Alexander the Great This book offers a strategic analysis of one of the most outstanding military careers in history, identifying the most pertinent strategic lessons from the cam- paigns of Alexander the Great. David Lonsdale argues that since the core principles of strategy are eternal, the study and analysis of historical examples have value to the modern theorist and practitioner. Furthermore, as strategy is so complex and challenging, the remarkable career of Alexander provides the ideal opportunity to understand best practice in strategy, as he achieved outstanding and continuous success across the spectrum of warfare, in a variety of circumstances and environments. This book presents the thirteen most pertinent lessons that can be learned from his campaigns, dividing them into three categories: grand strategy, military operations, and use of force. Each of these categories provides lessons pertinent to the modern strategic environment. Ultimately, however, the book argues that the dominant factor in his success was Alexander himself, and that it was his own characteristics as a strategist that allowed him to overcome the complexities of strategy and achieve his expansive goals. This book will be of great interest to students of Strategic Studies, Military History and Ancient History. David J. Lonsdale is Lecturer in Strategic Studies at the University of Hull. He is author of two previous books. Strategy and history Series editors: Colin Gray and Williamson Murray This new series will focus on the theory and practice of strategy. Following Clausewitz, strategy has been understood to mean the use made of force, and the threat of the use of force, for the ends of policy. This series is as interested in ideas as in historical cases of grand strategy and military strategy in action. All historical periods, near and past, and even future, are of interest. In addition to original monographs, the series will from time to time publish edited reprints of neglected classics as well as collections of essays. 1 Military Logistics and Strategic Performance Thomas M. Kane 2 Strategy for Chaos Revolutions in military affairs and the evidence of history Colin Gray 3 The Myth of Inevitable US Defeat in Vietnam C. Dale Walton 4 Astropolitik Classical geopolitics in the space age Everett C. Dolman 5 Anglo-American Strategic Relations and the Far East, 1933–1939 Imperial crossroads Greg Kennedy 6 Pure Strategy Power and principle in the space and information age Everett C. Dolman 7 The Red Army, 1918–1941 From vanguard of world revolution to US ally Earl F. Ziemke 8 Britain and Ballistic Missile Defence, 1942–2002 Jeremy Stocker 9 The Nature of War in the Information Age Clausewitzian future David J. Lonsdale 10 Strategy as Social Science Thomas Schelling and the nuclear age Robert Ayson 11 Warfighting and Disruptive Technologies Disguising innovation Terry Pierce 12 The Fog of Peace and War Planning Military and strategic planning under uncertainty Edited by Talbot C. Imlay and Monica Duffy Toft 13 US Army Intervention Policy and Army Innovation From Vietnam to Iraq Richard Lock-Pullan 14 German Disarmament After World War I The diplomacy of international arms inspection 1920–1931 Richard J. Shuster 15 Strategy and History Essays on theory and practice Colin S. Gray 16 The German 1918 Offensives A case study in the operational level of war David T. Zabecki 17 Special Operations and Strategy From World War II to the war on terrorism James D. Kiras 18 Science, Strategy and War The strategic theory of John Boyd Frans P.B. Osinga 19 US Defense Strategy from Vietnam to Operation Iraqi Freedom Military innovation and the new American way of war, 1973–2003 Robert R. Tomes 20 US Special Forces and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam Military innovation and institutional failure, 1961–63 Christopher K. Ives 21 War in Iraq Planning and execution Thomas G. Mahnken and Thomas A. Keaney 22 Alexander the Great Lessons in strategy David J. Lonsdale Alexander the Great Lessons in strategy David J. Lonsdale First published 2007 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2007. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.” © 2007 David J. Lonsdale All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0-203-00467-1 Master e-book ISBN ISBN13: 978-0-415-35847-7 (hbk) ISBN13: 978-0-203-00467-8 (ebk) For my loving wife Maria Contents List of figures x Acknowledgements xi Introduction 1 1 The art of strategy 5 2 Ancient Greek warfare 22 3 Lessons in strategy 1: grand strategy 45 4 Lessons in strategy 2: military operations 79 5 Lessons in strategy 3: use of force 111 6 Lessons in strategy: conclusions 145 Notes 159 References 180 Index 187 Figures The campaigns of Alexander 2 Battle of Issus 80 Battle of Hydaspes 87 Battle of Granicus 98 Battle of Gaugamela 128 Operations at Pelium 141 Acknowledgements I would like to thank those students past and present who always shared my fas- cination with Alexander. In particular, I would like to thank the officers from my time at the Joint Services Command and Staff College and the Ph.D. students at Reading University. I would like to thank Colin S. Gray, who continues to be an inspiration and has supported me throughout my career. I would like to express my gratitude to Routledge, and in particular Andrew Humphrys for his patience and support. I have been fortunate to be able to complete this work in the sup- portive and stimulating environment of the Politics and International Studies Department, University of Hull. In particular, it has been a pleasure to reacquaint myself with Tom Kane. As always, my parents and sister have shown unfailing support of my work. I cannot find adequate words to express my thanks to my wife Maria, who is my academic hero, and whose love and support has kept me going. Finally, I would like to give thanks and praise to God. Sections of this book have been updated from my earlier book Alexander, Killer of Men: Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Art of War. I am grate- ful to the publisher, Constable and Robinson, for reverting all rights to me. The first chapter, ‘The Art of Strategy’, is an updated and retitled version of my earlier article, ‘Strategy: The Challenge of Complexity’, Defence Studies, 7/1 (March 2007), pp. 42–64. I am grateful to the editors of Defence Studies for granting permission for the use of this article. Introduction The nature of strategy is eternal. Regardless of time or place, those using mili- tary force for the purposes of policy will face the same complex phenomena.1 Strategy has always been, and will remain, a complex, non-linear, multidimen- sional, violent, and competitive activity. Thus, although every case of strategy in action displays unique features, each has something to teach us about dealing with the universal challenges. In this sense, the campaigns of Alexander the Great present us with an opportunity to study and understand how success can be achieved. And yet, despite this commonality of strategic experience, Alexan- der’s campaigns do seem completely removed from strategy in the modern world. The events that this book analyses occurred over 2,300 years ago. Whether it is the great battle on the plain of Gaugamela or Alexander’s coun- terinsurgency campaign in Bactria and Sogdiana, these events seem distant and almost mythical to a modern audience. However, at the time of writing war rages in modern Iraq (the site of Gaugamela) and Afghanistan (the area Alexan- der knew as Bactria and Sogdiana). Much may have changed since Alexander led his army through the Persian Empire; but war has remained a constant feature of man’s experience. In order to understand best practice in strategy we must look to history, for as Bernard Brodie notes ‘the only empirical data we have about how people conduct war and behave under its stresses is our experience with it in the past’.2 A career as outstanding as Alexander’s presents a good opportunity to help unravel the secrets of success in strategy. At this juncture the author of this work finds himself, for once, at odds with Clausewitz. The Prussian theo- rist saw less value in studying ancient campaigns, ‘The further back one goes, the less useful military history becomes . .’3 In this respect Clausewitz, unusu- ally, may have been overly impressed by the novelty of war in his time. It is argued here that since the core principles of strategy are eternal, the study and analysis of any historical example, however ancient, has value to the modern theorist and practitioner. Indeed, it was Clausewitz himself who convincingly wrote that ‘all wars are things of the same nature’.4 From this, Colin S. Gray concludes ‘Because war and strategy are unchanged and unchanging in their natures, it