UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Evidence Number Name E23 Pagoda PR E24 Paul Flynn MP E25 PCRC (Political and Constitutional Reform Committee) E26 PLMR (Political Lobbying and Media Relations Ltd) E27 Political Intelligence E28 PRCA (Public Relations Consultants Association) E29 Ranelagh International Ltd E30 Rowan Public Affairs E31 (SPA) Society of Parliamentary Agents E32 (TPA) TaxPayers’ Alliance E33 Transparency International UK E34 UKPAC E35 Unlock Democracy E36 William Dinan and David Miller UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED E23: Pagoda PR 1. Is there any reason to think that lobbying per se is a problem; and is there any evidence that abuse of lobbying is widespread or systemic, as opposed to exceptional behaviour by a few? Not in itself, although recent evidence would indicate that some parliamentarians may be susceptible to influence on the basis of inappropriate inducements. This does, as the paper suggests, damage the reputation of lobbying and parliamentary engagement more widely. In this respect, there is a risk that efforts to encourage more lobbying/campaigning from wider sections of society – especially young people – are undermined. We need to proactively promote the positive achievements of lobbying if we are to secure the confidence and participation of the next generation, who will otherwise view Parliament with cynicism. Politicians could do more to say when they have been persuaded by well run, well evidenced and transparent lobbying campaigns. 2. How wide should the definition of lobbying be? What activities should be excluded from the definition? This is extremely difficult because the current definitions rely on determining an attempt to ‘influence’. In many cases such intent is very difficult to determine. The engagement may often have been initiated by the politicians with the intention on influencing the other party. It may be part of a process of ‘good practice stakeholder engagement’ which companies are encouraged to pursue with only very general ‘reputational objectives’. Most effective lobbying involves networks of third party advocates, social and traditional media commentators where it is not clear who initiated the lobbying (indeed several may typically try to claim the credit in the twittersphere) 3. Is the proposed legislation for a Statutory Register of lobbyists likely to be sufficient to address the problem; and are the Political and Constitutional Reform Committee’s proposals[1] (wider registration, disclosure of issues and enhanced Ministerial disclosure) necessary, either as an interim measure or longer term? No, recent events have suggested that further regulation of members’ interests and disclosure is required. Ultimately public opinion will probably only be satisfied if measures go beyond disclosure to outlawing non-exec and paid advisory roles. 4. To what extent should the focus of finding a solution to the problems around lobbying be on those that are likely to be lobbied rather than those who do the lobbying? Ultimately, the solution will lie more with the lobbied. However, the PR and lobbying industry still needs to do much more to raise standards and enforce codes. 5. Do you consider that the existing rules are sufficient? If not how should they be changed? With members of parliament, disclosure needs to give way to outlawing potential conflicts. Where lobbyists have been involved in actions in which MPs have committed an offence (e,g. through the receipt of inducements) surely there is an opportunity to use charges such as ‘conspiracy to commit misconduct in public office’ in respect of the lobbyist.. [1] See further paragraph 9 below. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 6. Do you think it is a good idea to have a code of conduct or guidance directly applicable to any individual or organisation that is lobbied? If so, what are the main elements that should be included in any code of conduct or guidance and how could it be enforced? The first issue is whether they are being lobbied directly. If so there is a need to record meetings and any direct communication for purposes of transparency. However, if the pressure of influence is being brought to bear through third parties, social media etc, the person being lobbied may not know who is doing the lobbying and who is being paid to advise. These cases where there is no direct contact would be very hard to regulate. 7. Is there a case for establishing an external regulator for lobbying or are existing oversight mechanisms sufficient? Would suggest that CSPL adopts this role rather than adding further bodies 8. Do you agree that some form of sanctioning is a necessity? What form could it take? Clearly breaches of parliamentary rules require sanction and lobbyists or anyone else aiding and abetting such breaches should be punished 9. Do you think an outcome which relies on individuals who are lobbied taking proactive personal responsibility for being transparent in dealings with lobbyists is desirable and feasible? Yes a. If not, what are the impediments stopping such a process? b. How could it be monitored properly without leading to an increase in bureaucracy? At the moment secret dealings only come to light through ‘media stings’. It needs to be clear that any lobbyist (or indeed any party) that conspires with a parliamentarian to breach rules should themselves be liable for prosecution. 