VU Research Portal Understanding Psychologists' Understanding Eigner, K. 2010 document version Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record Link to publication in VU Research Portal citation for published version (APA) Eigner, K. (2010). Understanding Psychologists' Understanding: The Application of Intelligible Models to Phenomena. General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ? Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. E-mail address: [email protected] Download date: 28. Sep. 2021 understanding psychologists’ understanding Cover image: A subject performing a clock-watching task called the “speed and load test,” in: R. Conrad, Speed and Load Stress in a Sensory-Motor Skill, British Journal of Industrial Medicine 8 (1951),3. Typeset by TAT Zetwerk, Utrecht Printed by Wöhrmann Print Service, Zutphen VRIJE UNIVERSITEIT Understanding Psychologists’ Understanding The Application of Intelligible Models to Phenomena ACADEMISCH PROEFSCHRIFT ter verkrijging van de graad Doctor aan deVrijeUniversiteitAmsterdam, op gezag van de rector magnificus prof.dr. L.M. Bouter, in het openbaar te verdedigen ten overstaan van de promotiecommissie van de faculteit der Wijsbegeerte op woensdag 15 december 2010 om 9.45 uur in de aula van de universiteit, De Boelelaan 1105 door Gerrit Cornelis Eigner geboren te Utrecht promotor: prof.dr. J.A. Radder copromotor: dr. H.W. de Regt Contents Preface...................................... 9 Chapter1.Introduction........................... 11 Chapter2.AimsandMethodofthisStudy............... 17 2.1.Introduction............................... 17 2.2.AimsofPhilosophyofScience.................... 17 2.2.1. The Distinction between Discovery and Justification 18 2.2.2.CharacterizingSciencebyitsValues........... 22 2.3.MethodologyinPhilosophyofScience.............. 26 2.4. Reflections on the Specific Method Used in this Study .29 Chapter3.UnderstandingScientificUnderstanding........ 33 3.1.Introduction............................... 33 3.2.ScientificUnderstandingandExplanation............ 35 3.3. Basic Ideas of My Account of Scientific Understanding . 37 3.4.ApplyingTheoriestoPhenomena................. 41 3.4.1. The Transition from the Syntactic to the Semantic ViewofTheories........................ 41 3.4.2. Representational Views of Models Based on ScientificPractice........................ 43 3.4.3.Giere’sRepresentationalViewofModels........ 46 3.5. Intelligibility as an Epistemic Condition for the Successful ApplicationofModels......................... 51 3.6.KeyNotionsandKeyQuestions.................. 56 Chapter4.TheVirtueofSurplusMeaning:Neo-Behaviorism. 57 4.1.Introduction............................... 57 4.2. The Meaning and Use of Theoretical Terms in Neo-Behaviorism............................ 58 4.2.1. Operational Definitions and the Meaning of TheoreticalTerms....................... 61 6·contents 4.2.2. Edward C. Tolman and the Intervening Variable . 64 4.2.3. Clark L. Hull and the Application of Theoretical TermsinDifferentDomains................. 77 4.3. The 1950s Dispute on Theoretical Terms and their Surplus Meaning.................................. 92 4.3.1. Intervening Variables and Hypothetical Constructs 94 4.3.2. The Merits of Using Theoretical Terms with Surplus Meaning.............................. 98 4.3.3. The Nature of the Surplus Meaning of Psychological Concepts.............................106 4.4.TheEpistemicSignificanceofSurplusMeaning........110 Chapter 5. Skills for Understanding: Cognitive Psychology . 113 5.1.Introduction...............................113 5.2.ABriefReviewoftheRiseofCognitivePsychology.....114 5.3. Applying Information-Theoretical Models in Cognitive Psychology................................117 5.3.1.InformationTheory......................117 5.3.2. Experiments on the Capacity of Human InformationTransmission..................119 5.3.3. The Non-Trivial Application of Information-TheoreticalModels..............124 5.3.4. The Skill of Conceptualizing and the Role of Metaphors............................132 5.4. The Information-Theoretical Approach at Work: Donald E.Broadbent’sAccountofAttention................139 5.4.1.Broadbent’sConceptualFramework...........142 5.4.2.TheFilterTheoryofAttention...............146 5.4.3.TheIntroductionofFlowCharts..............151 5.4.4.TheMechanicalModelforAttention...........153 5.4.5. Analogies between the Mechanical Model and the PhenomenonofAttention..................157 5.5. Relevant Skills for Successfully Applying Models to Phenomena................................163 Chapter6.Conclusion............................165 6.1. Is the intelligibility of models an epistemic value and how doesitfunctioninscientificpractice?...............165 contents · 7 6.2. What kinds of skills are required for the successful application of a scientific model to a phenomenon? . 