social movement, these should be excluded due to the lack of focus on the specific police-protester interactions of the given dates. Therefore, it is necessary to be precise with the selection of articles to ensure data collected concentrates on the case selected. Articles from The Standard, HKFP and SCMP are easily found on Factiva, an international news database that aids in aggregating articles depending on given criteria. By developing keyword options and date publication limits, it allows for Factiva to provide more accurate articles that directly refer to the interactions of the selected dates. Keywords will be found by the identifying characteristics established in Chapter 3A while article publication dates will be limited to within 2 days after the incident date. These are summarized in Table 2.

Table 3: Example of Raw Data Collection

News Source Protester Action Police Action

HKFP (1) Protesters used lethal methods to (1) At least 22 protesters sustained injuries attack police by setting fires, using metal after police pushed the crowd back on bars, throwing bricks and damaging Wednesday using rubber bullets and tear public facilities gas

147 See https://hongkongfp.com/about/ Protesters formed barricades on Lung Wo Police attempted to clear protesters in Road using metal barriers and trash Admiralty when their permit expired around midnight

SCMP (2) 1. Hundreds of protesters rushed (2) 1. Police wielding batons and pepper towards the police line in the spray pushed back demonstration area, throwing metal Forced protesters off Lung Wo Road and barriers and bottles, and trying to break divided them into tow groups channelled into the legislative complex towards Central and Wan Chai

Coding the data collected from the news articles is the next step that must be addressed. Since the focus of the research is a specific kind of interaction, a human coding method will be used to gather data. By choosing this method, a sacrifice on reliability and speed will be made in return for interpretation of the semantics of the interactions.148 Especially since an inference on the interactions is needed, human coding may be more appropriate in providing data to link causality. Based on the content communicated by the articles, the data collected will be focused on actions by the protesters towards other protesters or police and police actions towards protesters. Table 3 is an example of how raw data from the selected articles will be organized. The bracketed number will denote the article the data was taken from while the doted numbers refer to connected pieces of data. More condensed codes will be formed on the overall kind of action performed, without the additional wording from the raw data. This description of action can than be assigned to one of the six typologies of violent collective action (scattered attacks, opportunism, brawls, violent rituals, broken negotiations and coordinated destruction). If the data contains information on reasonings behind certain actions, these will be added accordingly. Lastly, any indicators that may be relevant for a given data point will be added in the end. The shortened code will then be compared to the Post, Ruby and Shaw framework, to identify the dimension and the subsequent indicators they may trigger. This can be seen in Table 4. For example, when the code suggests that police responded with rubber bullets or violence towards protesters, indicators such as sense of threat or experience with violence will be highlighted. While codes suggesting multiple kinds of groups can suggest a factionalization. The given descriptors of these indicators will help in determining whether the code fits.

148 Klaus Krippendorff, “Content Analysis,” in International Encyclopedia of Communications, ed. Erik Barnouw et al., vol. 1 (New York ; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 404. Table 4: Coded Data and Associated Indicators

Protester Action Category of Response Reasoning for Action Indicators for Political Action or Response Violence HKFP Set fire, threw bricks and damaged Violent: - tear gas and rubber (1) Sense of Threat public facilities Coordinated bullets (2) Experience with Destruction Violence Created roadblocks Disruptive - attempted to clear protesters SCMP Protesters charged police line and Violent: Brawls - batons and pepper spray (1) Factionalization threw objects at police - channelled protesters away from offices

While researching the police-protester interactions through the use of media content analysis, there are certain limitations to this method that should be addressed. Designing a sample that is representative of interactions that occurred between police and protesters is influenced by the potential political biases that the newspaper may have. These affiliations may affect the narrative presented by a given newspaper however, the aggregation of articles over each source should help in identifying key facts surrounding each date. The separation of coded data into their respective news sources along with limiting the publishing window and excluding opinion pieces should help balance the information. Having noted the potential bias present will help in ensuring a higher validity in the data collected. Both the number of cases studied and the restrictions of date of publications may also restrict the research conducted. Restrictions of publication dates are placed in order to for Factiva to provide relevant articles that focus on the interactions that occurred for any given case. However, this can also exclude articles that are published at a later that either follow up on a given case or that provide additional context.

With representative sampling for political bias in the media selected been designed for, a question arises with the cases selected as well. Many of the cases selected occur at the beginning (June 9th and June 12th) or in the following month (July 1st and July 21st). The heightened conflict and mobilization phase of the cycle would attract many individuals who may not be involved when the cost of protesting increases. This is balanced with two cases, August 11th and Nov 17th- 30th, which come at a later stage of the cycle of contention. Missing from the sampling are cases that exhibit the exhaustion phase of the social movement. Since these dates are close to the beginning of the cycle of contention, it can be expected that a stronger sense of fervor and energy can be demonstrated during these cases. However, due to the excitement caused in the beginning of a cycle, this research may provide insight into how police actions can affect the repertoire of a social movement. Especially since this qualitative method can preserve the chronology and consequences of specific events, it may allow for a clearer analysis of the effects.149

Another limitation would be an indirect attempt to look at the motivations of the protesters in their actions. Seeking for causal links such as motivations requires a more intrusive research method that allows for more precise data. Although sampling should cover a variety of perspectives due to the different political stances, explaining motivations is difficult without interviewing protesters. Even though newspaper articles can take statements from protesters and police alike, without control of the questioning and other issues of sampling, the data collected may have biases that need to be framed correctly. Further problems may arise when trying to include interviews at this current time due to political sensitivity, therefore caution must be taken when looking at conclusions.

Governments are critical actors involved with tackling social movements and this is still the case in Hong Kong. Assessing the exact actions of the government, by means other than the police, is not a focus of the research. This means that peripheral actions may be affecting the actions of the social movement but cannot be fully accounted for in this design. Especially with the influence of China in political decisions in Hong Kong, it is difficult to understand the exact motivations or reasonings behind their actions. An attempt to isolate the variables of police- protester interactions and its role in escalating tensions will be the focus of the research but it is necessary to acknowledge this key actor. Certain media outlets may include statements and such from government officials that can be used to explain police actions but without direct questioning with these actors, true motivations can only be inferred.

149 Michael Neal, “Media Content Analysis: Qualitative Methods,” in The Oxford Handbook of Media Psychology, ed. Karen Dill (Oxford University Press, 2012), 517-8.

IV. Results and Analysis

In this chapter, the shorted codes from the content analysis will be presented along with the assigned indicators for political violence, as defined by the Post, Ruby and Shaw framework. Each case finding will be explained and summarized in their respective sections before a final section will provide an overall analysis of all the data collected. This will include an explanation into the events of the date and the kind of interactions that occurred between police and protesters. The resulting indicators found to be associated with these actions will be further expanded upon. It will follow a chronological order of the dates.

A. June 9th: First Large Procession Against Extradition Bill

Protester Action Category of Response Reasoning for Action or Indicators for Action Response Political Violence SCMP Protest march Contained - helping march by widening (1) Political roads Instability Planned occupation of roads Disruptive - pepper spray and batons - Reminiscent of Occupy (1) Group surrounding government building Movement Experience with Violence Decision to escalate action (1) Communities of (through social media) Belief Two groups rushed police line in Violent: Brawls - pepper spray and batons (1) Factionalization demonstration area HKFP Formed barricades on roads Disruptive - pepper spray to disperse crowd The - confiscated weapons - Behaviour suggests (1) Type of Standard (hammers, lighters) planning Supporters (2) Factionalization

The initial protest activities during June 9th followed the usual script of an organized march and demonstration through the city. During this time, the police monitored the protesters but also helped in ensuring the march went off smoothly, even widening roads to improve the flow of protesters. The protest had proceeded without brawls or attacks although the mass mobilization of citizens seemed to have taken the police by surprise. Although individual acts of aggression were seen during the march, these were handled in isolation by the police. Demonstrations and marches are categorized as contained forms of action, as the government and police have experience in handling these performances. The lack of collective violence during the march suggests that contained actions allow police to better prepare for the protesters. While the government provided a permit for demonstrations to last until 10pm, smaller groups of protesters had organized extra performances after the end of the march. Some had organized the occupation of the roads surrounding the Legislative Offices (LegCo) which would have been reminiscent of the 2014 Occupy Movement. However, through the use of social media, a call to escalate action and charge the police lines at the LegCo offices was made. The police responded with pepper spray and batons in an attempt to dissuade protesters. As the protesters retreated, they began creating blockades around the complex, yet the police continued to chase them away. The confiscation of weapons, such as hammers and lighters, had suggested a degree of premeditation by protesters to escalate actions beforehand. Initially, the contained action was the only planned action that was to be taken that day however, the presence of weapons may suggest a group willing and prepared to escalate their actions. Individual acts of aggression also allude to this potential factionalization between certain members of the social movement.

