Center for European Policy Analysis WILL BELARUS w . c e p a o r g CHOOSE THE WEST? Prospects for Democracy in Minsk Živilė Kriščiūnė Donald N. Jensen November 2019 2 Center for European Policy Analysis All opinions are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. About CEPA The Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) is a 501(c)(3), non-profit, non-partisan, public policy research institute. Our mission is to promote an economically vibrant, strategically secure, and politically free Europe with close and enduring ties to the United States. Our analytical team consists of the world’s leading experts on Central-East Europe, Russia, and its neighbors. Through cutting- edge research, analysis, and programs we provide fresh insight on energy, security, and defense to government officials and agencies; we help transatlantic businesses navigate changing strategic landscapes; and we build networks of future Atlanticist leaders. © 2019 by the Center for European Policy Analysis, Washington, DC. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be used or reproduced in any manner whatsoever without permission in writing from the Center for European Policy Analysis, except in the case of brief quotations embodied in news articles, critical articles, or reviews. Center for European Policy Analysis 1275 Pennsylvania Ave NW, Suite 400 Washington, DC 20004 E-mail: [email protected] www.cepa.org This research was made possible by funding from the Baltic American Freedom Foundation (BAFF). The views expressed are those of the authors and do not represent the views of BAFF. For more information about BAFF scholarships and the Baltic expert program, visit: www. balticamericanfreedomfoundation.org. Cover image: “‘March of the national flag’, 10th October 2015 in Minsk” by Marco Fieber under CC BY-NC-ND 2.0. 2 Center for European Policy Analysis WILL BELARUS CHOOSE THE WEST? Prospects for Democracy in Minsk Živilė Kriščiūnė Donald N. Jensen November 2019 2 Center for European Policy Analysis The Issue he democratic world just celebrated the 30th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. How far Teast was it considered a historic victory and how much longer will it take for its shadow to disappear in Belarus? Opening doors to token opposition representation in parliament, more frequent overtures to the West, and the promotion of national symbols may seem like the early spring of Belarusian rebirth after more than 25 years of Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s dictatorship. But are these signs of a thaw and a repetition of the events of 1989? Will Belarus Choose2 the West, 1 Center for European Policy Analysis INTRODUCTION takeover of our country,” analyst Vitaut Siuchyk stated on Belsat.eu.2 Military and security coordination are not explicitly mentioned, at Russia and its close ally Belarus plan to form least in public. Some experts and politicians an economic union by 2022, according to an claim that there are secret protocols to the undisclosed plan initialed by the Russian and framework that would establish Russian Belarusian prime ministers on September 6, military bases in Belarus and integrate the two 2019 and published by the Russian magazine countries’ security cooperation. Kommersant 10 days later.1 The document provides for the consolidation of the two This message of convergence between Belarus countries’ tax, customs, and civil code by and Russia clashed with news on September 17 spring 2021. Single regulation of the electricity, that the United States and Belarus announced gas, and oil market, as well as harmonization plans to exchange ambassadors 11 years after of industrial policy, would be the next step. The Minsk recalled its envoy to Washington to document reportedly does not mention the protest U.S sanctions on the Belarus regime introduction of a single currency or a common for human rights violations. The apparent thaw, budget. However, it calls for an eventual moreover, came after months of signaling by agreement on common banking supervision, the Lukashenka government that it intended to a single payment system, foreign exchange improve relations with the West and pursue a control, and so-called joint counter-sanctions foreign policy more independent of Moscow. against other countries. “The economy of Belarus is 29 times smaller than that of Russia, What is behind Belarus’ apparently so we’re talking about the actual economic contradictory behavior? “Minsk, Belarus” by Andrey Filippov under CC BY 2.0. Will Belarus Choose2 the West, 2 Center for European Policy Analysis WHAT DOES Military and Security Integration with Russia. There are no Russian military bases in Belarus, LUKASHENKA WANT? but armed forces from the two countries regularly conduct