ELECTORAL ISLAMISM: THE POLITICAL CLEVAGE AND VOTER ALIGNMENT OF PROSPEROUS JUSTICE PARTY (PKS) IN INDONESIAN DEMOCRATIC ELECTIONS Idris Thaha Fakultas Ilmu Sosial dan Ilmu Politik Email: [email protected] Abstract This study delves an outcome of electoral Islamism in Indonesia. The question posed in this research want to answer why PKS only becomes a middle party in Indonesia. By using the historical comparative analysis approach, the study argues that the different degrees of political cleavages and voter alignments in Indonesia is more plausible in explaining the progress of the electoral results of that Islamist party. This article wants to argue that in Indonesia Islamic activism was not really banned by the authoritarian regime, at least, culturally. Thus, they still had a chance to develop, cultivating plurality of political cleavages in the democratic system. In actual, the political fragmentations of Islamic parties based on Islamic ideological spectrums are more plural. In turn, it emerges such situation where the effort of the Islamist party like PKS in getting support of Muslim voters will face more competitors from other Islamic parties. Keywords: Electoral Islamism, Islamist Party, Political Cleavages, Voter Alignments, & PKS. *** The Strategies of PKS in Facing Democratic Elections (1999, 2004, 2009, 2014) Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) is one of the parties that is currently passing the trials of the reformation. In the 1999 election, when it was named Partai Keadilan (PK), the party managed to gain 1,436,565 votes or about 1.36% of the total votes. The result has placed 7 representatives of PK in the Assembly (DPR). Because of that result, the position of PK ranked on seventh of the total electoral outcomes —there were 96 parties, although finally only 48 parties that became contestants— or in the fourth rank, calculated by the votes of new parties.1 In the 2004 election, PKS votes rose significantly by winning 8.325.020 votes or 7.34% of the total votes.2 The outcome has brought PKS to the sixth position of the 24 parties participating in the election. The electoral outcomes also have also been filed by PKS to place its 45 representatives in DPR. Not only in the national contestation, PKS was also successful at the provincial level. PKS managed to obtain the total number of votes from each province of 8,290,425. PKS has successfully placed 158 representatives spread across provinces in Indonesia. Another political winning was the election of Hidayat Nur Wahid, one of the key 1 “Pemilu 1999” in http://kpu.go.id/index.php/pages/detail/2008/11/Pemilu-1999 2 KPU, Pemilihan Umum 2004 Dalam Angka dan Gambar Peritisiwa, p. 137. 1 PKS figures, as Head of the MPR. Of the four post-reformation elections (1999, 2004, 2009, 2014), the 2004 election was the most significant PKS success compared to the previous elections. The 2009 and 2014 elections were relatively stagnant, although it can still be interpreted as having a little extra vote in 2014. The 2004 election results continued consistently in the 2009 elections, even its electoral outcomes brought PKS in the top four. The result brought PKS as an Islamic party that gets the most votes. PKS seats in DPR also increased to 57 or increased 12 from the previous period seats. In the 2014 election, although only able to get a ranking of six and 40 seats in the DPR, PKS still managed to get a vote above 5%, ie 6.79%.3 PKS also succeeded in placing one of its cadres as head of the DPR-even though ultimately fired. Beyond that, the PKS has also consistently placed its cadres on local legislative seats and regional leaders. The success PKS that persists for more than a decade —and still continuing— is an interesting trend highlighted. Unlike other major parties, the success of PKS is the lack of reliance on well-known figures. Compared to its figures, PKS is more popular as a da'wah party.4 In many ways, PKS is also called some circles as an unusual party.5 As a political contestant, every election event becomes a "test of guts" of PKS. The political strategy became the main key to this party survives in every political event. All form of strategy undertaken by PKS is a political expression of PKS. From the various forms of strategy, PKS pragmatism and idealism will be categorized by itself. In the 1999 election —when it was named PK— the party did not put forward a campaign to gain outcomes. They rely on a network of cadres that are claimed to have existed in 21 provinces and 200 branches level II with the number of active cadres to 200 thousand people.6 The majority of PK cadres and sympathizers are among the middle-aged youth and students. It is a causality