Contextually, Hong Kong’s prior experiences with social movements may have played a role in the factionalization. June 9th was the first large-scale protest event since the end of the Umbrella Movement, providing an opportunity for new members to voice their concerns which may have been carried over from 2014. Although the Umbrella Movement had failed to achieve its goals, it had changed the perspective on the effectiveness of disruptive and even violent forms of actions. Many youths were finally able to participate after being influenced by the Umbrella Movement. These new members and those who experienced the Umbrella Movement may have created a community of belief that is willing to use escalated forms of action, such of violence or disruption. Descriptions on the utilization of social media channels such as Telegram in the organization of individuals may suggest different levels of commitment arising in the social movement. Although coordination displayed during these brawls were minimal, formations of sub-units within the social movement may form from social media groups. Potential for more radical members, willing to escalate towards more violent forms of collective action, to organize with each other is possible.

B. June 12th: Second Reading of Extradition Amendment

Protester Action Category of Response Reasoning Indicators for Action Political Violence SCMP Monitored police, run supply - Sense to do more due to (1) Groups booths and man first aid stations lack of leadership Experience with - Knew what they were Violence doing (2) Communities of Belief Protesters surged towards police Violent: Brawls - Tear gas and rubber bullets - Priority for police was lines securing government building - Forced to use weapons Protesters gathered construction Disruptive/Violent - Nothing done beforehand materials Used encrypted message services to (1) Communities of coordinate action Belief (2) Socialization HKFP Occupied roads and areas outside Disruptive/ - Restrained until protesters government building Contained charged Threw objects at police and charged Violent: - Use of tear gas, rubber - Stop violent radicals police lines Brawls/Scattered bullets and beanbag shots (low from charging attacks fatality weapons) - Government support for police maintaining public order and protect residents The Assault of officers with metal bars Violent: Scattered - Use of tear gas to disperse Standard attacks protesters Charged police lines and threw Violent: - Use of tear gas, rubber objects Brawls/Scattered bullets and beanbag shots attacks Encircled the Legislative Council - Set up officers in front of LegCo offices

Despite the display of concern over the proposed amendments to Hong Kong’s Extradition law, the government had decided to continue with the Second Reading of the Extradition Amendment Law on June 12th. As a result, protesters had planned to gather on that day. The protesters had begun to gather early in the morning and quickly managed to surround the entire complex and the surrounding roads. Unable to access the offices, the Second Reading had to be postponed. Police had placed a priority on ensuring that protesters could not be able to break into the Legislative Council offices. Even after the announcement of the delay, protesters had continued to occupy the surrounding areas. The focus of the demonstration was to vent their frustration at the government’s insistence to continue with their proposed amendments to the Extradition Law, signalling an unpopular policy change. While tensions were high in the morning, conflict between protesters and police had been minimal. However, during the afternoon, reports of scattered attacks and brawls between police and protesters had began to surface. Protesters began to throwing objects at the police line while also charging the police line. They had managed to obtain materials through construction sites and unsecured objects around the demonstration area. The perceived threat from the violent protesters had led police to deploy officers in riot gear and use tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse the crowd. Police would later confirm that 150 canisters of tear gas were used to defend the LegCo offices, shocking many as only 87 canisters had been used during the entirety of the Umbrella Movement.150 Police had also fired rubber bullets and beanbag shots into crowd in attempts to deter continued escalation. In the end, 81 injuries related to protest activities were reported by the Hospital Authority.

The way in which tear gas and rubber bullets were used during June 12th was cause for concern for many protesters. Although this was in response to the violent protesters that began to charge police line and assault officers, the appropriateness of tactics used by police to deter protesters has been questioned by onlookers. The amount of tear gas and rubber bullets used is seen as disproportionate to the perceived threat of the protesters. While protesters had began to escalate actions, little was done in attempts to de-escalate the situation by the police. Portrayal of police action was a swift transition from a restrained approach to direct confrontation with protesters. Increasing the cost of participation for the social movement, through escalation in repressive tactics, may deter some participants from continuing. However, it is also likely to also have the adverse affect and increase the number of radicalized members, depending on the type of support given to the social movement. The growing concerns over the appropriate protest policing tactics is evident of an increasing sense of threat caused by the police. When a social movement feels threatened by another actor, their options are to accept the repressive tactics or to retaliate in a collective manner. While it had managed to disperse protesters, it had also caused groups of protesters to turn towards violence as well.

Protesters had employed lessons learnt from their previous experiences with polices use of tear gas by not only monitor police movement as they attempted to disperse the crowd but also setting up supply booths and first aid stations. During the Umbrella Movement, police had

150 Christy Leung, “Police Draw Fire over Protest Tactics,” South China Morning Post, June 13, 2019. employed similar tactics in response to similar kinds of collective action. Before the Umbrella Movement, the use of tear gas in Hong Kong protest policing was unheard of. When police reverted to this tactic in 2019, protesters had become privy to how to react to this tactic. With a void of central leadership, the protesters continued to use encrypted messaging channels, such as Telegram, to coordinate their movement and actions. Social media has emerged as an important method of communication within the social movement. Information and updates on protest activities or threats to the community can be widely disseminated, without having to go through a central decision-making process. There are protesters that have developed an elevated sense of responsibility to fellow protesters due to the lack of leadership present during the 2019 protests. Compounded by the sense of threat created by the indiscriminate use of force on protesters, the risk for political violence is raised from the interactions between protesters and police. C. July 1st: Occupation of the Main Hall

Protester Action Category of Response Reasoning Indicators for Action Political Violence SCMP Annual peaceful July 1st march Contained Group besieged LegCo offices Violent: - police stood by Opportunism Vandalism of exterior of building Violent: - protesters believed (1) Group and interior of legislative chamber Coordinated violence may be means Ideology/Goals Destruction to achieve an end, even (2) Factionalization if outcome was chaos, (3) Assessment the cost was their arrest or Benefits of Terrorism even their life Outweigh the Risks Forced their way into the building Violent: - police retreated Coordinated Destruction HKFP Peaceful July 1st democracy march Contained

Hundreds of masked protesters Violent: (1) Factionalization broke into LegCo Opportunism Pried open metal shutters and Violent: - riot gear officers had vandalized interior and exterior of Coordinated guarded other side of shutters building Destruction until a call to retreat Heated deliberations once - announced those remaining - uncharted territory for (1) Sense of Threat legislative chamber was occupied will be arrested and cleared protesters (2) Groups out at 10:21pm Ideology/Goals - tear gas used to clear surrounding roads The Standard 1000 protesters attempted to break Violent: - 50 police officers were (1) Facitonalization into Legislative Council Opportunism present due to July 1st march 100 occupied the chamber and Violent: vandalized the interior Coordinated Destruction Threw pungent smoke through - Caused police to retreat Unknown substance and metal shutters to force police back lack of personnel

In the backdrop of the annual July 1st demonstrations in Hong Kong, a group of protesters had taken advantage of the situation and attempted to break into the Government Headquarters. Due to the routine nature of the July 1st Democracy march, police resources had been focused on monitoring and policing the gathering at Victoria Park. A group of protesters had taken advantage of the limited police presence at the LegCo offices and attempted to break into the building. Having shattered the exterior glass panels of the building, the police had remained behind metal shutters. As the officers in riot gear had waited idly by, protesters had used something that emitted pungent smoke and forced police to retreat from the building. Soon after officers left, the protesters broke through the final barriers and began to vandalize the interior of the Legislative Chamber. Police would not attempt to reclaim the building until 10:21pm, where they announced their clearance operation. This caused the protesters to deliberate over their next actions this event had never occurred before and protester would most likely never have the opportunity again. In the end protesters had decided to vacate the chamber and police continued to use tear gas to disperse the remaining crowd surrounding the Government Headquarters.