massive military exercises Often described as “Europe’s Last Dictator,” near the borders of Poland and Lithuania.4 President Alyaksandr Lukashenka’s primary On September 16, 2019, 12,000 military goal is to stay in power. His authoritarian rule is men—4,000 of whom who were Belarusian— based on four key pillars, each underwritten by participated in operational exercise “Union Kremlin support and without which his political Shield” in Russian Federation territory. The prospects would be uncertain. Ruthless Suppression of the Political Opposition. There is little chance that a Maidan-style revolution from below of the sort that happened in Ukraine in 2014 could Often described topple Lukashenka. The regime has banned as ‘Europe’s human rights groups and political opposition “ movements. No new political party has Last Dictator,’ been able to register since 2000. Belarus remains the only European country to use President Alyaksandr the death penalty, with several high-profile Lukashenka’s primary opponents of Lukashenka having vanished over the years: former Interior Minister Yury goal is to stay in power. Zakharanka disappeared on May 7, 1999; opposition politician Viktar Hanchar and his His authoritarian associate Anatol Krasouski vanished in Minsk rule is based on four on September 16, 1999; Russian television journalist Dmitry Zavadsky went missing on key pillars, each July 7, 2000. These men are presumed dead, underwritten by Kremlin but their fates remain unknown.3 Independent journalists, bloggers, and political activists are support. fined or imprisoned. Belarusian authorities put pressure on independent media resources to conform to the government line. The government sponsors sham elections, the next scheduled for November 17, 2019 for a new ” parliament, to legitimate Lukashenka’s rule Collective Security Treaty Organization and signal to the West that his grip on power (CSTO) agreement, signed in 1992 between is loosening (two members of the opposition Russia, Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, were allowed into the parliament in 2016, the Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and first oppositionists in 20 years). But the body is Tajikistan provides that in the event of conflict a rubber stamp. with the West, the Belarusian army would be Will Belarus Choose82 the West, 3 Center for European Policy Analysis “Zapad-2017 joint Russian-Belarusian strategic military exercises.” by kremlin.ru under CC BY 4.0. deployed as part of the Russian armed forces main export products competitive but very to defend Russia’s western boundaries.5 much dependent on Russia’s attitude toward Russia’s military and naval communications the Lukashenka regime. center, covering the North Atlantic and Europe, and its early warning radar are located on Russia is the largest investor in Belarus, Belarusian soil. Russia and Belarus also have accounting for 38 percent of all foreign joint regional air defense systems. direct investment in 2017. Belarus’ economy depends on Russian energy subsidies worth Moscow’s Economic Support. Russia is several billion dollars per year. Between 2001- Belarus’ main trade partner. In 2017, 51 percent 2010, a so-called integration grant from Russia of its foreign trade in goods was with Russia, accounted for up to 15 percent of Belarusian including 44 percent of exports and 57 percent GDP, or USD $10 billion annually. One of of imports. In return, Belarus exports fuels and the largest investments in recent years was lubricants (around 33 percent of all exports).6 Moscow-controlled Gazprom’s acquisition Belarus’ preferential trade relationship with of 50 percent of Beltransgaz shares in 2011 Russia, provided by the Russian-led Eurasian worth around $3 billion, which promises a Economic Union (EEU) in 2014, guarantees comprehensive program for modernizing it access to oil at a discount price and Belarusian gas infrastructure. Additionally, concessions in Russian market access for Russia has provided a $10 billion loan for the Belarusian producers. This makes the country’s construction of the nuclear power plant in Will Belarus Choose92 the West, 4 Center for European Policy Analysis Astravets, a facility being built and equipped “de-Belarusization” trends. Russian influence by Russian companies and which does not is also spread by the presence of the Russian follow international security standards.7 Orthodox Church, which is Belarus’ most trusted public institution. Russia’s shipment in 2019 of heavily contaminated oil through its Druzhba pipeline In the broader society, Russian-language to Belarus, Poland, Ukraine, Hungary, Slovakia, outlets occupy two-thirds of the Belarusian and the Czech Republic illustrated Belarus’ media space, which enables the Kremlin