Notes Chapter One State and Ideology 1. See R.M. MacIver, The Modern State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1926). MacIver and Wilson’s concern with the state had a more pragmatic bent, to reform the administrative apparatus. See Raymond Seidelman and Edward J. Harpam, Disenchanted Realists: Political Science and the American Crisis, 1884–1984, in series: SUNY Series in Political Theory: Contemporary Issues, ed. John G. Gunnell (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 49–50. 2. Postwar political science rejected the concept of the state as unscientific not only because it was considered an empirically void abstraction, but also because it had been historically implicated in normative issues. 3. See Peter T. Manicas, A History and Philosophy of the Social Sciences (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 216–221, for a concise analysis of this new empiricism, and the break from the predominant influence of German political thought it entailed. 4. See Raymond Seidelman and Edward J. Harpham, Disenchanted Realists, 67–74, for an analysis of the extreme empiricism inherent in Bentley’s rejection of “soul stuff,” particularly in his early work The Process of Government. What is rejected is not only the state, but also any institutional concept beyond the immediately observable behavior of individuals. 5. See, e.g., Gabriel Almond, “The Return to the State,” American Political Science Review, v. 82, no. 3, September 1988. 6. Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985), for a series of chapters on refocusing the discipline of political science on the various facets of the modern state. 7. Harold Laswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (New York: P. Smith, 1950). 8. George Armstrong Kelly, “Who Needs a Theory of Citizenship,” Daedalus, v. 108, no. 4, Fall 1979, 22. 9. Robert A. Dahl was the most prominent of the pluralist theorists. See, e.g., his A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), and Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961). See also Seidelman and Harpham, Disenchanted Realists, 159, for an analysis of Dahl’s pluralist-behavioralist tradition. 10. See John S. Nelson, “Education for Politics: Rethinking Research on Political Socialization,” What Should Political Theory Be Now: Essays from the Shambaugh Conference on Political Theory, ed. John S. Nelson, in series: SUNY Series in Political Theory: Contemporary Issues, ed. John G. Gunnell (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), 419–428, for a brief but illuminating analysis of the combined theoretical perspectives of structural functionalism and 132 Notes systems theory, and particularly of the influence of Talcott Parsons and David Easton in the development of the two approaches. 11. See David Easton, The Political System (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1953), for an example of the system analytic approach. Easton was the premier systems theo- rist in the period. 12. See Jeffrey Friedman, “Economic Approaches to Politics,” Critical Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Politics and Society, v. 9, no. 1–2, 1995. Friedman argues that while the focus of public choice is narrower than rational choice, the latter applying its analysis beyond the political, the basic assumptions are iden- tical in both: that human behavior can be reduced to purely economic forms of calculations. 13. The microphysics of power is a theme in most of Foucault’s works. Perhaps the most accessible of his writings in this regard is Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: Vintage Books, 1995). Foucault does not deny, however, that the state remains a crucial component of the overall structure of power in society. See Barry Smart, Michel Foucault, in series: Key Sociologists, ed. Peter Hamilton (London: Routledge, 1988), 131–132. 14. See Mark Irving Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 5–8, for a brief summary of the basic approaches in contemporary com- parative theory. These, according to the authors, are rational choice and cultural and structural forms of analysis. The latter includes those in the Marxian and Weberian traditions who are attempting to revive interest in the state. 15. Arthur Goldhammer, “Introduction,” in The Sociology of the State, ed. Bertrand Badie and Pierre Birnbaum, trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), ix–xx. 16. Ibid., ix. Chapter Two State Formations 1. Joseph R. Strayer, On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). Strayer also points to the difficulty in framing a satisfactory definition of the state, and lists in its stead a number of its key elements that overlap those we have detailed. 2. Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, ed. trans. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 78. 3. The absence of private property and class stratification in pre-state societies led Marx and Engels, among others, to argue that in the beginning a certain “primi- tive communism” prevailed. See Frederick Engels, “The Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State,” in Selected Works in One Volume, Col. