© F. Enke Verlag Stuttgart Zeitschrift für Soziologie, Jg. 4, Heft 1, Januar 1975, S. 34-45 Controversies in science: Remarks on the different modes of production of knowledge and their use* Helga Nowotny Europäisches Zentrum für Soziale Wohlfahrt, Wien Wissenschaftliche Kontroversen: Über verschiedene Arten von Wissenserzeugung und Wissensgebrauch* Inhalt: In der Wissenschaftssoziologie haben bisher Probleme der Konsensfindung vergleichsweise starke Beach­ tung erfahren, während selten danach gefragt wurde, warum wissenschaftliche Differenzen weiterhin bestehen. Eine Untersuchung wissenschaftlicher Kontroversen könnte zur Beantwortung dieser Frage beitragen. Kontroversen ent­ stehen nicht nur, wenn kognitive Differenzen bestehen, sondern vor allem, wenn diese Differenzen unterschiedliche Auswirkungen haben. Dies geschieht dann, so lautet die vertretene Hypothese, wenn immer die Art der kognitiven Beziehung zu anderen kognitiven Strukturen - und daher auch der Gebrauch des Wissens - ein anderer ist. Diese Hypothese wird durch Beispiele aus der kognitiven Anthropologie und der Wissenschaftsgeschichte illustriert. Schließ­ lich wird noch das Phänomen der „Nicht-Kontroversen“ erörtert, worunter jene Fälle verstanden werden, in denen kognitive Differenzen zwar bestehen, aber nicht — oder noch nicht - aktiviert wurden. Aus dieser Interpretation der verschiedenen Arten von Wissenserzeugung und Wissensgebrauch lassen sich eine Reihe von Schlußfolgerungen für die sogenannte Wissensakkumulation und für Engpaßsituationen in der Wissenschaftsentwicklung ableiten. A bstract: In the sociology of science relatively much emphasis has been accorded to the problem of how agreement in science is produced, while it has seldom been asked why disagreement should persist. An analysis of controver­ sies in science should therefore throw light on these questions. Controversies arise not only when cognitive diffe­ rences exist, but when these differences come to matter. This happens, it is hypothesized, whenever the patterns of connectedness to other cognitive structures and therefore to the use to which knowledge is put, will differ. This can be illustrated by examples taken from cognitive anthropology and from the history of science. Finally, the cognitive status of ‘non-controversies’ is discussed, i.e. those occasions where cognitive differences exist but are not - or not yet - activized. Consequences can be derived from this interpretation of the different modes of pro­ duction of knowdledge and their use for the so-called accumulation of knowledge in science and certain bottleneck situations in the development of scientific thought. I. Introduction through which intellectual debates could be sett­ led which proved otherwise undecidable through In the sociology of science as well as in philoso­ the conventional methods of scholarly, in parti­ phy much attention has been accorded to ques­ cular scholastic, debate. According to BEN-DAVID tions how agreement in science is produced. In the superiority of the new guild of scientists, the the sociological camp this interest has focused on incipient scientific community, over the contem­ the functioning of the by now legendary scien­ porary guilds of doctors, theologians and philo­ tific community, whose prove of existence has sophers, lay precisely in the fact that the former turned out to be so elusive (CRANE 1972, KLIMA were willing to abide by the rules of new scienti­ 1973), while among philosophers the belief fic method which assured them that agreement seems still widespread that procedures for reach­ could be produced. It is quite plausible that this ing clear-cut solutions to any kind of problem promise opened new visions of an accumulation worth its name ought to exist and enable agree­ of knowledge, as the newly acquired knowledge ment to be established. BEN-DAVID (1973) has would come to be built upon the firmly cemen­ recently put forth the intriguing interpretation ted foundations of previously agreed upon know­ that the institutionalization of science in 17th ledge. It is not without significance that the new century England was directly linked to the widely method was explicitly compared to a set of juri­ felt need for the possession of a secure method dical norms, thus reviving the old idea of a Court of Reason, and constituting a guarantee for both * This paper was presented at a working conference parties that a consensus producing procedure on “Determinants and Controls of Scientific De­ was at hand. Upon this skeleton of agreement velopment” held in Graz, Austria, in June 1974. Most producing norms and rules, flesh has been put of these contributions edited by K. KNORR, H. STRASSER, H.G. ZILIAN in Dordrecht, Holland, by the sociology of science through its emphasis