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Auction theory
Uncoercible E-Bidding Games
Putting Auction Theory to Work
Bimodal Bidding in Experimental All-Pay Auctions
The Ability of Dutch Foreclosure Auctions in Maximizing Seller Revenue
Foreclosure Auctions∗
Auction Theory
Equilibrium Bids in Sponsored Search Auctions: Theory and Evidence
Explicit Shading Strategies for Repeated Truthful Auctions
Auction Theory II
The All-Pay Auction Under Mean-Variance Preferences
Countering the Winner's Curse: Optimal Auction Design in A
Bidding for Contract Games Applying Game Theory to Analyze First Price Sealed Bid Auctions
1 the Unity of Auction Theory: Paul Milgrom's Masterclass Eric Maskin
Auction Theory: Some Basics
Auction Theory an Intrroduction Into Mechanism Design
Practical Secrecy-Preserving, Verifiably Correct and Trustworthy
Generalized Second Price Auctions with Hierarchical Bidding
Auction Theory for the New Economy
Top View
Auction Theory
A Multinomial Logit Framework to Estimating Bid Shading in Procurement Auctions, with Application to Cattle Sales in the Texas Panhandle
Generalized Second Price Auction Analysis Paper
Theory and Practice of Auctions
Economic Analysis of Proposals That Would Restrict Participation in the Incentive Auction
On the Efficiency of All-Pay Mechanisms
Selling to Advised Buyers∗
Countering the Winner's Curse
Network Economics -- Lecture 5: Auctions and Applications
Empirical Documentation of Bid Shading in the Discriminatory Auction
Internet Advertising and the Generalized Second-Price Auction: Selling Billions of Dollars Worth of Keywords
Uniform-Price Auctions: Update of the Treasury Experience
Introduction to Auctions†
Download Paper
Analyzing Unique-Bid Auction Sites for Fun and Profit
All-Pay Auctions with Pre- and Post-Bidding Options Fredrik Ødegaard Western University
Bidder Turnout, Auction Houses and Market Conditions
Winner's Curse Is a Feature of Auctions Which Has Been Observed for Many Years Across Different Designs of Auctions in Diverse Areas
Bidder Behavior in Multi-Unit Auctions Evidence from Swedish Treasury
Foreclosure Auctions∗
Auction Theory
Foreclosure Auctions
Market Design: Theory and Applications Auction Theory
Number of Bidders and the Winner's Curse
Auction Theory
Behavior in All-Pay Auctions with Incomplete Information
Foreclosure Auctions∗
The Unique-Lowest Sealed-Bid Auction
Scientific Background: Improvements to Auction Theory and Inventions of New Auction Formats
Common Value Actions and the Winner's Curse
Auction Theory
What Really Matters in Auction Design
Paul Milgrom and Robert Wilson's Contributions To