UC San Diego UC San Diego Electronic Theses and Dissertations Title Ethical Theory Meets Cognitive Science : A Naturalized Aristotelian Alternative to Principles- Based Ethics Permalink https://escholarship.org/uc/item/7k22j5mj Author Suhler, Christopher Louis Publication Date 2015 Peer reviewed|Thesis/dissertation eScholarship.org Powered by the California Digital Library University of California UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SAN DIEGO Ethical Theory Meets Cognitive Science: A Naturalized Aristotelian Alternative to Principles-Based Ethics A dissertation submitted in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy and Cognitive Science by Christopher Louis Suhler Committee in charge: Professor Patricia Churchland, Chair Professor Paul Churchland Professor Monte Johnson Professor Terrence Sejnowski Professor Piotr Winkielman 2014 © Christopher Louis Suhler, 2014 All rights reserved. Signature Page The Dissertation of Christopher Louis Suhler is approved, and it is acceptable in quality and form for publication on microfilm and electronically: ________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________ Chair University of California, San Diego 2014 iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Signature Page ................................................................................................................... iii Table of Contents ............................................................................................................... iv Acknowledgments............................................................................................................ viii Vita ..................................................................................................................................... ix Abstract of the Dissertation ................................................................................................ x Chapter 1 – The Standard Paradigm in Moral Philosophy ................................................. 1 1.1. Introduction and motivation of the project ............................................................... 1 1.2. The standard paradigm ............................................................................................. 4 1.2.1. Shared assumptions (a sketch) ........................................................................... 4 1.2.2. Historical origins ............................................................................................... 6 1.2.3. The deductive-nomological approach to ethics ............................................... 10 1.2.4. Appeal of the deductive-nomological approach .............................................. 13 1.3. Theory construction and evaluation ....................................................................... 19 1.3.1. Formulating principles ..................................................................................... 19 1.3.2. Thought experiments and conceptual analysis ................................................ 21 Chapter 2 – Difficulties for the Standard Paradigm .......................................................... 29 2.1. Overview ................................................................................................................ 29 2.2. Challenges in practice ............................................................................................ 31 2.2.1. Interpretation and application .......................................................................... 31 2.2.2. Counterexamples and theoretical stalemates ................................................... 34 2.2.3. Why theoretical reconciliation fails: Parfit’s Triple Theory ........................... 35 2.2.4. Contrast to scientific progress ......................................................................... 37 2.3. Making sense of the standard paradigm’s problems .............................................. 42 2.3.1. Defending the status quo (the difficulty response) .......................................... 42 2.3.2. Error theory...................................................................................................... 44 2.3.3. A third possibility ............................................................................................ 49 2.4. Moral philosophy and moral psychology ............................................................... 51 2.4.1. Overview and implications .............................................................................. 51 iv 2.4.2. Studies of moral judgment ............................................................................... 54 2.4.3. Experimental economics.................................................................................. 58 2.4.4. Clinical evidence ............................................................................................. 70 2.4.5. Significance for ethical theory (dispelling a worry) ........................................ 75 Chapter 3 – Why the Standard Paradigm Fails ................................................................. 78 3.1. Conceptual analysis and conceptual structure ........................................................ 78 3.1.1. Introduction ..................................................................................................... 78 3.1.2. Conceptual analysis ......................................................................................... 79 3.1.3. The role of concepts in cognition .................................................................... 82 3.1.4. Scope of the current project ............................................................................. 83 3.2. The demise of the classical view ............................................................................ 85 3.2.1. Wittgenstein’s early doubts ............................................................................. 85 3.2.2. Typicality effects ............................................................................................. 89 3.2.3. Fuzzy boundaries and borderline cases ........................................................... 94 3.2.4. Family resemblance and prototype structure ................................................... 97 3.3. Philosophical implications of category structure ................................................. 100 3.3.1. The failure of classical conceptual analysis .................................................. 100 3.3.2. The failure of philosophical conceptual analysis .......................................... 103 3.3.3. Reflective equilibrium ................................................................................... 107 3.3.4. Gradations in moral judgment ....................................................................... 111 3.4. Conceptual variability and experimental philosophy ........................................... 114 3.4.1. Experimental philosophy’s challenge ............................................................ 114 3.4.2. Conceptual variability .................................................................................... 117 3.4.3. Intra-individual variability ............................................................................. 120 3.4.4. Cross-cultural differences in moral intuitions ............................................... 121 Chapter 4 – A New Old Paradigm .................................................................................. 123 4.1. Beginning the positive project.............................................................................. 123 4.1.1. Where do we go from here? .......................................................................... 123 4.1.2. After Virtue.................................................................................................... 126 4.2. MacIntyre’s argument .......................................................................................... 128 v 4.2.1. The “predecessor culture” ............................................................................. 128 4.2.2. Consequences of the Enlightenment shift ..................................................... 134 4.3. The naturalistic fallacy ......................................................................................... 137 4.3.1. Origins of “the” fallacy .................................................................................. 137 4.3.2. Clarifications ................................................................................................. 140 4.3.3. Making sense of Hume’s is-ought problem ................................................... 143 4.3.4. Historical context of Hume’s challenge ........................................................ 146 4.3.5. Reassessing the naturalistic fallacy .............................................................. 148 4.3.6. The medical analogy ...................................................................................... 150 4.3.7. Further remarks on the medical analogy ....................................................... 152 4.4. Reintroducing teleology to ethics ......................................................................... 153 4.4.1. Returning to our roots .................................................................................... 153 4.4.2. Teleology and the status of ethics