Thinking About Libya, the Responsibility to Protect and Regime Change: A “Lessons Learned” Discussion Paper Robin Collins October, 2011 This discussion paper on the application of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine in Libya is intended to stimulate dialogue among members of the World Federalist Movement – Canada (WFMC) and other R2P advocates. We begin with the assumption that there was a real need for the international community to respond to the threats and behaviour of the Libyan government of Moammar Gaddafi. In the circumstances, the UN Security Council resolutions that followed Gaddafi‘s actions, resolutions 1970 and 1973, and then resolution 2009 which recognized the National Transitional Council after the fall of Gaddafi, were appropriate responses to the crisis. There was explicit reference to a responsibility to protect civilians and civilian areas. The International Criminal Court was referenced (in resolutions 1970, 1973 and 2009). There was demand for a ceasefire, to diplomatic channels being opened, to dialogue towards political reform (resolution1973), and to an arms embargo and freezing of assets. In resolution 1973 “all necessary measures” were authorized, as was a no-fly zone to protect Libyan civilians, including those in Benghazi. However, there were many rough edges and a fair amount of (intended?) ambiguity. These topics are important to explore so that we are clear about where mandates were followed, or violated. Our goal is to strengthen the R2P doctrine so that it becomes a reliable new normative framework for future international diplomacy and protection of civilians. The experience of application in Libya will impact future efforts by the United Nations to invoke R2P. Therefore it is important that we “get it right” to the degree possible. Was there a need for an international response? On February 26, 2011, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) stated in resolution 1970 that “widespread and systematic attacks currently taking place in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya against the civilian population may amount to crimes against humanity.” The resolution referred to “incitement to hostility and violence against the civilian population made from the highest level of the Libyan government.” There was condemnation, it noted, from the Arab League, African Union, and the Secretary General of the Organization of the Islamic Conference. The Security Council itself voted unanimously in support of Resolution 1970 (15-0-0). Estimates vary widely but there is some basic agreement that at least several hundred (the lowest estimate) if not a couple of thousand civilians died in the early months of 2011 at the hands of the Gaddafi regime, preceding the UNSC resolution 1973 of March 17. That resolution in effect authorized military action, as necessary. The vote was passed, with five abstentions (10-0-5). Ten Security Council members voted in the affirmative (Bosnia and Herzegovina, Colombia, Gabon, Lebanon, Nigeria, Portugal, South Africa, and permanent members 1 France, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Five (Brazil, Germany, and India, and permanent members China and Russia) abstained, with none opposed. There is little disagreement about whether there was a need for some response to a crisis in Benghazi. The initial Security Council resolution 1970 was unanimous; although it did not specifically authorize the use of military force, it referenced Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. In other words, there was near consensus – twice – that the level of violence targeting civilians by the Libyan government was high – high enough and extensive enough to justify an International Criminal Court investigation. There were documented attacks on civilians on a large scale. A low estimate of casualties might be what Lebanon stated in its explanation of vote for Resolution 1973.1 Lebanon referred to “hundreds of victims dying and thousands displaced. Faced with those risks and the great danger of those crimes, the United Nations had acted earlier, but Colonel Qadhafi had not heeded those actions.” The June 13 statement issued by WFMC supported the application of R2P principles to the crisis in Libya. The Libyan crisis developed directly from generally peaceful protests against the Gaddafi government beginning early in 2011 and was similar in scope and purpose to protests that took place in Tunisia and Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world. While the Libya activities were part of the “Arab Spring” events, they met with a violent backlash from the Gaddafi government. However, there were also violent backlashes in several other Arab states, including Yemen, Bahrain and Syria. WFMC pointed out in June that the engagement of the international community in Libya was a genuine application of R2P. We recognized that Responsibility to Protect was an emerging political doctrine. We had concerns about the ambiguity and permissive language of some parts of UN resolution 1973, which contained potential for abuse. However, the U.N. reference to