JENNIFER LACKEY DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY 1880 CAMPUS DRIVE, EVANSTON, IL 60208 PHONE: 847.491.2557 • E- MAIL: J - [email protected] WEBPAGE: HTTPS://SITES.NORTHWESTERN.EDU/JAL788 EMPLOYMENT Director, Northwestern Prison Education Program 2018–present Wayne and Elizabeth Jones Professor of Philosophy, Northwestern University 2015–present Professor of Philosophy, Northwestern University 2012–2015 Associate Professor of Philosophy, Northwestern University 2007–2012 Faculty Associate in Women’s Studies, Northern Illinois University 2004–2007 Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Northern Illinois University 2003–2007 Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Pomona College 2000–2003 VISITING POSITIONS Visiting Professor, Universität zu Köln (Cologne, Germany) 2018 Visiting Professor, École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (Paris, France) 2018 Faculty Fellow, Downing College, University of Cambridge (Cambridge, England) 2003 EDUCATION Ph.D. in Philosophy, Brown University 2000 Dissertation: Rationality, Defeaters, and Testimony Committee: Ernest Sosa (advisor), Jaegwon Kim, James Van Cleve M.A. in Philosophy, University of Chicago 1995 B.A. in Philosophy with Honors, magna cum laude, Saint Mary’s College, Notre Dame 1994 RESEARCH INTERESTS AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION Epistemology, Social Epistemology, Applied Epistemology, Legal Epistemology AREAS OF COMPETENCE Ethics, Philosophy of Language, Feminist Philosophy, Epistemology of Religion, Philosophy of Mind PUBLICATIONS AUTHORED BOOKS [1] The Epistemology of Groups, (forthcoming). Oxford: Oxford University Press. [2] Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge, (2008, hardback; 2010, paperback). Oxford: Oxford University Press. v Reviewed in Mind, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, The Philosophical Quarterly, Analysis, Analytic Philosophy, Erkenntnis, and Philosophy Now EDITED BOOKS [3] Applied Epistemology (under contract). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Volume of all new articles on a range of issues in applied epistemology. This collection includes papers by Karen Frost-Arnold; Kristie Dotson and Ezgi Sertler; Mylan Engel Jr.; Alexander Guerrero; Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa and Bianca Crewe; Michael Patrick Lynch and Hanna Gunn; Rebecca Kukla; Jennifer Lackey; Lauren Leydon-Hardy; Hallie Liberto; Aidan McGlynn; Rachel McKinnon; José Medina and Tempest Henning; Charles Mills; and Geoff Pynn. [4] Academic Freedom (2018). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Volume of all new articles on the topic of academic freedom. This collection includes papers by David Estlund; Jennifer Lackey; Michael Patrick Lynch; Mary Kate McGowan; Michele M. Moody-Adams; Martha C. Nussbaum; Philip Pettit; John Protevi; Jennifer Saul; Robert Simpson and Amia Srinivasan; and Brian Weatherson. [5] Essays in Collective Epistemology (2014). Oxford: Oxford University Press. Volume of all new articles in collective epistemology. This collection includes papers by Alexander Bird; Rachael Briggs, Fabrizio Cariani, Kenny Easwaran, and Branden Fitelson; David Christensen; Margaret Gilbert and Daniel Pilchman; Alvin I. Goldman; Jennifer Lackey; Christian List; Philip Pettit; Ernest Sosa; and Sarah Wright. [6] The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays (2013), co-edited with David Christensen. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Volume of all new articles in the epistemology of disagreement. This collection includes papers by Robert Audi; David Christensen; Stewart Cohen; Bryan Frances; Sanford Goldberg; John Hawthorne and Amia Srinivasan; Thomas Kelly; Jonathan Kvanvig; Jennifer Lackey; Ernest Sosa; and Brian Weatherson. [7] The Epistemology of Testimony (2006), co-edited with Ernest Sosa. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Volume of all new articles in the epistemology of testimony. This collection includes papers by Robert Audi; C. A. J. Coady; Elizabeth Fricker; Richard Fumerton; Sanford Goldberg; Peter Graham; Jennifer Lackey; Keith Lehrer; Richard Moran; Frederick Schmitt; Ernest Sosa; and James Van Cleve. PAPERS [8] “False Confessions and Testimonial Injustice,” forthcoming in the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology. [9] “The Total Evidence View of the Epistemology of Sexual Consent,” forthcoming in Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Applied Epistemology. (Oxford: Oxford University Press). [10] “Punishment and Transformation,” forthcoming in Enoch Lambert and John Schwenkler (eds.), Becoming Someone New: Essays on Transformative Experience, Choice, and Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press). [11] “Assertoric Quality,” forthcoming in Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Assertion. (Oxford: Oxford University Press). [12] “When Should We Disagree About Politics?” forthcoming in Elizabeth Edenberg and Michael Hannon (eds.), Political Epistemology. [13] “The Duty to Object,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2018): doi: 10.1111/phpr.12563. [14] “Credibility and the Distribution of Epistemic Goods,” in Kevin McCain (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. (Springer Publishing, 2018): 145–168. [15] “Academic Freedom,” in Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Academic Freedom. