- After you have read the research report, please give us your frank opinion on the contents. All comments––large or small, complimentary or caustic––will be appreciated. Mail them to CADRE/AR, Building 1400, 401 Chennault Circle, Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428. Turning the Vertical Flank Givens Airpower as a Maneuver Force in the Theater Campaign - Cut along dotted line Thank you for your assistance - COLLEGE OF AEROSPACE DOCTRINE, RESEARCH AND EDUCATION AIR UNIVERSITY Turning the Vertical Flank Airpower as a Maneuver Force in the Theater Campaign ROBERT P. GIVENS Lt Col, USAF CADRE Paper No. 13 Air University Press Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-6615 June 2002 Air University Library Cataloging Data Givens, Robert P. Turning the vertical flank : airpower as a maneuver force in the theater cam- paign / Robert P. Givens. p. ; cm. –– (CADRE paper, ISSN 1537-3371) Includes bibliographical references. Contents: Functions of a maneuver force––1973 Yom Kippur War––1972 Easter Offensive––Normandy Campaign. ISBN 1-58566-108-2 1. Air power. 2. Maneuver warfare. 3. Air warfare. 4. Tactics. 5. Unified oper- ations (Military science). I. Title. II. Series. 358.4142––dc21 Disclaimer Opinions, conclusions, and recommendations expressed or implied within are solely those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of Air University, the United States Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government agency. Cleared for public release: distribution unlimited. This CADRE Paper and others in the series are available electroni- cally at the Air University Research Web site http://research. maxwell.af.mil under “Research Papers” then “Special Collections.” ii CADRE Papers CADRE Papers are occasional publications sponsored by the Airpower Research Institute of Air University’s College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education (CADRE). Dedicated to promoting understanding of air and space power theory and application, these studies are published by the Air University Press and broadly distributed to the US Air Force, the Department of Defense and other governmental organiza- tions, leading scholars, selected institutions of higher learn- ing, public policy institutes, and the media. All military members and civilian employees assigned to Air University are invited to contribute unclassified manuscripts. Manuscripts should deal with air and/or space power history, theory, doctrine or strategy, or with joint or combined service matters bearing on the application of air and/or space power. Authors should submit three copies of a double-spaced, typed manuscript and an electronic version of the manuscript on a 3.5-inch disk(s) along with a brief (200-word maximum) abstract. The electronic file should be compatible with Microsoft Windows and Microsoft Word. 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Please send inquiries or comments to: Dean of Research Airpower Research Institute CADRE 401 Chennault Circle Maxwell AFB AL 36112-6428 Tel: (334) 953-6875 DSN 493-6875 Fax: (334) 953-6739 Internet: [email protected] iii Contents Chapter Page DISCLAIMER . ii FOREWORD . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . xi 1 INTRODUCTION . 1 Methodology . 3 Clarifications . 4 Notes . 5 2 FUNCTIONS OF A MANEUVER FORCE . 7 Ancient Greece––Shock Action through Direct Contact . 7 Rome—A Maneuver Force Exerts a Zone of Influence over the Enemy . 9 Neoclassical Period—A Maneuver Force Compels or Denies Battle . 10 Napoleonic Era—A Maneuver Force Gains and Exploits a Position of Advantage . 13 Maneuver Force Performance Characteristics . 15 Gettysburg Campaign . 16 Summary . 22 Notes . 23 3 1973 YOM KIPPUR WAR . 27 Overview . 27 Maneuver Force Characteristics of Israeli Air Operations . 32 Summary . 45 Notes . 46 4 1972 EASTER OFFENSIVE . 49 Overview . 49 Air Campaign Phases Related to Maneuver Force Characteristics . 53 Summary . 62 Notes . 63 v Chapter Page 5 NORMANDY CAMPAIGN . 65 Overview . 65 Maneuver Force Characteristics of Allied Airpower . 66 Summary . 78 Notes . 79 6 CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS . 81 Conclusions . 81 Implications . 84 Final Thoughts . 85 Notes . 85 BIBLIOGRAPHY . 87 Maps Sinai Front . 28 Golan Front . 29 Israeli Advance . 31 1972 Easter Offensive . 51 Normandy Air Campaign Area . 