W15481 RENAULT-NISSAN ALLIANCE: WILL FURTHER INTEGRATION CREATE MORE SYNERGIES?1 Wiboon Kittilaksanawong and Caroline Palecki wrote this case solely to provide material for class discussion. The authors do not intend to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The authors may have disguised certain names and other identifying information to protect confidentiality. This publication may not be transmitted, photocopied, digitized or otherwise reproduced in any form or by any means without the permission of the copyright holder. Reproduction of this material is not covered under authorization by any reproduction rights organization. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, contact Ivey Publishing, Ivey Business School, Western University, London, Ontario, Canada, N6G 0N1; (t) 519.661.3208; (e) [email protected]; www.iveycases.com. Copyright © 2015, Richard Ivey School of Business Foundation Version: 2015-10-19 Renault-Nissan Alliance (RNA) was the oldest of its kind in the automotive industry, celebrating its 15th anniversary in March 2014. As of April 2015, it sold more than one in 10 cars worldwide.2 The alliance was formed on the principles of mutual respect while preserving each other’s brands and corporate identities. On April 1, 2014, to accelerate synergies, RNA launched convergence projects in four key functions: research and development, manufacturing and logistics, purchasing, and human resources, expecting to realize at least €4.3 billion3 in annualized synergies and cost reductions by 2016, an increase of 54 per cent since 2013.4 However, the projects presented a number of important questions: Would this strategic move to enhance economies of scale through greater levels of product and process standardization limit quality and innovation? Would its benefits outweigh the costs of organizing common processes between the two culturally distant, independent entities? Would the move allow RNA to successfully compete in both developed and emerging target markets? Would further integration jeopardize the alliance’s original spirit of respecting each other’s distinctive identities, and thus undermine its competitiveness and sustainability in the long run? Should the alliance consider inviting new partners to strengthen its standing? THE GLOBAL AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRY The automotive industry had become increasingly consolidated to meet the challenges of a wider product line, global presence and economies of scale. While in traditional developed markets like the United States and Western Europe, the industry had slowed down, emerging markets — particularly those in Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC) — had been growing, representing over 50 per cent of global light-vehicle sales. 5 The developed markets had seen expansion in substitute means such as public transportation, car sharing and used cars. Consumers were more cost conscious and less loyal to brands while lengthening the use of their cars. Automakers had to deal with new and more stringent regulations concerning safety and carbon dioxide emissions. Accordingly, manufacturers had to find a way to invest in new technologies while ensuring competitive prices. In emerging markets, the main challenge was to adapt existing models and technologies to the local markets, and localize production and distribution capacities to achieve lower prices. However, the common key success factors in both markets for the 6 manufacturers were time to market, cost, quality and styling. This document is authorized for use only by Anna Mina ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional copies. Page 2 9B15M087 The industry had a few large parts and components suppliers serving major automakers. There were also a number of small, highly specialized suppliers — mostly original equipment manufacturers (OEM) — who relied on relationships with a few automakers. These suppliers had increasingly been challenged by automakers to provide more added values but generally for the same price.7 For example, suppliers were required to invest in highly specific assets or technologies dedicated to particular needs of their clients, and to ensure high production capacities at a global scale without reciprocal commitments. The Role of Purchasing Function Automakers outsourced over half of the required parts and components.8 Purchasing represented up to 70 per cent of the total cost of final vehicles. 9 The success of Toyota as the world’s first automobile manufacturer to produce more than 10 million vehicles per year was often explained by relationship- specific investments with its suppliers.10 Since the 1980s, automobile manufacturers had adopted “just-in- time” (JIT) production techniques, reducing the number of suppliers and investing in long-lasting collaborative relationships with only a few of them to ensure quality and product development time. Japanese automakers were mostly familiar with developing long-term and strong informal relationships with suppliers under the “keiretsu.” The keiretsu was a type of informal business group comprising companies with interlocking business relationships and shareholdings.11 While large automakers in the West had shifted to arm’s-length relationships with parts suppliers, Toyota invested significantly in its suppliers’ capability development. These suppliers were, in turn, able to provide sophisticated system components tailored to Toyota’s specific requirements at highly competitive prices.12 The relationship between RNA and its suppliers was in between such arm’s-length and highly relationship-specific transactions. In particular, the alliance developed strong partnerships with suppliers of key components, while it employed arm’s-length transactions with those supplying standardized, peripheral components. THE RENAULT-NISSAN ALLIANCE RNA was a strategic partnership between two automobile manufacturers: Renault, based in Paris, France, and Nissan, based in Yokohama, Japan. The alliance was officially established on March 27, 1999, with Renault acquiring 36.8 per cent of Nissan’s outstanding stocks.13 Carlos Ghosn had been appointed the chief executive officer of both companies. A key principle of the alliance’s formation was that the parties respect each other’s independent corporate identity. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, the automotive industry had undergone a period of consolidation, with numerous merger and acquisition deals.14 RNA’s top priority was to revive Nissan from the verge of bankruptcy. The revival plan drastically cut operating costs while implementing a clear strategic direction. In 2001, after the turnaround, Nissan bought a 15 per cent stake in Renault, while Renault increased its stake in Nissan to 43.4 per cent15 (see Exhibit 1). The main objective of RNA was to create synergies in each stage of the value chain, by fostering cost reduction and quality/innovation improvement (see Exhibit 2). The alliance allowed the parties to share technologies and best practices, and to enter new markets. Renault could benefit from Nissan’s strong position in North America and Asia, while Nissan could learn from Renault’s successful experience in Europe, Latin America and Russia (see Exhibit 3). The alliance aimed to be one of the top three automakers in terms of quality, technology and profitability, while upholding the imperative principle of respecting each other’s brand image, culture and organizational processes. Both sides realized that the cooperation had to be based on trust and that strategic decisions had to be mutually beneficial. This document is authorized for use only by Anna Mina ([email protected]). Copying or posting is an infringement of copyright. Please contact [email protected] or 800-988-0886 for additional copies. Page 3 9B15M087 Further Integration Strategies Since its formation, RNA had developed through more integration between the two partners. RNA first established the Renault-Nissan Purchasing Organization (RNPO) in 2001 to maximize economies of scale. To better align strategies and realize more synergies, in 2002, the alliance created the Renault- Nissan BV (RNBV), a strategic management company with the stocks being held equally between the partners (see Exhibit 1). RNBV was an impartial platform for Renault and Nissan to exchange ideas, build strategy and leverage each other’s competences and resources in a way that maximized their synergies.16 By 2009, RNBV had set up a dedicated team of alliance directors to accelerate the integration and sharing of best practices to create even more synergies. Such development allowed RNA’s partners to open their first joint manufacturing plant and technical centre in Chennai, India in 2010.17 The plant would begin the production of vehicles within the common module family — affordable (CMF-A), to be launched into the Indian market in 2015. CMF-A would cover the most affordable category of cars through the modular system of vehicle architecture. For maximum efficiency and brand differentiation, compatible parts and components within the modular system would be assembled into hundreds of possible configurations. A significant step towards the integration was made on April 1, 2014, when the alliance began the four convergence projects.18 Both companies jointly managed key project functions by appointing an alliance executive to lead each function, and a management committee to oversee the implementation.