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Paul Milgrom
Paul Milgrom Wins the BBVA Foundation Frontiers of Knowledge Award for His Contributions to Auction Theory and Industrial Organization
Fact-Checking Glen Weyl's and Stefano Feltri's
Putting Auction Theory to Work
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES COMPLEMENTARITIES and COLLUSION in an FCC SPECTRUM AUCTION Patrick Bajari Jeremy T. Fox Working Paper
The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting Or with Incomplete Information
Approximation of Large Dynamic Games
Determinacy for Infinite Games With
Equilibrium Selection in Multi-Player Games with Auction Applications∗
Adverse Selection and Auction Design for Internet Display Advertising†
Nelson Presentation
Celis Washington 0250E 10366.Pdf (969.5Kb)
Samuel Bowles and Wendy Carlin 28 October 2019 Abstract. We Make
Ricardo De La O
1 the Unity of Auction Theory: Paul Milgrom's Masterclass Eric Maskin
Pareto-Nash- Stackelberg Game and Control Theory Intelligent Paradigms and Applications Smart Innovation, Systems and Technologies
SEP 261987 W Laura Foster Library
Hard Choices and Hard Limits for Artificial Intelligence
The Human Side of Mechanism Design: a Tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
Top View
Supplement to "Equilibrium Selection in Auctions and High Stakes Games"
Investment Incentives in Near-Optimal Mechanisms∗
Information Economics
(I) 產業組織一 Course Outline
Before the FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION Washington, D.C
An Examination of the Influence of Theory and Individual Theorists on Empirical Research in Microeconomics
Collusion Agreements in Auctions: Design and Execution by an Informed Principal⇤
Minimax Rates in Permutation Estimation for Feature Matching
Complexity in Paul R. Milgrom's Discovering Prices
Playing General Imperfect-Information Games Using Game-Theoretic Algorithms
The Failure of FCC Spectrum Auctions
Crowding Theory and Executive Compensation FINAL
On the State of the Art in Game Theory: an Interview with Robert Aumann*
Partial Strategyproofness: Relaxing Strategy- Proofness for the Random Assignment Problem∗
Reading List 1998
The Book Review Column1 by William Gasarch Department of Computer Science University of Maryland at College Park College Park, MD, 20742 Email:
[email protected]
Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding by Lawrence M
Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms∗
Deploying Affect-Inspired Mechanisms to Enhance Agent Decision
Strategy-Proofness Versus Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High School Match
Discovering Auctions: Contributions of Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson∗
The Unity of Auction Theory: Milgrom's Masterclass
A New Payment Rule for Core-Selecting Package Auctions∗
572365672010.Pdf
Strategyproofness in the Large As a Desideratum for Market Design
The Economist As Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation As Tools for Design Economics1
Playing Games with the Law
Paul Milgrom Shirley R
Limited Foresight Equilibrium
Paul Milgrom Nobel Bio
Hayek's Contribution to a Reconstruction of Economic Theory
The Old Theory of Economic Policy and the New Institutionalism*
Econ 612: Microeconomics 1 Textbook
Informationally Robust Auction Design
Reflections on the 2020 Nobel Memorial Prize Awarded to Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson
But First, Why Is Mechanism Design a Big Deal?
Beyond Discoverydiscovery®
Coalition-Proofness and Correlation with Arbitrary Communication Possibilities*
The Evolutionary Basis of Collective Action Samuel Bowles Herbert Gintis
Regret Minimizing Equilibria and Mechanisms for Games with Strict Type Uncertainty
Strategyproofness in the Large As a Desideratum for Market Design
Economic Power: the Political Structure of Voluntary Exchanges∗
Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson's Contributions To
Mechanism Design with Maxmin Agents: Theory and an Application