This event illustrates a continued escalation in the type and extent of performances the social movement was willing to go to. These protesters had understood the potential consequences of their actions but believed that violence may achieve an end for the movement. This event has shown that a group of members have assessed that the benefits of political violence outweigh the risks involved, evidence for a more radicalized group of participants forming from within the social movement. Escalated forms of action have slowly become a more accepted means to put pressure on the government to concede to their demands in Hong Kong. Polarization towards violent forms of action can create a split within the social movement although the acceptance for these repertoires has increased since 2014. Although the group’s demands may have stayed the same, the use of more violent means to achieve these goals has continued to gain more support. The increased level of coordination in their violent actions also signal a growing number of members accepting and contributing to the violence. D. July 21st: Yuen Long MTR Attacks

Protester Action Category of Response Reasoning Indicators for Action Political Violence SCMP Anti-government march that Contained – - Riot police use of tear gas (1) Group Ideology broke into rolling waves of Violent: Scattered and rubber bullets and Goals protests that ended with siege of attacks Beijing’s liaison office and other government buildings Scuffles between drivers occurred Violent: during protests Individual Aggression - Brawls

Protesters were attacked in the Violent: Brawls - Police arrived late despite - Force’s capacity was (1) Sense of Threat Yuen Long MTR station calls occurring at 10:40pm stretched due to protests (2) Other - Two officers arrived at Opponents scene but left to call for help

HKFP After end of march, group of Violent: Brawls - officers were not present (1) Sense of Threat masked men attacked protesters when skirmish began (2) Other returning home in the Yuen Long - riot gear policemen arrived Opponents MTR station at 11:30pm - police accused of failing to take actions in Yuen Long while firing tear gas at protests Vandalization of legislators’ Violent: - Junis Ho, the legislator, (1) Need for office Coordinated was filmed congratulating Revenge Destruction the men that attacked people in Yuen Long

The Standard Besieged Beijing Liaison Office Disruptive – - increased police presence (1) Group Ideology Violent: Scattered and Goals Attacks Triad members targeted people Violent: Brawls - officers arrived an hour after - accusation of collusion (1) Sense of Threat dressed in black (protester colors) first report with triads and police (2) Other - police made no arrests when - prioritization of liaison Opponents arrived office over Yuen Long attack

On July 21st, an organized anti-government march had broken down into violent clashes and ended with protesters demonstrating outside the Beijing Liaison Office and other surrounding government buildings. Police attempted to disperse the crowd with tear gas and rubber bullets, a continued pattern of protest policing during the 2019 episode. The use of tear gas and rubber bullets had become the main method of protest policing and attempting to maintain public order. Police have continued to prioritize the protection of government buildings, especially in light of the July 1st occupation of the Legislative Council. More resources have been deployed to these government buildings to ensure the opportunity does not arise again. It has become a pattern in which protesters surround specific government buildings and as soon as brawls or scattered attacks appear, police use tear gas and rubber bullets to disperse the crowd.

Attention was not on the interactions between police and protesters at the Beijing Liaison office but instead on physical attacks to protesters and residents at the Yuen Long MTR station. Men dressed in white began assaulting passengers arriving to the station with sticks. Those dressed in black had in black, the protest color, had been targeted but the attacks were indiscriminate. Calls to the police had occurred at 10:20pm yet police did not arrive at the scene until 11:30pm due to the force’s capacity being stretched to handle the protests. Even after the arrival of police officers in riot gear, no immediate arrests were made despite some of the white- clad men remaining in the area. This led to citizens criticizing the police for failing to take action yet being able to fire tear gas at protesters in front of the Liaison Office. The following day saw protesters sought revenge on Junis Ho, a Hong Kong legislator who had been video taped congratulating men dressed in white outside the Yuen Long MTR station.

The police have continued to prioritize the protection of government buildings, especially in light of the July 1st occupation of the Legislative Council. However, suspicious over the lack of action once police arrived on the scene in Yuen Long had left many concerned over future interactions with this new group of opponents. It had been the first time that an opponent had engaged in collective violent action towards the social movement and there had been little consequence to this group. Although opponents to social movements may be tolerated by the government, the violent action taken by this group have left citizens shocked that nothing was done about them. The introduction of an opponent that is willing to enter into physical altercations with protesters increases the sense of threat to the movement and increases the chance of further political violence. Diminished attitude and trust towards the police from this incident may polarize more protesters to participate in violent actions in response. This negative characterization of the police, along with the increased sense of threat, will continue to push protesters towards political violence. E. August 11th: Tear Gas in Kwai Fong Station

Protester Action Category of Response Reasoning Indicators for Action Political Violence SCMP Tsim Sha Tsui police station Violent: under attack with petrol bombs Coordinated lobbed over walls Destruction Attempted to head to Kwai Chung - MTR shut down service at police station for another siege Kwai Fong - tear gas was fired, and riot officers entered to disperse protesters inside the station HKFP Generating smoke and launching Violent: - beanbag shots in proximity projectiles into Tsim Sha Tsui Coordinated police station Destruction Protesters moving to locations - fired one tear gas canister - police have guidelines in though MTR into Kwai Fong station while use of appropriate force pepperballs were used in Tai and attempt to use lowest Koo station level of force Mass sit-in at airport Disruptive Causeway Bay demonstration Contained- - used undercover cops and (1) Sense of Threat Disruptive locate and arrest protesters as part of intelligence operation - 149 total arrested with 15 “core violent” protesters The As numbers attending declined, a (1) Polarization Standard change to guerrilla-like tactics (2) Attrition emerged Siege of the Sham Shui Po, Tsim Violent: Broken - use of tear gas and charged (1) Negative Sha Tsui and Kwai Chung police Negotiations – protesters Actions toward stations. Scattered Attacks Target Group

Pointed laser beams at officers Violent: - use of tear gas and charged and threw petrol bombs into Coordinated protesters stations Destruction Plans for those at TST to move to - moved their defense to Kwai - catapults were being Kwai Chung through MTR to set Fong Station used inside the station by up roadblocks - fired several rounds of tear protesters gas and rubber bullets in the station

While earlier demonstrations and brawls had seen a coordinated effort on one area, protesters had begun to coordinate protests across multiple locations across Hong Kong. Protesters resorted to hit and run tactics due to a decline in participation Demonstrations held in Causeway Bay had slowly turned into brawls between protesters and police began. Disguised officers had pointed out and helped arrest protesters in an intelligence operation on radical members of the social movement. Out of the 149 arrested protesters in Causeway Bay, 15 had been labelled as “core violent rioters”. These undercover officers had been investigating the social movement for radical protesters since June, displaying a different approach to protest policing. Some of these protesters moved towards Tai Koo, where they were chased into the MTR station and police had fired pepper ball rounds in close proximity.

On the Kowloon peninsula, protesters started by confronting police outside of the Sham Shui Po police station but dispersed as soon as tear gas was fired into the crowds. The crowd quickly moved onto the Tsim Sha Tsui police station where protesters began throwing petrol bombs over the walls, setting fire to parts of the compound. Laser pointers were also used in attempt to distract and blind officers. As protesters began dispersing from Kwai Chung police station, police had begun to move their defense lines into the Kwai Fong MTR station. The station had shut down its services at the request of the police and protesters had become trapped within the station. Police decided to fire a canister of tear gas inside the station while also using rubber bullets. In response to the incident, protesters had planned a series of disruptive sit-ins at Hong Kong International Airport.

