Canadian Military History Volume 9 Issue 4 Article 3 2000 Viking Force: Canada’s Unknown Commandos George Kerr University of Western Ontario Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh Part of the Military History Commons Recommended Citation Kerr, George "Viking Force: Canada’s Unknown Commandos." Canadian Military History 9, 4 (2000) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Kerr: Viking Force Top: Viking Force Shoulder Patch. Left Si below: Soldiers from Viking Force engaged in training on the Isle of Mull, April 1942 l Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2000 1 Canadian Military History, Vol. 9 [2000], Iss. 4, Art. 3 Viking Force Canada’s Unknown Commandos George Kerr ost people interested in Canadian military (c) To inflict c a su a ltie s a n d dam age. Mhistory know about the elite first Special Service Battalion, formed in July 1942 as the Montgomery stressed the small-scale nature of Canadian element of the largely American First the proposed raids: “They are, in fact, patrols - Special Service Force.1 Few, however, have ever reconnoitering patrols and fighting patrols.” heard of Viking Force, Canada’s first attempt at Large-scale enterprises intended to cause creating an elite Commando unit in the Second significant destruction were not part of this World War. Viking Force does not appear in any policy: “such raids involve all three services, and Canadian Army Order of Battle, and did not even have certain repercussions, and they are planned last long enough for its members to put on the by GHQ.”3 unit’s horned-helmet shoulder patch, yet it played an important role in the sad story of the Monty’s outline raiding policy was, in other Dieppe fiasco. Acknowledgment of that role is words, based on the resources in men, materiel, long overdue. and expertise available to the forces in his South­ East Command, facing the Germans across the The creation of the Vikings was a response English Channel. His command, of course, to the political-military dilemmas facing the included the Canadian Corps forming in Britain, British and Canadian governments after the which would be given access to the training expulsion of Allied forces from the continent of facilities on the south coast, and to opportunities Europe in June 1940. The weakened for direct action on the other side of the Channel. Commonwealth forces had few means of Always eager to change the defensive mentality attacking the Germans directly, except for the of too many officers and men in his command, primitive and largely ineffectual raids by RAF Monty saw in a policy of small-scale raiding the Bomber Command on the German heartland. means of preparing his men for the realities of offensive action: “we live in a training In this situation of strategic near-impotence, atmosphere; we now see the first beginnings of the British government could do little in the short a policy which will help to fit our Army for term beyond authorizing small-scale raids on battle.”4 the coastlines of occupied Europe and training forces to carry them out.2 The aims of this Training for the kind of engagements raiding policy were described in a memorandum envisioned by Monty necessarily involved the to his commanders from Lieutenant-General Royal Navy, which presented its own problems: Bernard Montgomery on 1 November 1941. South-East Command was already training its Montgomery, then in command of British XII men in assault landing techniques at HMS Corps in south-east England, stated that: Northney, but lack of facilities - above all, of landing craft - meant that the parties of officers Initially, the objects of such raids, in order of and men sent to the Navy base received only priority, will be; about a week of instruction, and even that was (a) To bring back German prisoners, alive if frequently in subjects which would better have possible. been learned on dry land before making use of (b) To obtain information regarding the nature scarce naval resources.5 Monty’s memorandum of the enemy’s coastal defences. on raiding policy was a realistic but limited © Canadian Military History, Volume 9, Number 4, Autumn 2000, pp.26-34. 