Flood Preparedness-Response-Recovery & Risk Reduction

Flood Preparedness-Response-Recovery & Risk Reduction

2008-07-10, EMOPS-HPS

SYNTHESIS OF LESSONS LEARNED ON

FLOOD PREPAREDNESS-RESPONSE-RECOVERY & RISK REDUCTION

This synthesis draws together lessons from UNICEF analysis of experience(primarily over 2006-7) in various reviews, workshops and evaluations as well as relevant lessons from a recent external synthesis of lessons from ALNAP-PROvention Consortium (January 2008). As sources mostly provided a cross-sectoral overview of flood response, lessons on specific technical programme elements are less well developed. Many of the lessons are common to all humanitarian action in natural disaster and rapid onset emergencies – those with specific flood-related elements are highlighted in blue.

Preparedness – National capacity development

Experience consistently shows that UNICEF must be engaging with national partners in preparedness planning. Thefocus of capacity development with national partners in Country Programming must include preparedness planning. This is both true in regions where government is generally the weakest actor in the response (several countries in WCAR) and where government is taking a strong role (Mozambique, India, Pakistan). (WCARO, 2007:7; UNICEF Pakistan, 2007 ppt) The elements of preparedness planning that appear key for national capacity development include: establishingsector/cluster coordination structures (including decisions on which clusters and addressing central and local coordination) and distribution of roles and responsibilities including leadership; and Rapid Assessment and information management systems(WCARO, 2007:8; UNICEF Pakistan, 2007 ppt; Simpkin, 2000:10).

Coordination at national and local levels is critical for the response to be effective (multiple sources beyond reference list). There also must be attention to coordination and possible tensions between central and local level authorities; COs must have implementation strategies that take these dynamics into account (WCARO, 2007:9). By extension, preparedness should entail minimum government readiness at decentralized levels in high risk areas which can be facilitated by sub-offices(WCARO, 2007: 3; 10)

Preparedness – IA and NGO partnerships

As concepts of partnership are changing, it is clear that we must strengthen/expand NGO partnerships at central and local levels in line with Humanitarian Reform (WCARO, 2007: 4).

UNICEF can play a critical role in linking NGOs with the national government partners to ensure good information exchange and coordination and preparing government to engage with a wider range of NGO partners (ALNAP, 2008: 12; ESARO 2007: 27)

Similarly, there is a clear recognition that we must involve IA partners in SWOT and EPRP exercises(WCARO, 2007: 9).

Experience has also shown the important role national NGOs can play. Investment in national NGO partners by UNICEF has been seen as critical to rapid response in a number of countries, though this capacity development role is labour intensive and cannot be undertaken lightly (ESARO, 2007:25). UNICEF fostering partnerships between international and national NGOs can facilitate this while sharing the labour(ESARO, 2007:25; Simpkin, 2000: 10).

In support of all of the above, there is consistent recognition that response was/would have been faster wherepre-standing PCAsare established with identified NGOs outlining roles and responsibilities (WCARO, 2007: 10; ESARO, 2007: 27, 36)and training provided (UNICEF Bangladesh, 2007 ppt).

Preparedness -- Involving affected populations

In any progress is to be made in involving affected populations, there must be advance work on this in a preparedness phase. Concrete discussions with partners on how to effectively involve communities in planning, implementation and/or monitoring must happen as part of preparedness work as opposed to during the response (ESARO, 2007:27; ALNAP, 2008:5).

Related to participation, and true for all emergency preparedness/response, we continue to be weak in providing information to affected populations/communities – on the assessment, response and recovery. In addition to a key “rights-based” issue, this is also a critical base to participation (ALNAP, 2008: 5; EO draft synthesis of Tsunami evaluations) Preparedness should include giving thought to establishing mechanisms/practices/physical means for communicating with/to affected populations.

See also risk reduction below.

Vulnerability-capacity analysis (VCA), rapid assessment (RA) andmonitoring

Preparedness for undertaking RA is critical. It requires tailoring existing tools according to the country context, including anticipating who will do the RA (government, NGO, etc.). Italso requires an assessment of technical capacities of respective partners(WCARO, 2007:13, 29). Adaptation and simplification of the IRA is a common concern (UNICEF Pakistan, 2007 ppt).