The actions of the police inside the Kwai Fong MTR station had raised questions over the safety of police tactics as traces of tear gas could still be found the following day. Concerns over the safety of not only protesters but MTR staff and commuters had been raised as a result. A shift in the polices approach to the use of force can be seen in this incident, as the assertive actions had occurred in two different stations. Besides the tear gas, rubber bullets and pepper ball rounds had been fired in close quarter situations, increasing the chances of severe injury. Further concerns were also voiced as their tactics had essentially trapped protesters within the station. The police force justified their actions by stating that they followed guidelines to apply the lowest and most appropriate level of force to handle the protesters. Although tear gas and rubber bullets may have become a routine encounter, the instances in which they are used can chance the perception of the degree of threat. The threat of low fatality weapons increases in a confined space, like the Therefore, the threat of these low fatality weapons increases in a confined space.

The declining numbers of participants also suggests that the social movement has reached a point of exhaustion in its cycle of contention. A consequence of this is that a movement is likely to become more polarized due to moderate members often leaving during this phase.151 More radical members may attempt more disruptive or violent forms of action to inject more

151 Della porta excitement into the movement again. The effects of attrition on the kind of support remaining should not be ignored. F. November 17th – 30th: Siege of Polytechnic University

Protester Action Category of Response Reasoning Indicators for Action Political Violence SCMP Roughly 1000 protesters and Violent: Brawls – - shot tear gas and sealed Campus is connected to supporters occupied the campus Coordinated campus exits except one the Cross Harbour Tunnel after clashes with police nearby Destruction occupied by police (strategic choice) - established checkpoints and allowed protesters to leave through designated exits Attempted to control footbridge - attempted to clear debris on - strategic location that over Cross Harbour Tunnel footbridges and push would bring traffic to a protesters away standstill Shot arrows, catapulted bricks, Violent: - brought water cannons and created barriers and threw petrol Coordinated armored vehicles to breach bombs at advancing police lines Destruction - defense lines Brawls Created an assembly line for Violent: - recovered thousands of (1) Formation of petrol bombs and explosives with Opportunism explosives, petrol bombs and Fighting Units chemicals found in PolyU corrosive liquids laboratories Attempted to stop people clearing Violent: Brawls their roadblocks by throwing bricks HKFP Dozens of protesters refused to - arrested those who left the - lasted over 12 days (1) Sense of Threat leave university campus grounds - university asked police (2) Assessment that - ended siege and entered to help with dangerous the Benefits of building to handle weapons materials Terrorism Outweigh and chemicals Risks - no riot police were part of (3) Negative team to clear university Actions toward Target Group Around 1000 people gathered in Contained (1) Type of Support TST to condemn siege of PolyU Escalating clashes with police at Disruptive – - part of occupation of (1) Negative university campuses Violent: Scattered universities and class Actions toward Attacks – Brawls boycott Target Group (2) Groups Experience with Violence The Set fire to footbridges above Violent: - used tear gas, rubber bullets Standard Cross Harbour Tunnel and threw Coordinated and sponge rounds to reclaim petrol bombs and shot arrows at Destruction - bridges police Brawls - sent water cannons and armored vehicles Some were surrounded when Violent: Brawls attempting to relight fires on footbridges After the retreat from Chinese University, focus of activity was in Hung Hom During siege, protesters attempted - arrests of those hiding inside - aiming to capture to escape at least 3 times the university hardcore rioters who had holed up in the university

The siege of Hong Kong Polytechnic University (PolyU) was an almost two week-long incident that saw protesters unwilling to leave the campus after police had sealed off many of the exits except police checkpoints. Initially, protesters had set-up roadblocks at the Cross-Harbour Tunnel to disrupt traffic and had used the near by Polytechnic University to defend their blockade from the police. Footbridges gave direct access to the entrance of the Cross-Harbour Tunnel as well as the Hung Hom MTR station from the university. After protesters had retreated from Chinese University, after clashes with police, an emphasis had been placed on activities at PolyU. On November 17th, volunteers had attempted to clear the roadblocks at the Cross- Harbour Tunnel but were met with protesters throwing bricks at them. Riot police, along with armored water cannon trucks, had attempted to disperse the protesters. An estimated 1000 protesters retreated into the university campus and began retaliating by throwing bricks and petrol bombs as well as shooting arrows. Attempts to breach the university with an armored vehicle had been unsuccessful as the protesters threw petrol bombs from the campus rooftop. Control over the footbridge had become a focal area and protesters had lit it on fire to stop police from advancing. The police chose to seal all exits and set up designated areas to leave and announced that any protester leaving would be arrested for rioting. A demonstration was held in Tsim Sha Tsui condemning the police for laying siege to the university.

As conditions deteriorated inside the university and the number of protesters dwindling, the police entered the campus looking for protesters that remained along with clearing hazardous materials from the premises. During the siege, protesters had begun to loot the university’s laboratories and gained access to many dangerous chemicals that could be used to make explosives. An assembly line had been created to produce petrol bombs, explosives and corrosive liquids that could be used against the police. The university had asked for assistance in removing the materials. A “safety team” was formed and consisted of negotiators, bomb disposal officers, media liaison officers, social workers, and clinical psychologists. They found almost 4000 petrol bombs, 1300 pieces of explosives, 601 bottles of corrosive liquid and 573 items that could be considered as weapons.

This event exemplified a complete break down of attempted negotiations or communication between protesters and police. Protesters have developed a strong negative attitude towards the police, with thousands of protesters openly engaging in direct confrontation with police. Even in the face of rubber bullets, tear gas and armoured vehicles, formation of fighting groups to keep police from advancing show high levels of coordination towards violent actions. The acceptance of escalated forms of actions represent a shift or polarization in the group’s ideology as well. No longer is there are distain for disruptive or violence but instead it has become a means to place pressure on the government to concede to the demands of the movement. Members involved in the political violence have adapted to overt police repression and supporters have accepted these methods. The actions receive the support of the social movement, with members gathering at Tsim Sha Tsui to condemn the police’s siege of the university campus. G. Analysis

Through the data collected on six cases during the 2019 Hong Kong protests, a pattern of escalation in the repertoire and forms of action of the social movement occurs over this period of time. During the 2019 protests, the conduct of the police had not only been criticized by citizens and protesters in Hong Kong but also received international attention. While the Post, Ruby and Shaw framework highlights the numerous variables associated with increased risk of political violence, the focus of this thesis will be the interactions that protesters had with the police. By assessing the common indicators that are applicable to the coded data, an understanding of the how police actions influenced the social movement repertoire can be made.

On June 9th, protesters attempted to raise concerns over a proposed amendment to the Extradition Law that would allow mainland China to extradite individuals back to the mainland when suspected of a crime. The organized march had been the first large scale protest movement since the end of the Umbrella Movement of 2014. Although acts of individual aggression occurred during the demonstration, conflict between protesters and police had been minimal. Police performed normal monitoring duties during the police and even helped widen the road for demonstrators to accommodate for the larger number of attendants. Police-protester interactions during a routine setting saw no escalation towards violence since the social movement had planned contained forms of action.

However, as the protest permit ended, small groups began to plan extra activities around the Legislative Council. Social media channels were used to organize smaller groups of individuals that agreed to escalate their actions and charge police lines at the headquarters. The police had responded by using pepper spray and batons on front line protesters while also pushing them away from the Government Headquarters. As stated earlier, being the first large mobilization for the social movement since 2014, many individuals who were unable to participate then had now been given a new opportunity. Small factions could have arisen in that time, demanding that more extreme measures would be needed to pressure the government. This comes from the lack of resolution seen during the 2014 protests, as many of the demands were not met by the time the Occupy Movement had reached exhaustion. In relation to those who escalated violence in 2019, police responded with direct force to those who had chosen to charge the police line. While only a few hundred protesters had participated in the brawls, support for the escalation to violent collective action was at a minimum. Some of it can be attributed to the mobilization of radical members that had not participated in 2014. It does suggest the potential for further political violence as a group had already demonstrated the willingness to do so.

