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- Expert Report of Carl Shapiro
- Infinite Populations, Choice and Determinacy
- NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES RULES, COMMUNICATION and COLLUSION: NARRATIVE EVIDENCE from the SUGAR INSTITUTE CASE David Genesove Wa
- Redalyc.Fifty Years of the Nash Program, 1953-2003
- Towards a Theory of Learning in Games
- Game Theory and the Law: Ready for Prime Time?
- Models in Microeconomic Theory Covers Basic Models in Current Microeconomic Theory
- Formation of Coalition Structures As a Non-Cooperative Game 1: Theory
- List-Rationalizable Choice
- Economics & Finance 2009
- Coalitional Bargaining Games: a New Concept of Value and Coalition Formation
- Coalition Formation in Political Games
- Ariel Rubinstein Economic Fables
- Advanced Microeconomic Analysis I Harvard University • Fall 2018
- Introduction to Mechanism Design
- The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior Under" Almost Common Knowledge"
- Bounded Rationality and Mechanism Design
- Analogy-Based Expectation Equilibrium and Related Concepts
- A Personal Reflection on Robert J. Aumann's Approach
- Rational Choice Theories of Politics & Society
- Eric S. Maskin2 School of Social Science, Institute for Advanced Study, Einstein Drive, Princeton, NJ 0850, USA
- Economics and Language
- Berk-Nash Equilibrium: a Framework for Modeling Agents with Misspecified Models,” Arxiv 1411.1152, November 2014
- Robert J. Aumann Center for the Study of Rationality, and Department of Mathematics, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, Israel
- Determinacy of Nonzero-Sum Games
- Nash Equilibrium
- Equilibrium in the Jungle*