73 vi Foreword The role of airpower in theater campaigns is a matter of heat- ed debate among the military services and their supporters. Lt Col Robert P. Givens’s Turning the Vertical Flank: Airpower As a Maneuver Force in the Theater Campaign addresses a question that is fundamental to that debate: to what extent can airpower function as a maneuver force in a theater campaign. The US Air Force contends that airpower is a maneuver force and frequently turns to the 1991 Persian Gulf War for evidence in support of their position. Those critical of the Air Force’s view argue that Operation Desert Storm was an aber- ration and charge that arguments based on that essentially unique event are suspect. Seeking to parry the charge of exceptionalism, Givens deliberately sets out to provide a more broadly grounded study that transcends the particular experi- ence of Operation Desert Storm. Colonel Givens begins with a general examination of warfare from ancient Greece to the American Civil War in order to deter- mine the essential functions of a maneuver force. He then exam- ines three distinctly different air operations in reverse chrono- logical order: airpower employment in the 1973 Arab–Israeli War, the use of airpower in conjunction with South Vietnamese ground forces to frustrate the Communist Easter offensive of 1972, and operations against the Wehrmacht during the 1944 Normandy campaign. The evidence in all three cases suggests that airpower can function as a maneuver force. The conclusion is—if capable of serving as a maneuver force, airpower can great- ly enhance the joint theater campaign both independently and in cooperation with other maneuver forces. Turning the Vertical Flank: Airpower As a Maneuver Force in the Theater Campaign originally was written as a master’s the- sis for Air University’s School of Advanced Airpower Studies. The College of Aerospace Doctrine, Research and Education (CADRE) is pleased to publish this study as a CADRE Paper and thereby make it available to a wider audience within the US Air Force and beyond. JAMES R. W. TITUS Dean of Research Air University vii About the Author Lt Col Robert P. Givens (BS and MPA, Troy State University) is a senior pilot with more than three thousand hours in the T-37, T-38, A-10, and F-16. He is a 1986 graduate of the United States Air Force Academy. Upon graduation from undergraduate pilot training in 1987, Colonel Givens was assigned to fly the A-10. During Operation Desert Storm, he flew 40 combat missions and was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for action against Iraq. Colonel Givens was sub- sequently selected to attend the USAF Fighter Weapons School. After nearly 2,200 flying hours in the A-10, he was selected as the Right Wing for the USAF Air Demonstration Squadron. Colonel Givens is a 2000 graduate of Air Command and Staff College and a 2001 graduate of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies. ix Acknowledgments I am indebted to the staff of the Air University Library, the librarians and staff of Huntingdon College Library, and Joseph D. Caver and the Air Force Historical Research Agency. I also am grateful to the faculty and staff of the School of Advanced Airpower Studies for guidance and assistance, and to my fel- low classmates who helped to formulate the argument pre- sented in this paper. I express gratitude to the men and women of the 355th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, who helped me to gain what understanding I have of airpower’s contribution to the land war. I express thanks to Lt Col Forrest Morgan and Dr. Harold R. Winton for providing insight, encouragement, and guidance. This project would have never been completed without their assistance. I extend my gratitude to Dr. Roy Givens III for his advice on style. I thank my sons Morgan and Mitchell, who have had to do without daddy. Most importantly, I am grateful to my wife Carla, whose unwavering encouragement and support have made all things possible. xi Chapter 1 Introduction While maneuver is the key to victory, it is maneuver of the units of firepower and not of masses of cannon fodder. We must learn to depend for success, not on the physical weight of the infantry attack, but on skillful offensive used in com- bination of all available weapons, based on the principle of maneuver. —Basil H. Liddell Hart Is airpower a maneuver force? This question has been hotly debated within the realm of military doctrine. United States Air Force (USAF) doctrine claims that airpower is a maneuver force while joint and US Army (USA) doctrine imply it is not. At the heart of the issue is how best to employ all combat forces in a theater campaign. This study contributes to the resolution of the debate by answering the following question: To what extent can airpower operate as a maneuver force in a theater campaign? Air Force doctrine considers airpower a maneuver force. As stated in Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, September 1997, “Air and space forces are inherently maneuver forces with unmatched organic lethal and nonlethal ‘firepower.’ ”1 The USAF believes it possesses a maneuver force capable of achieving tactical, operational, and even strategic ob- jectives as assigned by the joint force commander (JFC).2 This belief is most evident in the USAF’s doctrine concerning coun- terland warfare. Counterland warfare is the battle against enemy surface forces, traditionally the purview of friendly ground ma- neuver units. Air Force doctrine claims that airpower is now a maneuver force capable of fighting the counterland battle throughout the depth of the theater.3 While not addressing the issue directly, Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 February 1995, seems to support both answers.