27 https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol9/iss4/3 2 Kerr: Viking Force The commanding officer of Viking Force, Major Brian McCool (left), along with some unidentified officers of his unit. program for an active, aggressive role for an opportunities fail to materialize in which the Army which had received a bloody nose at the officers and men of my command can match hands of the Germans, and which needed time, skill and courage against the enemy, the more resources, and a realistic syllabus of training to difficult it will be to m aintain in them the desired keenness and morale. hit back at its very professional enemy. I believe that occasions will increasingly present Early in 1942, the Acting Commander of the themselves for small raids across the Channel opposite the Army front...In default of a Canadian Corps, Lieutenant-General H.D.G. reputation built up in battle the Corps Crerar, shared the frustration of his British undoubtedly would receive great stimulus if, in colleagues in finding ways of hitting back at the the near future it succeeded in making a name Germans, and had the additional problem of for itself for its raiding activities - a reputation dealing with his own troops’ frustration with which, incidentally, it very definitely earned for itself in the last war.7 higher authorities’ refusal to allow Canadian troops to join other Commonwealth forces in the To this combination of appeals to political Middle East.6 A partial solution to the problem considerations, morale-building, and history, could be found in the commitment of Canadian Monty replied the following week in encouraging forces to raids on the continent. With his chief, terms, reminding Crerar of the continuing General A.G.L. McNaughton, on extended sick landing-craft shortage, diplomatically reassuring leave in Canada, Crerar took the initiative and him that “your men should be quite first class wrote Montgomery: I at raiding,” and giving him the green light to run Canadian raiding activities from the port of I am conversant with the reasons which have led to the continued retention of the Canadian Newhaven.8 Corps in the Home Forces and require no additional arguments to convince me that this Thus emboldened, Crerar held discussions policy has been the sound one to maintain. At on the Canadian Corps’ future role in cross­ the same time...as the months go by and Channel raids with Montgomery and with the Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2000 3 Canadian Military History, Vol. 9 [2000], Iss. 4, Art. 3 deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff headquarters and passed on verbal instructions [DCIGS], General Archibald Nye, before meeting from his superiors to the Division’s Acting with the CIGS himself, General Alan Brooke.9 commander, Brigadier Hamilton Roberts, and These conversations led to two meetings on 6 his GSO 1, Lieutenant-Colonel Churchill Mann, March 1942 with the Director of Combined to the effect that organization of the force was to O perations [DCO], Lord Louis M ountbatten, the begin immediately and that it should be as DCIGS, and other high-ranking officers involved representative of the 2nd Division as possible.11 in the growing area of combined operations. Crerar’s presentation at the first meeting, Within a fortnight, 267 volunteers from the minuted by his Brigadier-General (Staff) [BGS], Division were training at Seaford in the muddy Guy Simonds, was essentially a recapitulation estuary of the Cuckmere River in Sussex. The of his letter to General Montgomery. The DCO Vikings’ organization was essentially that of a was initially reluctant to employ a Canadian force British Commando, albeit on a smaller scale. because it would “dilute” the role of the The Detachment HQ Section was headed by an Commandos, who were, according to an officer with the rank of major, and comprised agreement with the Commander-in-Chief Home 24 officers and ORs. A further 36 officers and Forces, to have a monopoly on raiding. men staffed Intelligence, Signals, and Medical Mountbatten was nothing if not acutely tuned to Sections. The remaining 130 were divided into the political issues involved in every military two troops, each consisting of five officers and organization and operation, and agreed to make 60 men. Personal equipment reflected the nature an exception for a purely Canadian force. of the tasks undertaken by Commandos: oilskin Significantly, he also voiced his opinion “that very coats and sou’westers, Mae West lifejackets, wire small raiding parties were useless, and that the cutters, blued torches, toggle ropes, and scaling minimum strength should not be less than 100 ladders. The Vikings, like their British and preferably stronger.” Mountbatten then laid exemplars, placed heavy emphasis on firepower: out two conditions for the Canadians to meet: in addition to the standard .303 Lee-Enfields, each troop carried four Bren light machine guns (a) That ample time should be allowed for proper and eight Thompson sub-machine guns, as well organization and training - this was stated to be as two anti-tank rifles and a two-inch mortar. six to eight weeks. Additional support could be provided by HQ (b) That the enterprise should be known only to Detachment’s three-inch mortar.12 the Corps Comd and B.G.S.