Preparedness must also consider information management systems to collect and process data from RA (including pre-crisis data) – this includes capacity development for systems such as DevInfo/Emergency Info (UNICEF Bangladesh, 2007 ppt)and forging links with other existing national/IA systems such as VAM (Simpkin, 2000:12).

Critical preparedness work on vulnerability-capacity analysiswill entail gathering good analysis/building understanding of traditional coping strategies forfloods (ALNAP, 2008:5); this is a critical opportunity for strong inclusion of gender in VCA that will lay the ground work for a more gendered response. ESAR has also seen need for understanding/advocacy on key sector policies that may aggravate people’s vulnerability to hazards; for example policies on food and agriculture that counter coping strategies(ESARO, 2008:1).

Rapid assessment/needs assessment in flood response, more so than in other emergencies, has to be planned for as a rolling exercise. As in all emergencies, a distinction must be made between RA in the first 24 hours (essentially a statement on the situation of children) and an IRA with systematic field data collection to be started within the first week to 10 days. RA must also be designed to expand in both coverage and depth of information as flood waters recede and access increases, with different levels of RA ongoing in different locations simultaneously.

As with other natural disasters, this rollingRA has to anticipate that the affected populations’ needs and their own response capacities will evolve over time. In flood response, this includes changing needs during the flood and as flood waters recede and populations return to devastated homes/ communities – both immediate response and recovery dimensions will be revealed only gradually. RA must also contemplate other changes over time: changing response/recovery support as some international NGOs exit; changes in the local economy both due to floods and the flood response;changes in gender relations which in floods are often linked to landownership and housing registration(ALNAP, 2008:5; ESARO, 2007: 28; Simpkin, 2000:14).

In flood situations – where access is often a critical challenge – it is important to combine rapid assessment of newly accessible areas with some immediate relief supplies – water purification, bednets (ESARO, 2007)

Approaches for RA must also contemplate options if the government is reluctant to trigger a RA at the outset – this has been a problem both where government wasoverwhelmed and where it was reluctant to recognize an emergency. Experience shows a range of options – the UNCT undertaking a needs assessment on its own; or agencies undertaking an informal joint field visit. Where assessment is delayed, clear definitions of priorities and most vulnerable populations have been weak.(WCARO, 2007:13; UNICEF Bangladesh, 2007 ppt).

As in other type of emergencies and especially where government is a strong partner, establishing mechanisms/practices for joint monitoring are important (UNICEF Pakistan, 2007 ppt)

Preparedness – salient programme elements(see limitations in introduction)

Education

COs still struggle with partners (government and NGO) and donors in getting recognition of education as an emergency need in flood response (UNICEF Nepal, 2007 ppt; ESARO, 2007: 22). In some cases, this recognition is also mixed within the COs (ESARO, 2007 ).

Child protection

Similarly, integratingchild protection and SGBV as part of the flood reponse has been challenging. (UNICEF Nepal, 2007 pp; ESARO, 2007:22; ESARO:2008: 1) Achieving high coverage in either area proves challenging.

Nutrition

Community-based Management of Severe Acute Malnutrition has been recognized as an important approach to extend coverage for emergency response. However, it also brings challenges in supervision and is clearly an area for preparedness capacity building (ESARO 2007: 26; UNICEF India, 2007 ppt)

Provision of supplementary food under the existing MoU with WFP has often been problematic and until this is resolved globally, country level preparedness must include discussion with WFP to ensure supplies. (UNICEF NY Emergencies Meeting, 29 July 2008)

Promotion of appropriate infant feeding practices is a priority and in flood response, where breastmilk substitutes and infant formula with bottles and teats are indiscriminately distributed, the consequences of unsafe water increase dramatically. National policies and sector standards on breastmilk substitutes are a key preparedness measure. (Correspondence PD-EMOPS, 2008)

Health

Reducing the spread of disease and securing the quality of the environment require good understanding of water and sanitation conditions, disease surveillance and preparedness of health actors to respond.(ALNAP, 2008: 9)

Programme response on cholera prevention/control also requires preparedness mechanisms for cross-border information sharing (ESARO, 2008:1)

Malaria is an important life saving intervention in flood response in Africa at least. High coverage of Long-Life Insecticide-Treated Nets (LLITN) distribution can be scaled up quickly especially where a malaria control and treatment programme is in place in the country. The challenge however comes in following up that population with the wider Roll Back Malaria programming. Experience in the Horn of Africa also shows that benchmarks for LLITN distribution appear unclear across the different countries and emergencies. A coherent approach is needed among partners, at least within each country. This requires considering targeting as appropriate both in ongoing programmes and emergency response as the two may differ. (ESARO 2007: 19)