Protests in Hong Kong have often maintained a contained repertoire of action during its cycles of contention. During the 2019 protests, the frequency in the use of disruptive and violent forms of action had not only increased since the Umbrella Movement but also increased in each case analyzed. June 12th can be marked as a triggering event, as the interactions between police and protesters would change drastically after this date due to the response of the police to the social movement. Although protesters had surrounded the LegCo Offices, the HKFP and SCMP had described minor scuffles that occurred near the lines between police and protesters. However, The Standard mentions that protesters had began to assault officers with construction materials gathered. As groups of protesters began charging police lines, police responded with additional force in the form of officers equipped with riot gear and firing tear gas and rubber bullets. The Hong Kong Police Force would regularly deploy tear gas and rubber bullets in many situations throughout the cycle of contention after this date. Their actions are in stark contrast to the more subdued response seen on June 9th.

The Hong Kong Police Force had built a dependency on the effects of tear gas and rubber bullets as a deterrent for radical protesters. On June 12th, police had confirmed that 150 canisters of tear gas had been fired on that day, compared to 87 in the total of the Umbrella Movement. Besides the June 9th case, these measures would be used throughout the 2019 protests would see protesters attempting to adapt their repertoires and attitudes. The consistent willingness to deploy these tactics in differing contexts, such as in subway stations, may have increased a sense of threat to those participating in the protests. Lack of control in these methods indiscriminately affect the areas they are deployed in, increasing the cost of participation. Although this will deter some protesters from continuing their forms of action or further participating, it can also have the adverse effect on the social movement. As the contention prolongs, the radicalization of certain members of the movement will increase when placed under a constant sense of threat. Perceptions of unequal or extreme use of force by the police may play a role in the choice to use violent collective action. The emergence of fighting units, like those found at the Siege of Polytechnic University, also shows the growing coordination between more radical members of the social movement. Presence of members that were willing to escalate their forms of action had become more apparent as the movement continued. While many protesters had continued with the annual demonstrations on July 1st, a group of protesters had organized themselves and taken the opportunity to storm the Legislative Council Offices when police resources had been pulled towards the planned actions. Not only was there a growing number of radicalized protesters and support for them, but their coordination had become more complex than in earlier cases. Rolling protests were organized in order to prevent police from being able to respond effectively to their actions. While demonstrations and other forms of contained forms of action continued, groups of radicalized protesters escalated their forms of action at night. Unlike on June 9th, many that associated with the social movement had began to support the violent collective action even if they did not participate. In 2014, leadership had limited and condemned the escalation to political violence. Police had also demonstrated more restrained when using more overt repressive tactics as well. Without the same kind of controls in place, more violent interactions erupted between the two.

When alleged triad members had involved themselves in an altercation between protesters returning from protests, the arrival of a new actor in the interactions may have played a role in the continued escalation of violence. Other opponents can often be tolerated or allied with the government due to their ideological alignment, even if they chose to physically attack members of the movement. Although individual cases of aggression had been seen throughout 2019, the July 21st attacks had been the first time an opposing group had showing a willingness to use violent forms of actions against members of the social movement. This will further increase the sense of threat for members of the social movement, as not only could police interactions result in harm but another group had become involved. Many were unsure if this group would continue to find opportunities to attack protesters or whether this was a unique situation.

Besides the introduction of a new opponent, the inaction of the police during several emergency calls had triggered many indicators for further escalation. Police did not arrive in Yuen Long until an hour after the first emergency call had been made, citing that their forces had been stretched because of protest activities across the city. Having been left at the mercy of the new opponents, protesters would have felt a deep injustice to the lack of action, especially with the lack of arrest or further investigation into the incident. The role of the police is often seen as protecting its citizens from harm and protesters may have been humiliated by this. Due to the deterioration in the trust for the police force afterwards, protesters had begun to coordinate acts of destruction towards police stations. The number of protesters involved with confrontations with police had also increased in the following incidents. During the July 21st case, protesters had besieged two different police stations and had began to head towards the third station before being stopped in the subway station. With the attacks on protesters occurring on July 1st, these actions can be considered revenge for their lack of action. When the government had suspended the proposed amendment to the Extradition Bill, the focus shifted of the protests had been towards police conduct. The change in ideology directly targeted the interactions police and protesters had throughout the 2019 Protests.

The direct interactions that are forced upon police and protesters places a considerable amount of pressure on the relationship. When protesters had organized contained forms of actions or familiar disruptive tactics, the Hong Kong Police Force were able to prepare and react to these standard routines. As all the newspapers stated, during the planned march on June 9th, little escalation would occur between the two. However, when police attempt to use overt forms of repression, an increased chance of political violence can result from these actions. During this early mobilization phase of a social movement, repressive tactics on a movement that has seen a tremendous amount of support can embolden members. Signs that a more radical collective participating had started in the beginning. The support for this group seems to have grown over time, although this can be attribute to multiple variables which could include police actions towards them. Soon after the trigger event, June 12th, a shift in the relationship between the police and protesters had occurred. Members of the social movement had adapted and innovated on the repertoire available to them, with the level of coordination in these actions increasing over time. With reports of more violent forms of action being added, police attempted to repress these groups with force. Due to this new perspective of the police, the repressive tactics were also received poorly by the public. Even as the described collective action increased per case, many demonstrations were help in support of them such as the hundreds of protesters that took part in the Siege of Polytechnic University. While protesters innovated different performances in an attempt to pressure the government, police actions did not attempt to de-escalate the situation. When protesters tried less coordinated efforts to escalate their actions in the beginning, the police responded with indiscriminate uses of force. Media descriptions have also shown that de-escalation was not a goal in the police’s response and instead repression was the preferred response. Even though the study focused on six incidences, there were no signs that would suggest a different approach to protest policing on different occasions.

Through the analysis of the media portrayal of the 2019 Hong Kong Protests, it is clear that violence increased between police-protester interactions over the period of time studied. As the movement persisted, there is a shift in the kind of indicators seen for each case. In the beginning, the sense of threat caused by repression tactics by the police had been a leading indicator for escalation to violence. Protesters also became opportunistic by infiltrating the Legislative Office when police were distracted with policing the organized demonstration. With the involvement of a new opponent, the triads, the inaction of the police force had caused further distrust between protesters and police. The emergence of demands for investigations into police conduct during the protests had coincided around the July 21st case as well. These demands also mark a shift in ideology, as the tactics used by police became a focal point in the demonstrations. Attitudes towards the police had clearly turned negative. Violent forms of actions also increased as protesters would find themselves in an almost two-week long battle with police on the premises of the Polytechnic University in November. This evolution in repertoire was also fueled by the type of support that the social movement had received. Even with police utilizing tear gas and rubber bullets, many members who did not participate in these violent forms of action would vocally support those who did. In the wake of repressive tactics, the strength of support for protesters using violent forms of action enabled them to continue with this repertoire.

The evolution of the relationship between protesters and police suggest that police conduct had played a role in causing the escalation although it is not the only variable to cause this. The presence of new opponents had also presented a new threat towards to social movement, as an organized group had shown their ability to harass protesters after July 21st. Differences in the structure and organization of the social movement in 2019 also contributed to the escalation towards violent forms of action, as communities of belief formed around the use of violent collective action. Without a central authority figure, it became much more difficult to target and repress the movement as subgroups may have emerged from this lack of structure.