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels (New York: International Publisher, 1968). 4. The first to recognize that governance in pre-state societies is rooted in kin relations was Sir Henry Maine, the nineteenth century father of comparative jurisprudence who, in his Ancient Law, posited kinship rather than territoriality as the basis of the primitive polity. Another lawyer, Louis Henry Morgan, fol- lowed Maine’s lead in his Ancient Society, a work that greatly influenced later anthropologists and political scientists as well as the thinking of Friedrich Notes 133 Engels and Karl Marx. See Ted C. Lewellen, Political Anthropology: An Introduction, 2nd ed. (Westport: Bergin and Garvey, 1992), 8–10, for an analy- sis of the thought, and influence, of Maine and Morgan. And while not all have accepted the Maine–Morgan thesis uncritically, for early on there were those, such as Robert Lowie, who argued that other relationships beyond kinship played a role in social and political cohesion of pre-state societies, no one has disputed that kinship is the primary basis of the primitive polity. See Robert Lowie, The Origin of the State (New York: Russell and Russell, 1962). 5. See Pierre Clastres, Society Against the State, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Mole Editions, 1974), 148–158. Clastres goes so far as to argue that primitive “law” is designed precisely to prevent the emergence of a centralized coercive power and, as such, is literally “written” upon the body in ceremonial initiation rites. 6. The term “segmentary” is derived from a particular form of kinship structure called “segmentary lineage” typical of some tribes, particularly in Africa. The tribe is composed of lineage segments that are autonomous, but that are capable of coming together for specified social or political purposes, most impor- tantly for the regulation of conflict. Disputes among lower kinship segments are raised to higher segments for resolution, a process known as “segmentary oppo- sition.” See, e.g., Max Gluckman, Politics, Law, and Ritual in Tribal Society (Chicago: Aldine Pub. Co., 1965), 163–166, and Lawrence Krader, Formation of the State (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1968), 35. We employ the term in its broadest sense, however, to refer to stateless societies that are organized polit- ically in autonomous units. This would include Western society during the feudal period. It is possible, however, that in the early formation of the state it will not entirely overcome segmentation and the term “segmentary state” may be appro- priate. For an analysis of the concept of segmentary state see F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty (New York: Basic Books Inc., 1966), 18. 7. Hinsley, Sovereignty. Hinsley employs the concept of segmentary society and the “segmentary state” to analyze the structure of medieval society and the impediment to a theory of state sovereignty that structure entailed. 8. See Morton H. Fried, The Evolution of Political Society: An Essay in Political Anthropology (New York: Random House, 1967), Chap. 4, for a general characterization and analysis of these and other elements of more centralized pre-state formations, what Fried terms rank societies. 9. See I. Schapera, Government and Politics in Tribal Societies (London: C.A. Watts and Co., 1956), 211–212, for an example of titular and strong chieftainships in South Africa. Shapera derives the distinction from Lowie. 10. See Jonathan Haas, The Evolution of the Prehistoric State (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 212–213. Haas notes that not all chiefdoms become states, and that under some circumstances the state may evolve out of more “primitive” social organizations. 11. Lewellen, Political Anthropology, 47–51. 12. See Lowie, The Origin of the State, for a classic example of an early integration theory. 13. See Haas, The Evolution of the Prehistoric State. These are Haas’s categories; we employ them as well as his general framework of analysis of theories of state formation. 14. See ibid., 123. While attempting to combine elements of both integration and conflict theories, Haas admits that the conflict theory is empirically the more persuasive of the two. 134 Notes 15. Ibid., 216–217. 16. See Elman R. Service, Origins of the State and Civilization: The Process of Cultural Evolution (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975), 282–308. See also Clastres, Society Against the State. Clastres argues that “The economic derives from the political; the emergence of the State determines the advent of classes” (168). 17. What might be termed modern empire states could be included here as well given the imperial expansion of some early-formed nation-states, but these were not true empire states in their structure or ideologies of legitimation.