167 6.3. Which kind of virtues can render a model intelligible to its users?....................................168 6.4. On what kind of pragmatic and contextual factors does intelligibilitydepend?.........................168 6.5. Is the characterization of science advocated in this study useful for the explanatory and normative tasks of philosophyofscience?.........................170 References....................................173 IndexofNames.................................183 ListofFigures..................................186 DutchSummary(Samenvatting).....................187 Preface Writing this dissertation in philosophy of science was both an enor- mous challenge and an intellectual adventure. Now that it is finished, I would like to thank my supervisors Henk de Regt and Hans Radder for their support. Their enthusiasm, concern, assistance, and expert advice were invaluable to the success of this undertaking. This dissertation is the end result of a Ph.D. project that was part of the research program “Understanding Scientific Understanding” of the Faculty of Philosophy at VU University Amsterdam. The aim of this program, which was supported financially by the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (nwo), was to investigate the na- ture of scientific understanding in a variety of scientific disciplines. Henk, who started the program, focused mainly on understanding in the physical sciences. Sabina Leonelli, who carried out the other Ph.D. project, concentrated on understanding in the life sciences, and I stud- ied understanding in psychology. I enjoyed working with both, and I would like to take this opportunity to thank them for the pleasant and constructive teamwork that led to many satisfactory results. For example, together we organized the successful conference “Philosoph- ical Perspectives on Scientific Understanding” held in Amsterdam in August 2005. Another highlight was the volume Scientific Understand- ing: Philosophical Perspectives (2009), which we edited together and in which I published some of the results of my research project. Especial- ly chapter 4 of this dissertation overlaps with my contribution to that volume. In the process of carrying out my Ph.D. research, I have benefited greatly from the help of many. Next to my supervisors, I would like to thank, in particular, Uljana Feest for her constructive comments on chapter 4. Furthermore, I would like to acknowledge the feedback from the members of the research group “Philosophy of Science and Technology” at VU University Amsterdam. In addition, I am grateful to Ivo Geradts and Johannes Rustenburg, not only for their excellent typographical work in this book but also for their warm collegiality 10 · preface and support. A special thanks is extended to the philosophers octet “OttoeMezzo.”Theopportunitytorehearseandperformmusicregu- larly by Weill, Shostakovich, and others together with fellow philoso- phers and friends is an enrichment of my (academic) life. Last but not least, my deepest appreciation goes to my family, especially my wife Astrid and my son Jonne. They supported me greatly through their encouragement, cheerfulness, and – most of all – their understanding. chapter 1 Introduction Scientific explanations provide understanding of phenomena. Al- thoughitseemsquitenaturaltoregardthisasoneofthemainad- vantages of science, there was, until recently, a tendency among sci- entists and philosophers of science to downplay the value of scientific understanding. Illustrative for this is the ironic tone used by the psy- chologist Edward C. Tolman in a discussion on the development of behavioral theories. This leading figure of the psychological school of neo-behaviorism, which had its heyday between 1930 and 1950, is one of the subjects in chapter 4 of this study. In his view, theories of behavior are necessary primarily to gather the results of behavioral experiments and to use these results to generate new predictions. Fur- thermore, he suspected that some scientists have