R2P was unambiguous. R2P was explicitly mentioned2 in both UN Security Council resolutions 1970 (February 26) and 1973 (March 17) but not in the more recent UNSC Resolution 2009 (September 16).3 The Libyan-NTC representative did refer to R2P in his comments at the time when resolution 2009 was adopted. WFM - Canada acknowledged in our June statement that there could be a rough road ahead in the application of R2P to Libya; and we made clear that even with our own best hopes and international community’s best intentions, “some governments also fear that this new norm compromises traditional notions of sovereignty and will be used in future 1 Full casualty estimates, February - present day: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties_of_the_2011_Libyan_civil_war 2 “Recalling the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to protect its population...” (Second page of preamble, UNSC Resolution 1970 (2011)) 3 SC Resolution 2009 of September 16, 2011 does not refer to R2P but recognizes the National Transitional Council as the interim replacement representatives for Libya and authorizes the creation of a UN support mission (UNSMIL). There was unanimous SC support for this resolution: 15-0-00. There was reference to R2P in the explanation of vote section of the UN news release. http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2011/sc10389.doc.htm 2 by powerful governments to intervene unjustly in the internal affairs of weaker states.” This wariness towards a bad precedent being set was always in the background, and when the operation became controversial, which was quite early on, it was not surprising that a variety of critiques would surface. Nonetheless, there was all-party support in Canada on March 21, 2011 for UNSC Resolution 1973 demanding an “immediate establishment of a cease-fire and a complete end to violence and all attacks against, and abuses of, civilians;” and authorizing a No Fly Zone, and “all necessary measures” to “protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack…” Canada’s follow-up vote in June to extend the mission another three months won support from all parties, except for the leader of the Green Party. In June the New Democratic Party (NDP) qualified their support by indicating that they would not support continuance of the military mission at the end of another three months. The September 23 majority vote in the Canadian House of Commons supported “an extension of up to three months of the involvement of the Canadian Armed Forces operating with NATO in accordance with the legal mandate from the UNSC Resolution 1973…” The vote was 189-98 with support from the Conservatives, Liberals and Bloc Québecois, but not from the NDP or Green Party leader. Was the NATO operation justified? Was it authorized by the United Nations? There was sufficient evidence of large-scale human rights abuses and potential for war crimes. With the application of the responsibility to protect the objective is not to wait until it is too late. The Security Council, with no vetoes, approved an operation and included authority for all necessary measures, and a no fly zone, etc. There had been at least one precedent within the Security Council by which an abstention by a permanent member of the Security Council would still give a “green light” for a resolution in the absence of unanimity, and thus the Russia and China abstentions were equivalent to “nods of consent” for others to proceed. (During the first Gulf War, for instance, China abstained but military action proceeded, based on UN Security Council resolution 678 (1990)4. Thus, after 1990 it was well understood that an abstention by a permanent member of the Security Council could not block the required consensus.) UNSC resolution 1973 was vague in its language, perhaps too permissive and ambiguous. If the meaning of “all necessary measures” wasn’t unclear, it was at least open-ended. Political control and oversight over military operations was not obviously in the hands of the Security Council. Guidelines affecting rules of engagement, were not specified in the resolution. Member states implementing the resolution were obliged only to “inform” the Secretary-General of the measures they took. Similarly the Internatonal Contact Group for Libya5 (later, the “Friends of Libya”) an ad hoc group of states implementing the 4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_678 5 The Libya Contact Group was comprised of 28 country members and 16 observers, 6 international organizations (including the UN) and 2 observer organizations (including the African Union). See also: “New Libya contact group to meet in Qatar”, Aljazeera, March 29, 2011 (viewable on the web.) 3 resolution moved quickly to support the rebel side in the civil war. There were many questions about why no ceasefire was seriously pursued once offered by Gadaffi, and why diplomatic channels were not explored more exhaustively. There was no assurance that a ceasefire or the diplomacy track would have been successful, but in the eyes of many, both options seemed to be pulled from the table too quickly.