V. Conclusions

A. Conclusion

Through media content analysis of the 2019 Hong Kong protests, police action towards protesters can influence the likelihood of escalation to political violence although other variables can also play a role. When applying the Post, Ruby and Shaw indicators to the data collected, the most common ones were; sense of threat, factionalization, negative attitudes toward target group, type of support and group ideology. As the movement persisted over time, different indicators became more prominent as the situation evolved. Overt police repression such as the use of tear gas create a hostile attitude when indiscriminately used on a social movement, especially when the general perception of the performance is peaceful. Over time, negative attitudes toward the police had developed and support for the use of violent collective action was more accepted. While the police may not be the only cause for escalation to violence, they play a significant role due to the constant interaction between the two.

Protests in Hong Kong have often followed a set routine that police are familiar with, however, the changes in repertoire had left police reliant on their routine responses. Resorting to tougher forms of protest policing, such as tear gas and rubber bullets, this became the common tactic used during 2019. Besides June 9th, police had used tear gas in all other incident dates without fail. Although they must maintain public order, police actions seem to have the reverse effect in the long-term. Protesters had become weary of police after the June 21st triad attacks as inaction by the police broke any relationship between the two. The media have shown that repression against a well supported social movement can cause an escalation towards violence given the right context. Along with the historical dimension and the organizational differences, there was an increased likelihood for escalation to occur. Although this is independent of police action, repression may have further pushed the social movement towards violent forms of collective action. Current police actions are not adequate at handling a few situations. Whilst being able to monitor large groups, there is an inability to isolate smaller groups hiding within the larger protest. The events in Hong Kong have emphasized a weakness in current protest policing methods. While it seems unlikely that the Hong Kong regime was attempting to de-escalate the situation, with no mention of these kind of tactics in the media, many tactics chosen by the police seemed to aggravate the movement. The development of negative attitudes towards the police created an environment for escalation to occur between the police and protesters. However, the question that arises as a result of this is whether the government had pushed for this in order to give China a chance to intervene? Data from each case shows a constant attempt to repress the movement despite the reaction from the social movement. Whether this was caused by Chinese influence or the Hong Kong’s governments attempt to force the movement to stop is unclear.

B. Further Research

As stated in the Methodology chapter, the complete motivations of protesters cannot be examined through content analysis of newspapers. In order to understand the escalation to political violence, interviewing protesters and organizers may yield more reliable results. Although reporters would have been present at the time of the selected dates, certain aspects of the organization of the social movement will not be apparent unless those who were directly involved are questioned. If the interviews were designed to offer anonymity and security for the interviewee, it would increase the reliability of the data gathered. It would offer insight into more nuanced characteristics and processes of the social movement.

In order to increase the representativeness of the media selected, an interesting route would be to analyze Cantonese-language newspapers and their coverage of the protests in comparison to the English ones. With Hong Kong’s main language being Cantonese, insight into the descriptions these newspapers would have on the 2019 Protests might provide a different perspective into the situation. Especially since the Cantonese newspapers can skew much more dramatically in their political affiliations. Apple Daily, a prominent pro-democracy newspaper, has had a long history of criticizing Hong Kong politics and supported the 2019 protests openly.152 Its readership is also much greater than that of the HKFP.

152 See https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/09/world/asia/hong-kong-arrests-lai-national-security-law.html

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VII. Appendix

Table 1: June 9th: First Large Procession Against Extradition Bill

News Protester-Related Action Police/Opponent Related Action Source SCMP (1) When the protest ended at 10pm, protesters (1) Organised, prepared, armed and radical – that was planned to take over the driveway of Harcourt Road the police description of hundreds of young reminiscent of the Occupy Protests in 2014 protesters (1) Call of “Let’s do it, Hongkongers” went up and an They were stopped by special tactics police squirting almost spontaneous decision to escalate their action pepper spray was taken (1) Police wielding batons and pepper spray pushed (1). Hundreds of protesters rushed towards the police back line in the demonstration area, throwing metal barriers (1) … reporters were called “rubbish” and pushed and bottles, and trying to break into the legislative into metal barriers (by police) complex. (2)1. … even-handness of police who opened roads (1) Sunday was the first time they had joined a protest and kept crowds moving. since (the Umbrella Movement) (2)1 … almost entirely peaceful expression of dissent (2) two activists’ groups clashed with police seemed bent on forcing confrontation HKFP (3) Largely peaceful “million-strong” march saw (3) Police attempted to clear protesters in Admiralty Hong Kong come to a standstill as protesters when their permit expired at around midnight demanded Lam step down and extradition bill be (4) Pepper spray being deployed to disperse crowds scrapped (4) Police officers have experience in dealing with (3) Protesters formed barricades on Lung Wo Road large crowds using metal barriers and Trash The (5) Other types of “weapons” were also found, Standard including concrete hammers, cutters, gas lighters, and mallets. (5) Based on their behaviour and gear, these “rioters” planned the clashes Note 1 Sources used are 1. Christy Leung, “Hong Kong Slowly …,” June 10, 2019. 2. Alvin Lum and Xinqi Su, June 10, 2019. 3. Jennifer Creery, “‘We Are Duty-Bound…,” June 10, 2019. 4. Jennifer Creery, “Hong Kong Gov’t…,” June 10, 2019 5. Jane Cheung, “New Occupy …,” June 10, 2019. Table 2: June 12th: Second Reading of Extradition Amendment

News Protester-Related Action Police/Opponent Related Action Source SCMP (1) Young demonstrators worked together to monitor (1)1 When police began firing tear gas and rubber bullets police, run supply booths and man first aid stations. as the protesters surged forth, (1) Their singular mission: vent their anger against the (2) priority for police was to secure the city’s legislature extradition bill that they said would mark the death of and government buildings first rather than remove Hong Kong protesters violently demonstrating against the bill (1)1 response was calm, as if the youngsters knew (2) No police officers stopped them (gathering bricks) or instinctively what to do appeared prepared to disperse the crowds (1) In the absence of a leader, we all hope to go the (2) We were forced to use weapons to stop violent extra mile and be more devoted in our protest – Bevis radicals from charging, reiterating it was not a clearance Lo operation (1) strategies executed smoothly after being discussed in encrypted channels (of Telegram) (2) They (the crowd) were seen gathering metal poles to add to bricks they had prised from walkways earlier (2) the protesters had been observing police movements and gathered crowds within a short period of time at 6am when the police presence was loose (2) The protesters could take whatever was readily available as weapons (in construction sites) HKFP (3) 81 casualties related to protest activities attended (3) Police Commissioner said “low fatality weapons” A&E departments were used to clear Wednesday’s anti-extradition law (4) Demonstrators occupied areas outside the protests because demonstrators charged police lines with legislature until police deployed tear gas and rubber weapons bullets after frontline demonstrators threw objects (3) 150 tear gas canisters, “several” rounds of rubber bullets and 20 beanbag shot were fired during the protest clearance (3) “very restrained” as protesters occupied main roads on Wednesday, until 3pm when demonstrators began to charge police with weapons (3) multiple cases of riot shields being used to push journalists; several cases of batons being wielded to prevent arrests being filmed (4) “We will support the police fearlessly exercise their responsibility to maintain public order and protect residents” – Starry Lee The (5)1 at least 22 of whom were injured (5)1 use of tear gas, rubber bullets and bean bag rounds Standard (5) protesters used metal bars to assault officers that were fired at protesters (6) rioters charged the police lines and threw bricks (5) defense lines were under attack and steel bars at the officers (6) (police) fired more than 150 tear gas rounds during (6) Before 10am, several scores of police and more Wednesday’s running battles outside the Legislative than 100 protesters stood facing each other on the Council footbridge of Citic Centre, with only several fences (6) The protest encircling the Legislative Council… between them ended with a crackdown by police (6) some reporters… claimed they (the police) scolded them using foul language and treated them violently

Note 2 Sources used are 1. Jeffie Lam, “It Looks like Occupy …,” June 13, 2019, 2. Christy Leung, “Police Draw Fire over Protest Tactics,” June 13, 2019. 3. Kris Cheng, “‘Very Restrained’…,’” June 13, 2019. 4. 5. Charlotte Luo, “Police Chief Defends Use of Force,” June 13, 2019. 6. Phoenix Un, “Ammo Tally Revealed…,” June 14, 2019.

