International Journal of Business, Humanities and Technology Vol. 9, No. 3, September2019 doi:10.30845/ijbht.v9n3p3 Business Ethics and Artificial Intelligence: Towards the Underlying Concept of Man Dr. Claudius Mandel FOM – Hochschulefür Oekonomie und Management University of Cologne, Professional Center Germany Abstract Artificial Intelligence (AI) and its social implications are a key challenge of the contemporary world. This includes ethical and anthropological issues. Dealing with these issues asks for an interdisciplinary discourse - for example with philosophers, economists, and engineering scientists. The most important position among those who advocate AI development is 'trans-humanism'. In the following essay, the motives and arguments of this position and particularly its anthropological concept are analyzed and critically evaluated from a variety of perspectives, including ethics and business economics. Keywords: business ethics, business economics, Artificial Intelligence, transhumanism, concept of man, singularitarianism, technological singularity 1. Business ethics and Artificial Intelligence The reflection of ethical principles in the context of economic action can be traced back in the history of ideas and theory to the unity of ethics, politics and economy by Aristotle. Since the emancipation of economics from late medieval moral philosophy in the 19th century, however, ethics and economics have long been in a disciplinary disproportion - an economic rationality oriented towards efficiency and self-interest versus the question of a good life in the sense of correct interpersonal action. For several decades, however, interest in business ethics has been revived: the increasing destruction of the environment, growing inequality of distribution, and not least tasks in the context of global digitization raise the question of the normative foundations of economic activity. The situation-specific application of ethical principles to new social developments and life situations takes place within the framework of applied ethics. From a technological point of view, the central social development of the present can be summed up by the term Artificial Intelligence, i.e. the automation of intelligent behavior in the context of machine learning. From an ethical perspective, on the one hand it can be asked on a practical level whether and if so on which ethical concepts relevant statements of certain companies active in the field of Artificial Intelligence are based and what purpose they pursue. On this basis, the practical behavior of these relevant actors could then be analyzed and evaluated from an ethical point of view. On the other hand, it is also worth taking a look at a theoretical level that examines the topic of Artificial Intelligence, for example with its anthropological basic assumptions: When dealing with the topic of Artificial Intelligence in the economic context, it seems clear that this object of investigation is interwoven with fundamental anthropological questions. A sketchy discussion of the following questions addressed in this paper can provide a critical view of the anthropological and ethical assumptions in the current debate on Artificial Intelligence: Which concept of man expresses the endeavor to perfect artificially intelligent machine behavior? Which (psychoanalytical) motives can be responsible for favoring such a concept of man? How can this concept of man be critically considered and evaluated from an ethical perspective? 2. Artificial Intelligence and Transhumanism: Man and Machine Transhumanism can be identified as the philosophical line of thought that seeks to expand the limits of human possibilities through the use of technological processes - especially intellectually, but also physically or psychologically. Among the various transhumanist currents, singularitarianism is closely linked to developments in Artificial Intelligence. The representatives of singularitarianism proceed from the assumption that the state of so-called technological singularity will soon occur. This can be understood as a point in time at which machines rapidly improve themselves by means of Artificial Intelligence and thus accelerate technical progress to such an extent that the duration of human life expectancy can be significantly increased or even biological immortality achieved. The most prominent current representative of this way of thinking of transhumanism is Raymond Kurzweil, Director of Engineering at Google: Kurzweil thinks man as an information-processing intelligence that is still bound to a biological shell, but will soon become potentially immortal as an electronic platform (cf. Kurzweil 2006). 18 ISSN 2162-1357 (Print), 2162-1381 (Online) ©Center for Promoting Ideas, USA www.ijbhtnet.com However, interweaving questions of Artificial Intelligence with fundamental anthropological considerations is not new. The German philosopher, cultural anthropologist and psychoanalytical media theorist Dietmar Kamper already drew this connection in the 1980s. He formulated theses that could serve the current discussion on the one hand as a philosophical anthropological foundation for dealing with Artificial Intelligence. On the other hand, these considerations have the potential to serve as a guideline for answering questions about motives for the emergence of transhumanist currents and, building on this, as an orientation aid for the current topic-specific ethical discussion. For these reasons, Kampers' thoughts in this essay - in the sense of a Grounded Theory approach - are to be re-updated in order to make them suitable for connection as a contribution to the current field of discussion on Artificial Intelligence, anthropology and ethics. Kamper'sopen anthropology possesses its nucleus in the conviction that it cannot answer the question of man conceptually - insofar as this is to be understood as a definitory determination (genus proximum and differentia specifica) to be made once and for all. Rather, Kamper would like to explore central traces of social change. For the author this means the following: "Instead of the border to the animal, the transition to the machine seems to be the problem of contemporary anthropology". (Kamper 1988, p. 82, own translation). Following this basic thesis, Kamper no longer wants to consider man in a definitive demarcation to the animal, but in a hypothetically gliding, transitional scenario that blurs all boundaries: This consideration means a redefinition of man at the interface of the 20th to the 21st century, which is supposed to do justice to the third industrial revolution, the digitalization and computerization of the world, as the central historical-social developmental step in technical terms: With the formula "deus qua machina" (Kamper 1988a, p. 82, own translation) Kamper describes man already in 1988 as the future constructor of an intellectually intended exposed machine being, which makes itself superfluous in a certain way in the operation of a perfection of artificially intelligent machine behavior. These remarks by Kampers are, it can be worked out, based on two mutually converging approaches, which finally lead to the special proposal of Kampers for an adequate determination of the contemporary human being. As far as the strategy of demarcation from the animal, which has meanwhile been classified as obsolete, is concerned, these considerations follow Gernot Boehme's explanations in his Anthropologie in pragmatischerHinsicht (anthropology in a pragmatic way) (cf. Kamper 1988, p. 85 f.): Boehme concedes that nowadays a certain calmness has occurred towards animals (cf. Böhme 1985, p. 238), with the consequence that it is no longer important to have to distinguish oneself from it in order to determine oneself. As a reason for this Böhme puts the circumstance into question that mankind in the course of evolutionary history had actually achieved the desired superiority over animals, which makes a theoretical discussion of differences superfluous. In contrast to Kamper, Boehme positions his concept of a sovereign humanbeing who can love, work and integrate events into his own self-understanding as a counterproposal, whereby one of his main sources for this is again identical with that which Kamper conjures up for his reversal of the strategy of deposition from the animal (cf. Kamper 1988, p. 86): Arnold Gehlen's conception of man as a being of defects (Mängelwesen) is mentioned here. In the course of this determination - in reaction to the organic unspecialization of humans - it depends on one's own effort, on substituting and overcoming human insufficiency and weakness, on the design of a world that goes beyond humans. In this respect, a strategy of demarcation from the animal appears to be a secondary problem, almost banal (cf. Gehlen 1963 and 1974). For Kamper here, feeling committed to the social change of his time, a different approach is now necessary. He wants to read and interpret the transformation of natural deficiencies into artificial strengths as a special case of a worldwide machinization of the human mind. Consequently, it is not mechanics and not electrification, but computerization that provides the model of an inevitable human transgression. (cf. Kamper 1988, p. 86; cf. Kamper 1995, p. 183). It is important for Kamper to note that this consideration exceeds those approaches which attribute to man a striving for organ lengthening by means of technology; here, for example, Freud's understanding of a prosthetic god would have to be taken