WASH

Communications for development/emergency consistently proves a challenge in emergency response – it is often not well covered by UNICEF and partners alike and difficult to see results in the short term. And yet the hygiene education component of WASHand Information, Education and Communication (IEC) on use of supplies for safe water are critical in flood response. Experience shows that it is next to impossible to ‘catch up’ on producing good health messaging materials in the thick of the emergency – having good IEC materials for immediate dissemination is clearly an area for preparedness work. (ESARO, 1997: 22; UNICEF Nepal, 2007 ppt) Advance work must also include building awareness and capacities among UNICEF staff and partners as to the importance of this component, especially where partnering with private sector (ESARO, 2007: 36).

Preparedness -- Operations

Experience consistently shows the high value of pre-positioning of suppliesfor a pre-defined number of affected people (including at decentralized levels) – where stocks were pre-positioned in WCAR in 2007 floods, this was considered the strongest factor in the response; this was also truein ROSA COs in 2007. Similar conclusions have been drawn by COs who had leftover supplies from previous emergencies. Critical stocks mentioned include: essential drugs, BP-5, therapeutic food, tube-wells, low flush emergency latrine sets for IDPs (ESARO, 2007: 33; ESARO, 2008: 1; UNICEF Pakistan, 2007 ppt; UNICEF Bangladesh, 2007 ppt; UNICEF Nepal, 2007 ppt; UNICEF India, 2007 ppt; WCARO, 2007: 14).

Also experience has underlined the importance of complementary logistics preparedness and support (LCAs, LTAs including for transportation and warehousing and/or wherever possible agreements with WFP on warehousing, logistics staffing covered in HR mobilization plan) and warehouse management capacity of UNICEF and partners (ESARO, 2007: 36; WCARO, 2007: 14; UNICEF Bangladesh, 2007, ppt, UNICEF Nepal, 2007 ppt; UNICEF India, 2007 ppt; Simpkin, 2000: 7). This entails thinking through decentralized distribution and partners who can effectively support this (ESARO, 2007: 33; UNICEF Nepal, 2007 ppt.) Finding/defining fast-track procedures for emergency logistics – customs, visas, air traffic control as well as radio transmitting permits -- also makes a difference in the actual response (Simpkin, 2000: 6 ; UNICEF Bangladesh, 2007 ppt). In particular for flooding, planning must anticipate transportation solutions when flood waters are high – mobilizing helicopters through civil-military arrangements and/or boats (ESARO, 2007:18 ; Simpkin, 2000: 7).

In contingency plans, there is value in explicitly identifying those programme resourcesthat can be diverted for the immediate programme response -- funding and stocks (ESARO, 2007: 17, 36; WCARO, 2007:15). Similarly, in high-risk countries, overall response can be speeded wheredraft proposals such as CERF requests and other funding requests are prepared in advance (WCARO, 2007: 4).

Human resources mobilization planningmust be part of preparedness, including use of rapid internal re-deployments of staff in larger offices and attention to surge for Operations in general, human resources and admin especially (ESARO, 2007: 36; UNICEF Pakistan, 2007, ppt). As an additional feature specific to seasonal flooding in many countries, HR mobilization plan must contemplate summer leave plans (UNICEF Pakistan, 2007 ppt; ROSA 2007 ppt)

Setting up ad-hoc emergency management systems within the office including at sub-office levels – e.g. taskforces – help clarify roles and responsibilities within the CO and galvinize response (WCARO, 2007:10; UNICEF Bangladesh, 1997 ppt).

Support to CO preparedness

Several COs mentioned the value of preparedness training for their own staff and/or having gone through EPRP development and simulations. Important training for field staff noted focused on situation assessment and monitoring, and coordination with partners. (WCARO, 2007 ppt; UNICEF Bangladesh, 2007 ppt)

WCAR is significant contributor to experience in SWOT exercises and has found good results in doing simulation exercises just before flood season in high-risk countries to test preparedness, staff response skills and update EPRP (WCARO, 2007: 11).

WCARO and ROSA/EAPRO have also started in 2008 using specific preparedness checklists in their interactions with high-risk COs in the lead up to flood season.