Table 3: July 1st: Occupation of the Main Hall

News Protester-Related Action Police/Opponent Related Action Source SCMP (1) a much bigger crowd of protesters used a metal cage trolley and iron poles to shatter the glass exterior of the building (1) As the holes in the doors grew bigger and a metal shutter was pried open, protesters flooded into the building, making their way into the legislative chamber, spray-painting graffiti and defacing the emblem of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (1) Observers and protesters alike pointed to a real and perceptible shift among the demonstrators: that violence could be a means to achieve an end, even if the outcome was chaos and the cost was their arrest, and, in an extreme case, even their lives (2) While hundreds of thousands marched peacefully, what set yesterday apart from previous July 1 protests was the unprecedented violence perpetrated by radicals who spent most of the day besieging Legco while police stood by (2) After using makeshift battering rams to smash holes in the glass front, protesters forced their way into the legislature and took over HKFP (3) hundreds of masked protesters broke in through (3) Police deployed tear gas to clear the the rear of LegCo, smashing through glass doors and surrounding roads shortly after as the remaining prising open metal shutters protesters poured out of the building (3) Interior was vandalized with furniture overturned (4) Police officers armed with riot gear had been and graffiti spray painted onto walls standing guard on the other side of the shutters for (3) Coincided with the end of a separate, largely hours, but they had apparently retreated and left the peaceful July 1 democracy march building just moments before (the protesters broke (4) Protesters began spray-painting slogans onto the through) corridor walls and vandalizing the portraits of (4) at 10:21pm, the police issued a video saying Legislative Council presidents they would clear the area surrounding the (4) demonstrators realized they were in unchartered Legislative Council “shortly” waters, with heated deliberations between protesters on what to do next

The (5) Over 1,000 protesters stormed and occupied the (5) at 8.55pm police officers defending the metal Standard Legislative Council chamber gate suddenly retreated and the protesters charged (5) Over 100 protesters broke into the chamber and in through the broken gate in less than five minutes sprayed the SAR emblem and the wall behind the (5) At the time there were only about 50 police president's seat with black paint. They also tried to officers, who were equipped with helmets, shields, hang a colonial British flag over the SAR emblem at baton, pepper spray and beanbag rounds (at LegCo) the chamber. (6) about 9pm that police retreated temporarily as (5) Protesters threw objects that emitted a pungent many protesters were outside the legislative smoke through the crack of the broken glass building's main entrance and were about to charge (6) One was the July 1 rally, which was peaceful and through the inner door. Police could not use generally orderly and reflected the core values of peace maneuvers that could work in open areas and order. The other was violence and vandalism by (6) "There was already a toxic powder attack on my protesters who stormed the legislative headquarters. officers in the afternoon. So without knowing whether this was another toxic powder attack we had no choice but to temporarily retreat." Note 3 Sources used are 1. SCMP Reporters, “Hong Kong Police …,” July 2, 2019. 2. SCMP Editorial, “Hong Kong’s Future Hinges …,” July 2, 2019. 3. Elson Tong, “Hong Kong’s Carrie Lam …,’” July 2, 2019. 4. Holmes Chan, “12 Arrested…,” July 3, 2019, 5 Cindy Wan and Jane Cheung, “Legco Occupied,” The Standard, July 2, 2019.. 6. Phoneix Un, “Lam Faces Media at 4.30am …,” July 3, 2019.

Table 4: July 21st: Yuen Long MTR Attacks

News Protester-Related Action Police/Opponent Related Action Source SCMP (2)1 protesters lay siege to Beijing's liaison office for (1) riot police arrived late on Sunday night because first time the force's capacity was stretched across Hong Kong (2) After another massive anti-government march Island dealing with protests, and promised a review from Causeway Bay to Wan Chai in the afternoon of manpower and response times broke up into rolling waves of protests that spread to (1) The attacks, which left at least 45 people injured, Admiralty, Central and Sheung Wan, the main road started at around 10.40pm, when a mob of men in outside the Hong Kong-Macau Ferry Terminal was white T-shirts, whom witnesses described as triad - the tear smoke-filled battleground for late-night gangsters, attacked black-clad protesters and other clashes between heavily geared riot police and masked passengers with sticks and metal rods at Yuen Long and helmeted youths in black. MTR station (2) peaceful marches had repeatedly ended in (1) Two officers who arrived on the scene seven unlawful demonstrations, with protesters charging minutes later backed off and called for help, after police cordons, laying siege to police headquarters and deciding they did not have the equipment to deal occupying roads with armed crowds (2) brawls broke out between protesters and drivers (2)1 Riot police fire tear gas, rubber bullets … arguing they had no right to block his vehicle (2)2 … amid tightened security measures by police (2)2 The violence came after hundreds of thousands of over fears of escalating violence protesters took to the streets again in a third massive (2) In a separate outbreak of late-night violence, march scores of men in white shirts stormed into Yuen Long MTR station and attacked passengers with rods HKFP (4) protesters vandalised the Tsuen Wan office of (3) Hundreds of masked assailants dressed in white pro-Beijing legislator Junius Ho after he was filmed have assaulted residents, protesters, journalists and a congratulating men in the area of the attacks on lawmaker in Yuen Long Sunday (3) Police officers were not visibly present when the skirmish occurred (3) Police in riot gear arrived at Yuen Long station at around 11:30pm (3) The Front accused the police of failing to take actions in Yuen Long while people were being attacked and instead, unnecessarily firing tear gas at protesters in Sheung Wan. (4) Hours after an anti-extradition march ended in police-protester clashes on Hong Kong Island, a group of masked men battered residents, journalists and a lawmaker, The (6) protesters for besieging the Liaison Office (5) The alleged triad members targeted people Standard dressed in black - the color worn by fugitive bill protesters - while also beating up other passengers with metal sticks and bats (5) did not see any officer an hour after reporting the incident (6) allegations that the government and the police turned a blind eye while triad members were beating civilians in Yuen Long (6) On why she prioritized the liaison office incident before the Yuen Long attack Note 4 Sources used are 1. Christy Leung and Victor Ting, “Chief Defends Delayed Response,” July 23, 2019. 2. SCMP Reporters, “Central Hong Kong Becomes Battleground …,” July 21, 2019. 3. Kris Cheng, “Hong Kong Police Made No Arrests …,” July 22, 2019, 4. Elson Tong, “6 Arrests …,” July 22, 2019 5. Sophie Hui, “Shock, Pain, Frustration Recalled,” July 23, 2019. 6. Phoenix Un, “Lam Dismisses …,” July 23, 2019.