Reidel, 1975, will appear under the title of the con­ on the functioning of the reward system, the so­ ference. cialization of scientists into their roles and the esta­ H. Nowotny: Controversies in science 35 blishment of effective communication structures ‘macroscopic and microscopic types of analyses’, — lines of inquiry that can be re-interpreted as are but a small sample of the types of conflict direct contributions to the question of how, in a scientific context which MERTON classifies through what social and cognitive factors, agree­ as social rather than intellectual. “ . When we ment is reached. In spite of this heavy bias, it is consider the current disagreements among socio­ nevertheless surprising that the question why logists, we find that many of them are not so there should be disagreement at all, has seldom, much cognitive oppositions as contrasting evalua­ if ever, been asked before. Viewed against the tions of the worth of one or another kind of so­ impressive results of decades of research in the ciological work. They are bids for support by the sociology of science (MERTON 1973) with all its social system of sociologists” (1973: 58). Con­ emphasis on the communal advances of know­ troversies in sociology, or polemics, as they are ledge, one is left wondering why disagreement called, are said to be “less a matter of contradic­ still persists. If scientists are socialized in long tions between sociological ideas than of compet­ years of intimate and intensive training, if they ing definitions of the role considered appropiate absorb and internalize the elaborate norms and for the sociologist. Intellectual conflict of cour­ standards of scientific thought and practice, if se occurs; an unremitting Marxist sociology and they have at their disposal an effective commu­ an unremitting Weberian or Parsonian sociology nication structure geared to their needs for the do make contradictory assumptions. But in con­ exchange of rewards and views, if authority is sidering the cleavages . we should note whether vested into institutions like Nobel prize winners the occasion for dispute is the claim that this or and eminence is easily recognized — why should that sociological problem, this or that set of there be disagreement and about what? ideas, is not receiving the attention it allegedly deserves. I suggest that very often these polemics have more to do with the allocation of intellec­ II. The ambiguous nature of controversies tual resources among different kinds of sociologi­ cal work than with a closely formulated opposi­ Answers to this deliberately provocative question tion of sociological ideas” . (1973: 55). Although will tend to be of either of two kinds: one set MERTONS observations pertain specifically to so­ of answers will emphasize the social nature of ciology, there is no inherent reason why the dis­ any scientific controversy. According to this view tinction of what controversies and polemics are controversies are what might be called ‘conflict about might not be extended with the appro­ by proxy’ — they are debates fought for reasons priate modifications to other disciplines as well. which ultimately are to be found outside the realm in which they purport to be fought and Another set of answers stressed the inevitability for reasons that are extraneous to the intellec­ of the ideological nature of any scientific contro­ tual content of the debate. Pushed to the extre­ versy, whereby ideology can either be taken in me, controversies and social conflict in science an all-inclusive sense or be limited to scientific appear to be inevitable, because there are only norms which bind together scientists who share limited resources in terms of positions, funds or them. The first view has been expressed most even immaterial rewards like professional recog­ clearly by ROSE and ROSE (1974) who have nition. Their scarcity leads to the emergence of emphasized the specific ideological issues around intellectual disagreements as the only legitimate which controversies evolve. Speaking about ideo­ mean of carrying out an otherwise inevitable com­ logical inputs into science, they note the broa­ petition for status and rewards. This kind of con­ der social pressure towards the comissioning of troversy is at times contrasted with controversies research, the engagement of scientists, and the of a supposedly purer version which are fought ideology of science and of its institutions. Their for their intellectual merits only. Such a view analysis of the types of conflict which are con­ has been expressed by MERTON (1973), limited ducted in contemporary neurobiology between though to sociology as a discipline. Charges like different groups, clearly reveal the strong ideolo­ the one that ‘others are busily engaged in