of the root of party formation initiated by campus missionary activists, including the networks that had been nurtured in rohis. The pattern then became distinctive until nowadays, therefore, PK or later changed to PKS can also be called as party cadre. The cadre network has been utilized by this dakwah party from the election to the election. In the 1999 election, they targeted 10 percent of the vote, assuming every cadre could invite 10-20 people.7 To be more attached, one of the ways in which PK is held various tryout college entrance examination which majority are in the urban area. PK also closes ranks with young cadres who are studying abroad. The power of the mass is not obtained by PK in a short time. Reformation is only a way for strengthening the base that has been done for a long time. Before becoming a political movement, since the 1980s, the backbone of PK has been closely aligned with the activities of dakwah campus. The genealogy that makes PK label in the community is an urban party, young man, 3 Dani Prabowo, “Disahkan KPU, Ini Perolehan Suara Pemilu Legislatif 2014 in http://nasional.kompas.com/read/2014/05/09/2357075/Disahkan.KPU.Ini.Perolehan.Suar a.Pemilu.Legislatif.2014, 9th of May 2014. 4 Ali Said Damanik, Fenomena Partai Keadilan Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia, (Jakarta: Teraju, 2002), p. 278. 5 Burhanudin Muhtadi, Dilema PKS Suara dan Syariah, (Jakarta: KPG, 2012), hp 5. 6 Damanik, Fenomena Partai, p. 265. 7 Ibid. 2 and educated people party. The base that has been arranged neatly makes PK has a solid mass. To attract mass outside the solid base, the strategy used by PK that used its image as the successor of Masyumi. However, that way was actually not effective enough, because, in addition to PK, some parties also imaged themselves as the successor of the Masyumi, such as PKB, PKU, and parties that label themselves with the name Masyumi. That was what makes the vote of PK, although it can enter the top 10, but still dominant solid mass ballots. The solid mass was in addition to being PK power in the early days of reformation, also a weakness; the mass who want to be part of the party difficult to join the PK. Because there is no denying that there is a typical psychological gap between PK members and outsiders.8 However, with its solid mass, PK is able to measure its ability. To capture the vast masses, at that time, PK also formed an online portal that has not been done many other parties. Thus, in the 1999 election, PK was only able to attract solid cadres or sympathizers. That solidity also made a boomerang for PK. In the wider community, society viewed PK as an exclusive party. Later, the issue of exclusivity became PK evaluation of the 1999 election. Some even argue that the 1999 election was a PK failure.9 Concretely, the failure was clearly illustrated in the inability of PK to pass electoral threshold of 2% as stipulated in the 1999 Election Law, chapter VII, article 3, PK threatened by not being able to contest the next election. The political steps taken by the PKS top brass to be able to participate in the 2004 elections is to lobby lawmakers through their parliamentary cadres, to fight through the Constitutional Court (Mahkamah Konstitusi), and to prepare for the establishment of new political parties. The first step does not work, the second step is not continued, the third step was realistic and continued to be matured to the end. The context, if the party wants to contest the 2004 election contest and cannot pass electoral threshold, the party must join the other party or establish a new party. The third step chosen was consistent by PK. The move also resulted in the establishment of PKS on 20 April 2002. When PKS was established, PK merged with PKS. In a superstructure and infrastructure, the PKS actually is no different with PK. It was just that with the addition of the name "Kesejahteraan", the party widen the field of struggle. Not only to fight for justice of law change through political channels but also to help society down to solve all its welfare problems. In the 2004 elections, in addition to strengthening the solid mass network, PKS was also massive in campaigning on universal issues, such as clean government. Even PKS issued anecdotes, PKS is an abbreviation of “Pantang Korupsi dan Sogokan”.10 In this case, PKS performed image and strategy refreshment. Therefore, it is not excessive to change PK into PKS called a transition process. To introduce themselves to the broader community, PKS only has 10 months, from mid-2003 to election 2004 event. Various brands of PKS was massively distributed to the community through pins, stickers, hats, and other attributes.