Table 5: August 11th: Tear Gas in Kwai Fong MTR

News Source Protester-Related Action Police/Opponent Related Action SCMP (1) protesters using hit-and-run tactics (1) Police step up use of force (1) the protesters had been heading towards the (1) Police fired tear gas at protesters in an enclosed Kwai Chung Police Station nearby for another flash train station mob-style siege when they were driven back (1) Tear gas was used after multiple warnings and (1) The tourist hub of Tsim Sha Tsui became a MTR announcements that the station was closed battlefield again as the police station came under and trains would not be stopping at Kwai Fong attack for the second straight day, with protesters (1) Police fired tear gas at them from inside, and at lobbing petrol bombs over the barriers protecting the one point at night, anti-riot officers from the Special building front. Tactical Squad charged out to disperse protesters attacking them (2) police admitted firing tear gas inside Kwai Fong station on Sunday night in an unprecedented deployment and also using pepper balls at Tai Koo station, with riot police charging inside to grab protesters who had been moving from one station to another HKFP (3) protesters inside the paid area were generating (3) police officers disguised themselves as smoke and launching projectiles “different characters” during the Causeway Bay (3) a protester outside Tsim Sha Tsui police station operation appeared to be shot by a bean bag round (3) Police reported 149 arrests on Sunday…15 of (4) On Monday, protesters conducted a peaceful those were “core violent rioters,” who were mass sit-in at the airport condemning alleged police deliberately targeted in an “intelligence-led” brutality operation in Causeway Bay (3) police fired one canister of tear gas in the Kwai Fong MTR station, and pepperballs were shot at close range in Tai Koo MTR station (3) police had unveiled their water cannon truck to lawmakers (4) On Sunday, the Hong Kong police fired tear gas inside Kwai Fong MTR station and shot protesters at close range at Tai Koo MTR station (4) The police have their rigid and stringent guidelines in the use of appropriate force, and that requires the lowest level of force in dealing with those situations The Standard (5) moving guerrilla-like to flash points across the (5) Police charged at the crowds in the three city, as the number of people attending approved districts with tear gas rallies dwindled (5) Police soon pushed their defense to Kwai Fong (5) protesters in the Kowloon peninsula moved from MTR Station and fired several more rounds of tear Sham Shui Po to Tsim Sha Tsui before hitting Kwai gas and rubber bullets inside the station Fong (6) Undercover police officers have been infiltrating (5) Protesters confronted police outside Sham Shui the ranks of demonstrators to investigate "radical Po police station, but were soon dispersed by tear protesters" since June gas (6) intelligence operation would only be conducted (5) protesters at Tsim Sha Tsui moved to Kwai Fong against radical protesters "who inflicted violence by MTR to set up road blocks on the section of and used lethal weapons such as petrol bombs Kwai Chung Road outside Kwai Chung police (6) admitted one tear gas cylinder was fired into station Kwai Fong Station on Sunday while dispersing a (5) protesters in the paid area of the station used fire crowd among whom were people using catapults hoses to spray jets of water at anti-riot officers with steel beads outside the station (5) Some protesters pointed laser beams at officers behind the gate and some hurled what believed to be petrol bombs at the station, setting some objects on fire inside the station Note 5 Sources used are 1. SCMP Reporters, “Hong Kong Police Ramp up Force …,” August 12, 2019. 3. Holmes Chan, “Hong Kong Police Top Brass …,” August 12, 2019. 4. Kris Cheng, “Hong Kong Police Shoot Projectiles …,” August 12, 2019, 5. Jane Cheung and Cindy Wan, “Violence …,” August 12, 2019. 6. Cindy Wan and Phoenix Un, “Undercover Cops in Radical Ranks,” August 13, 2019.

Table 6: November 17-30th: Siege of Polytechnic University

News Source Protester-Related Action Police/Opponent Related Action SCMP (1) more than 1,100 people arrested after leaving the (1) The force responded with tear gas, sealed all site, only 46 were registered students at the university campus exits and ordered those inside to leave (1) A total of 3,989 petrol bombs, 1,339 pieces of (2) Police laid siege to Polytechnic University last explosives and 601 bottles of corrosive liquid had night, warning people to leave or face action for been found, alongside 573 seized items that were "taking part in a riot" classified as weapons (2) Police fired a large quantity of tear gas and (1) "assembly line" to make and transfer petrol deployed two water cannons and armoured bombs inside PolyU, while chemicals including vehicles strong alkali and acidic substances as well as raw (2) The two sides battled to gain control of a materials which could be made into explosives strategically located footbridge overlooking the (1) university became an unintended victim because approaches to the tunnel. The bridge also connects it was "strategically close" to the Cross Harbour the Hung Hom railway station to the campus Tunnel in Hung Hom, which was targeted as part of (2) Police set up checkpoints and would only allow the protesters' plan to bring traffic to a standstill. people to leave through a designated exit (1) 1,000 radical protesters and their supporters (2) Police said most of the dangerous material occupied the campus a fortnight ago, and engaged in seized from arrested radicals over the past few days fierce battles with police on November 17 had been stolen from PolyU's laboratories (2) with masked radicals occupying PolyU waging (2) Two water cannons and two armoured vehicles pitched battles against riot police were called in and made several attempts to breach (2) The radicals shot arrows and hurled petrol bombs the radicals' defence line and bricks - sometimes from catapults mounted on the roof of the campus (2) Radical protesters first put up bricks to slow down the police advance. Later they set flammable material and other debris on the bridge ablaze, creating a huge bonfire that caused several explosions (2) dozens of volunteers tried to clear roadblocks on Austin Road near the northern part of PolyU campus but were met with a hail of bricks hurled by a group of masked men. (2) The protesters scattered sharp spikes and bricks on the ground. From the commanding height of the campus rooftop, they thwarted the police advance with a hail of petrol bombs and projectiles HKFP (3) Dozens of demonstrators have refused to leave (3) Hong Kong police have returned control over the blockaded Hung Hom campus for more than a the Polytechnic University (PolyU) campus to the week school management on Friday noon, ending a siege (3) they found a total of 3,989 Molotov cocktails, that has lasted 12 days 1,339 items of explosive, 601 bottles of corrosive (3) The force is happy to see that the process has liquids and 573 items of weapons. On Thursday, been conducted peacefully police said they found 12 bows, 200 arrows and an (3) Hundreds of officers entered the campus on air rifle Thursday, saying that their main objectives were to (3) Over 1,000 people gathered near the Tsim Sha handle offensive weapons and dangerous items, as Tsui Clock Tower on Thursday night to condemn the well as gather evidence related to the extensive police for laying siege PolyU damage (4) Over 1,100 have been arrested in relation to the (3) Officers encountered no protesters during their siege at PolyU two-day search (4) black-clad protesters and police have been locked (3) began on the evening of November 17 when in escalating clashes since November 11, when riot police blocked all campus exits and announced protesters started to occupy universities in keeping that anyone leaving would be arrested for rioting with a larger plan to mobilise a citywide strike and (4) Hong Kong police have announced that they class boycott will enter the Hong Kong Polytechnic University on Thursday morning – over 10 days since the siege began at the Hung Hom campus (4) The “safety team” will consist of negotiators, bomb disposal officers, media liaison officers, social workers and clinical psychologists. It will also include members from the fire and ambulance services – but no riot police (4) PolyU also requested the government’s help to remove or secure the dangerous materials on the campus The Standard (5) More than 400 protesters and hardcore rioters (5) police are aiming to catch hardcore rioters who used petrol bombs and other weapons as they tried to have been holed up in the campus since Saturday flee the police siege of the Hong Kong Polytechnic (5) Police fired tear gas, rubber bullets and sponge University rounds (5) The fierce confrontation began on Saturday night. (5) They also sprayed blue liquid from water Rioters hurled petrol bombs and shot arrows at the cannon trucks and charged protesters with armored junction of Austin Road and Chatham Road South, vehicles and set fire on footbridges above the Cross Harbour (5) They guarded the perimeter of the campus Tunnel carrying AR-15 assault rifles (5)1 Protesters attempted to escape the campus at (5)1 police drove them back with volleys of tear least three times gas and water cannon. (6) The clashes saw a police officer shot in the leg (6) Police fired tear gas on to the bridge and an with an arrow and a riot policeman hit by a steel armored vehicle tried to charge rioters slingshot ball (6) protesters have laid siege to the Cross Harbour Tunnel. (6) Since protesters retreated from Chinese University on Friday, the battlefield has moved to Hung Hom (6) rioters set fire to the flyover connecting the PolyU campus and Hung Hom station at about 7pm (6) Rioters returned and set fire again to the Cheong Wan Road bridge at about 8pm as they were surrounded by police and could not leave Note 6 Sources used are 1. Ho Him Chan and Chris Lau, “Hong Kong Protests: Battered Polytechnic …,” November 29, 2019. 2. Lok-kei Sum et al., “Hong Kong Protests: Cold and Hungry Radicals …,” November 19, 2019. 3. Holmes Chan, “Hong Kong Police Lift Siege …,” November 29, 2019, 4. Holmes Chan, “Search for Trapped …,” November 27, 2019. 5. Staff Reporter, “PolyU Team Finds a Ghost Campus,” November 27, 2019.