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018): 3–20. [16] “Silence and Objecting,” in Casey Johnson (ed.), Voicing Dissent: The Ethics and Epistemology of Making Disagreement Public. (Routledge, 2018): 82–96. [17] “Group Lies,” in Eliot Michaelson and Andreas Stokke (eds.), Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018): 262–284. [18] “Experts and Peer Disagreement,” in Matthew Benton, John Hawthorne, and Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018): 228–245. [19] “Group Assertion.” Erkenntnis 83 (2018): 21–42. [20] “Collective Epistemology,” in Kirk Ludwig and Marija Jankovic (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Collective Intentionality (Routledge, 2017): 196–208. [21] “The Epistemology of Testimony and Religious Belief,” in William J. Abraham and Frederick D. Aquino (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of the Epistemology of Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017): 203–220. [22] “Norms of Credibility.” American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2017): 323–337. [23] “What Is Justified Group Belief?” The Philosophical Review 125 (2016): 341–396. [24] “Assertion and Expertise.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2016): 509–517. [25] “To Preempt or Not to Preempt.” Episteme 13 (2016): 571–576. [26] “Disagreement,” in Robert Audi (ed.), The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015). [27] “Reliability and Knowledge in the Epistemology of Testimony.” Episteme 12 (2015): 203–208. [28] “Social Epistemology: 5 Questions,” in Duncan Pritchard and Vincent Hendricks (eds.), Social Epistemology: 5 Questions (Automatic Press/VIP, 2015): 111–125. [29] “Socially Extended Knowledge.” Philosophical Issues 24 (2014): 282–298. [30] “Taking Religious Disagreement Seriously,” in Laura Frances Callahan and Timothy O’Connor (eds.), Religious Faith and Intellectual Virtue (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014): 299–316. [31] “A Deflationary Account of Group Testimony,” in Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Essays in Collective Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014): 64–94. [32] “Lies and Deception: An Unhappy Divorce.” Analysis 73 (2013): 236–248. [33] “The Virtues of Testimony,” in John Turri (ed.), Virtuous Thoughts: The Philosophy of Ernest Sosa (Dordrecht: Springer, 2013): 193–204. [34] “Introduction,” (with David Christensen) in David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 1–3. [35] “Disagreement and Belief Dependence: Why Numbers Matter,” in David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013): 243–268. [36] “Deficient Testimonial Knowledge,” in Tim Henning and David P. Schweikard (eds.), Knowledge, Virtue, and Action: Putting Epistemic Virtues to Work (New York: Routledge, 2013): 30–52. [37] “Group Knowledge Attributions,” in Jessica Brown and Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012): 243–269. [38] “Assertion and Isolated Secondhand Knowledge,” in Jessica Brown and Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 251–275. [39] “Testimony: Acquiring Knowledge from Others,” in Alvin I. Goldman and Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: An Anthology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011): 71–91. [40] “Testimonial Knowledge,” in Sven Bernecker and Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Routledge Companion to Epistemology (London and New York: Routledge, 2010): 316–325. [41] “Disagreement, Epistemology of,” Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy (2010). [42] “Acting on Knowledge.” Philosophical Perspectives 24 (2010): 361–382. [43] “A Justificationist View of Disagreement’s Epistemic Significance,” in Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar, and Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Social Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 298–325. [44] “What Should We Do When We Disagree?” in Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 3 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010): 274–293. [45] “Testimony” in Jonathan Dancy, Ernest Sosa, and Matthias Steup (eds.), A Companion to Epistemology, Second Edition (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010): 763–768. [46] “Knowledge and Credit.” Philosophical Studies 142 (2009): 27–42. [47] “What Luck Is Not.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2008): 255–267. [48] “Perspectives