Also suggested that a CO that is prepared for floods will have key elements of the flood response integrated in the AWP(WCARO, 2007: 11; ESARO, 2008: 1; ROSA, 2007 ppt).

There is an important role for RO support in clarifying and preparing for implementation of the cluster approach especially as Country Teams are often unclear(UNICEF Nepal, 2007 ppt)

There is still some lack of clarity – overlaps and gaps – in distribution of responsibilities between HQ-RO in supporting CO. The RO oversight role needs to be more clearly established. Conference call format still receive mixed reviews. (ROSA, 2007 ppt).

There are multiple experiences where governments have delayed the response (WCARO, 2007:7; ESARO, 2008: 1). There is value in anticipating possible avenues for advocating with government at countyr, regional and global levels as appropriate.

Early warning/early action

We often have information for flood warning with longer lead times than for other crises, but globally we are still not consistently using this effectively (ALNAP, 2008: 4; Simkin et al, 2000). Within UNICEF there is feedback suggesting that the EW/EA is not working as a real-time emergency preparedness/contingency planning monitoring mechanism – more probing is needed on how this works/does not(ROSA, 2007 ppt).

Recovery and risk reduction

It is important to note that early recovery comes earlier in flood response, with opportunities opening up as soon as flood water recede (ALNAP, 2008:7).Recovery options also include coordinated IA efforts to strengthen capacities at decentralized levels (Simpkin, 2000: 17).

Many elements of risk reduction that can be integrated in regular country programming may be less about new interventions and more about strengthening risk reduction in best practice standards of what we do already. E.g. in WASH, simple things like raising tube wells and boreholes above flood water level to prevent contamination; raised latrines, pit liners or rings, sealed pits or tanks, or contained leach fields; specific flood-related elements of hygiene education to schools and community groups; flood proofing through raising plinths or foundations for schools and flood shelters have also been successful (ALNAP, 2008: 4,10).

Flood risk reduction and response will be more effective where local coping mechanisms are integrated in both assessment and programme design. “Many flood-prone communities have local and traditional institutions dealing with disasters” (ALNAP, 2008: 3, 5)

Effective ways of strengthening community level preparedness include support to the development of functional local level networks/groups, support to their organizational capacity development and support to preparedness planning. While NGOs and Asian governments have undertaken small-scale mitigation, teaching of lifesaving skills, contingency planning and upgrading service provision, ad hoc measures have often been found unsustainable. Continuity of funding is an issue. In this context, support to enable communities to link up to national disaster response mechanisms is key. (ALNAP, 2008: 3) There is often a critical opening for community-level preparedness planning just after the relief phase – there is interest and it is seen to reduce post disaster anxiety. (ALNAP, 2008: 4)

Bibliography

•ALNAP-Provention Consortium (January 2008) Flood Disasters: Learning from Previous Relief and Recovery Operations

•UNICEF WCARO (November 2007) Review of 2007 UNICEF Emergency Response to Recurrent Floods in West and Central Africa

•UNICEF Solomon Islands (Aril 2008) Solomon Islands April 2nd 2007 Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster: An Evaluation of UNICEF Response in the Emergency and Initial Recovery Phases

•UNICEF ESARO (July 2007) Review of the 2006 UNICEF Emergency Response in the Horn of Africa -- Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia

•UNICEF ESARO (May 2008) RMT Side Meeting: Southern Africa Flood Response – Key Challenges and Recommendations for Action

•UNICEF Mozambique (2007) UNICEF Mozambique Real Time Review of the ZambeziRiver Basin Floods and the Cyclone Favio Emergency Response

•UN (2008) Final Draft Lessons Learned Northern Sudan Floods 2007

•Simkin, P. and J. Gottwals (July 2000) Working Paper: Lessons Learned from the Mozambique Humanitarian Flood Relief Operation February-June 2000 (UN)

•UNICEF Bangladesh CO (October 2007) ppt to RMT The Bangladesh Flood 2007

•UNICEF NY Correspondence PD-EMOPS 7 July 2008

•UNICEF NY Emergencies Meeting Minutes 29 July 2008

•UNICEF Pakistan CO (October 2007) ppt to RMT Review of Preparedness and Response to June 2007 Floods

•UNICEF ROSA (October 2007) ppt Emergency Preparedness

•UNICEF India CO (October 2007) ppt

•UNICEF Pakistan "Lessons Learned – UNICEF Child Protection Response to June 2007 floods"

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