10. What should an individual do to ensure that he/she is aware of the dangers of potential conflicts of interest? Perhaps there should be an opportunity for an MP to offer information to the Parliamentary Standards Commissioner for review if they are unclear as to potential conflicts 11. Would enhanced disclosure by individuals and organisations provide the pertinent information on who is lobbying whom and sufficient incentive for decision makers and legislators to be balanced in the views they seek? Would this taken together with the Freedom of Information regime ensure sufficient transparency and accountability to enable effective public scrutiny of lobbying? Done well – yes Ian Coldwell Managing Director, Pagoda PR UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED E24: Paul Flynn MP Lobbying is omnipresent in Parliament. It’s the lubricant that eases policy and decision-making at all levels in partial ways that subvert the public interest. MPs are stalked, badgered, hunted and nagged by vested interests with bottomless pockets. It’s an infestation that reaches all areas of parliamentary work. Apart from party conferences, approaches to persuade MPs rarely come directly from lobbyists. The processes are subtle and usually aim to be invisible. Constituents’ letters are crafted, select committee witnesses are trained and rehearsed, all party parliamentary groups are subverted and their reports written, lobbyists arrange foreign trips, surreptitiously. There was widespread support for David Cameron’s call for reform in March 2010. Nothing has improved since then. The evidence of several stings by the media proves the eagerness of parliamentarians in both houses to work with the lobbying industry. Four Lords agreed in a sting to legislate for cash. On the Dispatches programme a string of ex-ministers offered to prostitute their influence, time and contacts for money. The influence of endemic lobbying is growing. No new controls have been introduced and there is new permissiveness. Adviser on Ministerial Interests The role of the Adviser on Ministerial Interests has been downgraded with the resignation of Sir Philip Mawer. He was replaced by Sir Alex Allan, an individual whose appointment was unanimously opposed by the Public Administration Select Committee (PASC). There was no legitimate inquiry into the Fox-Werritty affair even though it was the most egregious example of the potential power of lobbying to subvert Government policy. The introduction of the office of Independent Adviser on Ministerial Interests was a major advance in the scrutiny of Ministers and a bulwark against unaccountable lobbying. The previous government introduced this reform. The Adviser, Sir Philip Mawer, investigated one Minister Shahid Malik. This was done entirely independently of the Prime Minister and the civil service. Sir Philip Mawer told PASC he believed he should have been called to investigate the case of Liam Fox MP and Adam Werritty. He said he disagreed with the matter being decided by the Head of the Civil Service, Sir Gus O’Donnell. The excuse offered was that Sir Gus could deal with the issue speedily. This was political expediency to avoid the embarrassment of a lingering scandal. Liam Fox’s resignation was a key factor. It was absolution by resignation. There was no thorough probe into the conduct of the former Defence Secretary and the very serious allegations that his adviser was sponsored by American interests. The need for a strong and independent examiner of alleged breaches of the Ministerial Code was a recurring concern for PASC in the 1997-2001, 2001-2005 and 2005-2010 Parliaments. The Committee on Standards in Public Life (CSPL) recommended the establishment of a post of independent adviser on Ministers' interests in its 9th Report, published in 2003. UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED A PASC report in May 2008 warned that it would be difficult to command public confidence in the role of independent adviser "if the Prime Minister can decide that prima facie breaches of the Code will not be investigated". PASC therefore called for the independent adviser to have the power to instigate his own investigations in its report Investigating the Conduct of Ministers. This Report also recommended greater distance between the independent adviser on Ministers' interests and the Cabinet Office, and called for the holder to be appointed through a transparent open competition and subject to a pre-appointment hearing by a parliamentary select committee. These conclusions were not accepted in the Government's response. The extent of the lobbying of a special adviser to Culture Secretary Jeremy Hunt was a surprise. It included over 500 emails and persistent invitations from a lobbyist seeking to influence the decision on BSkyB.